“SALIENT FEATURES OF THE

AGRICULTURAL LAND REFORM

CODE (REPUBLIC ACT 3844, AS
AMENDED) AND JUDICIAL
PRECEDENTS”

ATTY. JIM G. COLETO

Board Member III
DARAB
AGRICULTURAL TENANCY

- is the physical possession by a person of land

devoted to agriculture belonging to, or legally
possessed by another for the purpose of
production through the labor of the former and of
the members of his immediate farm household, in
consideration of which the former agrees to share
the harvest with the latter, or to pay a price
certain or ascertainable, either in produce or in
money, or in both. (RA 1199, as amended)
AGRICULTURAL LEASEHOLD/TENANCY VS. CIVIL
LAW LEASE

a) Subject Matter — agricultural leasehold is limited

to agricultural land; while a civil law lease may refer to rural or
urban property;
b) Attention and Cultivation — leasehold tenant
should personally attend to, and cultivate the agricultural land;
whereas the civil law lessee need not personally cultivate or work
the thing leased;
c) Purpose — In leasehold tenancy, the landholding is devoted
to agriculture; whereas in civil law lease, the purpose may be for
any other lawful pursuits;
d) Law governing the relationship — Civil law lease is governed
by the Civil Code, whereas leasehold tenancy is governed by
special law (RA 3844 as amended by RA 6389). (Gabriel vs.
Pangilinan, 58 SCRA 590 (1974)) (Jusayan vs. Sombilla, G.R. No.
163928, January 21, 2015)
ELEMENTS OF TENANCY
a) The parties are the landholder and the tenant;
b) The subject is agricultural land;
c) There is consent by the landholder for the tenant to work
on the land, given either orally or in writing, expressly or impliedly;
d) The purpose is agricultural production;
e) There is personal cultivation or with the help of the
immediate farm household; and
f) There is compensation in terms of payment of a fixed
amount in money and/or produce.
[Caballes vs. DAR, 168 SCRA 254 [1988]; Gabriel vs.
Pangilinan, 58 SCRA 590 (1974); Oarde vs. CA, 280 SCRA 235,
[1997]; Qua vs. CA, 198 SCRA 236 [1991],(Cornelio De Jesus, et.
al., vs. MOLDEX REALTY, INC., G.R. No. 153595, November 23,
2007.)
Tuazon vs. CA, 118 SCRA 484/Gelos VS. CA, 208
SCRA 608 (1992)

Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent

on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is
also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the
understanding when the farmer is installed, and as in this
case, their written agreements, provided these are
complied with and are not contrary to law, are even
more important.
MANUEL JUSAYAN, ALFREDO JUSAYAN, AND MICHAEL JUSAYAN, vs.
JORGE SOMBILLA (G.R. No. 163928, January 21, 2015)

The Court ruled that the relationship of the parties was one of agricultural
tenancy, due to the personal cultivation of the respondent and also the
payment of fixed rental. The Court also ruled that the RTC had jurisdiction
because at the time of the filing of the suit, the RTC was the successor of the
Court of Agrarian Relations, and it was only in 1987 when the DARAB was
established.

Cornes vs. Leal Realty, 560 SCRA 545

All requisites must concur to establish the existence of leasehold

relationship, and the absence of one or more requisites is fatal.
AGRICULTURAL LAND:
R.A. 3844

“Agricultural Land" means land devoted to any

growth, including but not limited to crop lands,
salt beds, fish ponds, idle land and abandoned
land as defined in paragraphs 18 and 19 of this
Section, respectively.

R.A. 6657
Agricultural Land refers to land devoted to
agricultural activity as defined in this Act
and not classified as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial or industrial land.
NATALIA REALTY, INC., AND ESTATE DEVELOPERS AND
INVESTORS CORP. vs. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM,
(G.R. No. 103302 August 12, 1993)

We now determine whether such lands are covered by the

CARL. Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall
"cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity
produced, all public and private agricultural lands." As to what
constitutes "agricultural land," it is referred to as "land devoted
to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as
mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land." 16The
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this
limitation. "Agricultural lands" are only those lands which are
"arable and suitable agricultural lands" and "do not include
commercial, industrial and residential lands.“
Since the NATALIA lands were converted prior to 15 June 1988,
respondent DAR is bound by such conversion. It was therefore
error to include the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills
Subdivision within the coverage of CARL.

Be that as it may, the Secretary of Justice, responding to a

query by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, noted in an
Opinion that lands covered by Presidential Proclamation No.
1637, inter alia, of which the NATALIA lands are part, having
been reserved for townsite purposes "to be developed as
human settlements by the proper land and housing agency,"
are "not deemed 'agricultural lands' within the meaning and
intent of Section 3 (c) of R.A. No. 6657. " Not being deemed
"agricultural lands," they are outside the coverage of CARL.”
CONSENT:

Just like any agreement, an agricultural leasehold contract

is perfected by mere consent, “by the meeting of the offer
and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which
are to constitute the contract.”(Art. 1319, New Civil Code)

Consent may be express or implied. This is confirmed by

Section 5 of Republic Act (RA) 3844, as amended, which
provides that:

“The agricultural leasehold relation shall be established by

operation of law in accordance with Section four of this
Code and, in other cases, either orally or in writing, expressly
or impliedly.
The consent of the landholder need not be given
wholeheartedly. His consent given reluctantly or out of pity
is sufficient to establish tenancy relationship.

By allowing the plaintiffs to cultivate the landholding in

question and in receiving the owner's share of the produce
defendant impliedly recognized the plaintiffs as tenants
and there arose between them implied contract of
tenancy. In the case of de la Cruz vs. Castro (CA-G.R. No.
47039-K, January 5, 1972) the Court of Appeals has held
that by allowing a person to cultivate the land and
accepting share or rental from him is an eloquent example
of implied consent (Maria Luisa Vda. De Donato vs. Court of
Appeals, Cresenciano Prado and Orlando de Guison, G.R.
No. L-61094, September 18, 1987).
CONSENT:
Consent by landholder
Consent must be given by the true and lawful
landholder of the property. In Hilario vs. IAC, 148
SCRA 573 (1987), the Supreme Court held that
tenancy relation does not exist where a usurper
cultivates the land.

