POPULAR OPINION ON

PERFORMANCE OF
METROPOLITAN, MUNICIPAL
& DISTRICT CHIEF
EXECUTIVES (MMDCEs)

REPORT ON NATIONWIDE SURVEY

PRESENTATION OUTLINE
• INTRODUCTION
• APPOINTMENT OF MMDCEs
• MMDCEs & INFLUENTIAL ACTORS
• MMDCEs & MPs
• MMDCEs & THE COMMUNITY
• MMDCEs & DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS
• PERFORMANCE OF MMDCEs
• PARTISAN & NON-PARTISAN ELECTIONS
• SOME LESSONS
INTRODUCTION

• The current local government system in Ghana,

initiated in the PNDC era was incorporated into the
1992 Constitution and has operated for 27 years in
the Fourth Republic
• Created under the system are Metropolitan,
Municipal & District Assemblies (MMDAs) to serve as
grassroots institutions to mobilize the people for
local development and to provide citizens’ political
and economic participation at the local level
INTRODUCTION (Cont’d)

• Among the key political and administrative actors of the

MMDAs: Assembly Members, Presiding Members, Members
of Parliament, Coordinating Directors, the Metropolitan,
Municipal &District Chief Executives (MMDCEs) are the
most influential
• Appointed by the President upon the approval of two-thirds
membership of the MMDAs, the MMDCEs, in addition to
some specified functions, serve as the political and
administrative heads of the MMDAs, and the chief
representatives of the Central Government in the localities
INTRODUCTION (Cont’d)

• MMDCEs are constitutionally limited in the exercise of their

functions. They can occupy the position for two terms of four
years each, and could be removed from office when a vote of no-
confidence of not less than two-thirds of all members of the
MMDAs is invoked, dismissal from office at the fiat of the
President, or in the case of death.
• Most scholarly reviews of the efficacy of the decentralization
policy in Ghana have focused on the MMDAs to the neglect of the
activities of the MMDCEs who are the chief operating officers of
the grassroots institutions.
INTRODUCTION (Cont’d)

• It is against this background that this study sought

to focus on the MMDCEs in order to establish the
degree of their impact on the decentralization
process.
• It assesses, from the perspective of citizens, the
extent to which the MMDCEs have performed
their functions (that is, how they have engaged
various actors to promote local development)
•APPOINTMENT OF MMDCEs
APPOINTMENT OF MMDCEs

• Citizens tend to have a better appreciation of their leaders whether

national or local if they have a clear understanding and knowledge of
the processes by which they are chosen to their positions.
• In our context, popular knowledge of the process by which their MMDCEs
were appointed gives indication as to how the people have participated
in the decision making process at the local level.
• Data from the field, however, show a split in popular knowledge of how
their MMDCEs were appointed. Only a little over half of the respondents
(50.5%) claimed they know the appointment process of MMDCEs while
49.5% did not (see Table 1 below).
APPOINTMENT OF MMDCEs: Table 1: Do you
know how your MMDCE was appointed

Response Frequency Percent Cumulative

Percent
Yes 13894 50.5 50.5
No 13606 49.5 100.0
Total 27500 100.0
APPOINTMENT OF MMDCEs (Cont’d)

• The 49.5% that indicated lack of knowledge of the appointment

process of their MMDCEs suggests that a large number of the local
electorates are either apathetic to the workings of the MMDAs or
that the process is shrouded in secrecy.
• It may be the case that the choice of the MMDCEs by the President
has excluded the people from the selection process.
• It further shows that the Assembly Members who vote on the
President’s nominee have failed to engage or educate their local
constituents about the process.
APPOINTMENT OF MMDCES: If yes, how is your
MMDCE appointed?

• Of the 13894 (50.5%) who claimed to know the appointment

process of MMDCEs, only 5296 (38.2%) got it right: nominated by
the president and approved by the Assembly.
• In effect only 19.3% of the total 27500 respondents correctly knew
the process of appointment
• Almost half (6629, 47.3%) indicated the President alone did the
appointment while (1866, 13.4%) said it was the Assembly alone.
• Most interestingly nearly 1% (103, 0.7%) attributed the
appointment to traditional authorities (see details in Table 2
below)
APPOINTMENT OF MMDCES: If yes, how is your
MMDCE appointed?

Response Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative

Percent Percent
By the President 6629 24.3 47.7 47.7
By the Assembly 1866 6.8 13.4 61.1
Nominated by the President and 5292 19.3 38.2 97.3
approved by the Assembly
By the Traditional Authority 103 0.4 0.7 100.0
Total 13894 50.5 100.0
Not Applicable 13606 49.5
Total 27500 100.0
APPOINTMENT OF MMDCEs: Was your MMDCE
appointed from the party in the constituency?

