I, (name), of (address), do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court. I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same;

I will delay no man for money or malice and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; And I impose upon my self this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.

Towards the courts Towards the society Towards his colleagues in the profession To his client

DUTIES TO COURTS CANON 10 CANON 11 CANON 12

A lawyer is, first and foremost, an officer of the court. His duties to the court are more significant than those which he owes to his client.


Salcedo v. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724 (1935); Cobb-Perez v. Lantin, 24 SCRA 291 (1968)

His first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice; to that end, his client s success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics of the profession. For like the court itself, a lawyer is an instrument to advance the ends of justice. His superior retainer is with the court, which outlasts all his retainers with his client


Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, 31 SCRA 1 (1970); Castaeda v. Ago, 65 SCRA 505 (1975); Ledesma v. Climaco, 57 SCRA 473 (1974); Chavez v. Viola, 196 SCRA 10 (1991); Maglasang v. People, 190 SCRA 306 (1990)

Accordingly, should there be a conflict between his duty to his client and to that to the court, he should resolve the conflict against the former and in favor of the latter, his primary responsibility being to uphold the cause of justice.


Cobb-Perez v. Lantin, 24 SCRA 291 (1968); Castaeda v. Ago, 65 SCRA 505 (1975)

A lawyer owes the court the duty to render no service or to do no act which involves disrespect to the judicial office, adoption of legal proposition which is not honestly debatable, artifice or false statement of fact or law to mislead the court, or unlawful conspiracy with his client, a third person or a judge tending to frustrate or delay the administration of justice or to secure for his client that which is not legally and justly due him.
   

Lualhati v. Albert, 57 Phil. 87 (1932); In re Almacen, 31 SCRA 562 (1970) People v. Young, 83 Phil. 702 (1949) Occena v. Marquez, 60 SCRA 38 (1974) Langen v. Borkowski, 188 Wis 277, 43 ALR 622 (1925)

Utmost good faith and punctilio of honor are standards of conduct required of every lawyer pleading his cause before a court of justice.


Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, 31 SCRA 1 (1970)

A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.1 Rule 10.2 Rule 10.3 Cases

A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.

A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.

PEREA vs. ALMADRO, A.C. No. 5246, 2 May 2006 MALIGAYA vs. DORONILLA, A.C. No. 6198, 15 September 2006 LIBIT vs. OLIVA, A.C. No. 2837, 7 October 1994
AFURONG vs. AQUINO, A.C. No. 1571, 23 September 1999 [112 SCAD 838, 315 SCRA 77] VILLAFLOR vs. SARITA, A.C.-CBC No. 471, 10 June 1999 [107 SCAD 288, 308 SCRA 129]

This refers to an offshoot incident in the disbarment case filed by Edgar O. Perea against Atty. Ruben L. Almadro. Atty. Ruben L. Almadro engaged the services of the Sua & Alambra Law Offices to represent him in this disbarment case.

In their Entry of Appearance with Motion/Manifestation, signed by Atty. Alan Andres B. Alambra, he stated that respondent has yet to receive a copy of the complaint and thus prayed that a copy of the said complaint be furnished him so he can file an answer.

Complainant Edgar O. Perea filed a Manifestation, asseverating that he had furnished respondent copies of the complaint through facsimile machine. In a Resolution, the Court sustained the Integrated Bar of the Philippines order requiring Atty. Kenton Sua and Atty. Alambra to show cause for their deliberate falsehood and misrepresentation in the preparation of the answer for respondent, and accordingly remanded the case to the IBP for further action on the contempt proceedings.

The IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution finding that Atty. Sua and Atty. Alambra were less than honest and forthright in their representation before the Court and imposing a fine of P2,000.00 each with warning that any further unprofessional conduct will be dealt with more severely.