Tiongson vs. Court of Appeals, 130 SCRA 482

Tenancy relationship can only be created with the

consent of the true and lawful landholder through
lawful means and not by imposition or usurpation.
So the mere cultivation of the land by a usurper
cannot confer upon him any legal right to work the
land as tenant and enjoy the security of tenure of
the law.
Victor G. Valencia vs. Court of Appeals, (G. R. No.
122363 - April 29, 2003)
Contrary to the impression of private respondents, Sec. 6 of R. A. No.
3844, as amended, does not automatically authorize a civil law lessee
to employ a tenant without the consent of the landowner. The lessee
must be so specifically authorized. For the right to hire a tenant is
basically a personal right of a landowner, except as may be
provided by law. But certainly nowhere in Sec. 6 does it say that a
civil law lessee of a landholding is automatically authorized to install a
tenant thereon. A different interpretation would create a perverse
and absurd situation where a person who wants to be a tenant, and
taking advantage of this perceived ambiguity in the law, asks a third
person to become a civil law lessee of the landowner. Incredibly, this
tenant would technically have a better right over the property than
the landowner himself. This tenant would then gain security of tenure,
and eventually become owner of the land by operation of law. This is
most unfair to the hapless and unsuspecting landowner who entered
into a civil law lease agreement in good faith only to realize later on
that he can no longer regain possession of his property due to the
installation of a tenant by the civil law lessee.
ANTONIO PAGARIGAN, vs. ANGELITA YAGUE and SHIRLEY ASUNCION (G.R.
No. 195203, April 20, 2015)

Petitioner Pagarigan occupied and tilled the land of the respondents

without their consent, and therefore, it cannot be implied that the mere
receipt of the harvest was proof of implied consent.

We have consistently held that occupancy and cultivation of an

agricultural land, no matter how long, wilt not ipso facto make one a de
jure tenant. Independent and concrete evidence is necessary to prove
personal cultivation, sharing and harvest, or consent of the landowner. We
emphasize that the presence of a tenancy relationship cannot be
presumed; the elements for its existence are explicit in law and cannot be
done away with mere conjectures. Leasehold relationship is not brought
about by the mere congruence of facts but, being a legal relationship,
the mutual will of the parties to that relationship should be primordial.
JESUS VELAQUEZ vs. SPOUSES PATERNO C. CRUZ and ROSARIO CRUZ (G.R.
No. 191479, September 21, 2015.)

The Sps. Cruz as the original landowners instituted Navarro as the tenant
but he gave up his rights in 1985. Shortly thereafter, they were surprised
that the son in law has taken over the property and refused to vacate
the same on the grounds that he was a tenant. The Court ruled against
tenancy saying that there was no consent and no sharing of harvests.

ISMAEL V. CRISOSTOMO vs. MARTIN P. VICTORIA (G.R. No. 175098, August

26, 2015)

The Court here held that tenant Hipolito could not institute another tenant
(Victoria) without the express consent of the landowner, despite the fact
that the landowner received rentals from Victoria as the latter was
deemed a mere agent of Hipolito. This case discussed at length the
difference of the factual situation herein with the case of Co versus
Intermediate Appellate Court where the legal possessors instituted a
tenant and the Court ruled that the same is binding upon the landowner
even if he does not know about it.
RICARDO V. QUINTOS vs. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFFORM
ADJUDICATION BOARD AND KANLURANG MINDORO FARMER’S
COOPERATIVE, INC (G.R. No. 185838, February 10, 2014.)

The property which included a mango orchard was sequestered by the

APT and one of the officers of the APT executed a lease agreement with
farmers for the maintenance of the mango farm. The Court ruled that since
the APT was not yet the owner of the property, then it could not create a
tenancy relationship.

In this relation, it bears stressing that the right to hire a tenant is

basically a personal right of a landowner, except as may be provided by
law. Hence, the consent of the landowner should be secured prior to the
installation of tenants. In the present case, the PARAD, the DARAB and
the CA all held that a tenancy relationship exists between GCFI and the
KAMIFCI members who were allegedly installed as tenants by APT, the
“legal possessor” of the mango orchard at the time. Records are,
however, bereft of any showing that APT was authorized by the property’s
landowner, GCFI, to install tenants thereon.
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
Caballes vs DAR, 168 SCRA 248,
Therefore, the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a
tenancy relationship. Certainly, it is not unusual for a landowner to
accept some of the produce of his land from someone who plants
certain crops thereon. This is a typical and laudable provinciano
trait of sharing or patikim, a native way of expressing gratitude for
favor received. This, however, does not automatically make the
tiller-sharer a tenant thereof specially when the area tilled is only
60, or even 500, square meters and located in an urban area and
in the heart of an industrial or commercial zone at that. Tenancy
status arises only if an occupant of a parcel of land has been
given its possession for the primary purpose of agricultural
production. The circumstances of this case indicate that the
private respondent’s status is more of a caretaker who was
allowed by the owner out of benevolence or compassion to live in
the premises and to have a garden of some sort at its
southwestern side rather than a tenant of the said portion.
PERSONAL CULTIVATION
DAR AO 5 (1993)
Under DAR AO 5 (1993), cultivation is not limited to the
plowing and harrowing of the land, but also the
husbanding of the ground to forward the products of the
earth by general industry, the taking care of the land and
fruits growing thereon, fencing of certain areas, and the
clearing thereof by gathering dried leaves and cutting of
grasses. In coconut lands, cultivation includes the clearing
of the landholding, the gathering of the coconuts, their
piling, husking and handling as well as the processing
thereof into copra, although at times with the aid of hired
laborers
MEANING OF PERSONAL CULTIVATION
“Personal Cultivation exists when a person cultivates the
landholding by himself and with the aid available from his
immediate farm household."
EXCEPTIONS TO PERSONAL CULTIVATION

SECTION 27 (2) OF R.A. 3844, AS AMENDED

The tenant may employ laborers in case of illness or

temporary incapacity, whose services shall be on his
(tenant) own account.
CASE: PEREZ-ROSARIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
(494 SCRA 66)

It does not follow that, if the tenant hires a farmworker to

do certain phases of farm work, then the tenant ceases
all cultivation. xxx In the recent past, the Court has held
that the employment of farm laborers to perform some
aspects of farm work does not preclude the existence of
an agricultural relationship provided that an agricultural
lessee does not leave the entire process of cultivation in
the hands of hired helpers. Indeed, while the law
explicitly requires the agricultural lessee and his
immediate family to work on the land, this Court
nevertheless has declared that the hiring of farm laborers
by the tenant on a temporary, occasional or emergency
basis does not negate the existence of the element of
personal cultivation essential in a tenancy or agricultural
leasehold relationship.
SHARING OF HARVESTS/PAYMENT OF LEASE
RENTALS

There must be other independent piece of evidence such

as receipts signed by the landowner acknowledging the
receipt of lease rentals from petitioner-appellant.
Reynaldo Bejasa and Erlinda Bejasa vs. Court of Appeals,
et. al., G.R. No. 108941, June 6, 2000.
EXCEPTION: In cases where the tenant and the landowner
are family members, the issuance of receipts by the
landowner is not the usual practice. (Vda. De Brigino vs.
Ramos, G.R. No. 130260, February 6, 2006)
 Bayani Bautista v. Patricia Araneta, GR No. 135829
February 22, 2000)
All the requisites of a tenancy relationship must exist
and the absence of one or more requisites do not
make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant as
distinguished from a de jure tenant. Unless a person
has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not
entitled to secure of tenure nor is he covered by the
Land Reform Program of the Government under
existing tenancy laws.

SECURITY OF TENURE

Section 7 of Republic Act 3844, as amended by

Republic Act 6389, to wit:
 The agricultural leasehold relation once established
shall confer upon the agricultural lessee the right to
continue working on the landholding until such
leasehold relation is extinguished. The agricultural
lessee shall be entitled to security of tenure on his
landholding and cannot be ejected unless
authorized by the Court for causes herein provided.

