Labor Standards

Report
Group 4
Section 8. Probationary
Employee
DEFINITION
 INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC MIGRATION COMMISSIONvs NLRC
(Definition of Probation)

FACTS

International Catholic Migration Commission engaged the services of Bernadetted Galang on January
24, 1983 as a probationary cultural orientation teacher with a monthly salary of P2,000.00. On April 22,
1983, she was informed, orally and in writing, that she will be terminated for failure to meet the prescribed
standards of her employer as evidenced by the result of the teacher evaluation program conducted by
her supervisors. Galang filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice and unpaid wages
against ICMC. Galang alleged that her dismissal was illegal because it was effected without valid cause.
ICMC contended that Galang was dismissed because of her failure to qualify as a regular employee.
Hence, she is not entitled to the remainder of her salary for the unexpired portion of her six-month
probationary period.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Bernadette Galang is entitled to her salary for the unexpired
portion of her six-month probationary employment?
RULING:
NO. Galang was terminated during her probationary period of
employment for failure to qualify as a regular member of petitioner’s
teaching staff in accordance with its reasonable standards. Galang
was found by petitioner to be deficient in classroom management,
teacher-student relationship and teaching techniques. Failure to qualify
as a regular employee in accordance with the reasonable standards of
the employer is a just cause for terminating a probationary employee
specifically recognized under Article 282(now Article 281) of the Labor
Code.
A probationary employee is one who is on trial by an employer during which the
employer determines whether or not he is qualified for permanent employment. A
probationary appointment is made to afford the employer an opportunity to
observe the fitness of a probationer while at work, and to ascertain whether he
will become a proper and efficient employee. The word “probationary,”as used
to describe the period of employment, implies the purpose of the term or period,
but not its length.

Being in the nature of a “trial period” the essence of a probationary period of

employment fundamentally lies in the purpose or objective sought to be
attained by both the employer and the employee during said period. The
length of time is immaterial in determining the correlative rights of both in dealing
with each other during said period.
Phil. Federation of Credit Cooperatives Inc vs NLRC (1998)
Facts:

Philippine Federation of Credit Cooperatives Inc. employed Victoria Abril

as a Junior Auditor/Field Examiner. She worked as an office secretary in
1985 and as a cashier=designate for another four months. When she
resumed her position as an office secretary, she went on leave until she
gave birth to a baby girl. Upon her return, she discovered that somebody
was already permanently appointed to her position. Nevertheless, she
accepted the position of Regional Field Officer by signing a contract which
stipulated that her employment stats shall be probationary for a period of 6
months.
After a year, she was terminated by PFCCI. Victoria Abril then filed a
complaint against PFCCI for illegal dismissal. PFCCI contended that Abril’s
employment was that of a casual or contractual employment which was
fixed for a specific project or undertaking.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the nature of the employment of Victoria Abril is a casual or

contractual employment?
RULING

No. Victoria Abril attained the status of a regular employee. The Court
defined a casual employee as one who is neither regular nor project
employees. The Court also defined a regular employee as on whose work is
necessary or desirable to the usual business of the employer. The
employment contract was ambiguous because the initial statements of the
contract show that Abril’s employment was for a fixed period, but the
succeeding provisions stated that she shall be under probationary status.
The Court ruled that when the contract of employment is ambiguous, any
ambiguity therein should be construed strictly against the party who
prepared it. Finding no grave abuse of discretion, the Court affirmed the
decision of the NLRC. Regardless of the designation of Abril’s employment
status, a probationary employee who completed the probationary period
and was allowed to work thereafter has become a regular employee who
may be dismissed only for just or authorized causes under the law.
Therefore, the dismissal based on the alleged expiration of the contract
was illegal.
PURPOSE

Reporter: JAYSON CUTARAN

Phil-employ Services vs Rodriguez
GR 152616 , Mar 31, 2006

Anita Rodriguez applied with Philemploy Services and

Resources, Inc. Anita was hired and deployed for Taiwan as a
domestic helper for a one-year contract with principal Chao
Hung Ching in Taiwan with a monthly salary of NT$14,010.00. It
was agreed that she would undergo a forty (40) days
probationary period before she becomes a regular domestic
helper.
During the first ten (10) days of her probationary period,
respondent was observed to be inattentive and incompetent to
perform her duties and responsibilities. She could not cook and
do simple things as washing clothes. It was the principal’s
mother-in-law who did most of the household chores, like
babysitting of the child. Respondent kept insisting that she be
allowed to go home on account of her incapability to perform her
job. After the first ten (10) days’ work with the principal
employer, complainant returned to the Philippines.
ISSUE:

Is prior notice required in terminating a

domestic helper?
RULING
Yes. Even if it were true that Anita’s foreign employer terminated her
services after 10 days of her employment, there could be no illegal
dismissal as the termination was effected during the agreed
probationary period. The law in protecting the rights of the laborer
authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer.
While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the
protection of the working class, it should not be supposed that every
labor dispute would automatically be decided in favor of labor.
However, although Anita’s employment was terminated because she failed to
meet the standards of her foreign employer, still it is necessary and obligatory
to afford Anita her basic right to notice. Section 2, Rule 1, Book VI of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code provides:
Security of tenure. (a) In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not
terminate the services of an employee except for just or authorized causes as
provided by law, and subject to the requirements of due process.
(b) The foregoing shall also apply in cases of probationary employment;
provided, however, that in such cases, termination of employment due to
failure of the employee to qualify in accordance with the standards of the
employer made known to the former at the time of engagement may also be a
ground for termination of employment.
 CRUZ VS. NLRC
February 7, 2000
FACTS: The private respondent Norkis Distributors Inc., is a domestic
corporation. It is engaged in the business of selling motorcycles and
household appliances. It was operating in Mandaue City, Cebu; it had its
branch in Valencia, Bukidnon where the petitioner Cruz was employed.
On October 14, 1990, while petitioners and her co-employees were busy
working, petitioner collapsed and was brought to the hospital. From then
on, she was not able to report for work.
On December 28, 1990, she sent a letter to respondent Norkis to verify
her status of employment but as an answer, she received a termination
letter dated November 2, 1990 citing health reasons for the dismissal.

