Bab 4

Metafisika
 Metafisika
Kajian

Asal Usul
• Andronikus (± 70 sM) dari Pulau Rhodes
mengumpulkan karya Aristoteles serta
membaginya menjadi dua kelompok
• Kelompok phusika (fisika)
• ilmu alam, fisika
• teori politik, psikologi
• dan sejenisnya
• Kelompok meta ta phusika (sesudah fisika)
• teleologi, asas pertama
• hakikat realitas
• dan sejenisnya
• Meta ta phusika menjadi metafisika
• Metafisika dikenal sebagai filsafat pertama
 Metafisika
Kajian

Pokok Bahasan
• (1) Inkuiri ke apa yang ada (exist), atau apa
yang betul-betul ada
• (2) Ilmu tentang realitas, sebagai lawan dari
tampak (appearance)
• (3) Studi tentang dunia secara menyeluruh
• (4) Teori tentang asas pertama (first principle);
prima causa

Ontologi dan Kosmologi

• Ontologi adalah bagian metafisika tentang
hakikat realitas
• Kosmologi adalah bagian metafisika tentang
proses realitas
• Obyek utama metafisika adalah partikular
(materi) dan universal (ide)
ONTOLOGY

Ontology is the theory or study of being as

such; i.e. of the basic characteristics of all reality.
Though the term was first coined in the 17th century,
ontology is synonymous with metaphysics or “first
philosophy” as defined by Aristotle in the 4th century
BC. Because metaphysics came to include other
studies (e.g. philosophical cosmology and
psychology), ontology has become the preferred term
for the study of being. It was brought into prominence
in the 18th century by Christian Wolff, a German
rationalist, for whom it was a deductive discipline
leading to necessary truths about the essences of
beings. His great successor Immanuel Kant, however,
presented influential refutations of ontology as
deductive system and of the ontological argument for
God’s necessary existence (as supreme and perfect
being). With the 20th –century renovation of
metaphysics, ontology or ontological thought has again
become important, notably among phenomenologists
and existentialists, among them Martin Heidegger.
 Metafisika
Kajian
Partikular
• bBenda yang kita lihat satu demi satu (pohon
itu, buku ini, langit biru itu) adalah partikular
• Dikenal juga sebagai obyek satu demi satu,
obyek dunia nyata, alam, substansi, materi
• Sering diidentifikasi sebagai partikular atau
materi
• Ada banyak partikular, termasuk yang kurang
sempurna

Universal
• Keseluruhan benda dengan ciri atau bentuk atau
form sama (semua pohon, semua buku, semua
biru) adalah universal
• Dikenal juga sebagai obyek di dalam pikiran,
bentuk atau form, abstraksi, konsep, ide
• Sering diidentifikasi sebagai universal atau ide
• Hanya ada satu universal, dan sempurna
FORM
Form, the external shape, appearance, or
configuration of an object, in contraindication to the
matter of which it is composed; in metaphysics, the
active, determining principle of a thing as distinguished
from matter, the potential principle.
The word “form” has been used in a number of ways
throughout the history of philosophy and aesthetics. It
was early applied to Plato’s term eidos, by which he
identified the permanent reality that makes a thing what
it is, in contrast to the particulars that are finite and
subject to change. The Platonic concept of form was
itself derived from the Pythagorean theory that
intelligible structures (which Pythagoras called
numbers), and not material elements, gave objects their
distinctive characters. Plato developed this theory into
the concept of “eternal form,” by which he meant the
immutable essence that can only be “received” or
“imitated” by material, or sensible, things. Plato held
that eternal forms, though they were not tangible, were
of a higher reality than material objects.
For practical purposes Aristotle was the first to
distinguish between matter (hypokeimenon or hyle) and
form (eidos or morphe). He rejected the abstract
Platonic notion of form and argued that every sensible
object consists of both matter and form, neither of
which can exist without the other. To Aristotle matter
was the undifferentiated primal element; it is that form
which things develop rather than a thing in itself. The
development of particular things from this general
matter consists in differentiation, the acquiring of the
particular forms of which the knowable universe
consists. Matter is the potential factor, form the
actualizing factor. (Aristotle further posited the
existence of a prime, or unmoved, mover, i.e., pure
form separated from matter, eternal and immutable).
Thus according to Aristotle, the matter of a thing
will consist of those elements of it which, when the
thing has come into being, may be said to have become
it; and the form is the arrangement of organization of
those elements, as the result of which they have become
the thing they have. Thus, bricks and mortar are the
matter that, given one form, became a house, or, given
another, became a wall. As matter they are potentially
any thing that they can become; it is the form which
determines that they actually become. Here “matter” is
a relative term, for a brick on the pile, which potentially
part of a house, is already actually a brick; i.e., it is
itself a composite of form and matter, clay being matter
to the brick as the brick is to the house or to the wall.
Matter is that which is potentially
a given object but which actually becomes the object
only when it is given the right form.
Aristotle’s notion of form combines with his
teleological viewpoint to give the conclusion that
formal development has a direction and may have a
goal and that some things are more informed than
others. Bricks are more informed than clay, and a house
more than bricks.
The Aristotelian concept of form was uniquely
adapted to Christianity by Thomas Aquinas, whose
works mark the high point of the medieval Scholastic
tradition. Aquinas further delineated the concept of
form to include “accidental form,” a quality of a thing
that is not determined by its essence; “sensible form,”
that element of form that can be distinguished from
matter by sense-perception; and other such distinctions.
Other Scholastic philosophers, including John Duns
Scotus and William of Ockham, worked with the
Aristotelian concept of form, but none to as great in
effect as Aquinas.
For 18th century German philosopher Immanuel
Kant, form was a property of mind; he held that form is
derived from experience, or, in other words, that it is
imposed by the individual on the material object. In his
Critique of Pure Reason Kant identified space and time
as the two forms of sensibility, reasoning that though
man does not experience space and time as such, he
cannot experience anything except in space and time.
Kant further delimited 12 basic categories that act as
structural elements for human understanding.
Criticism. The concept of form is also indispensable
to the practice and criticism of several disciplines other
than philosophy. In literature, for example, the term
may refer to the schema, structure, or genre that a
writer chooses for the presentation of his subject—e.g.,
novel, short story, maxim, haiku, sonnet, etc.; it may
also refer to the internal structure of the work, and to a
great extent, a work’s critical success depends on the
degree to which the artist is able to integrate the
content and internal structure within the framework of
its external form. In criticism of the graphic arts, the
term form refers to the effect achieved by
draftsmanship or mass as distinct form that achieved
by such elements as colour or texture. In sculpture and
other plastic arts, form (or shape) is both tangible and
visible and this is the chief eternal of organization.
UNIVERSALS

