Ethics of Science and Technology Assessment 15

Schriftenreihe der Europäischen Akademie zur Erforschung von Folgen

wissenschaftlich-technischer Entwicklungen Bad Neuenahr-Ahrweiler GmbH
Series Editor: Carl Friedrich Gethmann

Armin Grunwald · Matthias Gutmann
Eva M. Neumann-Held Editors

On Human
Nature
Anthropological, Biological, and
Philosophical Foundations
Wissenschaftsethik und Technikfolgenbeurteilung
Band 15
Schriftenreihe der Europäischen Akademie zur Erforschung
von Folgen wissenschaftlich-technischer Entwicklungen
Bad Neuenahr-Ahrweiler GmbH
herausgegeben von earl Friedrich Gethmann
Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg GmbH
Armin Grunwald . Mathias Gutmann
Eva M. Neumann-Held (Eds.)

On Human Nature
Anthropologieal, Biological,
and Philosophical Foundations

Springer
Reihenherausgeber
Professor Dr. earl hiedrich Gethmann
Europäische Akademie GmbH
WilhelmstraGe 56, 53474 Bad Neuenahr-Ahrweiler. Cermany

Bandherausgeber
Professor Dr. Armin Grunwald
Institut für Technikfolgenabschätzung und Systemanalyse
Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe
Postt~lCh 3640, 7602\ Karlsruhe, Germany

Dr. Dr. Mathias Gutmann

Institut für Philosophie, Universitiit Marburg
ßlitzweg \6,35039 Marburg, Germany
Dr. Eva M. Neumann-Held
Institut für Philosophie, Universit:it Marburg
Blitzweg \A, 35039 Marburg, Ccrmany

Redaktion
Friedcrike Wütschcr
Europäische Akademie CmbH
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 Europäische Akademie
zur Erforschung von Folgen wissenschaftlich-technischer Entwicklungen
Bad Neuenahr-Ahrweiler GmbH

The Europäische Akademie

The Europäische Akademie zur Erforschung von Folgen wissenschaftlich-technischer

Entwicklungen GmbH is concerned with the scientific study of consequences of
scientific and technological advance for the individual and social life and for the
natural environment. Thc Europäische Akademie intends to contribute to a rational
way of society of dealing with the consequences of scientific and technological
developments. This aim is mainly realised in the development of recommendations
for options to act, from the point of view of long-term societal acceptance. The
work of the Europäische Akademie mostly takes place in temporary interdis-
ciplinary project groups, whose members are recognised scientists from European
universities. Overarching issues, e.g. from the fields of Technology Assessment or
EthiC'i of Science, are dealt with by the staff of the Europäische Akademie.

The Series

The series "Wissenschaftsethik und Technikfolgenbeurteilung" (Ethics of Science

and Technology Assessment) serves to publish the results of the work of the Euro-
päische Akademie. It is published by the Academy's director. ßesides the final results
of the project groups the series includes volumes on general questions of ethics of
science and technology assessment as weil as other mO'1ographic studies.
Foreword

Modern molecular technology in the so-called life sciences (biology as weil as

medicine) allows today to approach and manipulate living beings in ways and to an
extent wh ich not too long aga seemed Utopian. The empirical progress promises
further and even more radical developments in the future, and it is at least often
claimed that this kind of research will have tremendeous etfects on and for all of
humanity, for example in the areas of food production, transplantation medicine
(including stem cell research and xenotransplantation), (therapeutic) genetic
manipulation and (cell-line) cloning (of cell lines or tissues), and of biodiversity
conservation-strategies.
At least in Western, industrialized countries the development of modern sciences
led to a steady increase of human health, well-being and quality of life. However,
with the move to make the human body itself an object of scientific research-
interests, the respective scientific descriptions resulted in changes in the image that
human beings have of themselves. Scientific progress has led to a startling loss of
traditional human self-understanding. This development is in contrast to an under-
standing according to which the question what it means to be "human" is treated in
the realm of philosophy. And indeed, a closer look reveals that - without denying
the value of scientitic progress - science cannot replace the philosophical approach
to anthropological questions. On the other hand, however, philosophical analysis
cannot and should not dismiss knowledge gained by empirical approaches of life
sciences. What is needed is an interdisciplinary dialogue. The organization of such
a platform was the goal when the Europäische Akademie organized an int.::rnational
and interdisciplinary symposium on the topie "On Human Nature - Biological
Approaches and Philosophical Renections" (March 15-18, 1999).
Many speakers of this conference decided to participate in the publication of the
present book. Ilike to thank all authors for their contributions. Furthermore, my thanks
goes to the editors for their eommitment in initiating and organizing this project.
The book series "Wissenschaftsethik und Technikfolgenbeurteilung" of the
Europäische Akademie is devoted primarily to the publication of the work-reports
of the project groups, of the proceedings of conferences organized by the academy,
of works on the foundations of ethics, the ethics of science, and other issues related
to the work of the Europäische Akademie.
I wish this book that it may find attention in the relevant circles of academic
disciplines, and that it may inspire the needed further research and renection on
"Human Nature".

Bad Neuenahr-Ahrweiler, September 200 I earl Friedrieh Gethmann

Preface

The industrial revolution of the 19th century wh ich was followed by aseries of
cultural and societal upheavals marked the beginning of fundamental changes in
our understanding of ourselves as "human beings". It was accompanied by philo-
sophical approaches to anthropology. However, the methodological shortcomings
of "philosophical anthropology" soon became visible, and now, at the start of a new
millennium, it seems that the authority for supplying explanations of human nature
has shifted completely from philosophy and humanities to the natural sciences. Not
only in the public mind, it is particularly medicine and biology - here the cognitive
sciences and genetic approaches - that are assumed to supply an almost unlimited
access to "objective facts" on human evolution, history, and existence. In contrast,
the technical success and the prospect of future technological developments in the
biosciences are raising many ethical questions with regard to the ongoing "tech-
nicalization" of humans. At a closer look, however, it becomes apparent that the
treatment of those ethical questions depends on a clarification of the underlying
anthropological assumptions and a methodological examination oftheir validity. In
other words: It might be time for philosophy to regain its authority to contribute to
the questions on "human nature".
But how can this be approached? Although it is clear that such approaches
cannot be developed ignoring the assumptions, theories and empirical results of the
natural sciences, it is also evident that the natural sciences are not determined by a
single set of such assumptions, theories and results. On the contrary, there are
diverse theoretical frameworks available, which might very well be based on and
lead to different anthropological assumptions. Therefore, to approach the question
of human nature in face of the ongoing technicalization of human nature, it is
necessary to first initiate communication between relevant disciplines in the natural
sciences and philosophy.
At a time when all three of us were still members of the scientific statT of the
Europäische Akademie, we had the pleasure of having the opportunity to explore
these issues by making them the topic of the 1999 spring symposium titled "On
Human Nature. Biological Approaches and Philosophical Reflections". Many
researchers accepted our invitation to this interdisciplinary and international con-
ference, and it was not least due to the active participation not only of the speakers
but also of a very interested academic audience that the symposium became a
platform for discussions that bridged the usual disciplinary boundaries, and the
discipline-typical problem-solving strategies.
This conference inspired us to put together a collection of papers on the topic of
"Human Nature". However, the conference also showed us that we tried to cover
almost too many issues. We decided that for the book the framework of topics
X Preface

should bc narrower allowing particular topics to be treated in more detail. [n order

to reach this goal it was only possible to sekct some of the speakers from the
conference on the basis of the topics that they had presented. These speakers were
to elaborate and extend their presentations as contributions to our book project. To
cover more aspects related to the chosen topics we approached several additional
researchers with different disciplinary backgrounds. Some of them had participated
in the discussions at the conference, but did not have the opportunity to express
their viewpoints in a presentation; some were not conference participants at all. All
potential contributors were asked to write papers in wh ich they used their discipli-
nary backgrounds to elaborate on particular points with view on an interdisciplinary
readership.
Participation in such an interdisciplinary book project is not a usual task, and
therefore we were (and are) delighted that most of the researchers we approached
agreed to our request. All articIes were subjected to an internal review procedure,
and we wish to thank the authors for their wiIIingness to consider and (often) to use
our critical remarks and recommendations.
[n a sense this book can be viewed as the manifestation of the presentation and
discussion of arguments between different representatives of philosophy and of the
natural sciences.
In vicw of the main topics the articles are grouped into three sections. In the first
section the ongoing technicalization of human nature is critically viewed in three
articIes.
Gernot Böhme points out that although traditional European philosophy gener-
ated vanous dichotomies (such as nature and culture or nature and techno[ogy),
which articulated the self-understanding of human beings, all traditions have in
common that human nature has remained an unrenouncable topos. For the first time
in history this has changed. Böhme wams that modern medical and life sciences
threaten the unrenouncability of human nature, and that the human body itself is
becoming a subject of technologization, wh ich in itself is a threat to human dignity.
He proposes a critical theory of human nature that makes it possible to resist to the
unrestrained technologization of human being.
[n contrast to Böhme, Frederic Ferre views the technicalization of the human
body as not necessarily undermining human nature and human dignity. Within the
framework of personalistic organicism, Ferre argues for a specific grade of aware-
ness as an essential constituent of human nature. This constituent is not threatened
by technical interventions, as Ferre shows by discussing the example of human
cloning. Nevertheless, Ferre, too, wams against the application of such modern
technologies because the "modern world is not morally or metaphysically ready to
receive cIoned persons into our midst". Human self-perception in its relationship to
the development of natural sciences is also the topic of Christoph Rehmann-
Sutter's contribution. He refutes a particular kind of genome metaphysics, which
views the human genome as a program oflfor human nature. As an alternative he
suggests a "systemic theory of DNA" and discusses and evaluates so me anthro-
pological implications of this approach.
All three contributions use a particular viewpoint to describe and presuppose
specific biological knowledge in order to evaluate the possible ethical and philo-
sophical impact of technological orientation of life sciences on the modern image
 Preface XI

of human beings. As Rehmann-Sutter began already in his article. biologieal

knowledge itself is the subjeet of the biotheoretieal considerations in the articles ur
the second seetion. From these it will become evident that in biosciences one can
find diverse, often opposing approaches toward (and models for) the investigation
of human nature, which have at least the potential to result in different interpre-
tations. In Hans-Rainer Duneker's analysis human beings are described as the
result of an ongoing process of evolutionary integration and differentiation of
several systemic levels. Their uniqueness is expressed by the emergence of social
and cultural abilities that transcend the level of biological reduction. Following this
comprehensive overview the structure of biological descriptions is exemplified in
the treatment of neurobiological and cognitive sciences on the one hand, and
theories of genetics and developmental biology on the other hand. Introducing the
concepts of cognitive research Ernst Pöppel presents empirical evidence for his
approach to model conscious activity on the basis of fundamental logistir.,· and
content jimctions. He points out the significance of a highly preserved temporal
operating platform providing "three seconds" as the "singular states of being
conscious". Olaf Breidbach focuses on another important aspect of cognitive
processing. Following the concept of internal representation, he introduces an
artifieial device that fulfills the criterion of a eomplete assoeiative system. He
argues that this device serves as powerful tool for the understanding of the
functional organisation of an associative system established in the vertebrate brain.
Peter Janich emphasises the necessity to constitute sciences within everyday
lifeworld practices (such as cooperation and communication). This allows him to
rccognize the usefulness of natural scientitic description for certain contexts (c.g.
the cultural determination of cognition, validity criteria and functions in coping
with life). However, on the basis of a methodological viewpoint hc criticises the
significance of empirical and theoretical approaches used within neurological
and cognitive sciences for their claim to supply justified and justifiable images
of humans.
With the analysis of the genotype - phenotype relationship in Ulrich Wolf's
contribution we enter the field of genetic and developmental research. From the
field of human genetics Wolf presents empirical evidence that not even so-called
monofactorial diseases can be explained without reference to epigenetic factors.
The limitations of genetic explanations are also the subject in the articles by Scott
Gilbert and Eva M. Neumann-Held. Developmental biologist Gilbert dcplores
certain images of genetic determinism (and genetic centrism), which are being
communicated to the public in the name of developmental biology. Using three
examples he scrutinizes and refutes the empirical basis of genetic determinism.
This criticism is taken up and expanded in the contribution of Neumann-Held. She
contrasts genetic centrism with alternative approaches, and shows that the usual
reference to the causal explanatory power of genes is insufficient for the description
of developmental processes. From this point of view the assumption that human
nature is explicable in terms of the human genome is rejected. Furthermore, tradi-
tional dichotomies, such as the distinction between "nature" and "nurture" become
increasingly questionable in the light of alternatives to genetic centrism. This is the
main focus of Susan Oyama's article, wh ich treats this problem in the framework of
her Developmental S,vstems Approach.
XII Preface

In summary, the articles of the second section make very clear that natural
sciences can only provide a shaky basis for grounding an anthropological approach.
In a sense this leads back to the topics that were the subject of the first articles in
our book, that is: to the question how to deal with the putative consequences of the
application of progress in bioscience. This question may be viewed as the starting
point of the articles of the third section, which is directed toward methodological
reconsiderations. Here, Michael Drieschner expresses very emphatically his scepti-
cism regarding the possibility of predicting the consequences of gene technologies.
Drieschner argues that the societal value of these new technologies remains
doubtful, whereas the consequences of not developing these technologies are harm-
less. In contrast to the sceptical view of modern technology expressed in several
contributions, Armin Grunwald stresses the relevance of technology - in the sense
of applying means and tools - as a constituent of a comprehensive concept of
human being. Even culture itself is shown to be impossible without a reference to
technical rationality. It might be therefore, that human nalure not only cannot be
saved from technicalisation by sacrificing te<;hnology, but that human nature (and
culture) is determined by its relationship to technology itself. Here, the need for a
sound anthropological theory becomes very apparenr. Furthermore, it becomes
clear that the development of such an anthropological foundation will depend on
the conceptualisation of the systematic relationship between nature and culture.
This is the focus of Mathias Gutmann's contribution. On the basis of a critical
overview of biological and philosophical conceptualisations of human beings he
proposes a culturalist approach to anthropology that allows a comprehensive under-
standing of the term "human being" and at the same time avoids the typical short-
comings of biological and philosophical anthropological approaches.
Clearly this book cannot present a final answer to the questions on "human
nature". Our expectations, however, would be more than fulfilled if the contribu-
tions in this book can provide part of a framework for further exchanges between
philosophy and natural sciences, and for the ongoing development and critical
retlection of anthropological conceptualisations.
We like to thank Professor Carl Friedrich Gethmann and the Europäische
Akademie for supplying the intellectual, organizational and financial framework
for the conference and for the publication of this book. Furthermore, our thanks go
to Michael Weingarten and Anja Weigmann who were members of the conference's
scientific committee. Our special thanks are also due to Daniela Nies and Dagmar
Uhl for their administrative and organizational support in organizing the confer-
ence, and to Friederike Wütscher for the editorial work in the preparation of the text
for prinr.

Karlsruhe and Marburg, April 2001 Armin Grunwald

Mathias Gutmann
Eva M. Neumann-Held
List of Authors

Böhme, Gernot, Professor Dr., studied Physics, Mathematics and Philosophy, PhD
in 1965 (Hamburg); Habilitation in 1972 (München); 1969-77 research fellow at
the Max-Planck-Institute, Starnberg (Habermans, v. Weizsäcker); since 1977 Pro-
fessor of Philosophy at the Technical University of Darmstadt. 1973 Guestprofessor
at the University of Vienna, 1984 at the University uf Linköping/Sweden, 1995 at
the TU Vienna, 1985/86 at the University of Rutterdam; 1981 Research at the Har-
yard University, 1987 Cambridge University/England, 1989 ANU, Canberra, 1998
University of Wisconsin, Madison. Main fields of research: Classical philosophy,
Social Studies of Science, Philosophical Anthropology, Philosophy of Nature,
Aesthetics, Ethics, Goethe, Theory of Time.
Fachbereich Gesellschafts- und Geschichtswissenschaft, Fachgebiet Philosophie,
TU Damstadt, 64283 Darmstadt

Breidhach, DIa!. Professor Dr. Dr., PhD in philosophy (Hegel) and biology (ento-
mulogy), habilitation in zoology (neurobiology), chair for history of science at lena
university, head of the "Ernst Haeckel Haus", the "Theolab" and the "Institute for
history of medicine, science and technology". Research interests: history of bio-
and neurosciences, "naturphilosophie" and its reception in sciences, evolution of
nervous systems, neurosemantics, evolution and dynamics uf complex systems,
neuronal esthetics.
Ernst-Haeckel-Haus, Universität lena, Germany

Drieschner, Michael, Professor Dr., "Diplom" in physics (University of München

1964), doctoral thesis with Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker on the axiomatics of
quantum mechanics (Hamburg 1968). 1970-1978 research assistant at the "Max-
Planck-Institut zur Erforschung der Lebensbedingungen der wissenschaftlich-
technischen Welt", Starnberg. 1980 Habilitation in München with a thesis about the
conceptual foundations of quantum mechanics. 1978-1986 executive in several
industrial companies, member of the board of "Integra" life insurance company.
Since 1986 professor for Natural Philosophy at Bochum.
Institut für Philosophie, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, 44780 Bochum, Germany

Duncker, Hans-Rainer, Professor Dr. Dr., since 1953 study of Biology and since
1955 also Medicine in Hamburg, Tübingen, Kiel, Vienna, Kiel and Hamburg; 1964
Dr. rer. nat. (Zoology. Anthropology. Anatomy) at the Christian-Albrechts-Univer-
sity Kiel; 1965 Final State Medical Examination, University of Hamburg; 1967
Dr. med .• Medical Faculty Hamburg; 1969 Venia legendi for Anatomy by the
Medical Faculty Hamburg; 1971 Full Professor of Anatomy, Medical Faculty,
XIV List of Authors

lustus-Liebig-University Giessen; 1971J Rejected offer for Chair of Special Zoolo-

gy University of Tübingen; 1980 Chair of Anatomy, Medical Faculty University
Frankfurt a. M. Main Fields of Research: Patterns and cytology of extra-cutaneous
pigmentations in reptiles, amphibians and fishes and the biology of neural crest
cells, Lung-air sac system of birds, Evolution of the respiratory apparatusses
of vertebrates from fish to mammals and man including the ditferentiations of co-
elomic septations; Morphometry and scaling relationships of body size and organ
parameters in vertebrates; Evolution of homoiothermy in birds and mammals;
Embryology of the respiratory systems in birds, mammals and man; Evolution of
the ontogenetic modes in birds; Evolution of complex structural and functional
systems in vertebrates; Evolutionary biology of mankind and their cultural
abilities.
Institut für Anatomie und Zellbiologie des Fachbereichs Humanmedizin, lustus-
Liebig-Universität Giessen, Germany

Fern', Frederick, Professor Dr. em. of Philosophy at the University of Georgia,

where he was also co-founder of the interdisciplinary graduate Faculty of Environ-
mental Ethics. General Editor (1986-94) of the scholarly annual, Research in
Philosophy and Technology. His principal books include Language, Logic and God,
Basic Modern Philosophy of Religion, Shaping the Future, Philosophy of Tech-
nology, and Hellfire and Lightning Rods: Liberating Science, Technology and
Religion. Recently, his energies have been focused on a trilogy of interrelated
books. The first volume (his metaphysics) is Being and Value. The second (his
epistemology) is Knowing and Value. The third (his ethics) is Living and Value.

Gilhert, Scott F., Professor Dr. of Biology at Swarthmore College where he teaches
developmental genetics, embryology, and the history of biology. He received his
B.A. in both biology and religion from Wesleyan University (1971); he earned his
MA in the history of science and his PhD in biology at the lohns Hopkins Uni-
versity (1976). His research currently focuses on the roles of developmental change
in producing evolutionarily novel structures; specifically, how the turtle forms
its shell.
Department of Biology, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, PA 19081 USA

Grunwald, Armin, Professor Dr., studied physics at the universities Münster

and Köln; 1984 diploma; 1987 dissertation on thermal transport processes in
semiconductors at Universität Köln; 1987-1991 systems specialist, studies of
mathematics and philosophy at Universität Köln; 1992 graduate (Staatsexamen);
1991-1995 scientist at DLR (German Aerospace center) in the field of technology
assessment; 1996-1999 vice director of the Europäische Akademie zur Erfor-
schung von Folgen wissenschaftlich-technischer Entwicklungen Bad Neuenahr-
Ahrweiler GmbH; 1998 habilitation at the faculty of socia1 sciences and philosophy
at Marburg university with a study on culturalistic planning theory; since October
1999 director of the institute for technology assessment and systems analysis
(ITAS) at the research center Karlsruhe.
Institut für Technikfolgenabschätzung und Systemanalyse, Forschungszentrum
Karlsruhe, Germany
 List 01 Authors XV

Glltmann, Ma:hias, Dr. Dr., studies in philosophy, history, zoology, biophysics and
botany in Frankurt and Marburg. Doctoral thesis 1995 in philosophy and 1998 in
hiology. Scientific collaborator at the Senckenberg Research Institute in Frankfurt
until 1996. Member of the scientific staff of Europäische Akademie zur Erfor-
schung von Folgen wissenschaftlich-technischer Entwicklungen Bad Neuenahr-
Ahrweiler GmbH from 1996 to 1999. Since 1999 assistant professor in philosophy.
Collaboration with the working group "Critical evolutionary theory" in Frankfurt
since 1987 and with the working group "Methodical Culturalism" in Marburg since
1993. Main research areas: Theory science, theoretical biology, genetics, evolu-
tionary theory and morphology, philosophy of culture and anthropology.
Institut für Philosophie, Universität Marburg, Blitzweg 16,35039 Marburg, Germany

lanich, Peter, Professor Dr., studied Physics, Mathematics, Psychology and Philo-
sophy from 1961-1967 at the Universities of Erlangen and Hamburg; 1969
Dr. phi\.; 1969/70 Visiting Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Texas at Austin;
1970/71 Assistant Professor Erlangen; 1971-1980 Associate Professor for Philo-
sophy and History of Natural Science at the University of Konstanz; since 1980
Full Professor for Philosophy, Marburg. 1987 Fellow at the Centre for Philosophy
of Science, Pittsburgh. Publications in Philosophy of Physics, Chemistry and Bio-
logy, Theory of Knowledge, General Theory of Sciences and Epistemology.
Institut für Philosophie, Universität Marburg, Blitzweg 16,35039 Marburg, Gerrnany

NellJ1lann-Held, Eva M., Dr., Dip\. bio\., studied biology at the Ruhr-Universität
Bochum. 19~5 obtaining of the doctorate degree (PhD). 1985-1987 postdoctoral
research fellow at the Department of Physiology, Carlsberg Laboratory, Copen-
hagen, Denmark; 1987-1989 postdoctoral research associate at the Department of
Biology, Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas, USA. From 1989 on
studies and research in philosophy at the Ruhr-Universität Bochum, since 2000 at
the Universität Marburg. From 1991 participation as research assist:mt in Varil)US
projects, for example: "Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einer 'Evolutionären Ethik'
(Possibilities and limits of an evolutionary ethics)" (1991-1993), "GraduIerten-
kolleg 'Kognition, Gehirn und neuronale Netze' (cognition, brain and neuronal
networks)". Current reseach project: "Genom und Organismus. Philosophische
Interpretation der Entwicklungsbiologie (Genome and organism. Philosophical
interpretations of developmental biology)", sponsored by the foundation MGU,
Universität Base\. 1998-2000 member of the scientific staff of the Europäische
Akademie zur Erforschung von Folgen wissenschaftlich-technischer Entwick-
lungen Bad Neuenahr-Ahrweiler GmbH. project manager of "Xenotransplantation
of cells, tissues or organs" (report published in 2000). Research areas: Theory of
science, epistemology, philosophy of biology, with particular emphasis on analysis
of theories and concepts of genetic disciplines.
Institut für Philosophie, Universität Marburg, Blitzweg 16,35039 Marburg, Germany

Oyama, Sllsan, Professor Dr. em., trained at Harvard University, Susan Oyama has
written widely on the nature/nurture opposition and the concepts of development,
evolution, and genetic information. In 2000, Duke University Press brought out her
Evolution's Eye: A Systems View of the Biology-Culture Divide, and an expanded
XVI List of Authors

edition of The Ontogeny of InformatIOn, the foundational text of the "develop-

mental systems" perspective. With Paul Griffiths and Russell Gray, Oyama also
edited Cycles of Contingency (MIT), a volume of papers on developmental systems
by scholars from many fields. She is Professor Emerita at the John Jay Collcge of
Criminal Justice and The Graduate School and University Center, both of The City
University of New York.

Pöppel, Ernst, Professor Or. Or., 1976 Habilitation in Psychology (Or. phil. habil.)
Faculty of Natural Sciences, Innsbruck, Austria; 1974 Habilitation in Sensory
Physiology (Or. med. habil.) Faculty of Medicine, Ludwig-Maximilians-Univer-
sity, Munich, Germany, 1968 Ph. O. in Psychology (Or. phil.); 1962-1968 Studies in
Psychology and Zoophysiology Universities at Freiburg/Breisgau, Munich and
Innsbruck; 2001 Co-director of the "Parmenides Center for Neuroscience and
Knowledge research", Munich; 2000 Oirector of the "Generation Research
Program", Bad Tölz; since 1997 Acting Chairman, Human Studies Center, Ludwig-
Maximilians-Universität, Munich; 1992-1997 Member of the Board of Oirectors
Research Center Jülich; since 1977 Chairman of the Institute of Medical Psycho-
logy Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, Munich; 1973-1976 Research Associate
Max-Planck-Institute of Psychiatry, Munich; 1972-1973 Staff Scientist Neuro-
science Research Program, Boston, USA, Massachusetts Institute of Technology;
1971-1973 Research Associate Oepartment of Psychology and Brain Science
Massachusetts Institute of Technology; 1969-1970 Postdoctoral Fellowship uf the
Volkswagen Foundation Max-Planck-Institute of Psychiatry, Munich, Germany;
1966-1968 Fellowship of the Max-Planck-Society, Max-Planck-Institute of Be-
havioral Physiology, Andechs; 1965-1966 NASA Fellowship Max-Planck-Institute
uf Behavioral Physiology, Andechs.
Institut für Medizinische Psychologie and Humanwissenschaftliches Zentrum
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, 80336 München, Germany

Rehmwzn-Sutter. Christoph, Professor Or., Oipl. biol., assistent professor of ethics

in biosciences and biotechnology at the University of Basel, Switzerland. Aca-
demic training in both molecular biology and philosophy at the Universities of
Basel, Freiburg i.Brsg. and Darmstadt. 1997-1998 research fellow at the Univer-
sity of California, Berkeley. Currently head of a research group in bioethics at the
University of Basel. Since 1999 president of the Swiss Society for Biomedical
Ethics and since 2001 president of the Swiss National Ethics Commission of
Human Medicine. Main research interests: ethical issues of gene therapy and
genetic testing, political ethics of technico-ecological risks, philosophy of biology,
philosophical foundations of relational, caring and narrative approaches to bio-
ethics.
Arbeitsstelle für Ethik in den Biowissenschaften, c/o Institut für Geschichte und
Epistemologie der Medizin, Universität Basel, Switzerland

Wolf, Ulrich, Professor Or. em., studies in biology and physical anthropology at the
universities of Tübingen and München; PhO 1961 München, habilitation (lecturer)
1969 Freiburg, 1972 professor and head of the Institute of Human Genetics
and Anthropology, university of Freiburg; Main research areas: Experimental and
 List of Authors XVII

cIinical cytogenetics, genetic mechanisms of vertehrate evolution, genetics of sex-

ual development, genotype-phenotype relationship, the organism as an autopoietic
system.
Institute of Human Genctics and Anthropology of the university of Freiburg,
Germany
Contents

The Nature of Human Nature:

Ethical and General Issues

On Human Nature
Gernot Böhme .. 3
Personalistie Organieism and the Human Social Animal
Frederick Ferd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Genetics, Embodiment and Identity

Clzristoph Re/unann-Sutter . . . . 23

11 Biology in Discourse:
Biotheoretical Considerations on Human Nature

The Biologieal Fundamentals of Human Cultural Developments

and their Unique Functional Integration
Hans-Rainer Duncker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Three Seconds: A Temporal Platform for Conseious Aetivities
Ernst Pöppel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Gestalt Recognition and Internal Representation -
AReport from the Philosophieal Laboratory
OlafBreidbach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

Between Natural Disposition and Cultural Masterment of Life -

The Cognitive Seiences and Concept of Man in
Contlicting Coneeptions of Scienes
Peter .lcmich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 95

Genotype and Phenotype:

Genetic and Epigenetic Aspects
Ulriclz Wolf . . . . . . . . . . 111

Genetic Determinism:
The Battle between Scientific Data and Social Image in
Contemporary Developmental Biology
Scoft Gi/hert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
XX Contents

Can we find Human Nature in the Human Genome?

Eva M. Neumann-Held . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

The Nurturing of Natures

Susan Oyama . . . . . . 163

111 The Other Side 01 the Mirror:

Methodological Reconsideration 01 Human Nature

The Burdon of Proof -

On the Impossibility of Technology Assessment for the
Human Genome Project
Michael Drieschner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173

Philosophy and the Concept ofTechnology-

On the Anthropological Significance ofTechnology
Armin Crunwald . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179

Human Cultures' Natures-

Critical Considerations and Some Perspectives of
Culturalist Anthropology
Mathias Cutmann . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
The Nature of Human Nature:
Ethical and General Issues
On Human Nature

Gernot Böhme

1
Preliminary Remark

Nature has a double meaning both in everyday language and in philosophical

terminology. When, far instance, one speaks of the nature ofthe matter, one means
that which makes the matter in question into what it is, its essence. On the other
hand, if one says that animals, plants, mountains are apart of nature, then one
classes them with arealm of being that is there of its own doing, not made by
humans. Also with regard to human beings, one can speak of nature in this double
sense. The "nature of the human being" can refer to his or her essence, that which
makes hirn or her a human being. But one can also speak of the nature of the human
bcing in the sense that, by reason of his or her corporeality or embodiment
[Leiblichkeit], he or she is apart of the realm of being to which animals, plants, and
mounlains are also assigned. It is only in this latter sense that human nature is the
topic of this article - even though at the same time, however, the question arises as
to whether being natural lNatursein] is apart of the human being's essence.

2
The Role of Nature in Human Self-Understanding

As a philosophical term, nature - in Greek, physis - was originally, and that means
among the pre-Socratics, a designation for being in toto. Not until Socrates' time,
that is, with the Sophists, does a concept of nature emerge that develops contours
through its contrast to social and handicraft doing or making by the human being,
that is, in contrast to nomos and techne, and thereby becomes a designation for a
part of being. In his inimitable way, Aristotle specifies in the Physics this division
of being in reference to an example from the Sophist Antiphon: of nature (physei) is
that being that has the principle of its movement and rest in itself, of ta'hne is that
being whose principle of movement and rest is due to human beings. The principlc
of movement and rest refers to the order of and reason for evolving and decaying,
and even for the life process. If a bed made of the wood of a willow tree is buried,
Aristotle says, then a willow tree will grow, not a bed. That me ans that, in terms of
its material, this object is of nature, but in terms of what it is, its form, it is of human
hand.' Human beings in their self-understanding and practice are at a central
position in the above-mentioned formation of difference in being as a whole. They

I Aristotle, Physics BI.

4 Gernot Böhme

establish the division between what is to be regarded as natural and what as

technical or social. However, their own position, that is, the position of human
beings in the whole of being, becomes very ambivalent by virtue of this difference.
And this ambivalence develops into the central challenge of human self-
understanding. From cIassical antiquity up to thc present, the self-interpretation of
the human being has been articulated through the contrast between nature and
technology, nature and social composition, later then between nature and culture,
nature and civilization. It is not possible here to present the manifold versions of
this European self-understanding of the human being - this has been done in
another place (Böhme 1997 a). But one thing has to be expressly emphasized: in
human self-understanding, as it has been articulated in Europe, nature is an
unrenounceable topos.
To make this cIear it is sufficient to characterize brietly the main lines of this
self-understanding. In the tradition going back to cIassical antiquity, that which is
natural in the human being is contrasted with the capacity for language, with
sociality, rationality, reason, and, in the broadest sense, the human soul. The human
being is that living being which has language and reason (zoon !ogon echon), a
political animal - these being Aristotle's specifications; the human being is
composed of extended substance and a thinking soul - this is Descartes. The most
characteristic philosopher here is Kant, who changes the originally Aristotelian
definition of the human being as an animal rationale into the proposition that
the human being is an animal ration 'abile', an animal that can become rational.
Kant's formulation is so characteristic because it underscores the dynamic moment
in human self-understanding. As nature, human beings are given to themselves:
as social beings, as rational beings, as moral entities, they are objects of self-
formation. That is why Kant's anthropology is also divided into two parts, namely,
"Anthropology from a Physical Point of View", where the task is to present human
beings as what they are by nature, and "Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of
View", where the task is to say wh at they can make of themselves by knowing
themselves. Since human beings can be formed from one of these poles - be it
termed rational soul or self-consciousness - what they are in toto is also determined
by their self-formation. In Kant (1960) this is cxpressed as folIows: "Man can only
become man by education."
The tension between what is nature in the human being and what is not nature
and can therefore be formed or, to express in Heidegger's words (Heidegger 1957),
the tension between facticity and project, leads to two different dynamic deve-
lopments that range from educational programs to conceptions in the philosophy of
history and can be presented under the headings "emancipation" and "reconcili-
ation." The program of emancipation, that is, emancipation from nature, is the one
suggested by the definition of the human being as an animal rationale: According
to the cIassical scheme of definition of genus proximum and differentia specijica,
the essence of a thing, its proprium, is located in what distinguishes it from other
members of the same species. The essence of human beings is therefore centered in
everything that distinguishes them from other living beings - reason, sociality,
mind. As a consequence of this, human beings can comprehend their self-formation
as the overcoming of nature in themselves: they become what they really are and
should be, namely, rational beings, by being emancipated from nature. Historically,
 On Human Nature 5

this program has been extraordinarily successful hoth as an educational and as a

political-technological program.
The other possibility, subsumed under the heading "reconciliation", shows a
developmental tendency to go in the opposite direction. True, as a rule naturalness
is not exactly made the real end of essential humanness, but the split between nature
and culture, body and soul, sensibility and sense is painfully feit. The very progress
historically made in the program of emancipation is experienced as alienation and
is opposed by the program of a reconciliation. This can be found. for instance, in
Schiller's On the Aesthetic Education of Man; later, in a more explicit form and
elevated to the status of a historical-political project in Kar! Marx: the humani-
zation of nature and the naturalization of humans, that is, the reconciliation of the
two parts, which has to be achieved through labor, culture, and political organiza-
tion, becomes the historical end of humanity.
The Christian self-understanding of the human being - to introduce the second
main line of our cultural development - does in principle embrace a less con-
strained recognition of the naturalness of the human being, but it is still no less
ambivalent and dynamic than the Greco-Roman one. As God's creation, the human
being is of course first and fore most a creature among creatures and shares with
them the immutable finiteness of existence [Dasein], suffering, and death. But at
the same time human beings stand out infinitely from other creatures by virtue of
their being made in God's image and becausc of the call to dominate: Subdue the
earth and have dominion over every living thing (Gen. 1:26-28). Both determi-
nations relate c10sely to one another. Historically, they have developed, on the one
hand. into the technological program of the domination of nature and, on the other,
into the ideological-cosmogonic program of nature's coming to itself in the human
being. The latter can be found in the tradition ranging from lakob Böhme via
Schelling up to Teilhard de Chardin in our century. Thus, human beings, who
according to ludeo-Christian doctrine have to accept themselves as creatures
precisely in their dependence upon God, comprehend themselves - simultaneously
through the program of the domination of nature and the completion of creation -
as being intinitely above creaturalness.

3
The Threat to Human Nature trom New Technologies

The European self-understanding is dangerously explosive both in the Greco-

Roman and the ludeo-Christian traditions. Since this explosiveness is however
translated into historical programs, it can be said that these traditions make it pos-
sible tor each epoch and generation to have sutlicient orientation and enjoy a quiet
unfolding of human existence. What is characteristic is that one pole of human self-
understanding, namely nature, was always kept constant. Even where human nature
was experienced as problematic, painful, miserable, its givenness was nevertheless
something upon which one could rely. Programs of self-formation were not con-
cerned with changing human nature; rather, they were moral, pedagogical, political
programs. Even Marx's "humanization of nature" was, insofar as it referred to
human nature, concerned with its cultural formation not its change. The program
6 Gernot Böhme

for changing nature, which has developed as a teehnological-industrial projeet

sinee the end of the 18th century, referred to external nature not human nature.
The radieal change we have to envisage today consists in the fact that the project
of human self-formation now also encompasses what is nature in the human being.
In this way, as van den Daele phrased it some time ago (van den Daele 1985),
human nature becomes "contingent" or, as various authors put it today, it becomes
meaningless to speak of something such as human nature. That means, however,
that not only certain dangers and problems are brought on by this development
- that is, essentially, the development of biomedical technologies - but the entire
framework that has supported the self-understanding of the human being until now
is questioned.
Let us again recall the facts and the possibilities:
For some time now, pharmacology has been putting at our disposal something
which the individual human being has to process morally and in his or her character
as immediate self-givenness: mood, fitness, mishaps. The latest highlight in this
development is the pharmaeeutical product Viagra, which degrades to an on/off
mechanism what was once attraction generated by the other's nature or desire
generated by one's own.
Reproductive medicine has set itself the task of making every single step in the
reproduetion of the human species into a teehnical production proeess. It began
with the programmed birth, whereby nothing is left to the nature of the wo man in
labor, so that the birth can be conducted optimally and at a calculated point in time
with medication. This strategy is continued in in vitro fertilization, by means of
wh ich human beings can assert their abstract wish for a child over against the
will of their body and its capabilities. It is continued in prenatal diagnostics and
selection, on the basis of which children with their predisposition, gender und, as
the case may be, with their weaknesses no Ion ger have to be accepted as a godsend
or as a gift of fate. All this has been long realized and has already produced its
effects in attitudes toward children, the handicapped, and in conceptions of
parenthood. What is still to come is the extra-uterine breeding of fetuses, by means
of whieh it will be possible to have ehildren without one's own nature being in-
volved. Cloning is evidently ever eloser at hand: here natural, and that means
heterosexual reproduction would be abolished and with it the uniqueness of eaeh
individual human being's genes. 2 This teehnology will be practicable in the ncar
future, and the ditferentiation of the human species into two genders will thcrcby
become obsolete.
Advances in transplantation medicine (or better, the necessity of its frictionless
realization in society) have led to a seientific-teehnological definition of death and
have thereby undermined the lifeworldly relevanee of the natural process of
"dying." Wh at in Descartes and La Mettrie was still a theoretical model for
acquiring knowledge of the human body, namely, imagining it as a machine, has
become praetical reality on account of transplantation medicine. Every part of the
human body has become in principle replaceable, so that it is questionable whether
the identity of the human being still has any foundation in his or her corporeal self-
givenness. Since transplantation technology does not have to depend upon the

2 On this. see Böhme ( 1999).

 On Human Nature 7

tissue or organs of other human beings but - as cardiac pacemakers, artificial

hearts, and neurochips show - can partially replace human organs by cybernetic
machines or join them to these machines, the human being becomes a cyborg, anu
notjust in the metaphorical but in the concrete sense.
The natural givenness of humanity, namely, as a species, is questioned by
genetic engineering. First, it threatens to reduce the individual human being to
genetically established data. That began already with genetic fingerprinting and
will continue in genetic diagnostics, by means of whose results the individual will
be confronted with his or her genetic code, as a fate that will determine his or her
life chances not only as a possibility of the individual's genes butalso via mecha-
nisms of social evaluation and discrimination. If the first steps make it seem that
genetic engineering would just confront the human being in a more intensive
(i.e., scientific) form, his or her own nature as an ultimate barrier, then genetic
engineering will in the long term have precisely the reverse etfect, that of creating
the possibility of correcting and constructing the genetic code. What is al ready
evident in prenatal diagnostics - namely, that the child's natural constitution is
becoming the parents' responsibility - is infinitely magnified by genetic engineer-
ing: the child's genetic code will no longer be something that just has to be accept-
ed. People will have the desire or even the duty to eliminate harmful genes or to im-
prove the genetic code as such. This gives rise to the possibility of genetic eugenics.
Furthermore, since we cannot expect a humanity-wide consensus about desirable
developmental directions and anticipated functions of the human being, the dissolu-
tion of the distinct species "human being" can come about in the long run.
In this list we have considered the actual or pending technological developments
solely from the viewpoint of their contributing to the dissolution of human nature.
Neither the dangers or risks represented by the fight against illnesses, für instance,
nor the social attitudes or moral and legal regulations that prevent or promote their
development have been considered here, These two areas have to be carefully ana-
Iyzed and discussed when it is a matter of evaluating or, as the case may be, steering
the pertinent technological developments. Independently of this and, to a certain
extent, in the lead up to these discussions, however, it must be c1arified whether the
said technological developments affect our self-understanding as human beings and
whether they - via some of their possibilities - contradict our understanding of
human dignity as posited in human and basic rights. According to our analysis so
far, this is indeed the case. It has been seen that, für üur old European image of the
human being, "nature" in the sense of the given is an essential topos, and that these
technologies aim to place what is natural about the human being at the disposal of
the üptiünal, that is, to consign it to the realm of the moldable.

4
Reactions: Symmetrical Anthropology and
Cyborg Modernity

It could be believed that everything wüuld have been done if the technological
possibilities that contradict our understanding of human dignity were precluded by
law or morally disdained. In actual fact, so me of the above-mentioned technical
8 Gernot Böhme

possibilities for manipulating human nature are indeed forbidden - in Germany,

particularly by the Protection of the Embryo Act. It is a good thing that this law
exists and that other laws, conventions, and agreements are in preparation, ones that
can serve to restrain interference with human nature. Regulations and consensus of
this kind are necessary, but at the same time one should not have too much con-
fidence in them. On the one hand, it is evident that a technology is intluential even
when and where it is not applied; and, on the other, this old European self-
understanding of the human being, which still supports these prohibitions today,
could after all be transformed on the basis of these new technologies.
Let us first turn to the former possibility. Historical research has shown that.
after the introduction of optical apparatuses, human eyesight in general (i.e., in-
dependently of the use of instruments) was subjected to the norm of focused vision
(Böhme 1998 a). Recently, it has been seen that parents are made responsible for
the birth of handicapped children precisely when they consciously decline prenatal
diagnostics and leave things "to nature." Similarly, it is to be expected that human
cloning will alter the relation between the sexes and the relation human beings nave
to heterosexual reproduction even where cloning is forbidden. These prospects
allow us to presume that the sheer existence of new biomedical technologies under-
mines the traditional self-understanding of the human being to such a degree that it
can no longer provide a foundation for their prohibition, restraint, or legal-moral
regulation. In this situation it is not surprising that there are authors who, as it were.
seek refuge in attack, declare the old European self-understanding of the human
being to be obsolete, and disdainfully jettison those - supposedly modern - dichoto-
mies: nature/technology, nature/culture, naturelcivilization, nature/spirit. The human
being is a hybrid, according to Bruno Latour, or a cyborg, according to Donna
Haraway, and thafs a good thing, they say, and freedom consists in grasping this.
Donna Haraway comprehends the classical dualisms in principle as being
"systemic to the logics and practices of domination of women, people of colour.
nature, workers, animals - in short, domination of all constituted as others, whose
task is to mirror the self." (Haraway 1991, P 177). Her decision is therefore to have
"plellsure in the confusion of boundaries", (Haraway 1991, P 150) that is, she
emphatically welcomes the metamorphosis of the human being into a cyborg, a
metamorphosis that transpires partly through a fusion of the human being's organ-
ism with cybernetic machines, and partly through his or her absorption into net-
works. As a Marxist-feminist author, she in no way overlooks the fact that the tech-
nologization of the human being, particularly his or her body, implies domination
or, to put it better, repression. For example, under the headings 'The Informatics of
Domination" and 'The 'Homework Economy' Outside 'The Home'" she dramatic-
ally describes the conditions of female workers in Silicon Valley and of those in the
electronics industry in the Third World-conditions that are entirely insecure, em-
bedded in networks but at the same time isolated, public but also hidden from the
public, and, in what is left of privacy, reduced to sexuality. But since the repression
is virtually arepression without repressors, that is, a technological generalization of
what Johan Galtung has called "structural violence", what Haraway still tradition-
ally calls critique, struggle, and resistance does not have an addressee anymore.
After having bidden farewell to what Lyotard (1986) called the grand narratives
- "emancipation", "reconciliation", "order of creation" - Haraway believes it is
 On Human Nature 9

necessary to invent a new narrative for humanity, namely, the myth of the cyborg.
Cyborg is the idea of a transformation of the human heing such that what, in terms
of old European conceptions, represents the endangerment or even destruction of
humanity is to be regarded as a positive possibility for the human being.
Haraway sees c\early that: '''Integrity' or 'sincerity' of the Western seIl' gives
way to decision procedures and expert systems ... The organism has been translated
into problems of genetic coding and read-out." (Haraway 1991, p 163 and 164)
Against this she sets the pleasure in transgressing boundaries, freedom from the
compulsion to have an identity, "intensive pleasure in skilI, machine skilI ... "
(Haraway 1991, p 180).
What we can value in Donna Haraway is her sober, indeed, fearless account of
what is actually happening to the human being. However, one wonders whether her
form of critique, namely, cyborg politics (Haraway 1991, P 176), is not much more
than the call to make the best of it. If this consists in "rejoicing in the illegitimate
fusions of animal and machine", (Haraway 1991, P 176) then it seems to be nothing
but a cheerful march into postmodernity. What is called critique becomes affir-
mation because every standard for critique was al ready relinquished at the outset
with the abandonment of all differentiations.
What for Haraway is the cyborg is for Bruno Latour hybrids. Hybrids are mixes
between nature and society, between subject and object. Prototypes of these are for
hirn Robert Boyle's air pump and Thomas Hobbes' state. The hermaphroditic
character of these formations is for Latour primarily an epistemological fact, wh ich
he also celebrates as a discovery of the social studies of science. That it is at all a
discovery is justified by hirn theoretically in terms of the concept of modernity.
Latour poses as an ethnologist who returns from the tropics and applies the method
of structural anthropology to the modems. His characterization of müdernity is
therefore written not from the participant perspective but from the objectivistic
view of the ethnologist who examines modernity's strange tribe. He sees the main
constellation of modernity in the dichotomy of nature and society, the object pole
and the subject pole. He mentions God as a third reference point. The life of
modernity consists in constantly producing hybrids, that is, mixes between subject
and object, but at the same time maintaining the constellation, now nature, then
society, through "the work of purification." (Latour 1993, p 40). According to
Latour, the stability of this system is essentially guaranteed by the fact that the
production of hybrids is denied.
One could doubt whether this is in fact the case. After all, the human being is ex-
plicitly defined as a mix in the term "animal rationale." And that a thing such as an
air pump, or any technical object for that matter, is something between nature and
society would hardly be doubted by anyone. After all, nature itself, conceived of in
Kant's way as appearance, is constituted in its essential structures from the perspec-
tive of the subjecL Nevertheless. it must be granted to Latour that the polarity of sub-
ject and object, nature and society, is apresupposition of modernity; that, moreover,
grasping the given does indeed come about by "purification", that is, by breaking it
into subjective and objective parts in order then to "mediate" between them.
Now, Latour proposes a different conceptual model by means' of wh ich he
wishes to arrive at a new constitution of our European culture, which he calls
non modern (Latour 1993, pp 138-140). It consists in proceeding conceptually
I () Gernot Böhme

from the center, that is, from hybrids, and grasping nature and society as the
products of differentiation. In this way and only in this way will it be possible to
reach what was supposedly the goal of modernity: "continuous following of the
production of Nature, wh ich is objective, and the production of Society, which is
free." (Latour 1993, p 14 I). It is only in this way that we will really become modern
- or, depending on how one sees it, non modern. The modems found themselves in
astate of insincerity - of mauvaise fuie, to put it in Sartre's words. Wanting to
purify, they actually produced a proliferation of hybrids. If Bruno Latour criticizes
anything then it is the unimpeded proliferation of hybrids, and his declared aim is to
restrict this. Paradoxically, to achieve this he calls for unrestricted permission to
experiment with hybrids: "Every concept, every institution, every practice that
interferes with the continuous development of collectives and their experimentation
with hybrids will be deemed dangerous, harmful, and - we mayas weil say it -
immoraI." (Latour 1993, P 139). This can only be understood in terms of the belief
Latour draws from the stage of premodern cultures, namely, that the conscious
association with mixes restricts their manifoldness:
'"By saturating the mixes 01' divine. human and natural clemcnts with concepts, the premoderns
limit the practical expansion 01' these mix.::s. It is the impossioility 01' changing the social order
without modifying the natural order - and vice versa - that has ooligated the premoderns to
exercise the greatest prudence." (Latour 1993. p42).

Latour thus thinks that by consciously and explicitly allowing hybrids we can gatn
more freedom from them in the sense of freedom of choice. However, one wonders
whether this is not a superstition and one wonders in terms of what criteria such a
choice should be made.
What is impressive about Bruno Latour's large-scale project - like Haraway's
project - is above all the unreserved recognition of the state of our civilization. The
growing technologization of the human body is thematized more so in the concept
of cyborg than in the concept of hybrid because Latour's concept is essentially an
epistemological one. If one can describe what Latour calls hybridization also as a
growing technologization of nature on the one hand and society on the other, then
on the basis of what he argues, however, it becomes cIear that this is not only
a concrete process but affects the very conceptual frameworks characterizing
modernity. It is a matter of the obsolescence of those dichotomies, such as nature/
society, object/subject, that make up the constitution of modernity. In this way, they
therefore lose their incisiveness as instruments of critique: "The upper ground for
taking a critical stance seems to have escaped us." (Latour 1993, p43). '
This analysis is correct and therefore Latour's proposal to turn modern thinking
inside out, that is, to proceed conceptually from the center, has to be taken very
seriously. But one wonders whether he can in this way find a new basis for critique
or - to say it once more - a criterion for the choice between hybrids, which would
then no longer be termed hybrids.
What one actually finds in his book is nothing but the derision of all critique of
the advancing scientization and technologization of the Iifeworid as antimodern. 3

See in particular the section entitled "A Perverse Taste for the Margins." Latour (1993.
pp. 122-24).
 On Human Nature II

"[t is fine to want tu defend the claims of the sutTering body and human warmth against the
cold universality of scientific laws. But if universality stems from aseries of pI aces in wh ich
warm tlesh-and-blood bodies are suffering everywhere, is not this defence grotesque" Prutect-
ing human beings from the domination of machines and technocrats is a laudable enterprise.
but if the machines are full of human beillgs who find their salvation there, such a protectioll is
merely absurd." (Latour 193, p 124).

lt is thus evident that Bruno Latour - like Donna Haraway - simply becomes
affirmative in recognizing what is happening. The question arises as to whether his
call to proceed conceptually from the center might not be answered in the form of a
critical theory.

5
Sovereignty: Proceeding Conceptually from the Center

Thus the question is whether it is possible to construe the concept of human nature
in such a way that it makes it possible to stand firm against the advancing
technologization or the human being. It was seen that by simply referring to the fact
that nature is a fundamental topos in the old European understanding of the human
being is not enough because the concept of nature implied here has itself been
rendered obsolete by advancing technologization. Nevertheless, in the sense of a
provisional morality, reference to this topos is legitimate because its scope is after
all extensive enough to at least slow down the technologization of the human being
by introducing legislation. The new self-understanding of the human being, on the
other hand, cannot simply assurne nature to be a given state but has to consciously
integrate being natural [Natursein J into its own self-projection. Here, Latour is to
be followed: the differentiations of nature and society, subject and object, body and
soul have to be grasped as ones that are produced. However, it is to be assumed that
the production of an objective nature, which Latour takes over from the modems,
cannot be the goal when il is a matter of one's own nature, one's body [Leib]. This
nature is after all threatened by objectivization, that is, by scientific-technological
intervention. But he is however to be followcd in his assessment that it is important
to jump into the center.
Yet, we have been at the center all along, as the standard by which and through
wh ich nature and non-nature are separated. But in what way are we this center and
why do we first execute this separation in ourselves - e. g., as the separation
between animality and rationality? We are this center certainly not as hybrids -
e. g., as a composition of res extensll and res cogüans. For, as such, we appear only
retrospectively from the set poles. We are, I would say, this center in l)ur corzcerned
selj~givenness [betnJjfene SelbstgegeberzheitJ.
There are two elements in concerned self-givenness. We find or discover
ourselves here - in affective participation. Heidegger (1957) speaks here of care,
Hermann Schmitz (1968) calls this structure subjectivity. Concemed self-givenness
is primarily a corporeal sensing. This sensing is feeling - in the trivial sense of how
one feels at a particular moment - and is at the same time a finding of oneself in
particular surroundings - in a situation, in the broadest sense, in the world. In one's
own disposition [Befindlichkeit], however, one also senses appeals and. expecta-
12 Gernot Böhme

tions [AnmutunRen und ZumutunRen] that do not necessarily originate in the spatial
surroundings but might indeed spring from the social context.
What is decisive is that there is a tendency toward differentiation in concerned
self-givenness, toward a disjoining of subject and object. Ultimately, it is this that is
responsible for the fact that we ascertain that we are in a body which we have and
that we distinguish ourselves from this body in terms of an ego or a self that has it.
This tendency is clearest in negative experiences - sensing the burden of existence,
as Heidegger would say, particularly in pain. In sensing pain, the tendency to take
tlight is aroused, while at the same time the pain makes the inescapability of self-
givenness clear. After all, the tendency to take tlight leads to a gradual differentia-
tion and above all to a localization of the pain and thus to a progressive coping with
this pain. One is no longer simply consumed by the pain; rather, it is localized, for
instance, in the body and, in the next step, objectivized as parts of the body that
have to be treated, which is entrusted to doctors and/or medical-pharmacological
technology.4
One can see here how in fact the difference between object and subject is
produced. On the one side, the body in its state, which can be determined object-
ively by natural science, and in its capacity to be technically manipulated; on the
other side, the autonomous subject, which constitutes itself as the center of action
and projection. It can be seen how here there develops what Helmuth Plessner
(1981) analyzed as "eccentricity", the double character of being a body ILeibseinl
and having a body [Leibhabenl. Of course, it develops, it is not firmly given, and
being a body and having a body do not occupy the same level. Rather, being a body
in the sense of the corporeal or embodied [leiblich] sensing of concerned self-
givenness is more fundamental, whereas having a body - in German one should
now actually say "einen Körper haben" instead of "Leibhaben" - is first constituted
by a process of distancing.
Because the body and the autonomous ego are products of a differentiation from
the original concerned self-givenness, they cannot be assumed in any way to be
immovably given - its constellation always remains precarious. In insufferable
pain, in shock, lust, or through meditation, body and autonomous ego can indeed
disappear again, in regression to the original concerned self-givenness. 5 I claim that
sovereign human beings 6 will have to keep this possibility open. They will refuse
to stylize themselves into autonomous subjects, not only because this is an illusion
but also because they would lose contact with everything that atlects, that concerns
them. On the other hand, they will refuse to objectivize their corporeality [Leib]
completely into a body because they would lose their original self-givenness in
corporeal sensing.
It is of course a reasonable strategy to differentiate, from time to time and to a
certain degree, between objective body and autonomous subject. It is a way to cope
with the burden of existence, especially with pain and distress. But it is unreason-
able as soon as one is in danger of losing, because of it, the foundation of concerned

4 On this analysis, see Böhme (1986. pp. 229-249) and Böhme (1997 b. pp. 77-93).
5 On these processes of emancipation and regression. see Hermann Schmitz: Leib und Gefühl
(1989. pp. 78-83), and further pi aces in his "System der Philosophie".
6 On the concept of the sovereign human being, see Böhme (1994), chap. 19.
 On Human Nature 13

self-givenness. That has been traditionally called alienation. Today, however,

concrete possibilities of dissolving the human heing are looming - on the one hand,
the res cogitans stored as software and, on the other, the cyborgized body.
Sovereign human beings know in any case that the foundation of their participation
in the world and in the life of others is in their concerned self-givenness. They are
therefore ready in principle to accept pain and distress. The scholar of early
modernity Cardano recounts that he hit his legs in order to sense them.
In theconcept of a differentiation of the body and the autonomous subject from
original concerned self-givenness, on the one hand, and in the idea of the sovereign
human being, on the other, we have the theoretical-practical background for a
critical theory of human nature, one that makes it possible to put up resistance to the
unrestrained technologization of the human being. A critical theory stands out
formally as such in that it processes the phenomena to which it refers with double
concepts, and it is thereby kept safe from merely positivistically accepting given
conditions; instead, it can reconstruct the given under the auspices of reason-
able conditions. 7 The double concept for human nature is the pair "body" and
"corporeality."
Corporeality is the nature we are ourselves. It is what we experience in corporeal
sensing or, to put it better, it is this corporeal sensing itself. As the phenomenology
of corporeality has shown, embodiment has a complex structure and is the medium
of our concrete presence and participation in the world. We call corporeality that
nature that we ourselves are, in reference to the circumstance that we are given to
ourselves corporeally. In corporeal sensing, we also experience the fact that we are
never fully in command of ourselves, that we are constituted by that which we as an
ego are not. lt is precisely this which we can objectivize into a body by distancing it
from the ego.
The body is that which we can specify by relative localization in space and can
objectivize by processes of measuring and weighing and, more extensively, hy all
scientific methods. It is also what is called nature in the classical sense, namely, the
object of natural science.
The critical theory of human nature will always work with both concepts, with
body and corporeality. Their tension must be maintained, their meaning is not
reciprocally convertible, since other-givenness and self-givenness are categorially
separated. To objectivize human nature fully would mean violating the sovereignty
of the human being. Essentially, this consists in being given something the human
being is not in command of, being given it as something that constitutes this human
being. This means, if the dignity of the human being is interpreted as sovereignty,
then a consensus on limiting technological interference in human nature can be
founded on the basis of such a self-understanding.
Human dignity is threatened today by the technologization of the human body.
This leads to the fact that to be human must be defined no longer in demarcation
from animality or deity but in demarcation from the machine. Rephrasing a sen-
tence by means of which Albert Camus gives expression to Mediterranean thinking
and wh ich runs "To learn to live and to die and, in order to be a human being, to

7 On this, see Böhme (1998 b), chap. III.9 "Kritische Theorie."

14 Gernot Böhme

refuse to be a god", we would have to formulate the maxim of the sovereign human
being as folIows: 'To learn to live and to die and, in order to be a human being,
to refuse to be a machine."

6
Acknowledgements

This paper grew out of the research context of the Graduate College "Technisierung
und Gesellschaft" affiliated to the Dept. 01' Social and Historical Sciences at the
Technical University Darmstadt. My thanks are due to all the members of the Gradu-
ate College, especially Alexandra Manzei and Andreas Steiner, for stimulating
discussions.

