Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
• NOTE: The ruling in Cabrera v. Ysaac (2014), that a contract of sale which
purports to sell a specific or definite portion of unpartitioned land is null
and void ab initio, is an aberration.
Arambulo v. Nolasco (2014)
• A co-owner cannot abe forced to sell his share in the co-ownership by
invoking Article 491 of the Civil Code. While alienation of the thing by sale
of the property is an act of strict dominion and, therefore, an act of
alteration, it does not mean that a sale of commonly owned real property
is covered by the second paragraph of Article 491, such that if a co–owner
withholds consent to the sale, the courts, upon a showing of a clear
prejudice to the common interest, may, as adequate relief, order the grant
of the withheld consent.
• Instead, the applicable law is Article 493 of the Civil Code, which clearly
establishes that each co–owner shall have full ownership of his part and of
its fruits and benefits. That part which ideally belongs to them, or their
mental portion, may be disposed of as they please, independent of the
decision of their co–owners. Insofar as the sale of co–owned properties is
concerned, there is no common interest that may be prejudiced should
one or more of the co–owners refuse to sell the co–owned property.
Cruz v. Catapang (2008)
The construction of a house on the co-owned
property is an act of dominion. Therefore, it is an
alteration falling under Article 491 of the Civil Code.
As such, when only one of the co-owners gave his
consent to a third person to construct a house on
the co-owned property, the other co-owners can
successfully maintain an action for ejectment and
the consent of only one co-owner will not warrant
the dismissal of the complaint for forcible entry
filed against the builder.
Redemption of co-owned property
• The one who redeemed the co-owned proeprty had the right to be
reimbursed for the redemption price and until reimbursed, holds a
lien upon the subject property for the amount due. [Cabales v. CA,
531 SCRA 691 (2007) ]
• The failure of the other co-owners to reimburse the amounts
advanced by the one who redeemed in payment of the loan does
not entitle the latter to claim full ownership of the co-owned
property. It only gives him the right to claim reimbursement for the
amounts he advanced in behalf of the co-ownership. Such advance
payments are in the nature of necessary expenses for the
preservation of the co-ownership. Article 488 of the Civil Code
provides that necessary expenses may be incurred by one co-
owner, subject to his right to collect reimbursement from the
remaining co-owners. Until reimbursed, he holds a lien upon the
subject property for the amount he advanced. [Taghoy v. Tigol, Jr.,
626 SCRA 341 (2010)
Basbas v. Sayson (2011)
The Court pointed out that even just one of the co-
owners, by himself alone, can bring an action for the
recovery of the co-owned property, even through an
action for revival of judgment, because the enforcement
of the judgment would result in such recovery of
property. Thus, it is not necessary in said action that all of
the parties, in whose favor the case for partition was
adjudged, be made plaintiffs to the action for revival of
judgment. Any which one of said prevailing parties, who
had an interest in the enforcement of the decision, may
file the complaint for revival of judgment, even just by
himself.
Requisites of Article 461, NCC
If indeed a property was the former bed of a river or creek that
changed its course and passed through the property of the
claimant (owner whose land is occupied by the new course),
then, pursuant to Article 461, the ownership of the old bed left
to dry by the change of course was automatically acquired by the
claimant. Before such a conclusion can be reached, the fact of
natural abandonment of the old course must be shown, that is, it
must be proven that the river or creek indeed changed its course
without artificial or man-made intervention. Thus, the claimant
must prove three key elements by clear and convincing evidence.
These are: (1) the old course of the river or creek, (2) the new
course of the river or creek, and (3) the change of course of the
river or creek from the old location to the new location by
natural occurrence. [Galang v. Reyes (2012)]
Second option Under Art. 448, NCC
• In the event that the seller elects to sell the
lot, the price must be fixed at the “prevailing
market value.” The reckoning period for
valuing the property in case the landowner
exercised his rights in accordance with Article
448 shall be at the time the landowner
elected his choice. [Department of Education
v. Casibang (2016); Vda. de Roxas v. Our Lady’s
Foundation, Inc., 692 SCRA 578 (2013), Tuatis
v. Escol (2009)]
Art. 448; Rosales v. Castelltort (2005)
From the time the good faith of the possessor ceases, the
payment of reasonable rent should accordingly commence at
that time since he can no longer avail of the rights provided
under the law for builders in good faith.
[Aquino v. Aguilar, 760 SCRA 444 (2015) and Community Cagayan, Inc. v.