On March 18, 1991, they filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against
the private respondent praying for payment of separation pay and other
money claims before the NLRC Branch of Cayagan de Oro City. The
Labor Arbitration Branch ruled in favor of the petitioner. From the said
decision, both parties appealed to the NLRC where the decision was
reversed and set aside.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the dismissal of petitioner is

legal.
RULING:
Under Section 8, Rule 1 Book VI of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Labor Code, for a disease to be a valid ground
for the dismissal of the employee, the continued employment of
such employee is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health or
to the health of his co-employees and there must be a
certification by a competent public health authority that the
disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be
cured within a period of six months even with proper medical
treatment.
 There is merit in petitioner’s submission that the award of moral and
exemplary damages in her favor is warranted by her unjustified dismissal.
Award of moral and exemplary damages for an illegally dismissed employee
is proper where the employee had been harassed and arbitrarily terminated
by the employer.

The Court has consistently accorded the working class a right to

recover damages for unjust dismissals tainted with bad faith, where the
motive of the employer in dismissing the employee is far from noble. The
petition is granted.
 GRAND MOTOR PARTS CORPORATIONvs MINISTER OF LABOR

FACTS: Respondent Balicena was the Branch Manager of the petitioner

company’s Iloilo Branch. Prior to his employment in Grand Motor, he
was the Finance Officer of Warner, Barnes, & Co., when allegedly Mr.
Alfredo Cisneros (acting branch manager) induced him to apply for the
position of Branch Manager, as their company (petitioner) was looking
for a CPA. He applied for the job and was accepted. He started working
for the petitioner company on April 1 but resigned from his position in
Warner, Barnes, & Co. only on April 28.
Terminated after 4 months of work because of infractions alleged by the petitioner, such as:
● Failed to submit promptly the monthly Income and Loss Statement, Comparative Projections
& Actual Sales Report;
● Cash Sales of the Iloilo Branch went down to P91,318.41 for June, 1980 versus sales for the
month of May, 1980 in the sum of P174,697.77;
● Belicena in violation of company policy and without clearance from the head office in Cebu,
extended personal accounts in favor of 15 persons which as of November, 1980 produced
delinquent accounts amounting to P18,435.80; and
● Belicena claimed lack of knowledge of the vehicular accident caused by a subordinate and
failed to provide prompt administrative disciplinary action against the erring employee.

They claimed that Balicena is only a probationary employee, which would be observed by the
company for 4-6 months and that Balicena knew that there is a possibility that he would not get
the job.
Balicena on the other hand alleged that he is a regular employee,
although he was not able to present any contract establishing his status
as a regular employee; that the mishap involving the company's vehicle
which was used without his permission and knowledge could not be
blamed upon him; that the alleged reports which he failed to send were
not reminded to him, verbally or in writing; that his sales for the period
April to August, 1980 is higher compared to that for the same period in
1979; and that the alleged accounts remaining unpaid as of 11/6/1980
would have been collected in full if he were still the Manager, among
other things.
ISSUE:

Whether or not private respondent's employment as Branch Manager

was temporary or probationary, and not regular and permanent .
RULING:
Balicena was a probationary employee:

There was no written proof of Balicena’s appointment or employment as

regular and permanent Branch Manager.

There was the fact that he assumed his work as of April 1 but resigned
from his previous company only on April 28, meaning that if he was
really appointed as regular and permanentthen he would have
resigned immediately from his old company
The Court cannot sustain Balicena’s claim, the absence of a written
contract due to the fact that contracts were given only to those who will
pass the probationary period and the rank-and-file employee, not to
those managerial ones, arecontrary to usual business practice
especially in multi-million enterprises as the petitioner corporation.

● Balicena had never been hired as manager, and the petitioner

company and Balicena’s former company are engaged in different
kinds of businessso it was necessary for Balicena to undergo a
period of probation to test his qualifications, skills and
experience since managing is a new experience for him.
The employer has the right or is at liberty to choose as to who will
be hired and who will be declined. It is within the exercise of this right
to select his employees that the employer may set or fix probationary
periodwithin which the latter may test and observed the conduct of the
former before hiring him permanently. "The right of the laborer to sell his
labor to such persons as he may choose is, in its essence, the same as
the right of an employer to purchased labor from any person whom it
chooses. The employer and the employee have thus an equality of
rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
ESCORPIZO VS UNIVERSITY OF
BAGUIO
FACTS

- (June 13, 1989)Petitioner was initially hired by respondent as high school classroom teacher.
- It was stated that her appointment was probationary in nature; subject to respondent’s rules
- (March 18, 1991) Respondent informed petitioner that the employment was terminated due to her
failure to pass the PBET
- Petitioner appealed and respondent granted it; she was allowed to work during school year 1991-
1992
- Her continued employment was conditioned on her passing the PBET
- Petitioner failed the second time
- Respondent evaluated the teachers performance to determine who will be in the list for the next
school year; petitioner was not included
- Petitioner passed the exam but the respondent no longer renewed her contract of employment on
the ground that she failed to qualify as a regular teacher
- Labor arbiter ruled in favor of the university
- NLRC affirmed
ISSUE