• While the 1992 Constitution and the various Local Government

Acts unequivocally banned political parties from participating in
the MMDAs, it is commonplace that the selection of MMDCEs is
immersed in partisan arrangements.
• In particular, the ruling party’s machinery is used to lead the
selection of MMDCEs, whose nomination by the President is largely
influenced by the preferences of the constituency, regional and
national officers of the ruling party
• Table 3 below affirms the general perception that MMDCEs are
chosen through partisan considerations
APPOINTMENT OF MMDCEs: Table 3: Was your
MMDCE appointed from the party in the
constituency?

Response Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative

Percent percent
Yes 10087 36.6 72.5 72.5
No 1425 5.2 10.3 82.8
I don’t know 2391 8.7 17.2 100.0
Total 13894 50.5 100.0
Non 13606 49.5
Applicable
Total 27500 100.0
APPOINTMENT OF MMDCEs: Table 3:Was your
MMDCE appointed from the party in the
constituency?
• From Table 3 above, nearly three quarters (10078, 72.5%) of the
13894 respondents indicated that their MMDCEs were appointed
from the party in the constituency.
• While 10.3% (1425) said ‘no’, the remaining 17.2% (2391) did not
know.

• In effect almost two of five of the 27500 (36.6%) respondents

agreed to partisan consideration in the selection of the MMDCEs to
head the non-partisan MMDAs
LEADERSHIP QUALITIES OF MMDCES

• One of the salient indicators of development in the governance

architecture is leadership. Leaders who manage institutions are
expected to exhibit qualities that could potentially spur
development
• Data from the field show that the local electorate would like their
leaders to possess valuable qualities that would impact on the
performance of their functions.
• Of the 47050 responses, as illustrated in Table 4 below, hard work
topped the list (21.2%) followed by honesty (20.6%), humility
(15.5%), intelligence (13.7%) higher education (11.6%), while
17.4% indicated other qualities, too numerous to be listed here
LEADERSHIP QUALITIES OF MMDCEs: Table 4: What
leadership qualities does your MMDCE have to
perform the task?

Qualities Frequency Percent Cumulative

Percent
Hard-work 9969 21.2 21.2
Honesty 9674 20.6 41.8
Humility 7313 15.5 57.3
Intelligence 6433 13.6 70.9
Higher 5437 11.6 82.5
education
Other 8224 17.5 100.0
47050 100.0
LEADERSHIP QUALITIES IN MMDCES (Cont’d)

The respondents’preference for hard work is imperative: It is

indicative of how they want their MMDCEs to have the capacity to
stimulate community development through hardwork . Indeed in the
governance literature, celebrated leaders have been those who led
their countries/communities to achieve progressive development
through hard work
• The preference for honesty is also crucial: In an environment
where dishonest remains a bane of development, getting leaders
who would promote their activities through honest exchanges is
perceived to be a step towards de-emphasing corruption in
officialdom
•MMDCEs & INFLUENTIAL ACTORS
(LOCAL & EXTERNAL)
ACTORS’ INFLUENCE ON MMDCEs

• The activities of the MMDAs are actor-driven. Like any institution where interests
converge, competing forces would always influence the course of
decision making either for their parochial interests or the common good.
• In our context here, many political forces exert considerable influences
on MMDCEs, some local and others external
• The influential local actors include: local party financiers, constituency
chairperson, the traditional authority (chiefs), assembly members,
religious leaders.
• The external actors include: national party officers, the regional
minister and the local government minister.
• Cutting across both the local and external actors are Members of
Parliament
MMDCEs & LOCAL ACTORS

• We examine below the reaction of respondents to the influences

of local actors
• Of the 27500 respondents only 27.0% (7514) said they know that
there are local actors who shape the activities of MMDCEs.
• 26.7% (7340) emphatically denied the presence of local political
forces that act on the MMDCEs
• A significant 46.3% (12745) however indicated that they have no
idea whether or not local forces control the activities of MMDCEs
MMDCEs & LOCAL ACTORS (Cont’d)