7
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Beltz. Weinheim. pp92-116
Böhme G (1997 b) Leib: Die Natur, die wir selbst sind. In: Natürlich Natur, Suhrkamp. Frankfurtl
Main), 3. Autlage, pp 77-93
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Late Twcntieth Century. In: Simians. Cyborgs, and Women: The Rcinvention of Nature. Rout-
ledge, New York. pp 149-181
Hcidegger M (1957) Sein und Zeit. Niemeyer, Tiibingen [8 th edition J
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therapie C. H. Beck, München
Personalistic Organicism and the
Human Social Animal

Frederick Fem§

[ have been asked specifically to address the "Technicalization of Humans" as weIl

as to retlect on the cultural impact and ethical problems surrounding human nature.
[ welcome this additional assignment, since it is important to notice that both nature
amI human nature are capable of being "technicalized", that is, that both are open to
molding by intelligent purpose disciplined by method (Ferre 1988/1995). Reality in
general is plastic before purpose. Philosophers of technology too often take this
plasticity for gran ted and move on without retlecting on what it may me an for a
comprehensive theory of reality at large. Even more striking, from the viewpoint of
cultural impact and ethical problems, human reality is plastic before purpose.
Cognitive, genetic, and social manipulations are possible, and are actually being
practiced. How shall we understand this? What should we do about it?
[ plan to take just one example of the technicalization of humans - the prospcct
of human cloning - to use as thought-experiment and springboard throughout the
remainder of this paper. There could be no more extreme case of technicalization of
the human than engineering an artificial person. [ hope in this [ will be forgiven for
painting with a broad brush, but sometimes the big picture (the global theory) needs
urgent[y to be seen, not just the brush-strokes. This, [ believe, is one of those times.
I say this not simply with reference to the contributions assembled in this volume,
but also with regard to the present moment in human history, where great tectonic
plates of theory are on the move, grinding against each other. Orthodox modern
theories of reality - huge continental masses of beliefs and attitudes - have collided
in recent times with limits they cannot push aside. Cracks have broken in what onee
seemed solid rock, and frozen theory has onee again become molten from stresses
internal to itself. [n this more tluid moment [ would like to draw attention to a
theory [ eall "personalistic organicism", a coneeptual framework inspired by the
mathematician-philosopher, Alfred North Whitehead.
Here is what I plan. By retlecting on typically modern attitudes toward human
cloning, [ shall examine (in reverse order) the three great topies human experience,
human genetics, and human society - drawing attention to the orthodox modern
theory of reality within which these great topics are typieally set. Then I shall
suggest how personalistic organieism would eope differently with the cultural
impacts and ethical problems of the postmodern world into whieh, ready or not, we
are so quiekly moving.
It is only a matter of time, and perhaps not mueh time, before the first human in-
fant arrives, somewhere in the world, the product of purposeful cloning teehnique.
There are many ineentives (some noble, some mereenary, some simply internal
to the dynamies of science and biotechnology) for the cloning of human beings.
I accept this development as a high probability, though [ do not welcome it with joy
16 Frederick Ferrt~

becausc [ believc the modern world is not morally or metaphysically ready to

receive cloned persons into our midst. Since the appearance of [an Wilmut's little
lamb, Dolly, in February, 1997, [ have collected various reactions to the possible
technicalization of humans by cloning. One frequent theme reveals that many
modern people seem to imagine that clones, when they come, will be like zombies
- bereft of experience and cognition - suitable for being stored for use as living
organ farms, docile bearers of spare parts, such as hearts and lungs and kidneys,
designed for harvesting in case of need by the "parent" DNA provider. Personally, [
find this scenario deeply repulsive, but a number of my students seem to think that
organ-farming is one of the primary positive reasons for cloning humans; and
behind this reaction lies a major modern assumption about reality - about both
human reality and reality in general. The assumption is that basic reality, in what
might be called its "default state", is totally devoid of awareness.
There are opposite routes to this view. From one side, some (including many
religious people) are Cartesian dualists, who believe that the body is one thing and
the soul is another. Only the soul is capable of experience. Since clones are
artifacts, and humans have no way of manufacturing souls, clones will be living but
unaware, on this view. Rene Descartes, wel\-named Father of Modern Philosophy.
hirnself believed this of allliving tlesh exccpt the human, and justified vivisection
of cats and dogs on the ground that animals, though emitting the signs and sounds
of pain-behavior, are really only comp\ex automata, quite without interiority or
sensation.
From another side, others, in contrast, are modern materialists, who scoff at the
supernatural soul but still assurne that clones would have no interiority. Where
would it co me from? Consciousness in natural human beings is at best a mystery. if
it truly exists at all (and so me profess to doubt it, in keeping with modern scientific
principles excluding unverifiable subject matter), therefore why should theorists
multiply mysteries beyond necessity by imputing awareness and unverifiab\e
subjective states to clones?
The theory of reality [ call personalistic organicism completely reverses the
presumptions involved. As developed in the systematic works of Alfred North White-
head, this alternative approach takes experience not as a mystery but as a primary
fact. The only example of existence we can approach from inside - our own - is a
duration of awareness. That is, in first-hand experience we feet the pressure of an
immediate concrete past vectoring toward a less definite future. Sometimes human
experience is highly self-aware, conceptually sharp and clear, but not always - not
even most of the time, for Whitehead. Clarity of self-consciollsness is the excep-
tion, toward which (in our modern culture) we goad ourselves with the socially
approved chemieals in coffee, tea, or chocolate, and with much self-exhortation.
But high-grade or low, at same level, from foggy fumbles with the morning alarm to
the last drowsy moments before sleep (and even du ring sleep in dreams, whether
we remember them or not), experience is the actual default state of all directly
known existence. Whence the modern reversal? Why the prejudice against natur-
ally extending the only known default state to the rest of the uni verse?
There are many reasons - too many to discllss here (Fern! 1996). But we
should remember that no one knows for sure that aside from us (or perhaps from
big-brained animals) there is only darkness inside the entities that make up the
 Personalistic Organicism and the Human Social Animal 17

universe. Whiteheadian theory affirms continuity, some degree of sensitivity to

environment, some feeling-state, all the way down to the sub-atomic energetic
pulses that replicate themselves millions of times per second. Of course this does
not count as "thinking" or "consciousness". Such high grades of mentality require
the evolution of great organic complexities in which experience can be amplified,
transmitted, focused. But such a theory of continuity has the great advantage that it
makes thinking and consciousness not an alien mystery in the universe but nature's
natural t1owering.
The theoretical problem for Whiteheadian organicism, in fact, is just the reverse.
How account for the apparent insensitivity of so much in the universe') Lecterns,
pens, rocks, and the like, exhibit no trace of interiority, show no sign of sensitivity.
Why, on this theory? The ans wer is that such a theory does not hold that macro-
scopic inorganic things like these are capable of experiencing themselves, since
they are not selves. Awareness above the primitive atomic level depends on a
focused complexity provided by specific internal structure. Inertness, the absence
of interiority, is on this theory an emergent property, supervenient on the throbbing
vibrations of energetic moments characterized by low-level awareness.
What allows awareness to express higher and higher capabilities is the organi-
zation of these primary occasions of dynamic reality into societies of societies -
many-nested structures that are themselves dynamic and organically related. These
are the living things. In them complexity of organization allows vast amplification
of the experiential aspects that all primary things have. When organization includes
neural networks and eventually brains, higher and higher orders of experience
should be expected, on Whitehead's theory of organism. Even artifacts, futuristic
computers, for example, especially the so-ca lied "wet computers", if sufficiently
complex and capable of focusing streams of energetic pulses on central, self-
directive controlling nodes, would be acceptable candidates for their own sort of
self-awareness, on this view. So much the more so, then, living human clones,
being fully equipped with normal brains and glands and nervous systems. must be
assumed to be aware and intelligent. They will be human animals, just like their
makers in everything but the artificiality of their origin. They will feel pain, have
hopes, know frustration and fulfillment. The popular confusion of clones with
zombies. inert organ farms passively awaiting "sacrifice" for their DNA makers, is
as out of order theoretically as it is repellant morally.
The second great theme dealt with in this volume, ret1ecting on the wonderful
advances of understanding in human genetics, both systematic and evolutionary,
reminds me of a second great myth concerning the technicalization of humans by
cloning. That myth, widely shared by the press and by modern public opinion, is
that cloning will allow us to engineer the reproduction of Einsteins or Napoleons,
or at least basketball players and soldiers, contentedly fulfilling life-roles shaped by
designer genes that fully seal their fate. This myth is fed by another great meta-
physical assumption of modern thinking, the assumption that the default state of all
events is deterministic, not in the least detail free. Quantum physics has somewhat
shaken this modern deterministic orthodoxy among the scientifically literate, but
(we are told) the sort of micro-randomness found in quantum events is a far cry
from meaningful freedom, and macro-events (so modern thinking defends its
Newtonian preferences) are entirely unaffected by the underlying indeterminism.
18 Frederick Fern~

There fore , so it is argued, the techniques of human cloning will allow us soon to
realize what were only fantasies in the book, Brave New World, or the film, The
Boys jrom Brazil. Worker-c1ones, soldier-clones, artist-clones, inventor-c1ones - all
will soon spring from our genetic designing table.
Again a widespread theory of reality, deeply rooted in the founders of modern
thought, founders as diverse as Hobbes and Descartes, Leibniz and Newton needs
to be challenged. And again Whitehead's philosophy of organism provides what I
believe is the best antidote. We need to be careful here, since his organicism does
not impute much "freedom" to the basic events of physical reality. On the contrary,
Whitehead stresses the stability of the physical order as it has evolved into massive
self-replicating structures in this cosmic epoch. But as each primat event has a tiny
modicum of mentality - the capacity to feel and respond to its immediate environ-
ment - so, to that extent, is rooted the possibility for ever-greater and more signi-
ficant degrees of freedom. Freedom is not an all-or-nothing proposition. Even
humans, whose mental capacities are the greatest in the known uni verse, are far
from constantly or dominantly free. lust as our experience is by no means constant-
Iy c1ear and self-conscious, so our actions are tor the most part routine, predictable,
and habitual. We are limited by our external circumstances and our physical make-
up. This much a realistic organicist theory concedes - insists on - in the direction of
determinism. But just as our experience is not always dim but sometimes rises to
vibrant ment~1i c1arity, in which remote possibilities play significant roles in our
planning and decision-making, so also our behavior is sometimes led by mentally
entertained norms rather than forced by ingrained habit alone. Other large-brained
organisms also doubtless have some degrees of freedom, too, but human symbolic
freedoms, thanks to the evolution of language, provide vastly more precision and
power to thought - and therefore to control by mentality. In the enculturation of
humans into language, and especially in the mind-enlarging disciplines of educa-
rion, the scope of possibility is literally expanded and freedom is increased. Contrari-
wise, illness or denial of access to mental growth diminish human freedom.
If this is true, why not then opt for a theory of reality that makes it intelligible?
We also know that genetic makeup does not uniquely determine the human person.
Scott Gilbert (in this volume) trumps my intended example of identical twins with
his even better example of Siamese twins, who though sharing the same intra-
uterine environment and also, of grim necessity, sharing precisely the same life-
world environment, still turn out to be quite different people. Ir there is any
consensus among the contributions to this volume, it is the deconstruction of the
idea that genetics is fate. Therefore clones, who are genetically twins who do not
share the same uterine environment and do not share family upbringing or even the
same years of growth and nurture, certainly will be far more different from their
DNA-donor "parent" than twins are different from each other. So much for the
myth of Einsteins on demand.
Here, while discussing personal uniqueness, I need to say a word about what
makes my proposed personalistic organicism different from other forms of organi-
cist theory. For a while I tried to work wholly within the organicist tradition,
developing an environmental ethics resting solelyon the categories of healthy
organic life (Fern~ 1976). But on further reflecrion, I became aware of the dangers
in thinking too exclusively about the well-being of the whole (Fern! 1989). Without
 Personalistic Organicism and the Human Social Animal 19

some strong counter-pressure, individuals making up the whole tend to be neg-

lected or sacrificed too quickly. In this century we have seen Fascism, Naziism, and
Communism putting into horrific practice just such unbalanced theories, holding
that the good of the whole (as their leaders defined it) is everything and the indi-
vidual, nothing. Even so me otherwise admirable environmental thinkers err by
stressing in unguarded ways that the sole ethical standard should be, as Aldo
Leopold put it, that: HA thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stab-
ility, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise"
(Leopold 1966). If accepted literally, this could in principle justify new forms of
Ecofascism and genocide, in which whole human populations could legitimately be
exterminated if they are found guilty of thrcatening the integrity, stability, and
beauty of the biotic community. There is something too precious about human
persons to apply to them standards that might be perfectly appropriate for insects
or tadpoles. My "personalistic" qualifier on Whitehead's organicism is designed
to defend against such terrible distortions. It is meant to remind us of the incom-
parably precious qualities of personal (in contrast to simply organic) experience.
The personal is unique, vivid, self-aware, complex in its interweavings of possibili-
ti es and actualities; it is free; it is morally responsib!e; it is owed moral obligations
and is capable of c1aiming legitimate rights. Ontological!y, admittedly, it is at the
far end a long continultm shared with !esser modes of experience; valuational!y,
however, the experiential achievements and possibilities found at the personal end
of this ontological spectrum are so wondrous as to be special in kind and deserving
of highest honor, nurture, and protection.
Personalistic organicism provides a theoretical bulwark against fascistic dis-
tortions of holism, then, but in so doing does not open the door to thc excesses of
individualism that threaten to atomize and disintegrate modern free-market socicty.
Personalistic organicism is stil! a type of organicism, in which al! things are rooted
in real relations. Persons, human societies, are no exceptions. The human animal is
social. And with this we turn to thc third great theme: the theme involving anthro-
pology and sociology. But let us not forget, in this social domain, the so-called
"dismal science" of economics. One of the key anthmpological facts about our
modern society is that it is largely driven by economic realities and Icd by eco-
nomic thinking. The current global marketplace is humanity's largest institution,
and most pervasive. Thc power of economic models on modern visions of rcality is
illustrated by how often human clones are reduced to economic categories.
In the United States, the Supreme Court has declared it legal to file patents on
genetically engineered Iife forms. One of the first questions that modern reductive
materialism asks, then, is whether human clones will be paten ted products, owned
by the laboratories or universities responsible for their production. Huge sums are
potential!y at stake. Those who hold the patents on popular rock star or basketball
player designs could expect to reap enormous rewards. To whom will the clones
belong? Surely not to the surrogate mothers whose wombs are ren ted for the
requisite term of months. Then will ownership fall to the DNA-donor on whom the
clone was patterned? But why should the donation of a bit of tissue warrant the
ownership of the resulting c10ned individual? Perhaps the tissue was chosen
anonymously, or without consent. Would it make the DNA-donor-parent respons-
ible for the costs of college education for his or her cloned twin? One can imagine
20 Frederick Fern!

cases of the most intimate cummitment amI concern. For example, a woman bio-
technologisr might take so me of her own Lissue and in her laboratory clone an
embryo wh ich she could then implant and bring to term in her own womb. She
would then become the mother of her own twin self. Besides i1lustrating the new
technological irrelevancy of males, this thought-experiment would indeed warrant
in highest degree a kind of "ownership", but not merely of the economic kind.
Indeed, this is my point. Modern economic models tend to be atomistic and
reductionist. The theoretical image of the "economic man (or woman)" is out for
self-gratification, is the ultimate consumer. Everyone is in competition with every-
one else. Everything is for sale. The value of goods - even of intangibles and
environmental commons - is represented by the "bottom line" of profit or loss. De-
cisions are made by "cost-benefit analysis" in which all values, to be counted, need
to be quantified in terms of money. Little wonder, therefore, that early thinking
about human clones turns on the amounts of money that can be made by supplying
various sorts of demand - from the need of childless couples for children, to the
need of military dictators for foot soldiers, to the need of ill people for organ trans-
plants, to the insatiable need of the public for entertainment, and so on ad infinitum.
Clones, on this reductionist model, are seen first and last as commodities.
More generally, this retlex regarding clones isjust one example ofthe commodi-
fication of the uni verse by modern economic reductionism. Chickens, pigs, and
cows are recognized as valuable commodities, but if their well-being is protected
at all (as it often is not) regulations are justitied as "protecting an asset" rather than
in term~ of the intrinsic capacity for suffering and frustration that these living
organisms possess. Trees are seen as board feet of lumber. Laborers are seen as
"hands."
Personalistic organicism would allow critical distinctions to be made. Certainly
trees and animals are sometimes commodities. If we live in ecological relatedness
on the earth, we live in an ecosystem that runs on an energy-tlow in wh ich the food-
chain forms a great, legitimate part. But if we live in the spirit of personalistic
organicism, we recognize that our environment is made up not merely of means for
our satisfactions but also of ends in themselves. We will dfirm our part in the food
chain, but we will at the same time protect those dependent on us from unnecessary
frustration and pain. We will recognize that we are served by many commodities,
but that not all of them are merely commodities, and that to the extent they have
value in themselves we owe them - appropriate to their kind - due respect, nurture,
and protection.
As to the human clones, when they arrive, personalistic organicism will insist
that the reductionist economic model be wholly discarded, in favor of a personal ist
honor for the real human persons they will become. No one should be allowed to
patent a human being; no one should be allowed to own a human being. The unique
quality of personal experience, the freedom of human existence, demands that
clones, when they arrive, be recognized as fully part of the great human adventure,
sharing our germ-li ne and culture, and thus fully owed the rights, privileges, and
responsibilities of human life.
In the end, I do not bitterly oppose the coming of the clones. When they come,
they will be the product of intelligent purpose. They will represent to the highest
degree the technicalization of the human, since they will be, quite literally, artificial
 Personalistic Organicism and the Human Social Animal 21

people - that i.';, people who would not exist except through artifice. But artificial
things are not unreal. These will be /"('ul persons, real human animals, while also
artificial. To be artificial is not to be unreal. But while I have nothing against the
making of artificial people in the right way, for the right reasons, at the right time, I
do not believe the time is right. I oppose the bringing of human clones into a world
where thinking is dominated by bad metaphysical theories that will have bad
consequences far them. That is, I oppose bringing cloned humans into a context of
metaphysical materialism where subjective experience is problematic, of Illeta-
physical determinislll where freedom is denied, and of metaphysical reductionism
where full moral status, against the presumptions of commodification, is not
guaranteed.
Personalistic organieism, in contrast, otTers a world view - agIobaI concept for
orientation - in which real experience, real intrinsic value, is acknowledged, in
which varying degrees of freedom can be affirmed as a natural possibility, and in
which persons warrant high moral respect without undermining the solidarity of
society. Must we wait for the arri val of clones in order to see the merits of this
theoretical foundation for the world of our children. natural and artificial? For my
part, I prefer not to wait.

References

Fern: F (1988/1 (95) Philosoph" o( Tecill/ology. Prentice-Hall (I (88) and The University of
Georgia Press (I (95)
Ferrc F (1996) Beillg lIlId Val!/(': Towlird II COlIsl/"llclil'e Posil/wdall Melajlh\'Sics. State Uni-
versity of Ncw York Press
Ferrc F (1976) SlllIjlillg Ihe F//I//re: Reso//rcesjiJr Ihe PosI-Modem WorM Harper & Row
Fern: F ( 1989) Ohstacles on the Path to Organismic Ethics: So m.; S.;cond Thoughts. EIl\'imlllllell-
lai Elhics (Vol. 11. No. 3. 1989). pp 231-241
Leopold A (1966) A Sand County Almanac: With Essays on Conscrvation from Round Rivcr.
New York: Ballentine Books. p 262
Genetics, Embodiment and Identity

Christoph Rehmann-Sutter

1
The Metaphysical Genome

"Why is it okay to experiment on Homo troglodytes, but not on Homo sapiensT' -

This is the provocative question posed by Jared Diamond at the end of a chapter in
wh ich he points out the amazing genetic proximity of ehimpanzees and humans.
Only 1.6 percent of our DN A is really 'ours'. "The remaining 98.4 pereent of
our DNA is just normal chimp DNA." (Diamond (1992); guotes from pp 23
and 31.)
The question is provoeative far several reasons. The first, and perhaps the most
obvious, lies in the taxonomie name Homo troglodytes, suggesting an alternative
classification of chimpanzees that relates them to humans. In textbooks we find
Pan troglodytes given as the name for 'common chimpanzee', Pan indiearing a
different genus from Homo. Diamond justifies his reclassification by the very
shortness of the genetic distance. Gorillas, next in the order of percentage dif-
ference in DNA, are about 2.3 percent away from us, while the two chimpanzee
species - common and pygmy ehimps - share all but 0.7 pereent of their DNA.
These numbers are a result of DNA hybridisation studies, where the 'melting
point' of pure DNA of one species is compared with that of mixed, hybrid DN.\.
The difference between the lower melting point of the hybrid and the higher
melting point of the pure DNA, ~ T, is taken as a measure of the percentage uf
matching between the two DNA probes hybridized. As it turns out, a melting point
lowered by one degree centigrade (~T= J Oe) means that the DNAs differ by
roughJy J pereent. This percentage differenee between DNAs ean be related to the
evolutionary time of independent development. Assuming a constant rate of
mutation, the percentage ean be read as a molecular cluek indicating evolutionary
time. Gorillas must have separated from our eommon aneestors several millions of
years earlier than humans and ehimpanzees did. We are "just a third species of
chimpanzee", concludes Diamond. ([bid., p 23.)
Seeond, the guestion provokes because Diamond considers the strong moral
implications of this new taxonomie assessment. Thc reordering of nature might
result in a reardering of the moral universe. The use of chimpanzees for medieal
testing, even for lethai experiments, whieh is still widely aeeepted as a neeessary
step in the development of biomedical technology, would lose its legitimacy if the
separation between humans and ehimpanzees eould no longer be interpreted as a
morally relevant ontologieal differenee, so that killing beeomes murder and eating
becomes eannibalism. ([bid., p 30.) How can ditferenees in DNA aceount for the
eurrent radieal moral divide?
24 Christoph Rehmann-Sutter

In order to find an answer to this we need to understand what DNA does; and we
need to understand how Diamond understands what DNA does. There is a scientific
aspect to this. Diamond points to differences in the phenotypic impact of DNA
differences depending on the particular function of the sequences concerned. Some
differences in DNA might have a high impact - like having the Tay Sachs gene or
not - where others have none. There even seems to be a kind of 'junk' DNA, which
is highly repetitive in sequence and is never transcribed into RNA and translated
into proteins. We do not know wh ich sections of the genome are crucial in account-
ing for the observed differences between humans and chimps. But it seems possible
that those differences - which are considerable - are due to 1.6 percent of DNA.
But there is another, philosophical aspect. The differences mentioned so far are
purely quantitative or struetural. They do not aceount for the radical ontological
difference and the consequent divide in moral perception. To understand this we
need to know about Diamond's ontological account of DNA, his genome meta-
physics. He writes: "Our important visible distinctions from the other chimps - our
upright posture, large brains, ability to speak, sparse body hair, and peeuliar sexual
lives - must be concentrated in a mere 1.6 percent of our genetic program." (Ibid.,
p 23) Here he explains what he expects DNA to be in the context of the whole
organism, its development and function: DNA sequences are synonymous with the
'genetic program' . This is indeed a 'total view' of DNA. As a 'program' for what an
organism will beeome, or for its ontogeny, DNA sequenees are responsible for each
developmental step, each structural particularity, eaeh programmed behavioural
gesture. They define what the organism iso The sequences contain an account of the
nature 01' the organism. And thus, DNA must be a material carrier for the nature 01'
the organism itself. The nature of chimpanzees and the nature of human beings are
encoded in DNA.
Considering this as a metaphysical theory, we have the tools to understand the
step from sequenee eomparisons to moral assessment: The tertium comparationis is
the ontologieal account. Sequence differenees in DNA are seen as indicators of a
differenee in the ontological structure, or the 'nature' of the beings. And moral
status is seen as dcpendent on the ontological qualities of a being. Removing a dif-
ference in ontological qualities (motivated by DNA similarity) means removing a
difference in moral assessment. What was customary - the legitimate use of
chimpanzees for the sake of developing cures für human diseases - eeases to be
aeceptable.
The focal point of this chapter lies in the ambiguity of the term 'nature'. Humans
are described by the natural seiences as 'nature' in the first sense: as objects of
scientific research. The 'nature' of something is also an ontological term describing
what something is considered to he. in one's account of the world. For us, speaking
and self-interpreting animals, our 'nature' is discussed as our 'identity': how we
identify ourselves. Genes, DNA, the genome seem to play an outstanding role in the
contemporary diseourse of identity, and in this sense of human nature. Perhaps
Diamond's assessment of this role will turn out to be one-sided or false and be
replaeed by a better genome theory, one that comes even c10ser to the eutting edge
of moleeular biology and developmental geneties. Genome theories say something
about how we should think of ourselves, about who we are, about what makes us
what we are.
 Genetics, Embodiment and Identity 2S

I want to di:.;cuss a distinction between two different ways 01' interpreting DNA.
üne is weil known, but should nevertheless be clarified. I will call it the 'progmm'
theory 01' DNA. The second is not yet so weil known but can be developed by
exploring the opposite 01' the claim that information pre-exists in development. The
ehoiee between the two resulting DNA theories turns out to be a philosophieally
fundamental one. In sections 2 and 3 I begin by analysing the progmlIl view.
Seetion 4 gives an example from developmental geneties, arbitmrily chosen and
perhaps rather strange, but nonetheless illustrative. Section S sketches the alter-
native view, here caIIed a 'systemic' approach. The final sections 6 and 7 diseuss
and evaluate so me anthropological implications 01' the ehoice between 'program'
and 'systemic' theories 01' DNA.

2
Anatomy of Programs

2.1
The 'Genetic Program'

The eharaeteristic term in Diamond's aeeount 01' the genome's role in the organism
is, as we have seen, the not ion ofthe 'genetic progmm'. What ean this mean? Let us
examine more closely the sentenee where the idea appears.
"Our ... visible distinctions from thc othcr chimps ... must be '" [in I our gcnctic program."

The genetie program is used as a causal explanation for the 'visible distinetions·.
The visible distinetions 'are' somehow in this program. In it, they must be represen-
ted invisibly. 'Program ' must be a metaphor for how the invisible representations
can be understood as beeoming real and visible. An analysis 01' the sentenee
quoted shows that in order to make sense, the notion 01' the genetic program must
contain the idea 01' a way 01' transforming invisible representations into visible
di1'1'erenees.
Furthermore, the genetic program is associated with the sequence 01' the DNA,
just as the marks on a sheet 01' paper can be the visible, material representation 01'
language. There1'ore, the genetic progmm must be an ontological concept giving an
explanation 01' the ontogeny 01' living organisms; more precisely, 01' ontogeny as a
proeess 01' transforming invisible representations into the phenomenal organism.

2.2
Regularities

11' we are to explain this further we can look at the word 'program " which comes
from the Greek programma, meaning (I) public proclamation, or notice, edict; (2)
order 01' the day, agenda; (3) title 01' a prescription, address 01' a letter; (4) injunc-
tion, advice (Liddell/Scott (1968) p 1473). Today, we use the word program for
things such as computer software, lists 01' musie pieces in coneerts, the intended
actions 01' a politieal party, etc. In aII these examples, the program is something that
stands 'apart from' (beneath, behind, in, above, beside etc.) the sequence 01' real
26 Christoph Rehmann-Sutter

events, that are programmed. 1 The program is separate from and can exist on a
different level of reality from the programmed events: A pattern of "I' and '0', or
magnetisation patterns on a diskette vs. the function of an information processing
computer; writing vs. political action. The relation between DNA and the organism
might be explainable in a paraIIel way. H. F. Nijhout, in a critical retlection on the
status of the metaphor of the program, expressed this idea as folIows: "The very
orderly process of development and the tlawless repetition of an identical and
complex sequence of developmental steps in countless individuals suggests the
existence of an underlying program." (Nijhout (1990), P442.)
But how can this make sense? Is the fact that something behaves regularly and in
a foreseeable way a reason for us to assume the existence of an underlying program?
Nijhout himself gives an example of a different kind of regularity: "[AI bouncing
baII consists of aseries of causal reactions, but this does not mean that the baII is
programmed to bounce, nor is it useful in an analysis of the physics of bouncing to
suppose that such a program might ex ist." (Ibid.) Bouncing is simply bouncing, not
the expression of an underlying program to bounce. Why is this taken for granted in
phenomena of the bouncing type and rejected in phenomena of the developmental
type? Both are regularities, both depend on factors within the moving system and on
factors from outside, both demand an explanatory account.
Part of the answer may lie in the cultural tradition. Bouncing baIIs are consider-
ed simply as moving matter, whereas the development of organisms is considered
as a process of realising the lire of animated beings. The anima of animals
originaIIy fulfiIIed the ontological function that has been taken over by the genetic
program.~ The two quest ions - why Iiving beings were considered to have a soul,
and why they are considered to have an underlying program - are related.
This observation does not answer the questions but it does at least point to where
the reasons might be found. The same type of reasons why living beings but not
bouncing balls are seen as animated might explain why living beings are seen as
programmed.

2.3
The 'Logic' of Life

The concept of the "genetic program' gives a straightforward explanation of how

developmental regularities might come about. It is not the only possible expla-
nation, but certainly the one that (in a broad range of variants) acquired the greatest
popularity in the second half of the 20th century. Franc;ois Jacob, in his book of
1970, La logique du vivant, has contributed much by coining and refining this
genome metaphysics. Before him, Erwin Schrödinger's Dublin lecture of 1943,
What is life"! introduced the term 'code' (and the model of Morse code) to explain
how one can imagine the information-carrying role of an 'aperiodic crystal'

With the exception of radio or TV broadeasts, where ,the program' is not only used for indieat-
ing the sequenee or section of films and shows which can be communicated in advance as a list
but also for the show itself.
2 Cf. the faseinating analysis of the role ascribed to DNA in American popular culture by Nelkin
and Lindee ( 1995).
 Genetics, Embodiment and Identity 27

moleeule. In Schrödinger's view, this code represents a precise developmental plan

for the organism, and also contains the means of achieving its realisation. 3 Jacob
explained the idea of the program explicitly using the computer as a model. "Le
programme represente un modele emprunte aux calculatrices electroniqlles. II
assimile le materie I genetiqlle d'un oeuf a la bande magnetique d'un ordinateur."
(Jacob (1970), P 17) The magnetic tape has a steering role for the behaviour of the
machine, defining the norms of reaction to predetermined kinds of environmental
stimuli. For the computer, the stimuli can be the commands and data typed in (at the
right time and in the right order) on the keyboard. For the organism, such stimuli
can be biochemical and structural elements of the state of the organic system itself
at a given time, or elements of the inner and outer environment transformed by
sensory devices into signals. Jacob described the point of similarity between the
magnetic tapes of computers and DNA of organisms are similar as folIows: "Ie pro-
gramme evoque une serie d'operations a effectuer, la rigidite de leur succession
dans le temps, le dessin qui les sous-tend." (lbid.) According to this formulation, we
have three kinds of things determined and 'evoked': (I) aseries of operations;
(2) the rigidity of their succession in time, in part depending on determined types of
stimuli; and (3) the plan for the spatiotemporal structure of the organism, which
itself makes those operations possible.
Jacob also sees significant differences between magnetic tapes in computing
devices and the DNA of organisms. These differences are essential elements or
Jacob's model of the genetic program (Ibid., pp 17 ff.). (i) The magnetic tJ.pe is
accessible to (intentional) change, whereas DNA is not accessible for the storage of
acquired experiences. (ii) The instructions ofthe machine program do not affect the
physical structure of the parts of the machine running the program, whereas the
instructions of an organism determine the production of its own constituents. (iii)
The genetic program often does not determine precisely how and to what the organ-
ism will react. There are phenomena of regeneration, or structural modification by
the milieu. Often, the program establishes the limits between which the milieu can
have an effect, or it gives the organism the capacity to react adequately to a situa-
tion, or the capacity to take up new pieces of information that are not 'inborn '.
A computer program lacks such a tlexible openness.
Comparing different authors, we find different uses of the term 'genetic
program '. Even Fran<;ois Jacob himself substantially changed his ideas about the
program in his later writings, after turning his research interests to multicdlular
organisms and to questions of developmental biology. La [ogique du vivant retlects
the experiences of a bacteria geneticist. In a review paper of 1977 on the mouse
teratocarcinoma system he finds, for instance, that the instructions of the T/t
complex on chromosome 17, which is partly responsible for the behaviour of
teratocarcinoma cells, modify the surface structures of the cells in ditferent
developmental stages. Parts of the DNA determine components on the surface of
the cells that effect reactions in neighbouring cells, wh ich in turn seem to have an
effect on the activity pattern of the genes, i.e. they intluence the time and sequence
in wh ich different genes are turned 'on' and 'off'. In the introduction to that paper

Schrödinger (1944); cf. Keller (1995). Kay (1998; 1997) shows how language metaphors have
been introduced into biology.
28 Christoph Rehmann-Sutter

he states: "AlthOL~gh the basic prineiples at work in this process [development of

the embryo 1remain unknown, it seems clear that cellular interactions, and therefore
eell surface struetures, are in so me way involved in .the unfolding of the genetie
program."4
The crueial terms in this quote for our question, however, are 'in some way
involved'. This expression could be interpreted in two different ways - which lead
to quite different lines of argument in the philosophieal theory of developmental
geneties. The first interpretation, whieh I might eall the conservative approach, sees
this 'involvement' of cell surface structures and the interaction between them as
part of the execution machinery of the program but not as part of the program itself.
They could be compared to the flow of electricity in a cable between two different
electronic components of the computer. This flow of eleetricity would be consid-
ered as neeessary for the funetion of the machine and for the program to be played
but not as a constitutive element of the program itself. The eonservative approach
tries to keep the idea of a genetic program, consisting of instructions encoded in
DNA sequences on the chromosomes. The other interpretation, wh ich I might call
the expansivp approach, sees the involvement of cell surface struetures and their
interactions as part of the program itself. Evidence of the involvement of cell-cell
interaction, of 'communication' between cells carrying the same load of genes,
would be taken as a reason to expand the concept of the genetic program to include
those interactions. In this line of argument the very idea of the genetic program is
ehanged radically. The program is no longer restricted to something inherited from
the ancestors via their gift of DNA, but has its reality in the interactions of the cell
living with this DNA. The reality of the genetic program would be the phenotype:
the genetic program would cease to be constrained to the genotypical level. Jacob
has chosen this second line of argument, as becomes clear in his later works. 5
But let us remain with the eonservative approach for a while. It corresponds to a
popular view of DNA and its role in the organism, wh ich we encountered in Jared
Diamond's enthusiastic use of genetic distances. We have seen clearly what the
term 'program' ean mean: more precisely, we have taken a closer look at one
(intluential) version of ideas about program. The scientific and popular discourses
over the last five decades have actually produced a family of more or less closely
related program theories, and my reeonstruetion cannot claim to cover them all.
What I want to present now is my somewhat subjective assessment of what could
be the philosophieal eore of this family of program theories. Perhaps no single
author has put it explieitly like this. My question is why the program metaphor was
(and still is)O so attraetive as an explanation of the role of DNA. What were the

4 Jacob (1977), p. 3; I am grateful to Michel Morange (1999) for this reference.

See Jacob (1982), where he speaks evcn of the orgwzislIl illstrllcrillg itself to build its organs
(e.g. p.44), while keeping up the idea of the genetic program.
In today's newspaper I can read an article about early development in the plant Arahidopsis
(Stöcklin 2000): "patemal genes have nothing to say" - hence, genes are speaking. "Early
embryonic development is steered predominantly by matemal genes." - So, what they say are
instructions, commands steering and controlling dcvelopment. The title of the corresponding
publication in Nature carries a different message: "Delayed activation of the patemal genome
during seed development" (Vielle-Calzada et al. 2(00).
 Genetics, Embodiment and Identity 29

factors or elements that made it a suitable solution to the metaphysical challenge set
by the discovery of DNA as the genetic material?

3
Bottlenecks

3.1
The Background Picture tor DNA

I think the answer can be found when we go back to the world 01' ideas which was
present in hereditary ("transmission') genetics. There, we had the problem 01' how
the form and characters of organisms are transmitted over generations. August
Weismann's discovery of the germ line VS. soma distinction has reduced the
problem to one 01' single cells. The generations were seen as connected only by two
lines of germ cells fusing into a zygote. The multicellular organism, i.e. the living
creatures we encounter in nature and which we ourselves are, is a lateral outgrowth
from this germ line, determined for mortality.
The production of the individuals of the next generations was seen as the
achievement of the germ cells and the zygote. This is the dominating background
picture of 20th-century genomics (Fig. I): Germ cells and the zygote form a
bottleneck within the sequence of heredity. The old question of how humans
reproduce humans, horses horses, and peas peas has been transformed into the
question of how germ cells and their fusion product, the zygote, can reproduce a
new individual of the same species from which they themselves were derived. The
term 'gene' was introduced in 1909 by Johannsen precisely to serve this function. 7

Individual A
~ sperm
generation x- J

Individua; C
zygote ~ gelIeratioll x

Individual B
egg
generation x- J

Fig.1. The hereditary bottleneck (cell version):

A background picture far 20th-century genamies.

7 Juhannsen (1913), p.I~3f. "Es hat ja nie bezweifelt werden können, dass die Geschlechts-
zellen - die Gameten. wie man jetzt mit einem gemeinsamen Namen für Ei- und Spermazelle
sagt - in ihrer Konstitution "etwas" haben, welches den Charakter des durch die Befruchtung
gegründeten Organismus bedingt - selbstverständlich im Zusammenspiel mit dem ganzen
,Milieu'''. [ ... ] "Das Wort Gen ist also völlig frei von jeder Hypothese. Es drückt nur die Tat-
sache aus, dass Eigenschaften des Organismus durch besondere, jedenfalls teilweise trennhare
und somit gewissermaßen selbständige "Zustände", "Faktoren", "Einheiten" oder "Elemente"
in der Konstitution der Gameten und Zygoten - kurz, durch das was wir eben Gene nennen
wollen - bedingt sind."
30 Christoph Rehmann-Sutter

Genes are the factors - whatever their exact physical nature - that are delivered in
germ cells from generation to generation and determine the form and character of
the new individual organism. 'All genes of the zygote' together were later sum-
marized in expressions like 'genome' or 'genetic material'. The experiments of
Os wald Avery and Fred Griffith's group in the early I 940s and - more decisively -
those performed by Alfred Hershey and Martha Chase on bacteria and phages in
1952, provided irresistible evidence that the physical basis of these genes is not
protein but nucleic acid: DNA was established as the genetic material (Goodenough
(1978), pp 17-23).
The hereditary bottleneck consequently proved to bc even more narrow (Fig. 2).
The effective factor connecting generations is not acelI, nor an organelle, but a kind
of molecule contained predominantly in the nucleus.

Individual A
~ IhDNAA
generation x·1

Individual C
DNA C ~ generatio/l x

Individual B
112 DNA B
gl'neration x-I

Fig.2. The hcrcditary buttlcneck (DNA version).

In the case of even the simplest organisms, bacteriophages, wh ich lack the capacity
for autarchic self-reproduction, a DNA molecule is injected through the cell
membrane of the host bacterium. This phage DNA changes the metabolism of the
host cell and co-opts its protein synthetic machinery to synthesize phage constitu-
ents. Replicas of the phage chromosome are enveloped in protein coats (Cf. Stent
(1963». The phage model played a substantial role in the conceptual development
in early molecular biology (Cf. Judson (1995». A second factor was the parallel
development of information thenry, cybernetics and automata theory, whose inno-
vations reflected the exchange of essential ideas with molecular biology. especially
with bacteria and phage genetics. lohn von Neumann's formal theory of self-
reproducing automata, wh ich he developed from the early I 940s primarily through
his relationship with Norbert Wiener (Kay (1997), P 65), led to the explanation of
genes essentially as an information tape. H When DNA proved to be the material
basis of genes, the function of those genes (and now DNA) was already established
within an earlier theoretical frarnework. The DNA version of the 'bottleneck of
heredity' was the background pieture giving way lo later DNA-centrist views and to
DNA essentialism.

von Neumann ( 1951), pp. 25-31; cf. Kay (1997), p. 72.

 Genetics, Embodiment and Identity 31

3.2
The Needs of the Bottleneck Problem

The concept of the genetic program could fulfil the needs of this model. This need
consists mainly of the following elements: (I) The total function should represent a
self-reproducing biologica! automaton. This is the fundamental methodological
commitment 01' modern (Cartesian) biology and was taken for granted by scientists
contributing to the program model: the explanatory goal of molecular biology is to
render unnecessary both vitalist assumptions (nonphysical 'forces' that steer living
processes) and external, intelligent interventions (God as creator). (2) A new
organism of the same kind, but with the possibdity of variation, should be produced
after passage of DNA through the bottleneck. (3) This new organism performs
growth, differentiation, metamorphosis, behaviour, ageing (etc.). Hence, it is not a
static mechanism that must be reproduced by itself, but a dynamic system, whose
own structure is subject to change. What role and function must be attributed to
DNA in order to fulfil these three needs of the model?
The first key concept is representafion: The information needed to budd a new
organism must somehow be contained in DNA sequences. The language metaphor
is a considerable aid to imagination: DNA sequences contain a 'code'; the four bas-
es are its '!etters'. Base triplets are three-Ietter 'words' (ete) Cells contain a reading
machinery for genetic words. The form and structure including all molecular details
can be represented in the DNA 'Ianguage' as a 'blueprint' or 'plan'. The molecular
machinery 01" the cell must be able to transform this plan from DNA 'Ianguage' into
three-dimensional reality, i.e. it must 'realize' or 'implement' the plan. Because the
organism is (according to the third need of the model) a process rather than a static
construction, the plan must represent these dynamics as weil. The word 'program'
was found to indicate precisely this: the representation of a process. This is the
second element necessary for solving the problem: DNA must contain, somehow
encoded in its sequential structure, a representation of the developmental proccss.
The term (genetic) 'program' indicates precisely this.
Representation can occur at different levels of abstraction or codification. Theo-
retically, representation could be (i) realised by description. In that case, the genetic
program would contain an encoded image of the organic structure-in-change.
Mo!ecular biology makes such an idea extremely improbable, because the products
of genes are not organic structures but proteins. The proteins get involved in the
processes of metabolism and structural change which are not, however indirectly
prescribed by the genes. But representation can be (ii) realised also by a sequence
01' instructions which int1uence a systemic process in distinct ways at distinct times
and place's. This characterises the concept of representation used in molecular
biology. lohn Maynard Smith and Eörs Szathmary write: "What is transmitted from
generation to generation is not the adult structure, but a list 01' instructions for
making that structure." (Smith/Szathmary (1999), P 2). The same difference in
exp!aining representation used here for the static concept of structure can be used
for the dynamic concept of process. We have here the third element for the needs 01'
the bottleneck problem: DNA should be seen as containing the instructiollS
governing the developmental process.
32 Christoph Rehmann-Sutter

3.3
An Essentialism

As we have seen in Jared Diamond's lively account, the significance of the program
conception of DNA far transcended the boundaries of hypothetical scientific
models. It was lIsed as a metaphysical account to describe the nature of existence of
living beings. This epistemic transgression, however, was not a phenomenon re-
stricted to popular culture happening beyond the boundary of serious academia, in
the mass media where complicated and abstract scientific theories have to be
translated into a generally 'understandable' form. Within the language community
of the scientists themselves this transgression had already taken place. Respectable
pioneers of molecular biology performed a leading role when they cIaimed, e. g.,
that DNA is what Aristotle once had in mind with eidosY
This re1'erence to Aristotle points to one of the most fascinating entanglements in
the history of modern biologieal thought. Aristotle and Arislotelianism served as an
antagonistic pole for the development of scientific biology. Aristotelianism was
often identified with the theory of an 'entelechy' residing in living beings, organiz-
ing them from within and steering their development towards a pre-established
adult form. In fact, this teleological preformationism retlccts a very one-sided
undcrstanding of Aristotle. As I have tried to demonstrate elsewhere, there is a
better way of interpreting the concept of entelecheia which does not give rise to
contradictions within the theory of the four causes as this one inevitably does,
contlating the causajinalis and the causa e.fjiciens (Rehmann-Sutter (1996), eh. 5).
However, Aristotelianism was identified with preformationism, the eidos reprc-
senting the adult form residing in the organism and controlling the morphogenetic
processes of its realisation. The program concept of DNA was like a mirror image
of this metaphysics of entelechy. It replaced the eidos with the structure (sequence)
of a physical entity, thereby demonstrativcly expelling relicts of spiritualism or
animism from biological thought, but at the same time it followed cIosely the
structure and logic of the 'Aristotelian' concepts that were explicitly rejected.
I see such an unconscious loyalty in the following points: (I) Both Aristo-
telianism and program conceptions of DNA as~ume an inner organizing principle to
explain morphogenetic development; (2) the organizing principle determines what
it means to be this individual; (3) the organizing principle has an im material nature
(Aristotle defined the (JUsia as the principle detcrmining what it means to be this
individual: to ti en einai; Met. Z. 1029 b 12 tf.), contrary to Platonism, Aristotle
assumed that the ousia is an idea of the things inherent to them; the form and not the
matter constitutes the eidos and the OUSÜI. The idea of the 'genetic program' en-
coded in DNA sequences fulfils all these criteria: it is an inner, immaterial steering
principle, whose instructions are transformed inta the 3D reality of the organism
by developmental processes. Its immateriality is guaranteed by its informational
nature: the program is not the DNA molecule but the information encoded in its
nucleotide sequence. NucIeotides are matter; the sequence 01' nucIeotides is a
formal arrangement 01' matter, and as such immaterial.

9 Delbrück (1971); further refs in Rehmann-Sutter ( 1993/94), p. 144.

 Genetics, Embodiment and Identity 33

Thcre is one rather striking consequence of this parallelism which I should make
clear. The idea of the 'genetic program ' is by its nature essentialist. It is obvious that
in the program model, the factors determining the individual to become an indi-
vidual of this kind with these partieularities are to be sought at the genotypic level.
The program represents the totality of the genotype. Hence, the genetic program is
the essence, defined as the totality of factors making a living being. And DNA, the
carrier of the genetic program, contains the essence of a living being. Within the
theoretical framework of hereditary genetics, the model of the 'genetic program '
must have been a convincing solution to the question of how the four-dimensional
organismic structure is transmitted to the next generation. The consequence
- intended or accidental - is the establishment of a genetic essentialism.

4
An Example: The Gurken Story

However, the postulate of DNA as the carrier of the genetic program represented a
kind of 'black box' 111 that could not be opened before developmental genetics arose
in the 1970s and 80s. The gcnetic program was a description of what biologists
imagined could be in the box without being able to compare their imagination with
actual err:pirical evidence. Although I eoncede this, the model eannot be defended
as a theoretical solution that arose in the absence of alternatives. I I There are clearly
counterfactual assumptions in the bottleneck views discussed above. lz The most
evident tlaw is in Fig. 2. In fact, DNA is transmitted as apart ofthe cell. Saying that
the rest of the cell has only subordinate ontological status as a machinery for
executing the genetic program (i.e. as a means to an end) is evidently not the only
option in explaining the relation between DNA and its cellular context.
As a matter of fact, the program eoncept of DNA has been defended against this
argument from the necessity of the rest of the cell by a general clause, saying that
all the rest of the cell serves the function of executing the genetic program eneoded
in DNA. Like computer memory, the memory of heredity cannot aet by itself. The
function is only realised in the context of a cell. Fran<;ois Jacob explained this in his
1970 book: "Pour que soient produites les machines a partir les plans, il faut les ma-
chines." (Jacob (1970), P 298) Generally, this must be a logically sound defcnce,
indeed.
But we need to look closer at empirical cases and at the models used. I want to
discuss one example of how the developmental function of DNA is described in
current developmental genetics.
In Drosophila, the first steps of spatial differentiation of the egg begins in
oogenesis. This occurs within the female tly, at a stage before fertilisation has taken
place. The egg, at fertilisation, contributes a di1'1'erentiated plan 01' the basic body
axes: the anterior-posterior polarity and the dorso-ventral polarity. Fertilisation

10 The 'black-box' metaphor in this genetic context is owed to Neumann-Held (1997).

11 For politically sensitive readings see The Biology and Gender Study Group ( 1989) and Sapp
( 1987).
12 On epigenetics cf. Van Speybroeck (2000).
34 Christoph Rehmann'-Sutter

takes place ut a stage when early differentiation of the egg has already begun . The
new genotype produced by the combination of the two haploid chromosome sets of
the germ cells does not control the embryonic development starting from a tabuIeI
rasa stage. Because the steps that take place before fertilisation involve only the
DNA of the mother tly, while the DNA of the oocyte is silent, these phenomenu
are summarised under the heading of 'maternal effects'. Mutations in the father tly
can obviously only affect these parts of the developmental process in the sub-
sequent generation, when a mutant daughter tly produces her eggs. Nevertheless,
'maternal effects' involve genes. And the logic of how genes are involved in realis-
ing structural features at this point can be considered with as much attention as ut
later stages of development: DNA-cell interactions are no different. The category
'maternal effects' sterns from hereditary genetics, comprising the loci whose mutat-
ions have effects only in the descendants (F2) of the female descendants (FI) of a
mutant tly. It classifies gene loci according to the time und the situation in which
their effects take place, not according to a difference in the meclwnism of how
DNA is reluted to the organism where the effect takes place.

anlenor

a) b) C)

Fig. 3. Egg development in Droso"hila lIIe!al/ogllsler.

a) A dorsal view 01' the internal rcproductive system of an adult kmale. Two ovarioks
have been pulled loose from the right ovary. "Anterior" and "posterior" indicate the body
axis 01' the tly (moditied from Miller 1950 and Mahowald/Kambysellis 1980. p. 144).
b) Schematic drawing 01' one tubular ovariole containing ovarian follicles 01' progressive
size anti maturity. The stages in oogenesis are numbered from SI to SI4 (moditied from
Seyffert 1998, p. 734).
c) Enlarged picture 01' one ovarian folliele at stage S 11. n I. n2. n3: Nuelei 01' various types
01' follicle cells; n13: a portion 01' the compound nucleolus of the nurse cell; p: pore (inter-
cellular bridge) connecting a nurse cell to the ooeyte; k: karyosome in the nuckus 01' the
oocyte (germinal vesiele); vit: vitelline membrane; ys: yolk sphere (from King/Koch 1963).
 Genetics, Embodiment and Identity 3S

The Drosophila egg chamber, where thc anterior-posterior and dorso-ventral

polarities arise, is itself a structure with a differentiated architecture (see Fig. 3).
The first visible sign of anterio-posterior asymmetry is the movement of the
oocyte to the posterior sidc of the nurse cells. Nurse cells and oocytes are germ line
cells, whereas the surrounding folliele cells are somatic cells. Once the oocyte has
reached this posterior position elose to the folliele cells, it induces the adjacent
folliele cells to adopt a posterior fate , i.e. to behave in a way different from that of
the rest of the follicle cells. Acaimo Gonzalez-Reyes, Heather Elliott and Daniel
lohnston have suggested a model of how this might happen (see Fig. 4, Gonzales-
Reyes et al. (1995». A gene called Gurken (grk) seems to be a key element, with
different roles in subsequent steps. Mutations in grk (like mutations in aseries of
other genes) affect the polarity of both axes. After the movement of the oocyte to
the posterior of the nurse cells, the germinal vesiele and grk mRNA both become
localised to the posterior of the oocyte, leading to the polarised production of the
Gurken protein. Gurken protein is moved to the extracellular space between
the oocyte and the adjacent follicle cells. During early oogenesis, a gene called

bicO/d ·mRNA

SI · S6

anl f10t
10Iic1e ,eilt

\
S9

Fig. 4. The model for the generation of anterio-postcrior and dorso-ventral polarity in Drosophila
(as proposed by Gonzales-Reyes et al. 1995; modified from 5eyffert 1998, p. 735). Before
stage 6 of oogenesis. grk mRNA is concentrated at the posterior end of the oocyte; extra-
cellular Gurken protein is produced and induces (over the torpedo/DER signal pathway)
the adjacent follicie cells to adopt a posterior cell fate. Between stages 6 and 7 01' oogene-
sis, the posterior follicle cells signal back to the oocyte to repolarize the oocyte cyto-
skeleton. This repolarization 01' the oocyte cytoskeleton determines the movement of the
germinal vcsicIe to a site at the anterior margin of the oocyte (57-58). At stage 9 grk
mRNA is relocali zed at this corner 01' ihe oocyte. Extracellular Gurken protein induces the
follicle cells on this side 01' the egg chamber to adopt a dorsal fate . The dorso-ventral axis
is detcrmined.
36 Christoph Rehmann-Sutter

top/DER is expre'ised throughout the follicle eell layer. The eorresponding protein
torpedo/DER is a membrane protein that ean seleetively bind to Gurken. This
binding event aetivates a signal transduction pathway (tyrosine kinase), wh ich is
familiar from other stages of Drosophila development. The effeet of this signal
transduction in the follicle cell is a change in the regulatory stage of its nucleus.
The previously uncommitted follicle cells adopt a determined 'posterior' follicle
eell fate, behaving differently from the other follicle eells. The first special activity
is to 'signal' back to the ooeyte to repolarise the oocyte microtubule cytoskeleton
(Fig. 4b). A new microtubule network is created within the oocyte, probably via a
disassembly/reassembly step of the microtubule organizing centre, shifting from
the posterior end to the anterior margin of the ooeyte. The reoriented cytoskeleton
directs two different kinds of mRNA molecules (bicoid and oscar) to opposite poles
of the oocyte, thereby defining the anterio-posterior axis of the embryo.
At the same time, the germinal vesicle moves to a site at the anterior margin of
the ooeyte. This movement also depends on the relocalisation of the microtubule
cytoskeleton. The new position of the germinal vesicle direets the subsequent re-
loealisation of Gurken mRNA (Fig. 4) to the same site at the anterior margin. The
Gurken protein is exported to the extraeellular spaee and there binds to torpedo/
DER membrane protein of the adjaeent follicle eells in the same way as before, but
this time indueing the follicle eells on this side of the egg to adopt a 'dorsal' fate.
This succession of steps is perhaps surprising beeause the same protein Gurken
seems to be involved in the sequential induction of first the anterio-posterior and
then dorso-ventral polarity. In addition, torpedolDER-dependent signalling is
required for the induetion of both the posterior and dorsal follicle cells. This raises
the question of how the same signalling pathway ean induee two different follicle
eell states. The explanation Gonzales-Reyes' group offers is the following: it is
known from several labelling experiments that the polar follicle eells (becoming
either 'anterior' or 'posterior' follicle eells) have been speeified as distinet from the
rest of the follicle eell population before either induetion takes plaee. "It therefore
seems likely that the two follicle eell populations differ in their eompetenee to
respond to the inductive signal: the fate of the polar follicle cells is restrieted to a
ehoice between anterior or posterior, and the rest of the follicle cells are eommitted
to become dorsal or ventral." (Ibid. p 658)
In several respeets, this result seems remarkable. Even if Gonzales-Reyes'
model is preliminary and leaves open many questions, 13 amI even if more inter-
mediate steps are yet to be discovered, the way developmental geneticists now
describe the genetic mechanisms of morphogenesis in this example is at odds, or at
least in a strong disharmony, with the role of genes suggested by the program view
of DNA. I want to summarise five interrelated points:
(i) Genes launch into their function in the context of established organic strue-
tures, not in a morphologie al tahl/la rasa. Even the earliest spatial differentiation
steps in the oocyte, where the basic coordinates for later embryogenesis are set,
take place in direct relation to the polarities of the surrounding adult female. The

13 Cf. Gehring (1998), p. 95 IL all three body axes of the mother tly are represented in the egg:
anterio-posterior, dorso-ventral, and left-right.
 Genetics, Embodiment and Identity 37

egg's anterio-posterior axis is derived from the mother's anLerio-posterior polarity

via the micro-architecture of the ovarium, which is a directed dynamic structure
where maturation involves a succession of egg chambers and organised cellular
movements. Adult development, egg and embryonic development appear as scenes
in a continu()!ls morphogenetic process.
(ii) Spatio-temporal ditferentiation also occurs within cells. The microtubule
cytoskeleton is of particular importance for this intracellular morphological
differentiation. Particular steps are explained by developmental genetics as a result
of a complex dynamic and structurally differentiated situation encompassing both
intra- and intercellular environments at a specified place.
(iii) The function of nucIeic acid sequences is dependent on the specificities of a
particular place within intra- and extracellular environments. A pre-existing spatio-
temporal structure is a necessary prerequisite tor the genes' proper function. In our
example, grk mRNA is tirst concentrated at that part of the oocyte where it is cIose
to 'posterior' folIicIe celIs, then grk mRNA is concentrated at a spot ne ar the ger-
minal vesicIe cIose to nondetermined follicle cells. Intracellular morphological
differentiation is connected to intercellular differentiation and morphology step
by step. The question 'Wlzere?' is important for the role nucIeic acids can play in
development.
(iv) The same mRNA, and correspondingly the same DNA (in this case maternal
DNA), can plllY different roles at different times and places in the same cel!. Grk is
successively involved in the determination of the anterio-posterior polarity of the
oocyte and in the determination of dorso-ventral polarity. The effect of the gene
product depends on the respoflsive competence of other cells wh ich, again, is
established in earlier developmental steps.
(v) Hence, there is not always an unequivocal relation between a given DNA
sequence and a function in the developmental system. The actual function of a
DNA sequence in one developmental step depends on other, earlier and simul-
taneously occurring steps. The role Of'1 gene (Iike grk)14 depends on the place and
the succession of steps in the microarchitecture of the organism. There are cases
where the relation between a given DNA sequence and a function is unequivoca!.
But this clarity of the relation must itself be understood as an accomplishment of
the system, i.e. as a special case, where the circumstances recur. The causal com-
pie x corresponding to one function of DNA (i.e. that complex of factors, incIuding
the right DNA sequences themselves, which is necessary for the explanation of one
particular genetic function) is an ephemeral event. 15 A particular complex of caus-

14 Following Neumann-Held (1998. 1999) I distingllish 'genes' frum 'ONA-sequences'. Because

of multiple splieing phenomena und mRNA editing there is no uneqllivocal relation even
between a given ONA sequence and a polypeptide. But if a given polypeptide is synthesized,
thell there is a eorresponding ONA involved in its synthesis. The 'gene' ean be detined (in op-
position to the classieal textbook-detinition) as the process leading to this given polypeptide.
This redefinition characterizes Neumann-Held's 'process mo/eClt/ar gene' concept (cf. Griftithl
Neumann-Held 1999).
15 Neumann-Held's 'process molecular gene' is also ephemeral, whereas the classical molecular
gene (identifying the 'gene for x' with a ONA sequence) suggests (counterfactually, as we
know today) stable causation by ONA sequences.
38 Christoph Rehmann-Sutter

ally relevant factors that togethcr are sutficient to explain one step in development,
is present at one time and one place, not others. It is an accomplishment of the
organism as a complex system, coming about at specified moments and disappear-
ing afterwards.

5
Systemic Thinking
5.1
ADecision between Views

Of course, defendcrs of the program concept of DNA, if only they are patient and
painstaking enough, can find ways to integrate findings like the dual etfect of grk.
They can even try to explain the fact that homeotic (regulatory) genes wh ich are
identified as playing the role of 'main switches' in the development of whole organs
or organ complexes, as eye does for Drosophila facet eyes, are expressed in dif-
ferent tissues at different times without switching on a developmental cascade
leading to eyes. 16 All these co~textual effects could be dcscribed (in detail) as
secondary effects of a sophisticated program that also accounts for these regulating
or interfering contexts. Despite a growing cost in terms of theoretical complexity
this way is not, in principle, barred. However, simplicity and elegance do not make
a theoretical account true or reasonable; rather, they determine psychological
attractiveness from a certain point of view. Therefore, I do not claim that empirical
evidence leads to or implies a revolution in DNA concepts from the program view
to any alternative. The account of the total role of DNA in the context of the
developing organism will not be decided upon for purely empirical reasons. Rather,
there is a choice. And this choice is an expression of how we want to see the
organism.
I find one of the earliest treatments (and perhaps the most radical) of the '1uest-
ion of how the relation between DNA and the contexts of thc function of its sequen-
ces can be reconfigured in Susan Oyama's 1985 book Tize Ontogeny of Informa-
tion. In her 'developmental systems' approach DNA is radically de-essentialised.
She suggests that DNA is only one type of factor, even if certainly a very significant
and absolutely necessary type of factor, that plays a role in determining deve\-
opmental processes. Ncither DNA sequences nor any other type or factor should be
privileged apriori as the bearer of ultimate causal control in thc developing organic
system. This approach breaks with the dogma that, given a set of necessary con-
ditions for a particular developmental step, the conditions that can be identified
with DNA sequences are more fundamental than others. Rather, the whole complex
of factors - be they related to cellular morphology, to the dynamics of biochemical
transitions, to external circumstances, to previous developmental history of the
system or to the DNA sequences available - is considered as equally important for
explaining the occurrence and the regularity of developmental steps. DNA is no more
and no less than one necessary cause of development: one of its 'resourees' .

16 This evidence is reported by Halder et al. (1995).

 Genetics, Embodiment and Identity 39

It is not orfanismic form, or a prescription for developmental process. that is

transmitted in chromosomes, coded in amounts of information. "What is trans-
mitted is macromolecular form, which. though it is necessary for the development
of phenotypic form, neither contains nor constitutes plans for it, ami development-
a/ly relevant (lspects of the warM" (Oyama (1985), p22) Organismic form
"is constructed in deve\opmental processes" ([bid.) i.e. it is a result of interactive
processes taking place between the parts and processes of the organism and
between elements and processes in the environmental situation, where its life is
placed. Both cIasses of factor are equally important. Oyama has introduced the
metaphor 01' a macromolecular dance to illustrate her view. "Because mutual
selectivity, reactivity and constraint take place only in actual processes. it is these
that orchestrate the activity of different portions of the DNA. that make genetic and
environmental intluences interdependent as genes and gene products are environ-
ment to each other [ ... ]. Chromosomal form is an interactant in the choreography of
ontogeny; the 'information' it imparts or the form it intluences in the emerging
organism depends on what dan ce is being performed, when, where and with whom.
The dance continues throllghout the life cycIe, and everything that occurs in that
cycIe, from the first moments to the moment of death, from the most permanent
structure to the most evanescent, from the most typical feature to the most diver-
gent. is constructed from these interactants." 17
Perhaps most strikingly from this point of view, it follows that there is no level
of genotypical plan, program, blueprint (or the like) underneath the phenotypically
occurring actual processes of organic development. Oyama's metaphor of dan ce
does not suggest the performance of a prescribed choreography. The choreography
is what is actually performed; 'the dance' is the steps that are actually taken, not a
preformulated regularity of steps. The evident regularity of organic development is
not explained by an underlying or pre-existing plan - Oyama criticises this view as
a modern version of preformationism - but by the succession of the steps them-
selves. Each step leads to a next step and would do the same another time, given
similar conditions. It is like the regularity of a bouncing ball in Nijhout's example, IX
where the starting conditions (elasticity, weight, material of the ball and the surface,
gravity, air movements, the velocity of the ball etc.) will explain the regularity of
each section of the bouncing movement without insinuating that the ball or the
surface carry coded programs for the movements with them. Gunther Stent has
proposed characterising this kind of succession as a 'historical' process, I~ where
each of the steps depends on the previous steps. This comparison 01' development
with history, and of developmental biology with historiography, seems to me
illuminating because it shows how explanations for particular steps can succeed by
referring to complexes of causes present in the concrete situation where the step
arises withollt supposing a pre-established script.

17 Ibid. Cf. Oyama (2000) and for further refs the survey on the Developmental Systems alterna-
tive by Sterelny/Griftith (1999). Ch. 5.
IH See above [n. I.
19 Stent (1981); cf. the historieal diseussion 01' the debate between Gunther Stent and Sydney
Brenner by Chadarevian ( 1998).
40 Christoph Rehmann-Sutter

Thc comparison with history, however, also has its limits, which do not diminish
its value: (i) In human history there is no uncontroversial subject that could re-
prescnt the organism in its development. We can look at the history of humankind,
at the history of anational entity (like Switzerland. whose parts came together from
other national contexts), at the history of a eultural conereseenee (like western
society), at the history of a religion, or at an institution (like the Rockefeller found-
ation), at a family (like mine) or at a biography. There is a consensus that the aim of
developmental biology is to write the his tory of organisms. However, in biology it
might also be more difficult to separate 'individual' organisms out of more eomplex
contexts. Fungi living as mycelia and some plants with sc ions realize a rather
ditlerent, less 'individualistic' kind of individuality than most animals do (Cf. Buss
(1987». Organism coneepts often have a certain 'anima!' bias privileging the
'anima!' type of individuality. (ii) Developments in history are typieally not regular
whereas the striking aspect of metazoan development is its regularity. (iii)
Historiography itself has a history. What we see today as modern historical research
had its predeeessors, some of whieh saw in human history the realisation of a seript:
examples are Christian interpretations of history as steps between fall and salvation
or Hegelian Geschichtsphilosophien. (iv) Humans think extensively, retleet and
diseuss. Interaetions in human history are svmbo/ic, in eontrast to the interaetions
between the parts of an organism and their environment.

