4-The South China Sea

International Conflict Resolution

Class
28 January 2010

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 South China Sea
Paracel Islands-Xisha, Hoang Sa
Spratly Islands-Nansha, Truong Sa
Territorial conflict involving six
states, China, Vietnam,
Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia,
Brunei
China the locally dominant power
claims sovereignty over all the
area
Sovereignty entails control of
energy, contiguous gas and oil
fields
Relates to strategic sea lanes which
concern external powers, Japan
and the US
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 China’s claim
China’s grievance, it has
historical rights in the area
which have not been
recognised by others.
Ching dynasty China protests in 1877
when French vessel intruded into
the area, [Ambassador in London]
Boundary agreement with France in
1887
France in 1933 declares the Spratly and
Paracel islands to be part of Annam
Japan in 1939 occupies main islands
San Francisco Conference 1951 divests
Japan of all rights, but title not
decided
Communist China protests, Zhou Enlai 15
August 1951

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 China’s grievance
 From China’s perspective, legitimate historical rights were
dismissed by the allied powers
 What are China’s rights? First discovery and historical contact,
 Rights were separated from actual occupation, because of the
presence of the US navy during the Cold War
 International Law, the Island of Palmas 1928, Permanent
Court of Arbitration
 Decided that title was confirmed by continuous and
uninterrupted occupation

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 Effective occupation
Philippines,
– Tomas Cloma 1956 and Kalayaan.
– Res nullius or lapsed sovereignty,
– Marcos Presidential declarations,
1971, 1978
– 8 islands occupied in 1978 as
terra nullius
Taiwan
– Occupied Itu Aba from June 1956
until 1971, a response to Cloma
– The largest island, with 600
soldiers, airstrip and water supply
– Visited by President Chen Shiu
Bian in February 2008

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 Other claims
Vietnam
Claim that Nguyen Dynasty declared title in
1816
South Vietnam occupies islands in response to
Cloma
Demands reversion to original owner after San
Francisco conference
South Vietnam declaration of SCS in October
1956
Malaysia
1979 map staked the claim, based on
continental shelf
1983, three islands occupied, two more in 1999
Clashing claim with the Philippines
Brunei
Louisa reef
Indonesia-
Natuna Islands EEZ

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 Vietnam-China conflict
First naval clash, China removes
South Vietnam from the West
Paracels in January 1974
Reunified Vietnam in 1975, begins
occupation of islands, eventually
27 islands and reefs
China insists that North Vietnam in
1958 accepted Chinese
sovereignty
Vietnam from 1975 seeks Soviet
support, Soviet ally from
November 1978
China deprived of the
opportunity to demonstrate
effective occupation

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 China and effective occupation
The Central Military Commission [CMC]
China’s highest military policy body
Operational command in crisis
How the military influences decision making

From 14th Party Congress, 1992 to 15th Party Congress, 1997

Chairman-Jiang Zemin
Vice chairmen
Liu Huaqing,
Zhang Wannian [from 1995],
Chi Haotian [from 1995]
.

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 The Central Military Commission
Liu Huaqing [member 1992-97]
Naval commander, the importance of naval power, the
development of a “ocean-going”navy
Defence of China’s maritime resources
Zhang Wannian [member 1995-2002]
Role in Taiwan crisis 1995-96
Chi Haotian Defence Minister and member 1995-2002
Cao Gangchuan Defence Minister and Vice Chairman
Insistence on China’s maritime claims
The link with Taiwan

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 China’s expansion
Fiery Cross Reef clash 14
March 1988
Naval clash with Vietnam
China occupies 7 islands,
2 more in 1992
China’s territorial law 25
February 1992
SCS defined as inland sea,
with the right to evict
foreign military vessels
Restatement of claim as
law

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 The Philippines and Mischief reef

Chinese structures
discovered in February
1995, additional
structures over 1996-
1999.
Hainanese fishing
interests, supported by
Chinese naval units.
Beijing approval
Shock for the Philippines

