CASES ON

STATE IMMUNITY

Jan Danielle Bondad

Joielyn Dimaano
Doreen Ysabelle Garcia
CIVIL AERONAUTICS VS. COURT OF
APPEALS and ERNEST E. SIMKE

G.R. No. xxx

Date of Promulgation
Ponente: xxx
 FACTS
• ERNEST E. SIMKE was the Honorary Consul General of
Israel in the Philippines.
• He went to Manila International Airport to meet his future
son-in-law.
• While walking on the viewing deck, Simke slipped on an
elevation 4-inch high and fell on his back.
• Claim for damages - Civil Aeronautics Administration
(CAA), which was the entity in charge of the airport.
• Judgment was rendered in Simke’s favor.
CAA’s DEFENSE:
– Invoking the rule that the State cannot be sued without its
consent, CAA contends that being an agency of the
government, it cannot be made a party defendant in this case.
 ISSUE

Whether or not Civil Aeronautics Administration or

CAA is immune from suit.
 RULING
– NO.
– Immunity from suits is determined by the character of the
objects for which the entity was organized. Not all government
entities, whether corporate or non-corporate, are immune from
suits. Immunity from suits is determined by the character of the
objects for which the entity was organized.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON.
EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL, et. al.
G.R. No. 84607
March 19, 1993
Ponente: Campos, Jr.
 FACTS

• In January 1987, farmers and their sympathizers

presented their demands for what they called “genuine
agrarian reform”.
• The Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP) - Jaime
Tadeo
– giving lands for free to farmers
– zero retention of lands by landlords
– stop amortizations of land payments
• Dialogue between the farmers and MAR - January 15,
1987

• January 20, 1987 - Tadeo met with MAR Minister

Heherson Alvarez
– Alvarez was only able to promise to do his best to bring the
matter to the attention of then President Cory Aquino during the
January 21 Cabinet meeting
• The farmers, on their 7th day of encampment, barricaded
the MAR premises and prevented the employees from
going inside their offices.

• January 22, 1987 - Tadeo’s group (KMP) went to

Malacanang
• KMP were joined by Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), Bagong
Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN), League of Filipino
Students (LFS), and Kongreso ng Pagkakaisa ng
Maralitang Lungsod (KPML)

• Government intelligent reports were also received that the

KMP was heavily infiltrated by CPP/NPA elements, and
that an insurrection was impending
• Government anti-riot forces assembled at Mendiola.
– 12 marchers were officially confirmed dead
– 39 were wounded by gunshots and 12 sustained minor
injuries, all belonging to the group of marchers
– Of the police and military, 3 sustained gunshot wounds
and 20 suffered minor physical injuries
• AFTERMATH OF THE CONFRONTATION
– Then Pres. Corazon Aquino issued Administrative Order No.
11 (AO 11) dated January 22, 1987, which created the
CITIZENS’ MENDIOLA COMMISSION.
• created precisely for the “purpose of conducting an investigation of the
disorder, deaths, and casualties that took place in the vicinity of
Mendiola Bridge and Mendiola Street and Claro M. Recto Avenue,
Manila, in the afternoon of January 22, 1987.”
• The “Citizens’ Mendiola Commission” submitted its report
on the incident on February 27, 1987:
– The march did not have any permit
– The police and military were armed with handguns (.38 and .45
calibre guns) prohibited by law
– The security men assigned to protect the government units
were in civilian attire (prohibited by law)
– There was unnecessary firing by the police and military
– The weapons (steel bars, pillboxes, darts, lead pipe, wooden
clubs with spikes, and guns) carried by the marchers are
prohibited by law
– It is not clear who started the firing
– The KMP farmers broke off further negotiations with the MAR
officials and were determined to march to Malacañang
– No dialogue between the rallyists and the government forces.
– The police fought back with their truncheons and shields
– The water cannons and tear gas were not put into effective use
to disperse the rioting crowd because
(a) there was no order to use them;
(b) they were incorrectly prepositioned
(c) they were out of range of the marchers.
– No barbed wire barricade was used in Mendiola but no official
reason was given for its absence.
• The Commission’s recommendations:
– the criminal prosecution of four unidentified, uniformed
individuals shown either on tape or in pictures, firing at the
direction of the marchers
– all the commissioned officers of both the Western Police
District (WPD) and Integrated National Police (INP) who
were armed be prosecuted for violation of par. 4(g) of the
Public Assembly Act of 1985
– Prosecution of the marchers
– Prosecution of Tadeo for holding the rally without permit and
for inciting sedition
• Administrative sanctions:
– Gen. Ramon E. Montaño
– Police Gen. Alfredo S. Lim
– Police Gen. Edgar Dula Torres
– Police Maj. Demetrio dela Cruz
– Col. Cezar Nazareno
– Maj. Filemon Gasmin
• Last and most important recommendation:
– for the deceased and wounded victims to be compensated by
the government