- WON Escorpizo became a regular employee

RULING

- A probationary employee is one who, for a given period of time, is being observed and evaluated to
determine whether or not he is qualified for permanent employment
- A probationary employment affords the employer an opportunity to observe the skill, competence,
and attitude of a probationer.
- Escorpizo satisfied the first requirement of her employment, she did not fulfill the second. She had
failed twice at the time here probationary period ended.
- When she was given, upon her plea, a teaching load in the next succeeding year, it was already
beyond the two-year probationary period
- Under no circumstance could the continued employment alone beyond the two-year period bestow
on here the status of a regular employee.
- Petition is dismissed
Employer Right Set
Period/Obligation
Reporter: Bellen, Toni
Grand Motor Parts Corporation v MOLE
130 SCRA 436 [1984]; G.R. No. L-59858; July 6, 1984

FACTS: The VA decided for private respondent Narciso Belicena, Jr. purely on the basis of the position
papers of the petitioner corporation GMPC and the private respondent. The Regional Director of the
Ministry of Labor affirmed. GMPC alleges that they were denied due process and there was grave abuse of
discretion, since Belicena was a probationary employee and they had the right to terminate his
employment.

ISSUE: Whether Belicena’s employment was rightly terminated

HELD: Yes. Art. 282 of the Labor Code provides that a probationary employee may be terminated after 6
months for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee. There was loss of confidence here
due to Belicena’s performance as manager. It is sufficient there is some basis for such loss of confidence.
Orient Express Placement Philippines v NLRC
273 SCRA 256 [1997]; G.R. No. 124766; January 30, 1997

FACTS: Private respondent Luisa Collins was a liaison officer for Orient tasked with dealing with the POEA.
She was fired by President and Gen. Manager Dominador Batenga, Jr. on the same day she was accused of
exacting excessive placement fees. Collins filed a complaint to the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC for illegal
dismissal, various money claims, damages and atty’s fees, and the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the
respondent after investigation (Batenga’s cousin ordered her to accept excessive fees, and twin
requirements of notice and hearing not complied). NLRC agreed partially but deleted the award of moral
and exemplary damages and atty’s fees for lack of legal basis. Both pet and res filed late MRs.

ISSUE: Whether the late filing of the MRs by both parties is fatal to the present petition

HELD: Yes. In the absence of an MR timely filed within the 10-day reglementary period, NLRC decision
becomes final and executory after 10 calendar days from receipt thereof.
Mitsubishi Motors Philippines Corp. v Chrysler Phils. Labor Union
433 SCRA 206 [2004]; G.R. No. 148738; June 29, 2004

FACTS: Petitioner corp MMPC previously hired private respondent and member of the CPLU Nelson Paras as
a shuttle bus driver and later as a welder-fabricator. Later he was re-hired on a probationary basis as a
manufacturing trainee. After 6 months he received an average rating but after “evaluation of the
Department and Division Managers” it became unsatisfactory and therefore he was not considered for
regularization and received a notice of termination. CPLU says this was actually an offshoot of the heated
argument during CBA negotiations between MMPC Relations Manager and Paras’s wife Cecille who was the
President of the Chrysler Philippines Salaried Employees Union (CPSU). VA said Paras was validly dismissed.
CA disagreed and ruled for Paras, noting that the termination notice was sent after 183 days, more than 6
months (180 days).

ISSUE: Whether Paras was a probationary or now a regular employee, and if so, if illegally dismissed

HELD: Yes.
Mitsubishi Motors Philippines Corp. v Chrysler Phils. Labor Union
433 SCRA 206 [2004]; G.R. No. 148738; June 29, 2004

HELD: As to period:

Normally the SC is not a trier of facts but there is an inconsistency in the decisions of the NLRC and the CA.

Applying Art 13 of the Civil Code:

“probationary period of six (6) months consists of one hundred eighty (180) days. This is in conformity with paragraph one, Article 13 of the Civil Code, which
provides that the months which are not designated by their names shall be understood as consisting of thirty (30) days each. The number of months in the
probationary period, six (6), should then be multiplied by the number of days within a month, thirty (30); hence, the period of one hundred eighty (180) days.

“As clearly provided for in the last paragraph of Article 13, in computing a period, the rst day shall be excluded and the last day included. Thus, the one hundred
eighty (180) days commenced on May 27, 1996, and ended on November 23, 1996. The termination letter dated November 25, 1996 was served on respondent
Paras only at 3:00 a.m. of November 26, 1996. He was, by then, already a regular employee of the petitioner under Article 281 of the Labor Code.”
Mitsubishi Motors Philippines Corp. v Chrysler Phils. Labor Union
433 SCRA 206 [2004]; G.R. No. 148738; June 29, 2004

HELD: As to legality:

Employer has the burden of proving the lawfulness of his employee’s dismissal.

(However he cannot be reinstated as there was a retrenchment by MMPC and he would have been included
in those retrenched had he not been dismissed.)
Duration/Exception
Buiser v Leogardo
Facts:

Petitioners were employed by the private respondent GENERAL TELEPHONE DIRECTORY

COMPANY as sales representatives and charged with the duty of soliciting advertisements
for inclusion in a telephone directory.

