Phenomenology and the recent Philosophy of

the Image

Roberto Rubio
Universidad Alberto Hurtado (Chile)
The debate within the Philosophy of the Image
about the status of the image

Focus: exhibitory images (darstellende Bilder)

visible surfaces in which something
appears that is not actually in
persona
 General structure of the debate
(according to L. Wiesing)

Semiotic approach Structure of the exhibition Phenomenological approach

The significant aspect of the That what exhibits something Image-thing (Bild-Ding)
sign (Das Darstellende)
Meaning The exhibition as such (Die Image-object (Bild-Objekt)
Darstellung als solches)
Reference That what is exhibited (Das Image-Sujet (Bild-Sujet)
Dargestellte)
At the core of the debate is the exhibition as such
(according to L. Wiesing)

Semiotic approach Phenomenological approach

Exhibition Meaning Artificial presence
The object is exhibited The imaginary object appears
through meaning in presence
Back to Husserl

The image-consciousness is not simple.

It articulates three intentionalities:
• The intentionality towards the perceptual thing before
me (Bild-Ding)
• The intentionality towards the imaginary object (Bild-
Objekt)
• The intentionality towards the sujet (Bild-Sujet)
Husserl

The image-consciousness depends on the perception

in at least two ways:
• The experience of the imaginary object is based on
the appearing of the Bild-Ding
• The image-consciousness tends teleologically
towards the perception of the Sujet
 The Husserlian Phenomenology of the image
It offers an intuitionistic approach
Image-consciousness is not perception, but a kind of
intuition
These approach can be understood as a weak
perceptualism
Image-consciousness ist not perception, but is
based on perception
 My critique of Wiesing’s view
Wiesing highlights the appearing of the imaginary object (the so called “artificial
presence” of the imaginary object).

In doing so, he neglects the connection between Bildobjekt and Bildsujet.

He seems to forget that the appearing of the Bildobjekt is the way in which the
Bildsujet appears (Vergegenwärtigung of Bildsujet).

Against Wiesing: the proper object (Gegenstand) of the image-consciousness is the

Bildsujet – not the “artificially present” Bildobjekt.
Questions for further development

Wiesing describes the reference to object through meaning on the one

hand and the artificial presence of the imaginary object on the another
hand as opposite ways to understand the proper function exhibitory
images. Is the opposition strategy right?

I think it is not right. I would like to claim that there is an exhibitory

function of images in originary sense, that is the production both of
meaning and presence of the sujet.