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Oil and gas exports dominate Irans export revenues, constituting about 80% of total exports and are the most important source of foreign exchange earnings for the country.
The lifeblood of Irans economy, its oil and gas industry, is showing serious signs of distress. Due to years of neglect, Irans current daily oil production has fallen to near 3.7 million barrels, which is more than 5% below its OPEC quota.
In contrast, in 1974, five years before the Islamic Revolution, Iran pumped 6.1 million barrels per day.
Iran also has been plagued by aging infrastructure and old technology. Most oil fields dating back to 1920s require significant upgrades in facilities.
Structural upgrades and access to new technologies, such as natural gas injections and other enhanced oil recovery efforts, have been limited by a lack of investment.
It is believed that millions of barrels of oil are lost annually because of damage to reservoirs and these natural declines.
At the current rate of investment, production of oil is expected to decline at a rate of 13% per year making Iran an oil importing nation by 2020.
To maintain oil production at its 20082009 level of 3.9 million barrels a day, nine billion dollars fresh investment per year is needed. The current investment undertaking is under 3 billion dollars.
Currently, Irans 7 million vehicles consume the same amount of gas as Britains 35 million vehicles.
IRANIAN ENERGY SUBSIDIES, ESTIMATED VALUE AND SHARE OF GDP, SELECTED YEARS
Year Energy Subsidies Value* 1994 2001/2 2003 2005 2007 $11 (15.92) $11 (13.39) $13 (15.51) $37 (40.64) $50 (51.74) GDP of Iran* Share of GDP (%) 16.42 9.4819 10.00 19.68 17.54
$67 (96.99) $116 (139.43) $133 (155.07) $188 (206.52) $285 (294.89)
NOTES: *Billions of U.S. dollars in current dollars (historical dollars unadjusted for inflation); numbers converted into 2009 dollars in parentheses; numbers on subsidies value are inexact estimates from varying sources. Other sources say energy subsidies averaged 11 percent of Irans gross domestic product (GDP) in the 1990s; this data indicates subsidies dipped as a share of GDP near the end of the decade.
MOTOR GASOLINE LITRES CONSUMED FOR ROAD TRANSPORT IN IRAN AND ITS NEIGHBOURS IN 2007
Country
Liters/Day
Population
Liters/Day/Person
627,847 2,971,650 0.2113 2,946,049 8,120,247 63,862,027 65,397,521 14,343,879 27,500,156 5,323,693 169,121,963 9,046,192 74,767,836 Turkmenistan 3,139,233 4,774,232 U.S. 1,376,863,825 301,290,332 4.5699
Source: STRUCTURAL PATRONAGE IN IRAN:IMPLICATIONS OF SUBSIDIES REFORM FOR IRAN AND U.S. POLICY
Holding an estimated 10% of global proven oil reserves, Iran boasts the worlds third largest proven petroleum reserves following Saudi Arabia and Canada.
The country must import close to half of all refined petroleum products to meet domestic consumption needs. Iranian refineries produce about 44 million litres a day, whereas the domestic consumption is near 65 million litres a day. Iranian gasoline imports were projected to total $5.7 billion in 2006 and $6.1 billion in 2007.
With an estimated 15% of the worlds gas reserves, Iran has the second largest natural gas reserves globally, following Russia. Despite its vast gas resources, Iran has been unable to become a major international gas exporter. In fact, Iran has been a net importer of natural gas as late as 2005.
Economic Stagnation
Non- oil sector production is stagnant primarily due to the recent import-driven policy of the current government. When factories do remain open they cannot afford to pay workers. The resulting wild-cat strikes are hampering production in some key industries.
Economic Stagnation
Economic Stagnation
Other major export items are petrochemicals, minerals, carpets, and fresh and dried fruits.
Subsidy Reform
Although sanctions have hastened subsidies reform, critical motivations for reform are: the Iranian regimes desires to seize greater political power, increase the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps market dominance, redistribute income, and lessen budgetary pressure
Subsidy Reform
The regime could use subsidies reform to punish and reward members of Irans business class. Many of Irans businesses use energy subsidies to lower production costs.
Subsidy Reform
Reversing these subsidies, which has already begun, holds the promise of compounding inflation, creating favouritism, and fostering further public discontent.
Credit Crunch
Iran was recently planning to release 1.5 billion euros worth of bonds to finance the development of its key energy sector, including the giant South Pars gas field in Persian gulf. This is the second time the regime has resorted to this sort of measures since it came to power in 1979.
Credit Crunch
Iran has limited access to international credit markets due to several factors including: the sanctions, the falling price of oil, the accelerating flight of capital to safety due to the rising political risk, the growing crisis in the banking sector, and currency risk.
The Government of Islamic Republics efforts to stabilize the currency is costing it between $180 million to $250 million a day. Despite these efforts Rial has depreciated by almost 5% since last December. It should be noted that the daily oil export revenue- currently approximately $150 million- does not cover this shortfall.
The loss of income this way has compounded by rampant inflation caused by Ahmadinejad governments excessively loose fiscal policy and the consequent loose monetary policy forcing the government to resort to the policy of price control.
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
5.1 3.7 7.5 7.1 5.1 4.7 5.8 7.8 2.3 (forecast) 0.5 (forecast) 0
Source: Economic Intelligence Unit (derived from World Bank, World Development Indicators).
Irans economic growth has been hampered by consistently double-digit rates of inflation. Although high inflation is widespread among the oil-exporting countries in the Middle East and Central Asia, Iran has one of the highest.
In addition, the Central Bank is limited in its ability to issue direct instruments to combat inflationary pressures. The Central Bank must obtain approval from the Majlis in order to issue participation papers.
In May 2007, President Ahmadinejad capped lending rates to 12% for state-owned banks and 13% for commercial banks, despite strong opposition from the Central Bank. Setting interest rates below the rate of inflation reportedly has placed many commercial banks under financial duress.
In addition, most of the financial intermediaries loan portfolios are comprised of low-return loans to state-owned enterprises and quasi-government agencies, such as the bonyads. Currently the commercial banks- state owned or private- have a $40 billion overdue claim against their borrowers.
To support the expansionary economic programs of Ahmadinejads government, the Iranian Central Bank has resorted to an unprecedented expansionary monetary policy.
The monetary base, ( Currency in circulation + banks cash reserves), which is the ultimate determinant of liquidity and supply of money, grew at a breathtaking rate of 93% between 2006 and 2008, to be scaled back by 12 % over the following 6 months.