Universals, a term in philosophy. For many

centuries the theory of universals has been a
battleground for philosophers of contending
schools and the issue of whether universals exist is
still unsettled. From time to time, the universals has
been regarded as (1) an object existing in its own
right (sometimes as the most permanent of all
existences); (2) a concept nascent in the mind and
thus subjective; (3) a word or series of words; (4)
an identical quality, or group of qualities; (5) a
recurring resemblances; (6) that which can be
predicted of each and every individual in a species
or all species in a genus; (7) a principle of
classification. To complicate the issue further the
universals has at times been identified with the
species, the genus and the class.
Origin and Development. Differences in
theory are due in part to the different pressures
working upon philosophers in adumbrating their
doctrine. Socrates (?469 BC-399) and his friends
were concerned with the metaphysical problem of
the One and the Many and with the problem of the
objectivity of human values. The doctrine that uni-
versals were ideas, eternal and unchanging, and that
individuals were shadowy manifestations of such ideas
was put forward to help solve these problems. Plato
(428/427 BC-348/347) sometimes supports and
sometimes criticizes this solution, whereas Aristotle
(384 BC-322) rejects it. The latter was deeply
concerned with logical problems, particularly that of
the predicate (what is affirmed to belong to something
else). From this standpoint the universals is more
readily conceived as the common quality or qualities of
a group of material substances, some of these qualities
being essential. Reflection on the predicate led other
philosophers to regard the universals as an abstraction,
not itself existing outside the mind.
These differing opinions on the universals are
reflected in the famous remarks of Anicius Boethius (c.
480-c. 524), which provided the text for medieval
speculation. Do universals, he asked, “exist in reality or
solely in thoughts”? If they do exist, “are they then
corporeal bodies or incorporeal”? Are they “separated
from sensible things”? Or are they “in sensible things”?
Later medieval writers, such as Johannes Scotus
Erigena (c. 815-c. 877) and Anselm of Laon (d. 1117),
took the view that universals do exist really, but
Rocelin de Compiegne (d.c. 1120) and his pupil Peter
Abelard (1079-1142) began to question the realist
solution. The universal man, says Abelard, is no eternal
Idea of Man but the being of man, and the being of man
is neither a real man nor any other real thing.
Formalization of Theories. A century later
Albertus Magnus (1193/1206-1280) formulated the
different theories: universals, he held, are viewed 1) as
existing before the things which exemplify them, they
are ante rem, 2) as existing in the things, in materia or
in re, and 3) as abstractions, in thought only, that is
post rem. His pupil, Thomas Aquinas (?1225-1274),
blended the three solutions into his own theory. On the
whole the 13th century accepted a modified realism
(belief in the reality of universals, not to be confused
with material realism) with some suggestion of a post
rem theory, but it was the latter which became more
prominent in the next century, particularly in the
writings of William of Ockham (c. 1285-1349).
Supporters of the post rem theory in the later medieval
period became known as “nominalists,” yet it is
necessary to distinguish, under the post rem heading,
between nominalists and conceptualists. For
conceptualists the universals in a concept, for the
nominalists it is a word or set of words only. In spite of
the attribution of the term “nominalist” to late
medieval philosophers, they were in fact conceptualist;
this is certainly true of Ockham.
Modern Tenets. In the modern period dispute
about universals has never wholly died down;
generally, too, the solutions have been within the
medieval framework. The ante rem theory has had few
open adherents, although something like this theory
may be implicit in idealist thought. The other extreme,
nominalism, has had more support and has recently
been fashionable solution in some quarters.
Nominalsim was never stated more plainly than by
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), “there being nothing in
the world universal but names,” yet it is questionable
whether Hobbes’s final theory is strictly nominalist,
and though the nominalsim of today is strong in the
critical side it, too, usually so qualifies its positive
statement as to leave one in doubt whether it really is
frequently blended with conceptualism.
Mathematical Logic and Universals. A word
should be added on the treatment of universals by
mathematical logicians. Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) in
his On Concept and Object distinguishes between the
object and what is predicated of it, the concept. For
example, take the concept named “blue.” It is
predicable of many objects, and is in this sense a
universal; it is something unsaturated in need of
supplementation (“—blue”). A concept, for Frege, can
be said to be a function which may be symbolized Fx,
where x is the object variable and F the symbol of the
concept or attribute, and the class of all objects having
the property F may symbolized (x)(Fx). There is a
tendency to treat functions as classes and hence render
mathematical theory extensional. Without discussing
here the justification of this move, it is clear that it
does not free us from the problem of universals, as has
sometimes been suggested. On the contrary, the
question arises whether the class is discovered, or
invented, or denied all existence (even as an invention
“in the mind”). The debate in the mathematical
philosophy between logicism (Gottlob Frege, Bertrand
Russsell, Alonzo Church), intuitionism (Luitzen
Egbertus, Jan Brouwer, Herman Weyl, G.F.C. Griss),
and formalism (David Hilbert) is a special case of the
more general debate between realists, conceptualists,
and nominalists respectively.
 Metafisika
Ontologi