5.2
A Coherent View of DNA, Development and Organisms

Nevertheless, these sketehed thoughts illustrate the beginnings of a faseinating new

way of integrating empirieal tindings into a eoherent total view of DNA, develup-
ment and organisms. From the point of view of a philosophieal interpretation of
deve\opmental geneties I see the following four key elements in these approaehes:
(a) The organism develops with an 'historicallogic' of suceessive steps: each ster
is determined by the strueture and dynamics of previous steps, whieh establish
causa I complexes or a eausally relevant situation.
(b) No type uf factors, or DNA, is privileged ([ priori as a superior cause. as the
bearer of fundamental form that requires all the other factors for its expression.
(c) Genetic information - if we want to keep this concept to designate the
structural eomponents in causally determinative complexes of developmental
steps within the history of the system - is generated by interactive processes
between DNA and other factors in the organism and its surroundings. Genetic
information has an ephemeral existenee.
(d) The microstructure of the organism, i.e. the 'architectural' form seen from a
point within the developmental system, appears as one distinct type of cause in
explanations of developmental steps. Causal processes where genes are
involved are placed within a dynamic microstructure, whieh has biochemical,
biophysical and cell morphologieal elements. 2o

20 This point has been stressed extensively in biological structuralism. See Webster/Goodwin
( 1996).
 Genetics, Embodiment and Identity 41

[t is difficult to determine which one 01' these elements is fundamental 10 the

systemic alternative view. My own starting point was close to element (b): I have
claimed that we would need to build a whole bacterium around an extracted
bacterial chromosome in order for the DNA to function correctly (which includes
correct gene regulation) (Rehmann-Sutter (1993/94». But others have certainly
taken different puths. The four elements indicate a point 0/ view rather than a strict
scientific theory with axioms and inferences. Albeit in a much looser sense of the
term it can nevertheless be called a theory of the genome: it gives an explanation of
general principles of the art of explaining development, focussing on genes.
Because this view sees the function of DNA in development as arising regularly
within contexts where parts stand and work together, I call it a systemic approach or
a systems theory of DNA.21 lt explains the significance of DNA both as the whole
genome and as particular sequence stretches in the developing organism by the
interrelations between parts and processes in the morphologically structured
'system', which also includes features of the environment.
An intentional consequence of this terminological setting is that the develop-
mental 'system' and the 'organism' ure not coextensive. The systems approach
dodges the organism-milieu dichotomy without denying the reality of the organ-
ism's boundaries (skin, membrane, shell etc.). The interest of the systemic view is
to explain development, whereas the interest of the organismic view is to describe
the activity of a being (a sein within an environment of other beings. 22 The
'system' in the systemic view of DNA has no fixed boundaries. The boundarics are
as ephemeral as the causal complexes for developmental steps. The definition of a
difference between self and other is not its primary or constitutive interest.
This provides an opportunity to clear up a misunderstanding that might arise
from the use of the term 'system'. [n other system theories, the constitutive element
for the system is defined indeed as the boundary that separates an inside from an
outside. This is particularly manifest in theories of llutopoietic systems. Varela's
starting point is the 'organizational closure' that defines the internal and the
external spheres of the system. His usage of the word 'system' arises from a radical
mechanistic stance: living systems are 'autopoietic machines' which, "in a loose
sense, produce their own identity: they distinguish themselves from their back-
ground". (Varela (1979), P 12 f.) The distinction of self from nonself is therefore the
constitutive principle of autopoietic systems. Despite similarities in other respects -
Maturana and Varela also themsclves suggest a contextual approach to the function
of DNA (Maturana/Varela (1987), pp 76-79) - the 'systems' concept in Oyama's
'developmental systems approach' differs considerably on this point.

21 This coincides with Susan Oyama's (1985, p. 4) term 'developmental systems' approach .
." See the discussion between Oyama, whose starting point was a radieal critici~m on nature-
nurture distinction (see Oyama 20(0). and Evelyn Fox Keller (forthcoming).
42 Christoph Rehmann-Sutter

6
Between the Spheres of Science and Morality

6.1
Facts and Values

Intuitively it is evident that this reinterpretation of the role of DNA has implications
for human self-understanding, given the high prestige of genetics in current images
01' human nature. Before I can discuss the most crucial implications here I want to
explain how I see the connection between these domains. The discussion about
human identity takes place in the sphere 01' morality, whereas genome theories have
their roots in science. The path from one sphere to the other must move carefully
between the stumbling blocks 01' naturalistic fallacy. Descriptions do not yield
prescriptions: scientific models and ways 01' thought do not justify particular
concepts 01' moral identity. This is because of the logical differences hetween the
constative and evaluative modes 01' language: every fact can be good or bad, even
the fact that certain values exist socially. The nub is, however, that descriptions can
contain or presuppose evaluations in the way they are formulated, in the language
used, in the way they sekct things or aspects from a much richer world, in the fact
of being selected against other possible descriptions etc. The truth 01' the description
as a claim about facts is no proof of the superiority 01' the evaluations involved, no
justification for them. In genetics this implicit moral relevance 01' theory can be
clearly demonstrated.

6.2
Identity and Self-Explanation

A bewitching epistemological feature of genetic theory is its self-referentiality.

Genetic theory refers to the bodies 01' the very beings who are building, expressing,
discussing, learning or using genetic theory. Genetic theories, taken as a concoction
01' empirical data, functional models 01' macromolecular interaction, and interpre-
tations of the total role of DNA in the developing organism (genome theories like
program theory or systems theory of DNA), are contributions to the question of
how the speakers, learners (etc.) exist in the world. Put another way: genetic theory
actually expresses ideas about the identity 01' producers and consumers of the
theory. In saying this, I am not assuming that the validity 01' those ideas about
identity can be underpinned by empirical findings. The phenomenon I want to note
is that the discourse about genes and DNA (this 'concoction') actually contain.l'
such identity-relevant ideas, regardless 01' their justification.
Obviously, I don 't claim a logical self-referentiality of genetic theory. Genetic
theories are not about themselves, i.e. they are not assertions about genetic theories.
This would be the case for an assertion like "I am a liar", which is stating that some
or even all the speaker's statements are lies. It is also a claim about the truth 01' the
claim itself. In this case, logical self-referentiality is a self-destroying feature of the
lingual construcl: it denies what it positively suggests. If the speaker is lying in this
instance, then in fact she is not a liar, but because she actually teils us a lie, so, she
 Genetics, Embodiment and Identity 43

is a liar. Or if the speaker is not Iying in this instance, then she would be telling the
truth that she is a liar - which contradicts what we assumed. This is not the type of
self-reference meant here, despite the fact that an extreme form of genetic reduct-
ionism would lead exactly to these contradictions: A theory c1aiming that 'all
human thoughts are outcomes of genetic programs ' must include itself. A theory
that is itself an outcome of genetic programs cannot at the same time claim to be
true in the sense of describing facts correctly. Therefore, a genetic (or evolutionary)
epistemology is compelled to reduce its ambition, Its task is - rather than defending
self-dissolving universal claims - to investigate the interplay between biological,
cultural, personal and argumentative factors in making possible those ways of
thinking, speaking, hearing, perceiving and feeling that human persons actually
perform. The role of genetics in the self-explanation of mind is restricted.

6.3
Ourselves as Bodies

The impact of genetics on our understanding of the human hody is even stronger
than on our understanding of the human mind. As long as we do not separate the
body from what we consider to be ourselves; as tong as we resist the Cartesian
tlight into a philosophy of two substances, identifying ourselves with the spiritual
part and treating the material part as res extensa in the objective world of nature; as
long as we distrust such split-off theories of the self, the genetic explanation of our
embodiment can be recognised as a central part of our discourse on identity. Ge-
netics is omnipresent in contemporary biology and medicine. It is a main element
of the modern synthesis in evolutionary thinking (Weber (1998)), it is now the main
explanatory instrument in developmental biology (Gehring (1998)), and it increas-
ingly invades medical practice in the form of gene therapy, genetic testing and
counselling, preventive medicine, and even public health projects. The results of
the Human Genome Project are greeted with fanfares in the press. Human self-
understanding cannot avoid coping with the 'geneticisation' of many parts of scien-
ce, in particlliar the parts that tell us how we are in the world as embodied entities.
The nature of our bodies is somehow also genetically explicable. And insofar as the
body must be respected as an integral part of what we are as human beings, genetics
gives us lessons on human nature. The pure fact that connections are made with
genetics in discourses on the identity of human nature is plain. The quest ion for me
is how this relation can be explained and wh at could be the criteria with which we
can discriminate between better and worse references.
The ans wer I want to sketch is the following: the relation between theories of
genetics and ideas of human identity or nature is an interpretative one. The criteria
for a critical evaluation of positive interpretations should be discllssed by a genetic
hermeneutics. wh ich could be developed systematically as a subfield of the philo-
sophy of biology.23 By interpretation I mean a kind of translation from one mean-

23 Cf. Rehmann-Sutter (2000). A short review 01' philosophical explanations 01' 'interpretation' is
given by Dirks ( 1999).
44 Christoph Rehmann-Sutter

ingful context to another. It is a recursive process of (I) expectation, (2) perception

and (3) examination of how what was expected makes sense in the light of what is
perceived (and vice versal, leading to an understanding of the meaning of certain
elements from the first context in the second.
If this characterisation of the way identity discourse is related to genetics were to
be defended, I would foresee three direct consequences. First, the reference of
identity concepts to genetic theories is not illegitimate per se. But particular identity
claims are only valid if they survive an explicit conj'rontation with the empirical
genetic findings. Second, the observation that even genetic theary makes certain
presumptions about how DNA is related to the whole organism (which are not
themselves results of empirical observations) is not odd. Rather, it can be recon-
structed rationally as a pre-understanding used in interpretative processes taking
place within genetics. There, interpretations occur in the recursive relation between
theory (e. g. review and textbook context) and investigation (experimental context).
Third, the interpretation is not dedllced from what is interpreted. Interpreting is an
act with its own inherent responsibility. No values are deduced from facts.

6.4
Caring for the Self-Image

The terms 'seil" and 'identity', used here extensively to characterise dimensions of
human self-description, do not stand for things that can be localised in space and
time. Rather, 'self' and 'identity' express relations and qualities. Of course, we
cannot look around in the world and tind 'here' a seil' and 'there' an identity. But
we have a conception of what it is to be a human agent or aperson. what it is to be
a child, a wo man or a man, what it is to be a mother or a father. a scientist, a friend.
a philosopher. We ask ourselves: Are we animals? Are we machines? (Williams
(1995), pp 79-89) and we become entangled in ongoing discussions about these
issues in our everyday lives. We have a self-image. And how we conceive ourselves
as humans. women, men, geneticists, citizens (etc.) will be highly important far
morality and ethics. Klaus Michael Meyer-Abich goes so far as to say: our actions
are 'expressions' of our self-understanding (Meyer-Abich (1997), P 23). Caring for
the self-image we carry around with us, and taking identity conceptions seriously.
as weil as the implications they have for practical life are, therefore, ethically
important tasks. Perhaps we can even say the capacity for and the act of caring is
itself an essential feature of our humanness. Our self-image is not installed by
nature. Rather, what and who we are is open to deliberation. Responsibility does
not end where questions about identity of the subject of responsibility begin. This is
one of those 'opennesses' that I believe to be essential far human nature. (And in
saying this I still participate in the discourse of identity. There is no way out of iL)
As Bernard Williams puts it: "[T]he more that cultural diversity within the human
race declines, and the more the world as a whole is shaped by structures charac-
teristic of modernity, the more we need not to forget but to remind ourselves what a
human life is, has been and can be. This requires a proper understanding of the
human sciences, and that requires us to take seriously humanity, in b6th senses of
the term" - as a name far a species and for a quality (Williams, op. cit., p 88).
Genetics, l' d like to add, is a human science.
 Genetics, Embodiment and Identity 45

The relationship we as human persons have to ourselves is our 'identity'. This

relation to ourselves, cannot, of course, be sufficiently understood as the simple
equation I = 1. Identity questions are questions about the qualities that make me a
person who can be held responsible and how I understand this responsibility. lohn
Locke's answer - to take one important eontributor - was: It is consciousness
which makes me responsible for what I did as an T at another time and plaee.
Consciousness is a morally qualifying eonneetion between the person who did
something and the person who is held responsible for the deed, a constitutive
element in Locke's aceount of identity.24 CharIes Taylor explains identity as a
'framework' within which we understand human agency. "[L]iving within such
strongly qualified horizons is eonstitutive of human ageney"; a person without a
framework altogether would be outside our space of interloeution; he wouldn't
have a stand in the space where the rest of us are." (Taylor (1989), pp 27, 31)
Identity is, according to Taylor, retleetively constituted. It is an essentially cultural
accomplishment. The question of identity is often phrased in the form: Who am I?
"What does ans wer this question for us is an understanding of what is of erueial
importanee to uso To know who I am is a species of knowing where I stand. My
identity is defined by the commitments and identifications whieh provide the frame
or horizon within which I ean try to determine from case to ease what is good, or
valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I endorse or oppose. In other words, it
is the horizon within wh ich I am capable of taking astand." (Ibid., p 27) With
identity we participate in the sphere of moral thought.

7
Frameworks tor Agency
7.1
The Self as Author

What are the main differences in this self-interpretation when we look at the
differenee between program concepts and system coneepts of DNA? There are
various ways of spelling out this differenee, because this spelling-out is also an act
of understanding and interpretation and ean establish different emphases. In my
view, in the relations constructed between body, self and DNA there lies one crucial
implication.
In the program concepts of DNA, the form (plan, blueprint etc.) of our bodily
self or of our humanity tends to be assoeiated with the information eontent of DNA,
while the body is a realisation of this information content. The proeess of embodi-
ment ('development') is described as a very complicated aet of executing instruc-
tions imposed by the inherited genetic information. DNA is the carrier of this
information, and as such, is part of the body. But the genetic information is al ready
in existence when the organism executes its instructions. Embodiment is hetero-
nomous with respect to genetic information. In our self, a dichotomy is opened
between information and materiality, the former controlling the latter. If we eall the

24 Locke (1690), book II, eh. 27 "Of Identity and Diversity".

46 Christoph Rehmann-Sutter

significance of genetics for identity our 'genetic identity'25, then we must say that
the genetic identity of the program is a heferonomous identity: I am essentially a
product of my genetic sequences. In its extreme forms, the program concept of
DNA leads to a picture of the body as a 'survival machine' for its genes (Dawkins
(1976». The genetic sequences, when known, consequently appear as an 'instruc-
tion book' for this machine. 26
The systemic view, on the other hand, actively opens aspace in which to take
seriously all actual relations in which our bodies grow and develop: ecological,
social, cultural and, of course, genetic. The semantics of the word 'genetic infor-
mation' in this contexr take a radical changeY It is not information brought into a
process of genesis, informing and directing it. Rather it is information contained in
the constellations, tensions and dynamics of particular developmental situations. It
is not a script for development; before development occurs (and recurs) it is now-
here. There is no pre-existing informational world behind the phenotypic reality.
Genetic information is rather written by the developmental system itself, as those
local causal constellations necessary for bringing about each next step. The results
of each get involved in new causal constellations. This information is 'genetic' in
the sense that it is both a particular result of morphogenetie processes and an epi-
tome for the structural causes for morphogenetie processes encompassed in the
whole lifetime of the body. The sum of all developmentally relevant information
ean be considered essentially as something wh ich is generated by the body. In this
sense, the body is the author of its genetic information.
My body is also {he place where the specific and unique genetic information
requested by the presence of my organism has its ephemeral existence. My body
active1y constitutes itself as a bodily self, developing its structural integrity further,
step by step. Embodime~ is an autonomous developmental process, wh ich is not
separate frorn psychie and mental and social developmeru. The process is self-
constituting, but it is also fragile and can easily be disturbed. It depends on a variety
of resources and above all on morphological struetures (inc1uding DNA-sequences)
which, coming from the past, inform the present and constitute the system's
partieular exeitability. The body, itself an activity, is the self's material side.

7.2
The Self-informing Body

The essentialist deseription of DNA as the carrier of the genetic program and the
systemie deseription of DNA as a developmental resouree lIsed by the body in the
reglilarities and irregularities of its developmental his tory, are both speech aets in
identity politics (Cf. Butler (1990), pp 143 ff.). Geneties makes referenee to the
selves who are performing the genetie discourse. In this sense of eonneeting per-
sons with other persons through knowledge about genetie information in general,

25 This concept 01' genetic identity differs from that of 'one's individual set of genes'.
26 Tom Buerkle, in an article for the International Herald Tribune (Dec. 2, 1999), qu<,ted a
researcher explaining the sequence of chromosome 22 as "the first complete chapter in the
human instruction book".
27 Compared to an understanding like Smith/Szathmary's (1999).
 Genetics, Embodiment and Identity 47

and increasinbly also about their individual genetic data. genetics is literally a
body-writing practice. cx Obviously, those acts of inscribing genetic information on
the visible surfaces of phenotypic bodies are part of a political discourse where
identities are regulated and dcregulatcd.
Concepts of identity are descriptions of who somebody is supposed to be in
relation fo others. The question 'whoT contains always a double reference: to a
'seIt" and to an 'other' category. We carry manifold identity concepts with uso most
of them are socialised and ritualised, so me of them challenged. Gender identities,
for example. are challenged today and are the subject of transformation. They
ddine the normative structure of relationships with others as gendered persons.
ldentity concepts speil out what we consider to be the internal coherence of a
particular layer of selfness toward the corresponding othernesses.
The systemic concept of DNA does not make way for transferring an essence of
others in nur relationships to genes. A two-Iayer picture (genotype vs. phenotype),
where the invisible genotype is basic and expresses itself into phenotype, is
replaced by the picture of a self-informing body where the meaning of genes is
continuously generated. Consequently. finding a gene, a mutation or an individual
sequence variation, is not a reason for considering somebody as determined by a
hidden 'nature' bencath her or his present body. The danger of such a construction
of a hidden nature. wh ich becomes technically accessible by gene tcsts, is to givc
lllore attc'1tion to that hidden essence than to thc integral person. In the systcmic
conception of DNA we identify ourselves and others with the developing bl'Jy in
its totality. It makes no sense to identify with genes or with the genome because the
context bringing about genetic information i.l· the body in its developmental dyn-
amics. The program concept of DNA, however, implies an identification with
genetic information, the sum of one 's genes. The focal point of idcntification is not
cmbodimcnt but the information figured as steering it. The systemic approach
evades such a diversion and insists on the intcgrity of cach embodiment.

7.3
Conclusion

For these reasons I think that the systemic concept of DNA gives a better basis for
coping with the rapid progress of human genetics in human relationships. It does
not consider genetic information as less important, less helpful in certain situations
or dangerous in others, than does the program concept. Conversely, one could
suggest that systemic interpretation takes the reality of the molecular constitution of
embodiment even more seriously. eliminating metaphysical simplifications, work-
ing on the Entmythologisierung of DNA.
Genetic data can be indices for certain future characteristics, diseases or par-
ticular strengths which are not yet developed in reaIity. But genetic data are not
signifiers of the reality of those characteristics, diseases or traits in astate of
potentiality. They are not there as "potentials" behind the scenes before they are
manifest. Genetic data, even the knowledge of the total genome, can improve our
knowledge about which features of humans are accessible to voluntary change and

2X This term has been explored by Elizabeth Grosz (1994).

48 Christoph Rehmann-Sutter

wh ich are not. Even the changeable features involve genes that constitute the
capacity for change. Coping humanely with all this new knowledge and possi-
bilities of knowing will demand much circumspection. But none of this knowledge
will solve the mystery of human nature. The euphoria which has been generated
around the genome deciphering projects rests on a particular DNA theory, that is
contested by sound alternatives. Deciding between them has not only a scientific
but also an ethical component. I have tried to demonstrate the impact this decision
has on the moral configuration of human relationships.
"L'humain ne s'offre qu'a une relation qui n'est pas un pouvoir." (Levinas
(\ 951» - "Humanity is only revealed in a relationship which is not power." - This
formulation by Emmanuel Levinas might apply to our distinction: Genetic essen-
tialism, inevitably entailed by the program view of DNA, provides an illusionary
power. The humanity of human embodiment is only revealed by an appreciation of
the relational process of its self-constitution.

8
Acknowledgements

This research was funded by the Stiftung Mensch-Gesellschaft-Umwelt MGU at

the University of Basel (grant F 42/95). For comments which have led to an
improvement of the argument [' d like to thank Susan Oyama, Armin Grunwald and
Eva Neumann-Held, for English revision [ am grateful to Monica Buckland and
Jackie Leach Scully.

9
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11 Biology in Discourse: Biotheoretical
Considerations on Human Nature
The Biological Fundamentals of Human Cultural
Developments and their Unique
Functionallntegrations

Hans-Rainer Ouncker

To explain the basic principles involved with the special biological conditions 01'
human cultural developments, it will be necessary to introduce a short description
of the underlying thoughts on the evolutionary development 01' the hierarchically
organized cornplexity 01' our organism. We carry in our organism important
elements of the 3.5 billion years of evolution 01' life on earth.
All organismal functions are based on biochemical and biophysical functional
systems, most 01' which can be already found in prokaryotes (Fig. I). These
functional systems, consisting of causally interconnected elements. such as in
biochemical reaction cascades (Stryer 1990. Voet und Voet 1992). are directed
towards a special functional purpose: the uptake of certain substances, their
metabolism for extracting the necessary energy für building up cellular structures
and for all regulatory cellular functions, from gene activation up to growth and cell
division. These functional systems are controlled and maintained during evolution
by the fulfillment of their specific purposes: organisms with errors in their
functional systems are eliminated by selection. Thus, the precise functional systems
in their preexisting complex arrangements are conserved throughout evolution.
These functional systems in prokaryotes are built up by larger biochemical
molecules. In addition to the primary functional purpose these systems possess side
effects or secondary functions. which result from the nature of the proteins and
other macromolecules. They are. for instance, responsible for the osmotic pressure
in the cell or act as structural components of the cell and its membrane systems.
During further evolution duplication of certain parts of the genome occurs (Alherts
et al.. 1995, Hennig 1995). One portion of these genomes maintains the structure
and function of the original functional system, whereas the second portion of the
genome can alter certain elements of the original functional system via mutation
and other genetical changes, thereby developing the side effects or secondary
functions of the system into an additional new primary function. Such a develop-
ment occurs especially under changing environmental conditions, supplying the
organisms with new functional capacities (Duncker 1998a. in print). Through this
development the original functional system can be elaborated. now supporting
different functional purposes. Alternatively. a structurally independent system can
be evolved for a new functional purpose. In this way new primary functions are
added to the original main functional systems 01' the organism, for example, in the
development 01' cytoskeletal structures or new biochemical pathways (Duncker
1998b).
In the further evolution of organisms, a second mechanism is very important.
The evolved side effects of the newly developed functional systems enable
functional interconnections between them, by which they make up new and more
54 Hans-Rainer Duncker

Biological Evolution

Tran 'ilion from

Animallo Mankind
Funetion Sy tems in ocial Tradilions
Funeli nal Sy lems in Specilie Social Communicalions
y lems in Complex Behaviour: Social Sy. lcm~
. lems in Behaviour
y lems in LocOmolory Differenlialion wilh Skelelal Apparatu
ystem~ in eural amI Hormonal Regulation or Organ,
y lems wilhin Organ (inel. Senee Organ & crvou Sy tem )
Systems via Coupling of Differenrly pecializcd Cell
Syslems in Mullicellular Organi. m wilh Different eil Type
Sy tems in Eukaryolc wilh Organelles
.....n .. m'orlll-Kiophy. ical Functional System. in Pmkaryotcs

Fig. I. Biological Evolution ant the Hierarchy of its Functional Systems

complex funetional systems. All organelles have developed in this way. inereasing
the efficiency of the biochemical metabolie pathway as weil as enlarging general
cell size. However, not only do the cellular dimensions and their funetional capacity
inerease: By this stepwise evolutionary development not only the number of
functional systems is enlarged, but by the resulting, extended number of inter-
connections between them also the complexity of the functional organization of the
eell increases and thereby new functional phenomena emerge. Thus, eukaryotic
eells inerease the number of cellular organelles and develop the nucleus as a very
special organelle in the enlarged cell, in which their genetic material is partitioned
into chromosomes (Fig. I). After duplication of the latter, new mechanisms are
necessary for the regular distribution to the two resulting daughter cells. These new
mechanisms are established as mitosis . The regular genetie recombination in
eukaryotes required another set of new mechanisms. established as meiosis: There-
by not only an exponential increase in the velocity of evolutionary changes became
possible, but also the basic functional processes wh ich make up sexuality have
emerged (Duncker 1998b).
New levels or functional systems can be generated in evolution by way of these
basic mechanisms or doubling the genome and elaboration or the side effects of
existing functional systems. By interconnecting these newly evolved functional
systems, more complex systems lead in turn to new functional phenomena.
Thus, after evolution of eukaryotic cells and their mitotic mechanisms. multi-
cellularity has emerged by just slight changes in the terminal phase of cell division
via the evolution of molecules of adhesion (Fig. I) . These multicellular organisms
became the starting point for the differentiation of cells into different cell types.
The latter, with their different struetures and functions, are the basic unit for
 The Biological Fundamentals 55

development of new functional systems: By the coupling of different cell types,

new and efficient functions emerge: For example, the connection of sensory cells,
neurons and muscle eells enables eo-ordinated movements (Fig. I). Other examples
with increasing body size are the development of an intestinal system for pro-
cessing food in \arger amounts, a vascular system for supplying the organism with
nutrients, and arespiratory system for extern al gas exchange. In a subscquent
step the functional systems at the organ level were evolved (Fig. I), each organ
being composed of ditferent tissues and cell types in a very specific arrangement,
wh ich enabled them to fulfill their specitic functions in a very etficiently manner
(Duncker 1998b).
This evolution depends basically on the outlined genetical mechanisms,
especially with respect to the coupling of further evolved functional systems to
generate new functional phenomena including their supporting structures. But all
these evolutionary developments do not depend exclusively on the molecular
changes of the genetic material: The mutations, gene transpositions, genome dupli-
cations etc. dcliver only the broad basic stream of genetically possible alterations in
the functional systems and their supporting structures. Which genetic alterations of
the functional systems will persist and become a constituent part of ongoing
evolution will be determined to an increasing extent by the eomplexly integrated
functional systems (Duncker 1998a, in print). Only those very few alterations will
persist that do not disturb the eomplexly integrated functions of these systems and
thus are eompatible with survival. From these few compatible genetic changes,
only a very limited number will aetually alter the funetional systems and their
struetural components in such a way that its bearer will receive benefit for the
functioning of its internal machinery or efficieney, and thereby render it more
successful in its ecologieal interrelationships. These very few genetic changes
promote evolutionary development. In this way the growing internal eomplexity of
the integrated functional systems determines increasingly further evolution by the
cncapsulatcd nature of the ditferent functional levels, one building upon the other
(Duncker I 998b).
The development of sensory cells, neurons and muscIe eells and their specitic
functional connections enable the animal to adjust actively to the environment. The
development of sense organs and nervous systems for processing of sensory
information initiated the development of interaetions between organisms and their
environment, especially interactions with other organisms. This capacity for adjust-
ment to the environment and to other organisms in their neighborhood increases
exponentially by the evolution of organ-regulatory systems, i.e. nervous systems
and hormones (Fig. I). Such regulatory systems are used by the organism not only
to adapt between resting conditions and exereise, but also to reaet specifically to
other organisms in a range from reproductive behaviour to escape reactions, from
predators or locomotory patterns of attack and catching prey. These abilities of
animals increase exponentially by virtue of highly developed and differentiated
locomotor systems, which become very powerful through newly formed skeletal
structures in vertebrates in the form of an internal skeletal apparatus (Fig. I). These
skeletal-museular systems increase the mobility of organisms, culminating in some
forms of vertebrates in group migrations, but also enahling individuals to use their
appendages or jaws as tools (Duncker 1998b).
56 Hans-Rainer Duncker

These developments in the locomütor systems and the general increase in

motility üf animals allow actions beyond immediate funclional needs für the single
movements. These locomotory capacities establish new functional systems via the
elaboration of sequences in movement as the basis of behaviour (Fig. I). Behaviour
evolves in extent and importance for the animal together with the increasing
development of sense organs and especially the brain, particularly the higher
midbrain and forebrain regions. Thus, behaviour becomes increasingly more an
expression of their functional abilities and interactions with the environment. In the
further development of these behavioural systems, the specific interactions with
members of their own species become increasingly important. Thus, social systems
begin tü develüp (Fig. I).
These social systems enable the integrated animal to perfürm cooperative
actions for foraging and shelter or avoidance of predators. With the further evolu-
tion of social systems, the division of labour is introduced together with an increas-
ing emphasis on care for the growing young, especially when there is an increase in
the length of ontogenetic development. This temporally extended development of
the young is used for \earning of highly differentiated social structures in the
community and the elaboration of successful interaction within this realm. All these
developments of differentiation in the internal social structure are necessarily
accompanied by the deve\opment of specitic social communications (Fig. I). These
various forms of communications determine the interactions of the members of the
community as weil as being the mechanism for the elaboration of the internal
structure of the social community. In the highest evolved social communities these
developments lead to social traditions, as documented in primate communities.
Single successful actions, primarily performed in a playlike testing of the handling
of certain objects or the treatment of social members or enemies, are learned by the
young and become a fixed inventory of the behavioural abilities of this specific
community. In this way single communities form social traditions (Fig. I) (Duncker
1998b).
This is the basis in which the evolution of modern man has occurred. In a quite
comparable manner to all other evolutionary developments, in human evolution a
number of structures and functions has evolved further, including special changes
in ontogenetic developmental time tables of certain organ systems, so-called
heterochronic changes of developmental time patterns (Fig. 2) (Duncker 1998a, in
print). In the realization of these evolutionary developments all ~xisting levels of
the organismic functional systems are involved, from the genetical molecular level
through organ systems up to specific growth rate changes and alterations in the
ontogenetic time patterns. These further evolved structures, functions and onto-
genetic temporal patterns interact during the ontogenetic development of individu-
als from birth to adulthood in a very specific and unique way, which results in the
development of the social and cultural beings of modern mankind (Duncker
1998b).
The upright position of man is biomechanically refined by a special design of
the joints and a precise arrangement of size and angles of the working muscles.
Thus, our motor apparatus is specialized for locomotion in an upright position,
freeing the hands for other functions (Preuschoft and Witte 1991, 1993). Maintain-
ing a relative general form, our hands have become specialized by differentiation of
 The Biological Fundamentals 57

Transition from
Animalto Mank ind pezinl Funet

Fig. 2. Evolution of Special Functional Systems of Mankind

their musculature to grasp objects forcefully and simultaneously in a very differ-

entiated and controlled movement. Thus, they can function as universal tools and
can manipulate artificial tools (Fig. 2). Another important developmental alteration
of our body structure was the proportional changes in the human pharyngeal region,
i.e. its elongation and the drastie reduction in the size of the epiglottis (Aiello
and Dean 1990). Whereas the newborn demonstrates proportions found in chim-
panzees, the typical adult human proportions are attained by differential growth,
thereby presenting at the end of the first postnatal year the physical basis for the
functional differentiation of speech. This also includes differentiated actions of the
highly speeialized mouth, tongue and pharyngeal muscles. This speech-producing
machinery is guided by the brain, wh ich is not only responsible tor the motorie of
speech but also for eomprehension of language.
The outstanding feature in the evolution of modern man is the growth of the size
of the brain (Fig. 2), the greatest extent of this increase taking plaee in the cerebral
cortex and its nuclei , and in the cerebellum (Martin 1995, Knußmann 1996,
Duneker 1998b). The brain of humans has at least the threefold volume compared
to ehimpanzees and australopithecines, and the surface area of the cerebral cortex is
enlarged fourfold. This increase in brain tissue mass is metabolically extremely
expensive: In the late fetus and newbom the brain, which takes up 13 % of the total
body mass, oeeupies 65 % of the basic metabolie rate of the entire body! Even in
adults, attained at the age of 20, with 2 % brain mass of total body mass, the brain
tissue requires 20 % of the basic metabolie rate of the body (Martin 1995, Ulijaszek
et al. 1998). The evolution of the cerebral cortex is due to the development of very
differentiated cortieal functional systems. The first greatly enlarged cortical system
58 Hans-Rainer Duncker

is that made up by the parietal, occipital and temporal lobes. This enlargement starts
from the belt areas of the primary sensory areas, the visual, acoustical and somato-
sensory areas, wh ich increase moderately in size. The cortical areas adjacent to
these sensory belt areas are responsible for the development of the extreme ex-
pansion of the tertiary sensory areas and the cortical association areas (Rapoport
1990, Ricklefs und Finch 1996, Duncker 1998b). They encode not only all sensory,
biographical and episodical memory, but are also incorporated into all cognitive
developments.
The second extremely enlarged cortical system is represented by the fronto-
basal lobe, wh ich contains the highly developed motor systems and the large
cortical areas responsible for the gencral abilities of man for short-term and long-
term planning of activities, for the special characteristics 01' personality (Rapoport
1990, Duncker 1998b). The motor system with its extended possibilities 01' learning
and performing locomotory actions is intensively interconnected with the extreme-
Iy enlarged basal ganglia and the midbrain nuclei as weil as the cerebellum. The
sensory and association cortex can preserve sensory, biographical and episodical
events as weil as knowledge in the form of memory 01' single events and is able to
accumulate new memory at least for several decades 01' the life span. In contrast,
the learning 01' locomotory actions and motor patterns requires several trials and
repetitions 1'or perfect performance 01' these movements, and the ability 1'or inten-
sive learning of new motor patterns is only maintained up to the conclusion of
puberty, beyond puberty this ability gradually diminishes (Duncker 1998b).
The other 1'orebrain system, which has been specifically evolved in modern
humans, is the frontal activation system, wh ich is often neglected. The mammalian
cortex receives its sleep-wake activation from midbrain nuclei. All sensory infor-
mation is introduced into the cortex via the limbic system and the thalamus. In man
as the important third activation system, the fronto-basal complex of the nucleus of
Meynert is almost newly developed and supplies all cortical areas with activating
fibers (Rapoport 1990, Kolb und Whishaw 1996). In the wake phase this con-
tinuously activating input is responsible for steadily ongoing activity, including the
short- and long-term planning of all aOlI various actions. The great apes are capable
of highly complicated cognitive achievements, which they, however, only perform
in an experimental situation with reward (Valerius 1998). Lacking this frontal
activation system, they do not perform these complicated actions by themselves.
In addition to these evolutionary developments of the human cerebral cortex
also its ontogenetic development demonstrates a very specialized time course
during postnatal growth and functional maturation (Birbaumer und Schmidt 1996.
Kolb und Whishaw 1996). At birth all cortical neurons are differentiated in their
final position, but the volume of the cortex is only one eighth of its adult volume.
During the postnatal asymptotic growth process up to the 20 th year of age the dend-
rite and the axon cOllaterals develop in the cortex with large area-specific differ-
ences (Semenova et al. 1993). Beyond these intensive growth processes a further
limited growth of neuronal dendrites and axon collaterals occurs above the age 01'
forty (Braak et al. 1994). At birth the growing cortex begins to develop functional
connections between its neurons, starting with the primary sensory areas. Motor
cortex and association areas follow later. The well-known functional dominances 01'
both hemispheres also develop stepwise during this growth period, attaining adult
 The Biological Fundamentals 59

differentiatiop. beyond the age of 13 to 15 years (Kolb und Whishaw 1996). This
cerebral growth and functional development is connected to the general growth
patterns of the individual, which are nearly doubled in length compared to
chimpanzees. The growth of the human body demonstrates one peculiarity, i.e. the
secondary strong increase in growth during the entire phase of puberty (v. Harnack
1990). This is specific for man. In some apes an additional growth phase occurs
only in males after sexual maturity.
Only limited attention has been paid to the special evolutionary biology of the
human skin (Duncker 1998b), which is directly interconnected with the highly
specialized form of human sexual behaviour. The body covering with hair is
reduced so that our body is practicall y naked, but a new development of hair around
the pubic area has taken place. Especially the amount of subcutaneous fat tissue
increases greatly in humans. Already in newborns it makes up 15 or more percent of
body weight compared to only a few percent in great apes (Sarnat and Sarnat 1994).
Thus, the external appearance of the human body is no longer determined by fur or
hair, but by the specific and sexually specific molding of the skin through sub-
cutaneolls fat tissue. In human females but not in female great apes, permanent
breasts consist nearly totally out of fat tissue except for periods of gravidity and
lactation. The connective tissue provides the basic structure, into which the large
glandular apparatus for milk production can easily proliferate in times of gravidity.
These large mammary glands are necessary to maintain the high metaholie needs of
the newborn with its energetically demanding brain (Martini 1995, Ulijaszek et al.
1998). By this sexually specific molding of the naked skin the appearance of the
human body becomes visually very attractive to the opposite gender, which is
intensified by such special developments as the permanent breasts of females. Be-
sides its visual attractiveness the skin becomes an important tactile organ of
contact. This is, however, under strong social restrictions, since in all societies
touching of most skin areas underlies strong social tabus (Morris 1977). These
tabus can only be overcome by the slow development of close, intimate acquain-
tance, based on personal individuality in pair bonding, thus intensifying the tactile
contact experience and the pair relationship. The intensive social contacts that are
developed and maintained in ape communities by the constant social grooming has
been substituted in human communities by the use of the' newly dcveloped lan-
guage, which enabled men to perform long-term chatting and gossiping, and
thereby establishing and maintaining various social relationships (Dunbar 1996).
In direct conncction with the biological changes in the skin, sexual behaviour of
modern man has altered drastically (Baker and Bellis 1995, lones 1997, Valerius
1998). Whereas all apes mate in public within their social community, intimate
human pair contact and sexual intercourse occur in a very restrictive manner only in
pair bonding. Also the sexual cycles of the female are not demonstrated externally
as in great apes, but are hidden by the so-called crypsis. Additionally, the coupling
of gender with the development of a psychological sexual role has loosened, but
within great individual variation. These changes in human sexuality have important
consequences: The main social function of the male is no longer to maintain the
sexual role in the community or to win a dominant position. Thus, a larger
percentage of non-related males perform socially cooperative behaviour, which in
animal communities is limited to females (Valerius 1998). On the other hand,
60 Hans-Rainer Duncker

human females show much more interest in the material world. These changes,
especially the highly developed cooperative behaviour of non-related males.
represent a very important foundation enabling all cultural developments.
The human newborn is relatively much larger than the newborn of great apes,
obviously determined by its large brain (portmann 1951). But the body-extremity
proportions are also quite different, arms and legs are relatively shorter, and the
growth in length of arms and legs from newborn to adult is more than twice that of
chimpanzees (portmann 1951). [n connection with these drastic changes in body
size and proportions including brain size, not only the development of the
locomotory capacities of the human newborn is strongly retarded compared to
chimpanzees and other anthropoid apes, but also the further ontogenetic devel-
opment of its locomotory ami social capabilities. Anthropoid apes like most other
mammals posses~ basic patterns of locomotory and social behaviour, which are
genetically fixed in their ontogenetic development and then rcalized by starting to
practise these abilities in a playlike manner, exercising their capabilities for optimal
performance. The human newborn with its characteristic longer fetal development
is by no means physiologically premature at birth, as older authors stated (Holk
1926). [n contrast it demonstrates a very special adjustment to its social ontogenetic
development (Duncker 1999b). Not only its locomotory capacities are strongly
reduced at birth, but also most üf the genetically fixed locomütüry and sücial
patterns, wh ich come into function later in ontogeny and which are characteristic
for apes. In the human newborn only a basic set of vegetative, emotional and
locomotory reactions is genctically tixed, by which it commences interactions with
its mother. Due to its limited locomotory capacities the newborn is a "supportling"
("Tragling" Hassenstein 1987), who has to be carried by its mother, and who de-
velops a11 social and locomotory abilities through continua11y performed inter-
actions with its mother. This retardation and reduction of the genetica11y fixed
patterns of social and locomotory behaviour, not only at birth, but also in the flIrther
ontogenetic development, does not allow to characterize the human newborn as a
"nestling" or an altricial being (portmann 1951). Quite the contrary, based on its
special development as a "sllpportling" it is optimally adapted to its unique social
ontogeny. By the redllction of its genetically fixed behavioural patterns it is far
beyond a precocious newborn by being specially preadapted to its entire socially
guided ontogenetic development, which is adjusted to the social imprinting of its
emotional, social, locomotory and especia11y cognitive patterns and capabilities
(Fig. 3) (Duncker 1998b).
The human newborn, who is born into a system of social relationships, is at a
"socio-cultural zero position" (Nicolaisen 1994). Through its intimate connection
with its mother, it primarily does not differentiate between its own body, the
mother's body and inanimate objects. The newborn depends entirely on the actions
of the mother to acquire food, to be cleaned, and to maintain social contacts. These
interactions constitute social relationships, in which the mother, anticipating the
further development of the newborn 's actions, brings about a "scaffolding" (Bruner
1978, Nicolaisen 1994) of these flIrther developments by her own behaviour
(Fig. 3). Thus, in this reciprocal process the newborn determines, on the one hand,
the activities of the mother by its own physiological needs and its trials to regulate
the actions of its mother, whereas, on the other hand, the responses and "scaf-
 The Biological Fundamentals 61

Tran ilion from

nimallO Mankind Funcli nal )'slems in the Ue'~el4l1p~nenl lfol

Fig. 3. Ontogenetic Devdopment 01' Socio-Cultural Relationships

folding" 01' the mother modify the activities of the newborn, its rhythms and adapta-
tion to the daily course 01' activities of its elementary social group (Nicolaisen 1994,
Köhler 1996). Thus, basic social relationships are developed through these
interactions. At the age 01' two to three months the infant has learned to differentiate
between objects and living persons and expands its interactions to an increasing
number of members 01' its social group. In this way developing relationships and
social structures lead the infant and its social partners to organize social inter-
dcpendencies. As weil, these developments also deliver the roots for the relation-
ship to the material world and to the general processes of cognition as weil as to the
acquisition of language and phonation (Papousek and Papousek 1987, Papousek
and Bornstein 1992, Nicolaisen 1994). 11' the newborn is excluded from these basic
social interactions it only has the possibility to develop into a "Kaspar Hauser".
In this way the infant adjusts itself in the first few months of life to the daily
rhythms of its small confined sodal group. Gradually the visual system, followed
by the locomotor system, develops from the basic tactile, olfactory and acoustic
communication as weil as from the strong emotional interrelationship of the
newborn with its mother. All these developments are very strongly guided by the
alert infant with its continuous activity, with which it continually attempts to further
develop its social interactions, scaffolded by its social partners and in an increasing
amount by its experience with the objects of its material wodd. In this way the
retardation of the locomotory development enables the acquisition 01' new move-
ment patterns by social model leaming. In the human newborn and infant even the
locomotory development is entirely guided by its social interactions (Duncker
1998b). Thus, at the end of the first postnatal year the "supportling" masters the
62 Hans-Rainer Duncker

Tran. ition from

Animalto Mankind

Fig.4. Ontogenetic Socio-Cultural Development of Language Usage antJ Competence

upright sitting position, then the upright standing and eventually walking and
running. During the first year of life it has already learned the meaning of several
words and sentem:es, and in the second year starts speaking, increasingly acquiring
the use of the language of its community (Fig. 4) (Papousek and Bornstein 1992,
Nicolaisen 1(94). This learning and practicing of its language is far more than the
acquisition of a nominalistic communication system, it is much more an incorpor-
ation into the entire system of thinking of the community and the basic principles of
cognition of its cultural group.
These developments are permanently interacting with another form of loco-
motory development. The growing infant is learning and performing not only an
adequate locomotory use of the different parts of its body, but also of all the objects
it can handle. Thus, the child karns hundreds and hundreds of motor patterns. to
obtain a perfect use of all cultural and technical arte facts of its world, from toys to
tuuls and instruments (Fig.5) (Duncker 1998b). These strongly interconnected
social and locomotory develupments of the child are immediately interwoven with
its cognitive development (Piaget 1975, 1992, 1996. 1(97). The latter commences
with functioning of sensory-motor intelligence by the child up to four years of age.
followed by the elaboration of concrete thinking, increasingly employing linguistic
symbols as abstract concepts (Fig.6). Starting at eight years of age the child
develops an abstract-formal thinking into the different areas of conduct incIuding
that of the arts (Fig. 7).
These developmental steps are characterized by a very important feature: The
following step does not substitute for the preceding one but incIudes it, the new
capabilities are supplemented by the functions of all the underlying levels. Thus,
 The Biological Fundamentals 63

I"unctiunal yslems in the InlcmctiOIl' with

Tmn. ilioll from

Anima! 10 Mankind

Fig. 5. On\()gl!nl!ti~ Developlllcnt of So~io-Cultural Locolllotor Ahilitics

even formal abstract thoughts anu the resulting actions require the uirect handling
01' tangible things for their realization. which is guideu by concrete thinking. The
immeuiate hanuling of objects uepenus on our basic sensory motor intdligence. [n
this ongoing ueve!opment. abstract-formal thinking Ieaus to thoughts about time
and space beY!lIlu the range 01' personal experience anu about the general structure
of the world and the community one is Iiving in. [n this way general concepts of
cosmologic-religious iueas uevelop. which not only fulfill these cognitive neeus.
but also present rules for the behaviour 01' the members 01' a community. laying the
foundations for morality anu ethics (Fig. 8). These ucvelopments are characteristic
for all human societies (Duncker 1998b).
In this way the social anu cultural world 01' each growing inuiviuual is con-
structeu through continuous interactions between the developing infant amI youth
anu all its social partners anu the ambient material worlu. This construction 01' its
socio-cultural world can only take place within the framework 01' its body with all
its biologieal growing processes. physiological needs anu emotional uemanus. The
qualitative significance 01' these constructeu socio-cultural capabilities and cog-
nitive abilities are imprinted only through the structure. meaning and ongoing
activities 01' the historically developed and uetermineu socio-cultural society. in
which the infant and youth are growing up (Duncker 1998b). This is in strong con-
trast to the genetically fixed ontogenetic development 01' most mammals anu apes.
wh ich is augmented by 41 certain amount 01' socially handed down traditions.
The construction 01' the world. in which human societies, 4111 their members and
also 4111 growing youngsters are living in, is not only the framework 01' the social
and cultural worlu and its surroundings. but it is throughout the entire ontogenetic
64 Hans-Rainer Duncker

Functional System., in Ihe Social Delcnninalion or ognilive Developmcnl

Fig. 6. So<.:ial Determination of Ontogcnetic Cognitive Development

development of the individual, far more also the process of creating a model of
itself (Metzinger 1999a. b). This model with all its different levels. from the body
sensations up to sodal and emotional interactions. behaviours and feelings indudes
alilocomotory and eognitive capabilities and religious beliefs. as weil as the way in
wh ich the personal interactions with the material world are organized, handled and
mentally represented. This self model with its multiple and very different levels is
a product of all various kinds of continuous soeial interaetions and produees the
self-representation, wh ich is, on the other hand. the basis for all soeial actions and
management of the material world by the individual. The different levels of this
self-representing model become aware to the individual to varying degrees at
different times and situations. eonstituting the self-eonseiousness of the person. But
only in a limited number of situations the person is aware of the model character of
its self-awareness. Often this self-representation is taken by the individual in a
naive realistic way as the eonseiousness of the personal seil', and thereby this naive
self-eonseiousness beeomes the basis of most actions of the person in its soeial and
material world (Metzinger 1999 a. b).
This soeio-cultural ontogenie development of man from newborn to adult and
old age is eharacterized by yet another feature, wh ich is unique for the historically
determined human ontogeny. This development starts primarily for the newborn in
its own small soeial group (Nieolaisen 1994, Köhler 1996). Growing up in this
group. by the above-outlined intensive interaetions. the newborn and infant will
develop sodal relations and fulfill emotional needs and thereby williearn the basie
soeial eategories, including language and ways of thinking and beliefs as weil as all
loeomotory patterns and eapabilities within the realm of the soeial and material
 The Biological Fundamentals 65

E 'ID:ti'!olnal Sytem in the Development of Fonnal-Abstra t Thinking

Fig.7. Ontogcnetic Development 01' Formal-Abstract Thinking

world. However. this development of the infant and youth will take place entirely
endosed in one sodal group and environment only in a tri bai society in the rc-
motest parts of earth. In all other situations with neighbouring social groups of the
larger cultural community or even with social groups of other cultural and ethnic
communities. some kind of exchange between these different social groups will
take place in different developmental stages and to very varying degrees. The
availability and exchange of different toys for playing as weil as tools for
manipulating the social and material world. induding dothes and articles of
jewelry. are essential elements of this development. The growing child will learn
the use of certain toys and the necessary locomotory patterns from children of other
social groups, but also new words and new use of language induding new ways of
thinking and beliefs. In contact with societies with higher technological develop-
ments and especially in these societies with their different social groups and often
also different ethnic and language groups there is an exchange and reciprocal use
not only of technical apparatusses, but also of broad fi elds of knowledge. cognitive
and locomotory capabilities, which can be of imprinting importance for the grow-
ing generation. Especially in societies with elaborate educational systems, children
from different social and ethnic groups attend nursery school together as weil as the
different forms of elementary schools and other higher educational and professional
institutions. This mutual learning and experience gathering are the basis of a broad
mutual exchange, which goes far beyond the direct purpose of these educational
systems.
In this way at the different levels of individual ontogenetic development, the
individual person has a larger number of possibilities of exchange with members of
66 Hans-Rainer Duncker

Fig.8. Ontogenetic Dcvclopmcnt of Cosll1ologic-R..:Iigious Conccpts

üther social and in so me instances also ethnic groups. These exchange processes
will drastically intluence the deve!opment of locomotory and professional skills,
of social behaviour, speaking competence and ways of thinking and beliefs.
The different social. ethnic and cultural communities make use of these forms of
exchange in very different ways. In so me cases they even try to prevent exchange
between different social groups, ethnic communities and different religious groups.
for example, by a c1assical school education only for selected higher social groups.
At the other extreme, intensive cultural exchange is promoted by such social
arrangements as uscd by travelling journeymen, students and university teachers or
by the colonization of certain countries through the recruitment of craftsmen and
tradesmen from higher developed states. The extremes range from the eradication
of other ethnic and religious groups to a very integrative association of craftsmen.
artists and scientists of other language and cultural communities. An unanswered
question is, by which mechanisms certain ethnic, language, cultural and religious
communities retain their cultural identity. But beyond these large differences in the
behaviour of different cultural communities in different historical periods the
general characteristic of social and cultural groups of modern man is their ability
for exchange not only between different neighbouring social groups. but also
between different language and cultural groups even over large distances . Müller-
Karpe (1998) demonstrated this exchange to have occurred to a large extent
between different great cultural systems even prehistorically. Thus, modern men
possess in the ontogenetic development of their maturing generations not only a
unique multi level system of socialization and elaboration of all social , locomotory
and cognitive capabilities, wh ich generates human social and cultural systems and
 The Biological Fundamentals 67

System. in thc Dcvelopmcnt of Cultural Traditions

Fig. 9. Ontogenetic Development of Responsibility for Cultural Traditions

communities in a unique way, but also an intensive, often used exchange between
different social, language, ethnic and cultural communities, wh ich is also only
found in these historically developed socio-cultural systems of modern mankind.
The basis of all these cultural developments of mankind is the ontogenetic
development of all individuals of a single community. These developments arc
determincd by the biological conditions of the human organism, but they guide the
cultural developments only in forming frame conditions. As emphasized above. the
molecular genetic changes do not dctermine alone the course of evolution, but they
are very specifically selected by the complex interdependencies of the multiply
interconnected functional systems. In a comparable way in human socio-cultural
ontogeny. the quality of emotional. social. locomotory and cognitive developments
and their specific characteristics and capacities are not determined biologically by
the genetically determined development of the body and its organs, but only by the
very specific social and cultural aspects and conditions of the community in wh ich
these developments take place. All details of the social structure of a community
ami its cultural possibilities. including language and general ways of thinking and
belief, have been developed during a long social-cultural history, which is specific
for each language and cultural group. This is the unique historical development that
mankind has undergone in its radiation into more than 6000 language and cultural
groups, without showing basic differences between the different races and ethnic
groups. This was not a biological evolution, but a historical development of the
large number of social communities of the human species, which has led to the
richness and multiplicity of our cultural systems (Duncker 1998b).
All these ontogenetic developments. which last in most societies beyond the age
68 Hans-Rainer Duncker

in Ihe Developmenl of osmologic-Rcligiou. Concepl.

in the Developmenl of Formal-Abslracl Thinking
in the Social Dclcrminalion of ognitive Dcvclopmem
in thc Inlcraclion wilh CuhuraJ-Technologi aI Anefacl
in the Developmenl of Complex Language- y lern
the Dcvelopmenl of ocio - Cuhuml Relation hip '

Socio-Cultural History
Fig. 10. Developmental Hieran:hy 01' Socio-Cultural Functional Systems

of 20, are governed by elaborated systems of cultural traditions (Fig. 9). These
systems of tradition extend from the manner in wh ich mothers deal with and handle
thcir newborns up to the way in which suprafamilial educational systems have been
institutionalized and differentiated. These social-cultural systems are those which
determine the nature of modern man in its astonishing richness and the multiplicity
of its different cultures. They have developed historically beyond the biological
evolution of man (Fig. 10) (Duncker 1998b). [n contrast to the genetically fixed and
deterrnined ontogenetic developments of the structures and functional systems of
the body, which are realized by the biological ontogenetic development, all these
socio-cultural capabilities of single individuals have to be handed down by systems
of tradition, constructing in each individual anew these complex social structures
and interrelationships by innumerable interactions from birth to old age (Fig. 11).
Type and selection of these interactions determine the individuality of the person,
via interaction with the widely varying capacities of the body of the individual,
determining the biological and socio-cultural personality, the uniqueness of each
person.
Many analogies exist between the biological evolution of the organism of
modern man and the historical development of cultures; but they remain only
anologies . This has been demonstrated above by the description of the special
construction of the social structure and social interdependencies and relationships,
starting with the actions of the newborn and the scaffolding actions and reactions of
the mother, and eventually including all the different social interactions at the
different levels of social, emotional. locomotory, cognitive and mental develop-
ment including the culture-specific exchange between different social and cultural
 The Biological Fundamentals 69

in the Developmenl of osm 10 ie-Religiou epl

in the Developmem of Fonnal- bslrael Thinking
ial Detcnnination of

ifie Social ommun ic3tion

Comple Behavi ur: Social Sy lem
:SY~ltetli!li ß
:SYI,let_in Beh viour
LocomolOry inrcntiati ns \ ilh kclctal pparalu
in Neural and Honnonal Re ul mion of Organs
within Organs (ine!. IK.'C Orga ns & ervou ' y:tems)
via Coupling of Differenlly Speeialized Cell
in Multicellular Organi Im wilh Differenl Cell Type .
~lIoruUYsl.~ms in Eukaryoles wilh Organelle
~b_rcal - Biophy s ical Funclional y lem in Prokaryole

Fig. 11. Biological and Socio-Cultural Hierarchies 01' Mankind

groups and communities. These cultural differentiations can never be reduced to

features of organismic biological evolution. And this determines the uniqueness of
modern mankind.
Evolutionary biologists ask not only for the causes, but also for the reasons of
this evolution of modern man: As outlined in this paper, today we can demonstrate
a large number of interrelationships not heretofore recognized, wh ich enabled the
special development of human social and cultural structures and functions . This
was made possible, on the one hand, by newly discovered facts and results, and, on
the other hand, by compilation of knowledge from very different disciplines, which
have yet not been viewed in these interrelationships. Thus, we are obtaining a new
picture by including results and knowledge from paleoanthropology and evolution-
ary biology, traversing through neuroanatomy and neurophysiology, cognition
science, developmental psychology and sociology up to a theory of knowledge and
the philosophy of the mind. On this basis we can elaborate numerous new, as yet
unseen interrelationships and reasons for the evolution of man . Thus, modern man
gained a high ecological tlexibility as a result of these new functional inter-
depencies and with the unique cooperative cultural developments wh ich enabled
man to adapt within a short time not only to c1imatic and nutritional changes, but
especially for migrations into quite new ecological conditions including extreme
environments. In this way socio-cultural developments of man enabled modern
mankind to perform historical deve1opments, which enabled a successful survival
even within short time ranges, which were exponentially faster and more powerful
than all biological evolution could have been. In this way natural and cultural
sciences can deliver a better understanding of modern mankind even up to the point
70 Hans-Rainer Duncker

of interprcting the superiority to Neanderthai men due maillly to the greater

cooperation of non-related males and the t1exibility in the size of social groups and
thereby also number of cooperative men.
Beyond these interpretations the scientific explanations are reaching their limits.
The development of cosmologic-religious thoughts, the social construction of en-
tire religious imaginative worlds, which is a universal event of all human cultures,
can be understood as the general social system, which gives all social members
directions for their actions and behaviour, implanting the categories of morals and
ethics into human societies. But beyond these insights, sciences and humanities, as
weIl as natural and cultural sciences are not able to explain sufficiently these
historical developments at the cosmological dimension of human cultures. Even
toda)" this can only be accomplished by the explanations and interpretations of the
great religions of the different human cultural systems of the world.

Acknowledgement

For the careful writing and correction of the different vers ions of the manuscript I
express my thanks to Mrs. E. Hellmann. For the production of the computer graph-
ical illustrations [ am very thankful to Mr. eh. Thiele especially for the constructive
cooperation. For the precise linguistic revision of the manuscript [ am cordially
indebtcd to Priv.-Doz. Dr. R. Snipes.

