Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Slide 1
Objectives
To satisfy the training requirement for National Authorities outlined in EASA Decision Papers:
Slide 2
CAMO
Not required
NAA
Not required
Slide 3
Organisation
Personnel
Level of knowledge 2
Personnel in aircraft and component shop maintenance organisations involved in maintenance task planning, all personnel carrying maintenance tasks on aircraft or components classified as Fuel Tank Safety items, support staff and certifying staff
Management, quality assurance personnel and auditors, personnel in charge of stores, and any personnel not directly involved in maintenance activities as required by the organisation Management, inspectors and Auditors.
Not required
NAA
Not required
Slide 4
Organisation
Personnel
Level of knowledge 2
Yes
Slide 5
Level 1 (Familiarisation)Training
The attendant should, after the completion of the training:
1.
2.
be familiar with the basic elements of the fuel tank safety issues.
be able to give a simple description of the historical background and the elements requiring a safety consideration, using common words and showing examples of non conformities. be able to use typical terms.
3.
The familiarisation training should include a presentation of bulletins/notices, short videos or CD material, poster campaigns, etc.
Slide 6
The attendant should, after the completion of the training: 1. Know the history and the theoretical and practical elements of the subject, have an overview of Special Federal Aviation Regulations (SFARs) from 14 CFR SFAR 88 of the FAA and of JAA Temporary Guidance Leaflet TGL 47, be able to give a detailed description of the concept of Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations CDCCL, Airworthiness Limitations Items (ALI) and using theoretical fundamentals and specific examples,
Slide 7
3.
4.
Slide 8
5. 6.
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Slide 10
Slide 11
Contributing factors to the accident were the design and certification concept that fuel tank explosions could be prevented solely by precluding all ignition sources and the design and certification of the Boeing 747 with heat sources located beneath the CWT with no means to reduce the heat transferred into the CWT or to render the fuel vapor in the tank nonflammable. The safety issues in this report focus on fuel tank flammability, fuel tank ignition sources, design and certification standards, and the maintenance and aging of aircraft systems. Safety recommendations concerning these issues are addressed to the Federal Aviation Administration.
Slide 12
Background
The two NTSB safety recommendations led to two separate internationally supported initiatives:
1. Fuel
2. Ageing
Slide 13
SFAR NPRM
New York
1994
1995 1996 1997 1998
NTSB recommendations
Industry Fuel NGS Systems Development Safety ARAC FAA Task to Industry Program Inerting based on NTSB Study Recommendations
Industry and Regulatory consensus: Reducing flammability would provide major benefit to enhancing fuel tank safety
Slide 14
The centre fuel tank exploded while the aircraft was taxiing for departure. 8 of the 113 passengers were killed. The airline had fitted logo lights after delivery which involved additional wires to be passed through vapour seals in the fuel tanks. The NTSB recommended to the FAA that an AD be issued requiring inspections of the fuel boost pumps, float switch and wiring looms as signs of chafing had been found. The FAA declined to issue the AD.
Slide 15
The flight was being prepared by 5 cabin crew members and 3 ground staff members for a flight to Chiang Mai. The Thai Prime Minister was one of the 149 passengers waiting to board the plane. 27 minutes before scheduled departure time, a fire erupted in the cabin, killing a flight attendant and injuring 6 others. The fire was put out in an hour, but by then the aircraft had been gutted. Subsequent investigation discovered that the centre tanks pumps had been left running when tank was dry.
Slide 16
Aircraft parked on ramp for some considerable time with high ambient temperature (+900F) Centre Wing Tank empty Air-conditioning Packs running for some time.
Slide 17
Ignition
Oxygen
Fuel Vapor
Slide 18
Body Tanks
Pressurized <5% Un-pressurized >20%
Slide 19
Flammability Exposure
Flammability Envelope vs. Ignition Energy, Flash Point and O2 Level
Flammability Envelope vs. Ignition Energy, Flash Point and O2 Level
50 40
Altitude 1000's ft.
50
80o F OAT
LFL
40
Altitude 1000's ft.
UFL
40o F OAT
LFL
UFL
80o F Airport outside air temperature (OAT) 90 minute ground pack operation (~36oF CWT temperature increase, ~18oF for 30min) 20.9% Oxygen content 120 Flash point fuel
40o F Airport outside air temperature 90 minute ground pack operation (~45oF CWT temperature increase, ~22oF for 30min) 20.9% Oxygen content 120 Flash point fuel
0.5
0.4
Current World Fleet Explosion Rate = 16 explosions in 415 million flights 3.9E-8 per flight (10 Year rolling average) Note: 737-777 rate = 3E-8 per flight (10 Year rolling average)
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0 1959 1963 1967 1971 1975 1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999
Year
ARAC ~10E-8
Cumulative Accidents
7 6 5
Bangkok
4 3
Manila
New York
2 1 0
10E-9 Extremely improbable not anticipated to occur in the life of the fleet
1990
1995
2000
2005
Year
2010
2015
2020
FAA develop SFAR 88 JAA develop JAA Policy interim policy INT/POL/25/12 SFAR & INT/POL call for all TC and STC holders accomplish the following tasks: Conduct a safety review of the fuel tank system to determine that the design meets the requirements of FAR/JAR 25.901 and FAR/JAR 25.981(a) and (b). Develop all maintenance and inspection instructions required to maintain the design features of the fuel system that preclude the existence or development of an ignition source within the fuel tank.
