2
(P
1
)(P
2
) ~ (P
1
)(P
2
)
2. Differences in value
Values are sets of equipreferred prospects
o  > iff (Po)(P) > (P )(P)
10
3. Existence of utility
Axiomatic characterisation of a value difference
structure implies that existence of a mapping from
values to real numbers such that:
o  = iff U(o) U() = U() U()
4. Derivation of probability
Suppose ~ (o if P)( if P). Then:
) ( ) (
) ( ) (
) Pr(
 o

U U
U U
P
=
11
Evaluation
The Justification problem
Why should measurement axioms hold?
SureThing Principle versus P4 and Impartiality
Jeffreys objection
Fanciful causal hypotheses and artifacts of attribution.
Behaviourism in decision theory
Ethical neutrality versus state dependence
Desirabilistic dependence
Constant acts
12
Utility Dependence
Good egg Rotten egg
Break egg 6egg omelette
None wasted
Nothing to eat
5 eggs wasted
Throw egg away 5egg omelette
1 egg wasted
5egg omelette
None wasted
Good egg Rotten egg
Miracle 6egg omelette
None wasted
6egg omelette
None wasted
Topsy Turvy Nothing to eat
5 eggs wasted
6egg omelette
None wasted
13
Probability Dependence
Republican Democrat
Dodgy land deal Low taxes
Unrestricted development
High taxes
Restricted development
No deal No development No development
Miracle deal High taxes
Restricted development
Low taxes
Unrestricted development
14
Jeffrey
Advantages
A simple ontology of propositions
State dependent utility
Partition independence (CEU)
Measurement
Underdetermination of quantitative representations
The inseparability of belief and desire?
Solutions: More axioms, more relations or more
prospects?
The logical status of conditionals
15
Conditionals
Two types of conditional?
Counterfactual: If Oswald hadnt killed Kennedy
then someone else would have.
Indicative: If Oswald didnt kill Kennedy then
someone else did
Two types of supposition
Evidential: If its true that
Interventional: If I make it true that
[Lewis, Joyce, Pearl versus Stalnaker, Adams,
Edgington]
16
LewisStalnaker semantics
Intuitive idea: AB is true iff B is true in those worlds
most like the actual one in which A is true.
Formally: AB is true at a world w iff for every AB
world there is a closer ABworld (relative to an
ordering on worlds).
1. Limit assumption: There is a closest world
2. Uniqueness Assumption: There is at most one
closest world.
17
The RamseyAdams Hypothesis
General Idea: Rational belief in conditionals goes by
conditional belief for their consequents on the
assumption that their antecedent is true.
Adams Thesis: The probability of an (indicative)
conditional is the conditional probability of its
consequent given its antecedent:
(AT)
Logic from belief: A sentence Y can be validly
inferred from a set of premises iff the high probability
of the premises guarantees the high probability of Y.
)  ( ) ( A B p B A p =
18
A Common Logic
1. AB AB AB
2. A A
3. AA
4. AA
5. AB AAB
6. (AB)(AC) ABC
7. (AB) v (AC) A(B v C)
8. (AB) AB
19
The Bombshell
Question: What must the truthconditions of AB be, in
order that RamseyAdams hypothesis be satisfied?
Answer: The question cannot be answered.
Lewis, Edgington, Hajek, Grdenfors, Dring, : There is no non
trivial assignment of truthconditions to the conditional
consistent with the RamseyAdams hypothesis.
Conclusion:
1. few philosophical theses that have been more decisively
refuted Joyce (1999, p.191)
2. Ditch bivalence!
20
A
C B
AvB
BvC AvC
Boolean algebra
21
A
C B
AvB BvC AvC
AvCA AvCC
AvCAvC
AvCAC
Conditional Algebras (1)
(XY)(XZ) XYZ
(XY) v (XZ) X(Y v Z)
22
A
C B
AvB BvC AvC
AvCA AvCC
AvCAvC
AvCAC
Conditional algebras (2)
XY XY
23
A
C B
AvB BvC AvC
AvCA AvCC
AvCAvC
AvCAC
Conditional algebras (3)
XY XY
24
A
C B
AvB BvC AvC
AvCA AvCC
AvCAvC
AvCAC
Normally bounded algebras (1)
XX
XY XXY
25
A
C B
AvB BvC AvC
AvCA AvCC
AvCAvC
AvCAC
Material Conditional
X X
26
A
C B
AvB BvC AvC
AvCA AvCC
AvCAvC
AvCAC
Normally bounded algebras (2)
XX
(XY) XY
27
A
C B
AvB BvC AvC
AvCA AvCC
Conditional
algebras (3)