• Among the influential local actors the 7415 respondents

mentioned were: the ruling party constituency chairman, the local
party financier, the chief, religious leader, the assembly member
• As illustrated in Table 5 below, of the five influential local actors,
more than a third (37.0%) found the constituency chairman of the
ruling party the most influential, followed by the chief (26.3%),
the assembly member, the local party financier (14.6%) and the
religious leader (1.2%), while the remaining 5.9% mention one
other actor or another.
MMDCEs & LOCAL ACTORS: Table 5: Which of these
(local actors) have the greatest influence on your
MMDCE?
Response Frequency Percent Cumulative
Percent
The Constituency Chairperson 2742 37.0 37.0
The Chief 1943 26.2 63.2
The Assembly Member 1119 15.1 78.3
The Local Party Financier 1089 14.6 92.9
Religious Leader 88 1.2 94.1
Other 437 5.9 100.0
Total 7514 100.0
MMDCEs & LOCAL ACTORS (Cont’d)

• There were interesting dimensions to the responses on the local actors

with the greatest influence:
• It is intriguing that in a non-partisan system, it is the partisan
constituency chairperson who is seen as the most influential.
• Chiefs who have historically been allies in local governance still remain
very relevant in a system which currently has no formal role for them.
• The influence of the assembly members is not unconnected with their
role in the appointment of the MMDCE
• The low ranking of the local party financier has to do with the fact their
activities are often shrouded in secrecy.
• Religious leaders have generally stayed out of politics in Ghana,
whether local or national
MMDCES & CHIEFS

• The relations between MMDCEs and Chiefs were interrogated

further for in local governance, chiefs are traditional allies and
their collaboration with MMDCEs is regarded fundamental to the
successful performance of the latter’s work.
• While 45.8% of the respondents indicated that relations between
chiefs and MMDCEs range from somewhat cordial, to cordial to a
large extent; only 7.4% adduced to bad relations, but sadly 46.7%
did not know the extent to which the two groups collaborated.
• Similarly while almost half (49.1%) adduced to the non-existence
of tension between chiefs and MMDCEs, 3.5% thought there was
compared to 47.1% who did not know
MMDCEs & EXTERNAL ACTORS

• Some of the forces that shape the performance of MMDCEs come from outside
the local boundaries. Three among such influential external actors are national
party officers, regional ministers and the local government minister.
• Significantly, or rather sadly as illustrated in Table 6 below, a large chunk of our
respondents, indeed almost half in each case, are oblivious of such influences
• For national officers of the ruling party 31.4% adduced to their influence on
MMDCEs; while 21.3% disagreed, 47.1% were undecided on the matter.
• For the regional ministers who coordinate the activities of MMDCEs in their
jurisdiction, 29.7% thought they were influential, 21.3% disagreed while the
remaining 49.0% did not know.
• For the local minister who is the direct sector minister, it is interesting to know
that 51% did not know he/she has control over MMDCEs, 27.9% indicated he/she
has while 21.1% thought otherwise.
MMDCEs & EXTERNAL ACTORS: Table 6:Do you think
national party officers/regional ministers/local
government minister control MMDCEs?
External Actors Yes Yes No No (%) Don’t know Don’t
(Freq) (%) (Freq) (Freq) know
(%)
National Party 8627 31.4 5925 21.5 12948 47.1
Officers
Regional Minister 8155 29.7 5858 21.3 13487 49.0
Local Government 7663 27.9 5803 21.1 14034 51.0
Minister
•MMDCEs & MPs
MMDCEs & MPs

• There are intriguing relations between MMDCEs and Members of

Parliament (MPs) that are different from those of the other
influential local and external actors.
• The authority of the MMDCE is initiated from the national level but
he/she operates at the local level; while the MP elected at the
local level is of national significance as a representative in
Parliament
• The MP is an ex-officio member of the MMDA which is the domain
of the MMDCE
MMDCEs & MPs (Cont’d)

• The MMDCE and the MP have symbiotic interest in the delivery of

public goods (development) in the locality.
• Yet competition and potential conflict have often characterize
their relations arising out of the suspicion that the MMDCE has
ambition to contest the MP for the parliamentary seat; by
attempts to exclude the MP from attending assembly meetings or
reluctance of the MMDCE to disburse the MP’s share of the DACF,
among others
• It is against this background that we interrogated our respondents
about relations between these two power blocs in the locality
MMDCEs & MPs: Table 7: Does your MP
influence your MMDCE?

Response Frequency Percent Cumulative

Percent
Yes 7753 28.2 28.2
No 7537 27.4 55.6
Don’t know 12210 44.4 100.0
Total 27500 100.0
MMDCEs & MPs: Influence of MPs?