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Three Seconds:
A Temporal Platform for Conscious Activities

Ernst Pöppel

A new taxonomy 01' functions distinguishes between content functions and logistic
functions to implement conscious activities. On the basis of this classification the
repertory of consciousness comprises neuronal programs in four different content
domains, providing perceptions, memories, evaluations and volitional acts (Pöppel,
1988, 1989a). Neuropsychological evidence suggests that elementary functions
within these domains are represented in a modular fashion. This evidence comes
from studies with patients who have suffered specific injuries to the brain. It can be
demonstrated that elementary functions are lost if circumscribed regions of the
brain are no langer functional. Thus, the interindividual constancy of a loss of
function proves the existence of neuronal modules which under normal circum-
stances provide these functions. These content functions provide the material of
conscious acti vities.
However, for a subjective representation of these content functions, also logistic
functions have to be operative. There are basically two such logistic functional
domains which are necessary for conscious activity namely activation and temporal
contro!. Activation is for instance expressed within the framework 01' the circadian
oscillator, i.e. conscious activity is dependent of the phase 01' the 24-hour-rhythm.
Temporal control is necessary because 01' the mode of representation 01' functions. It
has been demonstrated that each mental act is characterized by the simultaneous
activity of spatially distributed neuronal modules. Thus, if we see something, listen
or talk to somebody or think about something, several neuronal modules are
engaged and not only one. The pattern of these spatially segregated activities is
apparently always different. Because of the spatial segregation of function. the
brain has to deal with the intermodular binding of neuronal activities to construct
unified and coherent percepts.
It is useful to distinguish between different levels of binding or a hierarchy of
binding operations. At a primary level identical features within one sensory modali-
ty are linked together; this is for instance necessary to construct connectivities, i.e.
lines or edges, through visual space, because the local elements representing iden-
tical orientations of line segments catch only a small part of the visual field and
they are spatially distributed. On the next level of binding different qualities within
one modality have to be linked together. Such operations are necessary if visual
objects are constructed because surfaces with different colors or shades and con-
nectivities as edges have to come together. For this binding operation a semantic
aspect has to be taken into account, as in a top-down manner different physical
features have to be selected to allow for a construction of the visual object. Thus,
a scheme or an apriori internal representation 01' the perceived object should be
centrally available, against which sensory information is compared.
74 Ernst Pöppel

On a third level of binding one deals with the problem of how activities from
different sense modalities are linked together. Objects which are consciously per-
ceived are often characterized by several modalities like visual, auditory and
olfactory information. Obviously. intersensory binding has to transcend intra-
sensory binding. It has, however, been suggested that fur the binding operations at
the three indicated levels, a common temporal mechanism based on excitability
cyc\es could be used that provides a temporal framework for further operations
(Pöppel et al., 1990). It has been suggested that this mechanism which is expressed
by neuronal oscillations (Pöppel, 1997b) provides system states within which
neuronal activities are integrated. This integration process is conceived of as the
basis of a neuronal machinery constructing basic events which are the building
blocks for conscious activities. A strong support for this notion comes from
experiments which patients who had to undergo a general anaesthesia (Madler and
Pöppel, 1987; Schwender et al., 1994). In this situation the oscillatory activity
within the neuronal assemblies wh ich represent the system states, comes to a stop
with the result that such patients process no sensory information at all. (A typical
remark of a patient who comes out of this physiological state is the ljllestion when
the operation will start, i.e. other than during sleep no apparent time has passed an
no event has been registered).
On a next level of binding the primordial events identified on a lower level are
linked together. Observations made within different experimental situations
provide evidence of the operative importance of a temporal integration mechanism
being essential to an understanding of consciousness. Although these observations
have been made in different contexts a common underlying principle is dctected in
spite of obvious observational diversities. The "botanizing" attitude to look for
common principles in different realms of activities is guided by the conviction that
if a phenomenon shows up in ljualitatively different experiments or situations a
universal princip\e has to be sllspected. In what follows an answer shall be given to
the question of what the "state of being conscious" (Pöppel, 1997b) could mean.
The anchor point of the reasoning is that one can understand consciousness only if
one analyzes temporal mechanisms of neuronal processes and behavioral acts.
The subjective present as a basic temporal phenomenon has interested psycho-
logists for more than one hundred years (e.g., James, 1890; Stern, 1897). We are
now in a situation to indicate how \ong such a subjective present actually lasts. This
numerical answer can be derived from a number of different experiments which all
converge to a value of approximately 2 to 3 seconds. Support comes from different
domains like temporal perception proper, speech, movement control. vision and
audition, and also memory. All these observations suggest that conscious activities
are temporally segmented into intervals of a few seconds and that this segmentation
is based on an automatic (pre-semantic) integration process providing a temporal
platform for conscious activity. It should be stressed that the temporal platform
does not have the characteristics of a physical constant but that an operating range
of approximately 2 to 3 seconds is basic to mentation; obviously. one has to expect
subjective variability for such a temporal integration window.
What is the experimental evidence? If subjects have to reproduce the duration of
either an auditory or a visual stimulus one observes veridical reproductions with
small variance up to 2 to 3 seconds, and large errors of reproduction with a strong
 A Temporal Platform tor Conscious Activities 75

tendency for 1 shorter reproduction for longer intervals (e. g., pöppel. 1971). It
appears as if short intervals can be experienced as a whole while longer intervals
temporally disintegrate, i.e., during short intervals of a few seconds it is possible to
focu~ one 's attention on specific events. The qualitative difference of phenomenal
availability has lead Fraisse (1984) to the suggestion that "time perception" refers
to short intervals and "time estimation" to longer intervals.
Using a different experimental paradigm Getty (1975) observed that Weber's
law in time perception experiments works within approximately 2 seconds but not
beyond. This experiment also stresses that qualitatively different mechanisms are at
work when dealing with time for intervals up to a few seconds and beyond the
horder heing 2 to 3 seconds. This view is supported by electrophysiological studies
from Elbert and colleagues (1991) who demonstrated different brain processes in
reproduction experiments for short and long intervals.
Temporal integration can also be studied by subjective accentuation of
metronome beats. Üne of the founding fathers of experimental psychology, Wundt
(1911), pointed out that temporal grouping of successive stimuli has a temporal
limit of approximately 2.5 seconds. In such a metronome task the subject imposes a
subjective structure onto identical physical events. If auditory stimuli like c\ick
sounds follow each other with an interstimulus interval of for instance one second,
it is easy to impose a subjective structure by giving a subjective accent to every
second of the stimuli. If, however, the temporal interval between the stimuli be-
comes too long (for instance 5 seconds), one is no longer capable to impose such an
apparent temporal structure. The two separate sequential stimuli no longer can be
united to one percept, i.e. temporal binding for temporally adjacent stimuli is no
longer possible because they fall into successive integration windows.
In recent experiments with brain injured patients it eould be demonstrated that
the temporal integration process as studied with this metronome paradigm is
selectively impaired after injuries in frontal areas of the left hemisphere (Szelag et
al., 1997). Patients with injuries in these areas adopt a new strategy of integration
by consciously counting successive events; the "pop-up" impression of belonging-
ness of suceessive tones is apparently lost in these patients and, thus, they re-
construct togetherness by abstract means.
A qualitatively different paradigm providing further insight into the integration
process comes from studies on temporal reversal of ambiguous figures (Pöppel,
1988 b; 1997 a). Ir stimuli ean be perceived with two perspectives (Iike a vase or
two faces looking at each other) there is an automatie shift of perceptual content
after approximately 3 seconds. Such a perceptual shift also occurs with ambiguous
auditory material, such as the phoneme sequence KU-BA-KU where one hears
either KUBA or BAKU; one can subjectively not prevent that after approximately
3 seconds the alternative percept takes possession of conscious content.
This regular shift between two potential interpretations of the stimulus material
has also been observed in studies on binocular rivalry; interestingly, the switching
rate of the two potential interpretations of visual stimulus material extremely slows
down after injury of eortieal areas (Pöppel et al., 1978). The spontaneous alteration
rate in the two sensory modalities, i.e., vision and audition, suggest that normally
after an ex haust period of 2 to 3 seconds attentional mechanisms are elicited that
open the sensory channels for new information. If the sensory stimulus remains the
76 Ernst Pöppel

same. lhe alternative interpretation will gain control. Metaphorically speaking.

every 2 to 3 seconds, the endogenously generated question arises "what is new".
and with unusual stimuli such as the ambiguous material the temporal eigen-
operations of the brain are unmasked.
Some data in a study by Sams and colleagues ( 1993) where the amplitude of the
mismatch negativity as a function of the interstimuluis interval (ISI) was investi-
gated support the above considerations. The mismatch negativity, a component of
the auditory event-related potential, is elicited by a physical deviant stimulus such
as frequency or intensity of a tone in a homogeneous stimulus sequence. If during
the experiment the ISI is altered, the largest amplitude of the mismatch negativity is
observed with an ISI of 3 seconds, i.e., shorter and longer IS[s result in smaller
amplitudes of the mismatch negativity. As negativity indicates increased neuronal
activity, this result suggests that the auditory channel is characterized by a higher
neuronal activity in regular intervals. This modulation is endogenously determined,
being a property of the neuro-cognitive machinery itself, and it implies that
approximately every 3 seconds the sensory channel is more sensitive than at other
times for new information coming from the external or internal environment.
Temporal integration for intervals of 2 to 3 seconds is also seen in sensorimotor
control. If a subject is requested to synchronize a regular sequence of auditory
stimuli with finger taps, stimuli are anticipated with very small variance by some
tens of milliseconds (Mates et al, 1994). This kind of sensorimotor synchronization
is, however, only possible within the operating range of a few seconds. If the next
stimulus lies too far in the future (like 5 seconds) it is not possible to program an
anticipatory movement that is precisely linked to stimulus occurrence; in such a
case movements become irregular and subjects prefer to react to the stimulus
instead of anticipating it. Observations on the duration of intentional movements
coming from ethological studies gave similar numerical values (Schleidt et el.,
1987). Members of different cultures inc1uding those from old ethnia (for instance
Yanomami Indians) show very similar temporal patterns for homologous move-
ments the preferential duration being 2 to 3 seconds. On the basis of these human
studies Gerstner and Fazio (1995) have observed in various species of higher
mammals that they also tend to segment their motor behaviour in the same temporal
range as humans do. This observation suggests that we are dealing with a universal
principle of temporal integration that transcends human cognition and behavioral
control.
Supporting evidence for a specific temporal integration mechanism comes also
from studies on memory and speech. In a classical study (Peterson and Peterson,
1959) it was shown that the working platform for short-term retention is just a few
seconds; only if rehearsal is allowed are we capable to store information for longer
intervals. Experiments on the temporal structure of spontaneous speech on adults
(Vollrath et al., 1992) and on children (Kowal et al., 1975) also show that spoken
language is embedded in temporal windows of up to 3 seconds duration giving
speech it's rhythmic structure.
This observation has motivated studies outside the usual scientific context. ft
was observed that in all languages that could be studied (Turner and pöppel. 1983)
the duration of the spoken verse line falls into a temporal window of up to 3
seconds (with the exception of the hexameter which, however, is characterized by a
 A Temporal Platform for Conscious Activities 77

caesura). This phenomenon in poetry is probably more than astrange accident. If

independent of culture, historic tradition. poetic rules or syntax of the language onc
observes such a convergent etfect in a cultural artifact one is forced to conclude that
an underlying mechanism controls the work of the artist. Without explicit
knowledge the artist orients hirnself implicitly at neuronal mechanisms of temporal
integration.
Another aesthetic domain in which temporal segmentation becomes apparent is
music (Pöppel, 1989 b). Musical themes orten have a temporal limit of about 3
seconds. The famous theme from Beethoven's Firth Symphony can serve as a
representative example. In the tradition of the occidental music, perhaps also in
oriental music (Pöppel, 1988 b), there seems to be a universal phenomenon at work
that cannot easily be overcome by the composer or the musician. If one hears music
in which the temporal structure, as it is referred to here, is abandoned, then the
aesthetic etfect is also altered. Apparently, temporal mechanisms of our brain de-
fine temporal constraints that are also used for aesthetic evaluation. If the biologic-
ally predetermined temporal window is violated or ignored, the aesthetic frame
of reference within which the music is generally judged is also changed. Because of
the omnipresence of temporal segmentation in the arts one may consider these
observations as supporting factual evidcnce for a temporal integration process of
our brain.
As the experimental and other observations referred to above employ quali-
tatively different paradigms covering perceptual processes in audition and vision,
cognitive evaluations, movement control, speech, cultural artifacts, mnemonic
representation, perceptual accentuation or temporal integration, it is proposed that
temporal integration in the range of 2 to 3 seconds is a general principle of the
neuro-cognitive machinery. This universal integration process is automatie and pre-
semanlic, i.e. it is not determined by what is processed, but it defines a temporal
window within which conscious activities can be implemented. Because of the
omnipresence of this phenomenon, it can be used as a pragmatic definition of the
subjective present wh ich is characterized by the phenomenal impression of "now-
ness". Temporal integration in the range of2 to 3 seconds defines, howevcr, also the
singular "state of being conscious" or STOBCON (Pöppe\, 1997 b). The 3-second-
window provides a logistic basis for conscious representation, a working platform
for our phenomenal prescnt.
The access to this temporal operating platform is apparently controlled by
independent neuronal mechanisms as the observations on phenomena like residual
vision (also referred to as "blindsight") after brain injury (e.g., Pöppel et a\., 1973)
suggest. It has been observed that patients are still capable to process visual
information although they report to be absolutely blind. This phenomenon can be
interpreted as indicating a deficit with the entering operations into the temporal
platform of conscious activity. If such an access mechanism to the temporal plat-
form normally must be operative the question rises whether the content of the
separate STOBCONs is always of the same nature, i.e. whether the access mach-
inery to a conscious representation is just a passive bottleneck through which infor-
mation has to be channeled to reach a temporal platform, or whether access
mechanisms are characterized by selection processes. As thefe are in principle
two qualitatively different contents of a STOBCON, one being experiential and
78 Ernst Pöppel

one being retlective, it appears reasonable to assume that the access mechanisms
are at the same time selection mechanisms. As these selection mechanisms remain
implieit one has to conclude that the driving force of conscious activity stays
in the dark.

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Gestalt Recognition and Internal Representation -
AReport trom the Philosophical Laboratory

Dlat Breidbach

1
The Design of an Associative Mind

Areal brain is built up by neurons wh ich show highly stereotyped morphologies

(Braitenberg and Schüz 1991). That means that in spite of the huge amount of
contacts each neuron has, these were not chosen at random but were developed in a
complex, but highly regular structure. Accordingly, there is no simple Gaussian
uistribution of functional connectivities as, for ex am pie. in the elements of spin
glasses (Palm 1982). In the contrary a neuronal systems employs numerically co m-
plcx, but topologically strictly oruereu functional connections (Braitenberg 1977).
Thus. in contrast to the algorithm used to describe c1assical neuronal networks,
the brain activation patterns proceed on local connections. These are activateu in
parallel by any (internal or external) stimulus (Abeies, 1991).
In such a system, a stimulus elicits areaction that is promoted according to the
connectivity mode of the system (Abeies 1991). This mode is not just given by
the statics of a frozen structure of synaptic pathways, it also encounters varying
biochemical pathways anu thus is a highly uynamical functional system (Shepheru
1988). To describe its essential functions, so me basics of such a neuronal archi-
tecture have to be outlineu. One of these essentials are the connectivity patterns of
an associative neuronal network (Braitenberg & Schüz 1991). According to this
architecture, a signal is not propagated via a strictly defined cortical pathway, but
spreaus into neighbouring regions. In consequence, the effect of the activation of a
neuron is complicated. Neglecting physiological and biochemical specificities. the
principal pattern of such an activation, ncvertheless, can be described in a physical
model that embodies the two architectural principles of an associative neuronal
network: the local coupling characteristics and the parallel activation modes of
such a system.
Any activation of the system changes the system. At a time n - before stimu-
lation - the activity pattern of the system is in a eertain state S which is changed by
the stimualtion (I. At time n+ J; accordingly. a stimulation (I, thus. may have a
uifferent effect on the system (Vaadia et al. 1995; Breidbach et al. 1996): The
uegree of reorientation due to the stimulus is altered by the activity pattern of the
system at the time of the stimulation. Aeeordingly, there is a eorrespondence be-
tween the effeet of a stimulus and the activity mode of the system. That aetivity
mode ean be described as the funetional topology of the system. Using mathe-
matical terminology, it is possible to speak ofthe variation in this system's topology
in terms of information theory (Holthausen and Breidbach 1997). The optimal
functional topology is defined by the tendencies expressed in the energy landscape
X2 Olaf Breidbach

of the ),ystem in regard to any possible local activation of the system. Thus. the
n:),ponse is defined according to local system characteristics and tu the overall
value of energy distrubution in the system. That correlation is a complicted one. but
it can be described using physical functions. e. g. a function that describ~ the order
characteristics of the system as a function of lucal versus global energy distribu-
tions. Such patterns can be computed using the local and global entropy character-
istics of the system (Holthausen 1998). The system is described as a complex of
interacting reactions. A new stimulus can be dcscribed in its effect on such funct-
ion;.!1 characteristics. Extending this approach. the system can be described by its
reactions to certain inputs. As any input affects the system characteristics. such a
system is a dynamical one. The dynamics of the system can be expressed as
functions of the topology of the system (Holthausen and Breidbach 1997; lost
1998). Accordingly, at least in the modelling situation, stimulus characterisatiuns of
the system can be outlined exclusively on system internal characteristics:
The system defines a signal by its effect on its internal activation diversity. This
internal diversity can be described analytically using an entropy function (Kerridge
1961; Bongard 1970). Changes in the local entropy characteristics of the system.
can be outlined by system internal characteristics employing relative measures:
Anything that is new is tested against former activation modes. Thus. a signal can
be c1assified as something that either fits into 'categories' that have been internally
detined by the system, or as something that is really new for the system. Thereby.
these tjualifications correspond to an external world. but they do not just reproduce
the - objective - order characteristics of the outer world.

2
Views fram inside

Thc system detines a stimulus by its relation to any other activation of the system.
Accordingly, the value of a signal corresponds directly to its impact on the func-
tional connectivity of the system. Physically. the system can be described as an
ensemble of coupling characteristics. That functional connectivities describe the
reactions the system may exhibit. Thereby, the activation modes are not set at
random, hut are directed by the connectivity pattern of the system. Thus, activation
modes are directed towards aseries of basins of attraction that correspond tn the
system's topology. Accordingly. system dynamics can be described by the attractor
configuration.
The functional topology of the system is not fixed. As we know from neuro-
physiology. the activation of coupling sites of neuronal elements changes the
coupling intensities in the real neuronal system. By introducing learning algo-
rithms. such aetivity dependent ehanges ean be formed into the model. Thus,
the system not only proeesses a momentaneous activation mode aeeording to its
topology. but it ehanges its eonneetivity pattern in reaction to its internal activation
modes. In eonsequenee, the system is a dynamieal one. Using the mathematieal
tools that allow to detine topologieal charaeteristics in the interplay of global and
local eonneetivities. trends in those dynamics ean be deseribed. Thus, the model
provides a tool to study system dynamics and to describe the eomplexity of con-
 Gestalt Recognition and Interna I Representation R3

nectivity patterns found in an associative system with local coupling character-

istics. Accordingly, the model allows the description of priniciples of associative
computation in a neuronal network with topologically defined elements. Neurons
can be described as such elements processing local coupling characteristics. In so
far, the model implements the principal structural characteristics of areal brain.
As these characteristics are defined mathematically, any structural realization
that performs the same characteristcis has to be seen as a functional equivalent.
Thus, the question is whether it is possible not only to analyse such a dynamical
system, but to synthesize such a device that is able to mimic aspects of the functions
of areal brain. One of the essential characteristics of such a system will be that it
does not work on predetermined categories, but sorts out the internal characteristics
of a data manifold presented to it. Accordingly, such a device will describe any set
of data by the rcaction it elicits in the system. So far, this is nothing new. A new step
in computation, however, will be, that these internal characteristics are indeed
sufficient to evaluate the data manifolds exc\usively on the basis of system internal
characteristics.
Accordingly, the system will be able to structure a data space without reference
to an expert system. It will describe the anomalities in the set of data presented to
the system and evaluate only, how far internaiorder characteristics can be defined
in these data manifolds. Accordingly, no external observer is needed to catagorize
the data the system works upon. Ideally, the system will descrihe the structural
properties of these data by reference to their internal representation within the
system. If that is the case, it is argued that the system is to be described as a gestalt
recognition system.
Mechanically, the system reactions are quite simple ones. The system will
implement a new set of data in its activity pattern. In a kind of Markov operation,
the newly elicited overall activity is computed as a function of both, thc functional
topology and the activity patterns derived from a stimulus within this topology. To
do this, the system may simply superimpose itself, thus, correlating the activity
pattern of two successive steps of activation. The resulting activation mode directly
corresponds to variations in the activity pattern of the system, and, thereby, allows
to implement measuring functions for system diversity throughout its dynamic
phase (Holthausen and Breidbach 1999). Thus, the system detects whethcr its
newly gained activation fits into its al ready existing attractor hasins or not. New
attractors can be defined and characterized by their distance to that set of attractors
that defined the system in its initial configuration (before stimulus presentation).
The 'distance' is defined by the superimposition of activity patterns shared by the
different attractors. Those activation modes that are the most different are those that
have the least amount of activity states in common within the system.
Attractors may be without any correspondence to the activation modes of the
set of other attractors or, alternatively, they may interact. This interaction can be
one- or bidirectional. Accordingly, just by the criteria of putative interaction modes,
a hierarchy of internal activation modes can be established. Those attractors that
activate further attractors can be separated from those that only 'receive' stimula-
tions. Thus, there are attractors that initiate actions and those that are driven.
Working on the attractor level, however, the description of system dynamics is
quite far off from the actviation pattern of certain computational elements found in
84 Olaf Breidbach

a neuronal network. Even more. there might be alterations on this level that are
tolerated by the system in so 1'ar as they are attributed to the same attractor. It can be
shown that, on the one hand, the system allows a certain variability in the actual
stimulus configurations at the network level, hut otherwise it allows an internal
coding and decoding of system intrinsic states that show complicated system
activation patterns. These are varied in their parameter eonstellation by a multitude
01' events, and by the history 01' the system. Thus, with time, the activity landscape
of the system becomes more and more diversi1'ied, and, accordingly, the internal
representations are gradually specified. As has been shown, such specifications are
duc to system intrinsic categories (Breidbach 1999c).

3
Text Sequences

Gestalt is not defined by absolute values in the structurcal characeristics 01' an ob-
ject 01' interest. We kown that so me objects showing considerable variations in size
may actually have the same 'gestalt', as is the case in so me insect or plant species.
Accordingly, one has to describe a gestalt by relative characteristics: An automated
gestalt detection device cannot work on prede1'ined parameters. It has to describe
the relative and not absolute parameters 01' a data space.
A data mani1'old that should be characterized by a gestalt detecting device might
he a text. Struturally, a text has a certain syntax. Furthermore, each element in a text
- eaeh term - stands in certain relations to other terms. Thus, a certain term - appart
1'rom the syntactic pecularities 01' a text - is combined with other terms in a degree
that speci1'ies a certain text type or the pre1'erences 01' a certain author. To delect
such peculiarities 01' a text, a system has not to describe the meaning of certain
term, hut it has just to show the structural peculiarities in the combinations 01'
these terms.
[n text analysis, the device describes the relative distributions 01' certain sign
combinations (terms). [t 1'orms a web 01' relations between various such terms.
These were specified for each text. [n the result, there is a correlation diagram,
showing specificities in the internal eorrelation of certain terms within one text.
Such correlations can be compared with other texts. Thus, specifities in the internal
semanties of so me texts can be defined in relation to other texts. Each text is
characterized by a nctwork 01' relations in whieh each ofits terms is 1'ound (wh ich is
the syntactic profil of the text). That network is not simple. Ir not only shows the
relation between two terms, but between the various groups of terms. Thus, as has
been described, a hierarchy 01' relations develops. This hierarchy will be retlected in
an asymmetrie eonstellation 01' the funetional conneetivities of various term
clusters.
Aecordingly, a text is treated as a sequence of terms that are presented in a
certain order. Such a reductionistic definition of a text follows technical procedures
used in automated term association (Binot and Jensen 1987; Ruge [995). What is
new is that the approach presented here does not refer to a preformed standard
matrix of semantic relations (given by an expert system). Ir describes internaiorder
characteristics by disentangling the relation of the elements of a language to each
 Gestalt Recognition and Internal Representation X5

other. Following that approach, so me ideas about language acquisition and an

internal coding of stimulus representations can be discussed.
A text is aseries of letters in a certain order. Some 01' these letters are c\osely
correlated, others are not. Terms, thus, can be regarded as distinct units in which a
certain sequence 01' letters is formed with a certain probability. An automated ortho-
graphy corrcction device works on such assumptions (Church and Hanks 1990).
Within a text. so me 01' these terms show a eloser affinity, due either to restrictions 01'
the orthography or to semantic correspondencies. The question is, can such a device
detect such peculiarities just by refering to the internal representations elicited
when such text passages are implemented into an associative system 01' the type
presented?
There is a tradition to deal with such a problem that dates back to Pfaffelhuber's
(1972) attempt to define a subjective probability, that is a system internal function
by which a system reaction is calculated. Pfaffelhuber's approach in 1981 was
extended by Palm who introduced a measure allowing to describe how an event in
a system can be described in regard to the objective probability 01' different react-
ions 01' that system (1981). To do this, Palm introduces a surprise function that
works on a definition 01' putative combinations of events and gives an objective
probability 01' system internal events by calculating their frcquency 01" occurrence.
An event is unexpected when it differs from that objective probability. Actually,
however, these definitions and even the introduction 01' a subjective information by
Linsker (1988, 1997) did not get rid of the outer world as the control instance
against which the system is tested.

4
Gestalt Recognition and Text Analoga

The charactcrisations 01' the relative correspondencies of the elements 01' a text may,
thus, allow to unfold its syntactic structure. Accordingly, such a device may act as a
gestalt recognition system. In devoloping such an gestalt recognition system, we
have started with an analysis of automated structural catagorizations in a less
complicated data-manifold, the electroencephalogram (EEG) of neonates.
The EEG technology is a registration technique that allows to register changes in
the cortical activation patterns (see al ready Berger 1929). Because the electrodes
are placed on the skulI, the explicit physiological meaning 01' a EEG recording is
difficult to interpret (Witte et al. 1999). However, changes in the EEG activation
patterns can be correlated with certain cognitive activities allowing the use 01' EEG
recordings, for example, in experimental cognitive psychology. Such character-
istics that allow correlations in EEG activation patterns and certain cognitive states
of the mind are most prominent in the adult brain. In the infant brain, EEG patterns
are much more variable making a reliable identification of subpatterns in the EEG
pattern difficult (Scher 1997). In the neonate brain, such variability is even more
obvious. Furthermore, due to the ontogenetic stage, neonate EEG patterns are much
less pronounced than in the infant or adult brain (Schmid and Tirsch 1995). Is it
possible to c\assify the highly irregular patterns 01' neonate EEGs in order to de-
scribe a ontogenetic scaling or to use the EEG as a diagnostic tool? Using a slightly
86 Olaf Breidbach

varied device certain substructures in these irregular patterns have been classified
wilhout using prefixed categories with an absolute scaling (Breidbach et al. 1998).
The problem was that, because of the highly irregular EGG pattern of neonates, the
caregories worked out for the adult brain do not fit the neonate brain. In order to
find regularities in the brain activity patterns, an analysis was performed on
sleeping individuals. Yet even there, for the neonates, no prede1'ined mask~; allow a
classification of EEG anormalities. Employing a relational pattern recognition
system, nevertheless, certain EEG types can be classi1'ied (Breidbach et al. 1998;
Holthausen et al. 1999a): Our device was suecessfull in sorting out neonates with
anomalous EEG pattern automatically. How is this done when no predefined
calegories are a\'ailable?
Measurements 01' absolute values of EEG patterns are not reliable for such a
task, as the variation of neonate EEG characteristics allows only to describe relative
intensity changes. A eonsequent relationistic interpretation of the EEG takes
another route. The EEG is treated as a sequence of data that are characterized by
their relative frequency ehanges (Rreidbach et al. 1998). For a classification 01'
normal and anormal EEG spectra not the absolute s-:ale of the frequencies and
intensities of the EEG, but the internal rel.ltions in its data manifold are 01' interest
(Holthausen er al. 1999a). A number 01' 11 data spans a matrix of 11 x 11 elements. By
plotting that matrix, a certain diagram can be computed. Those patterns that show
analogous relative coupling characteristics will be strengthened. Those data that
disperse even in their relative coupling are without relevance for further compu-
tation. By the relevant coupling states, a vector of 11 dimensions is defined that
characterizes a certain EEG. Other EEGs are plotted. each defined by such a vector.
After computation of aseries of neonate EEGs. typical patterns of anormal EEGs
are calculated using the relational profile of frequency and intensity characteristics
of the EEG. Thus, just by internal data processing, certain types of EEG patterns
can be identified. The analysis shows that by such an analysis:
I) EEG data are automatically classified in their ontogenetic sequence. Thus, the
system is success1'ull in classifying the ontogenetic stage of a neonate.
2) Within such groups. anormalities in the EEG spectra were detected allowing
further clinical diagnosis (Holthausen et al. 1999a).
Employing automated EEG analysis. such a system succeeds in characterizing
sudden infant death risk patients by sorting out a specifie type of EEG pattern
mophologies. Thereby. not the absolute scaling of EEG patterns, but characteristic
relative ehanges in the EGG patterns are deseribed to be the relevant criteria by
which the different groups of risk and non risk patients were classified (Breidbach
et al. 1998).
What is most obvious in the EEG analysing system is that such a machinery
does not need a coneept about the meaning 01' a signal. Internal data classitication
aets just on a classification of local system reaction modes. By that, a set of highly
diversified internal representations is formed. As can be shown, not the relative
distribution, but the absolute measurements of EEG frequeney spectra differ. Thus,
the EEG analysing system does not depend on a certain preformed distribution of
funetional connectivities. In eontrary, by instantaneously adjusting its topology to
the internal activation modes, the system creates an optimal classification device.
Thus, the classification mode of the system is self-referential.
 Gestalt Recognition and Internal Representation X7

Such a device can even be employed in an automated text anaylsis. As an

exemplary test case, olle could study what happens when a philosophieal text is
implemented into such a gestalt recognition device without any referenee to its
meaning? The maehinery eould allow to detect strutural specifities, that is to
describe the syntaetie peculiarities and the various degrees of term correlations.
Using these criteria, a structural profile for a certain text ean be defined. Using sueh
definitions, a whole series of texts ean be eompared. [n our approch, we implemen-
ted aseries of Heglian and Schellingian texts into the deviee. For each text, the
struetural peculiarities were deseribed automatieally just be referenee to internal
representations. Thereafter, different texts were compared according to these pecul-
iarities. What the system does - so far - was to compare the different gestalt of the
various texts. The point 01' interest, hereby, is, that such a comparaion is not a mere
statistical one. As syntax and term associations were compared, text strutures and
not only the abundancies 01' certain peculiarities found in the texts were used as a
reference for comparison.
In the result, the device produeed relative profiles of the use 01' various terms amI
their specific correspondeneies that characterizes a eertain text. Thereby, its
"semantie' profile - in Fodor's sense (that in fact represents its syntax) - is de-
scribed. Thereafter, such speeific syntactic struetures were compared with those of
other texts to test how significant a certain syntactie structure is, and what sub-
eompartments are most effeetive for a eorrelation of various sueh texts. Herein. not
the frelluency of the oeeurrenee of eertain terms, but their relation to each other is
01' relevanee. The test is not given by a measure of the frequeney of aseries of
seleetcd terms. but by an estimation of the absolute ehanges in the distanee matrices
that charaeterise the relations of eertain terms. For a eomparison 01' two texts, those
terms are tcsted that occur in both texts. The number and extent of their relations is
measured. I) it is asked to whieh degree the eorrelations of eertain terms overlap;
2) the absolute ehanges in their relative distanees are deseribed. The measure of the
overall dissimilarities, ealculatcd by measuring the changes of the relative distances
between these two profiles. defines the relative degrees of similarities between the
texts. Thereby. a distance function for the various terms can be calculated. The machi-
nery measures the overall distances within the various profiles 01' the texts in such a
way that the different extent of the relations of one term in the syntactic profiles of
two texts is registered. Thus, a relative measure of the overall distance 01' two texts
is given. This is done with each text in relation to each other text. Accordingly. the
result is a network of correlations. The optimal cross correlation is found by
calculating those combinations of texts that show the shortest overall distances.
Thus, the relation of Hegelian texts is not described as a linear representation of
optimal correlation series. but as a complex interwoven network showing not only
the overall distances but the fine scalings of single term distances. Thereby, distinct
cluster islands and particular regions with a moderate level of entropy, but high
degree of local surprise are identified. Accordingly. by the device, each text is
transferred into a relational network showing even the details of its syntactic pro-
file. [n a second step, the best match 01' the syntactic profiles is tested via a calcul-
ation of the optimal local connectivities of the various relational networks.
Following that approach, the machinery showed that the Hegelian texts are
much eIoser correlated to each other than to the Sehellingian text. Within the Hegel-
88 Otaf Breidbach

ian texts, the moni)graph about the difference of lhe Fichtean ami the Schellingian
system is set apart, whereas the other three monographs (I ,t and 2 nd part of the
Hegelian logic and his phenomenology) form a cluster, in which the first part of the
science of logic is c\osely related to the second part of that work but is even more
c10sely correlated to the second part that of the phenomenology. Accordingly, the
deviee succeeds in defining more c10sely correlated and less closely correlated
texts. Here, it succeeded in deseribing the relative correspondences of those
phiilosophical texts that by c1assical philological means are set in just such aserial
order as that presented. The point of interest here is that such a c1assification of
relation is done without any reference to meaning, it is propagated automatically,
and it is done within minutes. Similar results have been obtained in the study of the
various books ofthe bible (Holthausen, unpublished). At the moment, that device is
tested on texts from ancient Egypt.
lt has been shown that the automated device is ablc to define structural
characteristics of various data manifolds - Iikewise in medieine and in text
analysis - just by reference to the internal representations. [t detects the pattern
characteristics, evaluates the anomalies in a certain data set and, thus, describes the
gestalt of a data manifold. [t is able to qualify such data manifolds exc\usively by
reference to system internal parameters. By employing internal represcntalions, the
system forms its internal world that eorresponds to the external stimuli. It does this
by optimizing the internal matching strueturcs in such a way that thcy will allow an
optimal response to an input. As in registration a complex data space into a parallcl
processing device, not only one input. but a whole input pattcrn is implernented into
the system; the latter will react locally, trying to optimize its local topologieal
characteristics. By that, the system is highly dynamic, allowing a multitude of
parallel representations.

5
'Gestalt'

What can be seen already in this short and somewhat speculative sketch of putative
analogies between the machinery that is a particular type of a neuronal network and
the real brain is that recognition devices and even the ontogenesis of recognition
devices seem to have strict paralleis in the artificial and real mind. Here, it is argued
that - thus - the model analysis will show a strictly operationally defined access to
gestalt recognition based purelyon internal representations.
What is such a gestalt? The sciences - expecially the non biological ones - have
tried to omit 'gestalt' from their vocabulary and are more Iikely to speak of a
'system', a constellation of various elements and attributes that at least somehow
can be seen as an effective entity. In morphology 'gestalt' means more than that,
however. Amorphem is defined not only as a constellation, but as an entity in
wh ich an attribution is modified according to the whole it is apart of (Bacr 1829).
One of the best examples for that type of thinking comes from the history of
paleontology. When in the beginning 19th century, in the limestone of Monmartre
one bone of the leg of an up to then unknown, extinct vertebrate was found
(Rudwick 1972); the anatom ist George Cuvier on the basis of that single bone gave
 Gestalt Recognition and Internal Representation 89

a camplete description of that anima!. His reconstruction was verified a couple of

years later, when a complete skeleton of that specics was found.
Gestalt, thereby, is more than the number of attributes tested. It is - in fact - the
relation of each attribute to any other one. Thus, there is no predefined core attrib-
ute. What is important is the relative position of each element of such aseries of
attributes in regard to each other. Accordingly, the definition of a gestalt is not
fixed. In biological systematics, the relation of the elements is given by the relation
of all attributes of one species in relation to the attributes of other species. Ac-
cardingly, the definition of gestalt is a relative one. That may explain the ditficulties
taxonomists have in a proper and clear definition of what they have to look at in
order to define a genus or a species. The attempt of a numerical taxonomy that tried
to get rid of that problem was not successful (Sokai and Sneath 1965: Sokal 1977):
In numerical taxonomy each taxonomical attribute was measured. Thereafter, by
performing statistics, the pool of data was sorted out in an objective way giving rise
to an analytically based definition of systematic units. That attempt failed, because
a pure addition of attrihute configuartions did not grasp the structures of the
organisms.
Similar problems were found in an attempt to define phylogcnetic distances on
the basis of quantitative DNA studies. Even there, not the single event, but its
relative position within this pool of all possible events is important. The discussions
of cladists show how far such a relativistic postion is effective (Fischer I q97;
Starck 1998). Here, a pragmatic approach to 'gestalt' has been proposed. A certain
morphology is defined in regard to the pool of attributes within the sampie of
species studied. Gestalt is defined as a relative entity.
By the automated device, gestalt was detined in a comparable way. The recon-
struction of its gestalt recognitions properties show how an associative machinery
looks on its world. This machinery was designed according to certain architectural
characteristics of a brain. Thus, the mechanisms described may outline so me prin-
ciple characteristics of a system designed in that way. As the description is based on
a physical analysis of such essential characteristics, it is to be interpreted as an
analytical description of the principle mechanisms of such systems: The physics of
the machinery correspond at least in some essential parts to the physics af the brain.
If we understand cognitive actions as an outcome of brain functions, we had to
enface such physical descriptions. On that level there is not actual difference in the
principal mechanisms of brain and machinery. Principle attributes of any associ-
ative systems are escribed. In that way, viewed from an operational perspective,
both machinery and brain have comparable 'minds'.
A system is defined by relativistic network of putative internal relations. Into
that network, new impressions may be incorporated. They are defined not by their
'objective' meaning, but by their relation in the preformed networks of putative
relations. In so far, the world for such a mind is not fixed, it evolves. Different
networks may be tested by looking at their correspondencies to sort out, how far
they structurally correspond in general and local characteristics.
The analysis of the mechanisms by wh ich the automated device was successful
in comparing structural characteristis of data manifolde allows adefinition of
"gestalt" one can really work with: It shows that, by introducing subjective infor-
mation, not only an identification of system intrinsic entities but even the identi-
90 Olaf Breidbach

fication of a hierar..:hy of system respon~es is possible. That gestalt detecting device

has provcu to be of value in regard to text iJentifications and text comparisons.

6
What to aim at

To construct an associative machinery, one has to ask whether such a machinery

can be describeu analytically. It shoulJ be formeJ with the least amount of pre-
forl1leJ expertise. Technically, that woulJ mean that it woulJ have to be JesigneJ
without fixation of any bounJary conJitions. There woulJ be no expert system
implemented into the machinery, neither by specific software implementation nor
by an introJuction of specific topologies in the classifying units. Thus, the question
will be whether a physical calculation of the Jynamics of a brain relying on internal
system states is possible (Holthausen 19lJS).
How far is such an explanation that presents a mechanism in orJer to unJer-
stanu the structure of structural analysis really helpful? How far might the
mechanisms allow to unuerstanJ the mechanisms useJ in their applications'! What
about the logics behinJ such mechanics'! The problem might be that the forl1lalisl1ls
employeJ to construct the machinery are themselves part of the mechanics Je-
scribed. This problem is - however - not a new one. What, for example, Hegel
aimeJ at in his logic was to think about thinking. He tried to work out a philosophy
that Jiu not uescribe its internal logic by reference to an outer worlu. Thus, he trieu
to unJerstanJ how "I" can be sure about things "I" think about by referring to an
internal coherence of thoughts (see Henrich 1971; BreiJbach 19X2; WanJschneiJcr
I lJ92; BurbiJge 1996). Thc problem is that kowleJge acquistion in such a respect is
based upon subjective probabilities, that is, on conclusions baseJ not on a explicit
reference to an outer - objective - worlJ but on the inner - subjective - structures
of thought. As Hege! haJ figureJ out, such a subjectivity is baseJ upon rules which
are essentially identical in any minJ. His approach trieJ to Jescribe that the
problem of meaning in such a logic can be solveJ by reference to a formalism that
defines any term by its relations to any other term. Logics, in so far, has something
in common with a mathematical system where a number (in a Gaussian sense) is
not just uefineu as an entity, but is uefineJ as a symbol for a set of operations that is
coherent with any other mathematical operation. The relational system presenteu
by Hege!, in its essence, is a selfreferential approach to the question what the
meaning of a term iso The meaning of a relational system, accoruingly, is not ue-
fineu by reference to an outer worlu; meaning is to be Jefineu by system internal
criteria.
The automateu Jevice Jefines internal categories by sorting out various clusters
of data sets that show internal correspondencies. Those clusters in which physically
similar system reactions are groupeJ, form sampies that are defined as being
different from other clusters (Breidbach 19lJ9c). An analysis shows that putative
clustering functions are a typical mode of systems with local topologies. Thus, not
a peculiar clustering function, but the general mode of clustering can be analytic-
ally described. This approach, in so far, shows structural analogies to the operations
Hegel outlined in the first two parts of his logic (Fleischhacker 1993,1997).
 Gestalt Recognition and Interna I Representation 91

7
Recognition

Recognition here has been defined as an operation by which corresponding signals

are identified. This correspondency, however, is not found by reference to an
external observer but by purely system internal criteria. Any activation of the
system is evaluated according to the rules by which the system reactions are de-
fined. The system defines an activation in relation to its internal activation modes.
A first activation of the system induced areaction, e1icting an attractor A. An event
x' in a system is effective either in eliciting an attractor A or it induces a new
attractor, that is defined as NON A. Accordingly. the system is characterized by two
conditions: A and NON A. Such a system now may be induced by something that
either elicits A or NON A or neither 01' these. So far, a new stimulation may be
c1assified as NON NON A, and so on (Breidbach 1999c, 200 I). Thereby, in such a
structure. the system's activation capacities become more and more diversified. The
simple rule 01' a relational or - in this formalism - a negative attribution 01' system
activation modes is the simple mechanism used here. With time, that mechanism.
nothwithstanding, causes more and more elaborated classification modes. Thus,
accnrding to aseries 01' signal implementations in the system. the negative attrib-
lltion 01' a system not only allows the distinction between new and old signal
patterns. but it already allows a qualification 01' signal modes. Those definitions that
are more c10sely associated, according to the measures in the first order semantic
profils, are regarded as more similar. So far an internal hierarchy 01' similarities and
dissimilarities is constructed employing the simple mechanism described.
There is again a correspondency to the Hegelian system that aimed at a system to
describe the world by employing a mechanisms of system internal reference
(SChlllz 1963; Henrich 1975; Marx 1972). In both approaches, the gestalt recog-
nition features are seen as being gradually evolving out 01' a gradual extension 01' a
relational network, by which certain terms are circumscribed (Breidbach 20(0). In
the introductory paragraphs 01' his science 01' logic Hegel had showlI how the
contents 01' eoncepts can be defined by an analysis 01' rules that structurally cor-
respond with those detined in a relational network presented in the analysis. There,
definitions were secured by the internal coherence 01' internal processing modes and
do not require reference to an outer world. Thus, as been described. 'meaning' is
defined just by the structure in wh ich a term is used in thought. This structure is
given by the relations the ideas are found in. The essential meaning 01' a term is
nothing but this relationaI characteristic. The science 01' Iogic demonstrates that the
meaning 01' meanings is the outeome 01' the relation 01' terms. That coherence 01'
ideas aimed at directly eorresponds to the semantie profils 01' terms defined by the
automated device.
92 Olaf Breidbach

8
Associative Minds

The system described here is a technical realisation of what James Mill in 1829 had
figured out as being characteristic for an associative mind (Mill 1869; see Breid-
bach 1996). He describes the behaviour of a parallel distributed system with local
characteristics. According to Mill, the first effects of an impression in the brain are
not a proper re-representation of the physical world. The effects are described as the
outcome of an superposition of inputs onto an internal activity mode of the system
(Breidbach 1997). Mill and, lateron, the physiologist Sigmund Exner saw signal
identification and associations as results 01" the activation of endogeneous brain
activation modes (Exner 1894; Breidbach I 999b). Signal inputs elicit activations in
certain neuronal pathways, these superimpose upon internal oscillations and, thus,
cause more complex reactions in the brain tisslle. The result is a complex coactiva-
tion of signal pathways established by former impressions. If such coactivations
were performed in different modes, the coactivated attractor woulJ be likely to be
reg:.lrded as a general attribute of a set of input situations. Thus, this concept depicts
a coherent picture of a putative physiological b:.lckground of cognitive actions like
identification, association and memory. Thereby, his concept made a framework for
a neurosemantic feasible (Breidbach 1999d).
Sensations are depicted as oscillations that might even directly interact. Thus,
Mill was ahle to develop his idea of coactivations as a principal scheme for an
understanding of the physiological basis of associations. He gave an idea of the
origin of those categories we use in our verbal analysis of the word and of ourself
(Kurthen 1992). Accordingly, already James Mill pictured a relationist's view of the
mental representation of the world. The mechanism he proclaimed as being
effective in selfreferential recognition were the associations. According to his idea,
the sensory input elicited sensations that technically were described as stimulus
dependent assosiations. Such associations are not simple representations of the
outer world, because the extension and the dynamics of the oscillations to a great
extent depends on the system intrinsic capacities. These are defined, first, by the
hardware of the system and, second, by changes, induced by experience, in the
functional coupling characteristics of he associative elements. According to certain
stimulus induced changes in local functional coupling characteristics, a ccrtain
signal will spread in the system in a way that may coactivate certain subfeatures of
the system. According to that idea, similar objects are those that evoke similar
characteristics in a system.

9
ACknowledgements

The ideas presented in this text would not have been worked out without the
continuous support of Klaus Holthallsen. P. Ziche is thanked for the help with the
english text. Research referred to in this study was supported by the Thüringer
Ministerium für Wissenschaft, Forschung und Kunst.
 Gestalt Recognition and Internal Representation 93

10
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 Between Natural Disposition and
Cultural Masterment of Life "-
The Cognitive Sciences and Concept of Man
in Conflicting Conceptions of Science

Peter Janich

1
Introduction

A critique 01' the conceptions 01' science that the cogniti ve sciences are factually
based on will form the subject matter 01' the following discussion. ' The purpose 01'
this critique is twofold: (I) It will provide arguments in support 01' the view that, in
the cognitive sciences, acting man with his cultural history is the measure 01' all
things; and (2) in a more general sense, it will discuss the question whether the
natural sciences can make contributions to the concept 01' man (Menschenbild).
Here, of course, the verb "can'" is meant philosophically since there t:an he no
doubt that, in fact and almost omnipresently, the natural sciences, in the guise of
evolutionary biology, physiology, or naturalistic approat:hes to psydlOlogy, are
indeed cont:erned with man. This is true not only für the t:omplete range from high-
bred specialil.ed research through popularised natural st:iences and publit:
simplifications, but also for modern wgnitive scient:es.
Thercfore, lel me take up these issues by asking, first of all. whether the fat:tual
intluence the natural sciences have on the currcnt concept of man is justified. Thc
ways in which the wgnitive st:ient:cs, in partintiar, take intluent:e are generally
known. For instance, t:onsider the intlucncc the use of t:omputers has on everyday
language. This intluence, which blurs the distint:tion between man and machine, is
twofold, but works in opposite directions: People address computers in anthro-
pomorphit: terms while they talk tet:hnomorphit:ally about man. Usually this
blurring of distinctions culminates in questions sut:h as: "Is the human brain a
t:omputer'!', und "00 wmputers think?' Protagonists of ideas of progess that are
apparent in such popularizations like to picture themseIves in the tradition of man's
dethronement. beginning with the Copernit:an turn (earth no longer in the center 01'
the universe) and going all the way to the Darwinist turn (man no l~ll1ger the pride
of creation) and perhaps to the Freudian turn (man no longer the master of his
desires). ami now. finally, arriving at a t:ognitive-st:ient:e turn. that attempts to

'" A first version of this paper has been published in: Gold. P. and Engel. A. K. (eds) (1998) Der
Mensch in der Perspektive der Kognitionswissenschaften. Suhrkamp. Frankfurt. pp. 373-394.
In contrast to other contriblltions to this volume. wh ich provide discllssions of factual ap-
proaches inside the cognitive sciences. the present paper concentrates on philosophical and
meta-theoretical issues.
96 Peter Janich

nvercOlne an alleged special status of mind through an informationist approach.

that considers mind merely a structural property of matter.
This roughly predetermins the organization of this paper. rn a first part. r will
criticize the conceptions of science enjoyed by the current cognitive sciences while.
in the second, r will search for possibilities to avoid or overcome the errors identi-
fied in the first part.
Still, there has not yet been presented any plausible motivation for preferring
natural-scientific approaches to the cognitive sciences, while approaches from the
social and cultural sciences are neglected. However, reasons for this focus are fairly
obvious: Traditional social sciences have ne ver done anything with regard to the
cognitive sciences. Rather. they have fallen back on the task 01' cultivating our
cultural heritage. A contribution to current cognition research from that side is
neither intended nor is it in sight. 2
The reasons for the dominance of natural-scientific methods in the cognitive
science are obvious. On the one hand, the methodical inventory available for
natural-scientific cognition research has very rapidly expanded. Quite considerably
improved observability of the Iiving brain and highly complex modelling capacities
through parallel computers. neuronal networks. etc. are among the milestones of
that development. On the other hand, the history of the natural sciences and their
respective self-perceptions seemed to suggest, that those natural sciences were best
4ualified also for dealing with matters of cognition. The relativistic revision of
classical physics, enforced by the philosophies of Logical Empirism and analytical
language theory. is considered a victory of empiricism over philosophie epistemo-
logies. Likewise. the biology of evolution. in the form it takes in Evolutionary
Epistemology, is also celebrated as a natural-scientific conquest of metaphysical
al ternati ves.
By contrast, university philosophy - and its major schools. in particular - has to
admit a total failure in virtually all respects. This also holds for analytic philosophy
of mind. Especially with regard to epistemological issues. most professional
philosophers consider it not only utopian, but utterly unserious scientifically. to
take any position towards the natural sciences other than an aftirmative one. Some
of them may shrink back from all that work and trouble that is required to obtain a
deeper understanding 01' the natural sciences; others may fear that philosophical
critique may not be expected to succeed anyway. However that may be, the vast
majority 01' professional philosophers dispense with Philosophy-of-Science-as-
Critique-of-Reason and thereby subscribe to the opinion that the natural sciences
(with the means provided by their profession) will probably come up with a home-
made philosophy 01' their own. Every single criticism of the natural sciences that
will be advanced here from a philosophical point of view therefore has to be set off
against the confession that, as a matter of fact, epistemologists and philosophers of
science have, for a long time and very efficiently, left alone the natural sciences in
order to enjoy their own self-generated questions and problems.

Potential exceptions such as, for instance. phenomcnologically-oriented sociology 01' science
also are not relevant in this respect. since they are not at all considered in the cognitive
sciences.
 Between Natural Disposition and Cultural Masterment of Life 97

2
A Critique of Conceptions of Science
Prevalent in the Cognitive Sciences

In perception research, the success the natural sciences can claim for theil' experi-
mental method for causal explanations was first established in sensory physiology,
in the psychology 01' perception, and in the neuro-sciences, in the experiment-
determined direction from the environment onto the organism. As experiments
always investigate relations between causes and effects in dependence on the
experimenter's possibilities for exerting technical intluences, and as the causes are
always due to the experimenter-manipulated circumstances, perception experi-
ments inevitably take the following form: An experimenter presents varying
stimuli, and he intluences standardizations or situates the perceiving organism, in
order to search for the organism's brain processes or states as indicated by its
behavior or by stimuli-induced effects.
Therefore, the experimental method virtually seems to enforce a sender-receiver
principle in perception and cognition research, even though the constructivity 01'
cognitive performances has long been known and frequently taken into account in
von Uexküll's 'circle 01' function' as much as in the aspects that are mentioned e.g.
in Andreas K. Engel & Peter König's survey of the neurobiological paradigme 01'
sense perception.
Proceeding in this way, all experiment-based cognition research seems to
disregard an indispensible premise that forms one determinant 01' the validity of any
experimental result: The stimuli the experimenter offers and manipulates not only
have to be produced and perceived by himself. They also must be assumed valid in
his dcscription. To put it differently, a cognition experiment always must lay claim
to a successful prior consensus among the scientific observers about the stimuli
offered for recognition. This consensus among cognition researchcrs which, of
course, only can be achieved by means of linguistic communication, not only is a
cultural achievement that has a constitutive function for the natural process the
experiment is supposed to investigate. Rather, it also determines the very criteria of
truth and validity of the experiment. Therefore, it is not possible for cognition
experiments themselves to tell cognition from non-cognition. That distinction is an
investment that has to be put into all cognition experiments.
This is particularly true for psychological cognition experiments with human
subjects who receive instructions from the experimenter. Here again, sueeessful
linguistic communication is constitutive for the subjeet's complianee with the
instruetions and, henee, for the experimental result.·1

An even more complicated situation exists in cognition experiments in the wider framework of
gestalt psychology - cf. the article by Engel & König (c.f. references). However. these experi-
ments will not be considered here since the specific forms of their perceptual offers al ready
prescribe the subjects' expected performances - such as the completion of an incomplete
figure to form a "good gestalt" - as mutally agreeable cultural products. These performances,
therefore. are no longer suspected 01' representing a causal relationship.
 9X Peter Janich

A second fundamental intluence (in addition to the experilllental method) on

natural-scientific cognitlOn research originates from the concept of adaptation in
traditional evolutionary biology. Environmental intluences on the organism, which
are described as cognitions, are rewarded through alleged selective advantages of
the right cognition over wrong or missing ones. This causes the impression that
evolutionary approaches to epistemology could finally catch up with epistemo-
logy's claim to distinguish between knowledge, mere opinion, and error.
However. the errors intruding into that approach are obvious: Quite apart from
hio-philosophical objections to questionable understandings pf evolutionary biolo-
gy (which will not he dicussed here). the concept of cognition as individual organ-
ismic performance forms a basic feature of evolutionary epistemology. Possibly.
some cognition researchers do recognize the role that an <Kting and speaking
community of those who have cognitions. and perhaps even their cultural history.
has for the distinction between knowledge and error. But then they ahide by the
reverse reductionism of physicalistic or biologistic approaches that strive to portray
even those socio-cultural performances as individual organisms' separate products.
[n this way. a possible natural history of cultural anthropogenesis is confused with
the genesis of present-day knowledge of that very development. Since they do not
distinguish sufficiently between a science and its ohject. they fail to differentiate
between the (chronologica!) direction taken by natural and cultural history on the
one hand and ways of epistemological acces, to these dcvelopments on the other.
As critiques of evolutionary epistemology have frequently pointed out. this con-
fusion has the consequence that we are confronted with a principally insurmount-
able petitio principii according to wh ich the cognition researcher already must
possess the very knowledge that he claims to be looking for in the objects of the
cognition research he performs. Even the alleged escape route that Gerhanl
Vollmerl says he has found and that ascribes that prior knowledge to the natural-
scientific descriptions of the world. in fact is not a way out but merely adds a ddour
to the existing methodical circle. As a matter of fact, the natural sciences also are
not possible without the natural scientists' cultural performance of reaching a
norrnatively oriented consensus.
This already identifies yet another error of cognition research that is based on
evolutionary epistemology: The naturalization of knowledge basically fails to
appreciate that a normative orientation towards the criteria of validity is indispens-
ible . This nonnative orientation cannot be derived from the natural sciences.
because these sciences themselves necessarily rest on norms. Therefore, especially
those conceptions that attempt to define cognition. as opposed to error and non-
cognition. with reference to survivalist advantages. do not possess any epistemo-
logieal criterion for the distinction hetween true and bise. or between knowledge
and lack of knowledge. 5
[n addition to the experimental mcthod and to the naturalization of eognition. the
means of modelling also burden a (barely recognized) problem on the shoulders of
the cognitive sciences that adhere to a natural-scientific orientation. An informa-

-l C.f. Vollmer. G .. Evolutionäre Erkenntnistheorie. Stuttgart 198 P.

, c.f. Geert Keil's critique of naturalism.
 Between Natural Disposition and Cultural Masterment of Life 99

tionist languafe, which either. explicity. with the linguistic means 01' communica-
ti on engineering and the information sciences or, implicitly, through the use of
computer models, tries to cope with cognition has accepted a naturalistic concep-
tion 01' information according to which cognition is described as the input. pro-
cessing, and storage of information. No matter whether the explicit equivalence 01'
information to matter and energy (Norbert Wiener) is concerned, or the talk about
information in terms 01' the chemistry 01' big molecules, molecular biology or
genetics. or popularizations of those approaches up to utter naiveties such as plans
for authoring a 'Physics 01' Cultural History" (8. O. Küppers)6 - information is
always interpreted as a structural feature of material systems or, respectively. 01'
their temporal changes. Information, according to that interpretation, is considered
equally suited for the description of natural and cultural objects. And, through the
unscrupulous equation 01' machine and animal (Descartes) and uf animal and man
(modern evolutionary biology), man is reduced to a natural object that can be
mode lied in terms of the theury of machines.
The ways in which this frequently happens are easily recognized as misguided:
11' informatiun-theoretic language is defined with reference to the objects uf chem-
istry ur molecular biology, this is done without regard to the fact that those objects
themselves are human products, i.e. theory-dependent constructions that happened
to be successful in technical laboratory practice.
This means that, in those cases, the information-theoretical way of speaking
turns out to be no more than an entirely redundant additional way of talking about
the causal description of chemical and molecular processes wh ich are assumed to
be successful anyway. In other words, neither are the presumably information-
carrying or information-processing objects of chemistry and molecular biology
natural objects, nor does this information-theoretical way of speaking give ex-
pression to knowledge that is in any way nove!, extended, or different from the
conventional causal description.
When an attempt is made, however, to introduce information-theoretical ways of
speaking with immediate reference to relevant machines for the transmission 01'
information, for information processing or für computerized calculation, this
disregards that the functional characterization of such deviccs wh ich guides their
construction, manufacture, and usage is provided by their performative equivalence
with human cognitive performances. Denying this would mean to disregard that, as
a matter of fact, such techniques cannot dispense with the distinction between
undisturbed and disturbed devices or their functions, respectively. In other words,
because of the constitutive character of their undisturbed functioning, even infor-
mation-processing machines and their descriptions remain dependent on the nor-
mative criteria for the distinction between succeeding and failing communication
and cognition. Only if this is kept in mind, 'information-processing' machines can
serve as suitable means in the framework of a causal description.
The entire naturalization of the concept of information through attempts to
ground it firmly in the soil of thermo-dynamics or statitics, conveniently ignores

Küppers, B. 0., Der Ursprung biologischer Information. Zur Naturphilosophie der Lebens-
entstehung, München/Zürich [<)90.
100 Peter Janich

that reference to succeeding human communication is indispensible. Succeeding

human communication, in turn, always is referred back to the practices in acting
human communities, wh ich, as long as their actions are linguistic ones, can never,
at any time or in any way, give up their claim to understand, to be understood, and
to attach validity to what is being said. Thus, the inevitable primacy of the
determination of information-theoretic or cognitive terms cannot be suspended by
natllral-scientific explanations.
The fourth and final critique aims at radical constructivist approaches. Their
basic intention to emphasize constructive aspects of cognitions about the world
contrasts with any representational or correspondence theory of truth and cognition,
and it certainly is defensible. Also, aglobai critique of Radical Constructivism
appears risky in view of the fact, that there are so many different radical-construc-
tivist approaches that, except for the emphasis they place on a certain constructivity
of cognition, they have hardly anything in common there even is a culturalist
branch that takes the form of a radical constructivist science of literature (Siegfried
J. Schmidt).
However, where autopoietic, symstems-theoretic, or (allegedly) non-redllction-
istic physicalistic approaches are taken (Gerhard Roth, H. Schwegler)7, we are
confronted with forms of radical-constructivist approaches to cognition that are
weil open to a principle objection: They all rest upon resliits of the natural sciences
in interpretations that are llnable to catch up with their own claims to truth.
Maturana and Varela's biologistic, Roth's physicalistic, or diverse systems-theo-
retie attempts to reconstruct the cognitive performances of the invested biology,
chemistry, and physics as the constructive performances of brains, observers, and
perhaps even higher systems of entire scientific communities, principally dis-
regard X the fact that the validity that this approach claims can no longer bc jllstified
within the framework of that approach itsell'.
He who talks in such a way that - by definition, and speaking in terms of
systems theory he can only adopt the observer's perspective, has ultimatcly
obstructed the participant's perspective for hirnself. On a cognitive-science level,
he can no longer lay any claim to the validity of the claims made by the cognitive
sciences, because he has turned these very claims into the objects of a systems-
theoretic description. This is how, a fortiori, the claim to the validity of cognition
resliits is missed on the object level of the cognitive sciences. That is to say that,
with its successful naturalization, the systems-theoretic subtlety 01' radical-
constructivist approaches has given up on the specifically human cultural achieve-
ments of truth and validity and of cognition and knowledge.
Structurally speaking, this objection can also be phrased in the following way:
Since, in the description, man as the one who has cognitions, only turns up as a
system viewed from the observer's perspective, he can no longer discern whether

7 c.f. Janich, P., Ja, wenn schon alles gegeben ist ... der blinde Fleck des "nicht-reduktionisti-
sehen Physikalismus", zu: G. Roth, H. Schwegler, Das Geist-Gehirn-Problem aus der Sicht der
Hirnforschung und eines nicht-reduktionistischen Physikalismus, in: Ethik und Sozialwissen-
schaften. Streitforum für Erwägungskultur 6, 1995, Heft I, p. 96--98.
x The same holds for the systems-theoretical approach Niklas Luhmann suggested for the social
sciences.
 Between Natural Disposition and Cultural Masterment of Life I () I

the generation of the system was a success or a failure. The systems-theoretical

dispensation of any methodical order in favor of system functions that are always
pre-assumed and described in terms of systems-theory, therefore has fallen victim
to an error equivalent to thc one that concludes from the highly complex function-
ing of, say, an electronic system that there was no such thing as a methodical order
for the manufacturing, i.e. the construction and assembling, of the respective
electronic device. The dilemma, so painfully experienced by some representatives
of radical constructivism, that they are only able to perform their own acting and
speaking in a chronological step-by-step order, instead of expressing the whole as a
whole through the whole, makes apparent how far radical constructivism has driven
the naturaliz:.ttion of the concept of man: The radical constructivists' philosophical
aha experience with regard to representational and correspondence theories of
cognition turns into an intellectual ny-paper that prevents a further philosophical
clarification as to how cognition with claims to validity and truth might become
possible in a constructive sense.
In retrospect, then, those cognitive sciences that lean towards the natural scien-
ces turn out to be principally misguided because of ( I) the undigested consequences
of the experimental method, (2) the cireular construction of selection-theoretical
explanations, (3) deficits in the information-theoretical linguistic means with
regard to the thenry of validity, and (4) radical-constructivist losses of validit>
claims following a consequent naturalization of the entire cognition research area.
In particular, they have lost the philosophical insight that speaking abOllt cognition
makes good sense only where cognition can be distinguished from the non-
cognitive performances of their material or organismic carriers. And they also have
lost sight of the fact that this distinction succeeds only bccause of the fact that
cognitions ean be distinguished from failing (i.e. missing or erroneous) cognitions
only in relation to claims of validity. Even though cognitive performances of living
beings generally depend on the presence of metabolic processes, the fundamental
problem of the cognitive sciences, i.e. the question "What is cognition and how is it
effected by human beingsT', is lef! untouched if cognition is defined through
refercnces to, respectively, metabolism or machine movements. If, therefore, the
natural-scientitic cognitive sciences can neither explain why the complex metabol-
ism of the centml nervous system is cognitively relevant, while Iiver metabolism is
not, nor get rid of this problem by simply re-defining non-cognitive metabolic
processes of the Iiver or of genetic mechanisms as cognitions (for then the cognitive
sciences can no Ion ger claim to be cognitive performances themselves), this is due
to the conception of science prevalent in the cognitive sciences.

3
Analytic Philosophy of Mind a Way Out?

There is a wealth of competing, even though related approaches and theories within
analytic philosophy of mind. Yet, as philosophical accompaniment of the natural-
scientific disciplines in cognition research they all are unable to prevent the failure
of philosophy that was noted with regret in an earlier section of this paper. It will be
sufticient to demonstrate that inability very briet1y.
102 Peter Janich

All (or almost all) approaches to and suggested solutions for the mind-boJy
problem share the same philosophical and epistemological shortcoming: they stand
naively and affirmatively vis-a-vis the natural sciences. In extreme cases, even
claims are made to the effect that the mind-body problem is caused, in the first
place, by the limits of the explanatory power of certain natural sciences9 , and that
these limits need to be overcome in some way ot other. However, all constitution-
theoretical considerations about the origin of the difference between body and mind
overlook that body and mind are only two aspects of an undifferentiated human
practice.
There fore , only attempts will be considered here which take recurrence to
aspects of intentionality and self-consciousness. Thel'e attempts - and, until proof
of the contrary, this counts for all such attempts - fail to detach themselves from the
descriptivistic attitude towards human action and speach and to adopt a
participant's perspective instead. The entire dealing of analytic philosophy of mind
(in its many different varieties) with intentionality misses the fact that it is only the
intentionality of the intentionality theorist that accomplishes the constitution of his
allegedly theoretical objects. This creates the paradoxical situation that analytical
philosophy of mind, which remains just as descriptivistic and affirmative with
regurd to practical human acting and speaking in everyday-life as it does vis-a-vis
the results of natural-scientific cugnition research, makes human linguistic self-
modelling (the self-cunsciousness of human beings) and the knowledge of man's
own intentionality the objects of their discussions, but then fails to be serious about
its own approach. That is to say that analytical philosophy of mind fails to retlect
the purposes and means of its own philosophizing in the form of distinctions in
terms of the philosophy of action or language and their norm-guided application in
developing cultural situations. Ir rather perpetuates its dcscriptivistic tradition like a
futile glass bead game, and it is always endangered by its blind belief in the natural
sClences.
Reluctant to take the participant's point of view in such a way that the con-
ceptual philosophical means are explicitly standardized and legitimized as 'mund
means for explicitly stated purposes, this tradition neither proposes a new or a
different direction for the cognitive sciences, nor does it provide a new or more
comprehensive philosophical framework for retlection.
This philosophie tradition has no consequences and no success. Therefore, the
suspicion seems justified that, in its affirmative attitude toward the natural sciences
and toward the cultural fact that language exists, this tradition only contributes to
an ideologizing superstructure of natural-scientific cognition research. The
reception modern research is met with in popularizations for educated readers such
as those published in magazines like Nature, Science, Spektrum der Wissenschaft,
etc., or even in the science sections or separate articles appearing in the FAZ,
Süddeutsche Zeitung, Spiegel, Die Zeit, and Stern, as weil as countless TV features
give impressive proof to that effect.

