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TWO POINT FIVE DOGMAS OF

VALUE-DRIVE EPISTEMOLOGY
JESÚS ZAMORA-BONILLA
UNED (Madrid)
Two point five dogmas of value driven epistemology


Recent trend towards an epistemology
grounded on practical philosophy

E.g., epistemic responsibility, virtue, merit, justice...

'Epistemic value theory': what makes
knowledge better than true belief is that
knowledge is more valuable.

Cf. ‘epistemic value page’, by Duncan Pritchard,
http://epistemicvaluestirling.blogspot.com/
Two point five dogmas of value driven epistemology


The big dogma:
− A single piece of knowledge is more valuable than
the corresponding (merely) true belief

Three semi-dogmas:
− Justification is what makes knowledge valuable
− Knowledge is a subspecies of belief
− Important epistemic values are intrinsic
Two point five dogmas of value driven epistemology

value of truly
believing that p’.
You win 200 € value of knowing that p.
value of truly You win 100 €
v’(p’)
believing that p.
You win 100 €
v’(p)
v(p)
Against the big
dogma (1)

Value If knowledge is more


valuable than mere true
value of knowing belief for an agent, then
value of truly
that p.
You win 100 €
value of truly
believing that p’. she may value more the
believing that p.
You win 100 €
v(p) = v’(p) You win 200 €
v’(p’)
knowledge that
v’(p)
guarantees a smaller
prize, than the true belief
that guarantees a higher
Value
prize
Two point five dogmas of value driven epistemology

Against the big dogma (2)

The one who knows that p, has more true beliefs


that the one who merely truly believes that p.

For knowing that p arises from having sound


reasons to believe that p. So, the one who knows
that p, believes ‘p, because of reasons R’,
whereas the one who merely believes that p,
does not have these additional true beliefs.
Two point five dogmas of value driven epistemology


If the difference between knowing X and truly
believing X consists in that in the first case a
valuable ‘virtue’ or ‘capacity’ is exercised,
then knowing X seems better just because [‘truly
believing X’ plus ‘having the capacity’] is better than
[‘just truly believing X’]
But having the capacity is valuable because it
leads to have many other true beliefs, not vice
versa.
Two point five dogmas of value driven epistemology


The big dogma:
− A single piece of knowledge is more valuable than
the corresponding (merely) true belief

Three semi-dogmas:
− Justification is what makes knowledge valuable
− Knowledge is a subspecies of belief
− Important epistemic values are intrinsic
Two point five dogmas of value driven epistemology

Against the first semi-dogma



Zagzebski's critique to reliabilism:

Two identical (good) coffee cups, one produced
by a reliable coffee machine, and other
accidentally by a bad machine.

Both cups are equally valuable

So, the reliability of the process leading to a piece
of knowledge does not explain its epistemic
value.
Two point five dogmas of value driven epistemology


We prefer reliable epistemic procedures because
we want true beliefs, not viceversa

What makes a proposition worth believing is
that it is true, not that it has been reliably
acquired.

So justification doesn’t add value to a true belief,
it only ‘certifies’ that it is true (and valuable)
Two point five dogmas of value driven epistemology

Stated differently, good epistemic procedures are not those


that create the value of their outputs, but just those that help
us to identify those outputs that are valuable (valuable
mainly, though not only, for being true).

The confusion arises because, having been produced by a
reliable method explains why the belief is very likely true

But here ‘explanation’ means that the procedure is our
reason for knowing the value of the belief, and not what
constitutes this value.
Two point five dogmas of value driven epistemology

A possible circularity?

We value epistemic procedures according to the
value of their outputs, but need to apply just those
procedures in order to determine the output’s
value.

This circularity cannot be solved by any
epistemolgical theory (or can we?).
Two point five dogmas of value driven epistemology


The big dogma:
− A single piece of knowledge is more valuable than
the corresponding (merely) true belief

Three semi-dogmas:
− Justification is what makes knowledge valuable
− Knowledge is a subspecies of belief (i.e., belief
plus something more)
− Important epistemic values are intrinsic
Two point five dogmas of value driven epistemology

Against the second semi-dogma



Two meanings of ‘believing’: ‘taking as true’ vs. ‘not being
fully sure’.

Analytic epistemology concentrates on the first sense

Bayesian epistemology, on the second.

One question: why do we use the same word for two such
different concepts?

‘Belief reports’ as endorsement of claims without
transmiting to the audience an obbligation (or right?) to
endorse them.
Two point five dogmas of value driven epistemology


The big dogma:
− A single piece of knowledge is more valuable than
the corresponding (merely) true belief

Three semi-dogmas:
− Justification is what makes knowledge valuable
− Knowledge is a subspecies of belief
− Important epistemic values are intrinsic (not
‘instrumental’)
Two point five dogmas of value driven epistemology

Against the third semi-dogma


The monetary value of a 200 € note is a paradigmatic example
of an instrumental value (it is only useful because of the
worth you put in the things you can afford with it), whereas
the fact that the note is brand-new and smooth has just a
merely intrinsic value (you like it to be so, but not as a means
to getting something else by means of it)
Do you prefer a brand new 5 € note, or a crumpled 200 € one
Two point five dogmas of value driven epistemology


This confusion rests on the idea that values must be
‘objective’ in order to ‘really’ be values

But values are nothing besides the fact that somebody
values them. I.e., a value is just a kind of goal or
preference of somebody.

Something can be a goal for someone only if she has
some mean of noticing whether she has achieved the
goal

What about ‘truth’?
Waiter, this is
tea, or coffee?
Can’t you notice the
difference by the
taste, sir?
No, I can’t!!!
In that case, does it
really matter
whether it is tea or
coffee, sir?

??!!
Two point five dogmas of value driven epistemology


Values are also essentially subject to a trade-off:
you often need to choose how much of one
sacrifice to get a bit more of another.

Value driven epistemology should also care about
many other values –both epistemological and not–
and their relative ‘costs’ (i.e., their
interdependencies and their possible conflicts).
Two point five dogmas of value driven epistemology

One last reflection:

Should the question about ‘what is


knowledge’ be more important to
epistemology as the question ‘what
is health’ is to medicine?

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