Among others, the "Employment Contract (On Probationary Status)" included the following
common provisions:

l. The company hereby employs the employee as telephone representative on a probationary

status for a period of eighteen (18) months, i.e. from May 1980 to October 1981, inclusive. It
is understood that during the probationary period of employment, the Employee may be
terminated at the pleasure of the company without the necessity of giving notice of
termination or the payment of termination pay.
The Employee recognizes the fact that the nature of the telephone sales representative's job
is such that the company would be able to determine his true character, conduct and selling
capabilities only after the publication of the directory, and that it takes about eighteen (18)
months before his worth as a telephone saw representative can be fully evaluated inasmuch
as the advertisement solicited by him for a particular year are published in the directory only
the following year.

The private respondent prescribed sales quotas to be accomplished or met by the petitioners.
Failing to meet their respective sales quotas, the petitioners were dismissed from the service
by the private respondent. The records show that the private respondent terminated the
services of petitioners Iluminada Ver Buiser and Cecilia Rillo-Acuna on May 14, 1981 and
petitioner Ma. Mercedes P. Intengan on May 18, 1981 for their failure to meet their sales
quotas.
Petitioners filed with the National Capital Region, Ministry of Labor and Employment, a
complaint for illegal dismissal with claims for backwages, earned commissions and other
benefits.

Regional Director dismissed the complaints of the petitioners, except the claim for allowances
which private respondent was ordered to pay. Deputy Minister Vicente Leogardo, Jr. of the
Ministry of Labor issued an Order dated January 7, 1983, affirming the Regional Director's
Order dated September 21, 1982, wherein it ruled that the petitioners have not attained
permanent status since private respondent was justified in requiring a longer period of
probation
ISSUE: W/N THE PERIOD OF PROBATIONARY EMPLOYMENT CANNOT EXCEED 6
MONTHS

HELD:

NO. Generally, the probationary period of employment is limited to six (6) months. The
exception to this general rule is When the parties to an employment contract may agree
otherwise, such as when the same is established by company policy or when the same is
required by the nature of work to be performed by the employee. In the latter case, there is
recognition of the exercise of managerial prerogatives in requiring a longer period of
probationary employment. Under the Labor Code, six (6) months is the general probationary
period ' but the probationary period is actually the period needed to determine fitness for the
job. This period, for lack of a better measurement is deemed to be the period needed to learn
the job.
In the case at bar, it is shown that private respondent Company needs at least eighteen (18)
months to determine the character and selling capabilities of the petitioners as sales
representatives. The Company is engaged in advertisement and publication in the Yellow
Pages of the PLDT Telephone Directories. Publication of solicited ads are only made a year
after the sale has been made and only then win the company be able to evaluate the
efficiency, conduct, and selling ability of its sales representatives, the evaluation being based
on the published ads. Moreover, an eighteen month probationary period is recognized by the
Labor Union in the private respondent company
Holiday Inn Manila v NLRC
Elena Honasan applied for employment with the Holiday Inn and was accepted for “on the job
training” as a telephone operator for a period of three weeks. After completing her training she was
employed on a probationary basis for six months.

Her employment contract stipulated that the Hotel could terminate her probationary employment at
any time prior to the expiration of the six month period in the event of her failure (a) to learn or
progress in her job;( b) to faithfully observe and comply with the hotel rules and the instructions and
orders of her superiors; or ( c ) to perform her duties according to hotel standards.

Four days before the expiration of the stipulated deadline, Holiday Inn notified her of her dismissal
on the ground that her performance had not come up to the standards of the hotel.
Elena filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, claiming that she was already a regular employee at the
time of her separation and so was entitled to full security of tenure.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint stating that her separation was justified under Art 281 of
the Labor Code.

The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter and held that Elena had become a regular employee and so
could not be dismissed as a probationer. It also ordered the petitioners to reinstate Elena “ to her
former position without loss of seniority rights and other privileges with backwages without
deduction and qualification.”
Issue: W/N Elena was already a regular
employee at the time of her dismissal.
No. The Supreme Court held that Elena was placed by the petitioner on
probation twice, first during her on the job training for three weeks and next
during another period of six months. Her probation clearly exceeded the
period of six months prescribed by Art 281.

Probation is the period during which the employer may determine if the
employee is qualified for possible inclusion in the regular force. In the present
case, the period was for three weeks, during Elena’s on the job training. When
her services were continued after this training, the petitioners in effect
recognized that she had passed probation and was qualified to be a regular
employee.
Bernardo, et al. v. NLRC
GR No. 122917, July 12, 1999
Panganiban, J., Third Division

Facts:

● Marites Bernardo, et al., who are deaf-mutes, were hired by Far East
Bank and Trust Co. as Money Sorters and Counters.
● Their Employment Contract was for six (6) months.
● Most of their contracts are renewed by the FEBTC.
● However, they were dismissed.
Bernardo, et al. v. NLRC
GR No. 122917, July 12, 1999
Panganiban, J., Third Division

Facts:

● Bernardo , et al. argued that they should be considered regular

employees, because their task as money sorters and counters was
necessary and desirable to the business of FEBTC.
Bernardo, et al. v. NLRC
GR No. 122917, July 12, 1999
Panganiban, J., Third Division

Facts:

● FEBTC claimed that Bernardo, et al. are special workers and not
considered as regular employee.
● That they were hired due to accomodation.
● That the Employment Contract was in accordance with Article 80 of the
Labor Code.
Bernardo, et al. v. NLRC
GR No. 122917, July 12, 1999
Panganiban, J., Third Division

Issue:

Whether or not Bernardo, et al. are regular employees.