9 Such as causa I self-containment of physics - again c10sely associated with so me philosophers'

inability to distinguish between science as practice with a claim to validity on the one hand and
the object area of that very sciencc on the other.
 Between Natural Disposition and Cultural Masterment of Life 103

4
Cognitive Sciences and Concept of Man

To recapitulate what has been emphasized in the introduction, there is a distinction

bctween the cognitive scienees on the one hand amI philosophizing about the
cognitive sciences on the other. The above critique of the naturalization of the
eognitive sciences meta-theoretieally refered to defieits of retleetion with regard to
the purposes and means of approaehes in the cognitive sciences.
Consequently, in what follows there will be no suggestion of a form of the
cognitive scienees that is to compete with those that are found empirieally. Rather,
some philosophieal retleetions on the foundations and methods for the deseription
of human beings in the cognitive sciences will be presented.
[f we speak of the purposes and means of the cognitive sciences, we have to take
recourse to a fact that is both trivial and frequently neglected: the cognitive seiences
are brought about through acting people. Here, "acting"' is used in a terminologica[
sense as it is explicated in methodical theories of action. That is, actions aim at
purposes or, respective1y, actions can serve as means for the achievement of pur-
poses. Purposes are intended facts that are brought about by actions, and these
facts, in turn, can be described in statements. The realization (or non-realizationl of
purposes through actions is termed the success (or the failure) of actions. According
to ordinary language understanding, actions can sensibly be requested, and they can
be omitted.
A central distinctive intention of this concept of action lies in the delimitation 01"
actions from mere behavior. Startling, stumbling, sneezing, and physiological
retlex,es may serve as examples of the latter.
[t is a consequenee of naturalized cognitive seiences themselves, that such a
distinction between action and behavior meets with the resistance not only from
behavioristic, physicalistic, and biologistic quarters. This is because the program
that turns cognitive performances of organisms into the objects of natural-scientific
descriptions must also necessarily consider acting persons' autonomy of setting
their own purposes as causally explainable. This overlooks in wh ich sense a prin-
ciple of methodical order is violated. ft is one of the most elementary competencies
of human every-day life management in our present cultural situation that a
distinction is made between action and mere behavior. In our early childhood we
had to learn (and did learn) what, as a matter of course, the cultural community we
are living in will and will not consider nur own guilt or merit. As long as an
educator is not either imbecile or a crimina!, he will only commend or reprimand a
child for actions that are at the child's disposal. He will not commend or reprimand
the child for a mere behavior that is not disposable for the chi ld (or anyone).
There can be no doubt that, in special or borderline cases, the theorctieal distinc-
tion between action and behavior is not always as selective as one would like. But
that holds for any distinction. In action routines, for instanee, and especially in
every-day routines such as walking, eating, or actions such as swimming, riding a
bicyc[e, car-driving, etc., that also have to be considered for the eompetent manage-
ment of one's every-day life, we always find borderline cases between action and
behavior (including concomitant cognitive performances). Only in the case of
104 Peter Janich

failure~ and sllbsequent attempts to avoid such failures through repetitions, such
borderline cases again turn into the well-considered explicit application of means
for the aim of reaching given purposes.
Yet, such borderline cases are irrelevant when we are about to make judgements
on the achievements of actions performed by cognitive scientists, i.e. to
dinstinguish succeeding from failing ones, and thereby to consider the validity of
their results. No matter against wh ich naturalistic background certain cognitive
scientists phrase and realize their research programs, they will not do so without
c1aiming validity for their results. Therefore, in a non-trivial respect, cognitive
scientists are culturally characterized persons who, in a methodical sense, primarily
act to pllrsue purposes and who, as a matter of fact and with regard to their own
pretensions, judge their own actions by their successes and failures. Not the least
important part of this is the intelligibility of the linguistic presentation of their
research results and the fulfillment of validity pretensions, i.e. the achievement of
the research purposes that were set programmatically. "Primarily in a methodical
sense" therefore describes the irreversibility of a sequence of steps by which the
cognitive scientist hirnself conducts his research and presents his results in cooper-
ation and communication with his cultural contemporaries. The cognitive scientist,
hence, is not an organism or animal which is blessed with a few additional emer-
gent qualities, and he is not some kind of machine that can be described in the terms
of molecular biology with a surplus of mind that likewise happened to evolve, for
example, from complexity.
It becomes the epistemological leitmotif of a philosophy of the cognitive
sciences to point out the dependence of those sciences on a methodical order as
soon as those involved have understood that the cognitive sciences also do not
co me ahout without human action. Talking about such actions reqllires the obser-
vance of the succession of actions and the lInderstanding that mixing them up in the
procedure can only be had at the prize of the loss of success. Examples of relevant
chains of actions can be found everywhere even before science and philosophy
enter the scene. The preparation of simple dishes such as, for instance, 'Preserved
Eggs' requires that the sequence of the actions of cooking, peeling, halving, ami
garnishing is observed. This is not due to any natural or moral law but only to the
desire to achieve the intended purpose. Wherever chains of actions are concerned in
which the mixing-up of partial actions leads to a failure to achievc the purpose of
the entire chain of actions, the legitimy of a principle of methodical order is
immediately obvious. Whenever prescriptively or descriptively worded statements
are made about the sequence of such partial actions that depart from the successful
order of actions, recipes lose success or descriptions becomes wrong. Transfering
this to the area of the cognitive sciences, all this means that only the human being
who autonomously decides about purposes and who, as an acting person, is always
in a position to judge whether the self-set purposes are achieved or missed, is
constitutive for the cognitive sciences. That is to say that natural-scientific research
into human cognition can only (and only subsequently, in a methodical sense) be
conducted by humans who have agreed beforehand on the questions as to wh at
cognitions are and how successes and failures in relation to certain cognitions can
be distinguished. Some additional aspects of this insight will be explained in the
following paragraphs.
 Between Natural Disposition and Culturat Masterment of Life lOS

rirst of all, we must distinguish whether 'cognition' as weil as the German word
'Erkenntnis' and the word 'performance' are meant to be applied to a process or to
the outcome of the process, its result. In what they, mistakenly, believe to be a
progress over philosophical traditions in epistemology, the current, naturalistically-
conceived cognitive sciences have diverted their attention from the cognition-as-
result question and have instead chosen the cognition-as-process question for the
object of their research: "How does cognition work?", or "Wh at mechanisms bring
about cognition?" In a methodically well-ordered way, however, such questions can
only be worded meaningfully (and become the legitimate objects of a natural-
scientific research attempt), when it has been explicitly clarified beforehand of
what the explanundum, cognition, consists or, more precisely, what kind of results
will or will not be considered cognitive performances. In other words, the cognitive
sciences miss their object (see the critiscisms advanced earlier) if they do not
embark on the aspect of the validity of the results of cognitions. because otherwise,
'cognition' as process would become indiscernible from other metabolic processes
. .
In orgamsms.
Whenever it is possible to speak of the successes and failures of cognitions, it
becomes apparent very soon that, in a methodical sense, these successes and
failures always must primarily be conceived in relation to successful cooperation
and communication in the communities of acting human beings rat her than as
individual performances of organisms. It is in such communities that battle-tested
criteria are developed wh ich, with normative intentions, lead to a distinction
between valid and invalid results of cognitions. Should the cognitive scientist
venture to object that a cross-country runner had no need for the linguistic
articulation of sentences that described the position of the trees that he did not want
to run into and that, therefore, he also did not need any criteria for the truth of
statements, the cognitive scientist would overlook that even such cognitions that
are made and decided about during the very execution of the respective
actions are only available to him, the cognitive scientist, after they are linguistic-
ally articulated and judged with regard to their successes and failures. To put it in a
nutshell, precisely because the cognitive scientist does a cognitive science he can
only start off with results of cognitions that are explicitly articulated and catego-
rized with regard to validity and error - or else he would not even have an object to
talk about.
From this, arequest can be programmatically derived according to which the
cognitive sciences must state by what criteria the cognitive sciences distinguish
their own successes from their failures. What do the cognitive sciences (maybe with
the explicit intention of contributing to a scientifically-based concept of man and
the world) want to find out. and by what criteria do they believe to have made such
findings?
It proves quite instructive here to take a look at the philosophy of a natural
science such as physics that is more mature than the cognitive sciences: Physical
knowledge is always linked with a successfullaboratory technique. In other words,
it is the technical, engineer-type control of experiments from which the validity of
physical theoremes or theories is infered. For an action-theoreticaI
consideration of research in physics this means that even for the preparation of
the Iaboratory technique, i.e. of the devices for observation, measurement, and
106 Peter Janich

experimentation. knowleJge about thc removal anJ avoiJance of Jisturbances as a

technical know-how is imperative in orJer to enable the researcher to establish thc
success of observation anJ experiment as the technical reproJuction of certain
courses (runs of events) anJ states. Transfered to the cognitive sciences. this means
that they woulJ have presentable results if they were able to specify proper know-
leclge for the removal anJ avoidance of disturbances with regard to both cognition-
as-result anJ cognition-as-process. Since. as explained before. the explanandum.
'cognition-as-result". primarily (in a methodical sense) makes use of the distinction
between valid and invalid. succeeding and failing cognitions. the cognitive sciences
might weil profit from the considerations in epistemology and the theory of truth.
These considerations need to explicate the criteria according to which results of
cognitions can be catcgorizcd as knowledge. as (unjustifieJ anJ therefore mere)
opinions. or as errors. It then would be the cognitive sciences' own task to research.
with the methodical tool-kit of the natural sciences. how (epistemologically JefineJ)
errors anJ Jisturbances occur anJ how they can be avoided or removeJ.
In a certain sense. this unJerstanJing of the tasks of the cognitive sciences is
alreaJy successfully practiceJ in medicine. Frequently. the common sense of those
people who successfully participate in a cultural community is quite sufficient to
Jefine. for all intents anJ purposes. which behavioral peculiarities of a human being
lenJ themselves to interpretations in terms of cognitive disturbances. Defects or the
loss of linguistic abilities such as. for instance. in cases wherc Iesion s or tumors
have JestroyeJ Wernike's Center or Broca \ Center in the brain may serve as
c1assical exampks. That is to say that a first step toward a knowledge about the
avoiJance and removal of disturbances regarding diagnoseJ Jefects of the linguis-
tic capacity of a human being lead tn a natural-scientific hypothesis about their
causes. which then is considered (solidly) contirmed when (in the most favorable
casc) the removal of the Jisturbance is successfully cffected on the basis of that
hypothcsis.
This example may be sufficient to show how, on the basis of performances that.
as a matter of fact, any cultural being has to effect in order to manage her or his
every-day life, the cognitive scienccs can be considered as instances of rational
actions relative to given purposes, of actions, that is, from wh ich criteria of validity
can be drawn and the perennial problem of the explanandum. 'cognition', can he
solved.
Guidance by the example of the mcdical procurement of prophylactic and
therapeutic knowledge for the avoidance or removal of cognitive disturbances, as
refered to above, also gives access to the distinction between natural and cultural
dispositions for gaining knowledge. With the same matter-of-factness with which a
human being, without distinguishing the natural from the cultural, grows into the
community of other people through cooperation and communication, he becomes a
member of a cultural community by way of learning and practice. Distinctions
between body and mind or between nature and culture are as irrelevant for leading
one's practical every-day life as they are during the acquisition of the practical
abilities necessary for coping with daily life.
Only when it comes to disturbances or impediments, even in such an utterly
undramatical case as fatigue during the learning or acquiring of abilities and capaci-
ti es such a playing a piano or commanding the vocabulary of a foreign language,
 Between Natural Disposition and Cultural Masterment of Life 107

distinctions are made between physical and mental or between natural and cultural
aspects. (Note that those two distinctiuns are not considered equivalent here!) One
might wish to distinguish, for instance, whether the lack of the expected learning
progress simply is due to a bad teacher or to an inefficient teaching method, or
whether modifications or improvements of the instructions do or do not instigate
progress. The pupil's lacking qualification (maybe in combination with her or his
lacking inclination) for the task may then be considered.
This example is intended to show that only during the attempted removal or
avoidance of disturbances a distinction is made between cultural aspects of the
acquirement and the practice of cognitive dispositions on the one hand and the
natural dispositions assumed for the respective task on the other. This distinction,
maybe even in connection with an admissiun of the unability to change or intluence
natural dispositions any further, always remains related to the context of cultural
coping with life. The natural cogniti ve dispositions, the investigations of which
have been entrusted to the cognition researchers, hence, turn out to be the remain-
der, as it were, that cannot be modelied by cultural means and that, with the aid of
causal hypotheses that are gained through and tested by natural-scientific means.
can only be explained or favorably subjected to therapy.

5
Conclusion

The question as to whether. considering cognition, philosophy should throw up a

concept of man of its own, may remain an open one in this place. Rather, the
present suggestion to catch hold of human cognitive performances in cultural
situations with the means provided by action thenry was made with the intention of
casting a critical look at natural-scientific approaches in the cognitive sciences.
Consequently, only those forms of cognition were considered to which the natural
sciences have devoted their attention. Hence, other major and vital forms were
intentionally neglected. [t goes without saying that it forms part of the cognitive
performances of each and every competent contemporary on our present cultural
level that he is able to acquire and to assess certain social cognitions occuring in the
varied social intercourse with one's own lifetime companion, professional col-
leagues, neighbors, fellow-citizens, and members of different cultures. Cognitions
in the sense of historical experiences also apply here. They, again, can be differen-
tiated according to subjective experiences and to the cognitive constitution of one 's
own biography as weil as to scientific historiography. So far. these have been lef!
out of consideration by the cognitive sciences as thoroughly as are, for instance,
cognitions concerning the consequences of one 's own actions. Three-dimension-
ality of space, an example that has been explicitly workcd out, is a case in point.
The 'necessity' of three-dimensionality in the sense of a synthetic-aprioric know-
ledge recently has been reconstructed as knowledge about the consequences of
actions in apoeisis that, according to cultural purposes, has equipped our every-day
material world of objects with plain surfaces, straight edges, and right angles lO •

10 C.f. lanich, "Does biology neeu a rclativistic revision')"

108 Peter Janich

This may serve a ..; an example for forms of cognition that can be further differ-
entiated with regard to, say, mathematical and logical cognition in every-day life
and which is owing to the realm of well-regulated human actions and of the pur-
posive rationality of the consequent observation of rules.
The cognitive sciences, on the other hand, largely seem to be committed to a
model of cognition according to which the world is represented in the brain which
it has entered through the eyes of the eye-minded human being. These approaches
are supplemented by cognitive-science research pertaining to auditive perception as
weil as by so me rather exotic neurobiological studies on the sense of smell. All this,
again. fails to take into account that humans would not survive i1' they had no
knowledge about the consequences 01' their actions and if they had no disposition to
distinguish between logically necessary and contingent empirical consequences 01'
their actions. That is to say that - at least implicitly. but no less orientatively at that
- the cognitive distinction between apriori and aposteriori, analytic and synthetic.
logical and empirical counts among the culturally indispcnsible cognitive disposi-
tions uf human beings. These are 1'orms of cognition wh ich philosophy, as a dis-
cipline that is concerned with retlectiun, must explicate and conceptualize (at least
as long as the dogmatic guillotine blade of a naturalized epistemology has not yet
established the background for unimaginativcness in the cognitive scienccs).
[n order to diagnose and criticize the de-facto contribution that natural-scientific
theories of cognition have made to the concept of man. we in addition would have
to think about the questions what 'concepts of man' rcally are and what they are
good for more thoroughly than the preceding retlections were able and intended to
do. Doing that would provide an additional instance ofjudgement that would prove
helpful especially for answering the normative quest ion in what sense the natural
sciences shall contribute to a concept of man in a well-reasoned and justifiable way.
Thc preceding critique should not be mi staken for the claim that a contribution
from the point of view of the natural sciences to the understanding of man and of
his cognitive dispositions was impossible or did not make any sense. Rather,
natural-scientific contributions inevitably have their legitimate place in the context
of cultural determinations of cognition, validity criteria. and function in coping
with life, as has been discussed with reference to medically-related cognition
research in the sense of a prophylactic and therapeutic know-how for the avoidance
and removal of disturbances of human cognition in all its many facets.
It seems very much like natural-scientific cognition research as factually
conducted is better than its appearance might suggest. For the latter, unfortunately,
the cognition researchers' insufficient self-assurance philosophies and their popular
window-displays are much more characteristic than the results of their scientific
research.

6
References

Contributions to the present volume that are refered to explicitly or implicitly in the text. are not
included among the following references. References included are either those subjected to critical
retlcction or ones that provide justitication for criticisms or the author's own suggestions.
 Between Natural Disposition and Cultural Masterment of Life 109

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wissenschaften. Frankfurt am Main 1998, pp 156-194
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moderne. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1996
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Wien, 1981, pp419--441
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Knowledge Socialized. Budapest, 1988, pp 313-326
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Genotype and Phenotype:
Genetic and Epigenetic Aspects

Ulrich Wolf

The question as to what extent a relationship between the genotype and the
phenotype exists addresses the problem of the genetic determination of phenotypic
characters. This problem would be straightforward if the respective fraction of the
genome that contributes to the manifestation of a particular trait could be defined.
However, approaches to identify this fraction have to reekon with eomplexities met
at the genotypie as weil as at the phenotypie level. Multiple phenotypie effeets of
one single gene or mutation are referred to as pleiotropy, and polygeny addresses
the eontribution of several genes to the manifestion of a phenotypie trait. Indeed,
there is inereasing evidenee that almost each gene is pleiotropie and almost eaeh
eharaeter is polygenie. Evidently, the genetie eontribution to the phenotype is rather
eomplex. This eomplexity retlects the evolutionary past of the respeetive genes,
and therefore the causes for it are to be sought in evolution. As Duboule and
Wilkins (1998) stated: "The eonventional view of single, dedieated gene funetion is
not only ernHleous in itself but subtly distorts thinking about the nature of the evo-
lutionary process". Obviously, tracing the evolution of genes is expeeted to be the
key to eloser understanding their roles during the proeess of forming a phenotype.
According to Fran,<ois Jaeob (1977), the evolution of genes is characterized by
what he ealls "evolutionary tinkering" (or in his original term "bricolage"). Tinker-
ing is the eonsequenee of the principlc that new DNA sequences are always deriveJ
from alrcady cxisting ones, and consequently new genes are created from old ones
(Ohno 1970). The funetional spectrum of a gene may be changed or extendcd by
various mechanisms. If a gene originally fulfills an unique function, it may aequire
additional specificities of promoter usage and target sites by ehanges in its control
region or in its eoding part. However, with inereasing multifunetionality, the origin-
al function whieh should be maintained may no longer bc optimally regulated.
Therefore, gene tinkering is limited. Gene duplication, resulting in additional
copies of a gene, provides a more tlexible basis for functional diversification. And
indeed, members of multigene families are assumed to have originated by repeated
gene duplications, showing overlapping functions which are older, and new speci-
fieities whieh are younger in evolutionary terms.
Thus, when addressing the genetie eontribution to the phenotype, the multiple
use of a partieular gene as weil as the interaetion of multiple genes, both of whieh
are consequences of their evolution, are to be considered. Closer study of hereditary
diseases reveals that in many cases several different genes are involved in the
realization of the disease phenotype, if only by modifying the expressivity or pe ne-
trance of a gene carrying a pathogenetic mutation, thereby affeeting severity and
age of on set of the disease. There may be almost no example of a phenotypic trait
beyond the polypeptide level that is not modified to so me extent by the so-ealled
I 12 Ulrich Wolf

genetic background. Evolutionary tinkering has rcsulted in a functional complexity

wh ich makes it difficult to unravel that fraction of the genome contributing to a
particular phenotypic character.
The genetic contribution, however, is only one side of the coin, becau~e the
phenotype also results from interactions of various other determinants including
epigenetic mechanisms and intluences of the internal and external environment.
Developmental processes bridge the gap between genotype and phenotype, and
exactly the analysis of development has been defined originally as the field of
epigenetics (Waddington 1942).
Considering genetic etlects on the phenotype, a conception of the term "gene" is
required, and this issue has been discussed recently by Neumann-Held (1999). In
the present context, the term "gene", if restricted to the DNA level, may be defined
as a functional unit represented by DNA and transmitted merely as a structure. Then
the genotype is the totality of genes 01' a particular genome, and the phenotype
comprises all qualities of an organism with the exception of the genome itself.
Thus. the phenotype also includes qualities that are independent of the genotype. If
only genetic effects on the phenotype are considered, markers (variants) at the
DNA level can be compared with phenotypic markers or traits. Genotypic markers
re1'er to the sequence of DNA, and the quest ion is whether changes in that sequence
are of phenotypic consequence. If it would turn out that a proportional projection
exists between cause and effect which in the present context mcans that a de1'ined
genetic structure is responsible for a defined phenotypic character, the phenotype
could be reduced to the genotype.

Table 1. Deviations from a one-to-one genotypc-phcnotype relationship in rnonofactorial lraits

I. Gene l(leus heterogeneity:

mutations in different genes cach resulL in a similar phenolype
2. Allclic heterogeneity:
different (allclie) mutations within one gene caeh result in different phenotypes
3. Identiealmutations rcsult in different phenotypes
.+. Mutalion without phcnotypic manifestation

In principle, an amino acid sequence can be projected on a nucleotide sequence

and vice versa. However, the point to be considered here is whether or not such a
relationship also includes more remote phenotypic traits as are many Mendelian
characters that follow a seemingly monofactorial mode 01' inheritance. Theoretic-
ally, several different relationships between genotype and phenotype appear to be
possible as depicted in Table 1. Of these possibilities, gene locus heterogeneity as
weil as allelic heterogeneity are compatible with Mendelian inheritance, while
identical mutations associated with phenotypic heterogeneity are not. A more
detailed discussion of this matter is found in Wolf (1995, 1997), and here I will
present only some examples for illustration of these various relationships.
 Genotype and Phenotype I I3

In the case of gene locus heterogeneity, mutations at different gene loci each
converge to a similar phenotype. A striking example is retinitis pigmentosa, a
progressive disease with pigment degeneration of the retina and finalloss of photo-
receptor function. By now, more than 20 different genes have been mapped on
human chromosomes and in some cases have already been eloser characterized
which, when mutated, result in retinitis pigmentosa (Apfelstedt-Sylla et al. 2000).
Apparently, these genes are of different evolutionary origin and their products have
different functions during the morphogenetic process. The convergence to a similar
phenotype of mutations in these genes may be due to constraints in the develop-
me nt of the retina because of a limited range of cellular responses. There are
abundant other examples of locus heterogeneity demonstrating that the Mendelian
("monofactorial") phenotype can not always be assigned to one and the same gene.
The relationship between a single Mendelian trait and a gene involved may deviate
markedly from a one to one ratio; in the case of retinitis pigmentosa the ratio would
be I : > 20. Therefore, conelusions from the number of different Mendelian traits to
the number of genes involved are not possible.
Allelic heterogeneity refers to different mutations in one and the same gene each
diverging to a different phenotype. The androgen receptor gene may serve as an
example. CelluIar response to androgens depends on the presence of an intact
androgen receptor, and mutations in the receptor gene affecting the hormone sell-
sitivity 01" target cells result in either completc or partial sex-reversal, depending on
the receptor protein domain affected. In addition. enlargement of a CAG triplet-
repeat in the first exon of the gene. translated into a polyglutamine tract, is regularly
("ound in patients with spinal and bulbar muscular atrophy (SBMA). In normal
control individuals. the number of CAG trinuc1eotides rangcs from II to 31. while
in patients with SBMA. expansion between 40 and more than 62 triplets occurs.
Because adeletion of the androgen receptor gene results in complete sex reversal
(testicular feminization), but not in SBMA, a gain of function by the triplet repeat
expansion which may interfere with the regulatory function of the protein in motor
neurons is discussed. The occurrence of different phenotypes associated with
different mutations within the salllc gene is not surprising in view of the organi-
zation of many proteins in domains of different functions. Thus, in the case of the
androgenreceptor a mutation affecting the hormone-binding domain or lhe DNA-
binding domain may result in various degrees of intersexuality, while thc triplet
repeat expansion in the N-terminal modulatory domain resulting in SBMA is not
necessarily associated with impairment of sexual differentiation.
Needless to say, allelic mutations are found in the majority of genes studied, and
attempts have been made to establish genotype-phenotype relationships for dif-
ferent mutations within one gene. In cases where this was possible, predictions can
be made by DNA-sequence analysis about the phenotypic outcome. It may be
stated that loss of function mutations result in a more homogenous (disease) pheno-
type than gain of function mutations or partial inactivation of the gene. However, a
elear-cut genotype-phenotype relationship appears to be the exceptioll rather than
the rule, and the severity of the particular disease, the age of onset and its pro-
gression remain unpredictable for most mutations. This uncertainty points to the
interference of additional factors during the course of the pathogenetic process.
The most unexpected phenomenon of heterogeneity is the occurrence of an
114 Ulrich Wolf

Genotypic hcterogeneity
mutations in different genes converge to a similar phenotype:
genetic causation 01' the phenotype

different
similar phenotype
genotypes

Phenotypic heterogeneity
the same genotype diverges to different phenotypes:
non-genetic causation 01' phenotypic variation

one different
genotype phenotypes

Fig. 1. Heterogeneity 01' the genotype-phenotype relationship

identical mutation associated with different phenotypes. In these cases, the palho-
genetic nature of the respective mutation is weil defined, but nevertheless the
phenotype is not unequivocally determined. A comprehensive list of examples is
compiled in Wolf (1997) of which just one may be mentioned here. Craniosynosto-
sis syndromes are characterized by premature fusion of the cranial sutures often
associated with hand and foot abnonnalities such as fusion of the digits. Of the
many distinct clinical entities, some are associated with mutations in fibrohbst
growth factor receptor (FGFR) genes. One of these genes, FGFR2, is highlighled
by the occurrence of several different point mutations, each of which shows
phenotypic heterogeneity. For example, the mutation Cys342Arg results uniformly
in craniofacial dysmorphies but causes differences in limb development; either
digits of the hands and feet are atTected (Pfeiffer syndrome), or feet only (Jackson-
Weiss syndrome), or Iimbs are normally developed (Crouzon syndrome). The
phenotypic heterogeneity of identical mutations is an obvious deviation from a one-
ta-one projection of the respective mutation on the phenotype, and this relationship
is apparently rat her complex.
There are various mechanisms to be considered which may modify or even co m-
pensate for the effect of a mutation. In multifactorial disease, there are abundant
examples for mutations which appear to be a necessary but only a predisposing
condition for an impairment of normal development or function, and this com-
plexity also applies at least to some part of so-called monofactorial diseases.
Considering the various categories of heterogeneity, either genotypic heterogeneity
 Genotype and Phenotype 1 15

Table 2. Genetic and epigenetic conditions and mechanisms intluencing development and resul-
ting in phenotypic consequences

• constitutional mutations of all kinds

modifying interactions at the DNA level
- intragenic sequence polymorphisms
- modifying genes
- epistasis
• genetic predisposition (susceptibility genes)
somatic gene mutations
chromosomal etTects
- chromosome aberrations (non-disjunction, rearrangements, mosaics)
- uni parental disomy
- position effects by translocation (heterochromatinization: gene silencing,
unmasking 01' a recessive trait)
epigenetic regulation of gene expression: methylation/demethylation of DNA
acetylation/deacetylation of histones
changes in chromatin contiguration
- genomic imprinting
- X chromosome inactivation
trinucleotide repeat expansion
stochastic effects (gradients, thresholds, formation of molecular complexes, recognition
between molecules or cells)
phenocopies

occurs converging to a similar phenotype, and here, genetic causation is evident, or

phenotypic heterogeneity is found pointing to the influence of either modifying
genes or epigenetic interactions or both (Figure I). There are various conditions
that have an impact on phenotypic development and manifestation, some of which
are compiled in Table 2. These conditions are discussed in Wolf (1995) and in some
more recent reviews focussing in particular on variatior. in chromatin configuration
and epigenetic moditication (e. g. Kadonaga and Grunstein 1999). In particular, the
case of identical mutation associated with phenotypic variation deserves closer
consideration, and some mechanisms involved are put together in Table 3. Apart
from cases where genetic variants other than the mutations under study themselves
can be traced, there are cases without additional genetic determinants, obviollsly so
in identical twins, and here the intluence 01' non-genetic factors can be assumed.
Although the mutation segregates in a Mendelian fashion, the phenotypes do not.
Mendelian inheritance is also not observed in so-called trinucleotide repeat syn-
dromes, and in mutations at gene loci undergoing genumic imprinting. Both causes
of disease are so to say non-classical mechanisms, an unstable repeat sequence and
an epigenetic chromatin alteration concomitant with DNA-methylation, respec-
tively. Heterochromatinization in the cases of X chromosome inactivation and
variegation-type position effects are other examples of epigenetic modification of
chromatinlDNA. Depending on DNA-methylation, the acetylation status of histon-
es and the binding of non-histone-proteins, chromatin is in either an active or
inactive state intluencing gene expression. The various states of gene activity
I 16 Ulrich Wolf

Table 3. Additional variables in cascs 01' identical mutations associated with phenotypic hetero-
geneity

Gel1clic .li/clOn"
- Identical mutation in the two alleles and an additional different mutation in one allele (cystic
fibrosis, Gaucher disease)
- Haplotype differences between the two alleles: an additional DNA-sequence polymorphism
intluencing the phenotype 01' a particular mutation (eystic fibrosis, prion disease)
- A modifying gene at another loeus (neurofibromatosis type I, Waardenburg syndrome type I)
- An interacting gene becomes epistatic (XY gonadal dysgenesis with wild-type SRY)

Epigel1e lid1'11 vi roll mel1lal .I1/clors

- A mutation as a predisposing condition; environmental factors trigger the disease
(ornithine transcarbamylase deficiency)
- Triplct repeat expansion with variation in methylation (fra(X)syndrome,
asymptomatic carriers 01' the full mutation)
- Genomic imprinting (deletion ofthe PWS/AS region resulting in either
Prader-Willi or Angelman syndrome)
- Familial balanced reciprocal translocation (affected and non-allected members)

SI()c/wsl;c processes
- Variation in the composition of heteropolymeric proteins conlaining mutant and wildtype
subunits (skeletal museIe chloride channels)
- Normal and allected carriers of a dominant mutation duc to quantitative variations 01' the
functional (wildtype) protein around a threshold (sax':) in campomelic dysplasia'?)
- Triplet repeats in the transitional (premutation) range to full mutation
(Huntington disease, normal and affccted individuals)
- Random X chromosome inactivalion (microsymptoms in fernale carriers 01' X-linked
mutations)

ranging from full expression to complete silencing are referred to as epialleles of

that particular gene.
The complex heterogeneities at both the genotypic and the phenotypic levels
considered here interfere with traditional Mendelian genetics, and the concept of an
aetiologically oriented nosology has to take into account that a particular disease
phenotype is not unequivocally determined by a specific genotype. Still in the
majority of cases, the gene locus defining the gene product can serve as the aetio-
logical point of departure for a nosological c1assification. [n contrast, referring to
individual mutations runs into the problem offunctional convergence or divergence
of different allelic mutations. How to integrate our rapidly increasing aetiological
knowledge into a feasible order, will remain achallenge for the future.
Mechanisms and effects as mentioned here also interfere with the concept of
genetic determinism. The processes resulting in the manifestation of phenotypic
traits do not only depend on genetic determinants, but on epigenetic interactions as
weil, and the genes are by no means autonomous. The prominent role which we
attribute to the genes in determining the phenotype reflects our focussing on genetic
 Genotype and Phenotype I 17

mechanisms. The analysis of the DNA allows for rclating well-defined structures
and structural alterations to the phenotype. With increasing knowledge of the
human genome, however, our interest is shifting to the study of pathogenesis as a
tool to understand normal physiological functions resulting in phenotypic charac-
ters. Genetics is combined with embryology (developmental genetics) and with this
approach, epigenetic phenomena become increasingly important.
While epigenetic marks are stable in somatic development and are transmitted
through cell division, it becomes increasingly evident that they can also be trans-
mitted to subsequent generations and thus may even play a role in evolution
(Jablonka and Lamb 1995). However, apart from the numerous observations in
other organisms, in mammals the examples are still scarce. A transgenerational
effect of epigenetic modirications was demonstrated by Roemer et al. (1997) in the
mouse: the experimentally induced suppression of two genes affecting the pheno-
type was transmitted through the germline. Further examples are discussed in John
and Surani (1999).
Because epigenetics cannot be reduced to genetics, it appears to become in-
creasingly difficult to define the rote of the genes. The concept of genetic deter-
mination of a trait is based on the idea of a hierarchical organisation. Molecular
unravelling of dcvelopmental pathways, however. discloses rather nctlike inter-
actions not only of numerous genes, but also of epigenetic factors. further com-
plicated ey feedback circles. The regulation of gene expression that involves the
RNA polymerase 11 machinery, transcription factors forming complexes with co-
regulators. epigenetic modification of the DNA. changes in nucleosomal organi-
I.ation of the chromatin. histone modification, alterations of higher-order chromatin
structure. and the role of nuclear compartments may again serve as an example.
There is indication that at least so me of these processes are interconnected as e. g.
DNA methylation and histone deacetylation and vice versa (Ng and Bird 1999.
CotTee et al. 1999).
Regulation of gene expression either by genetic or epigenetic mechanisms. and
posttranscriptional control of protein synthesis, no doubt have a fundamental im-
pact on ontogenetic development and thus on phenotypic characters. "The sequence
of the human genome is widely seen as the starting point for biological investi-
gation ... , and the debate on the origin of life largely defines 'alive' as equivalent to
'accurately transmitting a genetic blueprint'" (Kirschner et al. 2000). Under this
view. the nearly completcd sequence analysis of the human genome would provide
the basis for eventually understanding the functions bridging the stretch of road
between genotype and phenotype. However, "unfortunately, it takes more than
DNA to make a living organism ... The organism does not compute itself from its
DNA" (Lewontin 1992). This quotation leads into the debate about the nature of
biological organization, and I can not deal with that here. To indicate the problem. I
only refer to the manifold mechanisms of self-organization during development and
differentiation wh ich cannot be attributed to differential gene expression. These
processes are "often far removed from sequence information", and they have "no or
little dependence on prior organization" as Kirschner et al. (2000) demonstrate in
their thought-provoking review on self-organizing phenomena in organismal
physiology. These authors conclude from their considerations: "As it is now clear
that gene products function in multiple pathways and the pathways themselves are
 I 18 Ulrich Wolf

inten.:onnected in networks, it is obvious that there are many more possible out-
comes than there are genes. The genotype, however deeply we analyze it, cannot be
predictive of the actual phenotype, but can only provide knowledge of the uni verse
of possible phenotypes. Biological systems have evolved to restriet these pheno-
types, and in self-organizing systems the phenotype might depend as much on
external conditions and random events as the genome-encoded structure of the
molecular components. Yet out of such a potential nondeterminist world, the organ-
ism has fashioned a very stable physiology and embryology. It is this robustness ...
that we wish ultimately to understand in terms of chemistry."
The question as to which biological conditions make us human can also be
considered a question of the genotype-phenotype relationship which should be ad-
dressed in the light of evolution. Although genetics has essentially contributed to
our understanding of evolutionary mechanisms, almost no genetic specificities
have been identified so far differentiating us as human beings from our closest
primate relatives (Gibbons 1998). I have no doubt that gcnctic differences which
are relevant to human evolution will be found, if only at the level of a spatio-
temporal mechanism of genetic regulation during ontogenesis, and in particular.
with respect to genes expressed specifically in the brain. However. exactly in
ontogenesis and brain development, epigenctic mechanisms are assumcd to have a
prominent role.

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Roemer I/Reik W/Dean W/Klose 1 (1997) Epigenetie inheritanee in the mouse. Current Biology
7:277-280
Waddington CH ( 1942) The eanalization of development and the inheritanee 01' aelfuired charac-
ters. Nature 150: 563-565
 Genotype and Phenotype 1 19

Woll U (1995) Th<.! genetic contrihution tn the phenotype. HUIll Genet 95: 127-14X
Wolf U (19<)7) IJenticallllutations anJ phenotypic variation. HUIll Ge nd 100: J05-Y21
Genetic Determinism:
The Battle between Scientific Data and Social
Image in Contemporary Developmental Biology

Seott F Gi/bert

The importance of biology was probably best expressed by the philosopher of reli-
gion, Abraham 1. Heschel (\ 965). He noted that whereas "a theory about the stars
never becomes part of the being of the stars", a theory about human beings enters
our consciousness, determines our self-image, and modifies our very existence.
"The image of man affects the nature of man ... We become what we think of our-
se\ves." If we think of ourselves as killer apes, certain behavioral phenotypes are
acceptable that would not be tolerated if we view humans as the current apex of an
evolutionary trend towards cooperation.
[n today's society, biology is being asked to answer questions that religion 01'
cultural traditions had formerly been asked to solve. The main problems nf nur
society are being placed on a biological basis. Health care, pollution, war,
aggression, love, monogamy, ethnicity, race, gender, even educatability and law are
seen as having biological bases. Biologists are being asked to adjudicate whether
certain people can be educated, whether a certain person is guilty of a crime or of
fatherhood, and whether aggression or philandering is normal human behavior.
[ncreasingly, developmental biology and genetics are asked to define who we are:
What is anormal, what is abnormal; what is masculine, what is feminine (see
Gilbert, 1997b).
[n teaching developmental biology, [ find myself challenging the cultural images
and stories that many of the students have brought to c\ass with them. Such views
co me from previous science books, television documentaries, and popular movies
and magazines. I wish to look at three stories and images of genetic deterrninism which
are being told to the public in the name of developmental biology. In each case, [
will present data that contradict the accepted story and which, I think, provide far
more interesting stories. For in addition to telling society that its stories are wrong,
science (and especially, developmental biology) can also provide alternative
stories. At the end of this essay, [ wish to analyze the identity of some of the social
stories and to hypothesize why they have such remarkable power in our culture.

1
Story I: Fertilization is Scientifically Proven to be
the Beginning of Life

In America, there is a relatively large political movement to define fertilization

as the beginning of life. Indeed, it was part of the platform for the candidacy of
United States Senator Robert Smith for the presidential nomination in 2000. This
definition of ferti[ization as the beginning of life is based on the genetic view of life
122 Seott F. Gilbert

whieh claims that d new individual is formed when the genes from the mother meet
the genes of the father. Genetically this may be true; but genetics is not the sole
arbiter of biological truth. Physiology, neurobiology, and developmental biology
also have positions on this issue.

1.1
The Physiological View: Independent Life

Physiology can stake out two positions on the "beginning of Iife" question. One
eoncerns when the fetus is alive, the other eoneerns when the fetus is an individual.
Its first position is based on metabülism. The metabolic view of life claims that
there is no point when life begins. The sperm cell and egg cell are as alive as any
other cell or organism. Therefore, the metabolie view invalidates the entire question
of "when does life begin", for the answer is that it never ended. There is also, of
course. the second physiologically based view of life wh ich sees human life as
heginning when it can exist separalcly from its maternal biologieal environment.
Although this is the traditiünal "birthday" view of when life begins, it has aetually
been set by technologieal advances. The natural limit of viability oceurs when the
lungs mature, but technological advances can now enable apremature infant to
survive at about 25 weeks gestation. This physiological view is the legal per-
spective currently operating in many countries and states. Onee a fetus can be
potentially independent, it cannot be aborted.

1.2
The Neural View: Human Cerebral Function

There is also the neurological view of human life. Several countries have defined
human death (as opposed to heart death or eellular death) as the [OSS of the human-
specifie cerebral EEG (eleetroencephalogram) pattern. That being the case, Moro-
witz and Trefil (1992) proposed that the acquisitioll of the human EEG (at about
24-27 weeks) be defined as when a human life has begun. This looks partieularly at
when a new human life begins, rather than a new life itself.

1.3
The Embryological View: Individuation

The same ean be said for the embryologieal view of when human life begins. This
perspeetive is one of the most biologieally and theologically interesting views
about the beginnings of human life. In humans, identical twinning ean oeeur as late
as 14 days after fertilization. Such twinning produees two individuals with different
thoughts, different opinions, and different Iives. Even conjoined ("Siamese") twins
ean have different personalities. Thus, a single individuality is not fixed at fertili-
zation or at any other time earlier than day 14. In religious language, this means that
the two twins have two different souls, and that ensoulment eannot oeeur earlier
than day 12. Some medieal textbooks eonsider the stages before the onset of
individuality as being "pre-embryonie". This embryological view of when human
 Genetic Determinism 123

Iife begins ha ..; been expressed by scientists such as Renfree (1982) and Grobstein
( 1988), and it has been endorsed by theologians such as Ford ( 1988), Shannon and
Wolter (1990), and McCormick (1991), among others. (Such a view would allow
contraception, "morning after pills", and contragestational agents, but not aborti on
after two weeks).
Therefore, the view that fertilization is the sole valid scientific view of when
human life begins is patently false. It is a view that privileges the genetic approach
to life. Numerous scientists have proposed other scientifically valid views that are
less genetically oriented. This view forms the basis for human stern cell research
policy in the United Kingdom (Warnock et al. 1984).

2
Story 11: Genes Determine what we are

Genetic determinism. The view that life begins at fertilization derives from a
perspective of life that sees genes as the only crucial ac tors in biology. What makes
animals look the way they do? What gives each ()f us our phenotype? The answer
that we receive from culture and from many biology books is unequivocal: the
genes give us our phenotype. After all, genes are the bases for heredity, and DNA is
the "secret of life", the "master moleeule" 01' genetics. In television shows, in
advertisements, in documentaries, and even in novels, we are told that DNA makes
us what we are both physically, mentally, and behaviorally (see Keller, 1992;
Nelkin amI Lindee, 1995). Arecent cover of L!le Mllga::.ine depicts a canonical
double helix and proclaims: "Were you born that way? Personality. temperament,
even life choices. New studies show it's mostly in our genes." Thcrc are hundreds
01' other examples, and so me are very insidious. BMWs are c1aimed to have
"a genetic advantage", while Subaru i:-. billed as "a genetic superstar." The Infinity
uses nucleic acid to bol ster its authenticity: "While some luxury sedans just look
like their elders, ours has the same DNA." Genetic determinism is becoming an
assumption of modern life.
But this is in many ways a translation of some 01' the more extreme positions
taken by so me of the current popularizers of biology, such as Richard Dawkins
(1985), who writes 01' the genome as the book of life and that our bodies are merely
transient vehicles for the survival and propagation of their immortal DNA. Walter
Gilbert (1990) envisions each 01' us owning a CD that we can point to and say "Here
is a human being; it's me." So it is not surprising to see social critic Camille Paglia
(1992) declaring that DNA is the core of her being, "the hard nugget of the seit", a
genetic gift ... Biology is our hidden fate." And of course, there is the rhetoric of
James Watson and others of the Human Genome project who claim that understan-
ding the genome will be to find out who we are and to finally "know ourselves."
Moreover, according to such rhetoric, once we know the sequence of the human
genome, we will now know how to cure such diseases as homelessness (Koshland,
1989) and homosexuality (Watson, 1997). We are told by these well-known scien-
titic administrators that we are what our genomes tell us to be.
But we know, as scientists, that this is not true. Any parent of a set of twins also
knows that this genetic determinism isn 't true. Even Eng and Chang, the "original"
124 Seott F. Gilbert

Siamese twins-who shared not only the same heredity but also the same environ-
ment-became different people. (And it was difficult sharing one liver when one of
these conjoined twins was a tee totaler while the other liked his liquor; see Gould.
1997). Let us now look at the scientific evidence against genetic determinism.

2.1
Evidence against Genetic Determinism: Polyphenisms

The scientific evidence against genetic determinism have been building up ever
since embryologist Oskar Hertwig (1894) used location-dependent sex determina-
tion in Bonnelia against what he called the preformationism of August Weismann.
Until recently, developmental biologists have not studied organisms wherein the
environment plays a major role in development. The reasons were pragmatic. One
of the prerequisites for studying development in our laboratories is that we use
organisms that will develop in our laboratories (Bolker, 1995). We do not choose to
use organisms whose development could change dramatically by how much light
their larvae receive or at what temperature they are incubated. But the development
of many organisms is exquisitely sensitive to environmental conditions. Numerous
species, especially Homo sapiens, possess developmental plasticity wherein the
organism inherits the ability to express one set of phenotypes in so me situations and
other phenotypes under another set of conditions. Some species have polyphen-
isms that are distinct (either/or) phenotypes that are elicited by the environment.
Other species have a range of phenotypes where the response to the environment
can be incremental. This continuous range of phenotypes is ca lied the norm of
reaction (Wolteteck, 1909; Stearns et al., 1991.) The reaction norms and polyphen-
isms are inherited potentials and can be selected in the genotype. However, in all
these instances, the environment can govern the particular phenotype produced (see
Gilbert. 200 I).

2.1.1
Temperature Dependent Sex Determination

Temperature dependent sex determination is seen in numerous invertebrates and

vertebrates. Embryos of the turtle Emys, for instance, become males if incubated
below 2SOC and all females above 3UoC during the last third of their incubation
(Pieau et al., 1994). (In intermediate temperatures, different percentages of both
sexes are formed.) In some species, such as the fish Menidia. temperature-
dependent sex determination is found in the parts of their range where it is adaptive
to be one sex ur the other du ring particular portions of the breeding season
(Chamov and Bull, 1977; Conover and Heims, 1987).

2.1.2
Context-dependent Sex Determination

Many species have other types of context-dependent sex determination. The sex of
the blueheaded wrasse is determined by the social structure into which the larvae
enter. If the young fish enters a reef where there are no males, it becomes male.
 Genetic Determinism 125

Alternatively, if there are other males present, it becomes a female. Usually, there is
one male for each dozen females. When that male dies, the largest female develops
testes within 24 hours, and within two weeks it is making functional sperm ami
mating with the remaining females (Warner, 1993). Invertebrates such as Bonne/ia
viris and Crepidula jornicata are weil knüwn for the cüntext-dependent means of
sex determination. Some invertebrates such as the pillbug Armadillium vuIgare can
have their sex determined by bacterial infection! These bacteria are transmitted
through the egg cytüplasm and they can turn genetic males intü females. Ecolügists
have known about these life histüry strategies for years, and they have interesting
hypotheses für why they evolved (see Gilbert, 1997). Hüwever, the proximate
causes üf these life history strategies remain almost cümpletely unknüwn and will
make a fascinating field für develüpmental biologists to enter (Gilbert, 200 I).

2.1.3
Seasonal Polyphenisms

Sex isn't the only phenotypic trait intluenced by the environment. Linnaeus had
classified the brown and the orange forms of Araslmia laevana as two different
species. We now know that these phenotypes are two forms of the same species,
and that they are regulated by the temperature and photoperiod experienced by the
late instar larvae. More daylight and higher temperatures cause highcr amounts of
ecdysone (an important insect hormone) and produce the dark, summer morph.
Less daylight and lower temperatures produce the orange spring morph (see
Nijhout, 1991; Weelc, 1995). Such seasonal polymorphism is seen in numerous
buttertlies, including the common cabbagc white (Pof!tia protodice and P
occidef!ti) where the hindwings of those buttertlies eclosing late in summer havc
melanotic hindwings that ahsorh more light and raise the body temperature faster.
The seasonal polymorphism of Bicvclus anvaf!a is also caused by temperature,
wh ich, in some yet unknown way, effects the stability of Distal-fess gene ex-
pression in the wing imaginal discs (Brakefield et al., 1996.)

2.1.4
Nutritional Polyphenisms

In so me cases, you indeed are what you eat. In numerous species üf hymenoptera,
the worker, soldier, and queen castes are determined by the levels of food fed to the
respective larvae. In Pheido[e and Pheidologetof!, the protein-rich diet causes
elevated juvenile hormone titres, and these titres allow more growth to occur.
reprogramming the switch that determincs when metamorphosis will occur.
The differences in size, structure, and even cuticular proteins are often quite enor-
mous. The eggs üf the moth Nemoria ari:onaria that hatch in the spring produce
caterpillars that feed on oak catkins. These caterpillars develop a rugose, beaded,
yellow-brown morphology that enables them to hide by the catkins. Thüse cater-
pillars that hatch in the summer do not have the catkins. They eat the oak leaves.
Their morphology changes to resemble that of a new oak twig (Greene, 1989).
126 Scott F. Gilbert

2.1.5
Predator-induced Polyphenisms

Several vertebrates and invertebrates have evolved developmental respon!\es to

predators. By sensing a predator-secreted chemical in the environment, various
species of rotifers, crustaceans, molluscs, fish, and reptiles develop differently. The
rotifer Keratella slacki will develop large anterior spines when cultured in water
that has contained a major predator species, Aspfanchia. This makes them harder to
eat. Similarly, the carp Carassius carassius responds to the presence of predatory
pike by forming a pot-bellied. hunchback morph that will not tit weil in the pike 's
jaws The predator-induced polyphenism of the parthenogenetic water tlea. Daph-
nia, is beneticial not only to itself, but also to its offspring. When Daphnia cucul-
fata encounter the predatory larva of the tly Chaeoborus, their "heImets" grows to
twice their normal size. This inhibits their being eaten by the tly larvae. This same
heImet induction occurs if the Daphnia are exposed to extracts of water in wh ich
the tly larvae had been swimming Agrawal and colleagues (1999) havc shown that
the offspring of such an induced Daphnia will be born with this same altered head
morphology. There are numerous other examples of developmental plasticity that
enable developing organisms to respond to changing environmental conditions (see
Adler and HarvelI. 1990; Tollrian and Harvell, 1999; Gilbert, 200 I).

2.1.6
Human Developmental Plasticity

Nowhere is predator-induced polyphenism more important than in mammals such

as humans. Our major predators, of course, are microbes. We respond to them
through an immune system based on c10nal selection of Iymphocytes that recognize
specitic predators and their products. Our immune system recognizes a particular
microbe such as a cholera bacterium or a poliovirus by making Iymphocytes. each
expressing a different gene product on its cell surface. These genes for immuno-
globulin and T-cell receptors form the receptor proteins of the B-cells and T-cells
respectively. Each B-Iymphocyte. for instance. makes one and only one type of
antibody, and it places this antibody on the cell surface. One B-cell may be making
an antibody to poliovirus. while its neighboring B-cell is making an antibody to
diphtheria toxin. When a B-cell Iymphocyte binds its foreign substance (the anti-
gen), it begins a pathway that causes it to divide repeatedly and to differentiate into
an antibody-secreting cell that secretes the same antibody that originally bound the
antigen. Moreover, some of the descendants of that stimulated B-cell remain in the
body as sentineIs against further infection by the same microorganism. When we
have a polio vaccine, our body stores B-Iymphocyte memory cells that have re-
ceptors to the poliovirus. Thus, idcntical twins are not identical with respect to their
immune systems. Their phenotypes (in this case, both the types of cells in their
Iymph nodes and their ability to respond against an infectious microorganism) have
been altered by the environment. Moreover, our immune system also provides
transgenerational immunity against common predators. The antibodies produced by
our mothers during pregnancy can cross the placenta and give us passive immunity
 Genetic Determinism 127

when we are born. In binls. a similar antibody is placed into the eggs. Thus. In
combating infection. experience counts.
One interesting case of environment effecting our phenotype involves the
disease gulonolactone oxidase deficiency (hypoascorbemia; OMIM 24(400).
Homozygosity of a mutation in the gulanolactone oxidase gene on the short arm of
chromosome 8 produces a syndrome that produces death in childhood due to con-
nective tissue malfunction. Interestingly, this syndrome effects 100% of the human
population. Gulonic acid oxidase is the final enzyme in the pathway leading to
ascorbic acid, and we are all homozygous at this mutant locus. While most mam-
mals have this enzyme and can synthesize Vitamin C, our genes for this enzyme our
mutated, and we cannot make this necessary compound. This is why we need
ascorbic acid (Vitamin C) in our diet. Without this replacement therapy from the
environment, we are all dead. What is the effect of the environment on the human
phenotype? 100%. The effects of genes and environment are interactive; they can-
not be separated into component percentages. Our genotype programs us for an
early death, and the fact that we are here is testimony to the power of the environ-
ment to circumvent our genetic heritage.
Probably no species has a morphology more plastic than that of Homo sapiens.
Were I to reside long in the Andes or Alps, I would develop red blood cells more
efficiently, due to a developmental system that produces more erythropoietin in
response to oxygen deprivation (Brunn et al., 1998; Wenger et aI.. 1998). Were I to
exercise, 1 could no doubt hypertrophy my pectoral and biceps muscles into strong
and sculptured wonders. Genotype limits. but does not determine our phenotypes.

2.2
Evidence against Genetic Determinism: Stochastic Variation

Much has been made about the Minnesota Twin Studies. Popular accounts of these
studies tell the readers that some identical twins raised apart since birth have such
remarkable commonalities as tlushing the toilet twice. wearing large beIt buckles,
and marrying women with the same first name. Neither the diplojlu.I'lz aor macro-
buckel allele have becn isolated. In fact. the re ports of these studies wh ich are
published by newspapers are almost all retrospective studies. A survey of whether
any large fraction of twins marries spouses of the same name might show no
correlation at all. Certainly, there doesn 't seem to be any correlation in this regard
among twins raised together. But identical twins-with the same DNA in their
genome-can be discordant in both physical and behavioral phenotypes. For in-
stance, the randomization of X-chromosome inactivation can give rise to mono-
zygotic ("identical") female twins who are profoundly different. Dosage compen-
sation tor the human X chromosome is such that one of the two X chromosomes
becomes inactive in each somatic femaIe cel!. However, there is no determining
which X chromosome will be inactivated. Take, for example, the case of identical
twins who are heterozygous for an X-linked form of muscular dystrophy. Most
heterozygous women do not express any symptoms because the cells expressing the
wild-type allele can compensate for those cells expressing the mutant allele.
However, if by chance the wild-type allele is on the inactivated X chromosome in a
large proportion of her muscle cells, the woman will manifest the disease. There
128 Seott F. Gilbert

have been several instances where one girl shows the symptoms of this disease
while her identical twin sister does not (Pena et aL 1987; Norman and Harper.
1989; Richards et al.. 1990). Similarly, there are cases where monozygous female
twins are discordant with respect to eolorblindness or Hunter disease due to X-
chromosome inactivation (Jorgensen et al., 1992; Winehester et al., 1992; Goodship
et al., 1996).
The conclusion is that genetic determinism of physical phenotype. espeeially
that of humans, is not scientifically tenable.

3
Story 111: Genes determine who we are-
Neurogenetic Determinism

We are constantly exposed to the supposed truths of neurogenetie determinism. We

are told that Ringo Starr gave his ehild his drummer genes and that Japanese iee
skating champion Yuko Sato gave her daughter a "genetie advantage" towards
becoming a champion herself. In so me way. genes are expeeted to determine not
only what we are, but who we are.

3.1
Critique of Neurogenetic Determinism

While neurogenetie determinism might be eonsidered a subset of genetie determin-

ism, it is associated with a different set of evidence, and people may believe in it for
different reasons. What eonstitutes the evidenee that genes determine who we are?
The first set of evidence comes from genes whose mutant alleles produee be-
havioral changes. That genes affect behavior is obvious in humans. Children with
Angelman syndrome generally have inappropriate laughter, while children with
Prader-Willi Syndrome have an insatiable appetite. Boys lacking the gene for hypo-
xanthine phosphosphoribosyl transferase have an uncontrollable urge towards self-
mutilation, while those with William's Syndrome tend to be gregarious. We do not
understand how the genes involved in these syndromes confer these personalily
traits to the aft1icted individual.
Still, these genes do not determine a behavior. The HPRT gene of Lesch-Nyhan
syndrome encodes a purine-salvage enzyme. not a compulsion. Genes do not aet in
a vacuum, and genetic analyses measure the effect of the loss or gain of gene
function in an intaet organism, that is, where all other genes are intact and function-
ing. Mice lacking the HPRT gene do not share the human behavioral phenotype.
Thus, the geneticist cannot tell the function of a gene exeept by analyzing the
difference between an intact individual and a second "identical" individual who
only differs at this single locus. But this cannot tell you if a gene determines a
behavioral phenotype. If you have a flat tire, your car won't move; while an
identical car with functioning tires will. This does not mean that the tire is the
determinant for car motility. It is part of a large pathway of components that can be
used for several functions. Similarly, a gene may be an essential component of any
 Genetic Determinism I 29

behavior. but it does not "determine" it. The gene may be reqlliredf()r a function
without being /()r that function.
This is borne out by research into one of the few mental retardation syndromes
for wh ich we do know a mechanism. Smith-Lemli Opitz (SLO) syndrome. This
relatively common (1/30,000 births) syndrome includes microcephaly, hypotonia,
and mental retardation. It is caused by homozygosity for a loss-of-function muta-
tion in the gene encoding the enzyme 7 -dehydrocholesterol-reductase gene at
chromosome lI q 12-q 13 (Tint et a!., 1994; Shefer et a!., 1995). The protein en-
coded by this gene functions as the last enzyme of the pathway leading to the
synthesis of cholestero!. One would not think that a cholesterol biosynthesis gene
would be a critical component of mental function. However, cholesterol has been
shown to be a critical factor during brain development (it is necessary for the
reception of the Sonic Hedgehog protein that induces the t100rplate and polarizes
lhe ventral neural tube) and it is essential for the continued function of the brain.
Administration of cholesterol by mouth in combination with bile salts results in
growth of SLO infants. Even in adults this diet converts the patient from an
irritable, whining individual to a quiet and interactive one (Opitz. 1996; Kelley.
1(98) After only a few days or weeks. older children learn to walk. and adults speak
for the first time in years. often saying how much better they fee!. Thus the SLO
gene is not a gene for brain morphogenesis or mental function. It's a gene for
cholestervl biosynthesis. It certainly is not "the gene tor" intelligence, although it is
certainly required.
The second set of evidence for genes controlling behavior comes from studies
claiming to have found them. During the past decade. we have heard claims of
"genes for" male homosexuality, risk-taking behavior, a\coholism, aggression,
manic depression, general cognitive ability. and even television viewing. None of
them have been confirmed. The difficulty in confirming these studies may come
from several sources. First, the phenotype is ill-defined and may be caused in
several ways. Fever, for instance, is a medical condition that has many causations.
Behavioral conditions may be similar. So one family may display the phenotype
because they have the absence of one gene, and in another family with the same
trait. that gene is totally normal, but another gene is mutant. Second, as Ulrich Wolf
(1995; c. f. this volume, pp lII ff) has extensively shown, different alleles of the
same genes can have different effects in different people. The same mutated gene
that causes a minor thumb abnormality in the father can cause phocomelia (absence
of limbs) in his son. A mutation that causes two children to have a debilitating
muscle disease is also found in their wild-type mother and brother (Freire-Maia.
1975; Wolf, 1995). Immunologists know that "background genes" are critical when
discussing the susceptibilities of different major histocompatability allelesi. In
different backgrounds, the genes have different effects. The context-dependency of
the phenotype produced from a mutant allele has been mathematically mode lied by
Nijhout and Paulsen (1997). Therefore, with the exception of pathological condi-

It is interesting that the economic rationale for mammalian cloning is that the transgenes of the
elite transgenic producers do not express themselves in the same high rates when they have
different background genes due to sexual reproduction.
130 Sectt F. Gilbert

tions wherein single genes control the substrata upon which behaviors might be
forrned, individual genes do not "control" behaviors. To say that a particular gene
"controls" a complex behavior is akin to saying that a person scored the "winning"
hasket in a IOO-point basketball game (see Wheeler, 1991; Gottlieb, 1992).
Third, there is statistical variation even in those animals that are genetically
identical and who are given the same homogeneous environment. The Bristol N2
strain of CuenorlUlhditis elegans has an invariant cell Iineage (the cell divisions
wh ich occur between the fertilized egg and the adult are largely identical and
always produce the same set of tissues). an invariant nervous system whose
302 neurons have reproducible synaptic connectivity. and an invariant genotype.
Moreover. this strain of C. elegan.\" has a repertoire of behaviors that it performs on
a very Iimited environment. a tlat ag ar surface supplied with a uniform pad of
identical bacteria. Yet. their behavior is not uniform. Johannsen (Gilbert and
Johannsen. 1998) has isolated mutants in which most worms lie straight in a
paralyzed manner; but a fraction of them will consistently take on a quite different
"curly" posture. Such differences in a c10ned population might be caused by slight
differences in connectivity that could be caused by stochastic developmental effects
(see Schnabel, 1997). The nervous system <llso seems to encourage such differences
by the "winner takes all" mechanisms caused by Hebbian rules of ncuf()I1al con-
nections.
These studies linking particular alleles as the causative agents of particular
behaviors have not held up weil (see Mann, 1')')4). Most havc been retracted.
although the retraction does not get the publicity that the erroneous elaim had
made. No banner headline runs across the New York Time.\" saying that the gene for
shyness or homosexuality has been lost.
And this does not even take into account differences in environmental factors
that can interact with genes. These are not unimportant factors. Ir one is looking for
a gene tor schizophrenia or akoholism, the level of stress or akohol intake is bound
to be critical. We know this from studies of phenylketonuria. a condition character-
ized by mental retardation. We know that if such individuals have very low levels
of phenylalanine in their diet, their mental functions are preserved. Mental
retardation from phenylketonuria is 100% genetic and also 100% environmental.
As we discussed earlier, we are all "programmed" to die from massive connective
tissue failures stemming from gulonolactone oxidase deficiency. When you have a
fully interrelated system, especially one in which genes can be activated by
environmental stimuli, you cannot parse a trait into separate compartments of
nature and nurture (see Gottlieb, 1992).
But that hasn 't stopped people from trying. [n the lack of any ability to get elear
results. researchers have given ratios of hereditability. a term usually (but not
always) meaning what percentage of a certain phenotype is ascribable to genes."
The statistics in these studies are often much more modest than their headlines. Let
me give one particular example because it is one of the most recently trumpeted

Hereditability is the ratio of transmissible genetic variation over the total transmissible varia-
tion. Thus, having ten toes actually has low hereditability since there is little genetic variation;
while wearing lipstick has high hereditability since it has a high variability that correlates weil
with having two X chromosomes (Block. 1995).
 Genetic Determinism 131

ca~es. The New York Times had a headline prodaiming that European researchers
had conduded from their study of eognition in elderly Swedes that the proportion
of variance attributable to genes was 62 %. This was considered major news and
was even the cover story of Science that weck (MeLearn et al., 1997). However.
when one looked at the 95 % confidence limits given in the actual paper. they
ranged from 29 % to 73 %. That is a huge range, and such figures even can be used
to say that genes don 't do much at all. In addition, the study may have had nothing
to do with cognition. The people studied were in the eighties, so the study might
have been measuring parameters such as blood tlow, general health. or even the
desire and ability to follow directions.
The fourth evidence for the existence of behavioral genes comes from animal
studies. For instance, different strains of dogs have been bred for different behaviors.
No doubt such genes exist; but they ex ist as an ensemble, not as dissociable factors.
and it is chietly to inbreeding that these ensemles remain intact. Certainly there is
nothing in the nature of the gene or of the neuron which could allow us to predict
the nature of behavior that arises from it. We already know the entire DNA
sequence of the C. elegans genome and all of its neural connections. But the
predicted behavior of the animal does not emerge from this knowledge.

3.2
A Counter-Story to Neurogenetic Determinism: Neural Plasticity

To properly displace an existing seientific theory. one has to show that the existing
theOl'y is false and that there is a better, more comprehensive theory to n:plaee it. So
it is not enough to criticize neurogenetic determinism without having something
more scientific to put in its place. That latter theory is that of neural plasticity. The
plasticity we discussed above in relation to the genetic determinism of the physical
phenotype is even more pronounced when we look at the nervous system. Like the
immune system, this plasticity creates individuality. [t appears that new neurons are
being generated by experience and that new synapses are being retained or
destroyed through experience. As Purves and Lichtman (1985) conc~ude, 'The
nervous system, in higher animals at least, is shaped by its experience in the
postnatal world. Because each animal's experience is different, persistent neural
malleability generates nervous systems that are unique."

