‘Group Liability’

or
‘Joint Liability’
 Sections under IPC
Section 34 to Section 38
Section 120A
Section 121A
Section 149
Section 396
Section 460
 5 Categories of Group Liabilities
1. Where Criminal Act is done with the Common Intention of the
group. (S. 34 – S. 38)
2. Where the offence is committed with the common object of an
unlawful assembly. (S. 149)
3. Where persons are charge of Criminal Conspiracy. (S. 120A & S. 121A)
4. Where 5 or more persons conjointly in the commission of Dacoity
commits murder. (S. 396)
5. Where persons are jointly concerned in committing the offence of
lurking house-trespass / house-breaking by night. (S. 460)
Section 34- Acts done by several
persons in furtherance of
common intention
S. 34 was amended by 1870 amendment and the
words which were inserted was “in furtherance of the
common intention of all”

This particularly shows the rule of evidence that if 2

or more persons commits a crime in furtherance of a
common intention, each of them will be liable jointly
i.e. if each has done separate acts, they will still be
liable as if it was done by them alone.
This explanation is based on the decision laid down in Reg v.
Cruise (1838) 8 C&P 541.
In this case, a constable and his assistants had gone to arrest
a person A, in his house. There were three other persons B, C
and D. On seeing the police constable, B, C and D came out of
the house, gave him a blow and drove away the constable and
his assistants. The court evolved the ‘doctrine of joint
liability’, and held that each member of the group, i.e. B, C
and D, were equally liable and responsible for the blow,
irrespective of whether only one of them had actually struck
the blow.
Thus the main ingredients of Section 34 are:
a) A criminal act must be done by several persons [ 2 or more ].
b) There must be common intention.
c) There must be participation of all in the commission of the offence in furtherance of common
intention.

Section 34 must be read with Section 33.

Therefore, there has to be consensus of

◦ minds of persons participating in the act or prior consent.
◦ Acts of several person need not be same or identical
1. minds of persons participating in the act or prior consent.
[Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King Emperor AIR 1925 PC 1]
In this case, the accused was the only person apprehended for the murder of the
Postmaster of Shankaritola Post Office on 3 August 1923. On that day, several persons
appeared at the door of the backroom of the Post Office where the Postmaster was counting
his money and demanded the money. They fired pistols at him and he died almost
immediately. While all the accused fled the place without taking any money, the accused,
Barendra Kumar, alone was chased and caught by the Post Office assistants with a pistol in
his hand. It was his defense that he was only standing guard outside the Post Office, and
that he was actually compelled to stand so by the other accused and thus he did not have
the intention to kill the Postmaster. His conviction for murder under section 302 read with
section 34, IPC, was confirmed by Calcutta High Court. In the appeal before the Privy
Council, Lord Summer, while dismissing the appeal against the conviction held:
Section 34 deals with the doing of separate acts, similar or diverse, by several persons, if
all are done in furtherance of a common intention, each person is liable for the result of
them all, as if he had done them himself, for ‘that act’ and ‘the act’ in the latter part of
the section must include the whole action covered by a criminal act ‘in the first part,
because they refer to it….In other words, ‘criminal act’ means that unity of criminal
behavior which results in something for which an individual would be responsible, if it
were done by himself alone, that is, in a criminal offence.
 1. Acts of several person need not be same or identical
[Mahboob Shah Emperor AIR 1945 PC 118]

