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System level breaks on the Steps to War:

Major Power Interstate Managerial


Coordination

Konstantinos Travlos, Ozyegin University


Gennady Rudckevich, Georgia College
Ali Fisunoglu, Carlos III University of Madrid
Managerial Coordination and the Steps to War
Interstate Managerial Coordination (IMaC)
“Rules Making Game” within Issue Paradigm
Associated with decreased likelihood of certain types of war
Quantitative Qualitative
Wallensteen 1984 Randle 1987
Travlos 2014,2016 Miller 1995
Steiner 2004
Steps to War
Theoretical Framework within Issue Paradigm
(Vasquez 1993, Senese and Vasquez 2008)
Power Politics associated with war over territorial issues

Potential connection between the two


Presence of forms of IMaC decreased Steps to War pressures.
(Vasquez and Hanehan ,2001)
Why Managerial Coordination

Selection

Elites
Nicholas II
WAR Source :Wikimedia
Commons
WEARINESS

WAR Aversion to War


Domestic RADICAL SOCIAL
Power EVOLUTIONARY
Structure POTENTIAL OF
WAR

Managerial Coordination
Otto Von Bismarck
Source: Wikimedia Commons
How managerial coordination impacts the Steps to
War

Managerial WAR
Coordination
ALLIANCES

ARMS
RACES

ENDOGENEOUS &
EXOGENEOUS
CAUSES OF WAR
IMaC: A Categorical Instrument
Coordination Coordination Managerial Shared Membership in Adversarial Example
Category Category Alliance International Pacific Alliances
Name Value (Multilateralism) Institutions and (Adversarial
(linear 1: Present Regimes Coordination)
adjustment) 0: Absent (Consultation) -1.5: Present
1: Present 0: Absent
0: Absent
Early Vienna
“Universalist 2 (4)= 1 1 0 Congress
Regime” 1816-1822
1(3)= 1 0 0 Later Vienna
“Managerial Congress
Regulation” 1841-1853
1(3)= 0 1 0

“Bounded 0.5 (2.5)= 1 1 -1.5 N/A in 1715-


Regulation” 2010
“Anemic 0 (2)= 0 0 0 League of
Regulation” Nations
1922-1934
“Particularist -0.5 (1.5)= 1 0 -1.5 Detente Cold
Regulation” War Period
-0.5(1.5)= 0 1 -1.5 1971-1989

“Adversarial -1.5 (0.5)= 0 0 -1.5 Main Cold


Particularism” War Period
1950-1970
Some preliminary results
We find that increasing managerial
coordination among major powers has a
negative statistical association with major
powers ascending to unilateral alliances with
minor powers (1715-2001 period)

We do not find any clear association between


increasing managerial coordination and major
power support for NAGs.
What next?
Redo alliance evaluation for 1715-2010 period.

Look at influence of increasing managerial


coordination on major power alignment in
territorial dispute dyads.

Look at influence of increasing managerial


coordination on major power arms transfers to
minor powers engaged in territorial disputes.
Appendix
Element of Managerial Variable Temporal Range Sources
Coordination
Multilateralism Major Power Managerial 1715-1815 Gibler 1999,2010
Alliance
1816-2010 ATOP

Membership in Active 1715-1815 None Exist


IGOs 1816-2010 Hansen, Mitchell and
Consultation Nementh (2008)
;Bercovitch and
Schneider (2000)

Membership in Peace 1715-1815


Congresses 1816-2010 Randle 1987

Major Power Adversarial 1715-1815 Gibler 1999,2010


Alliances
1816-1945 ATOP
Adversarial Coordination
Major Power Linked 1946-2010 ATOP and Colaresi et
Strategic Rivalries al. (2008)
Appendix
Appendix
Variable Model I Model II
Ascension to Major Power Unilateral Ascension to Major Power Unilateral
Alliance Alliance
IMaC -.228537 -.4977284
(.09094)** (.2165409)**
Sensitivity to Major Power activity .1864959 -.1978676 (.2427755)
(.1010493)
Major Power a Demoracy -.0375582 -.0068245 (.1747032)
(.1706359)
Major Power a Nuclear Power -.0304011 .0001752 (.2672666)
(.2623463)
System year has Dominant Sea Power .3244885 .8256171
(.2131952) (.4284499)
Proportion of Major Powers that are 1.529415 .3836587
Democracies during system year (.4107855)*** (.8919646)

Sensitivity * IMaC N/A .1583008


(.1147867)
Sensitivity * Sea Power N/A -.3245934 (.2149257)

Sensitivity * Proportion of Democratic N/A .6837067


Major Powers (.4491634)

Constant -1.986794 -1.368048


(.2747225) (.4623905)
N 1158 1158
Log likelihood -552.9751 -550.23946
LR chi2(6) 45.74 51.21
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000
Appendix
Appendix
ImaC Positive Change Neative Change
(Row (Row
percentages) percentages)
0.5 13 (38.24%) 6 (26.09%)
1.5 1 (2.94 %) 2 (8.70%)
2.5 5 (14.71 %) 7 (30.43%)
3 14 (41.18 %) 4 (17.39)%
4 1 (2.94 %) 4 (17.39)%
Pearson chi2(4) = Pearson chi2(4) =
8.9377 7.1838
Pr = 0.063 Pr = 0.126

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