Retention of fetal neural growth rate. lf there is any important developmental

trait that distinguishes us from the rest of the animal kingdom, it is the retention of
the fetal neural growth rate. During early postnatal development, we add approxim-
ately 250,000 neurons per minute (Purves and Lichtman. 1985). Apes' brains have
a high rate of growth before birth. After birth, this rate slows greatly. [n contrast.
humans have rapid brain growth both before birth and for about two years there-
after (Martin, 1990). By the time, humans are adults, they are literally off the chart.
The ratio of brain weight to body weight is similar for great apes and humans at
birth. However, at adulthood, the human ratio is 3.5 that 01' apes (Bogin, 1997).
Going to the cellular level, we find that no 1'ewer than 30.000 synapses per second
per square centimeter 01' cortex are formed during the first 1'ew years of life (Rose,
1998). [t is thought that this increase in neurons may (l) generate new modules
132 Seott F. Gilbert

(addressable sites) that can aC4uire new functions, (2) store new memories for use
in thinking and forecasting possible scenarios, and (3) learn by interconnecting
among themselves and with prenatally generated neurons. It is in this early post-
natal stage that intervention can raise IQ (reviewed in Wickelgren, 1999.) This age
also sees much 01' the maturation of the neural circuitry as determined by axon
diameter and myelination.
The prodigious rate 01' continued neuron production has important consequen-
ces. Portmann (1941), Gould (1977), and Montague (1989) have each made the
claim that we are essentially extrauterine fetuses for the first year of our life. Our
actual gestation is 21 monlhs if you follow the charts of ape maturity. We are at 21
months what other apes are at birth. Our premature birth is a compromise between
pelvic width, head circumference, and lung maturity. They argue that we become
human through our early interactions with a rich environment of sounds, touches,
smells, and sights. Moreover, only in humans are the epiphyses of the long bones
and digits still cartilagenous at birth. Certainly the outward appearance of our head
makes the argument that we look more like the newborn ape than the adult ape. The
actual mechanism for the retention of the fetal neural growth rate may more
accurately described (Vrba, 1996) as a hypermorphosis (the phyletic extension of
development beyond its ancestral state) rather than by the merely descriptive term
neofenv (the retention of formerly juvenile characteristics by adult descendents-
produced by retardation 01' somatic development).
One of the more interesting speculations concerning the conse4uences 01' this
retained r:.\pid growth rate is that this extrauterine fetal growth rate necessitated the
invention 01' childhood. Bogin (1997) has suggested that childhood is a new stage
of the vertebrate life cycle, interposed between the infant and juvenile stages.
Infancy ends with weaning, usually around year 3. The juvenile stage is character-
ized by feeding independence from adults and the onset 01' physical maturity. In
humans, this usually begins around year 7. Between them, in humans, is aperiod 01'
childhood characterized by immature dentition, small digestive system, and a
rapidly growing brain that demands a high caloric diet. This is aperiod 01' time
when the human has to be cared and fed by adults.
The childhood period would allow the brain to develop in an enriched environment;
but Bogin argues that this is actually a byproduct 01' childhood and not its intention.
The selective value of childhood would be to improve the success rates of each child
surviving to maturity. This would explain why humans have lengthy development
and low fertility, but ye! the ·greatest reproductive success 01' any ape species.
The good news 01' recent years is that the human brain still makes new neurons
even when it is an adult. This was shown in an ingenious way by Fred Gage and
his colleagues (Erikkson et al., 1998). In certain cancer patients, the progress of
chemotherapy can be monitored by intravenously transfusing them with bromo-
deoxyuridine (BrdU), a thymidine analogue that becomes incorporated into divid-
ing DNA and which can be readily detected by anti-BrdU antibodies. Gage and
C'olleagues thought that if any new neurons were being formed, they would also
incorporate the BrdU. They took post-mortein sampies from tive patients who had
died between 16 and 781 days after BrdU infusion. In all five subjects, they saw
new neurons in the granule ceIllayer of the hippocampal dentate gyrus. The BrdU-
labe lied cells also stained for neuron-specific markers such as neuron-specific
 Genetic Determinism 133

enolase and NeuN. Thus, the human brain is not an anatomical jäit accompli at
birth or even after childhood. It keeps on making new neurons. As Barton Childs
(1999) has succinctly written, "Neoteny allows us to escape the tyranny of our
genes, or at least temper their rule."

3.3
Effects 01 Experience on Brain Circuitry and Function

The retention of the fetal neural growth rate gives us 'I remarkable number of new
neurons, and we can only speculate that these will be utilized in ways that allow us
to think and act. It should provide a new level of plasticity, one that adds experience
to endowment; for the ncrvous system, like the other sensory network, the immune
system, can develop according to environmental needs. fts repertoire is enormous,
and we can each leam different skills and have different memories. Indeed, it is
during this childhood stage that we leam how to learn. We learn to fantasize that
wh ich isn't there or even possible. AmI this may be critical in our becoming human.
For humans are those animals who can visualize alternatives and make plans to
enhance the odds of certain alternatives happening. We are event-planning animals
(Heschel, 1965). This retention of fetal neuron growth rate has been called neoteny
or hypcrmorphosis, depending on your embryological tradition. However. the
efkct is the same. As Childs ( 1999) has concluded:
Extended exposure of a gradually maturing nervous system to experiences of a variable
environment, together with the mental rcsiliency to continuc to karn at all ages. is a recipe for
the adaptive agility that has cnabled human beings to live in all latitudes and so to explnit the
earth\ resources tn construct civilizations and to be aesthetically creative.

There is extensive evidence that experience does create more neurons and neuronal
connections. The cerebral cortices of young rats reared in stimulating environments
are packed with more neurons, synapses, and dendrites than are found in rats reared
in isolation (Turner and Grcenough, 1983). Even the adult brain is developing in
response to new experiences. When adult rats learn to keep their balance on dowels,
their cerebellar Purkinje cell neurons develop new synapses (Black et al., 1990).
Studies on rats and mice indicate that environmental stimulation ean increase the
number of new neurons in the dentate gyrus (Kemperman et al., I 997a,b; Gould, 1999;
Praag et al., 1999). Studies on rodents have also shown that the neural stem cells in
the hippocampus can be cultured in vitro and then grafted back into an adult brain
where they respond to regionally specific cues and differentiate into site-specific
types of neurons (Gage, et al., 1995; Suhonen et al., 1996). Two of the most interesting
effects concerning the roles of experience and endowment co me from studies on
sex-dependent neurons in rats and on the visual cortex in a variety of mammals.

3.3.1
The Effect of Sex on the Central Nervous System (CNS)

Reports of brain differences in people with different sex orientation have been used
as evidence for the brain's controlling gender identities (se LeVay, 1991). However,
this evidence, is at best, a correlation. Marc Breedlove has fascinating evidence that
 134 Scott F. Gilbert

suggest that causation is actually in the reverse direction: sexual activity causes
anatomical changes in the CNS.
Using the same staining techniques done on post-mortem human brains, Breed-
love compared the brains of male rats that were induced to copulate frequently with
estrogen-primed adult female rats to the brains of male rats that were not induced to
copulate. The male rats were themselves castrated and were provided wilh testo-
sterone-filled Silastic implants to keep their testosterone levels constant. After 27
days, the spinal cords from the males were dissected and stained to reveal the motor
neurons of the bulbocavernosus (SNB). These ::Ire motor neurons innerv::lte muscles
th::lt are active during copulation. They are testosterone-sensitive, shrinking after
castration unless replacement testosterone is provided.
The nerve cell bodies were significantly larger (P<0.04, two tailed t-test) in the
non-copulators than in the copulators. Similarly, the SNB nuclei of the copulators
was significantly smaller (P<O.02) than in the non-copulators (Figure 6). Copula-
tory experience can alter the size of neurons, as revealed by Nissl staining.
Breedlove concludes by stating, "It is possible that differences in sexual behaviour
cause, rather than are caused by, differences in brain structure." A similar finding
has been shown in fish, where castration of territorial males causes the GnRH
neurons to increase in size (Soma et al., 1996).

3.3.2
Competitive Synapse Formation

Some of the most interesting research on mammalian neuronal patterning concerns

the effects of sensory deprivation on the developing visual system in kittens and
monkeys. Axons from the retinal ganglion cells form the two optic nerves, which
meet at the optic chiasm. Same fibers go to the opposite (contralateral) side of the
brain. but unlike most other vertebrates, mammalian retinal cells also send inputs
into the same (ipsilateral) side of the brain. These nerves end at the two lateral
geniculate nuclei. Here the input from each eye is kept separate, the uppermo'it and
anterior layers receiving the axons from the contralateral eye, and the middle of
the bodies receiving input from the ipsilateral eye. The situation becomes more
complicated as neurons from the lateral geniculate nuclei connect with the neurons
of the visual cortex. Over 80 percent of the neural cells in the cortex receive input
from both eyes. The result is binocular vision and depth perception. Hubel, Wiesel,
and their co-workers (see Hubel, 1967) demonstrated that the development of the
nervous system depends to so me degree on the experience of the individual during
a critical period of development. In other words, all of neuronal development is not
encoded in the genome: some is Iearned. Experience appears to strengthen or
stabilize some neuronal connections that are already present at birth and to weaken
or eliminate other connections. These conclusions come from studies of partial
sensory deprivation. Hubel and Wiesel (1962, 1963) sewed shut the right eyelids of
newborn kittens and left them closed for 3 months. After this time, they unsewed
the lids of the right eye. The cortical cells of such kittens could not be stimulated by
shining light in the right eye. Almost all the inputs into the visual cortex came from
the left eye only. The behavior of the kittens revealed the inadequacy of their right
eyes: when only the left eyes of these animals were covered, the kittens became
 Genetic Determinism 1.15

functionally blinu. Because the lateral geniculate neurons appcareu to be stimulateu

from both right anu left eyes in these kittens, the physiological uefect appeareu to
he between the lateral geniculate nuclei anu the visual cortex. [n rhesus monkeys,
similar phenomena are observeu (Kenneuy et al. , 1981).
Although it woulu be tempting to concluue that the resulting blinuness was uue
to a failure to form the proper visual connections, this is not the case. Rather, when
a kitten is born, axons from lateral geniculate neurons receiving input from each
eye overlap extensively in the visual cortex (Hubel and Wiesel, 1963). However,
when one eye is covered early in the kitten's life, its connections into the visual
cortex are taken over by those of the other eye. Competition occurs, and experience
play~ a role in strengthening and stabilizing the connections from each lateral
geniculate nucleus to the visual cortex. Thus, when both eyes of a kitten are sewn
shut for .1 months, most cortical cells can still be stimulateu by appropriate illumi-
nation of one eye or the other. The critical time in kitten development für this
valiuation of neuronal connections begins between the fourth and the sixth week of
the kitten's life. Monocular ueprivation up to the fourth week prouuces little or no
physiological ueficit, but after 6 weeks, it prouuces all the characteristic neuronal
changes. [f a kitten has hau normal visual experience for the first 3 months, any
subsequcnt monocular ueprivation (even for a year or more) is without efkct. The
synapses have been stabilizeu.

3.3.3
Cortical Remodeling in Adult Humans: Phantom Limbs

It uscu to be thought that the brain retaineu its plasticity only uuring the neonatal or
juvenile perious. However, recent stuuies have shown that the brain is remarkably
plastic in auults. This reorganization of the sensory cortex is thought to be respon-
sible for the "phantom-limb" pain, the pain perceiveu to be at the enu of a limb that
hau been amputateu. Here, the intensity of the pain is proportional to the amount of
cortical reorganization seen in scans of the patients' brains (Flor et a!., 1995). Davis
anu her colleagues (1998) have rccently shown that the brain of arm amputees
experiencing the "phantom limb" hau reorganizeu in a manner that sensory inputs
from the stump of the amputateu arm triggered neurological activity in the thalamic
region that had formerly been innervateu by neurons from the missing arm. They
placed electroues into normal parts of the thalamus and into regions of the thalamus
where neurons previously woulu have been stimulated by touching the missing
limb. They then showed that stimulating neurons in the amputated stump woulu
also activate this region and that sensations were "referreu" to the missing limb.
When these neurons were artificially stimulatcu, sensations were feit in the missing
hand. The reorganized cortex continues to infer the existence of ahanu. Even the
auult human brain retains its plasticity.
Thus, there are significant functions of our brain that are not "hard-wired" by our
genes. Even in such important areas as vision and sensation, neural connections
can be modified, and even the auult brain is still plastic. It is possible that critical
adult functions such as learning and memory arise from the establishment and/or
strengthening of different synapses by experience. As Purves anu Lichtman (1985)
remark:
136 Scott F. Gilbert

The interaction 01' individual animals and their world continues to shape the nervous s)stem
throughout life in ways that could never have been programmcd. Modification of the nervous
system by expericncc is thus the last and most subtle dcvclopmcntal stratcgy.

3.4
Why is Neurogenetic Determinism so strong?

If there is so much evidence for neural plasticity, why is neurogenetic determinism

so strong? There are many levels to this question. One ans wer would be that
neurogenetic determinism is the answer that people want to hear (HaITis, 1997). But
then one has to :mswer the question: Why do people want to hear it? There may be
several (interacting) answers to this quest ion. Here are some.

3.4.1
DNA as Soul

Sociologists of science Dorothy Nelkin and Susan Lindee (1995) have analysed
hunureus of articles about DNA anu behavior in the popular press. Their conclusion
is astonishing. The contemporary rhetoric of DNA fits the categories of the
mcuieval rhetoric of soul. DNA is that which constitutes the essence of our being,
that which udermines our behavior. anu that from which we can be resurrected
after ueath (a la Jllra.l'.I'ic Park.). The religious rhetoric is certainly there. with DNA
being calleu "the secret of life", anu the human genome being uescribed as "the
Bible", the "Book of Man", and the "Holy Grail." One may then ask: Why does our
culture respond to the genes in this religious fashion? Certainly, the failure of
religion to give individuals iuentity to our secular culture is one reason. Science has
become the rock of unchanging truth in our tumultuous time.

3.4.2
Failure of Social Programs to eure Social iIIs

Another reason for the widespread desire to hear the message of neurogenetic
determinism may be the perceived failure of social action programs to solve the
social problems of crime, poverty, and iHiteracy. Given that these problems are still
here despite years of attempting to remedy them may be causing society to blame
the people's genes rather than the society. (This also fuels conservative pressure to
stop "wasting" money on social solutions, when the problems are not social in
origin.) In addition to this "push", there is also a complimentary "puH": our
particular society (certainly our academic society) is unwilling to say that any
culture is superior or inferior to any other culture. So given that "culture" is not to
biarne, it is easy to say that the genes are culpable. Although the concept of race is
no longer a scientific category (see Owens and King, 1999), much of the contem-
porary rhetoric of racial differences is not based on social, but on what are per-
ceived to be genetic differences between races (see Nelkin and Lindee, 1995).
 Genetic Determinism 137

3.4.3
Absolution 'rom Blame

As Lewontin (1991) and Nelkin and Lindee ( 1995) demonstrate, there is a large
segment of the population who want to be eonsidered blameless for soeial wrongs.
If there are poor people and illiterate people, the fault is not in our society, but in the
genes of the poor and illiterate. Similarly, many gay men and their parents would
like there to be a gene for homosexuality. It would not only make homosexuality a
human polymorphism for which there is no soeial remedy, but it would absolve
parents as to their raising their ehild to beeome homosexual.

3.4.4
It is Congruent Science

Seienee ean more readily be funded when it says the things that soeiety wishes it to
say. Schwartz (1985) has analyzed the eyele of tautologieal eyele of explanation
between eeonomies, soeiobiology, and behavioral psyehology. Eaeh justifies its
reduetionist assumptions by showing that the other diseipline confirms them. As
Lewontin (1991) showed. these seiences appeal to there being universals in human
eulture whieh underlie all soeieties. Moreover. these universal traits would be
inherited in the genes, and these genes have been seleeted for over hundreds of
thousands of years. Thus they are the traits that have enabled our survival as a spe-
eies. The genes are what matters, and our behaviors are merely epiphenomena of
whether we have "aggressive genes", "shy genes", "polygamous genes", "gay genes",
"risk-taking genes", "monogamous genes" or even "alcoholic genes." Behavior is
mercly a matter of how the genetie eards are shuftled. Thus, the "human being" of
behavioral geneties and sociobiology is the Homo ecoflomicus of eontemporary
eeonomie theory. Eaeh animal invests its genes in the next generation according to
the strategies provided in the open marketplace. The hidden hand is nothing other
than natural seleetion (Haraway, 1979: Schwartz, 1985). Is it any wonder that
eontemporary eulture fears this new biologieal seience?
Developmental biology has a major roie in being a critique of those biologieal
hypotheses. theories, or Weltaflschal/l/ng that propose the gene or genome to be the
ultimate unit of life. Human life is far rieher than merc endowment. As wonderful
as our endowment is, it all the more remarkable for allowing us to change through
experience.

4
Acknowledgements

I wish to thank Drs. Peter Taylor and Stephen Borish for their eontinued discussions
on these issues.
13R Seott F. Gilbert

5
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Can we find Human Nature
in the Human Genome? I

Eva M. Neumann-Held

1
When Natural Sciences 90 in Search of Human Nature

The question posed by the overall title of this article presupposcs several things.
First, that lhere is something that can be identified as "human nature", and second,
that whatever makes up "human nature" can be found or explained by the "human
genome", that is, by the DNA sequence identified as "the" human sequence. There
are sevcral problems with these presuppositions: First, it is not at all clcar how we
define what we eonsider as "human", in the sense that we eould define what it takes
for a living being to be called "human". Usually, an approach based on meeting
eertain criteria (a criteriological approach) is considered adequate, but on closer
analysis the limits of such an approach become obvious, as Gutmann (200 I) and
Rehmann-Sutter (200 I) show in their articles in this book.
The next problem is the presupposition that the charaeteristies, or rather the
causes of the characteristics of "being human", can be found in thc "nature" of
humans, and in partieular in "the genes".1 This reductive view of causa I ex plan-
at ions of "human nature" deserves further consideration. The question of whether
"being human" is determined by a partieular "human nature" or by "human eulture"
has a very long philosophieal tradition as has the assumed dichotomy between
"nature" and "culture", whieh is also eonneeted with other dichotomies ("nature-
nurture", "body-mind", "Leib-Seele"). The assoeiated problem of how these two
areas of the diehotomy (and diehotomies) are integrated - or at least interact with
each other - is equally old. A radieal solution to this problem is the denial of a
"real" division between nature and culture. Some consequences of such a denial,
and suggestions for putative alternative conceptualizations to the usual dichotomy,
are presentcd by Susan Oyama (200 I, this book) and by Mathias Gutmann (200 I,
this book). Although I would agree with their criticisms I have chosen another
approach for this contribution, which tries to stay inside the boundaries of a certain
understanding of scientific research. This decision is based on the fact that biologic-
al sciences - and with it major parts of the puhlic - seem strangely unaffected by
what are seen as purely "philosophical disputes" on the "unclear nature of the
concept of nature, of culture and of its integration". The self-understanding of

Acknowledgement: [ am very grateful to Jackie Leach Scully for her support in translating this
article into English. The author was partly supported by grant F42/95 of MGU (Mensch-
Gesellschaft-Umwelt), a foundation of the University of Basel. •
"Nature" is used here in the sense as it is used in the natural sciences (see below).
142 Eva M. Neumann-Held

biologieal seience ..; is that they investigate "natural" processes, ami in this sense the
"nature" of living beings, including human nature. This might also include the
quest ion of how human nature shapes human culture, but this is not the main foeus
of biology (despite the attention diseiplines like sociobiology and its successors
receive for some of their claims about human nature).
In terms of investigating the nature of humans (and of other living beings), the
fjeld of developmental biology has become increasingly important. The way
developmental biologists deseribe the subject of their own research might also
elucidate what "human nature" might mean in this context. On the first pages of the
recently revised textbook Deve/opmenral Bi%gy one can read:
Multicellular organisms do not spring forth fully formed. Rather, they arise hy a rclatively
slow process of progressive change that we call development. ... The study of animal devel-
opment has traditionally been called embryology. from that stage of an organism that exists
bctween fertilization and hirth. But development does not stop at hirth. or even at adulthood.
Most organisms ne ver stop developing .... Thereforc, in recent years it has hecome customary
to speak of developmental biology as the discipline that studies clllbryonic and oth<:r develop-
mental processes. (Gilbert 2000. p4)

As far as developmental biology concerns developmental processes of humans it

focuses on those "natural" processes by whieh a zygote develops through different
stages into juvenile and adult living forms, which again "develop" or "transform"
(change) further until they die. Thus, "human nature" - and the "nature" of non-
human living beings - would include particular lrails as certain "end-points" l)f
developmental processes (or at least of analysis). The development of humans is
treated as if it were possible to investigate the development of the "natural parts"
separate from "cultural intluences"-\
This Jescription of developmental biology makes obvious that it must make use
of empirical research and the tools of different scientific disciplines. In the words of
Gilbert:
Developlllental biology is a great tield fUf scientists who want to integrate different levels or
biology. We can take a problem and study it on the molecular and chemical levels .... on the
organ and organ system levels .. ., and evcn at the ecological and evolutionary levels .. .
Developlllental biology is laI ... tield in hiology, cn.:ating a framework that integrates mllle-
cular biology. physiology, cell hiology. anatomy, cancer research. neurohiology. illllllunology.
ecology, and evolutionary hiology. (Gilbert 2000, p 3-4)

Gilbert's reasoning for characterizing developmental biology as a "framework"

suggests that it is not a scientific diseipline in the traditional sense, in which a par-
ticular set of questions and problems requires a particular set of empirical and
conceptual research tools. Rather - as Gilbert makes dear - different disciplines,
with their very specific tools, meet under the heading of "developmental biology".
It is a very open quest ion how the results of these different approaches might be

It should be emphasized here that this pragmatically chosen approach ean be viewed as a
necessary limitation of the (any) subjeet of research and of the partieuIar goals that determine
the set-up of the empiricaI approaches. Within such well-detined boundaries (ilthey are well-
defined) this is justified. However. the problem arises when the validity of the claims thus
made is extended heyond the houndaries of the speeific approach.
 Can we find Human Nature in the Human Genome? 143

integrated 4 . Nevertheless. both inside and outside the boundaries of science.

moieculaI' genetics i~ increasingly aC4uiring the reputation of being able either tn
perform such integration 01' to make it obsolete. In either case. molecular approach-
es are trusted to solve the "riddle of human nature" (see section 2.1). This means
that developmental genetics reeeives more attention and respect (and financial
support) than more traditional approaches to development such as anatomy. It is
likely that this tendency will intensify over the next few years, as efforts under the
heading of "functional genomics" are given support to make sense of the sequen-
cing data derived from the human genome (see below).
This molecularization/geneticization of approaches in biological science,
particularly in developmental biology, is deplored by developmental biologists who
fear that the explanatory goals of their field are being unjustifiably reduced to
moleCLtlar and genetic ones. The article by Gilbert (200 I. this book) is an example.
in wh ich a developmental biologist delineates very clearly the limits of genetic
approaches. He argues against the now popular claim that genes are the ultimate
explanation for traits and developmental processes. and against the idea that the
nature of living beings, including that of humans. is explicable in terms of gene
interactions (see also the contributions of Rehmann-Sutter 200 land of Wolf 200 I.
both in this book).
It is this line of criticism that I will follow in my paper. The focus on genes as the
only or the most important causal agencies in processes of development will be
called gene-centrism (Smith 200 I a). For the purpose of this article I will accept the
framework in which the natural sciences - for example developmental biology (but
also human genetics) - operate to explore "human nature", and I will thereby adopt
their vague understanding of so me of the basic terms (e. g. "human" and "nature").
Within this framework I will present evidence that the value of gene-centred
approaches is overestimated, while many biologists - and with them a large part of
the public - seem blind to the criticisms of gene-centrism.
In my next section I will try to highlight the background of shared belief in the
"causal powers of genes". I will do so by referring to some expectations that ac-
companied the human genome project (HGP), and by following the transition of the
proposal of a "genetic" conceptualization of developmental processes to its being
put into empirical terms. This will be followed by a section in which I will intro-
duce so me criticism of gene-centric approaches and give examples of alternative
conceptual frameworks. This leads to the final section and to the question of why
alternative approaches and concepts receive so much less support than gene-based
approaches. Clearly. there are many answers to this 4uestion. ranging from prag-
matie choices to economic reasons. However, I want to focus on another kind of ar-
guments. Anyone who has tried to argue against the claim of the "causal power of
genes" in developmental processes will have experienced either that it was not
possible to convey the idea that there is an alternative to gene-centric frameworks,
or that the partners in the discussion eventually produce arguments that abandon the
framework of analysis of developmental processes. Even in the light of strong

4 Clearly. such etTorts at integration are anything but trivial. Among others. they depend heavily
on the applied phi!osophica! (epistemologieal) framework.
 1-+-+ Eva M. Neumann-Held

empirical evidence contradicting gcnetic primacy in the causation of devclop-

mental processes, one can frequently he ar wha! I call "yes, but ... " arguments.
"Yes, but genes must somehow be 'more causa!' because only genes are inherited ... ";
..... because only genes are significant for evolutionary processes ... "; " ... because
genes co me first ... ". I want to show that on closer view, these "yes, buts ... " play
the role of cornerstones of metaphysical belief systems rather than scientifically
grounded arguments.

2
The Belief in the Explanatory Power of Genes

2.1
Genes and the Human Genome Sequencing Project

Of course I do not want to claim that genes play no role in the causation of traits or
the pathways of developmental processes. But to admit this does not require us to
agree that developmental processes and phenotypic traits can onLy be explained by
re1'erence to genes. [t has become custumary these days to deny that such claims are
being made, as has been observed by Richard Lewontin in an article on the Human
Genome Project:
The scientists writing abOl!t the Genome Projcct explicitly n::ject an absolute gcm::tic
dctcrminism. but they seem to be writing more to acknowkdgc thcorctical possibilitics than
out 01' conviction. (Lcwontin I ()lj2, P 34)

And indeed one has to agree with Lewontin if one considers the stated expectations
o1'the Human Genome Sequencing Project (HGP) as they accompanied this project
from beginning to end). The project was and still is compared in signi1'icance and
e1'1'ort with the programmes that led 10 the conquest of space (Dulbecco 19X6).
The complete sequence of the human genome is seen as the final answer to the
command "know thyself', as the "Holy Grail of human genetics" (Walter Gilbert as
quoted in Bishop and Waldholz 199 I. p 256; Kevles 19Y3, p 30)°. Genes are
described as the essence of life itself (Dawkins 1989, P 265) and thc esscnce 01'
humanness itself (Bodmer and McKie 1995). In The Book 4 Mall Bodmer and
McKie (1995) view the HGP as thc highlight and goal of the "drama of thc
unravelling of the eomposition, strueture and role of DNA ... ", wh ich is "a story of
adventure and discovery, one that strikes at the essence of being a human. lt is hard
to see how one eould get any closer to our own interests, for the quest ion of our
biologieal lineage touches on understanding our role in evolution, and survival as a
species. It also offers the prospeet of creating new mcdicine. tracing our recen!
history and a host of other benefits. Far from worrying, we should relish the

) The role and societal consequences of such expectations being grounded in scientific evidence
or in "beliefs", are explored in Neumann-Held (200 I a).
I> This reference to the Grail and its implied significance for the human genome projcct has been
taken up in scveral critiques (see. for example, Kollek 1994, 1996; Lewontin 1992; Neumann-
Held 1996).
 Can we find Human Nature in the Human Genome? 145

prospeet befme us." And thus. the book ends enthusiastieally: "We are entcring a
golden era." (p 247).
Although expressed in more moderate terms, the priority of gene-foeussed
research has also been stated by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, one of the
major sources of financial support for research projeets in Germany. The publi-
eation Perspectives of Research on Genomes7 states: "Knowledge [of biological
processes] will be gained mainly by research on genomes ... [This will] ereate the
prerequisites to explain the molecular causes of diseases ... "~ On first view it seems
that the DFG might be aiming at a broader scientifie approach when it says: "The
aetual task of genome projeets [is] the analysis of gene products, their biological
functioning and their relation to traits relevant for diseases, specific for organs and
typical for dcvelopmental processes ... "Y If that is the task of a genome project then
any genome project must have an inten.lisciplinary approach as required by Gilbert
(sce quotation above). However. the remaining text makes clear that it is the
significance of DNA sequenees and the interactions of gene products that receive
almost exclusive emphasis. The DFG thus pursues - although on more moderate
paths - a foeus on the signiticance of genes. In the public understanding. therefore,
the impression of the special causal significance of genes is not corrected. but is
still intlueneed by the highly ambitious promises touted by high-ranking represen-
t.ltivcs of the scientific community in talks and publieations.
However, the focus on genetic causcs in developmental processes is not a result
of the HGP; rather, it seems to be the other way around. The hypothesis and as-
sumptioll 01' lhe priority of genetic explanations has roots which may have favoured
thc financial and ideologieal support of the HGP and other genome projects. An
cxample of such grounding is the topie of the next seetion.

2.2
Genes in Research Programmes of Developmental Biology

If we take "genes" here as equivalent to DNA sequences lll , then as far back as thc
1970s wc ean find the careful formulation of a genetically oriented conceptual

7 This tcxt was publishcd in German under the title "Perspektiven der Genomforschung" on the
following DFG Website: in Bonn. 26 May 1999. Translation into English by the author.
x In German: "Dieses Wissen wird vor allem die Genomforschung liefern und damit Voraus-
setzungen schaffen. molekulare Ursachen von Krankheiten aufzuklären ... ". Translation into
English by the author.
" The German text reads: "Die eigentliche Aufgahe der (Ienomforschung [isti ... die Analyse
der Genprodukte. deren biologische Funktion und deren Zuordnung zu krankheitsrelevanten.
organspezifischen und entwicklungstypischen Merkmalen ... ". Translation into English by the
author.
10 A "genetic approach" to developmental biology was suggested at the beginning of the last
century. and resulted in hostile debates between the "embryologists" and the "geneticists" in
the 1920s and 1930s. However, reference to genes then was obviously based on different
theoretical and empirical tools. and it remains a hotly debated question whether the gene con-
cepts of earlier days can be reduced to concepts by which "gene" denotes - or at least includes
(see section 3) - a specific DNA sequence. Within this article I am only interested in these
latter understandings.
146 Eva M. Neumann-Held

framework, awaiting its application to empirical research. In 1975. for example.

Wolpert and Lewis wrote:
D~velopment is the process relating genotype to phcnlltypc. Thc central prohlem is tn
umlerstand how the gcnetic information of the zygote hccomes expressed in the multicdlular
pattern that we reCllgnize as the adult organism ... The adult egg must Cllntain essentially all
the information for making the adult ... Arguments that there cannot hc enough information in
the egg or that the information content mysteriously increases in development are not valid.
Fm the egg need not contain a description of the adult, but only a program for making it.

And furthermore:
It is one of our main aims to show that in this sense, development, though it leads to a complex
result, is essentially a simple process. and that general principles are involved. (Wolpert ami
Lcwis 1975. p 14)

Based on these considerations Wolpert and Lewis suggest a model of cellular de-
velopmental processes. As quoted, their framework requircs that the control of
development is based in the genes, and therefore their model suggests a "genetic
control network" with a particular "Iogical organization: that is, which genes, by
switching on or off, switch on or off which other genes?" (p 14) Therefore, they
treat " ... cell behavior in terms of gene switching networks, genes being either on
or off' (p 17). They explain their approach with the following example:
For cytodiffcrentiation, a cell must activatc a partiClilar hallery of structural genes cllding for
enzymes or structural proteins. The memhers of the hallery must somehow he coordinated. and
Britten and Davidson ... suggest that for each battery there is an integrator gene, whose
activity stimulates the activity of allthe structural genes in the hallery ... (Wolpert and Lewis
IlJ7S.pI7)

That means:
Each gene is thus regarded as a two-way switch, and the states of all the gene-switches an::
taken jointly to define the state of the cell as a wholc ... In the course of development that state
must change. So me genes may be turned on or off directly by cues from outside the cell,
and other genes may follow suit throllgh contml connections hetween one gene and another.
(p 14)

From these assumptions Wolpert and Lewis construct models, which show genetic
control mechanisms in diagrams, Here, genes are connected with each other by
arraws suggesting not only a temporal sequence of activation but also a causal
sequence, Gene "a" causes the activation of gene "b" that causes the activation of
"c", which again might contral the activation of "a", Of course one might ask
whether something else is required to "activate genes", One may assume that
"activation of genes" is supposed to mean that the gene (the relevant DNA sequen-
ce) undergoes transcription and translation processes. Certainly, such "processes"
are highly dependent on the external and internal conditions of the cell (wh ich is the
assumed background of the modelIed gene networks). Wolpert and Lewis are
obviously aware of this when they write of a "gene directly controlled by the cue"
(p 17) and of the "nuts and bolts of the genetic network" (p 14). However, these
cues - internal and external conditions of the cellular environment - are ranked
secondary to the causa I connections within the gene network.
Such a ranking of some kind of primary and secondary conditions is not the
 Can we find Human Nature in the Human Genome? 147

suhject of my criticism in the framework of this article ll . Rather, I would argue that
such approaches are required in scientific research for pragmatic reasons. If the
goal is to know wh ich genes participate in the activation of which other genes, amI
which genes are necessary in these processes, then the general theoretical approach
by Wolpert and Lewis and its application to the empirical realm is justified.
However, such an approach, even if empirically successful (whatever successful
means in this context), does not allow us to conclude that there would be no other
possihilities to construct models of (cellular) networks, in which the genes would
he secondary "cues" to particular sets of internal and external "causes". Such
scenarios have been discussed on the grounds of both theoretical and empirical
research, for example, by Kautfman (1993), Goodwin (1994) and Webster and
Goodwin (1996). Others have suggested alternative conceptual frameworks in
which the focus is not on a particular set of conditions but on the interaction of rele-
vant conditions and entities. An example is the Developmental Systems Approach
(DSA), wh ich will be brietly introduced in the next section. And particularly in
cytology, it has been shown that gene-centrism is too narrow for the discipline's
explanatory goals (Alberts et al. 1989, Bereiter-Hahn 1988, (991).
In spite of this, most attention - and most financial support - is still directed
toward research in the realm of (molecular-) genetic approaches. Undoubtedly,
conceptual models of genetic networks have allowed for striking results when put
into the empirical realm, for example in the research by the groups of Christine
Nüsslein- Volhardt (Nüsslein- Volhardt, Wieschaus 1980, Nüsslein- Volhardt (996)
and Walter Gehring (Halder et al. I 995a, Halder et al. 1995b, Barinaga (995). With
their publication on the significance of the Pax-6 gene for eye development, the
latter might serve as an example of the empirical application of the theoretical
framework established by Wolpert and Lewis.
In the sequence of gene activations in eye development (in Drosophila), Pax-6
can be found very early in the chain. It was shown experimentally that the absence
of Pax-6 results in a complete absence of the process of eye development, while
experimentally induced expression of Pax-6 leads to the formation of eye structures
in "unusual" locations (for example wings, legs, tips of antennae) (Halder et al.
1995a). I do not intend the following comments to diminish the technical skill of
the experiments and the value of the results. For the purposes of this paper, how-
ever, it is more interesting to focus on the language with wh ich the results were
reported and how they are interpreted. This language resembles very closely thc
language used in the theoretical paper of Wolpert and Lewis: we find the talk of
genetic networks, and the Pax-6 gene is ca lied a representative of so-called "master
control genes that act as developmental swilches" (Halder el al. 1995a, p 1788).
Clearly, the paper by Gehring's team cOllld be viewed as the empirical concreti-
zation of a research programme outlined in Wolpert's and Lewis's paper. What
could be shown - and this is not trivial - is that it is possible to model the complex
interactions involved in processes of eye development as genetic networks in which
certain entities, such as the Pax-6 gene, are indispensable.
148 Eva M. Neumann-Held

However, what could not be shown either by the conceptual outline or its
empirical counterpart is that reducing those: dcvelopmental processes to nothing but
the interactions of genes is justified. Although one might still speculate whether the
metaphor of the "controlling power of the master gene" is adequate in the frame-
work of a genetic network model, it clearly loses its charm onee one steps outside
the pre-theoretical framework that requires a foeus on gene interactions alone. As
soon as one asks about the internal and external cell conditions under wh ich such
genes hecome genes and interact with each other via their products, one sees that
the "master gene" is obviously under so me "master control" as weil. This becomes
elear if we consider some further empirical research l2 . After all, it is not the DNA
sequence, ca lied Pax-6, that activates some other DNA sequence, but the protein
Pax-6, which is being produced by use of the gene: Pax-6. A closer look at this
mechanism reve:als furthermore that thefimction is not as clear as one might think
from the account of Pax-6 significance in eye development. The: Pax-6 protein
- a transcription factor - interacts with other DNA sequences, ami can thereby
activate or repress those genes. Furthermore, transcription factor Pax-6 is needed
not only for e:ye development but also for development of the nervous system ami
pancreas. Therefore, its function in the cell is obviously highly determined by
factors other than its "own" DNA sequence, and the time- and tissue-specijic devel-
opmental processes require a tight regulation of expression of the Pux-6 gene itsclf
(Gilbert 2000, p 122).
In summary, this example shows that both metaphors and theoretical models,
and their applieation to empirical research, lose their explanatory power when one
lcaves the relevant frameworks, that is the explanatory goals for which they were
developed. In other words, the focus on genes as causal entities in processes of
development is justified only if one pursues sole!y the causal role of genes in such
processes and declares all other conditions to be secondary. Of course it is not self-
evident that theoretical models will prove sufficient when applied to cmpirical
research. On the contrary, progress in science depends equallyon all these cases,
where such application fails. But even if such an application works it is still not
justitied to deduce that there are no other causal agents involved that enable genes
to exhibit their particular role in the first place. And it is not justified to deduce [Iwt
it is not possihle to construct alternative causal networks, in wh ich genes would be
no more than secondary .. ellahling side-conditions H.

A quote of Richard Lewontin is appropriate to lead us into the next section. In 1992
he wrote:
If we take scriollsly the proposition that thc internal and external codetermine the organism. we
cannot really believe that the sequence of the human genome is the grail that will reveal to us
wh at it is to be human. that it will change our philosophical view of ourselves, that it will show
how life works. (Lewontin 1992. p34)

This seepticism is shown by numerous critics of gene-centred approaches to ques-

tions of the development of the "nature" of living beings. In the following seetion,

12 Thc following details on the Pax-6 gene and Pax-6 protein interactions have been taken from
Gilbert (2000, in particular pp. 118-122).
 Can we find Human Nature in the Human Genome? 149

examples of such criticism and suggestions for alternative approaches will be

discussed.

3
Criticism of Gene-Centrism and Alternative Approaches

In 1990 developmental psychologists Robert Lickliter and Thomas Berry com-

plained of gene centrism in numerous disciplines that have "human nature" as one
subject of their research. They wrote:
Despite the lack of empirical support. this 'primacy of the genes' viewpoint is increasingly
evident in disciplines other than sociobiology. including animal behavior .... behavioral
ecology .... cultural anthropology .... and developmental psychology ... (Lickliter and Berry
1990. p 351-352)

A characteristic of this viewpoint is the (orten implicit) assumption

that behind the phenomena of development lie the genes as ultimate causal faetors; thercfore.
devclopment is (at least to so me extent) simply the manifestation of genetic information about
evolvcd (phylogenetic) characters ... (p 353).

Thus, many "developmentalisls" continue "to believe that some formative or exc-
cutive power resides solely in the genes ..... (p 354)
The consequences of such approaches or beliefs are that lhe
willingness to assign information for development to a genetic 'program' or 'blueprint' can ami
often does lead to the belief that the process of development is thereby somehow explained or
undcrstood. climinating the need for any further inwstigation or research. Thus. aspeets of the
organism-cnvironment interaetion process that actually produce developmental outeomes ean
eontinue to remain overlooked or unanalysed. (p 354)

Regarding research on human nature. Liekliter and Berry explicitly criticize a de-
velopmental psychology text by Sroufe and Cooper. in which the authors propose
that human development is mainly effected by a set of genes that contain.' the basic
instructions for the unfolding of development, while environmental condltions pby
only a supportive role. Lickliter and Berry argue against this proposal as folIows:
However. positing such a preonlogenetic explanation for aspects of human developmcnt and
viewing the individual's context as only 'supportive' docs not serve to explain how any par-
tieular trait or charaeter is actually realized by an individual. nm does it describe the condi-
tions. cireumstances. or interactants necessary for such an outcome to occur. These of course
are empirieal questions. (Lickliter and Berry 19l)(). p 353)

What then would be an alternative framework far concepts of development? One

alternative is offered by the so-called Developmental Systems Approach (OSA) or
Theory (OST), which was introduced by Susan Oyama (2000a, first edition 1985)
and taken up and further developed, in one way or another, by herself and numerous
other authorsl.l. The common ground of reasoning in the broad framework of OSA
is characterized by Gray:

1.1 See, für example. Oyama (2000b). and collectiüns 01' contributiüns in Griffiths (1992). Oyama
el al. (200 I).
150 Eva M. Neumann-Held

All phenutypes. be they physiological. 1II0rphologicai ur behavioural. are jointly determined

by both genes and the developmental context. This truislll lIIeans that it is not pussiblc to
assign causa I primacy nor to diehotomize developmental eausation into internal and external
eomponents. (Gray 1992. p 175)

The status of DSA could best be deseribed as a "kind of coneeptual background that
serves to orient more specifie empirical and theoretical endeavours" (Oyama
2000b. p 2) and as a "framework for a theory proper of the phenotype, or rather as a
matrix for a whole class of specific theories of phenotypic development, which are
empirieally testable (and thus refutable)." (Liekliter and Berry 1990, p 359)
At the molecular level the application of this general frame of thought has led to
the suggestion that the gene eoncept itself should be revised. Empirical findings
such as mRNA editing, alternative mRNA splieing and genomie imprinting have
blurred the view of genes as some struetural and/or funetional unit sitting in the
genome. Rather, it turns out that those entities wh ich serve as a matrix for the
production of proteins are subjeet to developmental construction processes
them~e1ves. Based on these findings Keller (2000) eoncluded:

Considered as a functional unit. the gene is no longer a statie entity. set above and apart frolll
the processes that specify eellular and inter-eelllIiar organization. hut itself apart and pan:el 01'
these processes. dcfilled and brought into existt:llee hy the action 01' a eomplcx self-regulating
dynamical system in whieh and for whieh the inherited DNA provides the crucial raw
material.

One might argue therefore that the gene eoncept should be adjusted - for the pur-
poses of research on developmental processes - to the empirieal evidenee l4 . Along
these lines it was reeently suggested that a gene be defined as those processes that
are involved each time a particular polypeptide is synthesized (Neumann-Held
1999. 200 I b). Here, a gelle is Ilot merely sitllated Oll the DNA; the term "gene"
includes - besides the relevant DNA sequenee(s) - processes. which under eertain
environmental conditions seleet certain DNA and mRNA sequenees and result in a
polypeptide. Consequently, the eoncept of the gene always includes the interaction
between DNA and the developmental environment. To specify a gene it is not
sufficient to indicate a particular DNA sequenee (or sequenees). but - in addition-
the specifieation of the eonditions is required under which this sequenee is used in
processes of polypeptide expression. In this sense, the "information" for the eon-
struction of a gene, a polypeptide or an organism does not reside in thc DNA
sequenee but depends on the interaction of DNA with its developmental environ-
ment. and on the history, i.e. the temporal sequenee, of such interactions l5 .
In support of this gene concept, the proces.\' IIllllecular gene eoncept (PMG). it
ean be argued that it makes explieit what the usagc of the term "gene" in molecular
contexts most orten refers to: causal talk about genes rarely rcfers only to DNA sc-
quences but includes all the other developmental intluenees that cause a particular

14 For an overview 01' the current discussion 01' the gene cuncept. see Neumann-Hcld (200 I b).
15 This emphasis on the significance 01' the temporal sequence (the hislory) in develupmental
processes will be found in several places in Ihis article. For a critical review 01' the concept 01'
"information" in molccular genetics, see Janich (1998).
 Can we find Human Nature in the Human Genome? 151

sequence to give rise to a particular product. PMG stresses these otherwise easily
overlooked interconnections between DNA and its developmental environment. lh
This section demonstrated that alternatives to the gene-centric framework are
available. Certainly, it is not trivial to derivc empirical approaches from these
alternative framcworks, but it was also not trivial to derive them from a molecular
genetic approach. Although genetic approaches have undoubtedly been quite
"fruitful" in biologieal research, the limits of these approaches are also evident. In
19R5 Gunther Stent wrote:
... the deep deve\opmental problem in want of explanation is ... the (somatically) heritable
process by which embryonic precursor cells coll1l11ir their descendants to differentiate into this
or that cell type at so me later developmental stage.

And Stent condudes that

... the overenthusiastic application of the concept of genetic information to the problem of
commitlllcnt would retard more than advance the progress of dcveloplllental biology. (Stent
IlJX5. pi)

Why are these warnings overlooked? What might he the reasons for keeping such a
tight grip on gene centrism?

4
"Yes, but ... "

4.1
..... there are no alternatives to gene-centrist approaches"

It is common - at least in my own experience - to counter conceptual and empirieal

arguments against the exdusivity of gene centric approaches with certain "Ycs, but
... " arguments. Some of these arguments will be highlighted below. They usually
share a basic ignorance of arguments in favour of alternatives to gene-centred
approaches. This ignorance seems partly based on the fact that "people just don 't
listen", meaning that even when arguments are presented they do not seem able to
enter the general discourse. Lewontin assurnes that the reason for this is that many
researchcrs in genetic and molecular sciences (and with them large sections of the
public) have turned some basic hypotheses shared by their respective disciplines
into metaphysical belief systems. Lewontin writes:
The molt:cular hiological revolution ... has asccnded to the state of an unchallenged ortho-
doxy. The \el f-image of its practitioners and the source of their Illetaphors have changed
accordingly. to rellec! their perception of transccndent truth and unassailable power. Molecular
biology is now a religion. and molecular biologists are thcir prophcts. (Lewontin 1992. p 31)

Ih With this in mind, recent evidence on the causes of so-called Illonogenetic diseases might not
co me as such a surprise. For the consequences for the concept of genetic diseases, see Neumann-
Held (200 I a). With regard to the "Illulticausality" of Illonogenetic diseases. see Wolf (2001: in
this book. and 19lJ5. 19lJ7).
152 Eva M. Neumann-Held

Whatever one thinks of the details of this poignant rhetoric, it is remarkable that the
grip of gene centrism is so strong. Obvious "irregularities" are therefore usually
denied or they are met wilh as much surprise as if the details had not previously
been discussed. Here, I present two examples of such "ignorance"17. In the first
ease a partieular indication of an "irregularity" did not beeome part of broader
awareness before the HGP directed attention to it. Even then, it seems possible that
the results are now being interpreted in such a way that they still fit into the genetic
framework. The second example will illustrate how even a dear-eut dcnial of gene-
centric approaches as the exclusive explanatory strategies of development is
misunderstood and inverted.
The first example concerns a result of the human genome project which the
popular press seized on, almost with disappointment. Neither the number of genes
nor the differences in sequence between the genomes of humans, mice and chim-
panzees see m sufficient to account for the differentia specijica of humans and their
specific developmental pathways. One might wonder why this was presented as
such surprising and unexpected news at the end of the human genome project,
when it was in fact known years before. The well-known molccular biologist
Richard Stroh man, tor example, discussed this issue very pointedly and therefore I
will quote hirn here at length. He wrote:
... genume eomplexity found in humans and mice. for example. is not eorrelated with the
differenees of form and functi<Jn found between them. Seljuence eomparisons between dif-
ferent species are nut always informative: nevertheless. there are many examples in which no.
or little. correlation exists between genetic and morphologieal complexity. Humans and mice
havc thc same estimated number uf expn:ssed genes (exclusive of su-ealled junk DNA). and
yet they are radieally different ereatures. Older tindings havc revcaled the similarity (98'k +)
between human and ehimpanzee DNA. and yet these two organisms manage to construet very
ditTerent results from their nearly identieal genes. Still older evidence dcaling with 'sibling
speeies' shows us urganisms that appear identical under the most stringent anatomieal
observation. and yet are found to be entirely different when examined at the level of their
genes and their proteins. These organisms uffer the reverse of the human-chimp problem.
because they extraet from extrcmely different genomes identical phenotypic end points.
(Strohman 1997. p 195)

So although from a moleeular, cellular or physiologieal point of view humans and

mice might not see m to be that different, the conclusion cannot be - as is frequently
heard these days - that humans and mice really are not that different, but that the
chosen approaches are not suitable for identifying these differences and their
causes. Strohman folIows:
The questiun iso what are the constraints - the buundary conditions - the developmental rules
that serve to organize these similarities into different constructions. We cannot assume. as
genetie determinism does. that constraints and developmental rules are all in the form of
genetie programs. Most biologists, when pushed. do agree that there is nut enough information
in any genome eapable of mapping out the details by wh ich morphologieal structures arise in
organisms. (Strohman 1997, p 195)

17 Strohman (1997) takes this "ignorance" as evidenee of a Kuhnian paradigm, and the identi-
fication of eertain empirieal and theoretical tensions as "irregularities" as indication for a
coming Kuhnian revolution in biology.
 Can we find Human Nature in the Human Genome? 153

And further:
There is a growing recognition that information for function may not be located solcly in
genomic databases. That is, it is hecoming ckar that sequence information in DNA, hy itself.
contains insufficient information for determining how gene products (proteins) intcract to
produce a mechanism of any kind. (p 195)
Therefore, undcrstanding of complex function may in fact be impossible without recourse to
intluem:es outside 01' the genome", sim;e it is evident that " ... assessing a mutant gene efket on
a complex phenotype ... [requires consideration on the unique life history 01' the individual in
question (diet, age, physical activity, stress, etc.) (p 196)

These quotations are well-suited as arguments for alternative conceptualizations

within the framework of DSA and PMG. However, eriticism of gene eentrism is not
limited to a partieular alternative approach. Scientists from diverse biological
backgrounds and philosophers of biology have indicated the limitations of gene-
centred approaches in the explanation of diseases (Smith 2001 a, 2001 b, Wolf 1995,
1997, 200 I: in this book,), of deve\opmental processes (Gilbert 200 I: in this book,
Oyama 2000a, 2000b, contributions in: Oyama et al. 2(01), and of the generation of
form (Goodwin 1994, Webster and Goodwin 1996, Müller and Wagner 1996,
Gutmann and Neumann-Held 2000 IX ). These contributions show c\early that genes,
i.e. DNA sequences, are not sufficient on their own to explain the complicated
processes of organismic development. And it might be doubted - at least it is not
convincingly c1aimed - that the shortcomings of gene-eentred explanatory
approaches can be resolved by elaboration of gene networks alone. Nevertheless,
other scientists continue to look for genes as the single primary eause of devel-
opmental proeesscs.
My second example shows that the foeus on gene centrism goes back further
than the HGP. But this example also shows that this is equally truc for scepticism
regarding gene-centric approaches to development; scepticism wh ich was c1early
lIlisltnderstood and even inverted.

My example comes from a short review artic1e published in Science in 1984 (Lewin
1984), on the state of research on organismic developmcnt. The first part of the
artic\e focuses mainly on the work of Sydney Brenner and his efforts to explain the
context of developmental processes and its regulation by genes. Here, the insistence
on a genc-centric approach is demonstrated.
Sydney Brenner initiated ground-breaking work in the cellular developmental
processes of the nematode C. e/egans in 1963 by suggesting a research programme
to study the genetics and biochemistry of the eontrol mechanisms of eellular
development of this nematode. Brenner's guiding hypothesis was:
At the beginning it was said that the answer to the understanding 01' development was going to
co me from a knowledge 01' the molecular mechanisms 01' gene contro!.

IX The problem of the j"rm is conceptually related to the concept of the organism. In regard to
this topic the journal Theory in Biosciences published recently a collection of papers. edited by
Gutmann, Neumann-Held and Rehmann-Sutter (2000).
154 Eva M. Neumann-Held

He continues:
I uouht whcthcr anyone belicves that anymore ... We have to try to uiseover the prineiples 01"
nrganization, how lots 01" things are put together in the same plaee. I uon't think these
principks will he embouieu in a simple ehemical uevice. as it is for the genetic coue.

Nevertheless, according to Brenner it Iws to be in the DNA:

Ultimately, the organislll must be explieable in terms of its genes. simply because evolution
has come about through alterations in DNA. But the representation [a term whieh Brenner
preferreu to "genetic program"J will not be explieit. We neeu to unuerstanu the grammar 01"
uevelopment to make sense ofit. (ljuoteu from Lewin 1984. p 1327)

Note here that the reference to a particuJar kind of model of evolutionary processes
serves to limit the range of concepts of putative causal agents that might shape
developmental processes. From this it is deduced that developmental processes
must be ultimately explicable in terms of genes, even if empirical evidence points
to the opposite. This is a lJuite remarkable point and I will return to it later in more
detai I.
Brenner llses a metaphor to try to explain what he means by the need to lInder-
stand the "grammar of development": i
The icosaheural heau 01' a hactcriophage is a precise geometrie objeet. This geometry is
inheriteu. So you say, there must he a uefinition 01" an icosaheuron in the genome somewhere:
where is ir: You won't finu a gene that says. 'make an icosaheuron'. In oruer to ulluerstanu
wlwt it means to speeify an icosaheuron you "rst have to unuerstanu the principlcs of mole·
cular assemhly. the way thut the coat proteins interact anu self·assemble ... This is uifferent
from writillg a computer program that teils thc machine to uraw an icosaheuron. We have a
uifferent kinu of haruware in the cell. The icosaheuron is ellcoueu in a uistrihuteu form throug·
huutthc entire genome. That is a prelly goou picture of what we have to say when we ask. what
uoes it take to make ahanu. make a fool. make a liver. The specifications for these structures
are scallereu throughoutthc gcnome. It's not a neat. seljucntial proeess ... It's everything going
on at thc samc timc ... (ljuoteu from Lewin 1994. p 1327 f.)

What Brenner tries to describe here by use of a metaphor is what is nowadays

called a genetic network 19.
At this point Lewin, the allthor of the review, compares Brenner's metaphor to
an analogy of Gllnther Stent, concluding that botl! descriptiol/s /1/ake tl/(: sall1e
poil/t! He lJuotes Stent as folIows:
Consiuer thc estahlishment of eeologieal communities upon eolonization 01' islanus or the
growth 01' seeonuary forests ... Both 01' these examples are regular phenomena in the sense that
a more or less preuietablc ecological structure ariscs via a stercotypie pallern 01' intermeuiate
steps. in which the relative abunuances of various types 01' tlora anu fauna follow a weil·
uefineu seljuence. The regularity 01" these phenomena is obviously not the conscljuence 01' an
ecological program encoueu in the genome 01' the participating taxa. Rather it arises via a
historical cascaue 01' complex stochastic interactions hetween vurious hiotu ... (ljuoteu from
Lewin 1984, p 1328).

Lewin concludes that both descriptions show that the "grammar of assemhly" must
be found in the interaction of the component parts of the system, '"even if the
ultimate source o{ information is at the level o{ the gene ... " (author's italics).

19 On eloser scrutiny this metaphor is not that obvious anu reljuires more analysis.
 Can we find Human Nature in the Human Genome? 155

However, in Stent's analogy - and in contrast to Brenner - there is no underlyillg

ill.l'trllctive level or program at all. That explains why Stent himself (1985)
explicitly rejects the kind of purely genetic approach toward development wh ich he
finds exemplified in Brenner's statements (whereby Stent refers here also to
Lewin 's quotations of Brenner):
... the tenet that the gene is a one-dimensional deseription of the primary strueture of a
partieular protein moleeule was turned. willy-nilly. into the doctrine that the genome is a one-
dimensional description of the whole anima!. [n partieular, it e.lme In he believed that the
genome emhodies. not merely a protein eatalogue. but also a genetic program for Jevelop-
ment. from zygote to adult.

[n contrast, Stent suggests - similar to Strohman much later:

... it becomes evident that development is a historic~iI rather than programmatic phenomenclIl.
undcr which each stage in the progressive structural and compositional reshaping of the
emhryo is both the etTeet of earlier and thc cause of later dcvelopmental transaetions.

Therefore, Stent concludes:

Hence. instcad of searching for an illusory genetic program. devclopmcntal biologists must try
to fathom thc complex network of causal relations to which thc: sequence of developmcntal
cvents owes its regularity. (Stent 1985. pi)

The fact that Stent is c1early opposing a purely gene-centric approach is obviously
misunderstood by Lewin, who chose Stent to support Brenner's gene-focussed
concept. One might speculate that Stent was misunderstood - as others berme and
after him - because his arguments and metaphors did not fit into a particular frame-
work of assumptions about the causa I powers of genes, which were and still are
taken for gran ted. Some of these cornerstones of the "genetic world view" will be
discussed below.

4.2
" ... evolutionary change rests on changes in gene frequencies"

The quotations from Brenner contained a very intriguing argument according to

which devclopmental processes Iwve to be explicable in terms of gene interactions.
because evolution has co me about by changes in DNA sequences.
The first counter to this argument is that many diverse theoriesco. wh ich are
difficult to test empirically, have been proposed to explain the mechanisms of
evolution. One might wonder therefore why a particlilar conceptual framework.
which is still controversial, should be superior to conceptual frameworks. wh ich are
supported by empirical evidence obtained by developmental biology research (see
above. in particular section 3).
A second point concerns the underlying gene concept itself. Ir is true that
evolution is traditionally (by population genetics) defined as the change in gene
frequencies over time in a population. and in the light of modern biological re-
search it seems ohvious that the term "gene" must refer to "DNA" as in Brenner's

cO See. for so mc examples. Gutmann (19<)0). Goodwin (1994). Oyama (2000a. 2000b) and
Gritliths and Gray (1994. 1997).
156 Eva M. Neumann-Held

comment. An explicit equating of DNA with genes for the modclling of evolution-
ary processes was suggested by George C. Williams (1966) and Richard Dawkins
(1982, 1989). However. it has been shown that their evollllionary !{ene concept is
neither equivalent to the usual molecular gene concept, according to wh ich a gene
codes for a polypeptide, nur does it necessarily require DNA as substrate (for a
prescntation of the complete argument, see Neumann-Held 1998 and Griffiths and
Neumann-Held 1999).
Dawkins, for example, states very explicitly that evolutionary genes are defined
in terms of phenotypic differences between members of a population, which in turn
cause differential replication rates. Evolutionary genes are not defined in terms of
the polypeptides they produce, and can even consist of DNA sequences that do not
participate in any coding regions at all (Dawkins 1982, p 87 tl.). Therefore, the sole
connection to molecular biology is Dawkins' stipulation that DNA sequences are
the only candidates for factars responsible for these differences in reproductive
success. However, if evolutionary genes are thus defined as heritable difference-
makers then this role does not have to be filled by DNA sequences. Other systems
of inheritance which change the pattern of polypeptide expression withol)t
changing the DNA sequence are weil known. Examples are DNA methylation
patterns (1ablonka and Szathmary 1995) and environmental conditions during
developmental (embryonic) processes (Barker 1998, 200 I). Geflomic imprifltin!{ is
a further example. Here, the methylation of DNA segments depends on their origin
from the matemal or the patemal side. The consequence is that although the
maternally and the paternally inherited DNA segments do not differ in the order of
their nucleic acid sequences, they are nevertheless treated differently, and therefore
have different effects. Heutink et al. (1992) report, for example, that paraganglio-
mas, a class of mostly benign tumours, will affcct individllals only when the
"disease gene" is inherited from the father, whercas "expression of the phenotype is
not observed in the offspring of an affected female ... " (For further examples of
genomic imprinting see Strachan and Read 1996, p 20 I L). These examplt.:s make it
quite clear that in contrast to Dawkins' assumptions, heritable difference makers dn
not have to be DNA. FlIrther research is needed on the consequences 01' these
observations for evolutionary modelling.
In any case, the relationship between genes as the subject of research in devclop-
mental genetics, and genes in evolutionary biology, rcmains very unclear. Thus, it
seems unjustified to require models of developmental processes to rely only on
genetic networks on the grounds that only these would have played a role in evolu-
tion. On the contrary: The evidence shows that factors other than DNA seqllences
can cause evolutionary changes. Therefare, empirical research into all the causally
relevant factors of developmental processes is needed, to enlarge the framework
within wh ich putative evolutionary changes are modelIed.

4.3
" '" genes were first"

Closely related to this argument, presented in section 4.2, is the assumption that
genes were first in the evolution of what might be called the predecessors of Iiving
entities (Küppers 1990). Again the question is: what is the validity of such a claim
 Can we find Human Nature in the Human Genome? 157

compared to that of the empirical evidence supplied by developmental biology'!

After all, nobody was actually present to observe the temporal ("historical")
sequence of events that leaves us now able to speculate about the construction of
(the) evolutionary tree(s). Certainly, it is legitimate to develop theories and models
of these early origins. However, the diversity of suggested models alone should
indicate that the claim that genes were first, is really highly speculative (for ex-
amples, see de Duve 1994, Dyson 1990, Eigen et al. 1986, Eigen 1992 21 ).

4.4
" ... only genes are inherited"

This assumption is c10sely connected to that investigated in section 4.2. Since

Weismannian coneeptualizations of germlines there is a guiding thought, whieh not
only entered concepts of main stream evolutionary biology (phylogeny), but it also
shaped underlying assumptions of other biological disciplines and of "public
opinions": Evolu'tionary changes must be traceable to changes in gene frequencies
beclIuse only genes are illheritedfrom generation to generation.
In my view, the assumption that only genes are inherited rests on a misunder-
standing of genetic research. In this article, genetic research has been viewed from
a very modern perspective, dependent on the new empirical tools of molecul:.tr
biology. Here, (molecular) genetics is described as being mainly interested in
developmental processes at the molecular level - leaving the phenomenon of
inheritllnce aside. However, genetic research was traditionally - and still is - direct-
ed toward tInding out how genes (DNA sequences) participate in transgenerational
regularity in living entities. This goal requires theoretical and empirical settings
that allow us to test whether genes are carriers of patterns of inheritance or whether
they are not. From these settings it folIows: As long as genes have anything to C!O
with pllrtiettlllr patterns of inheritance lIt all one will find genes participating in (he
inheritability of patterns. However, this does not exclude the existence of other
means of inheritability - some of which have been mentioned above. This point is
so important that I want to investigate it a little further.
The perspective of DSA may again be helpful for the question of the carrier of
inheritance. From our everyday lifeworld experience we know that, in general,
living beings must develop. This was also indicated by Gilbert in the quotation in
sec ti on I of this article. In the words of Oyama this means that all aspects of
"phenotype must develop" and therefore "they are all 'acquired' in ontogeny". In a
sense all phenotypes are thus '''environmental' because particular conditions are
required for their development, and becausc these conditions enter into the for-
mation of the organism from the beginning". But phenotypes are also "inherited",
in the sense that genes play some sort of causal role in their development. There·
fore, "if one seriously accepts the origin of phenotypes in causal interaction '" no
distinction between inherited and acquired components of the organism is
defensible" (Oyama 2000b, p 86).

21 Note, for example, that in Eigen's model it is not genes, but on c10ser view it is interacting
systems - compartmentalized (!) hypercycles - which are mode lied as a "first beginning".
I S8 Eva M. Neumann-Held

That uoes not mean, of course, that transgenerational stability anu inheritance
are meaningless terms. But it means that thc assumption that it is only genes that are
inheriteu anu that thus guarantee transgenerational stability is not uefensible
(except in the specified genetic framework referred tn above).
This leads to the question of what "inheritance" means. Oyama points here to the
everyuay lifeworlu understanding of inheritance, which refers "to the passing of
objects, land, money ... resmirces - from one inuividual to another". On this basis
she suggests thinking of "heredity ... as the ways in which developmental resour-
ces or meW1S become available to the next generation." But then one should include
all means: "the organism then inherits (has available to it) a highly complex, widely
ramified developmental system" (p 87-88). According to Oyama it is not enough to
include in these means only what is present within the boundaries of the egg or the
zygote. Oyama (2000b) argues:
... no egg can develnp in a vacuum, and other ontogenetic requirements must he provided in
so me way. Many are reliably present in the wider environment, but many others may have to
be 'iupplied by thc organism itself. hy rarents and other conspecillcs, or even hy organisms of
other srecies. (p 88)

[n the section above this was shown for the construction 01' genes, in the sense of
PMG, as weil. It has been argued that the constrllction 01' a gene from pure DNA
sequences depends on nllmerous means inside and olltsiue the bounuaries 01' a cell.
If time- anu tissue-uepenuent patterns 01' gene constrllction are I'Oll nu to be stabil'
inheriteu transgenerationally, it must be concluueu that in auuition to the relevant
DNA seqllences there are numerous other means which are stably inherited as weil.