• From the table above more than half of the respondents

(55.6%) were split on the issue.
• While 28.2% were confident that the MP influences the
MMDCE, 27.4% were emphatic that there was no such
influence.
• More than two of every five of them (44.4%), however
did not know
MMDCEs & MPs: Table 8: Prevalence of
Tension between the MMDCE & the MP?

Response Frequency Percent Cumulative

Percent
Yes 2204 8.0 8.0
No 14125 51.4 59.4
Don’t know 11171 40.6 100.0
Total 27500 100.0
MMDCEs & MPs: Prevalence &Sources of
Tension between MMDCE & MP

• On the issue of prevalence of tension between the MMDCE and the

MP, as illustrated in Table 8 above only 8.0% affirm there was
while 51.4% refuted its existence. However this does not negate
the possibility of tension between the two political heavy weights
since a large proportion (40.6%) indicated they did not know.
• For those who knew of tension between the two, the main source
is non-consultation (54.2%) followed by competition for the public
space (18.8%) hide and seek business and avoidance of meetings
(16.9% and open confrontation (10.1%)
MMDCEs & MPs: The degree of the effect of
tension between MMDCE & MP

• There are potential risks associated with MMDCE-MP acrimonies for

the delivery of public goods to the people
• It is therefore not surprising that a large majority (75.7%) those
who attest to the prevalence of MMDCE-MP tension/conflict think
it has affected the performance of the MMDCE ‘to some
extent’(33.7%) and ‘to a large extent’ (42.4%)
• While only 5.3% were insistent there was no relationship, the
other 19.1% were not sure (See Table 9 below for details)
• If the conflict/tension remain unresolved, it would potentially
stifle sustainable local development
MMDCEs & MPs: Table 9: How has the tension
affected the performance of your MMDCE?

Response Frequency Percent Cumulative

Percent
To a large extent 1008 42.4 42.4
To some extent 792 33.3 75.7
Not sure 452 19.1 94.7
It has no relationship 126 5.3 100.0
Total 2380 100.0
•MMDCEs & THE COMMUNITY
MMDCEs & the COMMUNITY

• As community leaders MMDCEs have a responsibility to engage the

people through regular visits to the localities to ascertain for
themselves pertinent issues that need their attention and action.
• Data from the field as detailed in Table 10 below show that
MMDCEs do not frequently visit their communities to obtain first-
hand information and attend to their welfare matters/concerns
• They mostly (51.4%) visit once a while but nearly two of every five
of them (39.0%) indicated that their MMDCEs have never come to
their communities at all. Only 2.0% visit weekly, 1.8% bi-weekly
and 5.8% monthly
MMDCEs & THE COMMUNITY: Table 10: How often
does your MMDCE interact with your community?

Response Frequency Percent Cumulative

Percent
Weekly 554 2.0 2.0
Bi-weekly 501 1.8 3.8
Monthly 1585 5.8 9.6
Once a while 14127 51.4 61.0
Not at all 10733 39.0 100.0
Total 27500 100.0
MMDCES AND THE COMMUNITY (Cont’d)

• This situation of irregular interaction between MMDCEs and their

communities is rather worrying:
• As representatives of the President, MMDCEs are expected to travel to
the constituents in order to ease the perceived problem of ‘remoteness
of the local people from the Central Government’
• Indeed, the proximity of the MMDCEs to the people is a deliberate
strategy to assuage the people’s fear that the centre has neglected them
in the decision-making process.
• MMDCEs’ regular visits to the communities are therefore meant to ease
these psychological and emotional burdens of the people in addition to
see to their socio-economic welfare
•MMDCEs & DEVELOPMENT
PROJECTS
MMDCEs & DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

• A salient ingredient in the decentralization policy is rural development

and MMDAs are the hub for the elimination of urban, peri-urban and
rural poverty
• MMDCEs are therefore the agents of central government to bring about
the needed change and people look up to them to stimulate local
development
• MMDCEs are expected to harness and utilize the available local resources
to improve the socio-economic lives of the grassroots
• However data from this survey as shown in Table 11 below point to an
unimpressive performance by MMDCEs in carrying out development
projects
MMDCEs & DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS: Table 11:
What projects has your MMDCE undertaken in your
locality?
Projects Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
Market 1324 4.3 4.3
Road 1979 6.5 10.8
Hospital 1213 4.0 14.8
School 3231 10.1 24.9
Bridge 828 2.7 27.6
Other 2912 9.4 37.0
Don’t know 4723 15.5 52.5
Has done nothing 14252 47.5 100.0
Total 30462 100.0
MMDCEs & DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS (Cont’d)

