Soziale Systeme 16 (2010), Heft 1, S.

103-120

Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart

Iris Clemens

Self-descriptions of the World Society in non-western contexts and the implications for the general theoretical approach. An Analysis of the Edicts of Ancient India Emperor Ashoka1
Zusammenfassung: Wie Rudolf Stichweh im Anschluss an Niklas Luhmann ausgefhrt hat, sind Selbstbeschreibungen ein basaler Bestandteil aller sozialen Systeme und insbesondere fr die Analyse der emergierenden Weltgesellschaft grundlegend. Die Diskussion hat bislang jedoch zumeist nur westliche Quellen bercksichtigt. Ausgehend von den Sulenedikten des indischen Knigs Ashoka wird der Frage nachgegangen, ob frhe Formen einer Selbstbeschreibung der Weltgesellschaft auch in nichteuropischen Kontexten gefunden werden knnen. Mit der Analyse dieser 2200 Jahre alten Edikte kann die These gesttzt werden, dass bestimmte Formen solcher Selbstbeschreibungen der Weltgesellschaft auch fr den indischen Kontext nachgewiesen werden knnen. Der Blick kann so global geweitet werden, und es wird in Zweifel gezogen, dass es sich um rein europische semantische Erfindungen handelt. Zudem kann durch die Einbeziehung anderer als menschlicher Adressaten in der vorgefundenen Semantik der Fokus von einer im Westen vorherrschenden anthropologischen auf eine biozentrische Perspektive verschoben werden.

Introduction
Niklas Luhmann (1975; 1990; 1998) described the emergence of the world society in various perspectives. As Rudolf Stichweh (2000; 2003) has pointed out, self-descriptions are an essential part of any social system and an important variable especially for the analysis of the emerging world society. Social systems depend on their self-descriptions for their further continuation. The gradually and slowly emerging world system produces such self-descriptions in the course of time, and here the interesting question appears, in which way much older traditions of arguments and thoughts affect these present description forms and how they are transformed or newly formulated today (Stichweh 2008, 23). There are six different semantic complexes of historic, prominent self-descrip tion of global social connections. As specific forms of self-description of this emerging global social system, Stichweh proposes semantics concerning 1) foreig ners and how to treat them; more concretely for example, a right to hospitality, 2) membership and the question of belonging to a certain social
1 I am very thankful to the anonymous reviewers for their helpful and informative comments.

104

Iris Clemens

body; on the one side citizenship and ones rights as a member of a town, nation or empire, on the other side the idea of being cosmopolitan, being a citizen of the whole world, the cosmos (as Cicero ascribes Socrates to have said that he is not a citizen of Athens but of the whole world), 3) the very idea of mankind (which includes everyone, regardless of his or her religious membership), 4) the formulation of world history or global history, 5) conversation in the sense of a global social communication context and 6) autonomous social spaces which deal globally with specific issues (functional systems). These semantic forms are described as preparations for the emerging consciousness of the world society (see Stichweh 2008). Self-descriptions of the world society however are certainly older than the emerging structures of the world society itself, which is said to have started in approximately the 15th/16th century (Stichweh 2004). Although there have been many occasional contacts before, exchanges and communication between distinct social societies, only after deep historical changes does it makes sense to assume the emergence of a singular social system. However, some of the earliest forms of self-description of the world society were formulated nearly 2500 years ago, according to Stichweh, and these ancient descriptions do anticipate globalisation in various ways. Such ancient descriptions are concerned with the first three description forms mentioned above, the other three have developed later. But it has to be pointed out that the sources, on which the discussions are so far based, are texts and documents from the Euro-Atlantic context only. This is problematic, especially when the goal is a theory of the world society and a comprehensive understanding of its global emergence. In this case one has to overcome this Eurocentric bias to portray the whole picture and not only parts of it or at least as much as possible and from as many different perspectives as possible. In consequence, forms of fixed, textual semantics of such self-descriptions of the world society must be searched and analysed from across the world. In contrast maybe to the American context, such forms of textual semantics can be found especially in Asia. Taking the example of the Rock and Pillar Edicts of the ancient Indian king Ashoka2, the question will be raised, whether one can find forms of self-descriptions of a world society like the formerly defined semantics in Non-European contexts. As argued here, one can find evidence for this assumption, and the specific form of these Non-European self-descriptions of world society will be analysed in detail. Concerning the six listed forms of semantics, I will focus on the first three, which are seen as much older than the others: the treatment of foreigners or a universal right to hospitality, the question of membership and a general theory of mankind, which all deal in one way or another with the question of inclusion and exclusion. Taking these 2200 year old edicts, the the2 The spelling differs in the literature, I decided for Ashoka but in some quotations Asoka is used.

Self-descriptions of the World Society in non-western contexts

105

sis can be supported, that some forms of self-descriptions of the world society, already anticipating it, exist long before the actual social system emerges, but at the same time the argument is expanded globally, as it can be shown that they have been widespread and therefore that they are not a European invention. This new perspective can widen the focus of the question of inclusion and exclusion into a world society and add new, until now unconsidered actors in the sense of Bruno Latour (2008). In addition, one can also ask for the consequences with regard to the present descriptions. If the assumption is that older traditions of arguments and thoughts affect these present forms of description, when in other words some kind of continuity is presumed (although to much continuity should be seen critically as Stichweh points out stressing contingency, for example 2006), the perspective has to be widened and Non-EuroAtlantic contributions have to been taken into consideration while analysing recent forms of self-descriptions.