In summary: There are two kinus 01' argument that seem to support the thesis that
genes, i.e. DNA sequences, are either the only or the most relevant causal ueter-
minant 01' developmental (first kinu 01' argument) anu 01' evolutionary (second kind
01' argument) processes. Examples 01' each kind 01' argument have been given and
rejected on the grounds of empirical evidence anu plallsibility, respectively. On the
one hand, developmental processes are not laid out in the genome or genes, flor are
genomes the only thing inheriteu from generation to generation. On the other hand,
historical reconstructions 01' evolutionary trees and 01' "stories 01' origin" are limited
in their claims to validity, since they cannot be subjected to empirical scrlltiny. This
paper does not claim that such historical reconstructions cannot proviue a suitable
framework 01' hellristic value. Nevertheless, the status 01' these constructions must
be clear. They are ueriveu from empirical analysis and may provide inspiration for
further empirical research. However, if such reconstructions are used to deny the
value 01' empirical t,ndings that might lead to alternative reconstructions then they
are being used to immunize a metaphysical world view against rational analysis.
 Can we find Human Nature in the Human Genome? 151)

5
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The Nurturing of Natures

Susan Dyama

Any mention of human nature raises the question of determinism. When this
occurs, it is customary to condemn the silly extremes and to recommend a nature-
nurture continuum as the only reasonable option. Looking at my title, 'The
Nurturing of Natures", so me may think that I stand at the "environmental" end of
that continuum, but although environments are important to my story, this needs
explanation. Trying to resolve the dichotomy of nature and nurture by putting more
weight on one or the other Icaves the nature of both "nature" and "nurture"
untouched. lnstead. we must recast these terms, so that they are no longer seen as
candidates for combination or compromise. The reconceptualization of develop-
ment and evolution that is necessary for this recasting is what the dcveIopmental
systems approach is about.
I begin by saying what my title does and doesn't mean. and by brietly intro-
ducing the constructivist interactionism of the developmental systems approach.
Then I qllestion two traditional meanings of human nature, and finaIly, I give
another caveat, to head off a particular misconstrual of the interdependence of
organisms and their environments. To a certain extent, then, this is a cautionary
intervention, made with an eye to ethical and sociopolitical considerations as weIl
as the theoretical ones from which they cannot be neatly separated.

1
Nature and Nurture in Constructivist Interactionism

My approach to development and evolution is based on the idea of a developmental

system. This is achanging complex of heterogeneous elements, incIuding the
organism itself. but also encompassing all those aspects of its surroundings-abiotic,
biotic, social-that affect its development and survival. It varies over time and
across individuals. I call such a complex a system becallse its constituents, or
interactants. are causally interconnected. What counts as an interactant. and how
it interacts, as weIl as what effects it has. is contingent on the larger complex (and
on the point of view of the investigator). This is a minimal notion of system, in
the sense that it does not assume autonomy or homeostatically tight regulation,
though some regularity is necessary for there to be an organism at all (Oyama
1985/2000, 200 I). Traditional conceptions of nature and nurture have too often
been used to prejudge the relative stability of particular outcomes. This is one of the
sources of their political loading; it helps to explain why people so often deploy
these notions in moral and policy arguments, and also why it is so lInwise to do so.
Consider the temptation to assume that so me behavior will be easily altered
164 Susan Oyama

because it is learned, or that it will be resistant to change because it has an evolu-

tionary history.
Causal interdependence in such a system hardly makes it unanalyzable. An
interactant's impact on an organism. or its importance as a source of variation
among organisms, can be evaluated, depending on the kind of analysis one chooses.
No interactant. however, is privileged apriori as the bearer of fundamental form or
as the origin of ultimate causal control. A plant or animal isn't explained, for
instance, by encoded representations of it in its chromosomes. This means that an
organism 's nature is just the organism itself, in whatever environments it finds
itself. The phenotype, that is, should not be treated as an appearance - a manifesta-
tion of an underlying nature that it may to so me extent misrepresent. Never static, a
nature emerges in time and space, and can no more be attributed to genes than to
any other aspect of the complex, though dijferences among organisms can be
accounted for in a variety of ways. Nature thus has no existcnce prior to or separate
from the concrete living organism in its concrete, often living, surroundings: no
Platonic ideals here, no underlying reality more basic than the being itself, no
instruction manuals or little engineers in the cell nucleus. The idea of nurture is
similarly transformed. No longer associated with the arbitrary, the Iearned, the
"acquired" or the malleable, nllrture is nothing less than the ongoing processes of
development that produce the organism: both the invariant and the variable aspects,
the phylogenetically conserved and the novel. Instead of being restricted to the
"transmission" of genes, evolution becomes, in one definition I have used, the
derivational history of these organism-environment complexes.
Abbreviated as it is, this introduction should show why the message of my title
isn't the commonplace pronouncement that "even what is biologically natural
requires the proper conditions and materials, like food and air, in order to tluurish."
Nor am I saying that "nature" can sometimes be moderated, channeled. altered,
even overridden, by "nurture." Such furmulations are attractive because by emhrac-
ing them, people can reject "extreme" views without ever having to doubt that there
is a preexisting genetic nature to be overridden, and that nurture is the means for
this modification of nature's plan. I also disavow the idca that the genes definc
potential or propensities while the environment selects the outcome. 1 For me,
nurture is the totality of the developmental interactions that hring the phenotype
inta being, sustaining and changing it throughout its life. From the point of view 01"
a developmental system, nature and nurture cannot be contrasted, even on a con-
tinullm, because they are not of the same logical type in the tirst place. They are
related as product and process: organisms are the ever-changing products of contin-
1I0US processes of development. They contribute to those processes by their form
and function, even as form and function are being dcvelopmentally transformed.

My arguments against these common "solutions" to the nature-nurture problem can be found
elsewhere (see. for instance my 1985/2000 and 2000b).
 The Nurturing of Natures 165

2
Incidence, Essence, and Killer Questions

Most discussions 01' human nature deal with matters 01' frequency, probability, or
inevitability: roughly put, with in eiden ce. But as I have suggested, there is anolher
meaning 01' the concept: underlying reality or truth. Nature in this sense may
sometimes be hidden, but it is always there, inside us, presPnt whether or not it is
erident. This meaning 01' nature is more subtle and elusive, and thus more trouble-
some. scientifically and otherwise-more difficult to combat. Genetic determinism
involves both essence and incidence; the two are different, though often associated.
Often the idea of inherent limits is involved in both. The continuing contlation 01'
the two questions (relative probability/frequency and essential nature) allows
workers to deny one eITor while committing the other: to admit that "genetically
intluenced" traits may be open to environmental intluence, for instance, but to
maintain their faith in underlying biological truth. A refined connection between
incidence and essence is detectable in the idea that genetic factors define the realm
01' the possible. Here we have a complicated mix 01' statistical thinking (about
norms 01' reaction, for instance) with an elusive somethilll{ else.
Few people find it difficult to believe a person might keep his or her "true
nature" in check much or all 01' the time; indeed, according to popular psychology.
all too many 01' us do just that. In this case what is true is exactly what is not
habitually, or even easily, expressed, but it is thought to define us none the less.
Think 01' the overlapping languages of genetics and psychology: Genes are or are
not expressed in the body: emotions and impulses are or are not expressed in
behavior. This is not a simple case 01' synonymy. According to widely shared
conviction, it is genes that define and create the very passions and instincts that lend
themselves so neatly to notions of preexisting energies or desires that are inside us,
ready to be let loose, whether by choicc, inattention, or the pressure of the moment.
It is not incidental that a variety of evolutionary approaches to the mind, such as
Lorenzian ethology, sociobiology, and the less scholarly tradition 01' writings on
"naked apes" and "the beasts within" have been natural (!) allies with psycho-
dynamic theories of emotion and motivation. Indeed, Freud's evolutionary specul-
ations are weil known.
I said that what I have been calling the incidence and essen ce meanings of nature
are often c10sely entwined. 11' the latter is merely taken to mean "that which always
appears", tor example, then the one sense is assimilated to the other. (I won 't even
try to deal here with human nature as the desirable af good, but such nations
typically involve the same ambiguity: Sometimes nature is what is everywhere and
always found, and sometimes it is that which will appear if allowed to unfold
unhindered.) 11' critics have not been notably successful at forestalling unwarranted
conclusions about human nature from science, say from the tindings of genetics or
molecular or evolutionary biology, it is partly because their cautionary treatments
have tended to focus on issues 01' frequency or malleability-in short, on incidence,
and have neglected the scientifically more slippery idea of essence.
After a talk I gave recently, a man in the audience argued that we still need to
distinguish between biology and experience. He feit it was important to mark the
166 Susan Oyama

uifferenee. for instanee. between characteristies of the uescenuants of slaves that

were uue to inheritance anu those that were uue to eulture. When I replieu that this
was the very distinction that I was reworking. he inuicated that he realized this. but
nevertheless thought we should keep them separate. The exchange ended incon-
clusively. as such things often do. Although I had said that in order to see whether
we really disagreed. we would need to disClISS just what senses of biologv and
cultllre were intended. beeause they were both ambiguous terms. the gathering
dispersed before we could talk.
They are common enough. these frustrations of the unfinished colloquy, the
wish to have c1arified matters. to have gi yen a satisfying response. but this one
merits a bit more retlection. After the session. a eolleague remarked on the ex-
change, referring to the listener's query about biology and culture as the "killer
question." By using this phrase, my eolleague seemed to imply that the question
presented special eoneeptual problems. Now, it was true that it had raised the level
of vigilance in the room by several degrees, but what made it different was not
anything that could be cast in terms of evolution, genes, learning mechanisms. or
the rest of thc apparatus with wh ich scholars attempt to deal with such things. It was
that the question was about race, askeu in a hall full of professors and students. at a
time when the publication of The Bell Curve (Herrnstcin and Murray. 1994) hau
revived the race-IQ dcbate in a nation with an inordinate interest in intelligenee
qllotients, a nation whose troubled raeial history looms over public and privatt'
transaetions alike. In addition. the questioner had been black.
Richard Dawkins (1982. P 11) teils of another question from the tloor, this time
about "genetic" sex differences. at a symposium on sociobiology. The young
wo man in the audience was near tears. Dawkins reports. He claims that her
emotional intensity surprised him until he realized that she was confuseu abollt
what such differences mean. She thought genetic meant inevitable. He goes on to
explain that the determination of differences is a local. statistical malter lhat does
not predict outcomes in a different situation. Such c1arifications can be useful. of
course. and the point about genetic dift'erences has been made many times
(by Lehrman. 1970. for one). lnsofar as they foclls on incidence. however. ami
leave essence more or less undisturbed. these clarifications miss part of the point
(see Kitcher. 2001. for example). Surely so me of the emotional charge of "killer
questions" derives from this notion of a hidden but potently present essence. an
essence that informs our sense of identity. meaning, even value. Consider the case
with which evolutionary theorists' accounts of selfish genes and selfish organisms.
which ostensibly pertain only to the dynamics of natural selcction. get translated
into pronouncements about the real selfishness behind acts of apparent generosity
or altruism. the true meaning of parental love. Sometimes the theorists themselves
make the translation from genetic advantage to true meaning, sometimes not.
Sometimes they inadvertently encourage it even as they warn against it. My point is
that concepts of nature are psyehologically and ethically resonant in ways that
extend far beyond the question of incidence. 2 Ask yourself how you would feel

See Oyama (1989. 2000b. chaps. 9. 10). The psychological assumptions sometimes hecome
clearer amI more explicit in evolutionary psychology amI philosophy of mind. particularly in
 The Nurturing of Natures I f>7

aboul a dass of people (to which you yourself might bdong) that was by its
"biologieal nalure" Iess intelligent thall a eomparison group, or more aggressive,
sexually licentious, or otherwise different in a socially signifieant way, even if the
differellee.\' ('ollId he emdicated hy "proper" llpbringing, thempy, or other manipu-
lation of the ('onditio!1.1' ollife. 1 Is there a residual sense of the differentness of this
group? In what does it consist'l [ invite you to meditate on this at your leisure.

3
Organism-Environment Complexes, Harmony,
and Environmental Essentialism

In the developmental systems approach there are no underlying or preexisting

essences, no nature apart from a Iiving being in its world. A dass of developmental
intluenees among many, the genes are no more formative or basic to a person's
identity than any other, including the many environments that are also among his or
her developmental resources. In speaking of organisms and their environments
developing and evolving together, however, [ want to block several misconstruals.
One has to do with the notion of harmoniolls cooperation, and the other has to do
with what we might call environmental essentialism.
[nterconnectedness is linked in some writings with an emphasis on harmony and
eooperation (see bioregionalist Kirkpatrick Sale, 1985, pp 81, 82). Although one
ean see why people might want to counteract a tendency to define life exclusively
in terms of competition and contlict, [ think this is one of those places where one
should beware of simply affirming the opposite. The point is not that nature is
basically nice, harmonious or "balam:ed", but that the whole desire for such global
quasi-moral characterizations deserves scrutiny. We do not require them in order to
speak reasonably and responsibly about ecological degradation, regional diversity,
or the politics and economies of scale, any more than we need them in order to
study developmental processes and their outcomes. Our notions of harmony in
these cases are tied as mueh to our expectations of repetition and recognizable or
desirable outcomes as to the intricacy of the actual interconnections. [t is important
to note that such "harmony" at one level can be produced by proeesses that at
another level are easily viewed as fraught with conllict and eompetition (see, for
instance, Buss, 1987).
[ view with similar skepticism attempts to ground human essence in relations to
the land. Political and ethical worries are usually associated with the genetic side of
the gene-environment pair, and environmental essentialism is less weil articulated
and salient than its biologieal counterparts (though the cultural essentialism so
intluential in some eircles can be thought of as a variation on this theme). Never-
theless, the environments involved in a Iife cycle, or in a sequence of such cycles,

writings on innate ideas. Consider the language 01' genetic representations, or the prevalence in
the field of genetics 01' textual metaphors like transcription, translation, coding, and reading
frames (Godfrey-Smith, 1999; Oyama 1985/2000, 2000a, 200Gb) .
.1 01' course there is a great deal to be said abollt what standard is used fur such comparisons.
16~ Susan Oyama

shoukl no more be used to essentialize than the genes. A habitat or cultural tradition
is hardly more capable of carrying the true nature of the organism than is any other
interactant. 4
To invoke so me romantic notion of a blood tie to the land, then, to privilcge a
group's history with a particular locale or tradition in defining its one true nature or
its unique claim to that locale, is to take the wrong lesson from the developmental
systems perspective. Given our recent pasts, the explosion of ethnic and border
contlicts around the world, and the mine field of identity politics so me of us must
traverse every day, it is a misconstrual I want to block as emphatically as I can.
Again, this is not to deny the possibility, indeed, the necessity of adjudicating
contlicting claims, or the importance of acknowledging the impact of our own
histories on our perceptions, priorities, and judgments. It is to deny that so me
notion of a special ecological relationship is the place to look for a definitive
criterion. Our everyday world of shifting national boundaries, ethnic loyalties and
animosities, migration and conquest, already give us more criteria than we can
handle. Judgments can and must be made about the suitability of environments for
humans or fm other beings, and about their political and moral claims on each
other. There are many such judgments, and a multitude of considerations that must
be taken into account in making them. That is part of my point. "Nature" embraces
a riotous variety of issues, and it's hard to fit a riot on a continuum, at least without
picking out some dimension to sort by. There are numerous dimensions, and we
must employ them knowing t"ull weil that the various sortings may not line up with
each othcr, and that there is no way to avoid contlict among the values any one of
us holds dear, let alone contlict with others. Though I would hardly claim that my
own concerns and values are absent from my work, therefore, I do not otTer that
work as a ready-made guide to resolving the often painful moral and political issues
that face uso I do think that blocking illegitimate (incoherent, inconsistent, empiric-
ally or conceptually indefensible, etc.) proposals is a necessary and important part
of the debates in wh ich we must engage.
The organism-environment relations in a developmental system are indis-
soluble, not in the sense of being unalterable or more fundamental thall other
relations-indeed, both relations and constituents are changing all the time, and
many developmentally and evolutionarily important phenomena depend on organ-

Particular distinctions can still bc made. depcnding on the project. Many configurations 01'
interactants will, for instance. result in viable organislTls and many others will not, many will
result in reproductively able organisms and many othcrs will not. Some will result in pheno-
types whose gross morphology resembles that 01' most other mcmbers 01' the species. and this
can occur even if certain 01' the interactants are themsclves wildly atypical. (Some differences
in developmental resources, that is, dn not make a difference.) Conversely, a system whose
interactants are unremarkable except for aminute difference in one can produce an organism-
a "nature" - that is morphologically or behaviorally cxtremely unusual. Threshold effects are
often found in such cases. Over evolutionary time, of course, the anomalous can bccome
typical. and vice versa. Inquiry into all these questions, and myriad others, are not just emi-
nently possible within a developmental systems framework. I would argue that this conceptual
frame makes it easier to articulate them clearly and to pursue them without confusing them
with each other.
 The Nurturing of Natures 169

isms selecting and changing their envimnments. The ties are indissoluble in the
following senses: that no organism can exist or even be characterized independ-
ently from a richly elaborated world on many scales of magnitude, that causal
responsibility for the whole or for a tmit cannot be partitioned among the parts of
the system, and everything that organism does and is rises out of this interactive
complex, even as it affects that very complex. 5

4
Conclusion

Our natures are nurtured because each of us, like any other being, develops, and we
develop as whfJles, not by sprouting acquired bits from a prepackaged innate core.
We develop in many environments, and are constituted by our interactions with
these environments. Once nurturing-that is, development-is accepted as an
ineliminable and integral part of "biological" nature, it can no longer be contrasted
with nature. It cannot represent, for instance, an environmental "outside" to an
inherited "inside", or the psychological as opposed to the physical. Over evolution-
ary time some aspects of nurturing (that is, developmental interactions. at levels
from the genetic to the social/ecological) become integrated into the successive life
cycles ll b)' which generations of organisms and their worlds create and transfl'rm
each other. Only so me will become transgenerationally stable parts of these cycles:
some will be stable for a while and then change or disappear, but this does not make
them any more or less significant to the unique life in wh ich they play a part. Once
we relinquish the conviction that there is an essence hidden in our chromosomes, a
unitary truth we can glimpse from different angles with our scientific techniques, it
should be easier tn sec the differences among the diverse scientific questions we
might want to ask, as weil as the difference between questions th.at merit our attent-
ion and ones that don't.

5
Acknowledgments

In preparing this paper I was aided by valuable comments by Paul Griffiths, Eva
Neumann-Held, Christoph Rehmann-Sutter and Cor van der Weele. My thanks also
to colleagues who were willing to communicate with me about bioregionalism:
Lori Gruen, Paul Mankiewicz, William I. Thompson, and lohn Todd.

, See also the interpenetration 01' organism and environment 01' Richard Lewontin (1982) and
Levins and Lewontin (1985) and the treatments 01' Hendriks-Jansen (1996), Maturana and
Varela ( 1987) and Varcla ct al. ( 1991 ).
n Elsewhere (1999) [ have discussed the inadvisability 01' conceiving of this progressive integ-
ration (which, 01' course, can also be dis-integrated) as the il1tern(/Ii~(/tiol1 01' environments. [do
not think it any more helpful to think in terms 01' outsides being brought inside than of insides
(genetic or otherwise) simply being "expressed" or externalized.
170 Susan Oyama

6
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111 The Other Side of the Mirror:
Methodological Reconsideration
of Human Nature
The Burden of Proof-
On the Impossibility of Technology Assessment
for the Human Genome Project

Michael Drieschner

The editors asked me to elaborate a bit on a point I made during the conference at a
panel discussion, namelyon the complexity of natural processes and the warning it
gives us, not to tinker about with it: If it were not for other reasons then for the one
reason that we cannot assess the consequences.
Actually my point of view is no different from what any reader of newspapers
could think of. I feel encouraged to publish this view in the present conference
volume because of my special experience with this kind of questions from my time
in the "Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung der Lebensbedingungen der wissen-
schaftlich-technischen Welt", where in the course of interdisciplinary research and
philosophical considerations (and, correspondingly, much disappointment about its
possibilities) many problems of this kind were discussed. - So, what is at issue?
We are enjoying progress. On average we reach twice the age of our ancestors.
Nobody has to go hungry. Practically all of the 80 million dense population of
Germany live in aftluence, most of them rather struggle with their overweight. We
can reach every location on earth physically within 24 hours. Informationally
we can even be anywhere within fractions of a second, if somebody is there with a
cellular phone.
We can determine over ourselves to an extent unthinkable still a few hundred
years ago, from the election of the president to worker participation, from free
choice of partners and trade to free choice of the number of children. We are even
promised that in the near future we shall be able to determine the quality of our
children, or at least that only those will be born who are free from handicaps. It
should be like paradise. Only people do not seem to be happier or more satisfied
now. Is it possible that happiness does not depend on this kind of changes')
In the late 60s we could have learnt a historical lesson from a coincidence: The
Hudson Institute, Herman Kahn's "think tank", published a book "The year 2000"
(Kahn and Wiener 1967), an enthusiastic picture of the land of milk and honey we
stand on the threshold of, where all problems that harass us will be solved. - In the
very same year there came up the discussion about problems of the environment
and of the Third World. At that time we still mainly spoke of traffic noise and
starvation in the colonies (Heinrichs 1968). In the meantime the discussion has
broadened, and we see that we are weIl on our way of making the world uninhabit-
able for our descendants if we continue to live as we do now. Beyond that, our
way of Iife is such that only a small fraction of humanity can participate in it
(Meadows 1972).
Thus instead of Cockaigne we had suddenly the Apocalyptic Riders. What had
happened? Don't we have everything under contro!, as we thought?
Let us have a look at a case that is far from genetic engineering, that we al ready
174 Michael Drieschner

overlook, though, historically for some time: The automobile! When Mr. Benz built
his first motor carriage the technology assessment of that time could have
emphasized the saving of space for horse stables, the advantage that the motor
carriage would not wst anything when it does not ride, and the higher velocity of
trave!. Traffic victims, the problems of parking, cities adapted to the automobile.
splashing into the open countryside, monoculture of department stores in the inner
cities, the dependence of Germany's entire economy on the automobile: The very
best technology assessment could not have foreseen all that!
Individual traffic is still a limited, relatively small field, open before our eyes,
that has got its heavy impact on Iife only by the development ofthe automobile. But
I think I can show in this field what my concern is: That for the questions of
technology assessment it is all important to look up from what is immediately
before one's eyes and to gain an entirely new perspective.
It is interesting to see that we seem to have so much less time today than in
stagecoach times (when people of our status had to walk, anyway). Did it not seem
self evident that we would save time when we rode faster, taking Iess time for the
same distance? - I know two quite different approaches to explaining this discrep-
ancy. Both are rather schematic. But both have a quality that seems necessary: they
help look up from the workpiece right before my eyes.
The first one is Ivan //lieh's quite serious cakulation that by car one is really
even slower than walking or on bicycle. This comes out because he does not only
cakulate the time immediately needed for the ride. but also the time necessary in
advance for being able to ride: Time for car administration and repair; and mainly
time to earn the money that driving a car costs.
Let us take a rather realistic example: Somebody goes 1000 km by his car per
month, at an average speed of 50 km/ho This costs about 600 DM per month.
acwrding to the table of the German automobile association ADAC. Let us take the
net wage of an average worker being 15 DM per hour. It takes him 20 hours for
plainly driving 1000 km. but for earning the necessary money it takes this average
worker another 40 hours. So actually it takes him 60 hours for 1000 km, which
results in an average speed of 16 km/ho You go that fast on bicycle as weil! In reality
nobody would go 1000 km every month if he had not that easy and seemingly swift
method to do so by car. On foot he would maybe go 100 km per month and take for
that distance, very roughly, 20 hours. Now he prefers a car: If he wants to have a car
ready at hand, cven if he does not use it, he would have to spend the equivalent of
20 hours of work. In order to cover 100 km "quickly" he would use another 2 hours.
So on the whole he would spend 22 hours to cover 100 km: A human being Iiving
the way of life of stagecoach times could not save time by using a car, but it would
take him extra time!
An entirely different model is used by earl Friedrich von Weizsäcker in order to
make understandable the shortage of time of our contemporaries. Maybe this model
is as valid as Ivan //lieh's. Weizsiicker gives the following calculation: Let us as-
sume that I go to see friends or visit events that are within an ho ur of my home
(or whatever time you choose; for OUf caku1ation this does not matter). I assume for
simplicity that such opportunities are distributed uniformly around my home. Then
the number of opportunities I can reach easily is proportional to the surface I could
reach within an hour. When I walk, that surface is a circle with radius 5 km. When
 On the Impossibility ofTechnology Assessment 175

I urive it is a circle with rauius 50 km, that is with a surface one hunureu times as
large. Thus a uriver has about one hundreu times as many opportunities he coulu or
might want to visit as a peuestrian. - No wonuer he runs short of time!
Those calculations may serve as examples for an unconventional wiuening of
our view. At the same time they may illustrate that technology assessment depenus
largely on OLIr imagination: If there is a possibility we have not thought 01', but
which is crucial, our whole technology assessment is useless.
Let us return to the consequences of technical interventions into our lives: They
are much more complicateu than transportation ! Already the climate on earth is so
complex a structure that we have striven in vain for many uecaues to preuict the
consequences of the increase of CO 2 in the air. How much more this must be valid
for the extremely complex interrelations within a human organism or human
society! An intervention as simple as the introduction 01' "the pill" - how much has
it revolutionized not only the relations between sexes, but our whole way of life. Or
take the phone: materially entirely harmless, barely noticeable; but it has turneu OLIr
entire social structure upside down!
So now we go aheau and start assembling our offspring from blueprint. That
unfortunate debate about "the certificate" ("Schein") some time ago had one merit,
though: it brought into public awarencss once again that abortion coulu be a
problem. Whoever thinks abOlIt it at all in Germany, as, l'or example, the colleagues
from the medical ethics department, mostly sees the issue - that seems self-evident!
- only under the aspect of seil' uetermination ol' the parents: To the same extcnt as
my profession or my consumption is at my disposal, I shoulu be able, as far as
technically possible, to determine the ljuality 01' my offspring. The next step of
technical progress seems to be within our scope: Just now TV news report that the
first human chromosome has been sequenced completely: the rest 01' the human
genome will probably follow shortly. Nobouy knows up to now what we can do
with this knowleuge. But certainly a technical application will be l'ound, just as in
the cases of all scientific innovations until now: There was always a (profitable!)
application at hand! Think only of the technology ol' in vitro fertilization - it was
the one invention that maue the misfortune 01' a childless couple areal tragedy in
that it promiseu a technically realizable remedy.
In the meantime we have become pruuent: we think: "We have learnt that every
new technology was chargeu with side effects we hau not imagineu when it was
introduced. Thus we are doing technology assessment to gain control over this
problem. Unfortunately this uoes not work yet one hundred percent satisfactorily,
we are still at the beginning. So we shall have to uo massive technology assessment
research!" - Has anybody ever considered that this beats everything in human
hubris, over-estimating human abilities? As if it were ever possible to "gain control
over" the consequences 01' human action, beyonu the very immediate ones!
If we have learnt anything at all from genome research of the last decades, it is
this: The structure of the genome is extremely more complex than we had ever
imagined beforehand. Any progress in this research brings to light new complica-
tions, every glance mound a new corner opens our view at a whole new scenery of
streets and squares of a complexity inconceivable before. Structurally one couId
have imagined something like that from the beginning. But what kind of complex-
ity this really would be, nobody could have guessed be forehand. Still much less
176 Michael Drieschner

anyone is capahle of guessing the consequences of technical interventions in

systems that are so complex.
Certainly it is conceivable that we might find interventions that have a very
narrow positive effect, for example cure a certain hereditary disease. But even there
we should ask if such intervention makes sense. Take the example of a hereditary
disease: There are even today good ways to prevent the birth of handicapped child-
ren, in that parents who are in danger to have offspring with hereditary diseases
would not have offspring at all. There are many, in their majority worse reasons for
which couples decide not to have children, so why not for the reason that those
children might be handicapped? - We have learnt from this weIl-known method of
preventing hereditary diseases, which abyss can open behind "pure technique", in
this case the whole complex of eugenics. This turns out true even for methods the
technique of which is simple and the consequences foreseeable. How much more
this must be true of a so far unknown technology, even if our first impression is
simple and harmless as weIl. Thus the best requirement for the introduction of a
new technology would be the proof, according to the strongest criteria, that its
application is harmless.
This requirement is recognized even today as valid, but, alas!, rather according
to the guideline: "If nobody can think of anything that can be harmful with that
technology, we can regard it as harmless." - The criterion should rather be the other
way around, that the one who proposes a new technology is obliged to show that he
has checked all (really all!) possibilities, and has found that none is harmful,
including "social" consequences, as in the case of the eugenics debate.
One can easily see that nobody will be able to do that, regardless of the type of
technology. That means that we should not start at all tinkering with the genome!
We started with examples from transportation and other "simple" technologies.
For those, in principle, the same considerations apply. But would not the whole of
society come to a stand-still if we stuck to the advice not to tinker with complex
systems?
What do those stories with cars and blueprints aim at? - They are supposed to
open up a view that is not given automatically with considering technological
problems, that is not included in "technology assessment". The examples should
verify my conclusion:
There might be cases where the harvest for humanity from a technology is
obvious. Take, for instance, the necessity to check cholera: Se wage had to be con-
structed, and nobody gave long considerations about the question whether se wage
could be harmful. But se wage was a technology weil tried and tested from Roman
times on. - When it came to carrying through smallpox vaccination one had to
weigh up the consequences of an epidemic against the consequences of vac-
cination. It was a forced decision under conditions of ignorance - as it is necessarily
in almost all practical cases.

But: In the case of genetic engineering the problem is that we know, on the one
hand, so little about the very complex systems involved, such that technology
assessment is practically impossible; and that, on the other hand, the consequences
of not applying genetic engineering are obviously harmless. - This is probably an
unorthodox view; because it is rather easy to draw a line from any scientific method
 On the Impossibility of Technology Assessment 177

or ~..:ientifi..: result whatsoever to consequen..:es that are, if not salvation of mankinJ,

at least a Jecisive improvement of its rate. To prove that it suffices to reaJ at ran-
dom so me last paragraphs from papers in, say, S..:ientific American! - Such claims
are rather easily unmaskeJ as publi..: relations talk. If one gives it a closer look one
..:an see, in general, that there is no harm in keeping away from the proposal. And
one can see as easily that nobody can in the least imagine what the con~;equen..:cs of
realizing the proposal would be for the very complex system at stake.
It is so easy - with one false move within the almost absolute power of our
technical means - to destroy what cannot be re..:onstructeJ within centuries!
To weigh soberly in such Jiscussions, not to let oneself seJuce by arguments of
"technical sweetness": Such are the neeJs of the moment.

Reference

Ikinrichs J (1968) Weltern~ihrungskrise oJer: Ist eine Hungerkatastrophe unausweichlich')

Rowohlt, Reinbek
Kahn H, Wiener A (1967) Thc year 2000; a framework f(lr spcculation on thc next thirty-three
ycars. Macmillan Ncw York
MeaJows D (1972) Thc M.I.T.-Cluh of Rome Project on the Pn.:Jicamcnt of MankinJ. M.I.T
Press, CamhriJge, Mass.
Philosophy and the Concept of Technology -
On the Anthropological Significance
of Technology

Armin Grunwald

1
Anthropology, Methodical Philosophy, and Technology

The philosophy of technology has always (explicitly or implicitly) been interested

in the anthropological dimension of man's relationship to technology. The philo-
sophical question of our concept of technology can 't be treated separately from that
of our concept of humanity. The philosophy of technology, therefore, always has a
more or less strongly pronounced anthropological component. 1 This can, on the one
hand, be individualistically oriented, seen in relation to individual humans and
individual technologies (in the "technicalized" formulation, often known as the
"human-machine-interface"). On the other hand, the cultural and social aspects of
the relationship between society and technology can be emphasized, as is usually
the case in the sociology of technological systems (Halfmann 1996). The first ex-
plicit attempt at a philosophy of technology (Kapp 1877) is primarily an interpre-
tation of cultural history with special reference to technology, and sees technology
(individualistic viewpoint) above all as an amplification and extension of man's
organic capabilities. Technology is perceived as a projection and a strengthening of
human organs, in particular, of the hand's abilities. 2
From the anthropological point of view, the hypothesis of technology as
"augmentation of human organs" was developed in particular by Gehlen (1986):
technology as a compensation for the deficits of the "Deficiency-Being" humans
("Mängelwesen", cf. Gutmann 1998). In the philosophy of culture and in social
theory, approaches wh ich are sceptical of technology (Heidegger, Illich, y Gasset,
Anders, Marcuse) as weil as optimistic or pro-technology viewpoints, for cxample,
of marxist origin (Bloch), have been proposed.
In comparison with the claims of non-metaphysical and therefore methodical
philosophy (Hartmann/Janich 1996), however, serious problems characteristic for
this school of thought soon became evident. To a great extent, the philosophy of
technology, as it presents itself on the bookshelves of a library in an institute for
philosophy, consists of metaphysics, essentialism, platonism, idcologically-intlu-
enced opinions, attempts to imbed the development of technology in global inter-

I This becomes apparent as early as Hegers dichotomy of master and servant. The alienation of
human beings through labor and technology makes representation of world and self-awareness
possible (cf. leiden 1994 and the literature cited there).
On this example we can easily see that 19'h-century technology was primarily machine tech-
nology. Today, one would probably tirst name the paralleIs between computers and the human
brain (in the standard interpretation: for criticism of this view. s. lanich 1996).
 180 Armin Grunwald

pretations of cultural history, constructing relationships to rdigious beliefs, and

combinations of such approaches. The philosophy of tcchnology is, if one makes
the exception of some of the developments since the 1970's (Grunwald 1998,
pp 184 fr.), abovc alL the arena for controversies of partially ideological approach-
es, in which technology is seen only from the culture-philosophical viewpoint of a
dichotomy between scepticism vs. euphoria. Neither the pessimistic nor the opti-
mistic interpretations, however, help to shed light on the questions, what character-
izes "technology", what is typical for "technical action", what is specifically
"Technological" or "Technical" in these concepts, or, to express it negatively, what
"non-technical" action, what "non-technology" could be, or what might be "non-
technological" or "non-technical" about them. They are, rather, - and that should
suffice as criticism - an expression of historically contingent scenarios of the future
and of their projection onto technology, are orten literary representations 01'
civilization, hut provide little in the way of philosophical c!arification. As early as
in Lenk ( 1973, P 199), we can read "that the philosophy of technology couldn 't
establish itself as a philosophieal discipline ... and that it - according to the re-
spective author's original attitude - turned out to be either an apologetic or a critical
global judgement" (translation A. G.).
The aims and the objects of the philosophy of technology seem, to a great extent,
to be unclear. Conglomerates made up 01' the theory 01' natural and engineering
sciences, scientific ethics, questions 01' political control of. and of the psychology (lf
dealing with technology, critique 01' civilization, feminist views of technology,
anthropology, and social theory, even to the relationship between technology and
religion are suhsumed under the term "philosophy 01' technology". This diffuse
and somewhat arbitrary juxtaposition is retlected in the corresponding anthologies
(for examples, s. RappIDurhin 1982, Miteham/Mackey 1983). The philosophy 01'
technology would see m to be little more than a eatch-all term for heterogeneous
retlections on technology, instead of a branch 01' systematic philosophy with a well-
defined subject matter and c!ear objectives. 1
[n order to shed more light onto this question, two different levels 01' reconstruc-
tion and retlection on the objectives 01' a methodical philosophy 01' technology,
which takes the constitution of technological knowledge by technical action into
consideration, were proposed in an earlier contribution (Grunwald 1998):
- explanation of technical action in the sense of a rational reconstruction and the
disc!osure of the formal pragmatics of the orientations for action which intluenc-
cd them (cf. Grunwald 2000a on planning action in general);
- improvement 01' the practice of technica[ action by retlection of the prerequisites
for validity and of the linguistic possibilities and limitations in dealing with
technology.
This approach, wh ich entails taking the point of departure for a philosophy of
technology in the reconstruction of technical action, stands, however, - as does the
greater part of the literature on the philosophy of technology - implicitly under the
premise that the technical artifacts, the technical hardware, is the center, if technical

.1 '"Indeed, the literature on the philosophy 01' techpology is rather disappointing ... We prefer to
suspend judgement on it until philosophers pro pose more realistic models of both science and
technology" (Pinch/Bijker 1987. p. 19).
 Philosophy and the Concept ofTechnology 181

action is defined as action which makes use of technology (Part 2). This - so to
speak: ontological- prcmise is, however, on the one hand, too restrictive, but is, on
the other, not as selective as necesssary. Defining an action which makes use of
technology as technical action overlooks the fact that non-technical practices also
make use ()f tcchnical artifacts, aso for example, many art-genres. On the other
hand, figures of speech wh ich use the adjective "technical" without necessarily
meaning technical artifacts have also become accepted and intelligible usage. as,
for example, in the case of "mediation-" or "meditation-techniques". This observa-
tion gave the impulse for the present contribution. Its purpose is to correct the
premise stated above, to distinguish between the paired attributes "technical"j
"non-technical", the differentiation of technical artifacts from non-artifacts, and to
use the former as a fundamental distinction which would be fruitful for a philo-
sophy of technology.
In this approach, one may, at first glance, miss the traditional relationship
between the philosophy of technology and anthropology. It seems to have been
sacrificed to methodological purism. In a certain sense, this is also actually the case
- inasmuch as we make no use of metaphysical orientation (in particular) in our
view of mankind's relationship to technology. We will sec, however, that new
insights can be gained in a new culturalistic aspect, which concerns the relationship
between humanity, technology, and culture. Its point of departure is the observation
that the term "technology" has a material (i.e., concerning the artifacts) as weil as a
procedural (concerning the technical processes) aspect (Janich 1996, Grunwald
1998). The question is, why there is at all in colloquiallanguage a common generic
tcrm 'Technik" [i.e., "technology" + "technique"] for such heterogeneous activities
as playing the piano, surgical operations on the hip, and aircraft. 4
Where is the common semantic kernet of thcse various concepts? The anthropo-
logical frame of reference lies, so to speak, hidden in this linguistic-philosophical
question, because philosophical anthropology is, to a great extent, reconstruction of
language (Kamlah 1973).
In the following, the question of the semantic kerne I of the technology concept
will be pursued, in order to gain insight into the anthropological and cultural
significance of the property "technical". In the pursuit of this goal, the hypothesis
that the semantic kernel of the technology concept lies nearer the procedural- than
the artifact-aspect, and that it approximates the concept of the "technical rule"
which is well-known in the theory of action. The anthropological and cultural
function of technology lies in the fact that it - in the historical development of
situations and contexts (in the "stream of action", Schwemmer 1987) - makes
repeatability, recognizability, and continuity possible - in other words, it enables us
- despite the mutability of individual historical situations - to retain an entity.
inasmuch as it can be repeated, or rather, rcproduced. This, further, leads us to
understand technological and technical rationality as a model for all rationality,

4 The discussion initiated here is only fully comprehensible when the reader knows that the
German word 'Technik" includes in its denotat ions not only the equivalent of the english term
"technology" but also the skills known in English as "techniques". Whenever in the following
text the German term 'Technik" is used in a sense which includes both of these meanings. it
will be left untranslated in the original German form (as "Technik").
 182 Armin Grunwald

to wit: as the cor.structive production of personal and contextual invariance. This,

however, means abandoning the - in the philosophy of technology - supposedly
evident artifact-reference as a concept of retlection.

2
Technology as a Concept of Reflection

Presumably, all attempts at developing a comprehensive concept of technology

have to deal with the dichotomy of a material concept of technology (technology as
a theory or an artifact) on the one hand, and a procedural concept of technology
(technology as a process) on the other. The philosophy of technology is often
concentrated solely and directly on technology as "hardware" (Kapp 1877; Gehlen
1986), and aims at the "more precise analysis of the position of things in sequences
of action" (Wagner-Döbler 1989, p 25; in the same sense also Ropohl 1979/1999).
In this connection, the anthropologically interesting questions are: a) how humans
arrive at the artifacts, b) which relationships between human beings and artifacts
exist, and c) - if this question is ever posed - how do they dispose of the artifacts?
The definition of technology - in comparison with Ropohl ( 1979) broadened by
inclusion of the social practices with which the artifacts are connected (Grunwald
1998) - is founded on this basic consideration: technology as a generic term for:'
- practices of the development and production of technology,
practices in which technology is employed, and for
- practices in which technology is withdrawn from its context of use (i.e., dis-
posal, recycling. deposition).
This definition has, as opposed to many others (prototypical is Dcssauer's
platonically-motivated definition 01' technology as "real being out of idcas"), the
advantage 01' proximity to actual systems of action. It finds its point 01' departure in
existing social practices, and not in impractical mctaphysical conccptions, and has
the further advantage of apparent evidence in the current discussion on the ellccts
01' technology ami how to cope with them. In this discussion the effects and impacts
01' technology do not, of course. refer to the consequences 01' piano virtuosity or 01'
meditation techniques, but to the impact 01' road and power plant-construction, of
computerization of the workplace and of life in general. or 01' the unlimited use 01'
the automobile.
[n spite of these advantages 01' a semantic orientation, the definition given above
iso in actual fact, no genuine definition 01' technology, becausc it presumes the term
"technology" to be already given or pre-defined: the concept of "technology" is
taken as given, and not defined. As in the techn,)logy assessment discussion. the
conception of tcchnology as a number of concrete artifacts is postulated. Artifacts
are the nucleus around which the action contexts of production, utilization, and
disposal revolve.o In spite of the pragmatic orientation 01' this definition, onto-

, The following list is not disjuncted. In production and disposal as weil. technical devices can
also be employed.
(, So also Gethmann/Sandcr (1999). who detine technical action as device-supported. as action
with the help of (concrete) technical instruments.
 Philosophy and the Concept of Technology 183

logical orient:Jtion on the artifacts is retained; these form the "hard" substratum of
the philosophy of technology. The reproach against the older philosophy of tech-
nology, wh ich is taken into consideration in the above definition, that one can not
make material technology the starting point of a comprehensive philosophy of
technology, because it simply isn't "given", but rather itself has to be developed
(Grunwald 1998), is, in fact, correct, but it neither suffices to overcome the fixation
on artifacts (even a philosophy of technology as a theory of poietic action is nonc-
theless interested in the question how the artifacts come abollt), nor does it provide
an argument for grasping the semantic kernel of the technology concept. The
"pragmatization" of the term "technology" has actually been initiated by the above
definition, hut it hasn't been consistently implemented. The continuation of this
cndeavor is the purpose of the present contribution.
In some approaches, material and procedural aspects of technology are, in fact,
taken into consideration with equal weight. But the question isn't posed (much less
answered) which common characteristics would justify a common definition. If by
'Technik" I"technology" + "teehnique" I the mastery of action patterns such as the
techniquc of playing the violin or surgieal techniques as weil as machines, tools,
and devices (Grunwald 1998) are understood,7 then the question poses itself either
where the common denominator of procedure and substanee might be found, or
which subsumption relationship might apply in one direction or the other.
If the concept 'Technik" is used linguistically divested of any connotations to
technical artifacts, if one can discover the property "technisch" aside from the
discourse on technical artifacts, then the introduction of the concept of technology
which explicitly or implieitly makes reference primarily to the technical artifacts
would be too narrow. And this is in fact the case, as a few examples show:
- techniques of mathematical rcasoning ("mathematische Beweistechnik"), für
example, require only exactly-detined terms, established and generally-accepted
rules, as weil as the corresponding knowledge, but no devices or machines;
- techniqucs of interpretation ("Interpretationstechniken") in literary studies put a
partieular method in the foreground, which eonsists of addressing specifie
questions to the text, and in eertain steps in answering these questions, but whieh
makes no use of technical artifacts;
- interview techniques ("Interviewtechnik") don't merely consist or a set of
microphones and recording instruments, but mean rather certain ("teehnieal'?")
knowledge or skills in attaining specific interview goals by effective formulation
of questions;
- theatrieal techniques ("Schauspiel techniken") also designate the skills and
knowledge of actors and actresses who intend to produce certain effects with
their respective roles, and not machines or devices used in stage technique.
The equation of technical action with actions in wh ich artifacts playa part leads
to unsatisfactory results, even when one tri es to see it from the reverse direction:
for example, many artists use technical devices (brushes, audio/video recorders,
cameras, multimedia equipment). Equating this type of work with technical action

7 In this sense cf. also Peter lanich under the entry 'Technik" in the "Enzyklopädie Philosophie
und Wissenschaftstheorie·', Stuttgart 1996.
I R4 Armin Grunwald

wüuld, in individual cases, be possible, but it Wüuld also leave many of its aspects
out of consideration (probably just the decisive ones). Cutting a ribbon with a pair
of scissors, as is customary, for example, when a bridge is otlicially opened, could
also be interpreted as a technical act, but this wOllld seem - pragmatically and
semantically - to miss the main point, the actual nature of the ceremony.
The semantic kernel of the term 'Technik" (technology and technique) can
therefore - with reference to its common use in everyday speech - not consist
solely of the "hardware"-aspect of technical artefacts. The linguistic distinction
technical vs. nontechnical is not identical to the distinction between technical
artifacts and immaterial entities like procedures on the one hand and natural entities
on the other. The actual use of the concept of technology in speech and in society
wOllld see m to indicate something else, something more general: the semantic
relationship hetwan "Technik" and regularity. For the examples listed above, the
fact that the respective technique can be employed repeatedly is constitutive:
regardless of context or contextually modified. [f this "repeatability" is obvious for
the production or use of most technical artifacts (a hammer or an automobile can be
used repeatedly, a device can be produced repeatedly, according tu the correspon-
ding specifications), there is nonetheless the possibility of repeated use also in other
contexts than in those of technical artifacts: knowledge (in the form of rules) of
dramatic or interview techniques can, once learned, also be employed repeatedly.~
The hypothesis wh ich is to be developed below is that the semantic kerne I of the
'Technik"-concept lies in this "repeatability". [n the use of the term "Technik", we
will be interested in the question, to what extent this "repeatability" can be sustain-
ed, and to what extent the suggested regularity can be transformed into action. In
short: when talking about "Technik", we are interested in the possihilities allli
limitations ol the construction o( situation invariance. This view of the concept of
'Technik" sets the procedural aspects in the foreground, but can then (e. g., accor-
ding to the tripartite definition given above) also integrate the material aspects by
means of the action patterns connected with the artifacts. [n this manner, both the
material and the procedural views of "Technik" are not simply additively juxta-
posed and independent, but rather both aspects are integratcd as regards content
by means of a general (procedural) definition of "Technik". The orientation of the
"Technik"-concept on situation invariance and regularity means, therefore, in
summary:
I) Not objects (technical artifacts) are the raw material of rctlection in the philoso-
phy of technology, but rather technical action (as set out in Grunwald 1998).
2) This however, does not per se me an action carried out with the help of technical
artifacts (as was suggested in Grunwald 199R), but action governed by rules
which are set up according to certain requirements of situation invariance.
By means of this linguistic-pragmatic reference, it becomes c1ear that technical
action can not be separated ontologically from a field of non-technical action.

x On the other hand, teehnieal artifacts can also be used in a manner that places the uniqueness
of the aet in the foreground (e. g., in eertain art-genres, action painting. performances). This
consideration would also seem to argue in favour of defining the category "technical"
independently of any referenees to technical artifacts.
 Philosophy and the Concept of Technology 185

The designation "technical" is, rather, an attribution carried out on the basis of an
interpreting reconstruction. Neither the property "technical" nor the property
"non-technical" exist by themselves, but rather we constitute "technical" and "non-
technical" by attribution (ascription). An action can be viewed from the aspect
"technical-reproducible"as weil as under the aspect of a unique deviation from the
rule: the category "technical" is a cultural construct. The distinction technical vs.
non-technical is not an ontological one, but rather a pragmatic differentiation of
interest for social theory.
The attribution "technical" or "non-technical" is the result of a reflection on
invariance in carrying out actions. This ret1ection focuses on the questions how and
in which respect these actions are invariant. The concept of technology therefore
turns out to be a concept of rejlection for the degree of situation variance or in-
variance of action contexts. We can perceive an interview as an action governed by
rules (and c1assify it as "Technik"), or address it as a unique occurrence (as a sort of
performance). These attributions can, of course, not be made arbitrarily: strongly
schematized action can only with great difficulty be described under the aspect of
uniqueness (although, as a rule, this, too, is possible, because every standardized
action also shows aspects of uniqueness). The technology concept is, therefore, a
concept of retlection for the degree of situation invariance of goal-means-
relationships. It makes reference to the difference between a mode of action strictly
governed by rules and the historically unique performance of the act. By retlection
of "Technik" in these contexts, the deviations of the latter from the former can be
made subject of the discourse. Distinguishing "technical" from "non-technical" is
the fundamental differentiation which enables us to make the connection bctween
the historically unique and and the endlessly reproducible (on the cultural
significance of this relation. cp. part 3).9 The use of the attribute ··technical"
emphasizes the situation invariance of goal-means-relationships and the possibility
of teaching and learning the relevant operations; techniques can be taught and
learnt because they are standardized and formalized as rules. (Part 3). In the
following, the term "regularity" will tirst be detined more accurately in both of its
denotations "repeatability" and "reproducibility" in order to build up on these
foundations and in order to be able to characterize better the concept of "Technik"
as a concept of retlection for this standardization of actions.
The term "repeatability" makes reference to actions: actions or action patterns
are detined as repeatable when instructions for their execution exist, which can be
followed; if a plan of action can be given which can be carried out and supervised
in aseries of individual steps. The repetition of actions can be interpreted as the
repeated renewal of action systems (Hartmann 1996). Action systems are abstrac-
tions which transcend concrete actions in reference to unique historical situations
(Schwemmer 1987). Actions (the actual performance of individual actions) are
historically unique occurrences, and as such are not repeatable, because they also

9 For example, the difference between technology and art. One can, of course, reconstruct
painting with brushes and oil colors as a technical act in the above sense (e. g., in order to learn
or to teach it); the essential aspects from the point of view of art would in this interpretation
probably be overlooked.
186 Armin Grunwald

comprise contingent. time-dependent aspects. They are repeatable only as repeated

renewals of situation invariant (or covariant) defined action patterns in their
respective. historically new constellation. Prerequisite for the possibility of
repeatability is, therefore, the preceding constructive task of ahstractio/l.
On the other hand. conditions and processes as results of actions carried out can
be reproducible. While "repeatability" makes reference to action as a means, the
term "reproducibility" refers to the potential repeated production (or bringing
about) of certain results of action(s). These results can not be completely identical-
their topographical and temporal coordinates, at the very least, would, as a rule,
vary. On the example of this consideration, it becomes clear that the term "re-
producibility" has to include pragmatic criteria which point out what respectively is
to be understood under "identical" results. The attribute "reproducible" is assigned
relatively, according to previously-defined equivalence-criteria. These last are
oriented pragmatically on the objectives and conventions of the respective field of
activity (part 3).
One may be inclined to ans wer the question on the relationship between repeat-
ability and reproducibility by stating that the former would have to be considered to
be the prerequisite for the latter: if astate or condition is to be reproducible, then
there must be a sequence of actions the repetition of wh ich should lead to the result
desired. Seen pragmatically, this conclusion would be premature. On the one hand,
one can, as a rule, arrive at the same result also by different courses of action; on the
other hand. the simple repetition of actions under different circumstances must not
necessarily always lead to the same result. Strictly speaking, the repeatability of a
certain action pattern is not the prerequisite for the reproducibility of the state or
condition it brought about (Grunwald 1998). An inductive conclusion based on the
observation that certain repeated sequences of operations repeatedly lead to the
same state or condition as a result, and to the appeal that, whoever wants to bring
abOllt the said condition should please carry out the sequence of operations given. is
neither logically nor pragmatically conclusive (Grunwald 2000a). [n a pragmatic-
ally fully satisfactory sense, however, one can often successfully adhere to it -
relative to the contextual requirements on "equivalence" or "equality" and to the
availability of adequate action systems. [n this "pragmatic" sense, then, even the
assertion that repeatability is the prerequisite for reproducihility would be justified.
80th terms make reference - in different ways - to regularity, to the possibility of
uniformity of action. or of the production of certain states or conditions.
[f repeatability is connected with the possibility of being able to formulate plans
of action abstractly. and with the presuppositiun for the voicing of appeals to carry
out certain actions, the term reproducibility is situated at the level of the results of
these actions. The results of actions develop, however. only in concrete situations:
the situation invariance of repeatability gives way to situation-dependency of the
attainability of the action's objectives (of reproducibility; Grunwald 2000a).
Finally, these considerations prompt us to the following linguistic-pragmatic
suggestion for the detinition of 'Technik". We call precisely those action patterns
"technicai" which can be reconstructed in the form of technica/ ru/es. Technical
rules should be propositions about regularity which could be provided with a
universal quantifier in certain aspects (as regards the corresponding experiments,
the circumstances, or time; for more detailed treatment, cf. Grunwald 2000a,
 Philosophy and the Concept ofTechnology 187

chap. 2.1; on formalization, cf. Hartmann 1993 pp 149 tf.). In the form of a goals-
means-relationship in the sense or the theory of action, oriented on the category of
reproducibility, the reconstruction proposal is:
For all situations Si wh ich can be assigned the predicate Pj, the conclusion applies: if the effcct
E is to bc reproduced, wh ich. for example. could consist in bringing about a chain of events or
attaining a certain state or condition. then the action pattern A should be employed.

Situation invariance in the case of technical rules is a consequence of the stipulation

that that certain relevant aspects Pi of the situation fulfill certain conditions.
lustification of technical rules requires the statement of the corresponding attribute
Pj , The ensemble of these attributes should be called the area of validity V of the
technical rule. The functioning of "Technik", the "sense" of the property "tech-
nical" relative to observance of its validity is correctly reconstructed by this
linguistic formulation, because it makes possible the delimitation of the invariance
in action constituted by the ruks from the context-dependent variables. The
concept of technology as a concept of retlection (s. above) makes reference to just
this delimitation. The reconstruction of the property "technical" by means of
technical rules proves itself to be technology's claim to validity invariance with
regard to changes of place, time. and persons. How this reconstruction can be
retlected in (a) technical action with the help 01' artifacts, and (b) technical action
without the use of artifacts, will be explained below.
(a) The peculiarity of poietic action in the production of "Technik" lies in the
fact that its results form relics, and are durabk. Technical artifacts are materialized,
"hard" goal-means-relationships, becallse they were produced in poietic action as a
mcans to a certain goal. With the end of the poietic action, the fundamental goal-
mcans-relationship has been virtually "frozen". Because technical artifacts are
hardware. they can be used repeatedly,!O whether to reach one and the same goal
(drive over a bridge, pound in a nai! with a hammer, write a text on a computer), or
for other pllrposes not originally intended by their poiesis (inappropriate or
unintended use/misuse, cf. Rohbeck 1993). This potential for repeated use makes
the formulation of technical knowledge as an invariant in regard to changes of
context possible, relative to those in the fllnctioning of "Technik", defined as the
realization of the goals pursued. This situation invariance is apparently only re-
lative to the observance of certain conditions of validity, as they are expressed, C.g.,
in specifications of temperature or relative humidity. Poietic action is repeatable
and technical artifacts can thereby - at least in principle - be reproduced "repeat-
edly" in a functionally equivalent manner.!! They lend themselves to reconstruction
as the observance of technical rules, and they can therefore be classitied under the
proposed definition of 'Technik".
(b) The definition of "Technik", however. isn't limited to the observance of
rules, but lets itself be applied in similar - but not identical - manner to the

10 The durability of the relics i~ obviously relative. On the one hand, degradation such as
corrosion ami wear affect the artifacts. on the other hand, some artifacts are made for a
single use.
!I This characteristic is the prerequisite for being able to hand down the relevant knowledge of
action and fur develuping technical practices and traditions Uanich 1998).
188 Armin Grunwald

examples of technical action given above, but without the use of artifacts. The
(factua\) durability of the artifacts as aprerequisite for repeated use becomes
irrelevant in this case, and is replaced by the storage of the corresponding
knowledge and skills in society's "archive" (Groys 1997). There, this knowledge is
retrievable, and can be used, e. g., for purposes or reproduction (for example, in the
form of models for economic management, as knowledge for economic policy).
There is, therefore, no reason for limiting the question of repeated use to the
hardware-qualities of technical artifacts. Other social "inventions" as well also
make "Technik" possible. Clearly, reproducibility (of the purpose) and repeatability
(renewal of the action pattern), are amalgamated here, independent of the question
whether technical artifacts are used or not. Technical action in this sense could be
the acts of producing, utilizing, and disposing of technical artifacts mentioned at the
outset, but also interview or literary interpretative techniques, inasmuch as they are
formalized, i. e., consistently governed by a set of rules.
I1' the concept of technology is used as a concept of rctlcction on regularity and
situation invariance in action patterns, should it refer to regularity in the sense of
reproducibility, or in the sense of repeatability'? When we discuss "Technik", are we
talking about Repeatabilities, or about Reproducibilities? The answer is, that only
both of them combined, and only in this combination, form the semantic kernet or
the term "Technik". The reason for this assertion results, on the one hand, out of the
fact that regularity in the technical sense of the term can be inferred only on the
basis of the purposes or these rules. These objectives, i. e., the state or conditiclI1
which is to be reproduced by the repetition of the action pattern, are the integrating
factor, without wh ich a sequence or actions couldn't be perceived as congruous.
Repeatability obtains its "sense" only in view or the result which is to be reprod-
uced. [f we, on the other hand, take the viewpoint of reproducibility, we can 't
discuss this term without taking the level of the means of the action - the repetition
of which is intended to bring about reproduction - into consideration. Reproduci-
bility is, in fact, not strictly bound to the repeatability of a certain seLJuence of
actions (cf. above) - there could also be alternatives -, but it can't function without
the "idea" of repeatability, because it is extremely improbable that a new action
pattern would be spontaneously and ud hoc available whenever reproducibility is
needed (whenever this actually succeeds, one speaks of "great improvizers", which
immediately makes the exceptional nature of this type of action evident). In tech-
nology, action pattern and intention, repetition and reproduction belong together
indivisibly. This means in the categories of goal-means-rationality, that technology
is never only means, but also goal. In fact, "Technik" is in these categories a
"frozen" goal-means-relationship, and not merely an instrumental means to just any
end. To put it trivially, one can 't boil water by using meditation techniques, nor
prove a mathematical theorem by using a washing-machineY

12 This goal-means-relationship is, of course, not onto[ogically "frozen", but rather pragmatic-
ally, relative to the restrictions and basic conditions of the context of action in which it is
imbedded, This relationship can also - in order to use the same metaphor - be "thawed up"
again, when "Technik" (explicitly understood as concrete and abstract "Technik") is used
inappropriately or misused (Rohbeck 1993, Grunwald 1998).
 Philosophy and the Concept of Technology 189

3
Technology in Culture

If the concept of technology serves as an instrument of retlection to enable llS to

disCllSS the degree of regularity in actions, it mllst be seen from two viewpoints. On
the one hand, invariance can be required and action be placed under the demands of
invariance (for example, under the stipulation of being invariant in regard to
personal preferences). This normative orientation can, on the other hand. be con-
fronted with a descriptive orientation, which consists of testing the potentials and
limitations by the constitution of statements of invariance and of technical rules. 11'
the formulation of the question is pragmatically different in each direction, both
nonetheless make reference to the common figure of speech of the reconstruction of
the technical rule.
Constitution of invariance by means of technical rules is a cultural achievement
because it is dependent on attempts at interpretation and reconstruction. Nothing is
invariant by virtue of its very nature, but is constituted as invariant by linguistic
means (so, far example, by retlection on the extent of the property "technical" and
the possibility of establishing technical rules). This constitution takes place relative
to the antecedent determination of criteria for "equal" or "equivalent", and relative
to knowledge of the field of application for the proposed and formulated rule. These
criteria are, in their material expression, oriented on social objectives and cultural
preconceptions, are therefore also themselves culturally and situationally variant.
Rules make possible the continuity of tradition of actions through time. In this
manner, the development and stabilization of collective structures and identities
through time is made possible. and the dimension of long-term action in time is
opened. Arbitrary action by solipsistic individuals without mutual comprehensi-
bility - and comprehensibility functions by means of the reconstruction and inter-
pretation 01' action as observance of rules - doesn't constitute culture or society, but
chaos. The recognizability of situations and processes is a condition for the
possibility 01' culture, stability, and continuity. Othcrwise, there would only be an
episodic stringing together 01' unique situations, between which it isn't even pos-
sible to discover any relationships, because there are no criteria for comparison -
also, for the comparison of situations, processes of abstraction and normative
criteria are necessary.
Retlection on the property "technical" in acting and deciding serves to insure
reliability and predictability as the essential basis of collective action. In this sense,
the category "technical" is a central element for understanding societies. In this
term, the possibilities and limitations of transsubjective knowledge and of trans-
subjective orientations for guaranteeing the functioning of collective practices of
action are retlected. The constitution of reproducibility by means of technical rules
is a cultural and constructive achievement.
Technical artifacts as relics of poietic action guarantee continuity, for example,
as objects of historical research, by means of which history is written ex post. This
is, however, probably not the major share of the property "technical" in this func-
tion. In this connection, well-ordered social relationships and decision-making
procedures, legally concentrated rules of social life, traditions, rites, and rituals
190 Armin Grunwald

must be named, which are present in the collective awareness of a society, provide
for mutual understanding, and can be reactivated as needed. Repetition of action
patterns and reproduction of conditions are not limited to the sphere of technical
artifacts, but are established in social contexts - as necessary prerequisites for the
existence of culture. The dividing line between "technical" and "non-technical"
isn 't congruent to the border between technical artifacts and the non-artificial. 13
The unretlected and wholesale equation of both of these borderlines points up the
dangers of an understanding of technology which makes reference only to the
artifacts. Criticism of technology can, in such cases, miss the real problem, in-
asmuch as it criticizes the engineers and industry, when more probably societal
developments and political mistakes had better been criticized.
As an example, one could cite the apprehensions against the technicalization of
human beings by means of modern biomedicine and medical te<.:hnology. This
technicalization is often asso<.:iated with the installation of machine-parts and
"spare parts" in the human body, even to discussions about the dissipation of the
border between humans and robots in the future. Putting this topic on the agenda as
a problem con<.:erning medicine, implant surgery, or robotics - in other words, in
regard to the artifacts - would miss the central point of the problem. The tech-
nicalization of humans and of our perception of humanity is decided about in the
use of language, in the <.:hoice of metaphors, how these ideas are transported lin-
guisti<.:ally. The cultural self-image of human beings, e. g., the self-<.:hara<.:terization
of humans as cyberneti<.: ma<.:hines or as data-pro<.:essing robots (<.:ritique in lani<.:h
1996), intluen<.:es these developments decisively. From the viewpoint of the philo-
sophy of te<.:hnology, it is of little interest wh ich human organs <.:an be repla<.:cd
(or are being replaced) by te<.:hni<.:al devices, as opposed to the question whi<.:h
technicizing self-images are formulated and spread. If these self-<.:hara<.:terizations
<.:an oe rcconstru<.:ted as tcchnical rules, or consist of technical rules, then they are
examplcs far technicalization of our concept of humanity. This happens completely
independently of references to artifacts, and requires no more than the use of
des<.:riptions which lend themselves to reconstru<.:tion as a technical rule. In this
manner, the cultural effects become clear: if and to what extent our concept of
humanity is being technicalized, dcpends just as strongly on the cultural constel-
lations as on the point beyond wh ich a counter-movement against these tcndcncies
begins to form. Sensitivity in this respect is the result of cultural development.