Security of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessee

which they value as life itself and deprivation of their
landholdings is tantamount to deprivation of their only means
of livelihood (BERNARDO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 168 SCRA
439).
SECTION 10, R.A. 3844, as amended

Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by

Expiration of Period, etc. — The agricultural leasehold relation
under this Code shall not be extinguished by mere expiration
of the term or period in a leasehold contract nor by the sale,
alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the
landholding. In case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates or
transfers the legal possession of the landholding, the
purchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the
rights and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural
lessor.
Tanpingco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, (207
SCRA 653)
Under Article 428 of the Civil Code, the owner has the right to dispose of
a thing without other limitation than those established by law. As an
incident of ownership, therefore, there is nothing to prevent the
landowner from donating his naked title to the land. However, the new
owner must respect the rights of the tenant. Section 7 of RA 3844, as
amended gives the agricultural lessee the right to work on the
landholding once the leasehold relationship is established. It also entitles
him to security of tenure on his landholding. He can only be ejected by
the court for cause. Time and again, this Court has guaranteed the
continuity and security of tenure of a tenant even in cases of a mere
transfer of possession. As elucidated in the case of Bernardo v. Court of
Appeals (168 SCRA 439 [1988]), security of tenure is a legal concession to
agricultural lessees, which they value as life itself and deprivation of their
landholdings is tantamount to deprivation of their only means of
livelihood. Also under Section 10 of the same Act, the law explicitly
provides that the leasehold relation is not extinguished by the alienation
or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding. The only instances
when agricultural leasehold relationship are found in Section 8, 28 and 35
of the Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines. The donation of the
land did not terminate the tenancy relationship. However, the donation
itself is valid.
RELUCIO III vs. MACARAEG, (G.R. No. 82007 May 30,
1989)
As aforestated, the questioned tenancy relationship started with
the original owner and persisted despite the change of
ownership. The act of subdividing the whole land into several
agricultural and residential lots between and among the heirs of
the original owner thereby resulting in a substantial change in
the boundaries of the lot awarded to private respondent
pursuant to Land Reform Law cannot be invoked by petitioners
to justify their claim that there is no tenancy relation between
petitioners and private respondent. The fact is that private
respondent is and has been a tenant of the Relucios since 1945.
The tenancy relationship was not affected by the transfer of the
ownership of the landholding, as the new owner assumes the
rights and obligations of the previous owner. Otherwise stated,
tenancy right attaches to the landholding regardless of whoever
may subsequently become the owner thereof. Furthermore,
under the Land Reform Code, tenants are entitled to the
enjoyment and possession of their landholdings except when
their dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a
judgment that is final and executory.
SECTION 23. Rights of Agricultural Lessee in
General.-It shall be the right of the agricultural
lessee:

(1) To have possession and peaceful enjoyment of

the land;
(2) To manage and work on the land in a manner and
method of cultivation and harvest which conform to
proven farm practices;
(3) To mechanize all or any phase of his farm work;
and
(4) To deal with millers and processors and attend to the
issuance of quedans and warehouse receipts for the
produce due him.
 SECTION 24. Right to a Home Lot. — The agricultural lessee
shall have the right to continue in the exclusive possession and
enjoyment of any home lot he may have occupied upon the
effectivity of this Code, which shall be considered as included in
the leasehold.

Section 26 (a) of Republic Act 1199, provides that:

(a) The landholder shall furnish the tenant an area of not less than
one thousand square meters where the latter may construct his
dwelling, raise vegetables, poultry, pigs, and other animals and
engage in minor industries, the products of which shall accrue to
the tenant exclusively.

One of the rights of an agricultural lessee is to be entitled to a

homelot. But only the tenant-lessee has this right and that the
members of the immediate family of the tenants are not entitled
to a homelot
CECILLEVILLE REALTY AND SERVICE CORPORATION
VS. COURT OF APPEALS (278 SCRA 819)

 Only a tenant is granted the right to have a home lot

and the right to construct a house thereon. And
here, the private respondent does not dispute that
he is not the petitioner’s tenant. In fact, he admits
that he is only a member of Ana Pascual’s
immediate farm household. Under the law, therefore,
we find private respondent not entitled to a home lot
Neither is he entitled to construct a house of his own or to
continue maintaining the same within the very small
landholding of the petitioner. xxx Thus, if the Court were
to follow private respondent’s argument and allow all the
members of the tenant’s immediate farm household to
construct and maintain their houses and to be entitled to
not more that 1,000 square meters each of home lot, as
what private respondent wanted this Court to dole out,
then farms will be virtually converted into rows, if not
colonies of houses.

SECTION 25. Right to be Indemnified for Labor. — The

agricultural lessee shall have the right to be indemnified
for the cost and expenses incurred in the cultivation,
planting or harvesting and other expenses incidental to
the improvement of his crop in case he surrenders or
abandons his landholding for just cause or is ejected
therefrom.
 In addition, he has the right to be indemnified for one-half of
the necessary and useful improvements made by him on
the landholding: Provided, That these improvements are
tangible and have not yet lost their utility at the time of
surrender and/or abandonment of the landholding, at
which time their value shall be determined for the purpose
of the indemnity for improvements.

Romeo T. Caluzor vs. Deogracias S. Llanillo,

et, al., (G.R. No. 155580, July 1, 2015)
In short, the de Jure tenant should allege and prove, firstly,
the cost and expenses incurred in the cultivation, planting
or harvesting and other expenses incidental to the
improvement of his crop; and, secondly, the necessary
and useful improvements made in cultivating the land.
Without the allegation and proof, the demand for
indemnity may be denied.
SECTION 8. Extinguishment of Agricultural Leasehold
Relation. — The agricultural leasehold relation
established under this Code shall be extinguished by:
(1) Abandonment of the landholding without the knowledge of
the agricultural lessor;
(2) Voluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural
lessee, written notice of which shall be served three months in
advance; or
(3) Absence of the persons under Section nine to succeed to
the lessee, in the event of death or permanent incapacity of the
lessee.
ABANDONMENT ( Teodoro vs. Macaraeg, 27 SCRA 7)
It was held that the world “abandon”, in its ordinary sense, means to
forsake entirely, to forsake or renounce utterly. “The emphasis is on the
finality and the publicity with which some thing or body is thus put in
the control of another, and hence the meaning of giving up
absolutely, with intent never again to resume or claim one’s rights or
interest.” In other words, the act of abandonment constitutes actual,
absolute, and irrevocable desertion of one’s right or property. Xxx
Likewise, failure to cultivate the land by reason of the forcible
prohibition to do so by a third party cannot also amount to
abandonment, for abandonment presupposes free ill.”
VOLUNTARY SURRENDER (Nisnisan, et. Al., vs. Court of
Appeals, 294 SCRA 173)
Under Sec. 8, RA of 3844, as amended, voluntary surrender,
as mode extinguishing agricultural leasehold tenancy
relations, must be convincingly and sufficiently proved by
competent evidence. The tenants’ intention to surrender the
landholding cannot be presumed, much less determined by
mere implication.

