Bridging the Gaps Situational Awareness and Assessment

Public Health and Radiation Emergency Preparedness Conference March 22, 2011 CDC, Atlanta, Georgia

Panel
Harvey Clark, PhD, Principal Scientist, DOE Remote Sensing Laboratory Bill Irwin, ScD, CHP, Radiological Health Chief, Vermont Department of Health James Kish, BS, Technological Hazards Division Director, FEMA Patricia Milligan, BS, Senior Technical Advisor, Preparedness and Response, NRC

The Setting for This Panel

We will discuss situational awareness and assessment tools, and present questions about their value. We will describe their use by state and federal agencies in radiological and nuclear emergencies which include:

Nuclear power plant accidents; Hostile actions radiological dispersion devices, radiological exposure devices, mass or individual poisonings; Transportation incidents; Nuclear weapons or improvised nuclear device (IND) detonations; and Criticality accidents at nuclear facilities.

Nevertheless, what is presented here can be applied in most instances if you substitute the word chemical agent or biological agent for radiological agent.

Situational Awareness and Assessment is Critical

Who in the public needs to know what when?

Could it be that an informed populace generally responds more constructively than if they only operate on informally obtained information? How much is too much to share?

How much of the status of operations should the emergency responders be provided?

What is sufficient so they can see the whole of it and understand their work relative to objectives? Can too much information lead them to inappropriate action?

What if the information is inaccurate, too complicated or poorly presented?

How the Public Builds Situational Awareness

They will likely hear or see things about the situation in:

Commercial media Internet Personal conversation

They might get some information from the government, e.g., public affairs, the communications office, the Public Information Officer (PIO) or other source. Can a lack of timely and accurate information from the PIO or other party in possession of the facts leave the public vulnerable to acting on inadequate or wrong information?

And What about Emergency Responders?

They have the same sources usually, the PIO, commercial media, internet and personal conversation, but they also ought to have:

An Incident Action Plan (IAP); Data products like maps, charts, graphs, field data, computer models and photographs; and The guidance of technical advisors.

One of the challenges is getting information to field offices that may not have sufficient resources including internet access and plotters for printing large documents.

What Information Depicts the Situation for the Public and Emergency Responders?
Likely the same for each party, though that for the public may be limited in extent and detail:

What happened; What authorities are doing about it; What people can do to help; What people can do to protect themselves; What consequences are possible; What consequences are likely knowing what we do at the time; Where to go for help; and Where to get additional information.

Photos and videos feed the mind these days; we need to use them.

Maps are Perhaps the Most Useful Means to Display Information

Where the incident occurred Restricted areas with traffic control points Emergency facilities available for those affected including

Community reception centers, Congregate care facilities, Medical countermeasures points of distribution, and Available medical facilities.

Maps are Perhaps the Most Useful Means to Display Information

Where inputs to the food chain are restricted, and Critical infrastructure that is not currently accessible;

Electric, water, communications and other utilities Government offices, including police, fire and ambulance Businesses, especially major employers Schools Health care facilities Farms Food retailers and wholesalers Road, rail, boat and air transportation thos open; those closed

Dose Assessment Tools

Dose and contamination projection models.

RESRAD: A library of models for radiation and contamination effects for most incidents RASCAL: for nuclear power plant and spent fuel accidents A raft of other models from various government sites and private firms, e.g. ALOHA, CAMEO, MARPLOT

Field team radiation and contamination surveillance data. Aerial monitoring results.

Dose Assessment Tools

Environmental instruments like EPAs RadNet, DOEs Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty monitors, and those of states and local government.

Standardized presentations how many times standards, how many times background, actual units The US is severely hampered by not adopting SI units confusion is bad enough without having sieverts and rem, gray and rads, becquerrel and curies.

Emergency responder and public dose and contamination records. Emergency responder and public contaminated injury records. Medical records for radiation overexposures. There are still privacy concerns to be met.

But, Its Not Just About Dose

Weather

It may have been a cause It may make things better or worse It affects dispersal and fallout of the agent It affects the timeliness and nature of many elements of the response It affects the terrain

Used and available beds for medical and special needs populations. Personal protective equipment inventories. Medical countermeasures inventories. Emergency responder staffing rosters.

One States Experience

Vermont and Empire 09

Empire '09
06/04 - Thank You from Vermont Health Commissioner Wendy Davis, MD (pdf) 05/29 -Vermont to Exercise Public Health Response to "Dirty Bomb" This site documents the simulated events as they unfold. This is NOT a real event.