Hakikat Realitas
• Ada dua macam pertanyaan utama:
• Mana lebih utama, partikular (materi) ataukah
universal (ide)?
• Apakah universal suatu realitas?

Idealisme dan Materialisme

• Paham yang mengutamakan ide (universal)
sebagai realitas dikenal sebagai paham
idealisme
• Paham yang mengutamakan materi
(partikular) sebagai realitas dikenal sebagai
paham materialisme
 Metafisika
Ontologi

Realisme, Konseptualisme, Nominalisme

• Aliran yang beranggapan bahwa universal
adalah suatu realitas dikenal sebagai aliran
realisme
• Aliran yang beranggapan bahwa universal
adalah konsep di dalam pikiran dikenal sebagai
aliran konseptualisme
• Aliran yang beranggapan bahwa universal
hanyalah nama yang diberikan oleh manusia
dikenal sebagai aliran nominalisme

Kerumitan Realisme
• Banyak penganut idealisme menentang realisme
• Pada zaman pertengahan, realisme menjadi
bahan perdebatan selama berabad-abad
METAPHYSICS

Metaphysics, branch of philosophy concerned

with critically examining basic philosophical assumptions
and identifying what exists insofar as it exists.
Metaphysics interacts with such other philosophical
studies as logic, epistemology, aesthetics, and ethics.
Metaphysics has by tradition concerned itself
with issues with broad philosophical interest. One of the
most basic issues, first addressed by ancient Greek
philosophers, is the existence and nature of forms, i.e.
abstract realities which are objects of the mind. Since the
classical Greek philosophers distinguished between
objects of the real world—sensible things—and objects
of the mind—ideas—metaphysical philosophers have
concerned themselves with the relationship between
abstractions and substances, trying to determine whether
both are real or whether one is somehow more real than
the other. Metaphysicians have interpreted the natural
world, the significance of time and space, and the
existence and nature of God, all in an attempt to
understand the relationship between forms and ideas.
 Metaphysical argument is by and large an a
priori process. A priori arguments start with basic,
mutually consistent assumptions and develop them
through to their logical conclusions. If absurdities arise
during this deductive process, the original principles
must be rejected or reevaluated. Since metaphysical
conclusions are by nature extremely general, all
encompassing assertions that are paradigms of thought
rather than statements of empirical fact, refuting them
with counterexamples is ineffective criticism. Moreover,
unlike in the empirical sciences, where new knowledge
supersedes old beliefs, numerous conflicting
metaphysical theories have all stood the test of time,
affirming the notion that there is no single metaphysical
truth.
The first metaphysicians, Parmenides and
Plato, recognized a basic distinction between appearance
and reality. Plato rejected the changeable, deceptive
reality of the sensible world in favour of the unchanging
and therefore truthful world of ideas. Aristotle began
with Plato’s distinction between form and matter and
then integrated the two using a biological model.
Aristotle assumed that matter was always moving
towards its potential ideal form. In this way the material
world is seen as a continuum of orga-
nic change.
With the development of Christianity,
philosophers became concerned with finding an a priori
proof of God’s existence. Thomism, based on the
metaphysics of St. Thomas of Aquinas, combined
Aristotelian and Christian thought. According to St.
Thomas, the contemplation of the everyday (which was
the basis of Aristotle’s examination of the relationship
between form and matter) inevitably leads to the
understanding that God exists and is the prime and
sustaining cause of the material world. By examining
the finite, ever changing material world, one is
inevitably led to the source of change, i.e., God.
Rene Descartes caused another major shift in