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Chinese structures

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Scarborough Reef

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 Philippine response
President Ramos in 1995, Chinese structures
can stay temporarily
ASEAN and ASEAN Regional Forum
UN
Involve the US through Visiting Forces
Agreement VFA, signed 1998, ratified by the
Senate May 1999
US as balance to China
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 China’s motives
National reunification and
definition of borders
Pre modern China had frontiers,
traditional areas of influence
Modern China has turned frontiers
into borders
India and the Himalayan region
Peripheral territory and the
demarcation of China’s maritime
borders, separate but linked
with Taiwan
Who can be a traitor before China?
Li Ching-Fong and the Treaty of
Shimonoseki [17 April 1895]
China ceded Taiwan to Japan
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 Strategic factor
 Maritime control over sea approaches to South China
 Protection of SLOCs and ocean commerce
 Soviet threat to China 1979-88 from Vietnam.
 The South China Sea is a critical area for sea lane
traffic to Japan, Korea, and Southern China
 China’s dependence on foreign trade, oil and
resource imports

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SLOCs

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 Economic factor
China’s rising energy needs
Net oil importer as from 1993
Imported oil now 20% of
consumption
By 2010 imports to reach 40%
of consumption
Belief in great energy potential
of SCS.
China and Middle East, Sudan,
Nigeria, Venezuela, Siberian
oil fields

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 Oil reserves
Chinese estimates
23-30 bb,
168-220 bb
US estimates,
7 bb, same level as
Norway or
Azerbaijan
28 bb is possible
bb billion barrels

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 Resolution?
 China is the main actor,
 A legal resolution would be possible between ASEAN members alone
 But each claim affects China’s policy in a different way.
 National unification permits no compromise, economic and strategic
motives may allow compromise
 China has compromised over territorial disputes with others
 Nepal 1961, Pakistan 1963, Mongolia 1962, Burma 1960, Afghanistan
1963, Russia 1991, 2004
 Agreements negotiated when Beijing wanted to improve bilateral
relations, incentive was to improve relations
 Will there be a similar incentive in this case?

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 Legal resolution
UNCLOS 1982 [UN convention of the Law of the Sea]
How UNCLOS contributed to the problem, allowed extensive
claims
 Historical claims based on first discovery are not enough-
removes China
 Exclusive Economic Zone [EEZ] is a claim for resources up to
320 km, not for islands.
 Islands have an EEZ and continental shelf
 Overlapping and conflicting claims

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 Islands and rocks
Islands
Article 121 (10) UNCLOS 1982 defines an island as “ a naturally formed area of
land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide,”
Islands have their own EEZs, and continental shelves
Article 121 (3) Rocks that cannot cannot sustain human habitation or an
economic life of their own cannot have maritime zones
Article 60, artificial islands and installations
May be constructed in the EEZ, but do not possess the status of islands
No territorial sea, no EEZ or continental shelf
Possession of rocks and reefs brings no benefits

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 Rocks and reefs
 But rocks may be entitled to maritime zones, since article 121 says that rocks
can have not an EEZ or continental shelf, territorial sea and a contiguous zone,
 During UNCLOS negotiations, island states demanded that small offshore
features should generate maritime zones, though they may be uninhabited,
 If off shore waters of rocks and reefs are regularly used for fishing, temporary
shelter,
 Economic life may mean the use of waters around the features, tourist site for
diving and bird watching
 Actual economic worth rather than economic viability,

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UNCLOS-legal zones

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 Continental shelf
Continental shelf is a claim for resources, not for islands
A continental shelf can be claimed beyond the EEZ, from 320 km
to 500 km
or 150 km [100 m] from 2,500 metre isobath

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 A legal resolution
Based on EEZ and continental shelf
claims
Adjustment and delimitation of
continental shelves according to
Article 83 of UNCLOS
Agreement on the basis of
international law or legal
procedures
Allows for agreement between
states concerned
China claims “indisputable
sovereignty” and refuses to
discuss any legal resolution

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 Workshop approach
Managing potential conflicts in the South China Sea
Annually since 1990, funded by CIDA until 2001
At first ASEAN + China, then expanded to 11 states represented,
participants in non official capacity
Created technical working groups, biodiversity, CBMs
Ali Alatas in 1993
called for up grading of workshop to governmental level “government to
government dialogue”
Involvement of Japan and Australia
China’s opposition, workshops not the place for formal talks
Indonesia as mediator, what are the conditions for effective mediation?