Public information was useful for situation awareness for responders

THIS IS AN EXERCISE. THIS IS NOT A REAL EVENT.

Status Update:

06/04 (1600) - Field Lab Tests on Some Crops Show Excess Contamination 06/03 (1000) - Field Measurements in Vermont Show Low Contamination So Far 06/02 (1100) - Statement by Department of Health Commissioner Wendy Davis, MD (pdf) 06/01 (1800) - Environmental Testing in Vermont Shows Low Contamination So Far 06/01 (0900) - Low Levels of Contamination Detected. Special Precautions for Vermonters 05/31 (2100) - Updated: Instructions for Vermonters 05/31 (1800) - Instructions for Vermonters 05/31 (1800) - Explosions in Albany, NY Confirmed to be Dirty Bombs 05/31 (1230) - Explosions in Albany, NY

Public Information Line: Dial 2-1-1 for Vermont information (2-1-1 monitoring exercise only)

Facts About Dirty Bombs (exit VDH) For Hospitals & Health Care Providers Facts about Americium-241 For Individuals and Families(exit VDH) Facts about Cesium-137 Radiological Field Testing Frequently Asked Questions Exercise News and Advisories
Vermont Department of Health | 108 Cherry Street | Burlington, VT 05402 Voice: 802-863-7200 | In Vermont 800-464-4343 | Fax: 802-865-7754 | TTY/TDD: Dial 711 first VDH District Offices | Contact Us | Accessibility Policy (pdf) | Privacy Policy A Vermont Government Website 2005 Vermont Department of Health. All rights reserved.

The Department of Energy can get these kinds of maps to sophisticated fixed facilities. For field units to get them, they must have laptops and air cards. To use them for briefings or other display, they need printers or large monitors.

A National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC) data product. Great for decision makers. What about other emergency responders? What about the public? How do you keep from confusing any of these audiences with this unique language and unsettling and mysterious source of exposure?

The state has tested field teams which collect environmental samples for laboratory analysis for many years. The teams had no incident command structure, however, after they were deployed to forward camps. We asked Region 1 EPA to bring in an Emergency Response Team. They provided us additional sampling teams and an ICS structure. Their tent wasnt bad either.

As teams deploy, we must maintain accountability as well as progress toward meeting incident objectives

In addition to having a wealth of communications platforms which made internet communications possible, the EPA mobile command post also came with a plotter that could be used to print large documents neede to provide briefings to large groups and to show activities taking place across the four state region affected by the RDDs in Albany, NY.

The EPA deployed its RadNet units for detailed beta and gamma radiation, airborne radioactivity measurements and basic weather which are sent by wireless signals to EPA headquarters in Washington, DC. This one was at the sampling base camp. Others were deployed to forward areas of fallout deposition.

States, even the biggest, are not likely to have sufficient people to do it all. We had to sample more than 6,000 square miles that were modeled as contaminated. How can you integrate federal and other state teams without situational awareness?

Some may require teleconference capabilities to link widely Briefings are critical. dispersed assets. One briefing here used a blackberry on speaker phone for an address to all emergency responders from a high ranking government official

Connecticut lent us their mobile radiochemistry laboratory under the New England Compact. We were able to process high priority samples right at the sampling base camp. Who should hear the sampling results?

Geographical information systems (GIS) are invaluable for displaying the situation over layers of critical infrastructure like health care facilities, fire stations, ambulance facilities, utilities, farms, reservoirs and roads.

The Resources of the Department of Energy and the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC)

Radiological Assistance Program

8
8 7 6 2 3
2

Advise on radiological issues First responder - arrives in 4-6 hours Assist with radioactive material recovery Assist with the characterization of radiological incident

Advisory Team
Provides coordinated advice and recommendations on environment, food and health matters to the Federal, state, local and tribal governments. Representatives from:

EPA - FDA CDC - USDA Other Federal agencies as needed

AMS On-Call Response

Mission: Get data from large area quickly, Fly high and fast Activation: 5 to 10 hours on site

Beech King Air B-200

Avg. post-flight data processing time: 1 hour Data Products: Breadcrumb overlay plot Real-time data telemetry

29

Fixed Wing Response Range

AMS Radiological Mapping Helicopter Response

Mission: Get more detailed data. Fly low and slow Activation: 8 to 20 hours to site

Bell-412
Data product: Contoured ground exposure map Data processing time: 3-4 hours Intermediate phase product

CM Response Team I
Mission: Initial field element of FRMAC Activation: 4 hours following notification

Operations 24 hours (for limited time)

Capabilities Assessment Geographical Information Systems Health & Safety Monitoring & Sampling Five field teams Logistics