Bernardo, et al. v. NLRC
GR No. 122917, July 12, 1999
Panganiban, J., Third Division

Ruling:

“[Since Bernardo, et al.] were qualified disabled persons necessarily removes

the employment contracts from the ambit of Article 80 (Employment of
Handicapped Workers). Since the Magna Carta accords them the rights of
qualified able-bodied persons, they are thus covered by Article 280 of the
Labor Code.”
Bernardo, et al. v. NLRC
GR No. 122917, July 12, 1999
Panganiban, J., Third Division

Ruling:

The Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that a qualified disabled
employee should be given the same terms and conditions of employment as a
qualified able-bodied person. (Section 5)
Bernardo, et al. v. NLRC
GR No. 122917, July 12, 1999
Panganiban, J., Third Division

Ruling:

“The test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of the employer.” (Article 280 of Labor Code; De Leon v. NLRC, 176 SCRA
615, 621, August 21, 1989)
Bernardo, et al. v. NLRC
GR No. 122917, July 12, 1999
Panganiban, J., Third Division

Ruling:

“[T]he determination of whether employment is casual or regular does not

depend on the will or word of the employer, and the procedure of hiring . . .
but on the nature of the activities performed by the employee, and to some
extent, the length of performance and its continued existence.” (L.T. Datu v. NLRC,
253 SCRA 440, 450, February 9, 1996)
Bernardo, et al. v. NLRC
GR No. 122917, July 12, 1999
Panganiban, J., Third Division

Ruling:

The contract signed by Bernardo is akin to a probationary employment.

Hence, when the bank renewed the contract after the lapse of the six-month
probationary period, the employees thereby became regular employees,
therefore, Bernardo, et al. were illegally dismissed.
Mitsubishi Motors Phils. Corp. v. Chrysler
Phils. Labor Union
GR No. 148738, June 29, 2004
Callejo, Sr., J., Second Division

Facts:

● Nelson Paras was hired and reported for work, as manufacturing trainee
at Mitsubishi Motors Philippines Corporation, on May 27, 1996.
● He was given an orientation respecting the company’s standards for
regularization, code of conduct and company-provided benefits.
Mitsubishi Motors Phils. Corp. v. Chrysler
Phils. Labor Union
GR No. 148738, June 29, 2004
Callejo, Sr., J., Second Division

Facts:

● The Department and Division Managers reviewed the performance

evaluation made on Paras, and unanimously agreed that the
performance of Paras was unsatisfactory.
Mitsubishi Motors Phils. Corp. v. Chrysler
Phils. Labor Union
GR No. 148738, June 29, 2004
Callejo, Sr., J., Second Division

Facts:

● Thus, Paras was not considered for regularization.

● He received his Termination Letter dated November 25, 1996 only on
November 26, 1996.
Mitsubishi Motors Phils. Corp. v. Chrysler
Phils. Labor Union
GR No. 148738, June 29, 2004
Callejo, Sr., J., Second Division

Facts:

● CPLU posited that Paras was dismissed on his 183rd day of employment,
or three (3) days after the expiration of the probationary period of six (6)
months. Thus, Paras was already a regular employee on the date of the
termination of his "probationary employment.”
Mitsubishi Motors Phils. Corp. v. Chrysler
Phils. Labor Union
GR No. 148738, June 29, 2004
Callejo, Sr., J., Second Division

Facts:

● MMPC, on the other hand, argued that Paras’ probationary employment

which commenced on May 27, 1996 would expire on November 27,
1996. Thus, his termination was within the six month probationary
peroid.
Mitsubishi Motors Phils. Corp. v. Chrysler
Phils. Labor Union
GR No. 148738, June 29, 2004
Callejo, Sr., J., Second Division

Issue:

Whether or not Paras become a regular employee.

Mitsubishi Motors Phils. Corp. v. Chrysler
Phils. Labor Union
GR No. 148738, June 29, 2004
Callejo, Sr., J., Second Division

Ruling:

“Under Article 281 of the Labor Code, the employer must inform the employee of the standards for
which his employment may be considered for regularization. xxx The employee’s services may be
terminated for just cause or for his failure to qualify as a regular employee based on reasonable
standards made known to him.”
Mitsubishi Motors Phils. Corp. v. Chrysler
Phils. Labor Union
GR No. 148738, June 29, 2004
Callejo, Sr., J., Second Division

Ruling:

“Applying Article 13 of the Civil Code,31 the probationary period of six (6)
months consists of one hundred eighty (180) days.” (Republic v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 318 SCRA 459 [1999])
Mitsubishi Motors Phils. Corp. v. Chrysler
Phils. Labor Union
GR No. 148738, June 29, 2004
Callejo, Sr., J., Second Division

Ruling:

Thus, the one hundred eighty (180) days commenced on May 27, 1996, will
end on November 23, 1996. Hence, Paras is considered a regular employee,
therefore, he was illegally dismissed.
Alcira v. NLRC
GR No. 149859, June 9, 2004
Corona, J., Third Division

Facts:

● Middleby Philippines hired Radin C. Alcira, as engineering support

services supervisor on a probationary basis for six (6) months, on May 20,
1996.
● Apparently unhappy with Alcira’s performance. Middleby terminated
Alcira’s services, on November 20, 1996.
Alcira v. NLRC
GR No. 149859, June 9, 2004
Corona, J., Third Division

