FAILURE MODE and EFFECT ANALYSIS of SUSPENSION SYSTEM of AUTOMOBILES

Click to edit Master subtitle style

4/25/12

What is FMEA ?
Afailuremodesandeffectsanalysis(FMEA)is

aprocedureinproductdevelopmentandoperations managementforanalysisofpotentialfailuremodes withinasystemforclassificationbytheseverity andlikelihoodofthefailures. whichsomethingmightfail.Failuresareanyerrors ordefects,especiallyonesthataffectthecustomer, andcanbepotentialoractual. consequencesofthosefailures.

Failuremodesmeanstheways,ormodes,in

Effectsanalysisreferstostudyingthe
4/25/12

FMEA Cycle

4/25/12

Why FMEA?
Improveproduct/processreliabilityandquality Increasecustomersatisfaction Earlyidentificationandeliminationofpotential

product/processfailuremodes

Prioritizeproduct/processdeficiencies Captureengineering/organizationknowledge Emphasizesproblemprevention Documentsriskandactionstakentoreducerisk Providefocusforimprovedtestinganddevelopment

4/25/12 Minimizeslatechangesandassociatedcost

Risk Priority Number

The Risk Priority Number is a mathematical product

of the numerical Severity, Probability, and Detection ratings: RPN = (Severity) x (Probability) x (Detection)

The RPN is used to prioritize items than require

additional quality planning or action.

4/25/12

Rating Scale
Severity

1=Notsevere,10=Verysevere
Occurrence

1=NotLikely,10=MostLikely
Detection

1=LikelytoDetect,10=NotLikelytoDetect
4/25/12

OCCURRENCE
Rating Meaning No known occurrences on similar products or processes Low (relatively few failures) Moderate (occasional failures) High (repeated failures)

2/3 4/5/6 7/8

9/10

Very high (failure is almost inevitable) 4/25/12

SEVERITY
Rating 1 2 Meaning No effect Very minor (only noticed by discriminating customers) Minor (affects very little of the system, noticed by average customer) Moderate (most customers are annoyed) High (causes a loss of primary function; customers are dissatisfied) Very high and hazardous (product becomes 9/10 inoperative; customers angered; the failure may result unsafe operation and possible injury)

3 4/5/6 7/8

4/25/12

DETECTION
1 Certain - fault will be caught on test

2 3 4/5/6 7/8

Almost Certain High Moderate Low Fault will be passed to customer undetected 4/25/12

9/10

FMEA Double Wishbone System

ITEM/FUNCTION POTENTIAL POTENTIAL WAYS OF FAILURE

WISHBONE 1)ACTS AS A LINK BETWEEN KNUCKLE AND THE CHASSIS OF THE VEHICLE 2) ACTS AS A SUPPORT FOR SHOCK ABSORBER AND TRANSMITS FORCES EMERGING FROM THE ROAD PROFILE TO THE SUSPENSION SYSTEM. COMPONENT BREAKS

POTENTIAL

CURRENT DESIGN CONTROL

RECOMMENDE ACTION D ACTION RESULTS

RPN

EFFECTS OF CAUSE FAILURE

LOWER WISHBONE BREAKS DUE TO PROPOGATION OF CRACKS FROM STRESS CONCENTRATED AREAS

1)WRONG MATERIAL 1) MATERIAL SELECTION 2)IMPROPER SELECTION OF FACTOR OF SAFETY ERRORS. CHOSEN FOR G HAS A GOOD FATIGUE LIFE BY THE EMPIRICAL FORMULA PROPOSED BY BRAND & SUTTERLIN.

PROPER CARE DURING SO AS TO AVOID

NO FAILURE WHICH EFFICIENT OF LOWER WISHBONE

2*3*7 = 42

MANUFACTURIN MANUFACTURING RESULTS IN THE FORMATION FUNCTIONING STRESS CONCENTRATED AREAS (EG. NOTCHES)FROM WHERE THE PROPOGATION OF CRACKS START

3) MANUFACTURING AS CALCULATED OF LOCALISED

4/25/12

FMEA Continue..
ITEM/FUNCTION POTENTIAL POTENTIAL WAYS OF FAILURE
BENDING

POTENTIAL CAUSE

CURRENT DESIGN CONTROL

RECOMMENDE ACTION D ACTION RESULTS

RPN

EFFECTS OF FAILURE
1)DIMENSIONS OF WISHBONE CHANGES LEADING TO CHANGE IN VARIOUS VEHICLE PARAMETERS 2)INCREASED WEAR AND TEAR OF TYRE

1) WHEN ACTUAL

1) WISHBONE IS 1) CORRECT MOUNTING OF THE SHOCK

1) VEHICLE PARAMETERS CONSIDERED DURING NOT CHANGE RESULTS IN PROPER FUNCTIONING OF OTHER SYSTEMS (STEERING). 2) REDUCED WEAR AND

2*4*3 = 24

STRESS EXCEEDS THE MADE OF PERMISSIBLE STRESS CIRCULAR DESIGN. AS IT HAS THE

STIPULATED DURING CROSS SECTION ABSORBER 2)SHOCK ABSORBER LEAST MOMENT TO HAVE THE IS WRONG THUS PRODUCES RATIO. MINIMAL BENDING MOMENT. 2) ANALYSIS USING HYPERMESH INDICATES THE INDUCED STRESSES ARE WELL BELOW THE PERMISSIBLE STRESS. 3)CORRECT 2)CORRECT SELECTION OF FACTOR OF SAFETY SUCH THAT NEITHER THE DESIGN BECOMES TOO TO EXCESSIVE DIMENSIONS AND MASSES NOR IS TOO LENIENT THAT THE

ASSEMBLY SO AS DESIGN DOES

MOUNTING POSITION OF INERTIA AND CORRECT MOTION WHICH

CAREFUL LEADING TEAR OF TYRE.

INDUCED 4/25/12

FMEA Continue..
ITEM/FUNCTION POTENTIAL POTENTIAL WAYS OF FAILURE
SPRING BREAKING Or BENDING

POTENTIAL CAUSE

CURRENT DESIGN CONTROL

RECOMMENDE ACTION D ACTION RESULTS

RPN

EFFECTS OF FAILURE

1) BUCKLING DUE 1) WRONG MATERIAL TO IMPROPER MOUNTINGS 2) FATIGUE DUE TO CYCLIC LOAD SELECTION POSITION

1) SELECTION OF 1) CORRECT STANDARD 2) PROPER SPRINGS MOUNTING TO BE MADE WHILE FABRICTION OF THE SYSTEM 2) PROPER FOS TO BE SELECTED WHILE DESIGNING OF SPRINGS

SPRING DOES NOT FAILS.

4*3*4 =48

2) IMPROPER MOUNTING MATERIAL 3) FAILURE OF DAMPER MOUNTING OF

DAMPER

DOES NOT ABSORB THE SHOCKS GENERATED

1)OSCILLATIONS INTRODUCED IN THE SPRING 2)MORE STRESS IS INTRODUCED IN SUSPENSION MOUNTING BOLTS

1)DAMPER OIL LEAKS 2)PISTON BUCKLES

1)PROPER MOUNTING

1)PROPER MOUNTING OF NO FAILURE OF SHOCK ABSORBER

3*2*5 =30

OF SHOCK ABSORBER. SHOCK ABSORBER

4/25/12

THANK YOU

4/25/12