CM Response Team II
Mission: Complete CMRT staffing for full 24-hour operations Activation: 12 hours following notification Additional responders
24-hour/day operation for several weeks Augmented monitoring, sampling and assessment

Additional equipment
20 field teams

Laboratory Analysis
Sample receipt Prepare samples for transport to labs

Training for additional responders

Data Products Cycle

Set 1. An initial automated plot shows downwind location only with no estimate of health effects Set 2. Revised event data used to produce quality assured reachback plots

Set 3. The model is compared with a few initial field measurements to make an initial estimate of the amount released

Automated Web-Initiated or via Emergency Call; Only know release time and location

Example revised data: Updated source location, detailed weather

Source scaled to initial set of measurements

Later sets: We develop Relocation and Food-Ingestion plots

Set 5. We use more extensive sets of field measurements to improve the accuracy of the source term calculation

Cycle of new products based on updated sets of measurements

Set 4. A health-effects plot is developed based on a source term estimated 34 from field measurements

Briefing Products
Critical to explain for each Data Product

What decisions or actions are being addressed

Key points they should take away Actions that should be considered Assumptions and limitations of Data Product How each Data Product fits into the overall situation

FRMAC Participation
State, Tribes, Local FBI
NARAC CMHT AMS

NNSA

RAP

FRMAC
NRC

CMRT I & II

DoD

CM Augmen t

DHS/ FEMA
EPA A-Team

REAC/ TS

Transfer from DOE to EPA

At a mutually agreeable time After consultation with DHS, the JFO Coordination Group, state, local, and tribal officials

The following conditions are to be met before transfer:

Immediate emergency condition is stabilized Offsite release of radioactive material has ceased Offsite radiological conditions have been characterized Initial long-range monitoring plan has been developed Other Federal agencies will commit required resources

Environmental Protection Agency

Assist with non-radiological hazards

Such as chemical spills, hazardous materials fires, accidental hazmat releases due to radiological event

Coordinate off-site cleanup activities

with NRC with appropriate jurisdiction

Eventually close FRMAC in time and transition to EPA-only or other monitoring program

CM / FRMAC Contact Information

Colleen OLaughlin
NNSA / NSO - 702-295-0648 olaughlin@nv.doe.gov

FRMAC Program Information

http://www.nv.doe.gov/nationalsecurity/homelandsecurity/ frmac/default.htm
Emergency Response Numbers (24-hr)

NNSA / HQ 202-586-8100 NARAC 925-422-7627

Manuals
FRMAC Operations Manual Oct. 2010

This manual describes the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Centers (FRMAC) response activities in a major radiological emergency

FRMAC Assessment Manuals (2 volumes) April 2010

These manuals provide the scientific basis and methods for assessment calculations

FRMAC Monitoring Manuals (2 volumes) Dec. 2005

These manuals provide the monitoring and sampling methods for a radiological response

Manuals (cont)
FRMAC Laboratory Analysis Manual Dec. 2005

This manual provide general guidance relating to sample tracking and analysis

FRMAC Health and Safety Manual May 2001

The manual describes how radiological health and safety plans will be implemented for FRMAC

Link:http://www.nv.doe.gov/nationalsecurity/homel andsecurity/default.htm

NRC Incident Response Program

Typical Response Process

Incident

Local
Support or Response

State
Support or Response

Federal
Support or Response

National Response Framework

Type of Incident
a. Radiological terrorism incidents (e.g. RDD/IND or Radiological Exposure Device): (1)Material or facilities owned or operated by DOD or DOE (2)Material or facilities licensed by NRC or Agreement State (3)All others b. Nuclear facilities: (1)Owned or operated by DOD or DOE (2)Licensed by NRC or Agreement State (3)Not licensed, owned, or operated by a Federal agency or an Agreement State, or currently or formerly licensed, but of which the owner/operator is not financially viable or is otherwise unable to respond c. Transportation of radioactive materials: (1)Materials shipped by or for DOD or DOE (2)Shipment of NRC or Agreement State-licensed materials (3)Shipment of materials in certain areas of the coastal zone that are not licensed or owned by a Federal agency or Agreement State (see USCG list of responsibilities for further explanation of certain areas) (4)All others d. Space vehicles containing radioactive materials: (1)Managed by NASA or DOD (2)Not managed by DOD or NASA impacting certain areas of the coastal zone (3)All others e. Foreign, unknown or unlicensed material: (1)Incidents involving foreign or unknown sources of radioactive material in certain areas of the coastal zone (2)All others f. Nuclear weapon accident/incident (based on custody at time of event) g. Other types of incidents not otherwise addressed above (1) (2) (3)

Coordinating Agency
DOD or DOE NRC DOE

(1) (2) (3)

DOD or DOE NRC EPA

(1) (2) (2) (4) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2)

DOD or DOE NRC DHS/USCG EPA NASA or DOD DHS/USCG EPA DHS/USCG EPA

DOD or DOE DHS designates

NRC Roles & Responsibilities

Monitor and independently assess licensees actions. Serve as an independent source of information, advice and technical analyses for State. Determine if the incident meets criteria for Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence.

