Theory and Practice of Public

Administration in Southeast
Asia: Traditions, Directions,
and Impacts
 Three Distinct Models of Public
Administration

● Colonial-bureaucratic
● Postcolonial-developmental
● New Public Management

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 Southeast Asian countries
have embraced such a major shift
in public administration largely
guided by market-led principles
and businesslike structures and
standards.

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 Even in the case of Thailand, the
administrative system began to evolve in
line with the “western pattern” during the
19th and 20th centuries when the major
European powers established colonial
control over its neighbouring countries.

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Public Administration in Southeast Asia:
Traditions, Directions, and Impacts
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 .

Malaysia and Singapore were under the British

rule;
Indonesia experienced the Dutch rule;
the Philippines came under the Spanish and
American rule;
and Cambodia and Vietnam were ruled by the
French.
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 Parliamentary democracy in
Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand (with
the oneparty-dominant system in
Malaysia and Singapore); the presidential
system in Indonesia and the Philippines;
the military rule in Myanmar; the
communist model in Vietnam; and so on.
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 There are three major models
of civil service systems in Asia, such
as “servants of the emperor,”
“servants of the state,” and
“servants of the people.”
- Burns and Bowornwathana

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 There are three major paradigms of
public sector reforms in Asia, including
the “capacity building,” “new public
management,” and “social network and
civil society” paradigms.
- Cheung and Scott

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 1.

Colonial Bureaucratic
Model

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“The model is characterized by prescribed
rules and procedures, official documents,
hierarchy of authority, selection based on
merit, and separation of private or
personal life from office.”
- Max Weber

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 Southeast Asian cases, this colonial-
bureaucratic model came to provide the
guiding principles for modernizing state
administration, which largely replaced the
indigenous mode of local administration
based on ascriptive norms like heredity and
kinship that existed in almost all countries in
the region.
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 In the case of Malaysia, the
British colonial government gradually
institutionalized the bureaucratic
model of administration based on the
assumption of political neutrality and
hierarchical loyalty.

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 In Singapore, which was a part of
Malaysia before its separation in 1965, it
was the British model of public
administration based on the
abovementioned bureaucratic principles,
which became the dominant administrative
legacy for the People’s Action Party (PAP)
that came to power in 1959.
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 Southeast Asian countries
experienced a different system of
colonial administration based on
strong executive power under the
French rule, which include
Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.
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 The administrative system of Thailand
began to shift towards the western bureaucratic
model, especially after adopting the Civil Service
Act of 1928 that created its foundation based on
the uniform standards of public service,
classification of various career services, principle
of political neutrality, and separation between
public office and private life.
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 2.
POSTCOLONIAL
DEVELOPMENTMODEL
 Immediately after independence, most
developing countries began to pursue
state-led socioeconomic development, and
attempted to restructure their inherited
colonial bureaucracy in favor of
development-oriented public
administration.
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Malaysia
The public service became the
main stakeholder in undertaking the
country’s development initiatives and
carrying out the long-term economic
development plans.
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Singapore

Emphasized its greater role in the city-

state’s national development. The government
took some major initiatives, including the
creation of the Political Study Centre.

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Thailand
The government increasingly
pursued an interventionist
developmental role through the
creation of many state enterprises.

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 Thai government established the so-
called National Institute of Development
Administration (NIDA) in 1966 under the
ministry of education.

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Indonesia
Public sector became the main agent
to carry out development activities
related to agriculture, industry,
education, health care, transport,
banking, infrastructure, and so on.

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Philippines
The economic role of the public sector
expanded under the dictatorial regime of
Ferdinand Marcos when the number of
state enterprises increased in all major
sectors.

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Recent New Public
Management Model
 There was a paradigm shift in administrative
theory and practice worldwide in terms of its greater
emphasis on businesslike institutions, structures,
and functions. These market-oriented administrative
reforms, which began in the 1980s in developed
nations like America, Australia, Britain, Canada,
and New Zealand, are now encapsulated as a new
model known as New Public Management or NPM.
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Malaysia
The policy atmosphere has
changed in favor of NPM since 1983
when the government adopted the
Privatization Masterplan.

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 There is also a change in the role of
public sector from being a leading agent of
socioeconomic activities to an enabler or
facilitator of service delivery carried out by the
private sector.

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Philippines
According to Hayllar, the NPM-style
reform began with the Economic Recovery
Program launched by the Aquino government
(1987–1989) under the influence of the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), especially in terms of reducing state
intervention in the nation’s economic activities.

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Indonesia
The government took initiatives to
decentralize the administrative system,
privatize public assets, and deregulate
state controls.

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Singapore
It has introduced the strategy of
outsourcing, reduced the interventionist role of
public agencies, and transformed the
administrative system into a catalytic
institution in terms of its role to enable the
private sector to play the leading economic role.

