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COMPETITION

ACT
COMBINATION
WHAT IS COMBINATION?
• Broadly, combination under the Act means acquisition of control,
shares, voting rights or assets, acquisition of control by a person over
an enterprise where such person has direct or indirect control over
another enterprise engaged in competing businesses, and mergers
and amalgamations between or amongst enterprises when the
combining parties exceed the thresholds set in the Act. The
thresholds are specified in the Act in terms of assets or turnover in
India and abroad. The words combination and merger are used
interchangeably in this booklet.

• Entering into a combination which causes or is likely to cause an


appreciable adverse effect on competition within the relevant market
in India is prohibited and such combination shall be void.
THRESHOLDS FOR FILING NOTICE
   
Assets   Turnover
Enterpri India > 2000 INR crore > 6000 INR crore
 
se Level Worldwide > USD 1 billion OR > USD 3 billion
with India with at least with at least
leg > 1000 INR crore in > 3000 INR crore in
India India
OR

Group India > 8000 INR   > 24000 INR crore


crore OR
Level
Worldwide > USD 4 billion > USD 12 billion
with India with at least with at least
leg > 1000 INR crore in > 3000 INR crore in
India India
EXEMPTION NOTIFICATIONS
In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (a) of Section 54 of the Act,
the Central Government, in public interest, has exempted:

• an enterprise, whose control, shares, voting rights or assets are being


acquired has either assets of the value of not more than INR 250 crore
in India or turnover of not more than INR 750 crore in India from the
provisions of Section 5 of the said Act for a period of five years.

• a banking company in respect of which the Central Government has


issued a notification under Section 45 of the Banking Regulation Act,
1949, from the application of the provisions of Sections 5 and 6 of the
Act for a period of five years.
SCHEDULE I TO THE COMBINATION REGULATIONS
(1) An acquisition of shares or voting rights, referred to in sub-clause (i) or sub-clause (ii) of
clause (a) of section 5 of the Act, solely as an investment or in the ordinary course of business
in so far as the total shares or voting rights held by the acquirer directly or indirectly, does not
entitle the acquirer to hold twenty five per cent (25%) or more of the total shares or voting
rights of the company, of which shares or voting rights are being acquired, directly or
indirectly, or in accordance with the execution of any document including a share holders’
agreement or articles of association, not leading to acquisition of control of the enterprise
whose shares or voting rights are being acquired.

(1A) An acquisition of additional shares or voting rights of an enterprise by the acquirer or its
group, not resulting in gross acquisition of more than five per cent (5%) of the shares or voting
rights of such enterprise in a financial year, where the acquirer or its group, prior to
acquisition, already holds twenty five per cent (25%) or more shares or voting rights of the
enterprise, but does not hold fifty per cent (50%) or more of the shares or voting rights of the
enterprise, either prior to or after such acquisition :

Provided that such acquisition does not result in acquisition of sole or joint control of such
enterprise by the acquirer or its group.
(2) An acquisition of shares or voting rights, referred to in sub-clause (i) or
sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of section 5 of the Act, where the acquirer,
prior to acquisition, has fifty percent (50%) or more shares or voting rights
in the enterprise whose shares or voting rights are being acquired, except
in the cases where the transaction results in transfer from joint control to
sole control.
(3) An acquisition of assets, referred to in sub-clause (i) or sub-clause (ii)
of clause (a) of section 5 of the Act, not directly related to the business
activity of the party acquiring the asset or made solely as an investment
or in the ordinary course of business, not leading to control of the
enterprise whose assets are being acquired except where the assets
being acquired represent substantial business operations in a particular
location or for a particular product or service of the enterprise, of which
assets are being acquired, irrespective of whether such assets are
organized as a separate legal entity or not.

(4) An acquisition of stock-in-trade, raw materials, stores and spares,


trade receivables and other similar current assets in the ordinary course
of business
(5) An acquisition of shares or voting rights pursuant to a bonus issue or stock
splits or consolidation of face value of shares or buy back of shares or
subscription to rights issue of shares, not leading to acquisition of control.
(6) Any acquisition of shares or voting rights by a person acting as a securities
underwriter or a registered stock broker of a stock exchange on behalf of its
clients, in the ordinary course of its business and in the process of underwriting
or stock broking, as the case may be.
(7) An acquisition of shares or voting rights or assets, by one person or
enterprise, of another person or enterprise within the same group, except in
cases where the acquired enterprise is jointly controlled by enterprises that are
not part of the same group.
(8) A merger or amalgamation of two enterprises where one of the enterprises
has more than fifty per cent (50%) shares or voting rights of the other enterprise,
and/or merger or amalgamation of enterprises in which more than fifty per cent
(50%) shares or voting rights in each of such enterprises are held by
enterprise(s) within the same group:
Provided that the transaction does not result in transfer from joint control to sole
control.
(9) A combination referred to in section 5 of the Act taking place entirely outside
India with insignificant local nexus and effect on markets in India.
PROCEDURE FOR INVESTIGATION OF
COMBINATION

• As per the Combination Regulations, the Commission shall form its prima
facie opinion as to whether the combination is likely to cause or has
caused appreciable adverse effect on competition within the relevant
market in India within 30 days from the receipt of the notice.