Facts:
● Alcira claimed that a senior officer of Middleby in bad faith withheld his
time card and did not allow him to work.
● Considering this as a dismissal after the lapse of his probationary
employment, he filed a complaint in the NLRC against Middleby
contending that he had already become a regular employee as of the
date he was illegally dismissed.
Alcira v. NLRC
GR No. 149859, June 9, 2004
Corona, J., Third Division

Facts:
● Alcira contends that he already attained the status of a regular employee
when he was dismissed on November 20, 1996 because, having started
work on May 20, 1996, the six-month probationary period ended on
November 16, 1996. (Applying the 180 days Rule)
Alcira v. NLRC
GR No. 149859, June 9, 2004
Corona, J., Third Division

Facts:
● Middleby claim that, during Alcira’s probationary employment, (1) he
showed poor performance in his assigned tasks, (2) incurred ten
absences, (3) was late several times and (4) violated company rules on
the wearing of uniform. Since he failed to meet company standards,
Alcira’s application to become a regular employee was disapproved and
his employment was terminated.
Alcira v. NLRC
GR No. 149859, June 9, 2004
Corona, J., Third Division

Issue:

Whether or not Alcira become a regular employee.

Alcira v. NLRC
GR No. 149859, June 9, 2004
Corona, J., Third Division

Ruling:

(O)ur computation of the 6-month probationary period is reckoned from the

date of appointment up to the same calendar date of the 6th month
following. (CALS Poultry Supply Corporation, et. al. v. Roco, et. al., GR No. 150660, July 30, 2002)
Criteria Regularization

Alcira v. NLRC
ALCIRA V. NLRC
G.R. No. 149859. June 9, 2004
FACTS:
Middleby Philippines Corporation, hired petitioner Radin Alcira as engineering support
services supervisor on a probationary basis for six months. At the end of 6 months he was
terminated from service on grounds that the private respondent is unhappy with his services. It was
alleged by the respondents that Alcira showed poor performance in his assigned tasks, incurred ten
absences and was late several times and lastly violated the uniform policy of the company.

The respondents asserted that prior to his employment, it was made clear to him that
after his 5th month of service, he shall be evaluated in order to determine whether the company
would continue to employ his services. The results of the said evaluation however proved that the
petitioner was not fit to work for middleby and moved to dismiss him from duty before the end of
his 6th mont in Middleby. Unsatisfied with the decision of the respondent to dismiss him, Alrica filed
a petition before the NLRC claiming that he was unjustly terminated.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent Middleby informed the petitioner of the

standards for “regularization” at the start of his employment
HELD:
The court ruled in affirmative. In determining the merits of the case, the court cited Sec. 6(d)
of Rule 1 of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the labor code which states:

(d) In all cases of probationary employment, the employer shall make known to the employee the standards
under which he will qualify as a regular employee at the time of his engagement. Where no standards are
made known to the employee at that time, he shall be deemed a regular employee.

Hence, in applying the aforementioned provision, the court held that the private respondent
did in fact notify the petitioner of the standards to qualify as a regular employee when he was
informed during the start of his employment that his supervisory skills will be evaluated at the end of
his 5th month
Extension of Contract

Mariwasa Manufacturing Inc. v. Leogardo

 MARIWASA
MANUFACTURING V.
LEOGARDO
G.R. No. 74246. January 26, 1989
FACTS:
Joaquin Dequila was hired on probation by the petitioner Mariwasa Manufacturing, Inc. as a
general utility worker. On the onset of the expiration of the probationary 6 month period, he was
given notice by his employer that he was unable to meet the required standards of the company due
to his poor performance. However, the company expressed that he may improve his performance
and be qualified for regular employment should he consent to an extension of his probation period.
He agreed and gave a written consent to Mariwasa who in turn extended his employment for three
more months. His performance did not improve which consequently resulted into his termination at
the and of the period.

Dequila, in response to his termination, filed with the Ministry of labor a complaint for illegal
dismissal against Mariwasa. The Ministry of labor granted his petition and ordered that Dequila be
reinstated and the payment of backwages.
 Dissatisfied with the decision, the Petitioners appealed the case, hoping for the reversal
of the decision of the Ministry of Labor contending that agreement made by them and Daquila was
valid pursuant to Art. 282 of the Labor Code which states that:

“...Unless it is covered by an apprenticeship agreement stipulating a longer period...:”

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 282 of the Labor Code may be validly extended beyond
the prescribed six-month period by agreement of the employer and the
employee
HELD:
Yes. The Court agrees with the contention of the Solicitor General that the extention is
valid as it constitutes the exceptions to the statutory limitation which prohibits the extension of the
probationary period above six months since there is a contract between the employer and employee
that provides for a probationary period of 9 months.

The court went on in saying that the voluntary agreement of an extension of the
probationary period constitutes an effect of a waiver of the right originally mentioned in the
provision. Hence, the termination of Daquila was lawful and the court there on ordered the reversal
of the decision of the Ministry of Labor.
Absorbed Employees

Esteria, Marianne
Cebu Stevedoring Co. v. Regional
Director
Facts: Private respondents Arsenio Gelig and Maria Luz Quijano were former
employees of the Cebu Customs Arrastre Service (hereinafter referred to as
CCAS). On May 2, 1977, pursuant to Customs Administrative Order No. 21-77,
the CCAS was abolished. As a consequence of such abolition, all the
employees of CCAS, including herein respondents, were given their
termination and/or separation pay by the Bureau of Customs, Cebu City,
computed up to April 30, 1977.
Cebu Stevedoring Co. v. Regional
Director
Thereafter, on May 1, 1977, all the employees of CCAS including herein private
respondents, were absorbed by petitioner Cebu Stevedoring Co. Inc. (CSCI for
brevity), with the same positions that they held in the CCAS. Eventually, however,
on October 17, 1977, private respondents were dismissed by petitioner without
prior clearance, allegedly for redundancy and other alleged grounds.