1. The emperor Ashoka Statesman and Educator

After the death of Alexander the Great in B.C. 323, the grandfather of Ashoka, Chandragupta Maurya, took over power from the earlier dynasty of the Nanda in the east (this part of India was never part of Alexanders empire) and established a kingdom on the Indian subcontinent from sea to sea. His empire included parts of todays Pakistan, Afghanistan and reached as far as the south of India (Nellore and Ceylon excluded). He started an official intercourse with the Hellenic world, exchanged ambassadors and corresponded frequently with Seleukos Nikator, an Hellenic king. His grand-son Ashoka ascended the throne of Pataliputra in approximately 273 B.C. and reigned for about 40 years. One of his greatest personal interests and one of the goals of his reign was to spread the Law of Piety (or Dharma), a collection of principles related to the philosophy of Buddhism. He transforms Buddhism, which was initially only a local Indian sect, into one of the leading religions of the world. Recently however, historians more or less agree that Ashokas concept of Dharma was a wider concept and therefore cannot be fully equated with Buddhism or any other sectarianism of that time. In consequence, Ashoka may not have been a pure Buddhist king. The Dharma concept he used has to be seen as a broad social and ethical code of conduct, acceptable to and cutting across the socioeconomic, political and cultural differences among diverse communities in the vast Maurya realm. Dhamma thus appears to have been too broad to be treated from a sectarian approach (Ray/Chattopadhyaya/Chakravarti/Mani 2000, 592). Ashokas Dharma concept therefore is a mixture that takes into account thoughts of various indigenous sects and schools of his time. One has to differentiate between the legend of Ashoka (see for example Strong 2002) and the historical facts that have survived. Buddhist monks have used

106

Iris Clemens

the historical figure of Ashoka and his conversion to the Buddhism for their propaganda and have created a legend in which Ashoka turned from an unbelievably cruel despot who killed his 99 brothers to ascend the throne (and did much more cruelty) into a saintly person. But there is no proof for this legend his brothers and sisters are mentioned in the Rock Edicts and accordingly, they were clearly still alive at that time , and Smith (2002) has found no evidence for a war initiated by Ashoka other than that against the Kalinga kingdom. At around 261 B.C., Ashoka attacked this kingdom and annexed it. But the cruelty of this war must have affected Ashoka deeply and changed his attitude towards life and government. The war and its consequences are mentioned several times in his edicts (two edicts, known as Kalinga Edicts, were erected in this region; they are addressed to the officials in this region and were especially concerned with the issue of good government), and Ashoka expressed his sorrow for it and for the suffering and grief he inflicted on so many people in many edicts. Though, in the edicts in the region of Kalinga itself, the sorrow of the emperor is not mentioned directly. It is unknown whether the local officials made this correction of the content or whether Ashoka himself declined to mentioned it because legitimacy of government would have been difficult in this case. After the war he committed himself to the Conquest of Piety instead of war. He converted to Buddhism during that period, too. Piety or Dharma means a specific way of life, a kind of duty everyone has to fulfil to access the next world. Ashokas thinking and ruling were deeply influenced by Buddhism and especially by the concept of Dharma. Commandments of the Law of Piety he refers to are, for example, to avoid killing or harming, to speak honestly, honouring ones father, mother, asceticism, Brahmans and teachers, the right treatment of other people and so on. It is interesting that Ashoka made Buddhism (or his version of it) his ethics of governing, a religion which has the goal of overcoming the world and therefore is not at all predestined to the ethics of governing. In ca. 261 B.C. Ashoka began to put up Rock Edicts and Pillar Edicts to spread his instructions and to teach his people in his way of thinking, i.e. to teach them the Law of Piety. It must be mentioned that, beside the edicts he also tried to use Buddhist monks to spread his message and thoughts. In his edicts he describes what he has done to qualify himself as a Buddhist lay brother. This could also be read as a attempt to get the legitimacy to speak in the name of the order as a strategy. The Buddhist monks would have been another way to enforce and spread his message, or even vision, in addition to the edicts. Some of the edicts were directed to officials as appeals to follow the rules of the king and to emphasise his philosophy. Concrete orders like the rotation of high officials every five years to avoid abuse are written down. Others were directed to all subjects and give moral advice such as honouring ones father and mother etc. He erected his edicts all over his kingdom, some of them more or less identical, but erected in different places. In some edicts, the emperor speaks directly

Self-descriptions of the World Society in non-western contexts

107

to the reader. In the north-western border area of his realm, the edicts are written in Greek, in Armenian (Kulke/Rothermund 2010, 85) as well as bilingual in Greek-Armenian (Mukherjee 1983) because these were the languages in use there. An Armenian and Greek edict was found in the todays Kandahar, which shows the enormous vastness of his realm. It is assumed today that there was a master or central draft which was prepared by Ashoka himself and that later, other edicts were adopted, extended and abridged by local authorities in accor dance with local needs but within the broad framework of the central drafts of the edicts (see Ray/Chattopadhyaya/Chakravarti/Mani 2000). The edicts in foreign languages show how much Ashoka was interested in being understood and in spreading his message, not only in his empire but also beyond it. It must be mentioned that the fact that Ashoka erected edicts in these outer borders of his empire is also interpreted today as an attempt to retain[ed] the control over Arachosia, Paropanisadae and Gedrosia which had earlier been ceded to the Maurya ruler Candragupta by Seleucus in c. 301 B.C. (Ray/Chattopadhyaya/Chakravarti/Mani 2000, 588). In consequence, the edicts have to been seen as a governing tool as well of course, and not only as spiritual instructions. The spreading of Dharma had a political purpose too, apart from upholding a broad social and moral code of conduct. But this does not mean that the edicts are not valid as sources of early self-descriptions of world society. Due to the good fortune that a lot of these edicts are preserved at least partially we get an impression of the thoughts and philosophy of Ashoka even now, more than 2200 years later. Researchers assume that there are still some undiscovered edicts. Because they were written in a specific script that is unknown today, the edicts were translated rather late. For my comments I will use a translation by Vincent A. Smith an author whom also the Nobel Prize winner Amartya Sen quotes in his writings about India and who is therefore most probably a reliable source which was published in a third, revised and enlarged edition in 1920. To check the translations, I have used the writings of Romila Thapar (1997).