• If the Commission is prima facie of the opinion that a combination has


caused or is likely to cause adverse effect on competition in Indian
markets, it shall issue a notice to show cause to the parties as to why
investigation in respect of such combination should not be conducted.

• On receipt of the response, if Commission is of the prima facie opinion


that the combination has or is likely to have appreciable adverse effect
on competition, the Commission shall deal with the notice as per the
provisions of the Act.
ORDERS OF COMMISSION ON CERTAIN COMBINATIONS

31. (1) Where the Commission is of the opinion that any combination does not, or is not likely
to, have an appreciable adverse effect on competition, it shall, by order, approve that
combination including the combination in respect of which a notice has been given under sub-
section (2) of section 6.

(2) Where the Commission is of the opinion that the combination has, or is likely to have, an
appreciable adverse effect on competition, it shall direct that the combination shall not take
effect.

(3) Where the Commission is of the opinion that the combination has, or is likely to have, an
appreciable adverse effect on competition but such adverse effect can be eliminated by
suitable modification to such combination, it may propose appropriate modification to the
combination, to the parties to such combination.

(4) The parties, who accept the modification proposed by the Commission under subsection
(3), shall carry out such modification within the period specified by the Commission.
(5) If the parties to the combination, who have accepted the modification under subsection
(4), fail to carry out the modification within the period specified by the Commission, such
combination shall be deemed to have an appreciable adverse effect on competition and the
Commission shall deal with such combination in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

(6) If the parties to the combination do not accept the modification proposed by the
Commission under sub-section (3), such parties may, within thirty working days of the
modification proposed by the Commission, submit amendment to the modification proposed
by the Commission under that sub-section.

(7) If the Commission agrees with the amendment submitted by the parties under subsection
(6), it shall, by order, approve the combination.

(8) If the Commission does not accept the amendment submitted under sub section (6), then,
the parties shall be allowed a further period of thirty working days within which such parties
shall accept the modification proposed by the Commission under sub-section (3).

(9) If the Commission does not, on the expiry of a period of two hundred and ten days from
the date of notice given to the Commission under sub-section (2) of section 6], pass an
order or issue direction in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2)
or subsection (7), the combination shall be deemed to have been approved by the
Commission
EVALUATION OF ‘APPRECIABLE ADVERSE EFFECT
ON COMPETITION
Factors to be considered by the Commission while evaluating appreciable
adverse effect of Combinations on competition in the relevant market:
(a) actual and potential level of competition through imports in the market;
(b) extent of barriers to entry into the market;
(c) level of concentration in the market ;
(d) degree of countervailing power in the market;
(e) likelihood that the combination would result in the parties to the
combination being able to significantly and sustainably increase prices
or profit margins;
(f) extent of effective competition likely to sustain in a market;
(g) extent to which substitutes are available or are likely to be available in
the market;
(h) market share, in the relevant market, of the persons or enterprise in a
combination, individually and as a combination;
(i) likelihood that the combination would result in the removal of a
vigorous and effective competitor or competitors in the market;
(j) nature and extent of vertical integration in the market;
(k) possibility of a failing business;
(l) nature and extent of innovation;
(m) relative advantage, by way of the contribution to the economic
development, by any combination having or likely to have appreciable
adverse effect on competition;
(n) whether the benefits of the combination outweigh the adverse impact
of the combination, if any.
Case Study –
US department refused merger of British Airways and the American
Airlines on the grounds that it would threaten competition.
The two companies were reeling under September 11, 2001 attack on
WTO Centre.
When companies are too big, they can indulge in abuse and exploit the
consumer through market manipulation.
POWERS OF THE COMMISSION

• The Commission is empowered to inquire into any cartel, and to impose


on each member of the cartel, a penalty of up to 3 times of its profit for
each year of the continuance of such agreement or 10% of its turnover
for each year of continuance of such agreement, whichever is higher.

• In case an enterprise is a ‘company’, its directors/officials who are guilty


are also liable to be proceeded against.