Slide 23
Cont
Prepare and submit a report (or reports) to the FAA/JAA for approval/acceptance containing the following:
Slide 24
Due to the prevailing JAA system at the time: CAA implemented JAA Policy with AN 55 (followed by Generic Requirement GR No. 12 in CAA CAP 747). This has now been withdrawn.
All JAA TC & STC Holders have complied with the unsafe condition identification and proposed corrective actions
Slide 25
Yes
No
1.1
2.1
2.5 No Action
Examples of where the required ALI and ICA information should be placed
3.1 Introduction of fuel system ALIs & CDCCLs into Airworthiness Limitation Section
Slide 26
FAA /JAA(EASA) require TC / STC Holder review aircraft with - +30 seats or +7500lb payload (FAR 121 operator aircraft discriminant) Reviews completed by all JAA/EASA, FAA, Transport Canada, CTA Brazil affected TC & STC Holders
Design changes required to address unsafe condition will be mandated by AD, for example:
Airworthiness Limitation Items (ALI) Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations (CDCCL) Modifications FM Limitations
Slide 27
CDCCL
Critical Design Configuration Control Limitation Features of System Design that require their integrity to be maintained in order to ensure that unsafe conditions do not develop in the fuel system throughout the service life of the aircraft must be retained during modification, repair or maintenance..
Slide 28
ALI & CDCCL will be listed in a uniquely referenced TC & STC Holder Fuel Airworthiness Limitations Section of ICAW.
Slide 29
FSS Tasks developed from MRB process will be assigned a Failure Effect Category (FEC) 8.
Cannot be deleted or changed without EASA approval Must be subject to a (competent authority) approved procedure for escalation
Slide 30
Inspections (ALI) and modifications are aligned with existing MPD tank entry requirements could be a problem with escalated or equalised programmes CAA MOR data shows 16% maintenance error level in B747 ATA 28/73 MOR over 20 year period
Airworthiness / maintenance management, inspectors and mechanics at aircraft and component level will require awareness and training
NAA Surveyor/Inspectors will require training
Slide 31
Management of CDCCL will be a challenge for operators (during scheduled maintenance, modification, repair)
e.g.
Bonding features
Significant issues during modification and repair includes non fuel-tank systems
Slide 32
ADs addressing ignition source suppression started to be issued from mid-2004 Long lead times on many ADs July 2006, EASA have issued ADs (for those aircraft they are responsible for) mandating the adoption of Fuel Airworthiness Limitations document into the approved maintenance programme.
Slide 33
Inspection Standards (perhaps different standards applied) Maintenance Procedures (need to include: fuel tank safety awareness, HF elements, MEM etc) Fuel Tank Close-up (effective final inspections) Operational Procedures (i.e. dry tanks, boost pump running etc) MM Information (precautions & warnings) MMEL (i.e. dispatch criteria)
Slide 35
Flammability Reduction Means (FRM) concept introduced at late stage by FAA (circa 2004)
JAA (EASA) agree with concept not yet agreed on implementation (retrofit or production cut in) or applicability criteria (high flammability criteria, hot day conditions etc.)
Boeing applied for certification of Nitrogen Generation System (NGS) for B737, B747 NGS application being jointly investigated by FAA and EASA
Slide 36
NGS
System Status / Indication
External Inputs
System Control
Float Valve
Ram Cooling Flow via Existing ECS Scoop Flow On/Off Contro l
High Flow Descent Control Valve Air Separation Module NEA to Tank
Bleed Flow
Slide 37
N2
Slide 38
FAA issued NPRM November 2005 which included Flammability Reduction Means (FRM), the final rule is due to be issued November 2007. EASA position on Flammability Reduction outlined in Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA). Accessible on EASA website: http://www.easa.eu.int/doc/Events/fueltanksafety_240620 05/easa_fueltanksafety_24062005_ria_issue_1.pdf
Slide 39
Cont
Boeing / Airbus held operator seminars on SFAR 88 & JAA (EASA) policy
EASA held industry workshop in Cologne 24th June 2005 and 6/7th February 2006.
EASA and FAA are still in discussion on the harmonisation of FRM.
Slide 40