2. The Edicts of Ashoka: self-descriptions of a world society?

From a Non-Western point of view one can add some new facets to the picture of the early self-descriptions of the world society. As the tradition of thinking and arguing is very different in comparison to the European context, the main focus shifts and some more aspects concerning the possible semantics have to be taken into consideration. Based on the analysis of the edicts of Ashoka, some proposals can be made. It is important to notice however that these ideas are deeply rooted in Buddhism and other indigenous concepts and thoughts of that time and are therefore no result of a diffusion effect from the West (Kr cken 2005).

108

Iris Clemens

With regard to the question of inclusion and exclusion and a theory of mankind that includes all individuals, the absence of religious implications in the six semantics listed by Stichweh is especially striking and perhaps shows an until now not reflected bias. Secularism certainly takes different forms in different cultural contexts (Taylor 1996) and must not be seen as a genuine Western invention. For example Sen (2005) has shown in the Indian context, that secularism has a long tradition there. But as demonstrated once again by the lessons of terrorism in the last decades, for some semantics religion is (still or again) one of the leading sources that provide reasons to exclude certain persons from the idea of mankind and by this to justify inhuman treatment of them or even of killing them. Accordingly in the economic system, financial organisations which act according to the Sharia are global players today (Stichweh 2006a). And as the recent Gallup survey (Esposito/Mogahed 2007) has shown, religion is still a vital part of identity and the basis of creating meaning for many people all over the world, including citizens of the U.S. as much as of Iran. When takinginto consideration that 46% of Americans say that the Bible should be a source of legislation, another 9% believe it should be the only source almost identical numbers to those in Iran with respect to the Koran (Esposito/Mogahed 2007, 49) and the German Chancellor Merkel still argues for a genuine Christian Europe with regard to the question of the Turkeys membership of the European Union we cant ignore the influence religious semantics have on communication, inclusion and exclusion and social structures today. Obviously religious philosophies or doctrines will in consequence influence semantics which are concerned with the self-descriptions of the world society. Concepts of foreigners including precepts of how to treat them, the decisions regarding membership, or the very idea of mankind are affected by attitudes towards religion even today. In any case those religious concepts and argumentations have influenced these descriptions to a much higher degree in the ancient world. The argumentation of a self-description of world society should take into account religious semantics without arguing religiously or differen tiating between certain forms of religion. Therefore, a self-description that doesnt ignore religious semantics and yet describes an inclusive, global, singular world society must take a stand with regard to the variety of religions and must emphasise their right to acceptance and equal treatment. One should take into account that the foreigner can always be defined as a foreigner because of his religion and not because of ethnical belonging or skin colour for example. This argumentation will be in the centre of the first examination of the edicts of Ashoka. It has to be stated nevertheless that an interpretation of these 2200 years old texts is problematic of course. Nuances or even words might have changed their meaning through the translation, and a detailed, hermeneutical analysis is therefore not advisable. But I am convinced that the basic intentions and ideas of this semantics can certainly be understood.

Self-descriptions of the World Society in non-western contexts

109

Religious equality a pre-condition for self-descriptions of the world society?

In his remarks on the origin of the idea of mankind and the gradual inclusion of all human beings into it, Stichweh (2008) states that the Romanic genus humanum includes even the Barbarian and any other people. In addition, according to him, the later-established idea of Christianitas includes the potential believers (not yet converted people) as well as the Christians. However it is argued that later, in the 16th Century, exclusions and differentiations are introduced, especially with the term savages. For example, Christian Thomasius is quoted who differentiates with a logic of improvement or perfectibility (Luhmann/Schorr 1999) between beast, human being and Christians. As is pretty well known, the definition of savages and the differentiation between Christians and savages has led to unbelievable cruelty, especially in the context of South America mentioned by Stichweh. It is therefore difficult to understand how the argument can be justified that due to the Christian background, the idea of the unity of mankind was conserved (Stichweh 2008, 32), taking into consideration his own observations, that the narrow definition of Christian was removed finally by the term human being during the Enlightenment to smooth the way for a real all-inclusive idea of mankind. Thus it is interesting to analyse the argumentations of the Ashoka Edicts regarding the issue of religion and the composition of mankind. For an emperor whose aim was to spread his Law of Piety as far as possible and to commit everyone to it wholeheartedly, religious issues had priority of course. Accor dingly religious issues are probably the most often mentioned issues in his edicts. However, his edicts are a plea for religious freedom, and they stress the equality of all religions. The Christian idea of stages or perfectibility with ones own denomination as superior to all others, or even the disparagement of other religions and the consequent disparagement of the other believers is absent. In fact the opposite of such thinking or acting is strictly condemned. In his Rock Edict VII it is written:
His Sacred and Gracious Majesty the King desires that in all places men of every denomination (or sect, V.S.) may abide [all sects may dwell in all places, Thapar 1997, 253], for they all desire mastery over their senses and purity of mind. Man, however, is various in his wishes and various in his passions (Smith 2002, 175).