A complaint for reinstatement with back wages was filed by private respondents
before Regional Office No. 7 of the Ministry of Labor. The Labor Regional Director
ruled in favor of the private respondents, hence this petition.
Cebu Stevedoring Co. v. Regional
Director
Issue: Whether or not the private respondents, as casuals,
can be terminated within the 6-month period without
need of clearance from the Ministry of Labor and neither is
the employer obligated to pay them termination pay.
Cebu Stevedoring Co. v. Regional
Director
Ruling: The Court agrees with the Regional Director that private respondents could not
be considered probationary employees because they were already well-trained in their
respective functions. As stressed by the Solicitor General, while private respondents
were still with the CCAS they were already clerks. Respondent Gelig had been a clerk for
CCAS for more than ten (10) years, while respondent Quijano had slightly less than ten
(10) years of service. They were, therefore, not novices in their jobs but experienced
workers.

As regular employees, therefore, private respondents may not be dismissed and

petitioner cannot terminate their services except for a just or authorized cause provided
by law and with scrupulous observance of due process requirements.
Double Probation

Esteria, Marianne
A’ Prime Security Services, Inc. v. NLRC
Facts: Private respondent had been working as a security guard for a year with the
Sugarland Security Services, Inc., a sister company of petitioner; that he was rehired as a
security guard on January 30, 1988 by the petitioner and assigned to the same post at
the U.S. Embassy Building along Roxas Boulevard, Manila; that he was among those
absorbed by the petitioner when it took over the security contracts of its sister
company, Sugarland Security Services, Inc., with the U.S. Embassy; that he was forced by
petitioner to sign new probationary contracts of employment for six (6) months; that on
August 1, 1988, his employment was terminated. The private respondent filed a
complaint against A’ Prime Security Services, Inc. for illegal dismissal, illegal deduction,
and underpayment of wages. The NLRC ruled in favor of the private respondent, hence
this petition.
A’ Prime Security Services, Inc. v. NLRC
Issues:

1. Whether private respondent's employment with A' Prime Security Services,

Inc. was just a continuation of his employment with Sugarland Security
Services, Inc.

2. Whether private respondent is a regular or probationary employee of

petitioner.
A’ Prime Security Services, Inc. v. NLRC
Ruling:

1. Yes. The allegations of respondent that Sugarland and A’ Prime were sister
companies were never denied nor controverted by petitioner before the
Labor Arbiter. It belatedly contended that they were distinct juridical entities,
but such fact lacks any legal basis. The Court cannot sanction the practice of
some companies which, shortly after a worker has become a regular
employee, effects the transfer of the same employee to another entity whose
owners are the same, or identical, in order to deprive subject employee of the
benefits and protection he is entitled to under the law.
A’ Prime Security Services, Inc. v. NLRC
2. On the issue as to whether the private respondent is a probationary or regular
employee, the Court holds that the latter became a regular employee upon
completion of his six-month period of probation. Private respondent started
working on January 30, 1988 and completed the said period of probation on July
27, 1988. Thus, at the time private respondent was dismissed on August 1, 1988,
he was already a regular employee with a security of tenure. He could only be
dismissed for a just and authorized cause. There is no basis for subjecting private
respondent to a new probationary or temporary employment on January 30, 1988,
considering that he was already a regular employee when he was absorbed by A'
Prime from Sugarland, its sister company.
TERMINATION
AND
SALARY
Reporter: AIRA TIMOTEO
ICMC vs. NLRC & Bernadette Galang
FACTS:
International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC), a non-profit organization dedicated to
refugee service at the Philippine Refugee Processing Center in Morong, Bataan engaged the
services of respondent Bernadette Galang as a probationary cultural orientation teacher with a
monthly salary of P2,000. Three months thereafter, Galang was informed, orally and in writing,
that her services were being terminated for her failure to meet the prescribed standards of
petitioner as reflected in the performance evaluation of her supervisors during the teacher
evaluation program she underwent along with other newly-hired personnel.
Galang filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice and unpaid wages against
petitioner with the Ministry of Labor and Employment, praying for reinstatement with
backwages, exemplary and moral damages. The Labor Arbiter rendered his decision dismissing
the complaint for illegal dismissal as well as the complaint for moral and exemplary damages
but ordering the petitioner to pay private respondent the sum of P6,000.00 as payment for the
last 3 months of the agreed employment period pursuant to her verbal contract of
employment.
 ISSUE:
Whether an employee who was terminated during the probationary period
of her employment is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of her
six-month probationary employment?
RULING:
No. The Court ruled that Galang was terminated during her probationary period of employment
for failure to qualify as a regular member of petitioner's teaching staff in accordance with its
reasonable standards. Records show that she was found to be deficient in classroom management,
teacher-student relationship and teaching techniques. Failure to qualify as a regular employee in
accordance with the reasonable standards of the employer is a just cause for terminating a
probationary employee specifically recognized under Article 281 of the Labor Code.