• In addition, the Commission has the power to pass inter alia any or all
of the orders as may be specified under section 27
EXAMPLE:
1
A company’s personnel gets a call from one of its loyal
customers stating that another manufacturer/service
provider is offering the same product/service at a price which
is 10 per cent lower than what the company is offering in
open market. The company decides to check the veracity of
the information. Should the company call the other
manufacturer/service provider?
ANSWER
No, the company should not call the other
manufacturer/service provider to discuss the price at which
the company sells/provides services itself or inquire about
the price at which the other manufacturer/service provider is
selling/providing service. The company may confirm such
information through its agents and/or open market sources
and/or its marketing personnel. Thereafter, the company can
independently price its product considering all factors
including the market information that it procures from the
above sources and other channels including independent
market analysis.
EXAMPLE:
2
A company’s functionary is invited for a dinner by one of its
competitors’ personnel to discuss business strategies and
the future course of action with respect to certain buyers in
the market. Should the company’s functionary attend such a
dinner?
ANSWER
No. The company’s functionary should not attend such a
dinner as any discussion between competitors in relation to
business strategies including pricing and/or quantity
allocation and/or territory allocation is prohibited under the
Act. Such arrangements are considered anti-competitive. It is
not relevant whether these arrangements are formal or
informal, as the Competition Act, 2002 prohibits such
agreements as well. Even if the stated purpose of the dinner
is not to discuss business strategies, a company’s personnel
should be cautious to avoid any discussion on the above
topics.
EXAMPLE:3
A company’s functionary gets an e-mail/phone
call/WhatsApp message (social media) regarding a meeting
amongst the bidders to discuss the terms of the tender
floated by a third party. Should the company’s functionary
attend such a meeting?
ANSWER
No. The company functionary should not attend such a
meeting as any discussion between bidders in relation to the
tender floated by a third party is prohibited under the Act.
Such discussions/consultations are presumed to be anti-
competitive. Further, the company functionary must reply to
such an e-mail categorically stating that he/she shall not be a
party to any such discussions/consultations.
EXAMPLE:
4
Company X and its competitors, on the sidelines of
association meetings, provide the installed capacity details
of their various plants, along with capacity utilisation details
to other companies of the association. During such
meetings, the companies exchange information regarding
their proposed plant capacity utilization in the coming
quarter. Would this fall foul of the Act?
ANSWER
Yes. Any discussion or exchange of information regarding
production and distribution strategies should be strictly
avoided. Any agreement to maintain a particular capacity of
production is anti-competitive in nature and amounts to
formation of a cartel. Further, it is not necessary whether the
agreement is written or oral, formal or informal. In case such
a subject come up for discussion the representative(s) of
Company 'X' are expected to record their objection to such
discussion and leave the meeting and also record their
departure on the register.
EXAMPLE:5
Company X and Company Y, which are competitors,
collectively hold 50 per cent of the market share. In order to
maintain their stronghold in the market, they jointly approach
a third party customer, who has communicated its desire of
procuring goods that are manufactured by Company X and
Company Y, from the open market. Company X and Company
Y, independently do not have the production capacity to meet
the requirement of the customer. Therefore, they intimate to
the customer that they shall jointly provide the goods to the
customers at their cost of production, and in return request
the customer to not entertain attempts made by the other
competitors of Company X and Company Y to supply goods
to it. Whether such an agreement will be considered as anti-
competitive in nature?
ANSWER
Yes. Any agreement between competitors, which is entered
into with the intention of ousting other entities who operate
in the market, is presumed to have AAEC. In the instant case,
Company X and Company Y, by imposing the condition
foreclosed competitors to supply goods to the customer, are
acting in violation of the Act. Had they entered into a joint
venture agreement and then approached the customer to
supply their products, whilst not restricting other
competitors to approach the customer, the same may not
have fallen foul of the provisions related to presumption of
anti-competitiveness of the Act if it is established that such
joint venture agreement increased efficiency.
EXAMPLE:
6
Company X and its competitors, Y and Z, reach an agreement
that while X would service customers in North Delhi, Y would
service customers in East Delhi and Z in South Delhi. Would
such an agreement raise any competition concerns?
ANSWER
Yes. Allocation of geographic markets is presumed under the
Act to be an anti-competitive practice. Further, entry barriers,
for each company and each State may also be analysed and
it may be concluded that the companies have mutually,
informally or otherwise allocated geographical areas depot
wise.
EXAMPLE:7
A company’s employee has received information from its
field sales person that its competitors are offering the same
product/service at a price which is 10 per cent to 15 per cent
lower than what the company is offering in the open market.
Knowing that there is a trade association meeting scheduled
later in the week, the company personnel decides to discuss
the prices offered by the competitors who operate in the
market, in order to assess whether it should itself lower its
prices. Should the company’s personnel raise such issues at
the trade association meeting or on the sidelines of the
meeting?
ANSWER
No. The employee cannot and should not raise such issues
for discussion at the trade association meeting. Trade
association meetings are convened to discuss broader
market level issues such as government policies/ guidelines,
regulatory changes/ compliances, information concerning
new technology, industry lobbying etc. The company should
not discuss enterprise specific information such as cost of
production, distribution/ supply, customers and other such
commercially sensitive information. Dissemination of such
sensitive information may be treated as arrangement
amongst competitors, and in contravention of the Act. Any
such discussion on the sidelines of Associations meetings
shall also be avoided.

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