metaphysical thought. His dualistic philosophy defined
the material and mental spheres as separate,
independent realms. Rejecting the notion of God
proposed by the Christian philosophers, Descartes
postulated that material world was set up by a prime
agent, but thereafter, like a great mechanism, it ran free
of divine interaction. Immanuel Kant accepted dualism
but rejected Descarte’s explanation and revolutionized
metaphysics by demonstrating the importance of per-
ception. According to Kant, objective reality must be
perceived through the human constructs of time and
space. Thus the human view of the material world
would always be influenced by the perceiving
mechanism. What earlier metaphysicians had
considered objective reality, Kant rejected as such,
subordinating all observation to the mechanism of
observation.
Materialism and Idealism tried to synthesize
the concepts of mind and matter within a single theory.
The Idealists merged the two spheres by subordinating
matter to mind. Materialists assumed the antithetical
position, subordinating mind to matter and asserting
that all that existed was matter that the mind was
dependent on objective circumstances.
Several philosophers have questioned the
validity of metaphysical methodology and conclusions.
David Hume asserted that all knowledge comes
through the senses. Since all basic concepts are derived
from sense experience, Hume concluded that there is
no pure thought. Logical Positivism, a 20th century
school of philosophy, asserted that any statement’s
meaning depends it can be verified. Since
metaphysical statements cannot be verified, Logical
Positivists concluded that metaphysical assertions have
no meaning.
 Ludwig Wittgenstein’s criticism viewed
metaphysical experience as something beyond the
realm of language. Wittgenstein argued that there were
things that could be said and things that could only be
shown. Metaphysical theorizing is unsuccessful
because it tries to talk about a realm that exists outside
of the realm that language can illuminate.
 Metafisika
Ontologi: Idealisme

Hakikat Idealisme
• Ide, pikiran, kesadaran, dan spiritual memegang
peranan sentral di dalam penginterpretasian
pengalaman manusia.
• Pada pokoknya, dunia atau realitas ada di
dalam atau berhubungan dengan spiritual, ide,
atau kesadaran

Jenis Ide
• Ada ide konkrit dan ide abstrak
• Ide konkrit: berkaitan dengan benda atau
manusia
• Ide abstrak: berkaitan dengan atribut atau relasi
 Metafisika
Ontologi: Idealisme

Cabang Idealisme
Ada banyak cabang idealisme yang agak
berbeda satu dan lainnya

Beberapa di antaranya
• Idealisme subyektif
• Idealisme obyektif
• Idealisme metafisik
• Idealisme formalistik/transendental
• Idealisme kritik
• Idealisme estetik
• Idealisme moral
• Idealiseme dialektika (Hegel)
• Idealisme empirik
• Idealisme absolut

Tidak dibahas
 Metafisika
Ontologi: Idealisme

Ciri Umum Idealisme

• Universal dan individu kedua-duanya ada dan
berpadu
• Ada yang lebih tinggi dari keberadaan kita di
sini dan kini (transenden)
• Esensi sesuatu dapat terhubung dengan esensi
sesuatu lainnya
• Melalui pendekatan, hal yang bertentangan
dapat membentuk satu sistem (tesis, antitesis,
sintesis)
• Ada yang rendah dan ada yang tinggi; yang
rendah dapat dijelaskan oleh yang tinggi, tetapi
tidak sebaliknya. Ide, pikiran, kesadaran adalah
tinggi sedangkan materi adalah rendah
• Melalui pikiran dan kesadaran, yang tidak baik
dapat dijadikan baik
 Metafisika
Ontologi: Materialisme

Hakikat Materialisme
• Materi adalah merupakan satu-satunya
penyebab dan sumber dari keberadaan dan
perubahan
• Materi adalah utama sedangkan ide terhubung
dengan materi
• Penganut atom Yunani Kuno (Leucippus dan
Demokritus) dianggap sebagai penganut paham
materialisme
• Materialisme mengenal pengujian melalui
observasi umum dan menolak intuisi pribadi

Cabang Materialisme
• Materialsime mekanistik
• Materialisme dialektik (Marx)
 Metafisika
Ontologi: Materialisme