In their Explanation, Atty. Sua and Atty. Alambra avered that:

 Atty. Sua, a partner in the Sua & Alambra Law Offices, was not and

is not, the partner assigned to handle the case for Atty. Almadro and had no participation whatsoever in the case other than to notarize the Affidavit of Service for Atty. Almadro s Answer;  Atty. Alambra acted in good faith upon the express instructions and advise of Atty. Almadro that he never received a copy of the complaint up to the time that he referred the case to their Law Office.

To bolster their claim of good faith, they attached a photocopy of the letter of Atty. Almadro stating that he had not actually received a copy of the complaint of Mr. Perea.

A perusal of the aforesaid letter of Atty. Almadro reveals that indeed stated that he had not received a copy of the complaint. However, in Atty. Almadro s three Motions for Extension of Time to Comment which he filed before the Court before engaging the services of the law office, there was no mention that he had not received a copy of the complaint. In fact, in the second paragraph of the second motion for extension, Atty. Almadro stated that:
 He is in the process of reviewing an initial draft of said comment

and will need said period of ten (10) days to complete and finalize the draft.

Said statement shows very clearly that Atty. Almadro has received a copy of the complaint. For how can he prepare a draft of his comment if it were not so? This should have alerted Atty. Alambra to verify the veracity of the claim of Atty. Almadro. Atty. Alambra should not have relied on the statement given by Atty. Almadro.

Their being classmates in the law school is not a reason to be less cautious in his dealings with the Court. He is an officer of the court, and as such, he owes candor, fairness and good faith to the Court, as explicitly stated in Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Considering the admission made by Atty. Alambra regarding the non-participation of Atty. Sua, the latter should be absolved of any liability.

Finding Atty. Alan Andres B. Alambra guilty of contempt of Court and neglect of his duties as a lawyer as embodied in Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he is FINED in the amount of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) with a WARNING that any similar act will be dealt with more severely. Atty. Kenton Sua is absolved of any liability.

Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. of the Judge Advocate General's Service is charged of unethical conduct for having uttered a falsehood in open court during a hearing of a civil case, an action for damages filed by complainant Renato M. Maligaya, a doctor and retired colonel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, against several military officers for whom Atty. Doronilla stood as counsel.

At one point during the hearing of the case, Atty. Doronilla said:
 And another matter, Your Honor. I was appearing in other cases he

[complainant Maligaya] filed before against the same defendants. We had an agreement that if we withdraw the case against him, he will also withdraw all the cases. So, with that understanding, he even retired and he is now receiving pension.

Considering this to be of some consequence, presiding Judge Reynaldo B. Daway asked a number of clarificatory questions and thereafter ordered Atty. Doronilla to put his statements in writing and "file the appropriate pleading." Weeks passed but Atty. Doronilla submitted no such pleading or anything else to substantiate his averments.

Maligaya filed a complaint against Atty. Doronilla in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline. The complaint, which charged Atty. Doronilla with "misleading the court through misrepresentation of facts resulting [in] obstruction of justice," was referred to a commissioner for investigation.

Complainant swore before the investigating commissioner that he had never entered into any agreement to withdraw his lawsuits. Atty. Doronilla, admitted several times that there was, in fact, no such agreement.

Later he explained in his memorandum that his main concern was "to settle the case amicably among comrades in arms without going to trial" and insisted that there was no proof of his having violated the Code of Professional Responsibility or the lawyer's oath. He pointed out, in addition, that his false statement (or, as he put it, his "alleged acts of falsity") had no effect on the continuance of the case and therefore caused no actual prejudice to complainant.

The IBP investigating commissioner Lydia A. Navarro submitted a report and recommendation finding Atty. Doronilla guilty of purposely stating a falsehood in violation of Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommending that he be "suspended from the government military service as legal officer for a period of three months." This was adopted and approved in toto by the IBP Board of Governors.

There is a strong public interest involved in requiring lawyers who, as officers of the court, participate in the dispensation of justice, to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and honor. The common caricature that lawyers by and large do not feel compelled to speak the truth and to act honestly should not become a common reality.