• January 1988 - petitioners instituted an action for damages

against the Republic of the Philippines, together with the military
officers, and personnel involved in the Mendiola incident
• The Solicitor-General filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that the State cannot be sued without its consent.
– Petitioners opposed said motion on March 16, 1988,
maintaining that the State has waived its immunity from suit
and that the dismissal of the instant action is contrary to both
the Constitution and the International Law on Human Rights.
TWO QUESTIONED ORDERS BY JUDGE
SANDOVAL
• FIRST ORDER
– Dismissed the complaint as against the Republic of the
Philippines
• GROUND: There was no waiver by the State.
• Petitioners (Caylao group) filed a Motion for Reconsideration therefrom

• SECOND ORDER
– Denied the MR filed by Petitioners
• Consequently, Caylao group and co-petitioners filed this instant
Petition.
 ISSUE

Whether or not the State has waived its immunity from

suit
 RULING
• Art. XVI, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution: The State may
not be sued without its consent
– The recommendations by the Commission does not in any way
mean that liability automatically attaches to the State.

– Whatever acts or utterances that then President Aquino may

have done or said, the same are not tantamount to the State
having waived its immunity from suit.
– The case does not qualify as a suit against the State.
• Some instances when a suit against the State is proper are:
– When the Republic is sued by name;
– When the suit is against an unincorporated government
agency
– When the suit is on its face against a government officer
but the case is such that the ultimate liability will belong
not to the officer but to the government
• Official functions
• Use of firearms
• Main purpose

No reversible error by the respondent Judge found.

Petitions dismissed.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PABLO
FELICIANO and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT
G.R. No. 70853
March 12, 1987
Ponente: Yap, J.
 FACTS

• Respondent Pablo Feliciano

– filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance against the
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority,
for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of
land.

• Trial court: Lot No. 1 to be the private property of

Feliciano and the rest of the property reverted to the
public domain.
• Buying of the property in question from Victor Gardiola
• Upon his purchase, he took actual possession of the said
property and made some improvements on it
• Proclamation No. 90, under National Resettlement and
Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) which later on
became Land Authority
• The property in question be excluded from the sub-
division and distribution to the settlers
• Plaintiff prayed that he be declared the rightful and true
owner of the property in question consisting of 1,364.4177
hectares
DEFENDANT (represented by the Land Authority)
– Filed an ANSWER: lack of sufficient cause of action and
prescription
• TRIAL COURT’S DECISION
– rendered a decision declaring Lot No. 1, with an area of
701.9064 hectares, to be the private property of the plaintiff
– declaring said lot excluded from the NARRA settlement
reservation
– Lots 2, 3 and 4, reverted to the public domain.
• A Motion to Intervene and to set aside the decision of the trial
court was filed by 86 settlers, alleging that they had been in
possession of the land for more than 20 years under claim of
ownership.
– Ordered the settlers to present their evidence but they did not
appear at the day of presentation of evidence.
– Feliciano, on the other hand, presented additional evidence.
Thereafter, the case was submitted for decision and the trial
court ruled in favor of Feliciano.
• The settlers immediately filed a motion for reconsideration
and then the case was reopened to allow them to present
their evidence.

• Feliciano filed a petition for certiorari with the Appellate

Court but it was denied.

• The settlers filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that

the Republic of the Philippines cannot be sued without its
consent and hence the action cannot prosper. The motion
was opposed by Feliciano.
 ISSUE

Whether or not the state can be sued for recovery and

possession of a parcel of land.
 RULING

No. A suit against the state is not permitted, except upon a

showing that the state has consented to be sued, either
expressly or by implication through the use of statutory
language too plain to be misinterpreted.
• Feliciano contends that the consent of the State may be
read from the Proclamation itself, when it established the
reservation “subject to private rights, if any there be.”
– No such consent can be drawn from the language of the
Proclamation.
– The exclusion of existing private rights from the reservation
established by Proclamation No. 90 can not be construed as a
waiver of the immunity of the State from suit. Waiver of
immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred
lightly. but must be construed in strictissimi juris (the most strict
right).
THE HOLY SEE VS. THE HON. ERIBERTO U.
ROSARIO, JR. and STARBRIGHT SALES
ENTERPRISES, INC.
G.R. No.
Date
Ponente
 FACTS

• A parcel of land, Lot 5-A, registered under the name Holy

See, was contiguous to Lot 5-B and 5-D consisting of
6,000 square meters located in the Municipality
of Paranaque.
• Said lots were sold to Ramon Licup who assigned his
right to Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc.
• In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots
sold, a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the
responsibility of evicting and clearing the land
of squatters.
• Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by
petitioner of the lot of concern to Tropicana
• Star bright filed a suit for annulment of the sale.
• Holy See and Msgr. Cirilos moved to dismiss the petition
for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity.
 ISSUE

Whether or not Holy See can invoke sovereign

immunity
 RULING
– The Court held that Holy See may properly invoke sovereign
immunity for its non-suability. As expressed in Sec. 2 Art II of
the 1987 Constitution, generally accepted principles of
International Law are adopted by our Courts and thus shall
form part of the laws of the land as a condition and
consequence of our admission in the society of nations.