EFFECT OF DEATH OR PERMANENT INCAPACITY

OF THE TENANT
SECTION 9. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished
by Death or Incapacity of the Parties. — In case of death or
permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessee to work his
landholding, the leasehold shall continue between the
agricultural lessor and the person who can cultivate the
landholding personally, chosen by the agricultural lessor
within one month from such death or permanent incapacity,
from among the following:
 (a) the surviving spouse; (b) the eldest direct descendant by
consanguinity; or (c) the next eldest descendant or descendants
in the order of their age: Provided, That in case the death or
permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessee occurs during the
agricultural year, such choice shall be exercised at the end of that
agricultural year: Provided, further, That in the event the
agricultural lessor fails to exercise his choice within the periods
herein provided, the priority shall be in accordance with the order
herein established.
In case of death or permanent incapacity of the agricultural
lessor, the leasehold shall bind his legal heirs.
NICORP MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs.
LEONIDA DE LEON, (G.R. No. 176942, August 28, 2008); SALVADOR LIM
vs. LEONIDA DE LEON, (G.R. No. 177125, August 28, 2008)
A direct ascendant or parent is not among those listed in Section 9 of
Republic Act No. 3844, as amended, which specifically enumerates
the order of succession to the leasehold rights of a deceased or
incapacitated agricultural tenant, to wit:
In case of death or permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessee to
work his landholding, the leasehold shall continue between the
agricultural lessor and the person who can cultivate the landholding
personally, chosen by agricultural lessor within one month from such
death or permanent incapacity, from among the following: a) the
surviving spouse; b) the eldest direct descendant by consanguinity; or
(c) the next eldest descendant or descendants in the order of their
age. x x x Provided, further that in the event that the agricultural lessor
fails to exercise his choice within the period herein provided, the
priority shall be in accordance with the order herein established.
NON-PAYMENT OF LEASE RENTALS
Roxas y cia vs. Cabatuando, (1 SCRA 1106)
The mere failure of a tenant to pay the landholder’s
share does not necessarily give the latter the right to
eject the former where there is lack of deliberate
intent on the part of the tenant to pay.

Otilia Sta. Ana vs. Spouses Leon Carpo and Aurora Carpo, G.R. No.
164340, 28 November 2008; Antonio vs. Manahan ([G.R. No. 176091,
August 24, 2011])

The rule is settled that failure to pay the lease rentals

must be willful and deliberate in order to be
considered as ground for dispossession of an
agricultural tenant.[25] While the "term `deliberate' is
characterized by or results from slow, careful,
thorough calculation and consideration of effects
and consequences," the term "willful" has been
"defined as one governed by will without yielding to
reason or without regard to reason.
ERNESTO L. NATIVIDAD vs. FERNANDO MARIANO, ANDRES MARIANO and
DOROTEO GARCIA (G.R. No. 179643)

Non-payment of the lease rentals whenever they fall due is a ground for the
ejectment of an agricultural lessee under paragraph 6, Section 36 of R.A. No.
3844. In relation to Section 2 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
816,57 deliberate refusal or continued refusal to pay the lease rentals by the
agricultural lessee for a period of two (2) years shall, upon hearing and final
judgment, result in the cancellation of the CLT issued in the agricultural
lessee’s favor.

The agricultural lessee's failure to pay the lease rentals, in order to warrant his
dispossession of the landholding, must be willful and deliberate and must
have lasted for at least two (2) years. The term "deliberate" is characterized
by or results from slow, careful, thorough calculation and consideration of
effects and consequences, while the term "willful" is defined, as one
governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to
reason.58 Mere failure of an agricultural lessee to pay the agricultural lessor's
share does not necessarily give the latter the right to eject the former absent
a deliberate intent on the part of the agricultural lessee to pay.
In the present petition, we do not find the respondents’ alleged non-
payment of the lease rentals sufficient to warrant their dispossession of
the subject property. The respondents’ alleged non-payment did not
last for the required two-year period. To reiterate our discussion above,
the respondents’ rental payments were not yet due and the
respondents were not in default at the time Ernesto filed the petition for
ejectment as Ernesto failed to prove his alleged prior verbal demands.
Additionally, assuming arguendo that the respondents failed to pay the
lease rentals, we do not consider the failure to be deliberate or willful.
The receipts on record show that the respondents had paid the lease
rentals for the years 1988-1998. To be deliberate or willful, the non-
payment of lease rentals must be absolute, i.e., marked by complete
absence of any payment. This cannot be said of the respondents’ case.
Hence, without any deliberate and willful refusal to pay lease rentals for
two years, the respondents’ ejectment from the subject property, based
on this ground, is baseless and unjustified.
TENANT’S RIGHT TO PRE-EMPTION

SECTION 11. Lessee's Right of Pre-emption. — In case the

agricultural lessor decides to sell the landholding, the
agricultural lessee shall have the preferential right to buy the
same under reasonable terms and conditions: Provided, That
the entire landholding offered for sale must be pre-empted by
the Land Authority if the landowner so desires, unless the
majority of the lessees object to such acquisition: Provided,
further, That where there are two or more agricultural lessees,
each shall be entitled to said preferential right only to the
extent of the area actually cultivated by him. The right of pre-
emption under this Section may be exercised within ninety days
from notice in writing which shall be served by the owner on all
lessees affected.
DE LA MERCED vs. DE GUZMAN, (G.R. No. L-36626,
April 15, 1988)

To exercise the right of pre-emption, plaintiff De la Merced

or the Land Bank or the Land Authority, in his behalf or
benefit, should have tendered to the owner payment of
the reasonable price of the land within 90 days, as
provided for in Section 11 of Republic Act 3844, as
amended. It did not suffice that the Land Authority or the
Land Bank expressed their willingness to finance the
acquisition of the land by De la Merced.
RIGHT OF REDEMPTION:

Under Section 12 of Republic Act 3844, as amended,

said provision provides that:
In case the landholding is sold to a third person without
the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall
have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable price
and consideration: Provided, That where there are two or
more agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled to said
right of redemption only to the extent of the area
actually cultivated by him. The right of redemption under
this Section may be exercised within one hundred and
eighty days from notice in writing which shall be served
by the vendees on all lessees affected and the
Department of Agrarian Reform upon the registration of
the sale, and shall have priority over any other right of
legal redemption. The redemption price shall be the
reasonable price of the land at the time of the sale.
Benjamin Belisario, et. al vs. The Intermediate
Appellate Court, et. al. G.R. No.73503, August 30,
1988.
The general rule in redemption is that in making a repurchase, it is
not sufficient that a person offering to redeem makes manifestation
of his desire to repurchase; this statement of intention must be
accompanied by an actual and simultaneous tender of payment,
which constitutes the legal use or exercise of the right to repurchase
(Angao vs. Clavano, 17 Phil. 152). Likewise, in several cases decided
by this Court (Fructo vs. Fuentes, 15 Phil. 362; Retes vs. Suelto, 20 Phil.
394; Rosales vs. Reyes, et al., 25 Phil. 495, Canuto vs. Mariano, 37
Phil. 840; Dela Cruz, et al. vs Resurreccion, et al., 98 Phil. 975) where
the right to repurchase was held to have been properly exercised,
there was a definite finding of tender of payment having been
made by the vendor. The tender of payment must be for the full
amount of the repurchase price, otherwise the offer to redeem will
be held ineffectual. (Rumbaoa vs. Arzaga, 84 Phil. 812) Bona fide
redemption necessarily imports a reasonable and valid tender of
the entire repurchase price. (Conejero, et al. vs. Court of Appeals,
et al., L-21812, April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 775, 780).
FELIX DE JESUS, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
(G.R. No. L-33671 July 28, 1972)