By stating untruthfully in open court that complainant had agreed to withdraw his lawsuits, Atty. Doronilla breached these peremptory tenets of ethical conduct. Not only that, he violated the lawyer's oath to "do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court," of which Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 are but restatements. His act infringed on every lawyer's duty to "never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law."

Atty. Doronilla's unethical conduct was compounded, moreover, by his obstinate refusal to acknowledge the impropriety of what he had done. From the very beginning of this administrative case, Atty. Doronilla maintained the untenable position that he had done nothing wrong in the hearing of the civil case. He persisted in doing so even after having admitted that he had, in that hearing, spoken of an agreement that did not in truth exist.

Rather than express remorse for that regrettable incident, Atty. Doronilla resorted to an ill-conceived attempt to evade responsibility, professing that the falsehood had not been meant for the information of Judge Daway but only as "a sort of question" to complainant regarding a "pending proposal" to settle the case.

The explanation submitted by Atty. Doronilla, remarkable only for its speciousness, cannot absolve him. There is nothing in the duty of a lawyer to foster peace among disputants that, in any way, makes it necessary under any circumstances for counsel to state as a fact that which is not true. A lawyer's duty to the court to employ only such means as are consistent with truth and honor forbids recourse to such a tactic.

Even as we give Atty. Doronilla the benefit of the doubt and accept as true his avowed objective of getting the parties to settle the case amicably, we must call him to account for resorting to falsehood as a means to that end.

We disagree with the IBP's recommendation for Atty. Doronilla's suspension from the government military service. The only purpose of this administrative case is to determine Atty. Doronilla's liability as a member of the legal profession, not his liability as a legal officer in the military service. it would be improper for us to order, as a penalty for his breach of legal ethics and the lawyer's oath, his suspension from employment in the Judge Advocate General's Service.

Of course, suspension from employment as a military legal officer may well follow as a consequence of his suspension from the practice of law but that should not be reason for us to impose it as a penalty for his professional misconduct.

His unrepentant attitude throughout the conduct of this administrative case tells us that a mere slap on the wrist is definitely not enough. Atty. Doronilla, it seems, needs time away from the practice of law to recognize his error and to purge himself of the misbegotten notion that an effort to compromise justifies the sacrifice of truthfulness in court.

Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for TWO MONTHS. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar misconduct shall be dealt with more severely.

In Civil Case No. 84-24144 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled "Pedro Cutingting, plaintiff versus Alfredo Tan, defendant", the Honorable Presiding Judge Domingo Panis issued the following order:
 The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) is

hereby ordered to conduct an investigation with the end in view of determining the author of the Sheriff's Return which appears to have been falsified and to institute such criminal action as the evidence will warrant.

After conducting the necessary investigation, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), found the Counsels for PEDRO CUTINGTING in Civil Case No. 84-24144, entitled PEDRO CUTINGTING, Plaintiff vs. ALFREDO TAN, Defendant, did then and there, knowingly, willfully introduced/presented in evidence before the aforesaid Regional Trial Court, a falsified Sheriff's Return of Summons during the hearing of the aforesaid Civil Case thereby impending and/or obstructing the speedy administration and/or dispensation of Justice.

In view, however, of the report of the National Bureau of Investigation to the effect that the signature above the typewritten name Florando Umali on the last page of the complaint in said civil case is not his signature, complainant, through counsel, agreed to the dismissal of the case with respect to Atty. Umali.

With respect to Atty. Edelson G. Oliva, the IBP submitted a report and recommendation stating that there is ample evidence extant in the records to prove that Atty. Oliva has something to do with the falsification of the Sheriff's Return on the Summons in said Civil Case No. 84-24144.

After the careful review of the record of the case and the report and recommendation of the IBP, the Court finds that respondent Atty. Edelson G. Oliva committed acts of misconduct which warrant the exercise by the Court of its disciplinary powers.