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 Political resolution
 China refuses to discuss the issue at ASEAN and the ARF, will
not accept multilateral negotiations.
 The Declaration on Conduct [DOC]
ASEAN-China Agreement reached November 2002
4 November 2002 declaration on the “conduct of parties in the South China
Sea” signed
Manila wanted ban on new structures, this was deleted.
 Proposal by ASEAN and China scholars for a South China Sea Economic
Cooperation Organization (SCSEC) March 2008, to manage the resources
of the area
ASEAN hopes to bind China to a regime to govern the
islands
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 Joint development
Chinese Premier Li Peng Singapore August 1990
Sovereignty can be set aside for joint development
What joint development?
China and Crestone concession 1992
Vietnam and Arco and Mobil concessions.
Qian Qichen at 25th ASEAN foreign Ministers meeting, July 1992, when the
time is “ripe.”
Since then China has continued to declare interest in joint development while
rejecting proposals for joint development.
One example of joint development, the Joint Seismic Marine Undertaking
[JMSU] the Philippines, China, Vietnam in March 2005, strongly criticised
in the Philippines

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 Can China negotiate?
Negotiating strategy, various views
– As China rises ASEAN will offer more concessions
– Why negotiate now when China could obtain all?
– China is positioning itself for negotiations
No consensus
– PLA and economic, foreign ministry conflict
– Involves definition of China’s borders
The territorial claim prevents China from negotiating over economic
resources
In the meantime oil companies are promoting development projects with
Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia

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 Rising tensions
 In 2008 China warns ExxonMobil and British Petroleum that their business with
China could be affected if they went ahead with development projects with
Vietnam
 China imposed a fishing ban on areas between May 16 and August 1, 2009, the
area overlaps with Vietnam’s claim in the East Sea.
 Vietnamese fishing vessels in central provinces from stay at home because of the
ban, fishermen suffer
 China intensifies sea patrols in the area
 Chinese arrest Vietnamese fisherman and demand exorbitant ransom for their
fishing vessels
 From 2005 to the end of March 2009, 74 fishing vessels were arrested by other
countries, totaling 714 fishermen, 33 boats and 373 fishermen were arrested by
China.
 Vietnam Buys 6 Russian Kilo Class Subs, 12 Su-30MK2 Flanker-C multirole fighters
[submarine deal is worth $1.8 billion]

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 China’s approach
Under Hu Jintao, China has stressed “peaceful rise”
Integration into the global economy
Membership of international and regional institutions
December 2005, replaced by “peaceful development”, Foreign
Relations White Paper
To avoid connotations of hegemony, or disturbance
Rising nationalism may not be contained by the political
leadership “we are number one”
Nationalist outbursts against Japan April 2005, the text book issue
The party encourages nationalism as support since ideology has
withered, but nationalism my become uncontrollable
Hu jintao-Wen Jiabao have uncertain control over the military, as
military spending increases the CMC obtains greater autonomy over
defence issues

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 Energy cooperation as resolution
 ASEAN and ARF should promote energy cooperation
in the South China Sea
 Proposals to involve five national oil companies in
joint exploration, drilling and eventually production
China National Oil Company, PetroVietnam, Petronas,
Pertamina and Philippine National Oil Company
An extension of JMSU across the claim area
A complicated formula for revenue allocation would be
required based on EEZ claims
To bring China into jonit development with others

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 Close
The international community expects compromise and legal
resolution of South China Sea to allow development of oil
resources
Development is hindered by lack of progress over the legal
resolution of claims
Limited bilateral development projects are possible, but China
and also Vietnam object to multilateral development
China is playing a waiting game, as it rises it may expect
ASEAN countries to surrender their claims for the sake of
good relations
Any military action would destroy China’s “peaceful rise,” low
level action to intimidate ASEAN is possible.
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