KARGIL CONFLICT

BY:
ALI MOAZZAM
 GEOGRAPHY
• The Kargil Complex comprises of rugged mountains and
is about 155 by 75 kilometers.
• The mountain height varies from 8500 ft to 18500.
• The area is thinly populated and scarcely cultivated.
• Heavy snowfall on the mountains starts by the end of
September and goes up to April next year.
• During winter temperature remains between -20 to -40
C.
 ROAD NETWORKS
INDIAN:
• There are two major roads leading towards Kargil
• The main route starts from Srinagar goes up to
Kargil and then ends up at Leh. The road is called
NH1. This road remains closed for all sorts of traffic
from mid-November to mid-May. This is the main
supply route (MSR) for the Indian troops deployed
along LOC.
• The second important road is Manali Leh road,
which starts from Himachal Perdesh along
Pathankot to Upshi in Ladakh. This road passes by
Jammu and Kashmir valley. It is more difficult to
travel as it runs on the peaks of mountains as high
as14000 ft.
 ROAD NETWORKS

PAKISTANI
• In Pakistani side the road link is
comparatively poor.
• One is Skardu-Kargil road that
passes through Dewsai plains.
• The other is Burzil-Gultari-Kargil.
• There are unmetalled tracks which
be used for lighter traffic only in
summers. The road Burzil-Shaqme
is used as MSR for Pakistan army as
well as for civilian population.
 HISTORY
• The area beyond NJ-9842 remained un-demarcated and uninhabited since 1947.
• The Indian air force first landed helicopters on the glacier in 1978.
• The Indian army moved a large number of troops on foot to the base of the Siachen
glacier in 1983. They had been trained for several weeks to be able to fight there
and to occupy the Siachen glacier.
• Pakistan could not respond to the Indian aggression immediately, although
attempts were made in 1984 and 1985 to recapture the area.
• Pakistan deployed the elite Special Service Group (SSG) in 1987, at Khapalu.
General Musharraf, then in charge of the SSG, took part in intensive operations at
Siachen.
• In 1996, Pakistani gunners shot down three Indian MIGs and an IAF MI-17
helicopter.
 KARGIL CONFLIT-1999
• In early 1999 the conflict between Pakistan and India, which was going on in
Kashmir and Siachen on limited grounds, broadened when Pakistan succeeded
in gaining an obvious strategic position over Indian troops.
• Kashmiri militants, with support of troops of Pakistan’s NLI, crossed the line
of control and occupied strategic mountain peaks in Mushkoh Valley, Dras,
Kargil and Batalik Sectors of Ladakh.
• The master plan was apparently to block the Dras-Kargil high way, cut Leh off
from Srinagar, trap the Indian forces on the Siachin glacier.
• With this move in Kargil, the valley of Kashmir once again became the
flashpoint of the conflict between India and Pakistan.
 PLANNING
• Sometime around mid-November 1998, four Grnerals met
a) Lt Gen Mahmood (GOC-10 Corps)
b) Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Gen Pervez Musharaf
c) Chief of General Staff (CGS), Lt Gen Aziz
d) Major General Javed Hassan (GOC_FCNA)
• They sought permission to execute a plan, which had previously been shelved, to
occupy terrain in the Dras-Kargil sector, vacated by the Indians every winter.
• They got permission from PM NAWAZ SHARIF by arguing that the freedom
struggle in Kashmir needed a fillip
• The rest of the army was unaware of plans for the operation, including the Chief
of Air Staff and the Chief of Naval Staff, and preparations proceeded in secret.
 EXECUTION OF PLAN
• In the process, they had ended up occupying an area of about 130 square KMs
over a front of over 100 kilometers, and a depth ranging between 11-15 KMs.
• They occupied 132 posts of various sizes.
• Whereas the total number of troops occupying these posts never exceeded 1000
(from all ranks)
• Four times this number provided the logistical backup to undertake the
operation.
• While the occupants were essentially soldiers of the Northern Light Infantry
(NLI)
• There were some local Mujahideen assisting as labor to carry logistical
requirements.
 CASUALTIES AND LOSSES
Indian official figures Pakistani figures
• 527 killed • 453 killed (Pakistan army claim)
• 1,363 wounded • 665+ wounded
• 1 POW • 8 POWs
• 1 fighter jet shot down
• 1 fighter jet crashed
• 1 helicopter shot down
 ROLE & LIMITATIONS of PAF
• IAF made text book attacks on Pakistani positions in Kargil while the PAF looked at some
offensive options.
• ThecIAF’s minor border violations during recce missions were not of grave consequence in so far
as no bombing had taken place in our territory.
• It was resolved that Combat Air Patrols (CAPs) would be flown by the F-16 operating out of
Minhas (Kamra) and Sargodha.
• F-16 CAPs could not have been flown all day long as spares support was limited under the
prevailing US sanctions.
• This arrangement resulted in less on-station time but was safer than operating out of vulnerable
Skardu, which had inadequate early warning in the mountainous terrain.
• A flight of F-7s was, nonetheless, deployed primarily for point defense of the important garrison
town of Skardu as well as the air base.
• It is another matter that the Army high command did not envisage operations ever coming to
such a pass. Now, it was almost as if the PAF was to blame for the Kargil.
 WITHDRAWAL
• During the last briefing in late June, the COAS, General Musharaf, told Sharif
that, while the military did not believe that India would succeed in ousting
Pakistani troops from the posts they were holding.
• After some frantic telephone calls by Sharif to US President Clinton, in which he
conveyed his desperation at the course of events, he went to Washington. He met
Clinton on 4 July, and armed with guarantees of his support, returned to
announce the withdrawal of the ‘freedom fighters’ occupying Kargil.
 LESSON LEARNT
PAKISTANI SIDE
• Pakistan needs a broad body of experts, perhaps like the National Security Council
(NSC), to adequately assess its planned operations of this sort.
• Pakistan must develop specific media strategies to shape international opinion and to
mitigate India’s advantages on the information battleground.

INDIAN SIDE
• The Kashmir issue cannot be neglected in hopes of gradual atrophy. Rather, its
resolution requires high-level attention and commitment as well as creative responses
on the part of the government.
• India recognizes the utility of the media in contemporary conflicts and believes that it
won Kargil politically in part because of its dexterous capability of shapinginternational
perception.
 THANK YOU!
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