A probationary employee is one who is on trial by an employer during which the employer
determines whether or not he is qualified for permanent employment. A probationary appointment
is made to afford the employer an opportunity to observe the fitness of a probationer while at
work, and to ascertain whether he will become a proper and efficient employee. The word
"probationary", as used to describe the period of employment, implies the purpose of the term
or period, but not its length. It is well settled that the employer has the right or is at liberty to
choose who will be hired and who will be denied employment. In that sense, it is within the
exercise of the right to select his employees that the employer may set or fix a probationary period
within which the latter may test and observe the conduct of the former before hiring him
permanently.
Orient Express Placement Philippines vs. NLRC,
POEA and Antonio Flores
FACTS:
Chiang Kai Shek vs. CA

Facts:

Ms Belo, a teacher for CKSC since 1977, applied for a leave of absence for the sy 1992-1993 because her
children of tender age had mo yaya to take care of them. Upon submitting her application, she was
informed of the school policy that if she takes a leave, she not guaranteed of a teaching load upon her
return. She was likewise informed that only teachers in active duty may enjoy the privilege and benefits
provided by the school, such as free tuition for the teacher’s children. Ms. Belo nonetheless took her leave
of absences. In May 1993, she decided to return to teaching. However, she was not allowed to return. Thus
she filed a case for illegal dismissal, among others, against CKSC. The labor arbiter dismissed the case but
the NLRC disagreed. The CA upheld the NLRC’s rulling.
Chiang Kai Shek vs. CA

Issue:

W/N Ms. Belo enjoys security of tenure as a full time teacher

Chiang Kai Shek vs. CA

Held:

Yes. it must be noted at the outset that Ms. Belo has been a full time teacher in CKSC for 15 years. Under
the Manual of Regulations for Private School, for a private school teacher to acquire a permanent status of
employment and thus, be entitled to security of tenure, the ff requisite must concur: a. The teacher is a full
time teacher, b. He has been teaching for 3 consecutive years for service, c. such service must be
satisfactory. Since Ms. Belohas measured up to this standards, she therefore enjoys security of tenure. The
fundamental guarantee of security of tenure and due process dictates that no worker shall be dismissed
except for just and authorized cause provided by law after due notice and hearing.
La Consolacion College vs NLRC

Facts:

Jose De la Pena was initially employed by the LCC as a CAT Commandant and YCAP Coordinator for sy 1975-
1976. His employment as YCAP coordinator lastd until september 1979 after which he resigned and cut all
ties from LCC. However,on 1992, LCC received an application for De la pena. In 1992, LCC appointed De la
Pena as classroom teacher in physical education and health, a position he never held before. The contract of
employment between LCC and De la Pena expressly provides that the employment is for 1 academic year
only. Respondent De la Pena did not comply with the requirements and sop of the school. On November
1992, De la Pena called an emergency faculty meeting and berated Bayoguing, who was tasked to evaluate
De la Pena’s work.
La Consolacion College vs NLRC

Facts:

On February 1993, respondent dela Peña wrote to the principal of High School, stating that he "would like to apply
for reinstatement as a faculty member for SY 1993-1994." The academic team composed of petitioners Erodita P.
Madayag, Verdadero and Bayoguing informed respondent de la Peña of his unsatisfactory performance and advised
him that the school would no longer hire him for the incoming school year. On June 1993, respondent de la Peña filed
with Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI, Bacolod City a complaint against LCC and/or Rosalinda Bayla, Sr. Celia
Bayona, Erodita Mabayag, Judith Verdadero and Jose Bayoguing, for illegal dismissal, moral damages and exemplary
damages. After submission of position papers, on 11 November 1994, Labor Arbiter Reynaldo J. Gumaltico rendered a
decision dismissing the complaint, holding that at the time respondent de la Peña was dismissed, he had not attained
regular status.
La Consolacion College vs NLRC

Facts:

The Labor Arbiter also found respondent de la Peña guilty of serious misconduct and gross disobedience which were
just causes for termination of service. On appeal to the NLRC, on 31 January 1996, the NLRC rendered a resolution
reversing the decision of labor arbiter. The NLRC held that respondent de la Peña attained regular status at the time
he was dismissed and that LCC failed to prove the existence of just cause to warrant his dismissal. On 4 March 1996,
LCC filed a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC decision; however, on 19 August 1996, the NLRC denied the
motion.
La Consolacion College vs NLRC

Issue:

W/N De la Pena was a regular or permanent empoyee of LCC

La Consolacion College vs NLRC

Held:

No, De la Pena is not a permanent employee. In the case at bar, there is a written contract defining the period of
employment of respondent de la Peña.Clearly, the employment was not permanent but for a specified duration of
one school year. In resolving the issue of whether or not respondent de la Peña was permanent employee of
petitioner, it is the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, not the Labor Code, which is applicable. This was
settled in University of Sto. Tomas v. NLRC, where we ruled that for a private school teacher to acquire permanent
status in employment the following requisites must concur: (1) the teacher is a full-time teacher; (2) the teacher must
have rendered three (3) consecutive years of service; and (3) such service must have been satisfactory.
La Consolacion College vs NLRC

Held:

A school year begins in June of one calendar year and ends in March of the succeeding calendar year. The written
contract of respondent de la Peña stated that he shall be employed by the LCC for the school year June 1992, up to
March 1993, a fixed term of ten months. It is also important to note that respondent de la Peña was a new hire having
previously resigned from the school and was holding the position of classroom teacher for BED for the first time.
Respondent never denied the fact that he failed to comply with the requirements of the school, hence, his
employment was not renewed. Neither did he attain permanent status. Clearly, respondent was not illegally
dismissed.