Ashoka accepts the fact that striving for being good is common to all religions and therefore that no religion can be seen as superior to another. He decides that no restriction should be placed upon the residence of the adherents of any particular sect or denomination, because all the sects have equal rights and legitimacy. According to Smith this can be read as a hint to the restrictions mentioned in the Arthasastra, an old script on government and leadership, which Ashoka often follows in his argumentation. Here, however, he seems to disagree with the rule of the Arthasastra that only travellers who are trained in

110

Iris Clemens

the Vedas or who are ascetics and are known to be of reliable character should be allowed to reside in charitable institutions such as guest houses. In contrast Ashoka doesnt restrict access, and his argumentation that man is various in his wishes and passions is already a pointer towards the idea of mankind inherent in this semantics which will be discussed below. In Rock Edict XII, the philosophy underlying the semantics with regard to religion is explained in detail:
His Sacred and Gracious Majesty the King does reverence to men of all sects a man must not do reverence to his own sect or disparage that of another without reason. Depreciation should be for specific reasons only, because the sects of other people all deserve reverence for one reason or another. By thus acting a man exalts his own sects, and at the same time does service to the sects of other people. By acting contrariwise a man hurts his own sect, and does disservice to the sects of other people. For he who does reverence to his own sect while disparaging the sects of other wholly from attachment to his own, with intend to enhance the splendour of his own sect, in reality by such conduct inflicts the severest injury on his own sect (Smith 2002, 182-183).

The respect for other religions expressed in this edict goes as far as to say that a disparagement of another religion hurts ones own religion. Although most of the Indian ancient kings were tolerant of religious differences, this is remarkable, even when one takes into consideration that Indian sects, creeds or forms of religion had much in common in that time, as Smith stated, and therefore that mutual acceptance was not so difficult. But Ashoka was in contact with many other cultures, as already mentioned, and therefore pretty well aware of the different religions in the world which was known to him. The idea that all those who desire mastery over their senses and purity of mind are treated with respect and that each sect has the same rights for respect and recognition for one reason or another is a clear plea for equality for both men and religions. In comparison to the statement of Johannes from the Cross, that it is right that we always have to let us lead by what Jesus Christ has taught us, and that all others things are like nothing and we are not allowed to believe them apart from when they match with the teaching of Jesus (Vasudev 1986, 163, translation I.C.), the difference to the Christian doctrine becomes visible, as Vasudev has pointed out. Smith states that in the Arthasastra it is advised that a king who annexes foreign territory should follow his new subjects in their faith and should hold religious life in high esteem. Smith refers to similarities to the writings of Machiavelli here. As stated often, it is obvious that the concept of Dharma or the version of Buddhism that Ashoka is dedicated to can be recognised more as a philosophy than as a religion (in contrast to Christianity). In consequence he ignores, without denying, the existence of a Supreme Deity [like in Christianity, I.C.], and insist that man should by his own exertions free himself from vice, and by his own virtue win happiness here and hereafter (Smith 2002, 34). Of course beside his tolerance and respect, Ashoka wants to

Self-descriptions of the World Society in non-western contexts

111

support his own religion, because as he stated almost apologetically in Pillar Edict VI:
I devote my attention to all communities, because all denominations are reverenced by me with various forms of reverence. Nevertheless, personal adherence to ones own creed is the chief thing in my opinion (Smith 2002, 208).

Only in Rock Edict XIII can one find a hint for a less tolerant attitude with regard to so called forest folk which is a description for wild tribes living next to the border of his kingdom (and maybe in the territory of the former Kalinga kingdom) and for whom the term savage might have been used from a Christian point of view:
it never is the case that faith in some one denomination or another does not exist. Even upon the forest folk in his dominions, His Sacred Majesty looks kindly, and he seeks to make them think (alright, V.S.), for (otherwise, V.S.) repentance would come upon His Sacred Majesty. They are bidden to turn from their (evil, V.S.) ways that they be not chastised. Because His Sacred Majesty desires for all animate beings security, selfcontrol, peace of mind, and joyousness (Smith 2002, 186).

It is not clear here what might happen to them if they resist being bidden and who might chastise them. But as the inscriptions refer very often to the next world and that wrong behaviour in this world will have consequences for the next, this can also be interpreted as a religious admonition. The last sentence also shows that Ashoka expresses here his worries about the spiritual happiness of these people. In conclusion the semantics of religious equality as formulated in the edicts knows no exclusion of any human being and gives the same right and recognition to any religion and believer, even though Ashoka personally favours his version of Buddhism of course. Religion and striving for inspiration is the highest goal for all human beings in the eyes of Ashoka, and he gives free access to this ultimate goal for everyone. In this view, religious equality and the absence of any logic of stages or superiority can be seen rather as a pre-condition for a universal membership, for an idea of a universal mankind, which includes all human beings. In any case the species sympathy and the related almost natural idea of an all including mankind (Stichweh 2008) is clearly implied in the semantics. In the following passage the edicts will be analysed with regard to such a general idea of mankind.