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Thailand
Thai government has taken steps to downsize
public employment, abolish unnecessary state agencies,
contract out the delivery of services, replace the role of
public sector by private enterprises, establish result-
oriented administration, reinforce customer-orientedness,
and redefine the role of the public sector as a facilitator
or enabler rather than controller of economic activities.
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Divergence and Convergence in
Public Administration in the
Region
 In Southeast Asia, among the
three major models of public
administration discussed above, the
bureaucratic and developmental models
were largely based on the dominant
socioeconomic role played by the state.

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Theory-Practice Gaps
First, with regard to the colonial bureaucratic
model, although most Southeast Asian countries (except
Thailand) were under the colonial rule of western
countries experienced in bureaucratic administration, in
these colonies, the western administrators themselves
played the dual roles of politics and administration, which
often compromised the principle of political neutrality and
legal-rational character of the bureaucratic model
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 This deviation from
bureaucratic neutrality was also
caused by the remnants of the
paternalistic and kingship-based
rulership that existed in Southeast
Asia during the precolonial period

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 After the end of colonial rule, although some
countries in Southeast Asia adopted the western
parliamentary or presidential form of politics and
inherited the bureaucratic model of public
administration, there emerged considerable deviations
from this western politico-administrative framework
due to various events and factors that developed after
their independence.

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 Similar to the common challenges to public
administration faced by many other developing
countries, including one-party dominance, military
rule, and corruption, some Southeast Asian
countries could not maintain the bureaucratic
principles of political impartiality, equal
opportunity, and public accountability.

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 For instance, although the Philippines
experienced a relatively free and open political
culture under the American colonial rule, during
the post independence period, it experienced the
authoritarian rule of Marcos under which the
democratic model of constitutional rule,
bureaucratic neutrality, and public
accountability came under serious challenge.

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 Countries like Vietnam, Laos and
Cambodia suffered from political instability,
violent political conflict, and frequent
changes in the ruling party.

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 In the case of Singapore, the post-
independence administrative system appeared
to be closest to the bureaucratic model in terms
of the country’s stable political atmosphere
based on elected government and its strong
emphasis on neutrality and meritocracy in
public administration.

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 However, the Singapore case still
needs careful scrutiny due to its political
system characterized by the so-called one-
party-dominant system under which the
ruling party has been in power since 1959.

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 For instance, in cases like
Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, the
political situation became so violent and
unstable that the need for stability and
order became more crucial than any
concern for economic development.

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 Similar lack of decentralization and
people’s participation could be observed
under the autocratic rule of Marcos in the
Philippines where the administrative
system increasingly became based on
patron-client relationship.

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 In Indonesia and Thailand, as the
military personnel came to occupy top
administrative positions purely based on
their coercive power rather than their
knowledge and skills in development, the
basic tenets and conditions of development
administration were compromised.

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 Malaysia and Singapore are the two
Southeast Asian cases that did not experience
any military rule or undemocratic dictatorial
regime, and both cases consistently engaged the
administrative systems in nation-building and
development activities by creating various
government agencies, planning institutions, and
state enterprises
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 In Malaysia, although the political
neutrality of public administration may have
been affected by its ethnicized political
system and economic policy,[98] it has been
able to maintain the basic norms of
democratic governance that is vital for the
success of development administration

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 Comparative Look on
Decentralization on Southeast Asia
Regional Authority Index

It estimates the extent which

regional governments (defined as
intermediate governments) having a
minimum population of 150,000(on 2010),
exercise authority.

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SELF RULE
The authority that a
subnational government may
exercise within its own
jurisdiction

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 Five Domains of Self Rule

1)The institutional depth of a government

2)Policy scope
3)Fiscal autonomy
4)Its borrowing autonomy
5)Representation
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Shared Rule
It is the authority that a
sub-national government may
(co)exercise in a country as a
whole.

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 Five Dimensions of Shared Rule

1)National legislation
2)Executive policy making
3)Tax allocation
4)Borrowing constraints
5)Constitutional reform
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 Self Rule
A. The institutional depth
Institutional Depth
0: No functioning general-purpose administration at the regional
level;
1: Deconcentrated, general-purpose, administration subject to
central government veto;
2: Non-deconcentrated, general-purpose, administration subject to
central government veto;
3: Non-deconcentrated, general-purpose, administration not
subject to central government veto 54
 B. Policy Scope
Policy Scope
0: very weak authoritative competencies;
1: authoritative competencies in a, b, c, d
a) economic policy;
b) cultural-educational policy;
c) welfare policy;
d) one of the following: residual powers, police,
own institutional set–up, local government

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2: authoritative competencies in at
least two of a, b, c or d

3: authoritative competencies in dand

at least two of a, b or c

4: region meets the criteria for 3 plus

authority over immigration or
citizenship.

