kLLIA8ILI1 MANAGLMLN1

AN IN1LGkA1LD AkCACn
Wg Cdr !ayesh C S al
CSuC Al
1he Arrow
Work Work
ManagemenL ManagemenL
CperaLlonal CperaLlonal
SLaff SLaff
Company Company
8egulaLors 8egulaLors
CovernmenL CovernmenL
AcLlons AcLlons
Acc|dent Acc|dent
11/29/2011 CSuC 3
MA1u8l1?
Memory and |earn|ng
1o conslder pedagoglcal meLhodologles oLher
Lhan convenLlonal ones"
11/29/2011 CSuC 4
93 of whaL we teach
10 of whaL we read
20 of whaL we hear
30 of whaL we see hear
30 of whaL we see
"Convent|ona|
Learn|ng"
70 of whaL we d|scuss
80 of whaL we exper|ence
"Act|ve
Learn|ng"
DLMING uotes
1bete ls oo sobstltote fot koowleJqe
1be most lmpottoot tbloqs coooot be meosoteJ
1be most lmpottoot tbloqs ote ookoowo ot
ookoowoble
xpetleoce by ltself teocbes ootbloq
l tblok tbot people bete expect mltocles Ametlcoo
moooqemeot tbloks tbot tbey coo jost copy ftom
Iopoobot tbey Joot koow wbot to copy!
Defect kate Ana|ys|s
GL1 AN CVLkVILW A8CU1 1nL
AMCUN1 AND S1A1L CI 1nL kLCk1LD
DLILC1S
1C C81AIN AN CVLkVILW CI 1nL A11LkN
CI DLILC1S AkISING IN I1 WI1n A VILW TO
HISHLISHT POSSILE TROULE
PRONE ASSRESATES ICk 1nL IU1UkL
AND SUGGLS1 kLMLDILS ICk
IMkCVLMLN1
DA1A CCLLLC1ICN
1 Dk]Wk DA1A (kLCLIVLD IkCM UNI1S)
WING
AIkCkAI1 SUADkCN
AIkCkAI1 No
Dk]Wk No DA1L
DIk]WIk No DA1L
NCMLNCLA1UkL CI CCMCNLN1
Ak1 NUM8Lk
SS1LM
1kADL
18C
LIIL CCMLL1LD SINCL LAS1 CVLknAUL
LIIL CCMLL1LD SINCL NLW
kLCk1LD DLILC1
DI AGLNC
2 DIk ] W Ik DA1A (kece|ved from DI agency)
CCNIIkMA1ICN AND IINDINGS
kLCCMMLNDA1ICNS
IL CnAk1
1kADL AIkIkAML
DLILC1 DA1A AIkIkAML SS1LMS
C1PL8S
(18)
10
1AkL Cll/LAnulnC
S?S1LM
(13)
7
nLuMA1lC S?S1LM
(33)
19
P?u8AuLlC S?S1LM
(38)
32
luLL S?S1LM
(31)
17
Al8 CCnul1lCnlnC
S?S1LM
(28)
13
kecent NASA Acc|dents
Cenesls vehlcle slammed lnLo uLah deserL probably
because Lockheed englneers lnsLalled four small swlLches
backward
CllmaLe orblLer crashed lnLo Mars because Lockheed used
Lngllsh measuremenL whlle nASA used meLrlc
Mars polar vehlcle crashed when descenL rockeLs shuL off
premaLurely
1elevlslon lnfrared observaLlon saLelllLe (1l8CS) fell off lLs
LransporL sLand because an adapLer plaLe was noL properly
secured
11/29/2011 CSuC 10
1he L|ephant |s ||ke
lndu'r:| l|r|d:q:
1913
1960 1980 2000
Mass"
Lean"
llexlble" 8econflgurable"
roducLlon
Cb[ecLlve
lnLerchangeable arLs"
roducLlon ManagemenL
CompuLerlzaLlon
knowledge
Sclence"
Approach
1. CHECK SHEET
2. HISTOGRAM
3. PARETO DIAGRAM
4. CAUSE and EFFECT DIAGRAM
5. SCATTER DIAGRAM
6. CLUSTERING
7. CONTROL CHART
8. QUALITY FUNCTION DEPLOYMENT (QFD)
EIGHT TQM TOOLS EIGHT TQM TOOLS
Interval Mid Value Tallies
8.25 9.75 9 II 2
9.75 11.25 10.5 IIII IIII 10
11.25 12.75 12 .. 17
12.75 14.25 13.5 .. 11
14.25 15.75 15 .. 5
15.75 17.25 16,5 .. 2
17.25 18.75 18 .. 2
18.75 20.25 19.5 .. 1
50
8.25 20.25
5
11
2 2
1
17
10
2

1

12.78 , SD 2.31
Histogrum
!,7094 Di,7,2
Defective Item Number of Defectives Percent Defective Percent of Composition
Head defective (Hd) 99 4.6 % 47.4 %
Material defective (Md) 13 0.6 % 6.2 %
Bolt defective (Bd) 52 2.4 % 24.9 %
Corner defective (Cd) 9 0.4 % 4.3 %
Length defective (Ld) 36 1.7 % 17.2 %
209 9.7 % 99.9 %
Date : Number o1 Inspection, N 2160
Hd Bd Ld Md Cd
200
100 ()
75
50
25
0
0
100
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
#eaction Temperature
Scutter Diugrum
rocess Contro| Chart
1 2 3 4 3 6 7 8 9 10
Sample number
upper
conLrol
llmlL
rocess
average
Lower
conLrol
llmlL
CauseandLffect D|agram
"uaIity
ProbIem
Out of adjustment
TooIing probIems
OId / worn
Machines
FauIty
testing equipment
Incorrect specifications
Improper methods
Measurement
Poor supervision
Lack of concentration
Inadequate training
Human
Deficiencies
in product design
Ineffective quaIity
management
Poor process design
Process
Inaccurate
temperature
controI
Dust and Dirt
Environment
Defective from vendor
Not to specifications
MateriaI-
handIing probIems
MateriaIs
Engineers-wake up!