While recognizing the well-established jurisprudence that the

timely exercise of the right of legal redemption requires either
a valid tender of the price or valid consignation thereof, the
appellate court adjudged that petitioner did not make a
valid tender of payment which "requires that he should offer
the payment to the purchaser. This was not done by the
(petitioner)" who, according to the appellate court, made
the tender only in his answer filed with the agrarian court.
 JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS
1. NO AGRARIAN DISPUTE

WELLER JOPSON, vs. FABIAN O. MENDEZ, JR., and DEVELOPMENT

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, (G.R. No. 191538, December 11, 2013)

This case involved lands which were owned by the DBP but being
recovered by the parties on the grounds that they are the legitimate
tenants of the property. Court ruled against the claimants saying that there
is no tenancy relationship (no consent, land is not agricultural) and that the
DAR did not have jurisdiction because this is not an agrarian dispute as
per definition of the law.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, as represented by Fritzi C.

Pantoja, in her capacity as the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer,
DAR-Laguna, vs. PARAMOUNT HOLDINGS EQUITIES, INC., JIMMY
CHUA, ROJAS CHUA, BENJAMIN SIM, SANTOS C. TAN, WILLIAM C. LEE
and STEWART C. LIM (G.R. No. 176838, June 13, 2013)
 The PARO filed a case with the PARAD for the cancellation of
several deeds of sale in Laguna in favor of land developers, on the
sole ground that the sale did not have a DAR Clearance. The Court
regarded the case as not being an “agrarian dispute” since there
was no allegations of tenancy, there were no beneficiaries on the
property and there was no notice of coverage over the property.
Therefore, the deeds of sale were held valid, and the jurisdiction of
the DARAB was set aside.
2. VIOLATION OF SEC. 27, RA 6657, as amended
RURAL BANK DASMARIÑAS INC vs. NESTOR JARIN, APOLINAR OBISPO, and VICENTE
GARCIA in his capacity as Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite (G.R. No.
180778, October 16, 2009)

Upon the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 27 on October 21, 1972, petitioner
was DEEMED OWNER of the land in question. As of that date, he was declared
emancipated from the bondage of the soil. As such, he gained the rights to possess,
cultivate, and enjoy the landholding for himself. Those rights over that particular
property were granted by the government to him and to no other. To insure his
continued possession and enjoyment of the property, he could not, under the law,
make any valid form of transfer except to the government or by hereditary
succession, to his successors.
The prohibition against transfers to persons other than the heirs of
other qualified beneficiaries stems from the policy of the
Government to develop generations of farmers to attain its avowed
goal to have an adequate and sustained agricultural production.
With certitude, such objective will not see the light of day if lands
covered by agrarian reform can easily be converted for non-
agricultural purposes. (Capitalization in the original; italics, emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

JULIAN S. LEBRUDO and REYNALDO L. LEBRUDO, vs REMEDIOS LOYOLA,

(G.R. No. 181370, March 9, 2011)

Remedios Loyola was the owner of a parcel of land measuring 240 sq.
meters by virtue of RA 6657. Remedios’ mother mortgaged the land in
favor of Trinidad Barreto. Renedios wanted to redeem the land but
had no money, so she approached Julian S. Lebrudo for a loan.
Lebrudo agreed to shoulder all the expenses; in return Remedios
agreed to transfer ownership of one-half of the CLOA covered land to
Lebrudo. Remedios even executed 2 Sinumpaang Salaysays to that
effect.
 SEC. 27. Transferability of Awarded Lands. – Lands acquired by beneficiaries
under this ACT may not be sold, transferred or conveyed except through
hereditary succession, or to the government, or to the LBP, or to other qualified
beneficiaries for a period of ten (10) years: Provided, however, That the
children or the spouse of the transferor shall have a right to repurchase the
land from the government or LBP within a period of two (2) years. Due notice
of the availability of the land shall be given by the LBP to the Barangay
Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) of the barangay where the land is
situated. The Provincial Agrarian Coordinating Committee (PARCCOM), as
herein provided, shall, in turn, be given due notice thereof by the BARC.

 The title of the land awarded under the agrarian reform must indicate that it is
an emancipation patent or a certificate of land ownership award and the
subsequent transfer title must also indicate that it is an emancipation patent or
a certificate of land ownership award.

If the land has not yet been fully paid by the beneficiary, the rights to the land
may be transferred or conveyed, with prior approval of the DAR, to any heir of the
beneficiary or to any other beneficiary who, as a condition for such transfer or
conveyance, shall cultivate the land himself. Failing compliance herewith, the
land shall be transferred to the LBP which shall give due notice of the availability
of the land in the manner specified in the immediately preceding paragraph.
 In Estate of the Late Encarnacion vda. de Panlilio vs. Dizon, it was explicitly affirmed
that:
Sales or transfers of lands made in violation of PD 27and EO 228 in favor of
persons other than the Government by other legal means or to the farmer’s
successor by hereditary succession are null and void, and the prohibition even
extends to the surrender of the land to the former landowner.

In Hermoso vs. C.L. Realty Corporation , 489 SCRA 556, it emphasized:

A covered landholding does not revert back to the owner even if the
beneficiaries thus selected do not meet all the necessary qualifications.