– Article 31(A) of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic

Relations - that diplomatic envoy shall be granted immunity
from civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state
over any real action relating to private immovable property.
The Holy See is immune from suit because the act of selling
the lot of concern is non-propriety in nature. The lot was
acquired through a donation from the Archdiocese of
Manila, not for a commercial purpose, but for the use of
petitioner to construct the official place of residence of the
Papal Nuncio thereof. The transfer of the property and its
subsequent disposal are likewise clothed with a
governmental (non-proprietal) character as petitioner sold
the lot not for profit or gain rather because it merely cannot
evict the squatters living in said property.
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON.
AGUSTIN S. DIZON
G.R. No.
Date
Ponente
 FACTS

• August 30, 1990 - the University of the Philippines (UP)

through its then President Jose V. Abueva
– General Construction Agreement with respondent Stern Builders
Corporation (Stern Builders), represented by its President and
General Manager Servillano dela Cruz
• for the construction of the extension building and the renovation of the
College of Arts and Sciences Building in the campus of the University of the
Philippines in Los Baños (UPLB).
• Stern Builders submitted 3 progress billings for the work
accomplished but the University of the Philippines failed
to pay the third billing (P273,729.47) because of the
disallowance of the Commission on Audit (COA). After the
lift of the disallowance by COA, the UP still failed to pay
the third billing.

• A civil case was filed with the RTC of Quezon City for the
damages caused, and the case was decided in favor of
Stern Builders. UP filed a Motion for Reconsideration but
was denied by the RTC.
• UP filed a notice of appeal
– Stern Builders opposed such appeal
• on the ground that the appeal was filed late.

• UP countered:
– the denial of the previous motion was served to Atty. Nolasco
who is from UPLB Legal Office was flawed because in the case
at bar, UP was represented by the OLS of UP Diliman to whom
the documents should have been served.

• RTC denied the notice of appeal of the UP and granted

the Motion for Execution filed by the Stern Builders.
• The Writ of Execution and Notice of Demand was served
by the Sherriff.
– UP then filed an urgent Motion to Reconsider the Notice of
Appeal with the RTC but was also denied.

• June 24, 2003

– UP assailed the denial of due course to its appeal through a
petition for certiorari in the CA
– but was then dismissed upon finding that the UP’s notice of
appeal had been filed late.
• UP filed with the CA Petition for Certiorari to challenge the
jurisdiction of the RTC for the release of garnished funds
and averred that such cannot be done because the funds
involved are public funds.

• APPEAL:
– both the CA and the High Court denied UP’s petition
– Denial became final and executory
• Stern Builders
– filed in the RTC their motions for execution despite their
previous motion having already been granted and despite the
writ of execution having already issued.

• June 11, 2003

– RTC granted another motion for execution filed on May 9, 2003
(although the RTC had already issued the writ of execution on
October 4, 2002).
– Consequently, the sheriff served notices of garnishment to the
UP’s depositary banks and the RTC ordered the release of the
funds.
 ISSUES
• FIRST ISSUE:
– Whether or not the University of the Philippines, who
entered a private contract with Stern Builders which
established its suability, is also liable for the damages?
• No. Contrary to the judgment rendered against UP which it had
impliedly consented through entering the agreement, liability is not
immediately enforceable by execution against the UP because suability
of the State did not necessarily mean its liability.
• In Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme:
– Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued,
liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The
circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean
that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it
does not first consent to be sued.
– Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has
allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its
sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to
prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.
•SECOND ISSUE:
– Whether or not the funds of the University of the Philippines
are subject to garnishment?
• No. UP funds should not be subjected to garnishment. As a government
instrumentality, the UP administers special funds sourced from the fees
and income enumerated under Act No. 1870 and Section 1 of Executive
Order No. 714, and from the yearly appropriations, to achieve the
purposes laid down by Act 1870.

• All the funds going into the possession of the UP, including any interest
accruing from the deposit of such funds in any banking institution,
constitute a “special trust fund,” the disbursement of which should always
be aligned with the UP’s mission and purpose, and should always be
subject to auditing by the COA.
• An appropriation by Congress was required before the
judgment that rendered the UP liable for moral and actual
damages (including attorney’s fees) would be satisfied
considering that such monetary liabilities were not
covered by the “appropriations earmarked for the said
project.” The Constitution strictly mandated in Section 6,
Article 29 (1) “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”