Most engineers need to understand they are a
dying breed if they plan to maintain equipment
using only the seat of their pants, qualitative data,
for making decisions.
Engineers must fluently use reliability data so they
can reduce costs and avoid failures by using data
to make wise decision.
Without the numbers, we engineers will soon be
viewed as technical amateurs with declining pay
scales and unemployment as the byproduct.
Use the data in your maintenance systems to solve
technical problems and make improvements!
kLLIA8ILI1 vs MAIN1LNANCL LNGINLLk
%he task of reliability engineers is to avoid
failures which carry a requirement for solving
problems with data.
%he task of maintenance engineers is to
quickly restore equipment to operating
conditions which requires understanding
failure modes and the failure data.
Both reliability engineers and maintenance
engineers can use a common set of data for
an excellent communication tool to solve the
vitally few problems in the shortest interval of
time using facts from the data to reduce
costs.
f
elloblllty ls tbe oblllty of o system ot compooeot to
petfotm lts tepolteJ fooctloos ooJet stoteJ
cooJltloos fot o speclfleJ petloJ of tlme l 90
ln oLher words lL ls Lhe llkellhood LhaL Lhe sysLem
or componenL wlll succeed wlLhln lLs ldenLlfled
mlsslon Llme wlLh no fallures An alrcrafL mlsslon ls
Lhe perfecL example Lo lllusLraLe Lhls concepL
When an alrcrafL Lakes off for lLs mlsslon Lhere ls
one goal ln mlnd compleLe Lhe fllghL as lnLended
safely (wlLh no caLasLrophlc fallures)
f
f
ke||ab|||ty data requ|res def|n|t|on of a
fa||ure
lallures can be caLasLrophlc fallures or slow
degradaLlonyou dec|de by def|n|ng the
fa||ures
unlLs of measure for Lhe daLa musL be ln un|ts
of the degradat|on lL can be hours mlles
cycles and so forLhln shorL whatever
mot|vates the fa||ure
What |s a Ia||ure?
8ellablllLy ls quanLlfled as M18l (Mean 1lme
8eLween lallure) for repalrable producL and
M11l (Mean 1lme 1o lallure) for non
repalrable producL
M18l ls ofLen quoLed wlLhouL provldlng a
deflnlLlon of fallure 1hls pracLlce ls noL only
mlsleadlng buL compleLely useless
M18l lmpacLs boLh rellablllLy and avallablllLy
What |s a Ia||ure?
Cne could argue Lhere are Lwo baslc
deflnlLlons of a fallure
1) 1he LermlnaLlon of Lhe ablllLy of Lhe
ptoJoct os o wbole Lo perform lLs requlred
funcLlon
2) 1he LermlnaLlon of Lhe ablllLy of any
loJlvlJool compooeot Lo perform lLs requlred
funcLlon buL noL Lhe LermlnaLlon of Lhe ablllLy
of Lhe producL as a whole Lo perform
xomple
lf Lhe lnverLer of a uS falls and Lhe uS swlLches Lo
sLaLlc bypass Lhe fallure does noL prevenL Lhe uS
from performlng lLs requlred funcLlon whlch ls
supplylng power Lo Lhe crlLlcal load Powever Lhe
lnverLer fallure does prevenL a componenL of Lhe
uS from performlng lLs requlred funcLlon of
supplylng condlLloned power
Accordlng Lo deflnlLlon 1 Lhls ls noL a fallure buL
accordlng Lo deflnlLlon 2 lL ls a fallure
What |s a Ia||ure?
ln reallLy Lhere are more Lhen Lwo deflnlLlons of
fallure in focf fhey ore infinife.
ls cusLomer mlsappllcaLlon consldered a fallure?