3. RECOVERY OF POSSESSION BY CLOA HOLDERS

ROMEO M. LANDICHO vs. WILLIAM C. LIMQUECO (G.R. Nos. G.R. 19455, December 7,
2016)
The Court held that the DARAB has jurisdiction over the case which they
considered an agrarian dispute as defined in RA 6657. In this case, the
petitioners filed a case for the recovery of their titles which were transferred to
third party developers, through fraud and deceit by their original landowner.
The ownership of the petitioners was based on the CLOA generated in their
name, pursuant to a voluntary land transfer scheme allowed under CARP.
4. JUST COMPENSATION – A JUDICIAL FUNCTION

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EUGENIO DALAUTA (G.R. 19400, August 8, 2017)

The Court hereby DECLARES that the final determination of just compensation is a
judicial function; that the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, sitting as Special
Agrarian Court, is original and exclusive, not appellate : That the action to file
determination just compensation shall be ten (10) years from time of taking: that at
time of filing of judicial determination, there should be no pending for determination
of just compensation.
5. NON-PAYMENT OF AMORTIZATION

HEIRS OF LAZARO GALLARDO, namely: PROSPERIDAD PANLAQUIGALLARDO,

MARIA CARMEN P. GALLARDO-NUNAG, MARIO LAZARO, P. GALLARDO, JOY
CATALINA P. GALLARDO, PINKY PERPETUA P. GALLARDO and LAZARO P.
GALLARDO, JR. vs. PORFERIO SOLIMAN, VIVIAN VALETE, and ANTONIO
SOLIMAN (G.R. No. 178952. April 10, 2013)

This case was inconclusive since it was remanded to the CA for further
litigation, but seems to provide guidance that since the tenant was not able
to live up to the payment of his amortizations, then cancellation may be in
order.
Also, as the farmer tenant-transferee of the land under PD 27, Porferio is
by law required to make amortization on the land until he completes
payment of the fixed price thereof. Under the Kasunduan and Deed of
Transfer, he has to make good on his payments to be landowners. If he
fails to pay, cancellation of any Certificate of Land Transfer or
Emancipation Patent issued in his name is proper, pursuant to Section 2
45 of PD 816. Considering the tenor of the law, the PARAD’s and DARAB’s
pronouncement that respondents cannot be faulted for they “laboured
under the honest belief that they were now vested with absolute
ownership” of the land, and that they “cannot be expected to
understand the legal implications of the existing lien/encumbrances
annotated on their respective tittles entered into in 1990 to insure
payment of the land value” to petitioners, appears to be anchored not
on legal ground. Besides, it is common maxim that “ignorance of the law
excuses no one from compliance therewith.”
6. ABANDONMENT/CLT HOLDER

RAYMUNDO CODERIAS, as represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, MARLON M.

CODERIAS, vs. ESTATE OF JUAN CHIOCO, represented by its Administrative, DR. RAUL
R. CARAG, (GR. No. 180476, June 26, 2013)

The tenant farmer was allowed to pursue his case for reinstatement even after 14
years from the time of his dispossession.

It must be recalled from the facts that the arm has been placed under the coverage
of RA 3844. It is also undisputed that a tenancy relation existed between Chioco and
petitioner. In fact, a CLT had been issued in favour of the petitioner; thus, petitioner
already had an expectant right to the farm. A CLT serves as “ a provisional title of
ownership over the landholding while the lot owner is awaiting full payment of just
compensation or for as long as the tenant farmer is an amortizing owner. This
certificate proves inchoate ownership of an agricultural land primarily devoted to
rice and corn production. It is issued in order for the tenant-farmer to acquire the
land he was tilling.” Since the farm is considered expropriated and placed under the
coverage of the land reform law, Chioco had no right to evict petitioner and enter
the property More significantly, Chioco had no right to claim that petitioner’s cause
of action had prescribed.
In this case, we deem it proper to reckon petitioner’s cause action to
have accrued only upon his knowledge of the death of Chioco in 1993,
and not at the time he was forcibly ejected from the landholding in
1980. For as long as the intimidation and threats to petitioner’s life and
limb existed, petitioner had a cause of action against Chioco to
enforce the recognition of this juridical tie.

7. WRIT OF EXECUTION

GREEN ACRES HOLDINGS, INC., vs. VICTORIA P. CABRAL, SPS. ENRIQUE TO.
MORAGA and VICTORIA SORIANO, FILCON READY MIXED, INC., DEPARTMENT
OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB), and REGISTRY OF
DEEDS OF BULACAN, MEYCAUAYAN BRANCH (G.R. No. 175542, June 5, 2013)

The invalidation of the sale from the FB to a third party (Filcon) became final
through a DARAB decision, but prior to its finality, Filcon sold the land to
Green Acres. However, the DARAB refused to extend the writ of execution
to Green Acres since this company did not participate in the case and not
impleaded.
 The principle that a person cannot be prejudiced by a ruling rendered
in an action or proceeding in which he was not made a party conforms to
the constitutional guarantee of due process of law. In Muñoz v. Yabut, Jr.,
this Court ruled; An action for declaration on nullity of title and recovery of
ownership of real property, or re-conveyance, is real action but it is an
action in personam, for it binds a particular individual only though it
concerns the right to a tangible thing. Any judgment therein is binding only
upon the parties properly impleaded.

8. NO COLLATERAL ATTACK

FILINVEST LAND INC., vs. EDUARDO R. ADIA, et. al., (G.R. No. 192629, November 25,
2015.)

The execution of the farmers of an affidavit called Pagbibitiw ng Karapatan was

construed by the Court to be a virtual transfer of ownership and thus violated the
restrictions under Sec. 27 of RA 6657. The monies paid to the farmers in
consideration of the affidavit and their deprivation of the use of the property was
no longer required to be returned. Maintenance of possession of the farmers was
adjudicated, but the Court recommended that a direct action for the nullification
of the TCTs needs to be done, since the case only involved possession.
9. ALI MATTER
THE HON. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFOMR, vs. NEMESIO
DUMAGPI, represented by VICENTE DUMAGPI (G.R. No. 195412. February 4,
2015)

The land claimant Nemesio Dimagpi, was not recognized by the Court as a
legitimate public land claimant, since the area he was claiming was a coal
mine reservation. The Court recognized the authority of the DAR under
Presidential Proclamation 2342 placing the land as agricultural settlement area.
Hence, the decision of the RTC to recognize the prior rights of Nemesio was not
affirmed and reversed.

10. AGRARIAN REFORM MATTERS (AGRARIAN DISPUTE)

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by Ms. FRITZI C. PANTOJA in

her capacity as Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer of Laguna, vs. IGMIDIO D.
ROBLES, RANDY V. ROBLES, MARY KRIST B. MALIMBAN, ANNE JAMAICA G.
ROBLES, JOHN CARLO S. ROBLES and CHRISTINE ANN V. ROBLES, (G.R. No.
190482, December 9, 2015)
The Court upheld the jurisdiction of the DARAB to entertain a case for the
cancellation of various deeds of sale of agricultural lands that did not
have a DAR clearance and seems to be in violation of the law on
retention limits. In this case, the Court clearly stated that the concept of an
agrarian dispute did not have to mean that there is a tenancy relationship
that was in question. The mere fact that all agricultural lands are covered
under the CARP, and that there is a question on possible evasion of
coverage, that was already consummated through the transfer of the title
to the property, is enough to vest jurisdiction in the DARAB. The Court also
clarified that the jurisdiction of the DAR over all agricultural lands does not
commence with the issuance of a notice of coverage (because in this
case, the respondents alleged that the transfer of the title was done
before the issuance of the NOC)

It is also noteworthy that while Section 3 (d) 26 of R.A. No. 6657 defines the
term “agrarian dispute”, no specific definition was given by the same law
to the term “agrarian reform matters.” In view thereof, the Court cannot
restrict the DARAB’s quasi-judicial jurisdiction only to those involving
agrarian disputes where tenancy relationship exists between the parties,
for it should also include other “agrarian reform matter” which do not fall
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Office of the Secretary of DAR, the
Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, as well as the Special Agrarian Courts.
11. CONVERSION/EXEMPTION

HEIRS OF LUIS A. LUNA and REMEGIO A. LUNA, and LUZ LUNA-SANTOS, as

represented by their Attorney-in-Fact, AUREA B. LUBIS, vs. RUBEN S. AFABLE,
TOMAS M. AFABLE, FLORENTE A. EVANGELISTA, LEOVY S. EVANGELISTA, JAIME
M. ILAGAN, ET. AL., (G.R. No. 188299, January 23, 2013)

This case follows the general principle in the Natalia Realty case that lands
that have been reclassified prior to 1988 as non-agricultural fall outside the
scope of agrarian reform.