Coordinate Federal response and provide Federal support for licensee, State, and locals.
Support other Federal agencies. Coordinate public information for the Federal Government.

Notifications
Notifications typically are made to the NRC Headquarters Operations Center [(301) 816-5100] Although licensees are required to classify events as described in their emergency plans, the NRC response may vary based upon an evaluation of the situation; not solely upon the classification
Event Notification
Regional Duty Officer appropriate regional management/decision makers
Headquarters Emergency Officer determines if HQ management needs to be notified

Headquarters Operations Officer Assesses information, then makes notifications

Notification to other Federal agencies Notification to State agencies

NRC Incident Response Modes & Locations

Response Modes:

Headquarters Operations Center

Regional Incident Response Center

Normal Monitoring Activation Expanded Activation

On-Scene Site Team

Functional Response Organization

Management Liaison Public Information

Technical Assessment Protective Measures Security / Safeguards

Response Coordination

Joint Field Office

NRC Senior Officials would support the Unified Coordination Group

NRC Field Interfaces

State Remote NRC Headquarters Team (Director) Senior NRC Official Regional Base Team (Base Team Manager) DOE FRMAC FRMAC Laboratories Field Monitoring Data Advisory Team Joint Field Office

Principal Federal Official

(EPA, HHS, USDA)

Onsite
NRC Site Team (Site Team Director)

NRC Incident Response Post-Plume Phase Staffing

NRC Senior Official

Response Coordination Leader

Government Liaison Leader

Site Team Director Public Affairs Leader

Protective Measures Branch Leader

NRC Ingestion Pathway Team Responsibilities

Assess the adverse consequences of the incident to the general population and the environment Evaluate the protective actions being considered, providing an assessment, and as appropriate, a recommendation to the Site Team Director Ensure that NRC radiological information is coordinated with other Federal and offsite decision-making authorities

Together with Department of Homeland Security (DHS) representatives, coordinate and/or provide Federal assistance to the State, to assess radiological conditions

NRC Ingestion Pathway Team Responsibilities (continued)

Coordinate relocation to the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) Coordinate the dispatch of the Advisory Team for Environment, Food, and Health (ATEFH) to the site Coordinate the development of Federal positions on protective actions and assessment of radiological conditions with Department of Homeland Security (DHS) representatives

National Response Framework

Type of Incident
a. Radiological terrorism incidents (e.g. RDD/IND or Radiological Exposure Device): (1)Material or facilities owned or operated by DOD or DOE (2)Material or facilities licensed by NRC or Agreement State (3)All others b. Nuclear facilities: (1)Owned or operated by DOD or DOE (2)Licensed by NRC or Agreement State (3)Not licensed, owned, or operated by a Federal agency or an Agreement State, or currently or formerly licensed, but of which the owner/operator is not financially viable or is otherwise unable to respond c. Transportation of radioactive materials: (1)Materials shipped by or for DOD or DOE (2)Shipment of NRC or Agreement State-licensed materials (3)Shipment of materials in certain areas of the coastal zone that are not licensed or owned by a Federal agency or Agreement State (see USCG list of responsibilities for further explanation of certain areas) (4)All others d. Space vehicles containing radioactive materials: (1)Managed by NASA or DOD (2)Not managed by DOD or NASA impacting certain areas of the coastal zone (3)All others e. Foreign, unknown or unlicensed material: (1)Incidents involving foreign or unknown sources of radioactive material in certain areas of the coastal zone (2)All others f. Nuclear weapon accident/incident (based on custody at time of event) g. Other types of incidents not otherwise addressed above (1) (2) (3)

Coordinating Agency
DOD or DOE NRC DOE

(1) (2) (3)

DOD or DOE NRC EPA

(1) (2) (2) (4) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2)

DOD or DOE NRC DHS/USCG EPA NASA or DOD DHS/USCG EPA DHS/USCG EPA

DOD or DOE DHS designates

The Federal Emergency Management Agency