Ciri Umum Materialisme

• Peristiwa mental sebenarnya adalah peristiwa
fisik yang rumit; semua proses mental
ditentukan oleh proses fisik
• Semua fakta termasuk pikiran dan kemauan
manusia dan jalannya sejarah bergantung secara
kosal kepada proses fisik atau dapat direduksi
ke proses fisik
• Proses mental dan proses fisik adalah dua aspek
yang terjadi pada substansi
• Jalannya sejarah ditentukan oleh interaksi di
antara orang dan benda, serta dapat diprediksi,
tanpa mengacu kepada sesuatu yang lebih
tinggi (transenden)
• Menunjukkan doktrin dalam bentuk hipotesis
yang diuji secara umum
 Metafisika
Ontologi: Realisme

Realisme
• Aliran realisme beranggapan bahwa universal
adalah suatu realitas
• Mereka beranggapan bahwa secara obyektif,
universal ada di dalam alam, di luar pikiran
manusia
• Realitas universal adalah tetap sedangkan
realitas partikular berubah-ubah

Plato dan Realisme

• Plato menganut realisme
• Menurut Plato, pengetahuan bersifat tetap
sehingga pengetahuan tidak diperoleh dari
partikular (materi) yang berubah-ubah
• Pengetahuan diperoleh dari universal (ide) yang
tetap
REALISM
Realism, in philosophy, the conception that
objects of sensory perception or of cognition in general
are real in their own right and exist independently of
their being known or related to mind. Though of
modern origin, the term Realism is freely applied today
to certain aspects of Greek and medieval philosophy, as
well as to modern tenets.
In the history of philosophy the most
persistent and profound Realist concern is that of the
reality of “universals,” or principles and rules
governing the classification of things. It seems essential
to believe that one is doing something rightly when, for
instance, one classifies a new object as a chair (if that is
what it is) rather than as an elephant. However, the
nature of this rightness itself remains elusive. Realists
assert that such classification reflects distinctions
inherent in the world; conceptualists, by contrast, grant
universals reality only a a categorical concepts within
the mind; and Nominalists restrict the reality of the so-
called natures of things even further, to mere names.
The first of these views was embraced by Plato, who
considered correct classification to involve
apprehending a real common “form” which items
classified together shared; the second is the view pro-
pounded in the Essay of John Locke (1632-1704); and
the last appears in writers ranging from William of
Ockham (1285-1309) to Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-
1951). In light of the Nominalist assertion, it would
seem that uttering words would not consist in making
judgments at all, for nothing would count as correctness
or incorrectness (Wittgenstein struggled hard to avoid
this consequence). It is necessary, according to the
Realists, to arrive at some conception of the further fact
that makes talk of correctness appropriate. Realists
believe that such a fact resists both reduction and the
attribution of any Idealist, mind-dependent status, the
two positions most favoured by opponents of Realism.
This dispute underlies any analysis of the judgment of
truth or falsehood and thus infuses virtually all
philosophical issues.
Another issue central to the Realist-anti-
Realist debate is that of the status of immediate,
individual objects of perception. Realist, as opposed
primarily to the Idealists and Phenomenalists, hold that
the senses afford knowledge of the distinct, real
existence of independent object in space and time. The
difficulty for the Realist is that the experiences on the
basis of which one knows about such objects are
themselves apparently private and dependent for their
existence and nature upon the mind. The Realist
therefore seeks a link that permits knowledge of one
kind of thing on the basis of another, and opponent
charge that this leads inevitably to skepticism. This
standard philosophical pattern is the usual source of
reductionist and instrumentalist programs.
 Metafisika
Ontologi: Konseptualisme

Konseptualisme
• Universal atau konsep umum tidak ada di
dalam alam, melainkan hanya ada di dalam
pikiran manusia
• Manusia memerlukan universal untuk dapat
berpikir tentang partikular