In contrast to the exemption order issued by Secretary Pagdanganan, the

resolution and order, respectively, of OIC Secretaries Ponce and
Pangandaman – which the CA cited with approval – relied mainly on
certifications declaring that the property is irrigated or has a slope of below
18% and on a ocular inspection report stating that the property is generally
covered with rice and that the surrounding areas are still agricultural, as
bases for their conclusion that subject land is agricultural and, therefore
covered by the CRL. These maters however, no longer bear any significance
in the light of the certifications of the Deputized Zoning Administrator and the
HUDCC testifying to the non-agricultural nature of the landholding in
question.
AUTOMAT REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, LITO CECILIA AND
LEONOR LIM, vs. SPOUSES MARCIANO DELA CRUZ, SR. AND OFELIA DELA
CRUZ, (G.R. No. 192026, October 1, 2014)

The spouses Dela Cruz were taken in by the landowner Automat for the
purpose of being caretakers and to prevent squatting. But the spouses
dela Cruz filed a petition with the PARAD for maintenance of possession
on the grounds that they are tenants. SC ruled that this is not an
agrarian dispute, there is no tenancy and the land is no longer
agricultural.

The DAR exemption orders have determined with certainly that the
lands were reclassified as non-agricultural prior to June 15, 1988.
Consequently, the petition filed by respondent spouses in 2000 before
the PARAD did not involve “lands devoted to agriculture” and,
necessarily, it could not have involved any controversy relating to such
land. Absent an “agrarian dispute” the instant case cannot fall under
the limited jurisdiction of the DARAB as a quasi-judicial body.
AGRARIAN REFORM BENEFICIARIES ASSOCIATION (ARBA), as
REPRESENTED BY ISAIAS “ACE” NICOLAS IN HIS CAPACITY AS
PRESIDENT, et., al.,vs. FIL-ESTATE PROPERTIES, INC., (G.R. No. 163598,
August 12, 2015)

The Court ruled herein that the DARAB did not have jurisdiction
over the case since the pleadings did not indicate an agrarian
dispute: a) the farmers were not tenants but mere potential
beneficiaries over the land; b) the land is exempted by virtue of the
Lungsod Silangan proclamation and c) no need for conversion
under the doctrine in the Creba case. The Court ruled that the case
is more of a civil case rather than agrarian case, and hence the
filing by the ARBA of a case of maintenance of peaceful possession
with the DARAB was misplaced.
CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATION, INC. (CREBA), vs. THE SECRETARY
OF AGRARIAN REFORM (G.R. No. 183409)

This Court held in Alarcon v. Court of Appeals43 that reclassification of lands does not
suffice. Conversion and reclassification differ from each other. Conversion is the act of
changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use as approved
by the DAR while reclassification is the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be
utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, and commercial, as
embodied in the land use plan, subject to the requirements and procedures for land use
conversion. In view thereof, a mere reclassification of an agricultural land does not
automatically allow a landowner to change its use. He has to undergo the process of
conversion before he is permitted to use the agricultural land for other purposes.

It is clear from the aforesaid distinction between reclassification and conversion that
agricultural lands though reclassified to residential, commercial, industrial or other non-
agricultural uses must still undergo the process of conversion before they can be used for
the purpose to which they are intended.
Nevertheless, emphasis must be given to the fact that DAR’s conversion authority can
only be exercised after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988.45 The
said date served as the cut-off period for automatic reclassification or rezoning of
agricultural lands that no longer require any DAR conversion clearance or
authority.46 Thereafter, reclassification of agricultural lands is already subject to DAR’s
conversion authority. Reclassification alone will not suffice to use the agricultural lands
for other purposes. Conversion is needed to change the current use of reclassified
agricultural lands.

It is of no moment whether the reclassification of agricultural lands to residential,

commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses was done by the LGUs or by way
of Presidential Proclamations because either way they must still undergo conversion
process. It bears stressing that the act of reclassifying agricultural lands to non-
agricultural uses simply specifies how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-
agricultural uses and does not automatically convert agricultural lands to non-
agricultural uses or for other purposes. As explained in DAR Memorandum Circular No.
7, Series of 1994, cited in the 2009 case of Roxas & Company, Inc. v. DAMBA-NFSW
and the Department of Agrarian Reform,47 reclassification of lands denotes their
allocation into some specific use and providing for the manner of their utilization and
disposition or the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-
agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, or commercial, as embodied in the land
use plan.
12. PD 27 COVERAGE

CONRADA O. ALMAGRO, vs. SPS. MANUEL AMAYA, SR., and LUCILA

MERCADO, JESUS MERCADO, SR., and RICARDO MERCADO, (G.R.
No.179685, June 19, 2013)

The EP issued over the property was cancelled because the Court ruled based
on record that the land was primarily planted to vegetable; however, the lease
on the land was respected.

The evidence adduced during the hearing of the consolidated land cases before
the office of the RARAD contradicts and belies respondent’s above
averments. In this regard, the Court accords respect to the findings of the
RARAD who has the primary jurisdiction and competence to determine the
agricultural character of the land in question. The following excerpts of
RARAD Arrieta’s findings embodied in his decision are instructive.
Nonetheless however, Certification issued by the [MARO] of Delaguete, Cebu
and Certification from the Municipal Assessor dated September 27, 1995 and
October 4, 1995 respectively, shows that Lot No. 13333 which is the subject
this case is devoted to vegetables since 1972 up to present (exhibits “F” and
“G”, respectively). The same was further buttressed by Tax Declaration No.
2102400636 which shows that it is devoted to vegetable production (exhibit
13. EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL

SPOUSES LORETO G. NICOLAS and LOLITA SARIGUMBA,vs. AGRARIAN REFORM

BENEFICIARIES ASSOCIATION (ARBA), et. al., (G.R. No. 179566. October 19, 2016)

The case had a lengthy discussion on the rule on execution pending appeal with
the DARAB. As a rule, execution can be made only if the decision is final, but
execution pending appeal can be done upon motion and for good reason. In
this case, the petitioners were faulted by the Court for going ahead with the
transfer of the title of the property to third parties, pending appeal, hence, the
transfers were declared null and void.
14.RETENTION

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, QUEZON CITY & PABLO MENDOZA, vs.