112

Iris Clemens

3. Equality of all human being: the idea of mankind

Do hints exist for a construction of a mankind that includes all human beings in the edicts of Ashoka and therefore an indicator for an ancient Indian selfdescription of the world society? There are many passages in the edicts that can be interpreted in this way. First of all it is interesting to note the inclusion of suppressed and marginalized groups. In the edict cited above we have already seen that no differentiation between savages or tribal people and other human being is made. Whatever religion one follows, it doesnt exclude him or her from the species sympathy and the community of all human beings. Whatever is said by Ashoka, he makes no exclusion, his principles are valid also for the small man (Minor Rock Edict I) or men with low degree (Rock Edic X) and, especially surprising for his time, even for women and slaves. Ashoka in the third century B.C., did indeed insist on completely universal coverage [of toleration, I.C.], without any exception. There is little evidence that Plato or St Augustine were more tolerant and less authoritarian than Confucius. While Aristotle certainly did write on the importance of freedom, women and slaves were excluded from the domain of this concern (an exclusion that, as it happens, Ashoka did not make around roughly the same time) (Sen 2005, 136, emphasis I.C.). In Rock Edict IX, we find the statement: the ceremonial of piety, bears great fruit. In it are included proper treatment of slaves and servants (Smith 2002, 178). The same formulation is used in Rock Edict XI (Smith 2002, 181) and Rock Edict XIII (Smith 2002, 185). The idea is expressed even more clearly in Pillar Edict VII:
Whatsoever meritorious deeds have been done by me, those deeds mankind will conform to and imitate, whence follows that they have grown and will grow in the virtues of hearkening to father and mother, hearkening to teachers (or elders, V.S.), reverence to the aged, and seemly treatment of Brahmins and ascetics, of the poor and wretched; yea, even of slaves and servants (Smith 2002, 211).

Likewise Ashoka emphasises that whatever is said with regard to men is also valid for women. For example, in The Bhabru or Second Bairat Rock Edict, it is stated: and that likewise the laity, male and female, should do the same (Smith 2002, 155). It seems to be obvious that the edicts of Ashoka imply an idea of an all including mankind. Ashoka has formulated a philosophy or concept that shows sympathy and respect for any human being. In consequence there is evidence for the thesis that the idea of the unity of mankind was invented or conserved, not only due to the Christian background. Especially if one takes into account that the second Indian king well known for his far reaching tolerance, Akbar (born 1605 and a muslim) is often seen as a kind of heir of the philosophy and

Self-descriptions of the World Society in non-western contexts

113

thoughts of Ashoka, one can assume that there is an Indian tradition and continuation of an inclusive semantics. As Sen (2005, 16) puts it: Ashokas championing of public discussion has had echoes in the later history of India, but none perhaps as strong as the Moghal Emperor Akbars sponsorship and support for dialogues between adherents of different faiths, nearly two thousand years later, even before Thomasius was formulating his discriminating idea of beasts and Christians. Many authors stress that this tradition has survived until today in the Indian context. With regard to Indian thinkers like Gandhi, Swami Vivekananda or K.C. Sen, Vasudev states that they have had even higher claims. For Gandhi respect for religions was not a matter of tolerance, but of the utmost high esteem (Vasudev 1986, 164, translation I.C.). Tolerance implies in Gandhis view the conviction of the superiority of ones own religion. In accordance with this tradition of pluralism the Indian state keeps its secular character; its constitution is based on the democratic principles of equality and freedom (164, translation I.C.). And Tagore writes at the beginning of the 20th century and before his country gained its independence:
Where the mind is without fear and the head is held high; Where knowledge is free; Where the world has not been broken up into fragments by narrow domestic walls; Into that heaven of freedom, my Father, let my country awake (cited after Sen 2005, 98).

There is certainly as much evidence for the thesis that the idea of unity of mankind is conserved in this context as there is for the Christian perspective. Interes tingly, with the notion of a world without narrow domestic walls, a concept of world society is expressed here openly. The challenge to analyse and formulate a more complete picture of the self-descriptions of the world society is, in consequence, to overcome the confrontation and differentiation of East vs. West and to include more semantics from all over the world into this concept. The very idea of an all communications including world society and a plurality of sources for ermerging semantics has to be taken more seriously.

4. Foreigners and the idea of a right for knowledge for any people
For an all including idea of mankind and a self-description of a world society, the concept and treatment of foreigners is also crucial, as Stichweh has pointed out. Therefore the edicts have to be analysed with regard to this issue as well. As already mentioned, the tribal people near the borders were explicitly included in the thoughts of the king. In the first Kalinga Edicts we can read additionally:

114

Iris Clemens

All men are my children; and just as I desire for my children that they may enjoy every kind of prosperity and happiness both in this world and in the next, so also I desire the same for all men. (If you ask, V.S.) With regard to the unsubdued borderers what is the kings command to us? (The answer is that, V.S.) The King desires that they should not be afraid of me, and should receive from me happiness, not sorrow. Moreover, they should grasp the truth that the King will bear patiently with us (Smith 2002, 191).

The same argumentation can be found also in the second Kalinga Edict. In the first Kalinga Edict it is further explained that the officials of the king have to behave in such a way that the unsubdued borderers will believe in the king and in his serious intentions:
Now you, acting accordingly, must do your work, and must make these people trust me and grasp the truth that the King is to us even as a father; he loves us even as he loves himself; we are to the King even as his children (Smith 2002, 192).