The facts, as supported by the evidence, obtaining in this case indubitably reveal respondent's failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the strictures of the lawyer's oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics.

A lawyer's responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other party. The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. One of these requirements is the observance of honesty and candor.

Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy the expectation.

It is essential that lawyers bear in mind at all times that their first duty is not to their clients but rather to the courts, that they are above all court officers sworn to assist the courts in rendering justice to all and sundry, and only secondarily are they advocates of the exclusive interests of their clients. For this reason, he is required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court (Chavez vs. Viola, 196 SCRA 10 [1991]).

Atty. Edelson Oliva has manifestly violated that part of his oath as a lawyer that he shall not do any falsehood. He has likewise violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of

any in court nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

The Court resolved to impose upon Atty. Edelson Oliva the supreme penalty of DISBARMENT. The case is ordered dismissed as against Atty. Florando Umali.

Afurong filed a complaint for ejectment against Victorino Flores which was decided in her favor, and the corresponding writ of execution was served on Victorino. Victorino sought the assistance of the Citizens Legal Assistance Office (CLAO) and the case was assigned to Atty. Aquino, who was then connected with the said office.

Aquino filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment which was dismissed. He likewise filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. He filed an Urgent Motion for Postponement relative to the pre-trial conference of the above petition signing his name as counsel for Victorino and indicating the address of the CLAO as his business address, although he was no longer connected with the said office.

He premised the motion on his alleged appearance in a special proceedings case. It turned out that the special proceeding s case has already been terminated before the pre-trial date for which postponement was sought.

Respondent should not have filed the petition for certiorari considering that it has no apparent purpose other than to delay the execution of a valid judgment. He has violated his duty under the Rules of Court, to counsel and maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law.

Furthermore, his having stated false allegations in his motion for postponement that he has to attend the hearing of a special proceedings in the same day set for pre-trial as well as is purposely allowing the court to believe that he was still connected with the CLAO are employment of means which are not consistent with truth and honor and in fact seeks to mislead the judge.

Respondent has violated his duty to employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law.

A lawyer has an oath to do no falsehood and owes candor, fairness and god faith to the court. For his failure to observe such ethical standards, respondent was found guilty of malpractice and suspended for the practice of law for six months.

Respondent lawyer was able to obtain a favorable judgment in the MTC which was later affirmed by the RTC. The defendant in that case appealed to the CA and was able to obtain a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) addressed to and served upon the presiding judge of the RTC, the sheriff and counsel for both parties, enjoining the eviction and demolition of defendant s family home.

Respondent then filed an ex parte motion with the MTC for the implementation and/or enforcement of the writ of demolition previously issued without advising the trial court of the TRO issued by the CA.

Was the respondent guilty of unethical conduct?

Respondent is guilty of unethical conduct. His disregard of the TRO is an immeasurable disservice to the judicial system. By such act, he deliberately disregarded or ignored his solemn oath to conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity to the courts. He neglected his duties to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers, and to act with candor, fairness and good faith to the courts.

The fact that the TRO was ambiguous is no reason for the respondent to have resorted to the narrowly technical interpretation and implementation as court orders must be respected not because of the respect and consideration that should be extended to the judicial branch of the government. The respect for judicial orders is essential if our government is to be a government of laws and not of men.

Respondent likewise mislead the trial court judge into issuing the order to implement the writ of demolition, in effect violating Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states: A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court.

A lawyer s responsibility to protect and advance the interest of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other party. For violating the above duties, respondent was suspended for two years from the practice of law.

A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS. Rule 11.4 Rule 11.5 Cases

Rule 11.1 Rule 11.2 Rule 11.3

A lawyer shall appear in court properly attired.

A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings.

A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.

A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case.

A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper authorities only.