Penganut Konseptualisme
• Peter Abelard (1079-1142)
• John Locke
• Sering tidak jelas apakah seseorang menganut
konseptualisme atau nominalisme
CONCEPTUALISM
Conceptualism, in philosophy, a term applied
by modern writers to a scholastic theory of the nature of
universals, to distinguish it from the two extremes of
nominalism and realism. The scholastic philosophers
took up the old Greek problem as to the nature of true
reality, whether the general idea of the particular object
is more truly real. Between realism which asserts that
the genus is more real than the species, and that
particulars have no reality, and nominalism according
to which genus and species are merely names (nomina,
fiatus vocis), conceptualism takes a mean position. The
conceptualist holds that universals have a real
existence, but only in the mind, as the concepts which
unite the individual things; e.g., there is in the mind a
general notion or idea of boats, by reference to which
the mind can decide which a given subject is, or is not,
a boat. On the other hand “boat” is something more
than mere sound with a purely arbitrary conventional
significance; on the other it has, apart from particular
things to which it applies, no reality; its reality is purely
abstract or conceptual. This was enunciated by Abelard
in opposition to Roscelin (nominalist) and Guillaume
de Champeaux (realist). Abelard held that it is only by
becoming a predicate that the class-notion or
general term acquires reality. Thus similarity
(conformitas) is observed to exist between a number of
objects in respect of a particular quality of qualities.
This quality becomes real as a mental concept when it
is predicated of all the objects possessing it. Hence
Abelard’s theory is alternatively known as sermonism
(sermo “predicate”). His statement of this position
oscillates markedly, inclining sometimes toward the
nominalist, sometimes toward the realist statement,
using the arguments of the one against the other.
Hence he is described by some as a realist, by others as
a nominalist. When he comes to explain that objective
similarity in things which is represented by the class
concept or general form, he adopts the theological
Platonic view that the ideas which are the archetypes
of the qualities exist in the mind of God. They are,
therefore, ante rem, in re, and post rem, or as
Avicenna stated it, universalia ante multipliciatem, in
multiploicitate, post multiplicitatem (“universals exist
before, in, and after multiplicity of their particulars”).
The whole controversy suffers from a tendency to
confuse “idea” in the sense of a concept or notion in
the mind with “idea” in the Platonic sense of an
ultimate archetype of phenomenal objects.
 Metafisika
Ontologi: Nominalisme

Nominalisme
• Beranggapan bahwa universal tidak ada di
dalam alam dan tidak juga ada di dalam pikiran
manusia
• Universal hanyalah nama yang diberikan oleh
manusia untuk menunjukkan kesamaan di
dalam kelas atau kelompok partikular tertentu

Penganut Nominalisme
• William dari Ockham (± 1285-1349)
• Roscellinus
NOMINALSIM
Nominalism, in philosophy, position taken in
the dispute over universals—words that can be applied
to individual things having something in common—that
flourished especially in the late medieval times.
Nominalism denied the real being of universals on the
ground that the use of general word (e.g., “humanity”)
does not imply the existence of a general thing named by
it. The nominalist position did not necessarily deny,
however, that there must be some similarity between the
particular things to which the general word is applied.
Thoroughgoing nominalists would withhold this
concession, as Roscelin, a medieval nominalist is said to
have done. But unless such similarity is granted, the
application of general words to particulars is made to
appear entirely arbitrary. Such stricter forms of
nominalism as existed in the Middle Ages can perhaps
be viewed as reactions against Platonic realism, on
which some enthusiasts, such as Guillaume de
Champeaux, based the opinion that universals had real
being. The Realist position invited a defensive alliance
between empiricism and nominalism; the most notable
medieval example of such a synthesis was the work of
William of Ockham.
In the Middle Ages, when Platonic and
Aristotelian realisms were associated with orthodox
religious belief, nominalism could be interpreted as
heresy. But religious implications aside, nominalism
does indeed reject Platonic realism as a requirement
for thinking and speaking in general terms; and though
it seems to deny also Aristotelian realism, such
moderate nominalists as the 17th-century philosopher
Thomas Hobbes affirm that some similarity exists
between particulars and the general word applied to
them—otherwise thought and speech would be
impossible. By explaining thought and speech through
the use of symbols, such as mental images or linguistic
terms, nominalism seems to imply some form of
conceptualism that involves more than the mere
correct use of symbols and thus is not clearly
distinguishable from conceptualism.
In modern logic a nominalistic concern is
reflected in the form that is given to the universal
quantifier. Instead of saying “man is mortal,” or even
“all men are mortal,” the modern logician circumvents
the universal by saying “for any x, if x is a man it is
mortal.” Neopositivism, in repudiating metaphysic, has
often been explicitly nominalistic, insisting that there
exist only “the facts” of observation and experiment.
In the mei-20th century, Nelson Goodman, a
philosopher of science and of language, and Willard
Van Orman Quine, a logician, have championed a
modern nominalism that specifically rejects classes—
Goodman for their being “nonindividuals” and Quine
for their being “abstract entities.”
 Metafisika
Ontologi: Masalah Realisme

Pada Zaman Pertengahan

• Selama beberapa abad (12-14), realisme
dipertanyakan
• Terdapat sejumlah pertanyaan serta sejumlah
anggapan
• Terjadi pergeseran anutan dari abad ke-12 ke abad
ke-14

Beberapa Arti Universal

• Obyek dengan keberadaan sendiri (paling permanen)
• Konsep yang lahir di dalam pikiran dan subyektif
• Hanya kata atau urutan kata
• Kualitas atau kelompok kualitas pengenal atau
kemiripan yang sering muncul
• Asas klasifikasi (taksonomi)
 Metafisika
Ontologi: Masalah Realisme

Pertanyaan Anicius Boethius (±480-±524)

