Beruflich Dokumente
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VALUE-DRIVE EPISTEMOLOGY
JESÚS ZAMORA-BONILLA
UNED (Madrid)
Two point five dogmas of value driven epistemology
Recent trend towards an epistemology
grounded on practical philosophy
E.g., epistemic responsibility, virtue, merit, justice...
'Epistemic value theory': what makes
knowledge better than true belief is that
knowledge is more valuable.
Cf. ‘epistemic value page’, by Duncan Pritchard,
http://epistemicvaluestirling.blogspot.com/
Two point five dogmas of value driven epistemology
The big dogma:
− A single piece of knowledge is more valuable than
the corresponding (merely) true belief
Three semi-dogmas:
− Justification is what makes knowledge valuable
− Knowledge is a subspecies of belief
− Important epistemic values are intrinsic
Two point five dogmas of value driven epistemology
value of truly
believing that p’.
You win 200 € value of knowing that p.
value of truly You win 100 €
v’(p’)
believing that p.
You win 100 €
v’(p)
v(p)
Against the big
dogma (1)
If the difference between knowing X and truly
believing X consists in that in the first case a
valuable ‘virtue’ or ‘capacity’ is exercised,
then knowing X seems better just because [‘truly
believing X’ plus ‘having the capacity’] is better than
[‘just truly believing X’]
But having the capacity is valuable because it
leads to have many other true beliefs, not vice
versa.
Two point five dogmas of value driven epistemology
The big dogma:
− A single piece of knowledge is more valuable than
the corresponding (merely) true belief
Three semi-dogmas:
− Justification is what makes knowledge valuable
− Knowledge is a subspecies of belief
− Important epistemic values are intrinsic
Two point five dogmas of value driven epistemology
We prefer reliable epistemic procedures because
we want true beliefs, not viceversa
What makes a proposition worth believing is
that it is true, not that it has been reliably
acquired.
So justification doesn’t add value to a true belief,
it only ‘certifies’ that it is true (and valuable)
Two point five dogmas of value driven epistemology
A possible circularity?
We value epistemic procedures according to the
value of their outputs, but need to apply just those
procedures in order to determine the output’s
value.
This circularity cannot be solved by any
epistemolgical theory (or can we?).
Two point five dogmas of value driven epistemology
The big dogma:
− A single piece of knowledge is more valuable than
the corresponding (merely) true belief
Three semi-dogmas:
− Justification is what makes knowledge valuable
− Knowledge is a subspecies of belief (i.e., belief
plus something more)
− Important epistemic values are intrinsic
Two point five dogmas of value driven epistemology
The big dogma:
− A single piece of knowledge is more valuable than
the corresponding (merely) true belief
Three semi-dogmas:
− Justification is what makes knowledge valuable
− Knowledge is a subspecies of belief
− Important epistemic values are intrinsic (not
‘instrumental’)
Two point five dogmas of value driven epistemology
This confusion rests on the idea that values must be
‘objective’ in order to ‘really’ be values
But values are nothing besides the fact that somebody
values them. I.e., a value is just a kind of goal or
preference of somebody.
Something can be a goal for someone only if she has
some mean of noticing whether she has achieved the
goal
What about ‘truth’?
Waiter, this is
tea, or coffee?
Can’t you notice the
difference by the
taste, sir?
No, I can’t!!!
In that case, does it
really matter
whether it is tea or
coffee, sir?
??!!
Two point five dogmas of value driven epistemology
Values are also essentially subject to a trade-off:
you often need to choose how much of one
sacrifice to get a bit more of another.
Value driven epistemology should also care about
many other values –both epistemological and not–
and their relative ‘costs’ (i.e., their
interdependencies and their possible conflicts).
Two point five dogmas of value driven epistemology