But Ashoka didnt stop here. There are hints of a real global idea of inclusion and mankind. His care for humans (and animals, I will come to this point later) didnt stop at his borders. It has already been pointed out that the edicts at the north-western borders of his realm were written in the languages in use in these regions. As mentioned in two edicts, Ashoka built up institutions for healing and for travellers open to men and animals within his kingdom, and the access to both institutions were not restricted. As shown, he has disagreed with the rule of the Arthasastra that only travellers who are trained in the Vedas should be allowed to reside in charitable institutions such as guest houses. In Pillar Edict VII it is said:
On the roads, too, I have had banyan-trees planted to give shade to man and beast; groves (or gradens, V.S.) of mango-trees I have had planted; at every half-kos I have had wells dug; rest-houses, too, have been erected; and numerous watering-places have been provided by me here and there for the enjoyment of man and beast (Smith 2002, 210).

The king was a pioneer in creating hospitals for public use in the third century BCE (Sen 1005, 82) although one should not imagine Ashokas empire as an early welfare state, of course (Ray/Chattopadhyaya/Chakravarti/Mani 2000). But additionally, Ashoka was also concerned with the health and well-being of all human beings, including people all over the (known and for him accessible) world. The inscription of Rock Edict II is:
everywhere have been made the healing arrangements of His Sacred and Gracious Majesty the King in two kinds, (namely, V.S.), healing arrangements for men and healing arrangements for beasts. Medicinal herbs also, both medicinal herbs for men and medicinal herbs for beasts, wheresoever

Self-descriptions of the World Society in non-western contexts

115

lacking, have been everywhere both imported and planted. Roots also and fruits, wheresoever lacking, have been everywhere imported and planted. (Smith 2002, 160-161).

Ashoka wanted people abroad to gain the benefit from the knowledge and healing resources available in India. According to McEvilley (2002), there is evidence for the assumption that Ashoka even established hospitals in the Hellenic kingdom. Foreigners were allowed to use the institutions within the kingdom, but additionally Ashoka provided such services for foreigners in their native places. It seems that the very concept of foreigner has had no significant meaning for Ashoka. Beyond that we can find another interesting widening of the perspective. In the semantics an argumentation is implicit that leads to a right for universal access to available knowledge. The basic idea is that every one should have the right and the possibility to benefit from resources (herbs or medical treatment for example) and from knowledge that exists somewhere in the world and that it should be brought to wherever it is needed. Again one finds this argumentation in the poem of Tagore in his expression of free knowledge and therefore a hint for the continuation of this idea. Bearing in mind the fight between the rich Western countries and their pharmaceutical industries and the poor countries all over the world concerning medical treatment against HIV for example, this is a truly global concept of mankind and inclusion worthy of a world society.

5. The Environment argument: Extending the addressees of rights towards a biocentric perspective
There are more candidates as addressees (Fuchs 1997) for rights and the inclusion into a world society in the semantics of Ashoka than human beings. As a Buddhist he is also very concerned about the well being of all other living beings, about the gentleness towards living creatures (Rock Edict IX; Smith 2002, 178) in principle, and the non-violence doctrine of Buddhism also includes especially animals, which are not seen as completely different creatures compared to human beings. Instead the differences were described as graduations from very sensible creatures with many senses to those with less sensibility due to fewer senses such as plants for example, which are also not excluded. But especially the rights of animals are discussed several times. The killing of animals is a frequent issue, for example in Rock Edict I:
Here no animal may be slaughtered for sacrifice Formerly, in the kitchen of His Sacred and Gracious Majesty the King each day many hundred thousands of living creatures were slaughtered to make curries. But now, when this scripture of the Law is being written, only three living creatures are slaughtered for curry (daily, V.S.) Even those three living creatures shall not be slaughtered in future (Smith 2002, 158).

116

Iris Clemens

As a novelty Ashok condemns and forbids the killing for sacrifice, a common practice in the Brahmin religion (his religion before he converted to Buddhism), and also practiced all over the world in his time. He even tried to forbid the killing of animals for eating, or at least reduced it strictly, because excellent is abstention from the slaughter of living creatures (Rock Edict III; Smith 2002, 163; also in Rock Edict IV and Pillar Edict VII). In Pillar Edict V it is written:
When I had been consecrated twenty-six years the following species (or creatures, V.S.) were declared exempt from slaughter [following 22 animals such as river tortoises or categories like monkeys, I.C.], and all fourfooted animals which are neither utilized nor eaten. those which are with young or in milk, are exempt from slaughter, as well as their offspring up to six months of age. The caponing of cocks must not be done. Chaff must not be set on fire along with the living things in it. Forests must not be set on fire either want only or for the destruction of life. The living must not be fed with the living (Smith 2002, 204).

There follows a lot of restrictions with regard to killing. In all for about a quarter of the year the killing of animals was forbidden completely according to Smith, and these regulations again were imposed on all classes of the population without distinction of creed, social customs, or religious sentiments (2002, 57). Castrations and branding was another issue Ashoka tried to reduce as much as possible as he disapproved of these cruel practices, and the caponing of cocks was declared to be unlawful, too (Smith 2002, 59).3 The king establishes institutions for animals similar to that for the humans (Rock Edict II):
everywhere have been made the healing arrangements of His Sacred and Gracious Majesty the King in two kinds, (namely, V.S.), healing arrangements for men and healing arrangements for beasts. On the roads, too, wells have been dug and trees planted for the enjoyment of man and beast (Smith 2002, 160-161).4

