The Kyoto Protocol:

Two Level Bargaining and

European Integration
Presented to you by:
Jaemin (Jae) Lee
Roger Yang
Contents
Introduction

Two Models: 1. Two-Level Game Framework, 2. Europeanization Model

Quantitative Analysis: Tables 1, 2, and 3

Two Cases: Russia and Poland

Conclusion

Takeaway Questions
 Introduction
Authors’ Points:
1. The Two-Level Game Theory is NOT
supported by the cases shown in the
Kyoto Protocol.
The quantitative analysis conducted by the authors
shows that ratification constraints did not affect
bargaining over the Protocol, nor did bargaining
outcomes affect ratification.

2. The European Union significantly

influenced the Kyoto Protocol.
Cases of Russia and Poland show how the EU
candidate status played a huge role in settling their
agreements over emission quotas.
 Two Models Perspective from Europeanization Theorists: The
European Union influenced the Kyoto Protocol by
exerting pressure on both its members and its
candidates.

Testable Implication: “ratification depends upon

countries’ relationships with the European Union rather
than upon domestic politics, so that domestic
ratification constraints do not translate into effective
bargaining leverage.” (McLean & Stone pg 99)

Two-Level Game Theory Europeanization Model

Perspective from Two-level Game Theorists:

Domestic politics prevented agreements on
ambitious terms from being ratified in the
Kyoto Protocol

Testable Implication: “countries with

domestic constraints should receive more
generous terms” (McLean & Stone pg 99)
 Quantitative Analysis
Two key variables:

1. Effective Quotas after Kyoto

Two-level Bargaining Hypotheses: 2. Effective Quotas after
Marrakesh
“Domestic ratification constraints should
lead to more favorable bargaining Other variables:
outcomes.” → “More favorable bargaining
outcomes should make ratification more Two-level game theory:
likely.” 1. Parliamentary
2. Opposition majority
3. Fractionalization
EU Delegation Hypotheses:
Europeanization model:
1. EU 15
“EU membership should result in less
2. EU applicant 1
favorable bargaining outcomes; EU
3. EU applicant 2
candidacy should further worsen
bargaining outcomes.” → “EU
membership should increase the
likelihood of ratification; EU candidacy
Table 1: Ratification Stage
should further increase the likelihood
of ratification.”
Table 2 & 3: Bargaining Outcomes
 Quantitative Analysis – Table 1
Table 1 shows that the
member nations of the
European Unions ratified the
Kyoto Protocol for the
Table 1 does NOT benefits of the European
present evidence that Union in the international
shows how bargaining stage.
outcomes influence
ratification.
BUT, the results from
Table 1 fail to
Two-Level Game Theory differentiate the
is NOT supported by the behaviors of EU
data presented in Table members to those of EU
1. applicants.
 Quantitative Analysis: Tables 2 & 3

Table 3:

Table 2: -EU candidates:

Agreed to terms that
- Table 2 does not show seemed to be more
any supporting restrictive than those for
evidence for the Two- other Annex B countries
Level Game Theory as it -Older EU members:
tells us that bargaining Agreed to cut their level
outcomes do NOT affect of emission, but the cut is
ratification. not as heavy as that given
- Data presented in to EU applicants
Table 2 support the
Europeanization Model
to a moderate extent.
 Case 1: Russia – Brinkmanship in the
Kyoto Protocol

Facts

1 2 3 4

The Russian scientific Putin’s intention to join

community disputed the Protocol was to Russia threatened to
Government-sponsored
the assertion that CO2 enhance Russia’s scuttle the protocol if
legislation was passed
was the main cause of international leverage not assured of support
rather easily under Putin
climate change and and to gain membership from the European
administration.
in the World Trade Union.
criticized the protocol. Organization.
 Case 2: Poland – Concession of
Domestic Politics

Facts

1 2 3 4

Poland’s economy is Poland had been able to

Poland started to face EU commissions asked
largely dependent on set its own baseline year
pressure from the Poland to cut its planned
bituminous coal and for calculating emission
emissions by 16.5% after
lignite, which make the European Union after targets as a post-
the protocol was
reforms of the energy it had formally applied communist country,
ratified, which sparked
to join the institution. which could have been a
sector necessary. huge advantage.
off massive protests
from Polish companies.
 Tables 1, 2, and 3
Conclusion › Do not support the Two-
Level Game Theory
› Bolster the argument
presented by the
Europeanization Model

Cases – Point 1 Cases – Point 2

› Show that the Two-Level › Domestic Constraints:
Game Theory does not Russian scientists, Polish
explain the ratification companies
process of the Kyoto › Neither of the domestic
Protocol. constraints managed to stall
the final ratification.

Cases – Point 3 Europeanization Model

› Both countries had different › The European Union was
reasons to ignore their the key player in promoting
domestic constraints. the ratification of the Kyoto
Protocol.
10
 Takeaway
Questions
Question 1:
We have so far witnessed
how the European Union
exerted pressure on its
candidates during the Kyoto
Protocol. Then, are there
any cases where any types
of international institutions
played a significant role in
having a number of
countries sign a treaty?
Question 3:
Is the model of subordinating
domestic politics in favor of
the European Nations
sustainable in the long term?
Why or why not?
Question 2:
One of the weaknesses of
the Two-Level Game Theory
is that it fails to consider the
possibility in which political
actors may have chosen to
constrain themselves for
strategic reasons. Under
what circumstances do you
think political actors would
choose to constrain
themselves domestically?
Question 4:
It has been more than two
decades since the Kyoto
Protocol was ratified, when we
look back on it right now, do
you think it has made a
positive impact on helping
improve climate change?