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 C. Fiscal autonomy
Fiscal Autonomy
0: the central government sets the base and rate of all regional taxes;
1: the regional government sets the rate of minor taxes;

2: the regional government sets the base and rate of minor taxes;
3: the regional government sets the rate of at least one major tax:
personal income, corporate, value added, sales tax;
4: the regional government sets the base and rate of at least one
major tax.
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 D. Borrowing autonomy
Borrowing autonomy
0: The regional government does not borrow (e.g. centrally imposed
rules prohibit borrowing).
1: The regional government may borrow under prior authorization
(ex ante) by the central government* and it borrows under one or more of
the following centrally imposed restrictions:
a. Golden rule (e.g. no borrowing to cover current account deficits)

b. No foreign borrowing or borrowing from the central bank

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c. No borrowing above a ceiling
d. Borrowing is limited to specific purposes
* Including borrowing from the central bank
2: The regional government may borrow without prior
authorization (ex post) under one or more of the same centrally imposed
restrictions (a, b, c, d, e):
3: The regional government may borrow without centrally
imposed restrictions.

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 E. Representation
Assembly
0: the region has no regional assembly;
1: the region has an indirectly elected regional assembly;
2: the region has a directly elected assembly.
Executive
0: the regional executive is appointed by central government;
1: dual executive appointed by central government and the
regional assembly;
2: the executive is appointed by a regional assembly or is directly
elected. 60
Shared Rule
a.) Law Making
Law Making
0.5 for each of the following characteristics:
▪ regions are the unit of representation in a national legislature, i.e. the distribution of
representation is determined by regional weights, rather than 'one citizen, one vote' in the
country as a whole;
▪ regional governments designate representatives in a national legislature;
▪ regions at a given level have majority representation in a national legislature;
▪ the legislature with regional representation has extensive legislative authority, i.e. can
veto ordinary legislation or can be overridden only by a supermajority in the other
chamber

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b.) Executive Control
Executive Control
0: no routine meetings between central government and
regional governments to negotiate policy;
1: routine meetings between central government and regional
governments without legally binding authority;
2: routine meetings between central government and regional
governments with authority to reach legally binding
decisions.

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c.) Fiscal Control
Fiscal control
0: either the regional governments nor their representatives in a
national legislature are consulted over the distribution of
national tax revenues;
1: regional governments or their representatives in a national
legislature negotiate over the distribution of tax revenues, but
do not have a veto;
2: regional governments or their representatives in a national
legislature have a veto over the distribution of tax revenues.
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d.) Borrowing Control

Borrowing control
0: regional government(s) are not routinely consulted over
borrowing constraints;
1: regional government(s) negotiate routinely over borrowing
constraints but do not have a veto;
2: regional government(s) negotiate routinely over borrowing
constraints and have a veto.

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e.) Constitutional Reform
Constitutional reform
0: the central government or national electorate can unilaterally change the constitution
1: a national legislature based on regional representation can propose or postpone
constitutional reform, raise the decision hurdle in the other chamber, require a second
vote in the other chamber, or require a popular referendum
2: regional governments or their representatives in a national legislature propose or
postpone constitutional reform, raise the decision hurdle in the other chamber, require a
second vote in the other chamber, or require a popular referendum
3: a national legislature based on regional representation can veto constitutional change;
or constitutional change requires a referendum based on the principle of equal regional
representation
4: regional governments or their representatives in a national legislature can veto
constitutional change. 65
Conceptual Challenges
 Evaluating sub-national authority in
Southeast Asia poses several challenges. First, there is
the question of how to estimate regional authority
under an authoritarian regime. The countries in this
dataset cover the complete range from
authoritarianism to democracy over the period 1950 to
2010, and so require a nuanced appreciation of how
the character of the regime constrains sub-national
authority. 67
 The Rise of Regional
Authority from 1950 to 2010
 Southeast Asia might be considered hospitable terrain for
decentralization. It is composed of countries formed of islands and
archipelagos with high levels of ethno-linguistic and religious
fragmentation. Its growing and evermore densely packed populations
have faced frequent and devastating natural disasters that pose
difficulties for centralized governance. Still, Southeast Asian
governments remained highly centralized until recent times. Between
1950 and 1990, only Malaysia had elected regional governments with
extensive policy competences. Over the past two decades, the
Philippines, South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia have created and
empowered elected regional governments.
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 Figure 2 shows that the five dimensions
of self-rule move more or less in tandem, but
that the greatest change has been in
representation. Regional representation is
particularly vulnerable to authoritarianism
and responsive to democratization.
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Figure 3 charts shared rule over
the past six decades.

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An Application to Democracy in
Southeast Asia
✣ Regional Authority Index
is a measure of the authority
of regional governments in 81
democracies or quasi-
democracies on an annual basis
over the period 1950-2010.

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✣ Using Regional Authority
Index

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 Theories of Democratization

● Variation Overtime
● Cross-sectional Variation

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 Core expectation
● Democratization opens a regime
● Regime democratizes
● Hypothesis
● Expectation
● Power Sharing
● Ripple Effects
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THANK YOU!
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