In this case, the Privy Council, very succinctly expounded the scope of the operation of Section 34 thus:
Under S.34 of IPC the essence of liability is to be found in the existence of a common intention animating the
accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such intention. To invoke the aid of S.34
successfully, it must be shown that the criminal act complained against was done by one of the accused
persons in furtherance of the common intention of all; if this is so then liability for the crime may be imposed
on any one of the persons in the same manner as if the act were done by him alone. This being the principle, it
is clear to their lordships that common intention within the meaning of the section implies a pre-arranged plan,
and to convict the accused of an offence applying the section it should be proved that the criminal act was
done in concert pursuant to the pre-arranged plan… Care must be taken not to confuse same or similar
intention with common intention; the partition which divides ‘their bonds’ is often very thin; nevertheless, the
distinction is real and substantial and if overlooked will result in miscarriage of justice. In their Lordships’ view,
the inference of common intention within the meaning of the term in S.34 should never be reached unless it is
a necessary inference deducible from the circumstances of the case.
 Common Intention: Guiding
Principles
1. Common intention should be pre-meditated i.e. prior meetings of mind. But there might be
instances where common intention may develop on the spot, after the offenders have
gathered.
[Ramaswami Ayyangar v State of Tamil Nadu 1976 (3) SCR 870;
Suresh v State of UP AIR 2001 SC 1344;
Kripal v State of UP AIR 1954 SC 706]
In this case, there was a long standing property dispute between members of an extended family. The
deceased, Jiraj, was walking towards his field along with two labourers who were walking in front. The
labourers were first accosted by the three accused near a well and threatened from going ahead. They were
also beaten up by the accused by the blunt part of a spear handle. When Jiraj, who reached the spot a few
minutes later, remonstrated with the accused, he was attacked by the three accused in the course of which
he was stabbed by one of the accused in his jaw, because of which he died. In the course of the some
incident, a brother of Jiraj was also murdered. Originally, 13 persons were accused of offences under section
304(1), IPC, but acquitted them of charge under S.302, IPC. On appeal filed by the state, the High Court of
Allahbad set aside the acquittal under S302. Two of the accused were sentenced to death and the third to life
imprisonment. On the issue of common intention, arising suddenly the Supreme Court held:
The common intention to bring a particular result may well develop on the spot as between a number of
persons, with reference to the facts of the case and circumstances of the situation. Whether in a proved
situation all the individuals concerned therein have developed only simultaneous and independent intentions
or whether a simultaneous consensus of their minds to bring about a particular result can be said to have
developed and thereby intended by all of them, is a question that has to be determined on the facts.
1. Proof of Common Intention will rarely be found easily. It has to be culled
out from the facts & circumstances of the case.
2. There is a difference between Common Intention & Same or Similar
Intention
Each other must know about the consequence to be Common Intention.
In Similar Intention it is not the case.
[See- Dukhmochan Pandey v State of Bihar AIR 1998 SC 40]

3. Unless Common Intention is proved individual offenders will be liable

only for their individual acts.
 Note:
Under Section 33 act means only one act or a series of acts having a
Common Intention.
◦ Example 1- One stands at the door guarding, one commits the act inside the room.
All acts are part of Common Intention.
◦ Example 2- A, an accused along with 2 other co-accused B & C proceeded to D’s
house, in order to avenge an insult by the brother of D. They opened fire but only B
& C’s shots succeeded in hitting & killing D. However, A will also be convicted of
murder because of Common Intention.

In absence of Common Intention, it is different case.

◦ Example 3- X, Y & Z with the intention of assaulting A, give him a beating during
the course of which X who had the previous enmity with A stabs him in the
abdomen & A dies. The act of stabbing is not done in furtherance of Common
Intention. Hence, Y & Z will be liable for causing simple hurt only, while X for
murder.

Case Laws- KDG Pg. 32

5. S. 34 does not create any specific offence, it lays down the principal of Joint Criminal Liability.
e.g. - Gurdatta Mal v. State of UP AIR 1965 SC 257 :
In this case the question that arose was over the operation of S.34 in the context of right of private defence as provided
in S.96 IPC. In this case, the accused persons were alleged to have attacked the deceased person’s party in the
agricultural fields of latter party when they were harvesting the crop. Earlier in the day, the deceased, Gurucharan lal,
had given a written complaint of threat at the local police station, resulting in two police constables being sent along
with them. The complainant side had also taken a photographer with them. As harvesting was proceeding the accused
party armed with guns, spears and lathis entered the field despite the warning of Police constable and shot the
complainant party killing three persons including the photographer. The defence of the accused was that there was a
dispute existing over possession of the land, and that it was the complainant party which had attacked him and that
they had exercised their right to private defence of property. It was also their stand that they did not have any
intention to kill the deceased. It was in this context that the Supreme court observed:
It is well settled that Section 34 of IPC does not create a distinct offence; it only lays down the principle of criminal
liability. The necessary conditions for application of S.34 of IPC are common intention to commit an offence and
participation by all the accused in doing act or acts in furtherance of that common intention. If these two ingredients
are established, all the accused would be liable for the said offence, that is to say that if two or more persons had
common intention to commit murder and they had participated in the acts done by them in furtherance of that
common intention, all of them would be guilty of murder.
 Killed the complainant but accused said they were exercising their
right of private defence.

Therefore, even if no specific charge is levied on the accused then S.

34 can come into picture.

6. Free fight
7. Participation in the Criminal Act
In Shreekantian R. Munipalli v. State of Bombay, it is said that it is
the essence of the section that the person must be physically present
at the actual commission of crime e.g. In physical violence cases.
However, in its ratio it was observed:
while participation in action is a necessary in all cases for
participation to be in forms of Physical Presence.
e.g. in cases of cheating, misappropriation.