IN RE: SOTTO, 82 Phil. 595 IN RE: ALMACEN, 31 SCRA 581 ZALDIVAR vs. GONZALEZ, 166 SCRA 316 SANGALANG vs. IAC, 177 SCRA 87 WICKER vs. ARCANGEL, 252 SCRA 445

To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately, so many blunders and injustices , that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of one party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this court, and consequently to lower or degrade the administration of justice by this Court.

The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result.

As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.

The lawyer s duty to render respectful subordination to courts is essential to the orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their client s rights, lawyers even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.

The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the judge, and it may tax his patience and temper to submit rulings which he regards as incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the judge must be obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times be the foremost in rendering respectful submission (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481).

We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That is his privilege. And he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court s decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of rights (Per Justice Sanchez in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979, June 26, 1967).

The principal defense of respondent Gonzales is that he was merely exercising his constitutional right of free speech. He also invokes the related doctrines of qualified privileged communications and fair criticism in the public interest.

Respondent Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one seeks to deny him that right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice.

There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, with the context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general community.

As Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it:

x x x A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary, nor an independent judiciary to a free press. Neither has primacy over the other; both are indispensable to a free society.  The freedom of the press in itself presupposes an independent judiciary through which that freedom may, if necessary, be vindicated. And one of the potent means for assuring judges their independence is a free press.


Only slightly (if at all) less important is the public interest in the capacity of the Court effectively to prevent and control professional misconduct on the part of lawyers who are, first and foremost, indispensable participants in the task of rendering justice to every man. Some courts have held, persuasively it appears to us, that a lawyer s right of free expression may have to be more limited than that of a layman.

It is well to recall that respondent Gonzales, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a Special Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to this Court as the embodiment and the repository of the judicial power in the government of the Republic. The responsibility of the respondent to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice is heavier than that of a practising lawyer.

Respondent Gonzalez claims to be and he is, of course, entitled to criticize the rulings of this Court, to point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed into error. Once more, however, the right of criticism is not unlimited.

Its limits are marked out by Mr. Justice Castro in In re: Almacen which are worth noting:


But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.

The lawyer s duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients rights, lawyers even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers. The instant proceeding is not addressed to the fact that respondent has criticized the Court; it is addressed rather to the nature of that criticism or comment and the manner in which it was carried out.

The Court finds Atty. Sangco s remarks in his motion for reconsideration disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled-for. His suggestions that the Court might have been guilty of graft and corruption in acting on these cases are not only unbecoming, but comes, as well, as an open assault upon the Court s honor and integrity. In rendering its judgment, the Court yielded to the records before it, and to the records alone, and not to the outside influences, much less, the influence of any of the parties.

Atty. Sangco, as a former judge of an inferior court, should know better that in any litigation, one party prevails, but his success will not justify indictments of bribery by the other party. He should be aware that because of his accusations, he has done an enormous disservice to the integrity of the highest tribunal and to the stability of the administration of justice in general.

To be sure, Atty. Sangco is entitled to his opinion, but not a license to insult the Court with derogatory statements and recourses to argument ad hominem. In that event, it is the Court s duty to act to preserve the honor and dignity. . . .and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession.

Atty. Sangco himself admits that (a)s a judge I have learned to live with and accept with grace criticisms of my decisions . Apparently, he does not practice what he preaches. Of course, the Court is not unreceptive to comment and critique of its decisions, but provided they are fair and dignified. Atty. Sangco has transcended the limits of fair comment for which he deserves this Court s rebuke. (Suspended.)

Atty. Rayos filed a Motion for Inhibition of the Presiding Judge. The allegations are derogatory to the honor and integrity of the judge. Judge held lawyer and his client in direct contempt of court and orders their incarceration for five (5) days.

Does a derogatory pleading filed in the proceedings being tried by the judge constitute direct contempt?

What is involved in this case is an instance of direct contempt, since it involves a pleading allegedly containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements submitted to the Court or judge in which the proceedings are pending, as distinguished from a pleading filed in another case. The former has been held to be equivalent to misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the proceedings before the same within the meaning of Rule 71, Section 1 of the Rules of Court and, therefore, direct contempt.

