Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
TURNAROUND STRATEGY OF
CONTINENTAL AIRLINES
BEFORE 9/11
ID CARD #: 2011-1-92-13523
INTRODUCTION
COO and President: Gordon Bethune
a. He was a licensed airline pilot, qualified to fly Boeing 757 and 767 jets
b. He had an airframe and power plant mechanic’s license
c. Maintenance facility manager at both Braniff and Western Airlines
d. Senior Vice President of operations at Piedmont Airlines in the 1980s
Bethune’s diagnosis
Moves by Bethune:
i. Hub-and-spoke operations – new spoke locations that attracted
higher traffic
ii. Drastic cutbacks in late flights
iii. Closing the company’s Greensboro, North Carolina hub due to stiff
competition from other airlines and focusing on Continental’s hub in
Newark, Cleveland, and Houston. Also, intra-Florida routes were cut
as wells as Kansas City to Omaha with flights direct from Houston hub
iv. Raise fares on Continental’s routes.
v. Disposing off A300 planes – the loss control due to lease was
incorporated into financial plan; the seat capacity was also reduced.
THE MARKET PLAN: FLY TO WIN
Advantage of Marketing Plan:
i. Better position the airline in higher traffic markets
ii. Allow maintenance to be performed more sensibly and economically.
iii. Make it possible to reallocate resources into strengthening Continental’s
hub operations
iv. Improve the company’s overall load factor.
They ran the idea of changing the corporate culture in a board meeting
by Continental’s chairman, coworkers they trusted, and by friends and
family.
Culture changing effort was general and conceptual rather than list of
specific action proposals.
THE IMPLEMENTATION AND
EVOLUTION OF “GO FORWARD
PLAN”, 1999-2000
BETHUNE’S FIRST STEP AS CEO:
Setting alight the company’s manuals containing strict rules and
regulations to be followed to be replaced with freedom to operate airline
management and operations in any way but within rules.
Closing of Los Angeles maintenance operations – 1800 personnel worked
at Los Angeles
September 1996 - Bethune appointed Brenneman as president and
COO, with himself appointed as CEO and chairman.
Open door policy and casual dress Fridays
No Smoking flights
Fresh paint job on all the airplanes operating.
THE IMPLEMENTATION AND
EVOLUTION OF “GO FORWARD
PLAN”, 1999-2000
EXECUTING THE ‘FLY TO WIN’ MARKET PLAN
I. Collaborative efforts with the travel agents
◦ Upon reaching a certain trade volume of tickets sold or sales target reached, the
agents would be compensated above the level of commissions.
◦ Programs involving upgrades to first class and discounts for certain trade volumes
were created for travel agents to use in marketing Continental to large corporations.
II. Targeted leisure and business travelers
◦ As Brenneman used to call them “backpack and flip-flop” crowd and “coat-and-tie
crowd” – they are willing to pay higher charges in order not to take chance with their
comfort and convenience
◦ Letters to CEO, middle managers and sales representatives
III. Growth of hubs
o Addition of more units from its hub and addition of more flights to destination
o Expansion in international markets
THE IMPLEMENTATION AND
EVOLUTION OF “GO FORWARD
PLAN”, 1999-2000
IV. Distribution channel for marketing tickets
o E-ticketing to 95 percent of its destination
o Continental partnered with United, Delta, American, and Northwest to create a
comprehensive travel planning website called Orbitz (www.orbitz.com) that offered
airline tickets, hotel reservations, car rentals, and other services.
Continental Express:
o After 1996, Continental Lite was phased out and management decided to form a feeder
hub called Continental Express
o It operated as a distinct subsidiary with its own president.
o By 2000, it expanded its operation to include 1000 daily flights to 70 cities in US, 10
cities in Mexico and 5 cities in Canada.
o Frequent services to small cities
o Phasing out of turboprop aircrafts and using regional jets exclusively by 2004.