8. It is not essential for an Overt Act to prove Common

Intention.
The fact that there was common intention and some act is
done is enough to prove Section 34.
“S.149- Every member of unlawful
assembly guilty of offence committed
in prosecution of common object.—If an
offence is committed by any member of an
unlawful assembly in prosecution of the
common object of that assembly, or such as
the members of that assembly knew to be
likely to be committed in prosecution of
that object, every person who, at the time
of the committing of that offence, is a
member of the same assembly, is guilty of
 Comparison between S. 34 & S.
149
1. Both deals with Constructive Liability i.e. Joint Liability.
◦ S. 34 only lays down the principle of joint liability & does not create a separate offence.
◦ But S. 149 creates a separate offence i.e. offence against public tranquility i.e. membership in a unlawful assembly is liable to
punishment.

2. Common Intention in S. 34 is undefined & therefore unlimited in operation. But, Common Object in S. 149 cannot go
beyond 5 objects indicated.
3. Common Intention requires prior meeting of mind & unity of intention but Common Object can be met without these 2
ingredients.
Therefore, Common Object of an unlawful assembly may be same but intention of the participants may differ.
◦ Chittarmahal with Moti v. State of Rajasthan AIR 2003 SC 796
In this case the SC reiterating a set of thitherto settled propositions from its judicial pronouncements and articulating the
resemblances and differences between section 34 and section 149 IPC, offers a crystal principle of law governing the field.
When several persons numbering five or more, do an act and intend to do it, the court observes, both the sections, section
34 and section 149, come into play, through the principle of constructive liability mentioned therein is premised
respectively on common intention and common object. “If the common object does not necessarily involve a common
intention”, it stresses, “then the substitution of section 34 for section 149 might result in prejudice to the accused and
ought not, therefore, to be permitted”. “But if it does involve a common intention”, it points out, “then the substitution of
section 34 for section 149 must be held to be a formal matter”. “Whether such recourse can be had or not”, it cautions,
“must depend on the facts of each case”. And “the non-applicability of section 149”, it rules, “is no bar in convicting (the
accused persons) under section 302 read with section 34 of IPC, if the evidence discloses commission of an offence in
furtherance of common intention”.
◦ Rajnath v. State of UP AIR 2009 SC 1422.
4. S. 34 – Participation is important
S. 149 – Membership is important and no need of active participation

5. In S.34 – two or more persons

In S. 149 – Minimum is 5 persons

6. IN S. 34 – Some Overt Act, however small is pre-requisite for being liable.

In S. 149 – mere fact of being an unlawful assembly itself is sufficient to fix liability.

Case: Nanak Chand v. State of Punjab AIR 1955 SC 274

The SC in this case delving into the distinction between section 34 and 149 of IPC, observed:
There is a clear distinction between the provisions of sections 34 and 149 IPC and the two sections are not to be confused. The principal
element in section 34 IPC, is the common intention to commit a crime. In furtherance of the common intention several acts may be done by
several persons resulting in the commission of that crime. In such a situation section 34 provides that each of them would be liable for that
crime in the same manner as if all the acts resulting in that crime had been done by him alone. There is no question of common intention in
section 149, IPC. An offence may be committed by a member of an unlawful assembly and the other members will be liable for that offence
although there is no common intention between that person and other members of the unlawful offence to commit that offence provided
the conditions laid down in the section are fulfilled.

Important Distinction:
S. 34 – person himself must have done (participated) in commission of the act but
S. 149 – a person might be liable for the offence even though he himself did not actually join in perpetrating it, nor was the offence
committed in his presence.
Whereas section 34, does not take into account the fact of the participation of every individual offender in the
offence which is therein described as a “criminal act” as well as his mental state which is therein connoted by the
word ‘intention’.
Section 149 completely ignores both these factors.
SECTION 34 deals with the an offence from two aspects, the first of which may be described as the physical and
the second as the mental aspect. The physical aspect of which can be described here as the ‘criminal act’. This
criminal act must be done ‘by several persons’. Therefore , the emphasis is on the word done. This criminal act is
a joint act, everyone must be a sharer in the crime.
This sharply contrasts with s. 149, under which it is not at all necessary that every individual member of the
unlawful assembly should have himself participated in the commission of the criminal act which is termed as
offence. The result is that in 149, the person might be liable for the offence even though he himself did not
actually join in doing it, nor was the offence committed in his immediate presence.

Om Prakash v State AIR 1956 ALL 241