Nanol, 685 SCRA 453 (2012); see also Automat Realty and Development
Corp. v. Dela Cruz, Sr., 737 SCRA 395 (2014) and Department of Education
v. Casibang, 782 SCRA 326 (2016)]
Art. 437; Republic v. Rural Bank of
Kabacan, Inc (2012)
In an expropriation case, the Court uphold the CA ruling
which deleted the inclusion of the value of the excavated
soil in the payment for just compensation because there
is no legal basis to separate the value of the excavated
soil from that of the expropriated properties. The Court,
citing Article 437 of the Civil Code and the case of
National Power Corporation v. Ibrahim (2007), explained
that in the context of expropriation proceedings, the soil
has no value separate from that of the expropriated
land and that just compensation ordinarily refers to the
value of the land to compensate for what the owner
actually loses
Manila Electric Company v. The City Assessor (2015);
Capitol Wireless, Inc. v. Provincial Treasurer of
Batangas (2016)
• As between the Civil Code, a general law governing
property and property relations, and the Local
Government Code, a special law granting local
government units the power to impose real property
tax, the latter prevails for the purpose of determining
which property is subject to real property tax.
• Submarine or undersea communications cables are
akin to electric transmission lines which this Court has
recently declared in Manila Electric Company v. City
Assessor and City Treasurer of Lucena City, as "no
longer exempted from real property tax" and may
qualify as "machinery" subject to real property tax
under the Local Government Code.
Morales v. Olondriz (2016)
On preterition:
• The decedent's will evidently omitted
Francisco Olondriz as an heir, legatee, or
devisee. As the decedent's illegitimate son,
Francisco is a compulsory heir in the direct
line. Unless Morales could show otherwise,
Francisco's omission from the will leads to the
conclusion of his preterition.
Morales v. Olondriz (2016)
On conduct of probate:
• The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the scope of
the court's inquiry is limited to questions on the extrinsic
validity of the will; the probate court will only determine the
will's formal validity and due execution. However, this rule is
not inflexible and absolute. It is not beyond the probate
court's jurisdiction to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the
will when so warranted by exceptional circumstances. When
practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of
the will be passed upon even before it is probated, the
probate court should meet the issue.
Morales v. Olondriz (2016)
The decedent's will does not contain specific
legacies or devices and Francisco's preterition
annulled the institution of heirs. The annulment
effectively caused the total abrogation of the will,
resulting in total intestacy of the inheritance. The
decedent's will, no matter how valid it may appear
extrinsically, is null and void. The conduct of
separate proceedings to determine the intrinsic
validity of its testamentary provisions would be
superfluous. Thus, we cannot attribute error - much
less grave abuse of discretion - on the RTC for
ordering the case to proceed intestate.
Hacbang v. Alo (2015)
• Ownership over the inheritance passes to the
heirs at the precise moment of death - not at
the time the heirs are declared, nor at the
time of the partition, nor at the distribution
of the properties. There is no interruption
between the end of the decedent's
ownership and the start of the
heir/legatee/devisee's ownership.
Hacbang v. Alo (2015)
• For intestate heirs, this means that they are
immediately entitled to their hereditary
shares in the estate even though they may not
be entitled to any particular properties yet.
For legatees and devisees granted specific
properties, this means that they acquire
ownership over the legacies and devises at
that immediate moment without prejudice to
the legitimes of compulsory heirs.
Lee v. Tambago (2008)
• A cursory examination of the acknowledgment of
the will in question shows that this particular
requirement was neither strictly nor substantially
complied with. For one, there was the
conspicuous absence of a notation of the
residence certificates of the notarial witnesses
Noynay and Grajo in the acknowledgment.
Similarly, the notation of the testators old
residence certificate in the same
acknowledgment was a clear breach of the law.
These omissions by respondent invalidated the
will.
Samaniego-Celada v. Abena (2008)
Anent the contestants submission that the
will is fatally defective for the reason that its
attestation clause states that the will is
composed of three (3) pages while in truth
and in fact, the will consists of two (2) pages
only because the attestation is not a part of
the notarial will, the same is not accurate.
Samaniego-Celada v. Abena (2008)
• While it is true that the attestation clause is not a part of
the will, the court, after examining the totality of the will,
is of the considered opinion that error in the number of
pages of the will as stated in the attestation clause is not
material to invalidate the subject will. It must be noted
that the subject instrument is consecutively lettered with
pages A, B, and C which is a sufficient safeguard from the
possibility of an omission of some of the pages. The error
must have been brought about by the honest belief that
the will is the whole instrument consisting of three (3)
pages inclusive of the attestation clause and the
acknowledgement. The position of the court is in
consonance with the doctrine of liberal interpretation
enunciated in Article 809 of the Civil Code
Lopez v. Lopez (2012)
• While Article 809 allows substantial compliance for
defects in the form of the attestation clause, Richard
likewise failed in this respect. The statement in the
Acknowledgment portion of the subject last will and
testament that it "consists of 7 pages including the
page on which the ratification and acknowledgment
are written" cannot be deemed substantial
compliance. The will actually consists of 8 pages
including its acknowledgment which discrepancy
cannot be explained by mere examination of the will
itself but through the presentation of evidence
aliunde.