ROMEO C. CARRIEDO (G.R. No. 176549, January 20, 2016)/G.R. No.176549, Nov.
14, 2018)

The Court held that the respondent Carriedo still maintains his constitutional right
to retain 5 hectares of the land, despite the fact that he sold 70 hectares of his
land without necessary DAR clearance. In the process of affirming the right of
retention, the Court invalidates Sec. 4 of DAR AO 5, s. 2006, which essentially
states that if one sells more than five hectares, without the necessary
DAR Clearance and in violation of the law, then the consequence
would that the first five hectares of the sale would be valid, the five
hectares being part of the retention rights of the LO and the rest of the
sale is void. The Court here held that this was a penal provision and the
law did not allow the attachment of a penalty since this was not
declared as a prohibited act.

On Motion for Reconsideration, the SC reversed its earlier decision. Thus,

DAR AO 5, Series 2016 is held valid for being equitable and in accord
with the Stewardship doctrine. The AO is also in accord with Sections 24
(indefeasibility) and 70 (without DAR Clearance) of RA 6657, as
amended. It reiterated the principle established in Estribillo vs. DAR.

HEIRS OF LEONILO P. NUÑEZ, SR., vs. HEIRS OF GABINO T. VILLANOZA,

represented by BONIFACIO A. VILLANOZA (G.R. No. 218666. April 26, 2017)

The Court made a lengthy expose on the history of agrarian reform and
the right to retention. It reiterated the principle that the right to retain is a
guaranteed constitutional right, but if it is not exercised in a timely manner,
and if the property is not compact and contiguous, and if the title of the
farmer beneficiary already has become perfected, then the right to retain
as claimed by the heirs is already lost.
15. AUTOMATIC REFERRAL

CHAILESE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC., versus - MONICO DIZON, et al,

(G.R. No. 206788, Feb. 14, 2018)

On the application of Sec 50-A, RA 6657, as amended by RA 9700. A

cursory of the provision readily rules: That Sec. 19, RA 9700 merely
highlighted the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR to rule on agrarian cases
by adding a clause which mandates the automatic referral of cases upon
the existence of the requisites therein stated. Simply, RA 9700 does not
deviate but merely reinforced the jurisdiction of the DAR set forth under
Sec. 50 of RA 6657. Moreover, in the absence of any stipulation to the
contrary, as the amendment is essentially procedural in nature it is deemed
to apply to all actions pending and undetermined at the time of its
passage.
Based on the said provision, the judge or prosecutor is obligated to
automatically refer the cases pending before it to the DAR when the
following requisites are present:

a.There is an allegation from any one or both of the parties that

the case is agrarian in nature; and

b. One of the parties is a farmer, farmworker, or tenant.

In this case, the presence of the first requisite is satisfied by the

allegations made by the respondents in their Answer with Counterclaim.

The allegations in petitioner's complaint make a case for recovery of

possession, over which the regular courts have jurisdiction. However, in
response thereto, the respondents filed their Answer with Counterclaim,
assailing the jurisdiction of the regular court to rule on the matter on the
ground that it is agrarian in nature, which thus complies with the first
requisite, viz. :
 BY WAY OF SPECIAL/AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES, defendants further state
that:

5. The Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter and the nature of
the action. Verily, the allegations of the complaint would show that this
involves the implementation of Agrarian Reform law hence beyond the
pale of jurisdiction of this Court.

Anent the second requisite, the Court finds that the respondents failed to
prove that they are farmers, farmworkers, or are agricultural tenants.

Section 3 of R.A. No. 6657 defines farmers and farmworkers as follows:

f) Farmer refers to a natural person whose primary livelihood is cultivation on of

land or the production of agricultural crops, either by himself or primarily with the
assistance of his immediate farm household, whether the land is owned by him, or
by another person under a leasehold or share tenancy agreement or
arrangement with the owner thereof.
 (g) Farmworker is a natural person who renders service for value as an employee
or laborer in an agricultural enterprise or farm regardless of whether his
compensation is paid on a daily, weekly, monthly or "pakyaw" basis. The term
includes an individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in
connection with, a pending agrarian dispute and who has not obtained a
substantially equivalent and regular farm employment.

An agricultural tenancy relation, on the other hand, is established by the

concurrence of the following elements enunciated by this Court in the case of
Chico v. CA,

(1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2)
that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (3) that there is
consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) that the purpose of the
relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) that there is personal
cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) that the harvest is
shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.

Contrary to the CA's conclusion and as opposed to the first requisite, mere
allegation would not suffice to establish the existence of the second requirement.
Proof must be adduced by the person making the allegation as to his or her status
as a farmer, farmworker, or tenant.
 The pertinent portion of Section 19 of R.A. No. 9700 reads:

If there is an allegation from any of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature and
one of the parties is a farmer, farmworker, or tenant, the case shall be automatically
referred by the judge or the prosecutor to the DAR xx x.

The use of the word "an" prior to "allegation" indicate that the latter qualifies only the
immediately subsequent statement, i.e., that the case is agrarian in .nature. Otherwise
stated, an allegation would suffice only insofar as the characterization of the nature of
the action.

Had it been the intention that compliance with the second element would likewise be
sufficient by a mere allegation from one of the parties that he or she is a farmer, farm
worker, or tenant, the legislature should have used the plural form when referring to
"allegation" as the concurrence of both requisites is mandatory for the automatic
referral clause to operate.
Further instructive is this Court's ruling in the previously cited case of Chico.
Therein, the Court held that for the purpose of divesting regular courts of its
jurisdiction in the proceedings lawfully began before it and in order for the
DARAB to acquire jurisdiction, the elements of a tenancy relationship must
be shown by adequate proof. It is not enough that the elements are
alleged. Likewise, self-serving statements in the pleadings are inadequate.

Hence, in light of the absence of evidence to show any tenancy

agreement that would establish the relationship of the parties therein, the
Court in Chico granted the petition and reinstated the proceedings before
the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan.

Applying these principles in the matter on hand, in here, respondents merely

alleged in their Answer with Counterclaim that they are previous tenants in
the subject landholdings implying that a tenancy relationship exists between
them and petitioner's predecessor-in-interest, in this wise:

9. That defendants are actually tenants of the land long before the same
was illegally transferred in the name of the plaintiff;
 10. That the lot subject matter of this case is formerly a hacienda
devoted to agricultural production;

11. That since the land is within the coverage of the [CARL], the
defendants, are by law, the qualified farm-beneficiaries who should be
entitled to the compulsory acquisition and distribution of the same;

12. That without the knowledge of the said defendants, the property
was transferred to herein plaintiff who in order to avoid the compulsory
acquisition and distribution of the said land, filed a "bogus" petition for
conversion. xx x.

Apart from these statements however, respondents failed to elaborate

much less prove the details of such tenancy agreement and the
peculiarities of the subject landholding's previous ownership. There was
no evidence adduced of the existence of any tenancy agreement
between respondents and the petitioner's predecessor-in-interest. This,
as discussed, precludes the application of Section 50-A of R.A. No. 6657,
as amended by R.A. No. 9700, for failure to satisfy the second requisite.