• Apakah universal ada secara realitas atau hanya
ada di dalam pikiran
• Kalau betul ada, apakah universal berwujud
fisik atau tidak
• Apakah universal terpisah dari benda fisik
ataukah ada di dalam benda fisik

Teori dari Albertus Magnus

• (1) universal sudah ada, sebelum adanya benda
partikular, disebut ante rem
• (2) universal ada di dalam benda, disebut in
materia atau in re
• (3) universal adalah abstraksi dari partikular
yang sudah ada, disebut post rem
UNIVERSAL
Universal, in epistemology and logic, a general term
or common noun representing a recurrence or principle
of grouping or classifying, which is considered as an
entity and thus as posing the problem of what sort of
being should be ascribed to the referents of general
terms. It raises the question, for instance, of whether
there is any redness apart from particular red things.
The debate over the status of universals stems from
the ancient Greek theory of Forms or Ideas, which Plato
held to have a real existence distinct from their
manifestations in individual objects; ideal beauty must
exist, he thought, as a precondition of its manifesting
itself, albeit imperfectly, in certain things recognized as
beautiful. Aristotle was rather less positive, arguing that
Forms or universals exist but only “in” the particulars in
which they are discerned. Although both Plato and
Aristotle were realists holding that universals are real,
there was a difference between them, later summed up
in the phrases universalia ante rem (Plato’s belief in
“universals before the thing”) and universalia in re
(Aristotle’s belief in “universals in the thing”).
 Christian Scholastic philosophers of the Middle Ages
were influenced on the one hand by Augustine’s
identification of the Platonic Forms with archetypes in
the mind of God and on the other by a passing reference
by Boethius, a late Roman scholar, in his commentary
on Prophyry’s Isagoge, to the questions “whether genera
and species are substances or are set in the mind alone;
whether they are corporeal or incorporeal substances;
and whether they are separate from the things perceived
by the senses or set in them.” The Platonic-Augustinian
position, extreme realism, is reflected in the works of the
Pseudo-Dyonesius the Areopagite, of John Scotus
Erigena, of Anselm, of Guillame de Champeaux, and of
Gilbert de La Porrée; the Aristotelian position, moderate
Realism, in those of Albertus Magnus and of Thomas
Aquinas.
The medieval university’s opposition to Realism
granted existence to universals only as mental concepts.
Conceptualists arguments were first forward by Rocelin,
by Abelard, and by William of Ockham; but Rocelin and
Ockham were so uncompromising that their antagonists
equated their conceptualism with Nominalism (i.e.,with
the contention that universals are
Merely words or names arbitrarily applied to similar
things for convenience). Modern scholars, however,
doubt that there were any medieval Nominalists, for
extreme Nominalism cannot explain man’s perception
of similarities.
In the 17th century, however, the Materialist
philosopher Thomas Hobbes defended a moderate
Nominalism based on the close connection between
thought and speech. Later philosophers, divided
between those who upheld the validity of ontology (the
theory of Being) and those concerned only with logic
and with linguistic analysis, shifted the perennial
debate about universals into fields of epistemology
barely explored by the Scholastics. Thus, modified
forms of all four views--Platonic, Aristotelian,
Conceptualist, and Nominalist--are still defended.
 Metafisika
Ontologi: Masalah Realisme

Pada Zaman Pertengahan

• Universal sebagai ide berasal dari Plato, bersifat
abadi dan tidak berubah; Plato: ante rem
• Menurut Plato, partikular atau individu adalah
bayangan dari ide; Aristoteles tidak sependapat;
Aristoteles: in re
• Pada abad ke-13, banyak ahli filsafat cenderung
ke ante rem, realisme
• Pada abad ke-14, banyak ahli filsafat (termasuk
William dari Ockham) cenderung ke post rem,
nominalisme atau konseptualisme

Tidak berkesudahan
• Perbedaan pendapat tentang realisme tidak
berkesudahan, sehingga ditolak oleh positivisme
 Metafisika
Konsmologi Filsafat

Kosmologi Filsafat
• Membahas proses realitas yakni bagaimana
realitas itu terjadi
• Ada tiga aliran utama yakni deterministik,
probabilistik, dan teleologis