Echavez v. Dozen Construction and
Development Corp. (2010)
• As the CA correctly found, the purported attestation
clause embodied in the Acknowledgment portion
does not contain the number of pages on which the
deed was written. The exception to this rule in
Singson v. Florentino and Taboada v. Hon.
Rosal,cannot be applied to the present case, as the
facts of this case are not similar with those of Singson
and Taboada. In those cases, the Court found that
although the attestation clause failed to state the
number of pages upon which the will was written, the
number of pages was stated in one portion of the
will. This is not the factual situation in the present
case.
Echavez v. Dozen Construction and
Development Corp. (2010)
• Even granting that the Acknowledgment embodies what
the attestation clause requires, we are not prepared to
hold that an attestation clause and an acknowledgment
can be merged in one statement. That the requirements
of attestation and acknowledgment are embodied in two
separate provisions of the Civil Code (Articles 805 and 806,
respectively) indicates that the law contemplates two
distinct acts that serve different purposes. An
acknowledgment is made by one executing a deed,
declaring before a competent officer or court that the deed
or act is his own. On the other hand, the attestation of a
will refers to the act of the instrumental witnesses
themselves who certify to the execution of the instrument
before them and to the manner of its execution.
Seangio v. Reyes (2006)
• Segundo’s document, although it may initially come across
as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the
formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is
written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself.
An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced
from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not
make an affirmative disposition of the latter’s property,
the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of
disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance
results in the disposition of the property of the testator
Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the
absence of Alfredo.
• Unless the will is probated, the disinheritance cannot be
given effect. [
Testate Estate of Late AlipioAbada v.
Abaja (2005)
• There is no statutory requirement to state in
the will itself that the testator knew the
language or dialect used in the will.[25] This is
a matter that a party may establish by proof
aliunde.
Heirs of Policarpio M. Ureta, Sr. v.
Heirs of Liberato M. Ureta (2011)
• Preterition is thus a concept of testamentary
succession and requires a will. In the case at
bench, there is no will involved. Therefore,
preterition cannot apply.
Palaganas v. Palaganas (2011)
• Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills
executed by foreigners abroad although the
same have not as yet been probated and
allowed in the countries of their execution. A
foreign will can be given legal effects in our
jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states
that the will of an alien who is abroad produces
effect in the Philippines if made in accordance
with the formalities prescribed by the law of the
place where he resides, or according to the
formalities observed in his country.
Del Rosario v. Ferrer (2010)
• The trial court cannot be faulted for passing
upon, in a petition for probate of what was
initially supposed to be a donation mortis
causa, the validity of the document as a
donation inter vivos and the nullity of one of
the donors subsequent assignment of his
rights and interests in the property. The Court
has held before that the rule on probate is not
inflexible and absolute
Orendain, Jr. v. Trusteeship of the Estate of
Dona Margarita Rodriguez (2009)
• The creation of a perpetual trust for the
administration of her properties and the
income accruing therefrom, for specified
beneficiaries is not invalid.
• The trust is upheld, but only insofar as the first
twenty-year period is concerned. The
perpetual prohibition against alienation was
valid only for twenty (20) years.
Arado v. Alcoran (2015)
• As certified in Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate
Court [182 SCRA427,438 (1990)], the right of
representation is not available to illegitimate
descendants of legitimate children in the
inheritance of a legitimate grandparent.
CIR v. Primetown Property Group, Inc. (2007)
CIR vs. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc (2010)
Co v. New Prosperity Plastic Products (2014)
Sec. 19(1) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which requires the liquidation, partition and
distribution of properties prior to the issuance of decree of nullity of the marriage
applies only to a void marriage under Article 40 of the Family Code when said rule
mentions of “decree of absolute nullity” and not to a marriage declared void by
reason of psychological incapacity.
In the latter case, since the applicable property regime is that provided in Article
147 of the Family Code, the declaration of nullity can already be made even
without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties because it is not
necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for
declaration of nullity of marriage.
Family Home
Eulogio v. Bell, Sr. (2015)
If the increase in value is by reason of an involuntary
improvement, like the conversion into a residential area or
the establishment of roads and other facilities, the one
establishing the family home should not be punished by
making his home liable to creditors.