It is important to point out this distinction because in case of indirect or constructive contempt, the contemnor may be punished only (a)fter charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the accused to be heard by himself or counsel, whereas in case of direct contempt, the respondent may be summarily adjudged in contempt. Moreover, the judgment in cases of indirect contempt is appealable, whereas in cases of direct contempt only judgments of contempt by MTCs, MCTCs and METCs are appealable.

Consequently, it was unnecessary in this case for respondent judge to hold a hearing.

A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. Rule 12.4 Rule 12.5 Rule 12.6

Rule 12.1 Rule 12.2 Rule 12.3

Rule 12.7 Rule 12.8 Cases

A lawyer shall not appear for trial unless he has adequately prepared himself on the law and the facts of his case, the evidence he will adduce and the order of its proferrence. He should also be ready with the original documents for comparison with the copies.

A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.

A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.

A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse Court processes.

A lawyer shall refrain from talking to his witness during a break or recess in the trial, while the witness is still under examination.

A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a witness to misrepresent himself or to impersonate another.

A lawyer shall not abuse, browbeat or harass a witness nor needlessly inconvenience him.

A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client, except:

a) on formal matters, such as the mailing,

authentication or custody of an instrument, and the like; or b) on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends of justice, in which event he must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to another counsel.

GARCIA vs. FRANCISCO, AC No. 3923, March 30, 1993 ROXAS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 156 SCRA 253 VDA. DE BACALING vs. LAGUDA, 54 SCRA 251

A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client but not at the expense of truth and the administration of justice. The cause of the respondent s client is obviously without merit. The respondent was aware of this fact when he wilfully resorted to the gambits summarized above continuously seeking relief that was consistently denied, as he should have expected.

He thereby added to the already clogged dockets of the courts and wasted their valuable time. He also caused much inconvenience and expense to the complainant, who was obliged to defend herself against his every move.

By grossly abusing his right of recourse to the courts for the purpose of arguing a cause that had been repeatedly rebuffed, he was disdaining the obligation of the lawyer to maintain only such actions or proceedings as appear to him to be just and such defences only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law. By violating his oath not to delay any man for money or malice, he has besmirched the name of an honorable profession and has proved himself unworthy of the trust reposed in him by law as an officer of the Court.

The petition for review was granted and the decision of respondent Intermediate Appellate Court of March 31, 1986 and its order of April 24, 1986 are reversed and set aside. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of June 10,1985 is affirmed in toto. Let us serve as warning among members of the Philippine bar who take their own sweet time with their cases if not purposely delay its progress for no cogent reason. It does no credit to their standing in the profession.

More so, when they do not file the required brief or pleading until their motion is acted upon. Not only should they not presume that their motion for extension of time will be granted by the court much less should they expect that the extension that may be granted shall be counted from notice. They should file their briefs or pleadings within the extended period requested. Failing in this, they have only themselves to blame if their appeal or case is dismissed.

There is something more to be said about the nature and apparent purpose of this case which has its genesis in the case for illegal detainer (Civil Case No. 6823) brought before the Iloilo City Court. What transpired therein presents a glaring example of a summary proceeding which was deliberately protracted and made to suffer undue delay in its disposal. It was originally filed on September 13, 1960, it reached the appellate courts five (5) times, twice before the Court of Appeals, once before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, and twice before this Court.

The present petition smacks of a dilatory tactic and a frivolous attempt resorted to by petitioner to frustrate the prompt termination of the ejectment case and to prolong litigation unnecessarily. Such conduct on the part of petitioner and her counsel deserves the vigorous condemnation of this Court, because it evinces a flagrant misuse of the remedy of certiorari which should only be resorted to in cases of lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion by an inferior court. A recourse of this kind unduly taxes the energy and patience of courts and simply wastes the precious time that they could well devote to really meritorious cases.