Even the colonial observer Smith stated with regard to this inclusion of animals in the worries and care of the king: his teaching certainly attained to a level of practical morality little inferior to that of the Church of England in many respects, and superior in one point, by the inclusion of animals within the circle of neighbours to whom duty is due (Smith 2002, 67, emphasis I.C.). Even further, the restrictions regarding the burning of forests sounds like a statement from a modern environmental activist organization. This widening of the perspective and the inclusion of the environment into the semantics of a world society is surely remarkable, taking into account that comparable semantics
3 Interestingly cows might be killed and eaten, as cows are not included in Asokas list of protected animals (Smith 2002, 207), another hint for the liberal thinking of the former Brahmin Ashoka. 4 Smith (2002, 66) sees the animal hospitals existing in Surat and certain other cities in Western India at his time in connection to this old institutions and assume that they are may be survivals of Ashokas institutions, another hint for the continuation of certain ancient traditions.

Self-descriptions of the World Society in non-western contexts

117

rise only in the second half of the 20th Century in Europe and the Western world and that this perspective is still missing as an issue in the theoretical discussion of self-descriptions of the world society. There has to be a rethinking of the general theoretical approach, including more addressees or actors in a Latourian sense than human beings. Additionally, the emerging discussion about securing the environment in the West gets its dynamic mostly from the motivation to secure the living of the human beings and less from a care of other beings. It is the fear that the basics for human living is in danger that fuels the newer efforts to save all kinds of living beings according to Vasudev (1986). In contrary in the semantics analysed here the rights of animals and nature are seen as an independent right of its own, disconnected from the well being of human beings. In the ancient Asian writings, especially in Jainism and Buddhism, the principle of absence of violence to and an inclusion of all beings with senses in this principle and therefore in the social community (Vasudev 1986) is certainly a facet remarkable for the observation of the semantics of the world society. Taking that seriously would imply a turn from the anthropological perspective of the West to a biocentric perspective of Hinduism for example (Crawford 1974, 150). The very fact that the first three forms of self-descriptions of the world society mentioned by Stichweh are focussing on human beings only itself can be interpreted as an (Old-)European or Christian bias. A semantics that includes any kind of living beings in a self-description of the world society is certainly more adequate, even though it is more than 2200 years old.

6. Conclusion
After this analysis one can see quite clearly that self-descriptions of the world society have emerged not only in the Western context but in parallel in other parts of the world as well, and as a consequence that it is not longer plausible to couple them exclusively with Christianity or Christian philosophy. However it must be stressed that the indicated continuity of the semantics regarding a world society in the Indian context (from Ashoka to Akbar and Ghandi or Tagore) is only suggested and vague and has to be analysed of course in a much more detailed and serious way. Already, shortly after Ashokas death his edicts werent followed any more, for example. It would be presumptuous to compress 2200 years of history into a contribution such as this, and this was, after all, not the intention. This must be left for historical research by contextual experts. The point here is that there are enough hints to be able to assume a continuity such as there are in the Christian context. However there can be no doubt that self-descriptions of a world society are not exclusive to the western context.

118

Iris Clemens

Perhaps more interesting in any case is the question that arises for the general discussion for a theory of world society, because this leads to the question of a euro-centric bias of the recent discussion, especially with regard to the concept of world. Any society constructs a world, and the corresponding semantics must be plausible and fit the structures of that specific social system (for the structural coupling of semantics and social structure see in detail Clemens 2007). That means the world concepts vary historically and that earlier societies were not able to observe themselves as world societies: The world semantics varies with the structural evolution of the society system; but: to see that and to say that belongs to the world of our society, it is its theory and its construction of history. And now we can observe, that the old societies werent able to observe themselves and their world like this, as Luhmann (1998, 156, translation I.C.) states. The modern world is a correlate of modern society with similar characteristics. Older societies were hierarchical and organised according to the differentiation of a centre and a periphery: That correlates with a world order, which provides a ranking order (a series rerum) and a centre (157, translation I.C.). The differentiation of modern society forces us to give up these structural principles. Accordingly modern society is a heterarchical and acentric [azentrische] world (157). Consequently the metaphor of a centre and a periphery does not fit any more (Clemens 2010); nevertheless it might still be vital and powerful in parts of the theoretical discussion of world society. In consequence it could be questioned if the idea that the rest of the world was included slowly from the 15th century onwards into the euro-atlantic system as the world system emerged (Stichweh 2006a, 240) is still a adequate description. It can be asked whether the assumption that the rest of the world was included in the euro-atlantic centre is still based at least partly on a concept of world that uses a centre-periphery logic. It can be asked whether it might not be useful to take the idea of a heterarchical and acentric world as structurally coupled to the world society more seriously and to include it also in the theoretical description of world society. From there the emergence of world society could be described more in terms of a mutual communication flow instead of an inclusion in a centre: complexly woven network of interacting cultures substitutes the theory of transmission and diffusion founded on a unidirectional flow of knowledge and influences (Raina 2007, 184). As post-colonial research and its endeavour to re-write history has also shown in many regards, for example that the flow of ideas or knowledge has never been as one way as sociology of knowledge has stated since long (see only Spivak 1999; Raina 2007; Abraham 2006; Harding 1998) and that cultures and ideas have always mixed (Trojanow/Hoskot 2007). For a real heterarchical and acentric world description fitting to the world society, we need to include (self-)descriptions from all over the world. Maybe here lies also a reason for the more or less neglecting of (world) system(s) theory outside the euro-atlantic context, especially for example in India: it has only little con-

Self-descriptions of the World Society in non-western contexts

119

nectivity there until now. But we should be able to observe ourselves and the world as a truly heterarchical and acentric world society now.