Are shlpplng damages consldered fallures?
ls Lhe expecLed wear ouL of a consumable lLem such
as a baLLery consldered a fallure lf lL falled
premaLurely?
lf an LLu (LlghL LmlLLlng ulode) on a compuLer were
Lo fall ls lL consldered a fallure even Lhough lL hasn'L
lmpacLed Lhe operaLlon of Lhe compuLer?
Def|n|t|on of Ia||ure
ailure itself must also be thoroughly
defined at system and module levels.
It may be necessary to define more
than one type of failure (for example,
total system failure or degradation
failure) or failures for different
operating modes (for example, in flight
or on ground) in order to describe all
the requirements.
Def|n|t|on of Ia||ure
M18ls mlghL Lhen be ascrlbed Lo Lhe dlfferenL
fallure Lypes M18ls and fallure raLes ofLen requlre
clarlflcaLlon as Lo Lhe meanlng of 'fallure' and 'Llme'
1he laLLer may refer Lo operaLlng Llme revenue
Llme clock Llme eLc
1ypes of fallure whlch do noL counL for Lhe purpose
of provlng Lhe rellablllLy (for example malnLenance
lnduced or envlronmenL ouLslde llmlLs) have also Lo
be deflned
11/29/2011 CSuC 29
MAIN1AINA8ILI1
ESSEN%IALLY, %E EASE AND SPEED
WI% WIC A AILED EQUIPMEN%
CAN BE BROUG% BACK IN%O
OPERA%ING CONDI%IONS IS
MAIN%AINABILI%Y
ALSO CALLED AS MEAN %IME %O
REPAIR (M%%R) O AN I%EM.
11/29/2011 CSuC 30
,@@
Mean 1lme Lo 8epalr (or 8ecover) ls Lhe expecLed
Llme Lo recover a sysLem from a fallure
M118 lmpacLs AvallablllLy and noL 8ellablllLy
1he longer Lhe M118 Lhe worse off a sysLem ls
As Lhe M18l goes up AvallablllLy goes up
As Lhe M118 goes up AvallablllLy goes down
MLAn 1lML 1C 8LAl8
uL1LC1lCn Cl lAuL1
ALLCCA1lCn Cl MAln1LnAnCL 1LAM
ulACnCSL lAuL1
C81Aln SA8L A81S (LCClS1lC uLLA?)
8LAl8 1lML(M1181PlS lS 1PL MAnulAC1u8L8S
lnlC8MA1lCn)
1LS1 Anu ACCL1 8LAl8
CLCSlnC u 1PL S?S1LM Anu 8L1u8nlnC 1C nC8MAL
CL8A1lCn
SklLL Cl 1PL MAln1LnAnCL LnClnLL8S Anu 1PL
MAln1LnAnCL S1All AvAlLA8LL A1 1PL 8ASLS
11/29/2011 CSuC 32
MLAn 1lML 1C 8LAl8
If a Mean %ime %o Repair (M%%R)
or Down %ime (MD%) is specified,
then the meaning of repair time
must be defined in detail.
Mean time to repair is often
used when it is mean down time
which is intended.
,@
Mean 1lme 8eLween lallure ls a baslc measure
of a sysLem's rellablllLy lL ls Lyplcally
represenLed ln unlLs of hours 1he hlgher Lhe
M18l number ls Lhe hlgher Lhe rellablllLy of Lhe
producL
M%B Misquoted and Misunderstood
,@
A common mlsconcepLlon abouL M18l ls LhaL
lL ls equlvalenL Lo Lhe expecLed number of
operaLlng hours before a sysLem falls or Lhe
servlce llfe"
lL ls noL uncommon however Lo see an M18l
number on Lhe order of 1 mllllon hours and lL
would be unreallsLlc Lo Lhlnk Lhe sysLem could
acLually operaLe conLlnuously for over 100
years wlLhouL a fallure
,@
%here are 500,000 humans aged 25-year-old in the
sample population.
Over the course of a year, data is collected on
failures (deaths) for this population.
%he operational life of the population is 500,000 x 1
year = 500,000 people years.
%hroughout the year, 625 people failed (died).
%he failure rate is 625 failures / 500,000 people
years = 0.125% / year.
%he M%B is the inverse of failure rate or 1 /
0.00125 = 800 years.
So, even though 25-year-old humans have high
MTBF values, their life expectancy (service life) is
much shorter and does not correlate.
It's a|| about Assumpt|ons!