• From the table above, almost half of the responses denounced

their MMDCEs for their inability to bring development to their
localities.
• The phrase the MMDCE ‘has done nothing’ (47.5%) sums up the
non-delivery of development projects by MMDCEs.
• 15.5% of those who responded did not know of the development
projects the MMDCEs have undertaken in their localities
• It is the case that critical social infrastructure such as markets
(4.3%), roads (6.5%) and schools (10.1%) have received little
attention
•PERFORMANCE OF MMDCEs
PERFORMANCE OF MMDCEs

• The picture of low development is a reflection of the

poor performance of the MMDCEs (See Table 12 below):
• Only 2.4% rated their MMDCEs in the delivery of
community development projects as excellent; 6.3%
‘very good’ and 24.6% as ‘good’ a cumulative score of
33.3%.
• On the other hand, the cumulative score of ‘bad’ (35.4%)
and ‘very bad’ (31.3%) is 66.7%
PERFORMANCE OF MMDCEs: Table 12: How would
you rate the performance of your MMDCE?

Response Frequency Percent Cumulative

Percent
Excellent 661 2.4 2.4
Very Good 1717 6.3 8.7
Good 6696 24.6 33.3
Bad 9807 35.4 68.7
Very bad 8485 31.3 100.0
Total 27166 100.0
PERFORMANCE OF MMDCES & 2020
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

• Conventional wisdom teaches that the performance of appointees would

reflect on the appointing authority.
• However, to the question whether the performance of MMDCEs will
affect the people’s choices in the 2020 presidential poll (Table 12 below)
a little over half (51.0%) said they would not link their choice of the
president to the failures of the MMDCEs.
• But that should not give much comfort to the ruling party, given that a
significant minority (39.9%) would use the performance of the MMDCEs
as proxy for the achievement of the President in the locality.
• In addition 9.1% were undecided on the issue
PERFORMANCE OF MMDCEs: Will the Performance
of your MMDCE affect your vote in the 2020
presidential election?

Response Frequency Percent Cumulative

Percent
Yes 10831 39.9 39.9
No 13856 51.0 90.9
Don’t know 2479 9.1 100.00
Total 27166 100.0
PARTISAN & NON-PARTISAN
ELECTIONS
PARTISAN AND NON-PARTISAN LOCAL
ELECTIONS
• On the vexed issue of partisan and non-partisan local governance, the
survey solicited the views of the grassroots
• Evidence from the survey shows majority support for non-partisan choice
of MMDCEs and assembly members (See Table 13 below).
• The responses to the election of assembly members on partisan lines
were : Yes (24.0%), No (69.4%), Don’t know (6.6%). On the election of
MMDCEs on partisan lines, it was Yes (31.4%), No (61.5%) and Don’t know
(7.1%)
• But it is plausible to say that the views expressed by the respondents in
this study might have been influenced by the confusion that surrounded
the referendum processes – lack of education - that led to the
withdrawal of the Bills.
PARTISAN & NON PARTISAN LOCAL ELECTIONS: Table
12: Do you want your Assembly Member/MMDCE to
be elected on partisan lines?

Yes Yes No No (%) Don’t Don’t

(Freq) (%) (Freq) know know
(Freq) (%)
Assembly 6510 24.0 18854 69.4 1802 6.6
Member
MMDCE 8527 31.4 16720 61.5 1919 7.1
•SOME LESSONS
LESSONS

• It is a worrying development that after decades of practising the current

local government system in Ghana, less than a fifth of the respondents
could answer the basic issue of mode of appointment of the MMDCE
correctly. Similarly for several of the other questions in the survey, a
large chunk of respondents, usually more than 40% expressed lack of
knowledge. These are clear signs of apathy towards local governance
which is meant to be the closest to the people. There is the urgent
need for the MMDAs, the NCCE, the media and other stakeholders to
embark on intensive education to reverse this trend.
• The debate about partisan and non-partisan local governance would
rage on. While there is still massive support for the non-partisan system,
no one is left in doubt about traces of partisanship in the current system
particularly in the appointment and operations of MMDCEs
LESSONS (Cont’d)

• MMDCEs must strike a very delicate balance in their relationships

with local and external actors and in particular with chiefs and
MPs to succeed
• Whatever the challenges confronting MMDCEs must be addressed
to enable them improve in their interactions with their
communities and in the delivery of public goods. Their current
performance levels in both respects are rather unimpressive
• The ruling party cannot take for granted the large proportion of
respondents who would link their vote in the 2020 presidential
poll to the performance of their MMDCEs
•THANKS FOR YOUR TIME!!!!!