References
Abraham, I. (2006): The Contradictory Spaces of Postcolonial Techno-Science. Economic and Political Weekly XLI, 210-217. Clemens, I. (2007): Bildung Semantik Kultur. Zum Wandel der Bedeutung von Bildung und Erziehung in Indien. Frankfurt a.M. Clemens, I. (2010): The global icon of the Indian IT-Professional. Contact zones in the age of new media, globalisation and world society. Paragrana (forthcoming). Crawford, S. C. (1982): The evolution of Hindu ethical ideals, 2. edition. Honolulu. Esposito, J. L./Mogahed, D. (2007): Who Speaks for Islam? What a Billion Muslims Really Think. New York. Fuchs, P. (1997): Adressabilitt als Grundbegriff der soziologischen Systemtheorie. Soziale Systeme 3, 57-79. Harding, S. (1998): Is Science Multicultural? Postcolonialisms, Feminisms, and Epistemologies. Indiana. Krcken, G. (2005): Imitationslernen und Rivalittsdruck: Neo-institutionalistische Perspek tiven zur Empirisierung globaler Diffusionsprozesse. Pp. 94-111 in: J. Schriewer/M. Caruso (eds.), Nationalerziehung und Universalmethode. Frhe Formen schulorganisatori scher Globalisierung. Comparativ 15, 1, Leipzig. Kulke, H./Rothermund, D. (2010): Geschichte Indiens, 4. Aufl. Mnchen. Luhmann, N. (1975): Die Weltgesellschaft. Pp. 51-71 in N. Luhmann, Soziologische Aufklrung 2. Aufstze zur Theorie der Gesellschaft. Opladen. Luhmann, N. (1990): The World Society as a Social System. Pp. 175-190 in N. Luhmann, Essays on Self-Reference. New York. Luhmann, N. (1998): Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft. Paperback. Frankfurt a.M. Luhmann, N./Schorr, K. E. (1999): Reflexionsprobleme im Erziehungssystem. 2. edition. Frankfurt a.M. McEvilley, T. (2002): The Shape of Ancient Thought: Comparative Studies in Greek and Indian Philosophies. New York. Mukherjee, B. N. (1983): Studies in the Aramaic Edicts of Asoka. Calcutta. Raina, D. (2007): Multicultural and Postcolonial Theories of Science and Society. Pp. 175-194 in: J. B. Dasgupta (ed.), Science, Technology, Imperialism and War, PHISPC, vol. XV, Part I, Centre for Studies in Civilizations. New Delhi. Ray, N./Chattopadhyaya, B.D./Chakravarti, R./Mani, V.R. (eds.) (2000): A sourcebook of Indian Civilization. Calcutta. Sen, A. (2005): The Argumentative Indian. London. Smith, V. A. (1997): Asoka. The Buddhist Emperor of India. 3. edition. New Delhi. Spivak, G. C. (1999): A Critique of Postcolonial Reason. Toward a History of the Vanishing Present. Cambridge. Stichweh, R. (2000): Die Weltgesellschaft. Frankfurt a.M. Stichweh, R. (2003): Genese des globalen Wissenschaftssystems. Soziale Systeme, 9, 3-26. Stichweh, R. (2004): On the Genesis of World Society: Innovations and Mechanisms. Institut fr Weltgesellschaft (Working papers). Luzern. Stichweh, R. (2006): Inklusion und Exklusion in der Weltgesellschaft Am Beispiel Schule und des Erziehungssystems. URL: http://www.unilu.ch/files/stw-inklusion.exklusion.weltgschule.pdf (29.03.2010). Stichweh, R. (2006a): Strukturbildung in der Weltgesellschaft Die Eigenstrukturen der Welt gesellschaft und die Regionalkulturen der Welt. Pp. 239-257 in: T. Schwinn (ed.), Die Vielfalt und Einheit der Moderne. Kultur- und strukturvergleichende Analysen. Wiesbaden.

120

Iris Clemens

Stichweh, R. (2008): Selbstbeschreibung der Weltgesellschaft. Pp. 21-51 in: J. Baberowski/H. Kaelble/J. Schriewer (eds.), Selbstbilder und Fremdbilder. Reprsentation sozialer Ordnung im Wandel. Frankfurt a.M. Strong, J. S. (2002): The Legend of King Ashoka. Reprint. Delhi. Taylor, C. (1996): Drei Formen des Skularismus. Pp. 217-246 in: O. Kallscheuer (ed.), Das Europa der Religionen. Frankfurt a.M. Thapar, R. (1997): Asoka and the Decline of the Mauryas. Oxford. Trojanow, I./Hoskot, R. (2007): Kampfabsage. Kulturen bekmpfen sich nicht sie flieen zusammen. Mnchen. Vasudev, J. (1986): Kohlbergs Universalittspostulat aus indischer Sicht. Pp. 145-179 in: W. Edelstein/G. Nunner-Winkler (eds.), Zur Bestimmung der Moral. Philosophische und sozialwissenschaftliche Beitrge zur Moralforschung. Frankfurt a.M. Dr. Iris Clemens Freie Universitt Berlin Fachbereich Erziehungswissenschaft und Psychologie Arbeitsbereich Anthropologie und Erziehung Arnimallee 11, D-14195 Berlin I.Clemens@fu-berlin.de