CASETITLE

The Devastating Fire That Engulfed The

ONGCMumbai High North Platform

Presentation to Dr.BalaSubramanian , Faculty HSE

Presented by,

Jas Desai (15BPE025) & Pushkar Devle (15BPE026)

HSEForetalk
(w.r.t the Case)

@
OILAND NATURALGASCORPORATIONLIMITED
HSEManagement System in ONGC

 Is top driven efficient

 Effective and vibrant management system.

 Top management is committed for maintaining highest HSE standards

 HSE Committee Board comprises of members of Board from ONGC including

representative from Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas.

 A dedicated HSE website has been developed for creating awareness among
company employees

 ONGC has Institute of Petroleum Safety Health and Environment Management

(IPSHEM) the nodal institute which deals with all HSE related trainings
 ONGCHSEPolicy

 We are committed to maintain highest standards ofOccupational health,

safety and environment protection.

 We shall comply with all applicable codes and requirements topromote

occupational health, safety and environment protection.

 We shall be always alert, equipped and ready to respond to emergencies.

 We shall take all actions necessary to protect the integrity of the system
in order to avoid accidental release of hazardous substances.

 We shall enhance awareness and involvement in promotion of occupational

health, safety and environment protection wherever we work andreside.
4 PHASEANALYSISOFTHECASE

1. Introduction: Mumbai High North

2. The Accident

3. Aftermath (Key Safety Issues)

4. Conclusion
 Introduction

MUMBAI HIGH North

•Discovered in 1974
•160km west of the
Mumbai coast.
 MHW is a relatively recent
additional processplatform.

MHN is a processing platform

(1981)

MHF is residential (1978)

NA is a small wellhead platform,

circa 1976 (first offshore well in
India).
 Introduction

• The complex imported fluids from 11 other satellite wellhead platforms

and exported oil to shore via undersea pipelines, as well as processinggas
for gas lift operations.
• The seven-storey high Mumbai High North (MHN) platform had five gas
export risers and ten fluid import risers situated outside the platform
jacket.
• In July 2005, a multi-purpose support vessel (MSV) collided with the MHN
platform, severing at least one gas riser and causing a massive fire which
destroyed the MHN platform within two hours.
• Weather=Monsoon
 Location: Mumbai offshore,India
FireEvent: 27 July2005
Avessel collided with the offshore Mumbai High North platform,
160 km west of the Mumbai coast, causing a major fire,
completely destroying the platform and resulting in 11deaths
and 11 othersmissing.
Fire duration = 2 hours

FireDamage: Complete collapse of the platform

ConstructionType: Steel

FireResistance: No informationavailable

Function: Oil and natural gasprocessingplatform

Dimensions: 7 storeys
 The Accident
• The fire occurred on 27 July 2005 - a
multi- purpose support vessel MSV: Samundra Suraksha
(MSV), Samundra Suraksha,100m
long, hit one of the MHN platform
risers.
• Vessel owned by ONGCbut operated
and maintained by another
nationalised company, the Shipping
Company of India (SCI).
• Vessel working elsewhere in the
field, supporting saturation diving
operations. Cook cut off the tipsof
two fingers, and transfer soughtto
MHN complex for medical
treatment.
• Monsoon meant that nohelicopters
were available, so the vessel came
alongside MHN to affect a man-
riding basket transfer.
 The Accident
• Leeward crane on MHN was not working, so vessel came onto the
windward side (wind 35 knots, swell 5 metres, sea current 3knots).

• Problems with azimuth thrusters – came alongside under manual (joy

stick) control in emergency mode, stern first. The casualty wastransferred
off the deck bycrane

• The vessel experienced a strong heave, and the helideck struck the risers
(export gaslift).

• The resulting leak ignited very quickly afterwards. The resulting fire
engulfed virtually all of MHN and MHF, with NAand the Noble rig severely
affected by heat radiation.
 Rescue Operations

• 22 people died. 362 were rescued over next fifteenhours.

• The fire significantly affected rescue, with only two out of the eight
complex lifeboats able to be launched, and only one out of ten life rafts.
Similarly, only half of the NCY’s rescue craftcould be launched.

• Rescue exacerbated by the monsoon conditions. Mumbai, sono

helicopters could take off fromland.

• Six divers in saturation chamber on vessel rescued 36 hours later. Samudra

Suraksha sunk four days afterwards.
Aftermath

Key safety management issues:

• Robustness of risk assessment process

• Poor Safety Culture
• Riser Issues
• Vessel Issues
Poor Safety Culture
• Serious doubts have been raised on the safety certification ofMHN

• Intervention of the higher management seems to be just ad hoc

• Seaworthiness of the MSV has been questioned as during the rescue

mission it was found that the vessel was working onemergency thrusters
as the manual thrusters were not working

• Rescue efforts have also been questioned

• Standard operating practices were not followed

• There was enough warning from external agencies but the management
appeared remise without enquiring further into the risk of riser ruptures.
Riser Issues
• The positioning of risers in relation to the platform structure
and loading zones
• The vulnerability to damage (even risers inside the jacket
structure may be at risk)
• The appropriateness of fendering/riser guards in relationto
the design of attendingvessels
• The inventory which is likely to be discharged if the riser fails
below its ESDV
• Risk management process
Vessel Issues
• Role of Safety Zone and vessels approaching the installation

• Collision Risk Management Principles

– Installation vulnerability
– Vessel suitability
– Crew competence
– Marine knowledge of Installation
– Communication
• Installation data cards, pre-entry checks, UKOOA“Guidelines for
Ship/Installation Collision Avoidance”.
• Quality of discussions, radios etc
Conclusion
Incident reinforces the need for
Thorough risk assessment of the potential causes and consequences
of riser damage

Development, implementation and maintenance of associatedrisk

management measures

Adoption of collision avoidance and protection measures which atleast

meet current good practice as described in UKOOA

Management arrangements to ensure that therisk management

measures are effective and observed in practise.