THE IMPLEMENTATION AND
EVOLUTION OF “GO FORWARD
PLAN”, 1999-2000
Bethune’s Row 5 Test
◦ Aimed for “better performance” and “better services”
◦ Did not mind costs unless it provides “value for money”
◦ Hypothetical 5th row passenger
◦ Keeping the floors clean
◦ Preferred clean, safe, reliable service from well-managed hubs
◦ Convenient flight schedule to places customers wanted to go
◦ Amenities that makes the travel experience
◦ Desirable frequent flyer benefits.
THE IMPLEMENTATION AND
EVOLUTION OF “GO FORWARD
PLAN”, 1999-2000
EXECUTING THE FUND THE FUTURE FINANCIAL PLAN
Aftermath of the risk of bankruptcy
Strategies followed:
i. Renegotiate aircraft lease payments
ii. Refinance some of Continental’s debt at lower interest rates – saving
$25 million annually.
iii. Stretch out debt repayments on loans from 3 years to seven or 8 years
and,
iv. Raise fares on selected routes
1994 - $202 million in interest costs
1996 – $117 million interest costs and expected to go lower
THE IMPLEMENTATION AND
EVOLUTION OF “GO FORWARD
PLAN”, 1999-2000
Refund of $70 million Continental’s deposit from Boeing - $29 million got
returned.
Cash flows were further enhanced by the efforts of the company’s vice
president of purchasing and materials services to sell excess parts
inventories and renegotiate maintenance contracts.
Code-sharing agreements
Appointed Larry Kellner to overhaul the finances
Under Kellner
Developed system that allowed regularly updated estimates of revenue,
costs, profits and cash flows
Hedging (Fuel)
1996-1998 – (i) reduction of training and maintenance cost by reducing
the number of different types of aircrafts making up its fleet
It was further reduced by purchase of Boeing
Employee benefits scheme and wage raise
THE IMPLEMENTATION AND
EVOLUTION OF “GO FORWARD
PLAN”, 1999-2000
The Alliance with Northwest Airlines
Northwest Airlines purchased 8.7 million common shares of
Continental Airlines giving it voting rights and forming a basis of global
alliance between the two airlines.
Features of the partnership:
i. Code sharing
ii. Sharing of executive lounges
iii. Reciprocal frequent flyer programs
iv. Joint marketing activities
v. U.S Department of Justice filed suit against the violating companies, that
supposedly violated Section 7 of Clayton Act and Section 1 of
Sherman Act
The Alliance was continued while the case was pending.
THE IMPLEMENTATION AND
EVOLUTION OF “GO FORWARD
PLAN”, 1999-2000
EXECUTING THE MAKE RELIABILITY A REALITY PRODUCT PLAN:
Boosting on-time performance
Bethune reckoned on-time performance as the sole measure of customer satisfaction.
$65 bonus was awarded to employees who did better in on-time performance.
$5 million spent on taking care of the customers missing flights – including bonuses
to employees
Rankings according to on-time performance earned by the company:
7th – Jan 1995 (the year of introduction of the scheme)
4th – Feb 1995
1st – March 1995
1st – April 1995
May, June and July – worker slowdown by pilots that got solved after negotiations with
pilot unions
2nd – August 1995
3rd – October 1995
4th – November 1995
1st – December 1995
THE IMPLEMENTATION AND
EVOLUTION OF “GO FORWARD
PLAN”, 1999-2000
Bonus increase to $100 if they attain rankings of 3rd or higher
Other airline’s on-time performance ameliorated and thus Continental
changed the prerequisite for gaining $100 bonus by setting a standard of
above 80% or above on-time performances.
In 2000, that bonus pay structure changed - $100 on 1st position and $65
bonus on 2nd or 3rd position or on-time performance of 80% or above
Total cost to company in bonuses in 2000, where the company paid
bonuses in 11 out of 12 months - $39 million
During 1995-2000, employees were paid $157 million bonuses (on-time)