To warrant, therefore, the execution sale of the family
home under Article 160, the following facts are required to
be established: (1) there was an increase in its actual value;
(2) the increase resulted from voluntary improvements on
the property introduced by the persons constituting the
family home, its owners or any of its beneficiaries; and (3)
the increased actual value exceeded the maximum allowed
under Article 157.
Family Home
Cabang v. Basay (2009)
It cannot be established on property held in co-ownership with third
persons. However, it can be established partly on community property, or
conjugal property and partly on the exclusive property of either spouse
with the consent of the latter. If constituted by an unmarried head of a
family, where there is no communal or conjugal property existing, it can be
constituted only on his or her own property.
IRR OF RA 9523:
Any of the following adoption proceedings in court does not
require a Certification Declaring a Child Legally Available for
Adoption: (1) adoption of an illegitimate child by any of
his/her biological parent; (2) adoption of a child by his/her
step-parent; or (3) adoption of a child by a relative within the
fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity.
Adoption
In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim
and Michael Jude P. Lim (2009)
The requirement of joint adoption by husband
and wife is mandatory. According to the Court,
the use of the word “shall” in Section 7 of the
DAA means that joint adoption by the
husband and the wife is mandatory.
Adoption
Castro v. Gregorio (2014)
In the adoption by a spouse of his illegitimate
child, the consent of other spouse is mandatory.
The other spouse and other legitimate children
must be personally notified through personal
service of summons and it is not enough that
they be deemed notified through constructive
service; otherwise, the court does not validly
acquire jurisdiction over the proceedings and the
decision of the court is null and void.
The remedy of other spouse is annulment of
adoption decree.
Adoption
Foster Care Act of 2012
In case of adoption of the foster child by the
designated foster parents, the trial custody
period may be partially waived to the extent of
the period equivalent to the period in which the
foster child has been under the foster care of the
foster parents; provided, that a harmonious
relationship exists between the foster child, the
foster parents, and, where applicable, the foster
family.
Adoption
Bartolome v. SSS (2014)
When the adopter dies during the time that the
adopted is still a minor or incapacitated, the parental
authority of the biological parent is deemed to have
been restored. Considering that adoption is a personal
relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by
adoption, there shall be no one left to care for minor
adopted child if the adopter passed away, hence, the
parental authority of the biological parent should be
deemed to have been restored, applying by analogy
the provisions of Section 20 of the DAA.
Support
Lim v. Lim (2009)
the obligation to provide legal support passes on to
ascendants not only upon default of the parents but
also for the latter’s inability to provide sufficient
support.
The second option of giving support may not be availed
of when the wife and the minor children left the house
of the in-laws where they were then living when she
caught her husband in a “very compromising situation”
with the in-house midwife of the mother-in-law. It
amounts to moral obstacle.
Support
Mangonon v. CA (2006)
The second option may not be availed of when the
relations between the parties were already strained
brought about by the filing of the suit for declaration of
legitimacy and support and the denial by the grandfather of
familial relationship with the grandchildren, which
amounted to legal and moral obstacle for the availment of
the second option according to the Court.
Lam v. Chua (2004)
Any judgment granting support never becomes final and is
always subject to modification, depending upon the needs
of the child and capabilities of the parents to give support.
Parental Authority
Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto (2005) and Gamboa-
Hirsch v. CA (2007)
The rule that no child under seven years of age
shall be separated from the mother is called the
“tender-age presumption.”
Dacasin v. Dacasin (2010)
The statutory awarding of sole parental custody
to the mother under the second paragraph of
Article 213 of the Family Code is mandatory and
any agreement to the contrary is void.
Parental Authority
Becket v. Sarmiento, Jr. (2013)
Custody, even if previously granted by a
competent court in favor of a parent, is not
permanent.
Thus, in a very real sense, a judgment
involving the custody of a minor child cannot
be accorded the force and effect of res
judicata.
Funeral
Valino v. Adriano (2014)
The wishes of the decedent with respect to his funeral are
not, however, absolute, as said wishes are limited by Article
305 of the Civil Code in relation to Article 199 of the Family
Code, and subject the same to those charged with the right
and duty to make the proper arrangements to bury the
remains of their loved-one. Thus, if the husband was
cohabiting with another woman at the time of his death
and expressly wished that he be buried in the family
mausoleum of the paramour against the wishes of his
legitimate family, said wish cannot prevail over the right
and duty of the loved ones under Article 305 of the Civil
Code to make the proper arrangements.