Deterministik
• Proses realitas itu terjadi secara pasti; banyak
digunakan di dalam ilmu alam, misalnya hukum
fisika dan kimia, melalui sufficient reason
• Sering dalam bentuk sebab (anteseden) dan
akibat (konsekuen); sebab yang sama
menghasilkan akibat yang sama
• Berlangsung secara mekanistik (seperti mesin),
fatalistik (atas kehendak yang mahakuasa)
• Alam semesta adalah mesin raksasa, kalau semua
hukum diketahui, maka masa depan dapat
diketahui sejak sekarang
DETERMINISM
Determinism, in philosophy, theory that all events,
including moral choices, are completely determined by
previously existing causes that preclude free will and
the possibility that man could have acted otherwise.
The theory holds that the universe is utterly rational
because complete knowledge of any given situation
assures that unerring knowledge of its future is also
possible. Pierre-Simon, marquis de Laplace, in the
18th century framed the classical formulation of this
thesis. For him, the present state of the universe is the
effect of its previous state and the cause of the state
that follows it. If a mind, at any given moment, could
know all the forces operating in nature and the
respective positions of all its components, the world
thereby know with certainty the future and the past of
every entity, large or small. The Persian poet Omar
Khayyam expressed a similar deterministic view of the
world in the concluding half of one of his quotations:
“And the first Morning of Creation wrote/What the
Last Dawn of Reckoning shall read.”
Indeterminism, on the other hand, though not
denying the influence of behavioral patterns and cer-
tain extrinsic forces on human actions, insists on the
reality of free choice. Exponents of determinism strive
to defend their theory as compatible with moral
responsibility by saying, for example, that evil results
of certain actions can be foreseen, and this in itself
imposes moral responsibility and creates a deterrent
external cause that can influence actions.

KIND OF DETERMINISM
Intrinsic determinism (related to God)
Logical determinism
Extrinsic determinism (related to cause)
Causal determinism
 Metafisika
Kosmologi Filsafat
Determinisme dan Indeterminisme
• Fisika klasik berpegang kepada determinisme
• Fisika modern (subatomik partikel)
memunculkan indeterminisme (uncertainty
principle dari Heisenberg, tahun 1928); ada
ketidakpastian yang kecil sekali (orde konstanta
Planck) di antara letak dan kecepatan partikel
subatomik

Probabilistik
• Proses realitas berlangsung secara probabilitas,
seperti pada hasil lemparan dadu
• Di dalam deterministik yang makro, secara
mikro terdapat probabilistik, misalnya, paruh
umur pada keluruhan atom uranium adalah
deterministik, tetapi pada suatu saat atom mana
yang luruh adalah probabilistik
 Metafisika
Kosmologi Filsafat

Teleologis
• Proses realitas berlangsung menurut kehendak
(ada kebebasan untuk memilih)
• Finalistik Aristoteles (proses diatur oleh tujuan
yang akan dicapai oleh proses itu) adalah suatu
teleologis
• Vitalistik (prinsip kehidupan yang mengatur
proses realitas) juga adalah teleologis
• Vitalistik muncul dalam bermacam-macam
istilah: elan vital dari Bergson, psyche dari
Aristoteles, pneuma, anima, entelechia, anima
sensitiva, essentials, nisus formativus, creative
activity dari Campbell
• Organistik beranggapan bahwa realitas
berlangsung secara menyeluruh (organ) sehingga
tidak dapat diprediksi melalui bagian-bagiannya
TELEOLOGY
Teleology (from Greek telos, “end”; logos
(“reason”), explanation by reference to some purpose or
end; also described as final causality, in contrast with
explanation by efficient cause only. Human conduct,
insofar as it is rational, is generally explained with
reference to ends pursued or alleged to be pursued; and
human thought tends to explain the behavior or other
things in nature on this analogy, either as of themselves
pursuing ends, or as designed to fulfil a purpose
devised by a mind transcending nature. The most
celebrated account of teleology was that given by
Aristotle when he declared that a full explanation of
anything must consider not only the material, the
formal, and the efficient causes, but also the final
cause--the purpose for which the thing exists or was
produced.
With the rise of modern science in the 16th and 17th
centuries, interest was directed to mechanistic
explanations of natural phenomena, which appeal only
to efficient causes; if teleological explanations were
used, they took the form not of saying (as in
Aristotelian teleology) that things develop toward the
Realization of ends internal to their own natures but of
viewing even biological organisms as machines
ingeniously devised by an intelligent being. In the 18th
century, William Paley, a Protestant apologist, gave
classic expression to this kind of teleology.
Immanuel Kant’s Kritik der Untheilskraft (1790;
Critique of Judgment, 1892 with revision 1915,
reprinted 1951) dealt at length with teleology. While
acknowledging--and indeed exulting in--the wondrous
appointments of nature, Kant cautioned that teleology
can be, for man’s knowledge, only a regulative and not
a constitutive principle; I.e., a guide to the conduct of
inquiring rather than to the nature of reality.
In the 19th century, controversy centred on whether
the phenomena of growth, regeneration, and
reproduction characteristics of living organism could
be explained in purely mechanistic terms. The vitalism
of Hans Driesch, a German biologist and philosopher,
according to which an Aristotelian entelechy, or
immanent agency, must be postulated in every
organism, found little support after his death. There
remains, however, the question of whether biological
processes can be explained in purely physiochemical
terms, or whether the problems of structure, function,
and organization necessitate some kind of teleology.
Organismic conceptions, such as those espoused in the
mid-20th century by Ludwig von Bertalanffy, an
Austrian-Canadian theoretical biologist, have thrown
these issues into a new perspective.