So whaL ls Lhe M18l of 23yearold humans
80 or 800? lL's boLh! 8uL how can Lhe same
populaLlon end up wlLh Lwo such drasLlcally
dlfferenL M18l values?
lf Lhe M18l of 80 years more accuraLely
reflecLs Lhe llfe of Lhe producL (humans ln Lhls
case) ls Lhls Lhe beLLer meLhod?
,@
1he blggesL llmlLaLlon ls Llme
ln order Lo do Lhls Lhe enLlre sample populaLlon would
have Lo fall and for many producLs Lhls ls on Lhe order
of 1013 years ln addlLlon even lf lL were senslble Lo
walL Lhls duraLlon before calculaLlng Lhe M18l
problems would be encounLered ln Lracklng producLs
lor example how would a manufacLurer know lf Lhe
producLs were sLlll ln servlce lf Lhey were Laken ouL of
servlce and never reporLed?
Who would wanL Lhe M18l value of a producL LhaL has
been superceded by several generaLlons of Lechnology
updaLes?
ff
vailability, on the other hand, is the
degree to which a system or
component is operational and
accessible when required for use
[IEEE 90].
Availability is often looked at
because, when a failure does occur,
the critical variable now becomes
how quickly the system can be
recovered.
%herefore, if a device has not failed, the
downtime is 0, so the availability would be 1 or
100%.
or Equation 1 and Equation 2 above to be
valid, a basic assumption must be made when
analyzing the M%B of a system.
Unlike mechanical systems, most electronic
systems dont have moving parts.
As a result, it is generally accepted that
electronic systems or components exhibit
constant failure rates during the useful operating
life.
ke||ab|||ty or Ava||ab|||ty
or process-related equipment it is usual
to specify Availability. Unless, however,
some failure modes are defined, the
figures can be of little value.
or example, in a safety system, failure
may consist of spurious alarm 47 of
failure to respond.
Combining the two failure rates produces
a misleading figure and the two modes
must be evaluated separately.
ML1nCDS CI kLDIC1ING AND
LS1IMA1ING M18I
ReIiubiIity Prediction Methods :-
MILnD8k 217 1e|cord|a nkDS
k8D (ke||ab|||ty 8|ock D|agram)
Markov Mode|
IMLA ] IMLCA
Iau|t 1ree
Plghly AcceleraLed Llfe 1esLlng (PAL1)
ML1nCDS CI kLDIC1ING AND
LS1IMA1ING M18I
ReIiubiIity Estimution Methods :-
S|m||ar Item red|ct|on Method
I|e|d Data Measurement Method
1he lluLS redlcLlon Model (lu5 ColJe 2004 lssoe A
elloblllty MetboJoloqy fot lecttoolc 5ystems) wos
deslgned by Lhe lluLS Croup a consorLlum of
Luropean companles from Lhe aeronauLlcs and defense
flelds Lo apply Lo all domalns uslng elecLronlcs
lncludlng Lhe mlllLary commerclal lndusLry and
LelecommunlcaLlons
11/29/2011 CSuC 44
11/29/2011 CSuC 43
11/29/2011 CSuC 46
Ia||ure keport|ng Ana|ys|s and Correct|ve
Act|on System (IkACAS)
An effecLlve l8ACAS process provldes for gaLherlng and
Lracklng fallure daLa ln a cenLral daLabase so LhaL Lhls
daLa can be analyzed Lo deLermlne underlylng causes
?eL ln many organlsaLlons Lhe lndlvlduals parLlclpaLlng ln
Lhe process are dlsLrlbuLed across mulLlple groups or
locaLlons and are recordlng lnformaLlon ln dlfferenL
sources or daLabases
As a resulL Lhe ablllLy Lo qulckly lsolaLe fallure Lrends ls
compromlsed
l8ACAS SLandard helps organlsaLlons Lo overcome Lhls
fragmenLed approach Lo rellablllLy
11/29/2011 CSuC 47
ASL
Average Servlce Llfe
Sum of Lhe hours logged afLer lasL overhaul of Lhe
componenLs recelved as CaL u / ul durlng Lhe
perlod
____________________________________________
1oLal no of ComponenLs recelved as CaL u / ul
durlng Lhe perlod
(1he number of Lnglnes / 8oLables wlLhdrawn for lCu
/ 8lrd PlL / uefecL noL Conflrmed are excluded)
DLMING uotes
1bete ls oo sobstltote fot koowleJqe
1be most lmpottoot tbloqs coooot be meosoteJ
1be most lmpottoot tbloqs ote ookoowo ot
ookoowoble
xpetleoce by ltself teocbes ootbloq
l tblok tbot people bete expect mltocles Ametlcoo
moooqemeot tbloks tbot tbey coo jost copy ftom
Iopoobot tbey Joot koow wbot to copy!