4
Beyond Technical Rationality

To <.:ontinue: the problem af the prerequisites for the possioility of formulating and
justifying techni<.:al rules poses itself. lustification of technical rules implies the re-
instatement of the original situation, at least in the relevant attributes laid down in
the rule 's area of validity, whereby a repeated testing in active examination of the
rule, for example, in a laboratory, becomes possible: in the original situation an

13 'Technology is never purely technologieal: it is also social: The social is never purely social: it
is also technological" (Law/Bijker 1994 p. 3(5).
 Philosophy and the Concept of Technology 191

action pattern is repeateu. the result 01' this repetition shoulu lie in the regularly
attainable conuition 01' the final state (cL also Lange 1996). By systematic variation
of certain attributes of the original situations, the rule 's scope 01' valiuity can be
uetermineu experimentally - if it hasn't alreauy been establisheu analytically.
Without this possibility of re-instatement 01' relevant aspects of the original situ-
ations, any discussion about technical rules would be senseless. 14 This has serious
consequences for the chances 01' pushing through an iueal 01' technical rules in the
areas of nature anu culture.
Technical rationality as rationality which can be reconstructeu by way 01'
drafting, establishing, justifying, and observing technical rules is often presenteu as
the model for any kind of rationalityls (anu is then criticized as "technically halveu
reason". Habermas). Without wanting to argue in favor of technicalization, I
nonetheless find this hypothesis justified. By me ans 01' technical rules, it is possible
to prouuce invariance with respect to situations anu persons, anu to hanu it down.
The requirement 01' invariance as far as situations and persons are concerned iso
however. nothing other than a demand for transsubjective validity and intersubjec-
tive comprehensibility. wh ich, in general, is the rationality-eriterion of seientifie
retloction and scientifie knowleuge. This develops into teehniealization only when
the model-function 01' technical rationality is exaggerated, and it is pronounced to
be absolute rationality. in the sense that the aim 01' establishing technical rules for a
field of concentration can in any ease be realized. In this sense. technicalization
overlooks the resistance of many cultural institutions against attempts at regulating
or disciplining them by means 01' teehnieal rules. This resistance expresses itself,
for cxample and above all. in the - aecording to context - very different possibili-
ties of restoration of the original situation, state. or condition. At this point. a
methodologieal gap yawns between the teehnieal rules in natural and engineering
seiences, as weil as in teehnology on the one hand, and their non-restorability in
soeiopolitical quest ions, on the other. The aeecssability and reprodueibility 01' the
original condition makes it possible, in teehnieal quest ions, to ereate a basis for
justification discourses whieh is kept apart from ethical and politieal questions by
means of prototheoretical norms (Kambartel 1979). This makes a methodologleal
provision for pre-diseursive agreement possible, for example, in the norms 01'
protophysies (Janich 1997). anu thus opens the possibility of a "calculization", and
therefore of a eonsiderable acceleration and inereasc in the efficieney of justifie-
ation discourses.
In soeiopolitical practices, however, one ean - because of the uniqueness and
historicity of the action eontexts - argue situation-transcedent only relative to the

1-1The attrihute "relevant" is decisive here (this has been overlooked by Lorenzen/Schwemmer
1973). For a physical experiment in a laboratory. the current weather may be irrelevant; for a
demonstration 01' mountain-climbing techniljues. it would be extremely relevant. In historical
political contexts. controversial discussions often revolve around such quest ions.
15 The (practical) concept 01' rationality therefore makes reference to the attributes wh ich - in the
fields 01' action and decision-making - can be distinguished as invariant with respect to persons
(Rescher 1988. Grunwald 2000b). This obviously has to do with technical rules. because such
rules formulate these invariances. and address the ljuestion of their own scope by statement 01'
their area 01' validity.
192 Armin Grunwald

various interpretations of the situation. These are mediated by way of models,

interpretations, theories, and analogies, and lead to weaker arguments, which de-
pe nd on certain conditions. For non-repeatable actions, e. g., for measures in the
fields of politics or of the economy, the formulation of technical rules is, consc-
quently, impossible. Justification, of course, is often sought there - in analogies as
weil as justifications based on models - hased on the model o{ a technical rule:
whenever ... , do ... !
Although this type of argumentation is, for the above reasons, c1early weaker
than the founding of technical knowledge in technical rules, a well-retlected
method of dealing with such "quasi-rules", wh ich takes the scope of their validity
into consideration, is a prudent precept for sociopolitical, i. e., non-technical
planning.
This difference between technically accessible and non-technical fields of
concentration, which manifests itself in the different potentials far the constitution
of technical rules, has its effects in substantial areas of the sciences, namely, on the
possibility of quantification on the one hand, and on the possihility of setting up
laws of progression (Grunwald (994), with consequences for system-definitions
and the development of models, on the other. In a certain sense, it is the difference
between the life world and the laboratory which comes to expression here - wh ich,
again, is an indication of the construct- and cultural nature of tcchnology. As
opposed to the sociopolitical fields, wh ich are determined by individual and
historical uniqueness and just precisely non-reproducible situations, the cernel tlf
the "technical" is reproducibility (Hartmann/Janich (996).
The tcchnicalization of society is, in this connection, not to be understood as
fitting out individuals and institutions with an increasing mass of technical instru-
ments, but as a shift of action contexts in the direction of increasing regularity.
Apprehensions against a "colonization of the lived world" (Habermas) retlect just
this situation. A philosophy of technology which doesn't intend to exc1ude
anthropological quest ions should avoid running into individualistic or biologistic
bottlenecks, and should instead retlect on the cultural imbeddedness and function
of technology, and thereby make it accessible to criticism. The border betwcen
"technical" and "non-technical" is not ontological in nature, but rather pragmatic
and gradual, and is open to the intluences of culture. Shifts of this border often take
place in the form of small increments, which are often scarcely or not perceptible.
The objective of a critical but nonetheless systematic philosophy of technology
would be to reconstruct and retlect upon the borderline between "technical" and
"non-technical" - especially against the political background of the question. how
much technicalization - in this general sense of regularity - is either actually
acceptable, or even desirable. This has little to do with technical artifacts, with the
traditional objects of retlection in the philosophy of technology, but it has quite a lot
to do with social theary.
 Philosophy and the Concept 01 Technology 193

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Human Cultures' Natures -
Critical Considerations and Some Perspectives
of Culturalist Anthropology

Mathias Gutmann

1
Introduction

At the first glanee "anthropology" seems to be a seientifie diseipline eomparable to

other seientitie diseiplines such as physiology or geneties. From this point of view
the subjeet-matter of anthropology resembles some important features of the
"objeets" that are investigated by "c1assieal"' seiences. Assuming this general
similitude the unity of anthropology ean be defined in terms of its subjeet-matter or
in terms of the methods applied. In bOlh eases one is eonfronted with a great variety
of "anthropologies". The speetrum reaehes from genetie, medieal and eeologieal
approaches, to ethologieal, eultural and philosophieal approaches. Further differ-
enees wi~hin the field of eultural studies ean be added, such as eeonomie and even
ethieal eoneepts of human being. If a unity 01" anthropology were assumed lkspite
this variety of diseiplines, it would appear that a eonvergenee of reference must be
supposed. This eonvergence is usually sllbstantiated supposing "eulture-invariant"
aspeets or properties of human beings. For this reason, the deseription of humans
orten refers to biologieal knowledge. As a eonseLjuenee it seems und'lubted that
humans are humane by nature.
This nature of homo sa{Jietls may be defined in terms of genetie as weil as
morphologiea!. anatomieal, ethologiea!. neuro-physiologiea!. evolutionary and
"soeio-biologieal" deseriptions (s. Cavalli-Sforza 1996, Darwin 1972, Lorenz
1977, Eibel-Eibesfeld 1976, Markl 19H6, Thornhill et al. 1997, Sommer 1992: for a
eritieal synopsis s. Duneker 1998 and in this book). Consequently the "euItural"
performances of hOl/1o s(/piens have to be determined as advaneed eontinllations of
the fundamental biologieal properties I.
In very contrast to such "biologistie" approaches hllmans beings are defined as
human by eulture. Culture beeomes a eharaeter that eannot be deseribed in terms of
biologieal knowledge. An un-bridged and unbridgeable gap between nature and
culture of human beings is unavoidable (e.g. Simmel 1996, Portmann 195 I).
Despite the fact, that both positions are eonsidered as eontrary statements on
human nature both of them have one remarkable premise in eommon: both of them
refer to a eoneept of nature and both of them assume that nature is self-evidently the
subjeet-matter of natural seiences (e. g. biology). This deseription of "nature" - and
so a fortiori the nature of human beings - is the very rational of anthropologiea!

Within such a framework even animals "have" the properties of communication and speech:
these are properties that are consiuercu to hc fOllnu at least in nuce.
196 Mathias Gutmann

considcrations and the starting point for the further determination of human nature
itsclf.
From a methodological point of view, both types of argument demand on the
comparison between human and non-human entities, such as animals 2 and plants,
that must provide the basis for a characterisation of human beings. For example
compared with animals, human beings can be determined as "advanced3 animals"
on thc one side, or as "eccentric entities" and "non-animals" on the other side.
8ut despite the fact, that the conclusions drawn from both lines of argument
are to be considered as contrary ("advanced animals" on the one hand and "non-
animais" on the other hand), both of them refer to the same type of ontology,
namely a substance-ontology. 8ased upon substantialist concepts, human beings
are characterised by properties, functions, abilities that are "typical" for the genus
homo. From this point of view, the c1assical attributions of homo have to be under-
stood either as ontological constituents of this genus or as the "aspects" constituting
this genus. Human beings then are considered either as parts of the genus (with
more or less perfect realisations of the respective ontological constituents), or as
concretisations of the aspects themselves (s. Scheler 1947; for further reconstruct-
ions of Schelers point of view, s. Gutmann in press). Therefore, a human being
either "is rational" or "partakes in rationality". 80th "solutions" remain within the
limits of c1assical ontology. The first option treats "rationality" as the property of
individuals (possibly qua participation on the genus of rational entities, which
transforms this position into the second variant). The second resembles a platonistic
variant. 80th ontological schemes are open for further "naturalisation", if human
nature is to be expressed in terms e. g. of biological descriptions. In this case, the
conceptual tension between the two tightly eonneeted ontologieal alternatives is
transformed into a tension between nature in general and human nature as one of its
constitueneies (s. below).
The eonceptual tension that resulted from sueh substanee-ontological found-
ations of the deseription of human entities was identified in literature from an
epistemologieal point of view. Husserl (1973: 480 ff.) points out, that "anthro-
pology", if it is a seientifie discipline, eannot be used as a fundament of philosophy
itself; eonsequently, anthropology requires a foundation from other field~ of
knowledge. If on the other hand, anthropology is considered to provide a basic
fundament for other scienees - ineluding philosophy - the knowledge. wh ich is
used for the constitution of this fundament must be given without referenee to such
knowledge that is constituted by the application of anthropology. The origin of this
tension ean be seen in the insufficient characterisation of the explanClndum of
anthropology.

Following modern conventions, the term "animaI" is used here in the sense of "beast". In fact,
both terms are not synonymous (see e. g. Dewey 1958).
3 The term "advanced" implies not necessarily a "progressive" state. As will be shown later on,
both interpretations are possible, irrespective of the criteria that are used for the comparison.
By referring to the same sets 01' criteria, human beings can be characterised as "deprived"
or "abnormal" animals on the one hand, and on the other hand as "extremely developed" or
"super-animals".
 Human Culture's Natures 197

If "human beings" are thought to be the subject-matter of anthropology, and

anthropology is assumed to provide a comprehensive explanation or description of
human nature, one central aspect, namely the retlexivity of human action should
belong to the field of explananda too. In this case, the fact that human beings are the
only known entities which are at the same time the authors and the very objects of
their descriptions must be expressed in terms of substance-ontology4. And it is
exactly the insufficiency of this task, that argues for the inadequacy of "criterio-
logical" descriptions 5 of human beings.
Such criteriological approaches are often confronted with "grammatological"ll
objections. From this point of view, the fact is emphasized, that the language of
description that must be available even before we are able to apply biological
theories, is semantically irreducible to the level of biological theories themselves.
l.e. the intension of the term "human being" on the level of biological description is
simply different from the intension of the term "human being" in the context of
everyday-lifeworld or even of sociological, historicalor ethical considerations.
Certainly, I do not deny that such grammatological retlections allow adequate
non-reductive and non-biologistic description of the human world. And I will use
them here as an important prerequisite for the culturalist point of view in the last
section of this paper. However, a methodological problem remains, because the
methodological status of natural sciences and their possible descriptions and ex-
planations of human objectivation is unclear. From this point of view, grammato-
logical objections present in a way a mirror-image of the criticised criterioll)gical
approaches of humans. As criteriology attempts to determine humans only from the
side of nature, the other side approaches humans only from side of culture. 80th
remain un-mediated, each other mutually excluding, but referring to the same
central dualism, between culture and nature. This unredeemed contradiction seems
to be the very constituent of both positions.
An alternative can be seen in the attempt to reconstruct the scope of the term
"human being" by referring to all those "objectivations" that are usually denoted by
the notions of "knowledge, science, art, religion or language". These objectivati-
ons, e.g. in the form of Cassirers "symbolic forms", provide the basis for a generic
ddinition of humans as a developing entity. They comprise the "structural" aspects
of human action as a mediated form of constitutive as weil as retlective aspects.
Symbolic forms can be seen as double-barre lied media, providing the basis for the
constitution of human action on the one hand and the self-interpretation of this
action on the other hand.
Following these introductory remarks the typology of anthropological approach-
es falls into three sections. Section 2 of this paper deals particularly with "criterio-

4 lt is the insight into the inadequacy of a substance ontological description of humans, that leads
Hegel to his sarcastic reconstruction of physiognomy and phrenology as immediate (and
consequently inadequate) expressions of human nature (s. Hegel 1973; tor further reading s.
Taylor 1989; Taylor 1978).
5 For the characterisation of "criteriological descriptions of humans see Lohmar (1997).
6 The term "grammatology" is not meant in the sense of Derrida (1983). It refers to the concept
of "philosophical grammar" based e.g. upon the latter Wittgenstein (for further reading e.g.
Kambartel 1968).
 198 Mathias Gutmann

logical" approaches, which usually describe human beings in close relation to

animals (preferentially, but by no means exclusively non-human primates). From
comparisons 7 hetween animals and human beings arguments for and against the
status of human beings as a "Sonderstellung" (an exceptional-state) can be gaincd.
This dilemmatic situation can be shown to be the result of amistake of category
(even before we touch on the problem of "biologism" at all). Criteriological
approaches are by no means restricted to biosciences. Because criteriology does
present a mode of thought and not a scientific discipline it is represented here in
the form of two biological concepts (namely a "homology" and an "analogy"
approach) on the one hand and a philosophical anthropological concept, namely
Gehlen's concept of human being on the other hand. Section 3 deals with a putative
alternative within the conceptual framework of philosophical anthropology itself.
Plessner presents a conceptualisation of humans that is reconstructed as a retlect-
ion-theoretical mode of thought here. In contrast to purely biological descriptions
as weil as to Gehlen 's organismic-theoretical foundation ur anthropology, Plessner
starts with the epistemic constructinn of a boundary-category that allows the differ-
entiation uf three forms of living organisations (plants, animals and humans).
This leads to the fourth section, which deals with so me fundamental methodo-
logical objections against the attempt to describe the human world with reference to
biological theories. The fifth section then gives a short outline of a "mediation-
oriented" approach that provides an alternative fur a systematic anthropology. This
concept of human being refers to some fundamental considerations uf Cassirer and
allows the reintegration of biological knowledge into a framework of human
objectivations presented by the reconstructive devices of the "symbolic forms".
Finally, following the mediation-oriented mode of thought, a "culturalist" approach
is presented that avoids the typical shortcomings of the types of anthropology that
are reconstructed in the sections 2, 3 and 4.

2
Criteriological Approaches

The rational core of criteriulogical concepts is the assumption, that human bcings
are entities with specified properties or characters that can be dctcrmined by com-
parison with olher entities, such as animals or plants. From a methodological puint
of view, anthropology becomes a general ontology of human being:
Die Anthropologie. wo sie eigenständig und fundamental wird. ist deshalh zunächst eine
Ontologie des menschlichen Seins. Sie versucht den Menschen als eil/ S"ielll/es /Inter wll/erem
S"icl/dem ;/1 !Jeslill/II/ell. Aher zugleich so. daß nicht schon aus einer allgem<.:inen ./imllll/"1/
Ontologie. die das Seiende als solches hestimmt. solche Bestimmungen könnten festgelegt
werden: der Mensch soll vielmehr ein genuines Seiendes sein. er ,.;oll <.:ine Sonderstellung im
Sein seihst haben, durch welche er aus dem Zusammenhang des übrigen Seienden zugleich
auch heraustritt. (Lohmar 1997: 136)

7 These comparisons are usually considered as belonging to the field of biological research.
Against such a characterisation some serious objections can be done (s. helow).
 Human Culture's Natures 1<)9

Beeause of the ontologieal eeeentrieity, anthropology will at the same time oe

tightly eonneeted with "eosmologieal" consideration. It is human nature within
nature itself and as apart of nature, i.e. within the variety of other - consequently
non-human - oeings or entities, that eonstitutes the genus (holl/o) equipped with
speeifie and unique properties, abilities ete. This ret1eetion on the integration nf
human nature into nature is eomplemenrary to the underlying substanee-onrology.
beeause it provides the general framework within whieh all the different things.
eonstituted as substanees, will have their plaee. Methodologieal problems obvious-
Iy arise from the ambiguity of the notion "nature".

2.1
The Ambiguity of Nature Reconsidered

As Rehmann-Sutter notes in this book, the term nature shows a fundamental

ambiguity. On the one hand it refers to the ontologieal eoneept 01' a speeified objeet
in the respeet of its being an objeet and on the other hand designates objeets as the
referenees of seientifie deseriptions and explanations. But these two meanings of
"nature" represent only a small however prevalent seleetion of the intensions that
ean be identified within different eontexts such as ontology. mcthodology and
philosophy of seiences, philosophy 01' Iaws or ethies.
Taking into aeeount the extension of the diseussion eonecrning thc term
"nature", it is simply impossible to give a representative outline of all the relevant
present and historieal eoncepts of this term. But at least so me of the charaeterisa-
tions of "nature" must be reeonsidered for the sake of the following reeonstructions
(for further reading s. Rehmann-Sutter in this book).
The term "naturc" can be used with very different connotations. It may be used
in a metaphysieal framework, in order to define the very essenee of a specifie entity
being present or in (/ppeart/Ilce. From this point of view. essential properties or
features must be distinguished from aeeidental ones. However, the speeifie nature
of a human as a rational oeing does then not have any biologieal eonnotation. Even
the diseussion referring to the status of the obligatio can be seen as a metaphysieal
debate, which deals with the difference between "natural rights", that are given to
humans insofar as they are human beings and those rights that only belong to them
insofar as they are members 01' a speeific eommunity or soeiety (s. Hartung 1998).
Kant's attempt to characterise humans as a natural gcnus that is determined hy
rationality, and the necessary oseillation between both aspects, namely its "natural"
determinaey as a rational being on the one hand and the inadequaey of adescription
of rationality in terms of nature may serve as an exeellent example here x (Kant
I977'1-1 977e).
11' one emphasises the status 01' nature as 'I whole, then an enthusiastie coneept of
nature will result, wh ich in 'I way eombines several (different) meanings of the
term:

Lohmar (1997) shows that the definition 01' humans as bdonging to a natural genus leads
necessarily into the considered tension between nature on the one hand and rationality (as
differentia specifica) on the other hand.
200 Mathias Gutmann

Natur' Wir sind von ihr umgeben und umschlungen - unvermögend, aus ihr herauszutreten,
und unvermögend, tiefer in sie hineinzukommen. Ungebeten und ungewarnt nimmt sie uns in
den Kreislauf ihres Tanzes auf und treibt sich mit uns fort. bis wir ermüdet sind und ihrem
Arme entschlafen. Sie schafft ewig neue Gestalten; was da ist, war noch nie, was war, kommt
nicht wieder - alles ist neu, und doch immer das Alte. Wir leben mitten in ihr, und sind ihr
fremde. Sie spricht unauthörlich mit uns, und verrät uns ihr Geheimnis nicht. Wir wirken
beständig auf sie. und haben doch keine Gewalt über sie. (Goethe 1988: 45)

If the term nature is defined by reference to all those objects or events that can be
explained on grounds of sciences (particularly of physics, chemistry and biology),
the concept of nature becomes narrower than the former concepts. Identifying
nature with the realm of biology will lead to a synonymous application of the terms
"biologically" and "naturally", which may be very dose to the modem understanding
of the term nature (s. for example Lovelocks 1995 holistic concept of "Gaia").
The term nature can be used in contradiction to culture. In this case, all those
events, processes or things that were not influenced or generated by human action,
can be called naturally (for further considerations s. Janich 20(0). Finally, the term
nature can be applied to designatc spccific material aspects within the framework of
human practice itself. [n this latter case, the contradiction between nature and
culture is resolved into a difference made from within cultural relations between
humans, and the term nature loses its fundamental connotations (see e. g. Wein-
garten 1998). The debate on the definition of humans (in terms of "human by
nature", as apart of nature or as a cultural entity in opposition to nature) is severely
intluenced by the ambiguity of the application of the term nature. Because of this
confusion, it is useful to have a eInser look on some of the approaches that will
serve as examples for the criteriolngical point of view.

2.2
Culture as a Character

Detining human beings as human by nllture. some features are usually applied to
draw the limits between human and non-human beings. Schcler summarizes those
determinations of human beings as ''l'homme machine, homo{aber, homo {H'Caf!S
er redivivus, homo sapiens, homo mechanicus, homo sensirivus, homo negalls et
patiens, homo parhericus er divinans, homo curans, homo vitalis (homo oeconomi-
Cl/S, homo PO!itiCllS, homo libidinosus) super-homo, homo geometricus" (Scheler
[988:22 f.). All these determinations emphasise a specific aspect of "humanity".
But being apart of nature, human nature is simple a specific concretisation of
nature next to other living beings such as animals. If humans are considered to be
animals with specific properties, there remain at least two possible relations
between animals and humans. On the one hand, human beings can be determined as
anima!s, which are developed in so me respect towards a grade that is unknown
within the reign of animals. Nt!verthe!ess they remain to be animals and their
- specific - properties and abilities are more or less direct continuations of those
abilities and faculties that can be found - at least principally - in animals. On the
other hand, humans can be determined as being !ike anima!s. There may be even
fundamental similarities, but the gap between humans and animals remains un-
bridged. Both alternatives are two sides of the same coin insofar, as humans are
 Human Culture's Natures 20 I

described within the frame of substance-ontology. A short outline of a modern

biological interpretation of this description is the task of the following recon-
structiol1s9 •

2.2.1
Homologies

In accordance with the considerations of Weingart et al. (1997) it is possible to

discern "homology"- from "analogy"-approaches 1o of human nature. Humans are
human hy nature. And as the nature of a species lies within the scope of biology,
one might consider, that biology is the appropriate authority for the scientific de-
scription of the specific nature of humans. Stating a homology-relation of humans
and animals implies that humans are animals:
One reason far utilizing biology to lInderstand humans is the fact of human natural origins.
Humans evolved from apes. Our epigenetie development follows patterns similar to other
vertebrates. In our ecologieal interactions with other speeies and the physieal environment. we
face challenges 01' survival and reproduetion mueh like any other organism. (Weingart et al.
1997:151)

The justification of such a homology-approach can be done assuming the specific

differences of humans in terms of characters. As character-bearing systems, the
same methods can be applied that are used for the evolutionary reconstruction and
explanation of animal characters:
Thus. seientilic inquiry based on a homologieal line 01' reasoning always has ready justific-
ations. Reeonstrllctions 01' our phylogenetic past serve the understanding 01' our morphologieal
design. as weil as psychologieal and behavioural dispositions. Comparative analysis elucidates
wh ich features we share with other speeies and whieh combinations of traits are different. in
partieular with respeet to ccologieally similar spccics. Information likc this ean illuminat<!
biologieal foundations (i.e .. constraints and conditions. 01' human eulturc). (Wcingart ct :JI.
1997: 151)

In this case, human nature becomes an underlying "foundation" of culture, which

itself is a (specific) chameler of humans. Because this character is by definition
- i.e. compared with the "plesiomorphic" features found exclusively in the tield of
non-human animals - acquired during evolutionary transformation, the methods for
the reconstruction of evolution can be applied even for the reconstruction of the
development of this character. The development of culture is understood as an
evolutionary transformation from basic features towards the specitic expression of

9 For a profOll nd eritieism 01' biologistie approaehes sce Neumann-Held in this book.
10The integration 01' biologieal and social deseriptions on the background of biologieal ontology
had to faee systematie and empirieal objeetion that eame from biologieal research itself. The
distinetion between analogy and homology (better eonvergenee and symplesiomorphy resp.
apomorphy; s. e.g. Wägele 2000. Ax 1984) leads to typieal and well-known eontradictions.
beeause the unity of descent (as detiniens of homology) ean only be stated if some evolution-
ary knowledge is al ready available. This knowledge eannot be based upon the differenee
between homology and analogy again. Henee. the knowledge of homology is either unneees-
sary or unjustilied. The same is true for the identifieation of analogy. For further diseussion of
the methodologieal problems s. Peters & Gutmann 1971 & 1972, Weingarten 1992).
202 Mathias Gutmann

this eharaeter (it~ apomorphie state) that ean be found exclusively in humans. The
nature-eulture-differenee is embedded within nature (namely as the nature of
humans as animals). As one important outeome, the deseription of human nature as
~uhjeet-matter of evolutionary biology would result in the determination of eulture-
invariant features, shared by all members of the natural kind hOlllo sapiens ll • These
features should provide the uni versals that are assumeu to exist independent of
eultural uifferenees. Additionally - and this addition eharaeterizes the presenteu
form of a homology approach - eulture itself is a feature that underlies evolutionary
forees or meehanisms. In very contrast to oluer eoneepts of evolutionary biology
(in this ease Thornhill et al. refer to the founder of the "New synthesis", namely
Dobzhansky) culture is not seen as a "'super-organie", "'emergent" event, trans-
cending the limits of natural evolution. Stating instead a direct eonnection between
nature as a starting point and eulture as an evoilltionary extension, eulture (e. g. the
institutions, developed during history) would be uefined as a prouuet of hUJl/an
lIlinds wut their respective interactiolls:
Nu matter how spectacularly lIuvcl human institutions are, they ccrtainly cannol exisl wilhoul
human minds, and musl have heen huilt up over man)' millennia as human minds. which havc
an evolved architccturc, inlcraclcd. (Thornhill cl al. 1997: 20:1)

Obviously, the biologieal foundation interpenetrates even the highest regions 01'
cultural differentiation that may cover their character as simple eontinuation of
evolved natural features:
For eumple, whal seem 10 he "super organic" instilulions may he a ralher direct outeome of
the imeraetion of mental organs wilh variahle environments that evoke particltlar seemingly
transmitted eultural responses. The apparent history may he illusory, however; individual
responses to environment may he mueh more important. 11' so, large-scale, palterned social
hehaviour must arise from relatively transparent sclf-assemhly of a population of adapted
minds, much as in the nonhuman animal casc. (ThornhilI ct al. 1997: 20:1)

For asound eritieism of such an approach we have to eonsiuer the level of "bio-
logieal" theories that are applied as weil as the methodologieal justifieation of Ihis
application. Therefore, before the reproaeh for "biologistie reduetion" is made, one
should have a eloser look at the methods, that are applieu in order to explain
"eulture" in terms of evoilltionary theory. Indeed, several pre-deeisions have to he
noted, beeause they restriet the possible hio{ogica{ outeome:
I. The difference between proximate and ultimate explanations with a very
strong functionalist connotation:
The function 01' the hrain is to generate behaviour that is sensitively cOl1tingcnt on information
from an organism's environment. Thercfore. it is an informalion-processing deviee. It is
important to knuw the physieal structure of a cognitive device and the information-proccssing
programs realised hy that structure. There is, huwever. another level 01' explanation - a
functional level. In evolved systems, form follows function. Thc physical structurc is there
because it embodies a set uf programs; the programs are there because they solved a particular
problem in the past. This fUI1l:tional level of explanation is essential for understanding how
natural selection designs organisms. (Thornhill et al. 1997: 215)

11 The tenn "natural kind" is used here to avoid the ongoing discussion of the unity of the genus
hOlllo see e. g. Tattersall (1997).
 Human Culture's Natures 203

Accordingly, at the level of the phenotype threc aspects of the effect of selcction
can he discriminated:
An organism's phcnotype can be partitioned into (a) adaptations, which are prcsent because
they were selected for, (b) by-products, which are present because they are causally couplcd to
traits that were sdected for (e.g., the whiteness 01' bone); and (c) noise, which was injected by
the stochastic components 01' evolution. Like other machines, only narrowly defined aspects of
organisms fit together into functional systems: Most ways of describing the system will not
capture its functional properties. (Thornhill et al. 1997: 216)

These three levels of phenotypic organisation can be paralleled with the modal
aspects of necessity, contingency and chance, and all of them have to be taken into
consideration for the reconstruction 01' evolution of "functional" characters.
2. Organisms are defined as functional units (their parts e. g. as information pro-
cessing devices):
An organism's phenotypic structure can be thought of as a collection 01' "design features" -
micromachines, such as the functional components 01' the cye or thc livcr. Over evolutionary
time, new design features are added or discarded from thc species' design because 01' their
consequences. (Thornhill et al. 1997: 215)

Organisms are not described as if they were functional units: they simply are
functional units. Conse4uently, such aspects as contingent processes are excludeJ
by definition. This functional reduction provides the fundament for the selection-
mechanism, which is considered to act on different functional designs, developed
during reproduction.
3. The selection is usually described as Darwinian or (particularly in the case of
cultural evolution) as Spencerian selection, wh ich acts on the functional designs
that are confronted with the environment. The selection-values would have to be
defined by the identification of optimisation-criteria. In the case of behavioural
ecological anthropology this would imply:
In brief. individuals are vicwed as facultative opportunists who assess - either conseiously or
not, on either the behavioural or evolutionary time seale - a wide array 01' environmental
conditions (both social and ecological) and detcrmine the optimal litness-maximising strategy,
whereby they can out-compete wnspecifics in terms 01' the numbers 01' genes transmitted to
subsequent generations. As such, behavioural eeology rclies on Darwinian thenry in a hOOlO-
genous sense, and incorporates among its theoretical tools individual selection, inclusive
litness theory, optimisation models, and game theory. (Borgerhoff et al. 1997: 255)

Taking into account this short overview of central pre-decisions of homology ap-
proaches, each of these pre-decisions can be confronted with empirical as weil as
non-empirical objections. If we - for the sake of the argument - set aside the em-
pirical problems (see e. g. Lewontin 1961, Lewontin et al. 1984 and Gould 1988),
there remains the field of methodological problems, i.e. those problems that are
generated by the application of the methods themselves. In this case, the methodo-
logical shortcomings are tightly connected with the language that is applied. They
result from the confusion of different levels of descriptions. This confusion is
reconstructed here in two relevant aspects, namely considering the methods applied
for evolutionary inference and the description of the explanandum itself (the word
"culture") that is to be explained biologically.
204 Mathias Gutmann

Functional Description. In the short sketch of the biological presupposltlons

I gave above, there was no differentiation 01' the language level, irrespective of
whether animals or machines should be described. Because of this missing
differentiation animals are treated "as machines", built up from "micro-machines",
parts of animals such as the brain are treated as information-processing devices etc.
In this case, animals belonged to a specific class of entities, namely machines. And
those machines, called "animals", are characterised by several features, that cannot
be found within the realm of other non-organismic machines, e. g. that they are
alive, reproduce. execute a genetic program etc. (s. for further reading Mayr 1997).
This obvious metaphorical denomination of animals as machines leads to a signifi-
cant asymmetry: on the one side, the construction and driving of machines can be
done without the supposition of one single biological theory. But on the other side,
the introduction of the identification (namely that animals are machines) as a
hiological assumption can only be done, if we are already able to build and drive
machines. The identification of animals as machines cannot be proven to be correct
by referring to biological but to physical knowledge or engineering know-how. And
the physical language-Ievel is obvious methodologically independent from any
biological (and a fortiori evolutionary) assumptions. (For greater Detail s. Gutmann
2000, Gutmann & Neumann-Held 20(0). The analysis 01' the statement, that organ-
isms are functional units exposcs a fallacy of category that can be called a fallacy of
"misplaced concreteness". As one result of this fallacy, the knowledge, which is
borrowed from non-biological sources (e.g. engineering-know-how or physics), is
misunderstood not as a necessary methodological prerequisite of the constitution of
biological objects but as apart of nature. Consequently, the tools that must be
available for the description of "nature" become themselves naturalised. It is
obvious from the citations given above that a functional description of animals
(they may serve as an example for evolutionary unities here irrespective of whether
one considers "individuals", "species", "populations" or whatever to be the actual
units of evolution) refers at least to two different languages of description. The
necessity of the reference to these two languages is covered by the fact, that animals
are treated a.\' machines, their parts as "micro-machincs", or parts of animals are
treated as information-processing devices etc.
The first language-Ievel is presented by ordinary, everyday-lifeworld language
itself. It is possible to describe animals from an everyday-lifeworld point of view
without the application of biological theory. Let us take as an example the descript-
ion of animals that are used for work in the context of agricultural production.
Animals, e. g. horses or cattle, can be used to pull ploughs or to power a mill. In this
context we can describe the animals "as if they were" force producing units. But for
the sake of this description we refer to a second language that provides terms such
as "force". In this case we have to refer to physics or classical mechanics. In the
case of modelling specific properties of the brain in terms of information-proces-
sing devices, we have to refer to communication, computer-techniques and infor-
matics. In all those cases, where knowledge and know-how from non-biological
sources is borrowed and applied within a biological context for the description of
properties of living entities, the result of this description must not be misunderstood
as an identification of the described entities with the descriptive means. Le.,
describing an animal e. g. as if it were a force-producing unit does not imply that
 Human Culture's Natures 205

animals are foree-produeing units. Thereforc, we apply those non-biologieal know-

ledge and know-how as "models for" the introduetion of notions into biologieal
theory. Consequently, the maehines or devises, we use as a basis for this modelling,
are not "models of' the modelIed living entity (for the differenee between "model
for" and model 01" see Gutmann 1996, 2000, Gutmann & Neumann-Held 2000,
Janich & Weingarten 1999). The eonfusion of the respective language levels that
leads to the misinterpretation of (in this case functional) models as models of
biologieal entities results finally into the fallacy of category as we notieed above. It
is exaetly this fallacy that can be found again by the reconstruetion of evolutionary
pathways in terms of game-theory.

Evolution and Game Theory. Game theory is assumed to be one of the most
powerful tools far the analysis of evolutionary proeesses (s. Maynard Smith 1982,
Maynard Smith & Szathmary 1996, Axelrod 1984, Mc Farland 1999, Voland 2(00).
Following this approach, some central models of game theory sueh as "prisoners
dilemma" are applied in order to explain e. g. the evolution of eooperative be-
haviour. Here again the llnderlying coneept of "game theory" and its relevant
models, is used without further differentiation for the deseription of both evolution
as weil as decision proeedures. As we saw in the case of the deseription of
indi viduals in terms of funetional-units and machines, astriet order of language-
construetion can be identified even in this ease. And a methodological order of this
type ean be reeonstrueted for the ease of the applieation of game-theory too.
The starting point for the introduction of eonstitutive game-theoretieal notions is
not biologieal theory at all (neither of neuro-physiologieal, ethologieal or
evolutionary provenience), but the analysis of human aetion under explieit eon-
ditions. The deeisions between several "given" alternatives can bc evaluated
refcrring to standard-situations as e. g. "prisoners-dilemma", "gambiers-ruin" or
''skull boat". The explieation of the game-eonstituting l2 situations standardises the
eondition of decision sueh as the deeision under the eondition of incomplcre
information etc. (s. v. Neumann & Morgenstern 1980). Consequently, the con-
strlletion of a pay-off-matrix (wh ich of eourse provides severe methodologieal
problems per sel.l) and the determination of the respeetive outeome can only be
done, if the options within the respeetive standard situation are explieated. The

12 The term "game" is meant literally here, as "Gesellsehaftspiele" provide the very starting point
for further considerations (s. v. Neumann & Morgenstern 1980). From this point 01' view. the
methodologieal problems of biologieal applieation are generated if one ignores. that in afirst
stcp evolutionary contexts have to be interpreted "as if they were games" (s. below).
1.1 See for example Pareto's ditlerenec between "ophelimity" and "utility". Ophelimity is detined
as folIows: "We shall employ the term ophelimity, derived from the Greek W<pEAl~lOC:; (useful
or servieeablel, tn designate thc relationship 01' convenience whieh makes a thing satisfy a
need or desire, whether legitimate or not. This new term is all the more neeessary because
utility will be required for use in its ordinary aeeepted sense as the property whieh makes a
thing favourable to the development and well-being 01' an individual, a community or the
whole human species." (pareto 1966:99)
Dealing with "utility", a lot of differentiatinns are necessary in order to provide an evaluation
that retlects the respective situations. At least the one-termed application of the word "useful"
is übviüusly insufticient für any possible purpüse: "Different sorts üf utility are distinguishable
206 Mathias Gutmann

necessary abilities of the players themselves must be usually given by premise.

adopting: basic assumptions 01' methodological individualism. Methodologically
important in this context is the fact that constitutive terms are gained by scrutin-
izing collective, socially contextualised human action. As in the case of functional
description. we have to discern at least two language levels. On the one hand, we
have to consider the level of everyday-lifeworld communication, coordination and
cooperation. On the other hand, there is the conceptualisation of some of the
relevant actions "as" moves within agame or as decision, choice under defined
circumstances 14 and their formal representation. In analogy to the procedure of
functional attribution, we can apply in a third step these terms for the description of
animal behaviour. It is exactly this methodological order of construction of a
scientific language that is violated, if human behaviour is thought to be explained
by reference to game-theoretical conceptualisation of animal behaviour. If we
ignore the methodological starting point within pre- and non-scientific knowledge
and know-how, and the use of scientific non-biological knowledge (theory of
decision in this case) as necessary prerequisites for the construction of biological
theories. the naturalisation of the descriptive means is a typical consequence.
Naturalisations of this type are usually justified in two ways:
I. One justification of this remarkable inclusiveness of naturalised descriptive
means can be seen in the extension of the scope of this theory from human to non
human behaviour. which again is based on a homology assumption of humans and
animals:
Thc fnmework is broad enough to cncompass not only people but also nations and baeteria.
Nations certainly take actions, which can he interprcted as ehoices in a Prisoner's Dilemma -
as in the raising or lowering of tariff. It is not neeessary to assume that such actions are rational
or are the outeome of a unified actor pursuing a single goal. On the contrary, they might weil
he the result of an incredibly complex bureaucratic polities involving complicated information
processing and shit'ting political coalitions (Allison 1971). (Axelrod 1984: 18)

The differences within the insinuated scope of game theory are consequently
considered to be only of a gradual nature. The behaviour of humans and animals are
described on the same language level:
There is no need to assume that the players are rational. They need not to be trying to maximil.c
their rewards. Their strategy may simply rellect standard operating proeedures. rules uf thumh.
instinets. habits, or imitation (Simon 1955; Cyert and March 1963). (Axelrod 1984: 18)

according as they ensure the development and progress of different aspects of human nature.
Economic utility would he that utility which should ensure material well-heing; moral utility
that which should eonduce to the most perfect moral devclopment; and so on. Ophelimity
lends itself to similar distinctions; in measure as it satisfies material, moral, religious and
similar desires, we term it material ophelimity, moral or religious ophelimity. and so forth."
(Pareto 1966: 101)
Apart from the methodologieal problems that are generated by the task of the comparison of
outcome, the word "utility" has to be applied strietly eontext-dependent. Consequently, the
interpretation of the context is a eonstituent of the notion itself.
14 "Rational ehoiee" following the proeedure of decision-making in referenee to standards of
rationality (e.g. in the sense 01' end-mean-relations ete. s. v. Neumann & Morgenstern 1980).
 Human Culture's Natures 207

2. A second strategy far the justification of naturalisation is the assumption that

biology ,md economics follow the same rules, namely those rules that are concept-
ualised by game theory. [n this case, it is not meant metaphorically, that even
bacteria are able to "play"':
Likewise, at the other extreme. an organism does not need a brain to playagame. Bacteria. for
examplp, are highly responsive to selected aspects 01' their chemical environment. They can
therefore respond differentially to what other organisms are doing, and these conditional
strategies 01' behavior can be inherited. (Axelrod 1984: 18)

This identification of animals and humans is evidently only possible. if animals are
described as players (following astrategy) and their aggregates as societies:
Gesellschaften wie die von Löwen, Schimpansen oder Pavianen, in denen alle adulten Tiere
fortptlanzungsfähig und damit potentielle Eltern sind, lassen sich weitgehend durch unmittel-
baren gegenseitigen Nutzen erklären - es handelt sich um Riemenboot-Spicle. (Maynard
Smith & Szathmary 1995: 267)

Obviously this identification is - analogous to the first case of functional attribu-

tion - a fallacy of category. The methodologically most important consequence of
this fallacy is the impossibility to distinguish between explanans and explanandum.
Because of the transfer and retransfer - that is simply covered by the use of the
same terms - each "explanation" is rcduced to the statement of a structural analog)'.

Transfer and Re-Transfer of Concepts, Following the considerations above, the

homology argument is based on transfer of knowledge:
I. [n a first step, human behaviour is described and structured by applying the tools
of game theoretical analysis (v. Neumann & Morgenstern 1980). The Explan-
andum is "human behaviour" under the aspect of rational choice.
2. [n a second step, animal behaviour is described sub specie of human behaviour 15
and action. [n this case, the explanandum is not animal behaviour "per se" but
"animal behaviour" dcscribed in analogy to "human behaviour" (animal(human)
behaviour).
3. If in a third step the description of animal(human) behaviour is appliea to human
behaviour again, the explanandum is human(animal(human» behaviour: substi-
tuting the term "animai" by the reference-behaviour, namely "human behavi-
our", the explanandllm is simply "human behaviour", as was the case in the first
step - llnder the special aspects of game theory.
The explanandllm is not hllman behaviour as animal behaviour but in the contrary
animal behaviollr described under some special aspects of hllman behaviour.
The transfer and re-transfer of the descriptions simply fails the intended explan-
andllm.

15 The term behaviour is not a biological term in this context.

208 Mathias Gutmann

2.2.2
Analogies

A somewhat weaker concept regarding the expected explanatory power is sum-

marized as the fjeld of "analogy-concepts". The most important methodological
difference can bc seen in the attempt to describe humans not as animals, but like
animals. The term analogy is not used as the alternative character-state to homology
(in the sense of convergences; s. Ax 1984). Analogy in this context claims that the
cultural unfolding of humankind resembles some aspects of the evolutionary
process, that is thought to rein the development of animals. If we consider these
methodological differences, one central problem that was found within the homo-
logy approach. namely the necessity to state the same mechanism for cultural and
for evolutionary change, can be avoided:
The basic differences between changing cultures and changing biological populations preclude
mere suosumption. It is commonly undcrstood that new cultural practiccs can be produccd in
direct response to perceived needs, unlike the randomly generated novelty in evolutionary
processes. It is sometimes supposed that this process makes sociocultural theories in terms of
the Darwinian model impossiblt:. (Weingart et al. 1997: 286)

Cultural development becomes emancipated from the biological basis that is ruled
by evolution. For both processes different mechanisms can be assumed. 1h This
results again in a dualism between culture and nature, but that dualism is com-
patible with the concept of analogy that is applied here. The formal structure of an
analogy is that of a comparison; i.e. one thing or process resembles another thing or
process referring to a specified criterion. If we can say, that A and B have the
property Q and, additionally A has the property p, than it can be inferred per analog-
iam, that B has the property P too. Obviously, this conclusion will only fit if Q
implies P. Analogical relations are of so me interest within the field of empirical

10 Cassirer (whose conccpt of culture does of course not rder to any form 01' bi%giL'lI/ know-
ledge) noted the most radical difference between both processes. He states a "D .. rwinian
mode" of inheritance of animals that neglects non-inherited acquired characters: "Denn die
Veränderungen. die sich in ihnen Vollziehen, wirken auf die Gattung nicht unmittelbar zurück
und gehen in ihr Leben nicht ein. Hier besteht jene Schranke, die die Biologie als die Tatsache
der Nicht- Vererbbarkeit erworbener Merkmale bezeichnet. Die Variationen. die sich im Kreise
der Ptlanzen- und Tierwelt in einzelnen Exemplaren vollziehen, bleiben biologisch belanglos;
sie tauchen auf, um wieder zu versinken." (Cassirer 1994: 126)
In very contrast to this Darwinian mode of transformation of animal genera, a "Lamarckian
mode" of inheritance for cultural transmission can oe stated: "Der Mensch hat in den "sym-
bolischen Formen", die das Eigentümliche seines Wesens und seines Könnens sind, gewisser-
maßen die Lösung einer Aufgabe vollzogen, die die organische Natur als solche nicht zu lösen
vermochte. Der "Geist" hat geleistet, was dem "Leben" versagt hlieb. Hier ist das Werden und
Wirken des einzelnen in ganz anderer. tief eingreifender Weise mit dem des Ganzen verknüpft.
Was die Individuen fühlen, wollen, denken, bleibt nicht in ihnen selbst verschlossen; es
objektiviert sich im Werk. Und diese Werke der Sprache. der Dichtung. der bildenden Kunst,
der Religion werden zu den "Monumenten", zu den Erinnerungs- und Gedächtniszeichen der
Menschheit." (Cassirer 1994: 126)
This "analogy" can be expressed as a metaphorical description of so me centrals aspects of the
human world itself - i.e. without reference to the seemingly underlying biological concepts
(s. below).
 Human Culture's Natures 209

research and l!sually applied for heuristic purposes. This is the case particularly if
the two relata come from different genera. An excellent example provides the
comparison of the principles of aerodynamics of an aeroplane and the bird-tlight.
As similarity can be stateJ, that both, aeroplane and bird, can tly. One of the neces-
sary conditions for take-off is the production of sufficient buoyancy. This con-
clusion may be \erified in the case of bird-tlight. On the other hand, the identity of
the mechanism that is established for the production of the fon'es that are needed
cannot be inferred.
The term analogy is used in this sense, if humans are considered to be like
animals. Let culture be the explanandum, and let the explanatory relation between
species and the processes by which they originate be the one part of analogy. Now,
an analogy can be stated between the evolution of species and the development of
culture, only if this analogy of processes is determined in terms of reproduction. In
this case the analogy can lead to a reconstruction of the "phylogeny of culture":
Reconstructing eultural phylogenies is possible to the extent. that there are genealogieal enti-
ties that have suffieient coherence. relative to the amount 01' mixing and independent evolution
among entities, to ereate recognisable history. (Boyd et al. 1997: 364)

The extent of similarity between species and cultures can be described within a
range of correspondence. Following Boyd et a!., faur prototypic cases can be dis-
cerned:
I. Cultures are species and consequently they are highly integrated and mutually
isolated wholes.
2. ClIltures preserve only core traditions and show distinct "diffusion processes"
with other cultures.
3. ClIltures are not integrated units but they show so me subunits that have distinct
"patterns of inheritance":
Cultures eould be quite ephemeral assemblages 01' small units, but latter may have limiled
mixing and slow evolution. Culture may have no speeies, but it may have genes, plasmids, and
mitoehondria. Different domains may have different patterns 01' inheritanee and different
evolutionary histories. The eomponents may be fairly large, plasmids, or mitoenondrialike,
sueh as language, or smal!. solitary memes, sueh as the idea 01' using a magnetlsed needle 10
point north. (Boyd et al. 1997: 3651'.)

4. Cultures are ephemeral unites that show no characters, which would allow a
phylogenetic reconstruction.
Excluding the fourth case, the analogy between species and cultures transfers those
aspects of species that are necessary prerequisites fur phylogenetic analysis, name-
Iy their mutual reprodllctive isolation, their hierarchically integrateJ wholeness or
individuality. If we state this similarity, the analogy-argument wOllld lead to the
identical treatment of species and cultures unJer a phylogenetic point of view. In
order to reconstruct the phylogeny of culture, we will have to identify those char-
acters, that are adequate far evolutionary analysis, i.e. we have to identify homo-
logical characters in contrast to purely "analogical"17 characters. If this is the case,
the main argument against the phylogenetic methods can be applied likewise in the

17 Analogy in this sense means the teehnieal term for convergence and does not mean the
analogieal structure we are now reeonstrueting'
210 Mathias Gutmann

context of the reconstruction of "cultural evolution". If wc nccd the distinction

betwecn homological and :malogical characters in order to choose those characters
that are adequate for evolutionary reconstruction. the evolutionary pathway must
already be known. In this case, the reconstruction itself beeomes a truistie state-
ment. If we reconstruct thc phylogeny on the basis of those homologies, and}lIslifv
the selection of the homologies with referenee to the reeonstruetion, a vieious eircle
is inevitable (for further reading eoneerning these methodologieal shortcomings
of phylogenetie method s. Weingarten 1992. Peters & Gutmann 1971 & 1972
Gutmann & Janieh 1998).
But even if we assumed, for the sake of the argument. that the applieation of
phylogenetie methods were possible for the reconstruction of the transformation 01"
eultural eharaeters, there remains one eentral problem that was identified above
coneerning the formal strueture of the analogy-argument. Let spccies and cultures
have the eharacteristies neeessary for phylogenetic rceonstruetion, i.e. for example
being isolated, integrated wholcs. And let speeies show evolutionary processes of a
distinct type, then the conclusion that eultures show evolutionary'x processes of this
type, is true only, (f the eharacters eommonly shared imply, that those units show
evolutionary proeesses of the respeetive type. This a~sumption eannot be justificd
by refcrring to analogy again. Altcrnativcly, wc might try to justify this analogy by
stating, that humans - produeing eulturcs - are animals and not only like animals.
In this case, the analogy argument eollapses into thc homology argument and thc
same objeetions that were explieatcd above, becomc relevant.

2.3
Philosophical Anthropology and its Biological Foundation

Thc attcmpt to define humans as IllIlI/a/l bv /lallIre leads exaetly to thc apories of thc
substance-ontologieal dcscriptions of humans. Despite the fact, that all the ap-
proaches that wcre taken into aeeount above werc of biologieal origin, the applic-
ation of substanee-ontology is by no means a speeitieity of biologieal deseriptions
of human beings. Partieularly the field of philosophieal anthropology provides an
cxcellent example of this type of argument. These approaehes again show the same
argumentative structure we found in the case of the homology/analogy approaches
insofar as human beings are on the one hand regarded as a eontinuation of animals
- with so me speeifie progressive or degenerativei') aspeets. On the other hand,
humans are eonsidered to be like animals but unbridgeable separated from them.
For both argumentative types an appropriate example is reeonstructed here.

Ix Evolutionary process sensu strieto and not historieal processes !

I~ 80th assumptions ean be found. partieularly if we take the field of "Kulturphilosophie" into
account. The spectrum rcaehes from humans as super-animals to humans as degenerated
animals.
 Human Culture's Natures 21 I

2.3.1
Theory of Organism and the Standard of Comparison

The prominent approaches summarised by the term "philosophieal anthropology"

directly or indirectly refer to a specific type of organismic theory. A concept of this
type was developed by v. Uexküll within the framework of his 'Theoretical Bio-
logy". He starts with the constitution of some fundamental eategories that are
thought to be fundamental for biology itself. Aeeordingly, the very subjeet of
biology is the organism. The term organism is not synonymous with "living entity",
but it is a terminus teehnicus to denote so me speeific eategorieal eonstruction for
the introduction 01' the realm of biological theories. First of all, eaeh living entity is
charaeterised by its "Bauplan". In accordanee with this Bauplan, a specific
embedding of the respective living entity into its Umwelt 20 can be stated:
Jedes Tier ist ein Subjekt, das dank seiner ihm eigentümlichen Bauart aus den allgemeinen
Wirkungen der Außenwelt bestimmte Reize auswühlt, auf die es in bestimmter Weise ant-
wortet. Diese Antworten bestehen wiederum in bestimmten Wirkungen auf die Außenwelt, und
diese beeintlussen ihrerseits die Reize. Dadurch entsteht ein in sich geschlossener Kreislauf.
den man den Flillktiollskreis des Tieres nennen kann. (Uexküll 1973: I SO)

The "Funktionskreise" (functional spheres), denote basic aspects of organismic

activity that must be preserved during every single action or behaviour 01' the
respective entity. Uexküll distinguishes four relevant Funktionskreise, namely the
sphere of medium, nutrition, enemy and reproduction. In accordance with the
Funktionskreise the organism fits accurately into its Umwelt:
Die Tiere sind nun derart in die Natur hineingebaut. daß auch die Umwelt wie ein planmäßiger
Teil des Ganzen arbeitet. Man kann das folgendermaßen ausdrücken: Wo ein Fluß ist. da ist
auch ein Weg. Wo ein Mund ist, da ist auch Nahrung. Wo eine WatTe ist, da ist auch ein Feind.
(Uexküll 1973: 153)

The organism can functionally be described as a machine, i.e. a funetional unit that
is the subject-matter of at least thrce different sciences namely physiology, psycho-
logy and biology:
An der Untersuchung der lebenden Organismen sind drei Wissenschaften beteiligt, die
Physiologie, die Psychologie und die Biologie. Alle drei geben eine verschiedene Delinition
des Organismus. Die Physiologie behandelt ihn als Maschine. die Psychologie als beseelte
Maschine und die Biologie als autonome Maschine. Alle drei stimmen also darin überein. dem
Organismus die Eigenschaften einer Maschine zuzuschreiben. (Uexküll 1973: 156)

Being described as a machine, the organism has the prominent aspect of funetional
c1osure, but, and this defines so me prominent differences to contemporary Darwin-
ism. the Bauplan cannot be resolved into descriptions 21 • that refer exclusively to
physical or chemica! knowledge:

2() The term Umwelt is not a synonym for environment. The Umwelt denotes the specific
selection 01' those aspects 01' the environment (Umgebung) that are relevant for the organism
depending on to its respective Bauplan.
21 Uexküll emphasises the difference to Darwinist approaches: "Selbst der Darwinismus, der die
Baupläne der Organismen aus einer Wechselwirkung mit den Faktoren der Außenwelt ableiten
will, verlöre ohne die Anerkennung der in den jetzt lebenden Organismen wirksamen Bau-
212 Mathias Gutmann

Denn damit sind alle Theorien. die den Autbau eines Lebewesens aus den anorganischen
Gesetzen der Physik. der Chemie und der allg.:meinen Mechanik ableiten wollen. von vorne
herein abg.:wiesen. Denn es ist unmöglich mit allen Hilfsmitteln der Physik und Chemie.
selbst bei genauester Kenntnis der Gesetze der allgemeinen Mechanik. wie dem Hebelgesetz.
dem Gesetz der kommunizierenden Röhren usw. eine spezielle Maschine zu konstruieren.
wenn man jenen immateriellen Faktor außer acht läßt. der den Kern aller Maschinen. mögen
sie selbst lebendig sein. oder die Erzeugnisse lebender Menschen sein. ausmacht - nämlich
den »Bauplan«. Ohne Berücksichtigung des Bauplanes kann es keine spezielle Mechanik
geben d.i. die Lehre vom Autbau der Maschinen und Mechanismen. (Uexküll 1973: 156)

Functional descriptions of organisms that transcend the limits of purely scientific

descriptions must be completed by considering the arrangement of the functionally
described parts. Consequently, the "Bauplan" as an "immaterial factor" (because it
comprises the arrangement of the functional parts) is to be considered as a con-
dition for the working of the entire unit. The very structure of those Baupläne that
are generated in accordance with the principle of Funktionskreise can be seen in
figure I.

Merkwelt

Receptor

organ
Wirk-
organ

Wirkwelt

Fig. L Representation 01' the Funktionskreis (after Uexküll 1(7).

Every object is determined by its inclusion into the "Gefüge" 22 of the respective
organisms. This Gefüge embodies receptors and effectors as weIl as their respective
central representations (the receptor and effector aspects of the internal world of the
organism). The correlation between receptors and effectors constitutes the respect-
ive object of the Umwelt of the respective organism. Consequently, each organism
inhabits its own Umwelt, derived from those aspects of the external, physically
described environment wh ich are "selected" by the organism itself. Within the same
environment, several differing Umwelten can be constituted, that show no relevant

pläne. die Voraussetzung seines ganzen Lehrgebäudes." (Uexküll 1973: 156) On the other
hand one should keep in mind the fact. that Darwin himsel!" gives the "unity 01' type" a promin-
ent place within his own evolutionary concept. This underlines the necessity to distingllish
Darwinian approaches (that can be reconstructed as comprehensive evoilitionary concepts s.
Gutmann 1996) and Darwinist approaches; the latter are represented by specific reductive
aspects e. g. in the sense 01' the New Synthesis. The difference reflects particlilarly the under-
standing 01' the term selection (s. Gutmann & Weingarten 1999) .
.,., Uexküll calls the Hstructure" or contexture of an organism its HGefüge'".
 Human Culture's Natures 213

intcrsection. E.g. the world of earthworms is furnished with "earth-worm-things",

the world of moles with "mole-things" and so on.
From this point of view, there exists a complete adequacy between each organ-
ism defined by its Bauplan and the respective "objects" that constitute this Umwelt.
Because organisms are defined as working functional units, being interwoven into
the respective Umwelt by the closed Funktionskreise, a "pre-stabilised harmony"
between the organism and its Umwelt can be stated:
Schon der bloße Augenschein belehrt uns. ob wir es mit einem Luft-. Wasser- oder Landtier zu
tun haben. Die Flossen, die Flügel und die Füße tragen unzweideutig den Stempel ihrer
Bestimmung. Je mehr der Funktionskreis auf ein eng umschriebenes Medium eingeschränkt
ist, um so deutlicher kann man an den Effektoren ihre Fügung erkennen. Wir unterscheiden
Saugfüße, Springfüße, Lauffüße und Kletterfüße, die uns einen ganz sicheren Anhalt geben.
um das Medium der Landtiere in weitere Unterabteilungen zu zerlegen. Bei den Parasiten
entdecken wir Klammerfüße, die ganz genau den Geweben ihrer Wirte, die ihnen das Medium
liefern, eingefügt sind. (Uexküll 1973: 201)

Uexküll calls this relation between organism and its Umwelt a "Fügung". This term
has two relevant meanings, namely "insertion" as weil as "providence". And the
concept plays with both meanings of the term. This becomes clear when we have a
short look at the evolutionary conception. Uexküll is a prominent Anti-Darwinian
author, and this Anti-Darwinism can be shown to be a direct consequence of his
concept of organism. If organisms are thus weil inserted into their respective
Umwelt (Uexküll emphasises the completeness of this relation by determlning
organisms as "perfect" entities s. Uexküll 1973 :20 I), they can be considered to be
in complex homoeostatic harmony with their Umwelt. Consequently every shift of
the inner functional contexture will lead to critical outside-inside-relations unless
the complete architecture itself is changed in a way that guaranties a new, evenly
perfect insertion into the Umwelt. From this point of view, gradual evolutionary
shifts become unlikely. Only a saltationist mechanism may provide a basis for
"phylogenetic" change. Uexküll borrows a mechanism of this type from develop-
mental biology, namely the organiser-concept of Spemann combined with
Driesch's regulator-hypothesis. The ontogenetic development provides an example
for abrupt organisational shifts. According to this approach the oocytes of all
animal phyla start as the same structure and the differences between the single
phyla are produced during development because the oocytes of the "higher" phyla
do not stop their development, on a special earlier stage. At each single develop-
mental stage a new organiser starts its activity. Consequently, the higher forms run
through the states of those forms that stand on lower levels of the systematic
hierarchy of phyla. The development of a chick serves as an example for the
activity of an organiser that starts to operate when a specific state of differentiation
of the respective germ is reached:
An einem ganz bestimmten Punkt springen neue Organisatoren ein, die die bisherigen Anlagen
vernichten und die im Bau begriffenen Zelkn als indifferentes Ausgangsmaterial benutzen.
Ein zweiter solcher Sprung ist nach der Anlage der Kiemenbögen deutlich zu erkennen. Die
Kiemenbögen wachsen nicht zu Kiemen aus, sondern werden von mehreren Organisatoren in
verschiedener Richtung umgeformt. (UexkülI 1973: 259)
214 Mathias Gutmann

From this point of view, evolution can neither be aseries of gradual shifts of organisa-
tion, nor a sequence of adaptations. This Anti-Darwinian approach is a consequence
of the underlying theory of organism. And it is exactly this sort of organismic
biology, which provides the basis for so me eoncepts of philosophieal anthropology,
wh ich we will eonsider now.

2.3.2
The Sonderstellung of Human Beings

Philosophieal anthropology attempts to determine the Sonderstellung of humans.

This Sonderstellung is - as we will see - determined by applying speeifie
organism-theoretieal eonsiderations as a standard of eomparison between humans
and animals. Following Lohmar's argument (see eitation above) the Sonderstellung
of humans should be a eonsequence of a general ontology that simply states this
Sonderstellung as the original "natural" status of humans. [n very contrast, the
specificity of humans must be derived in comparison with other living entities by
emphasising speeific properties of fandties of the members of the natural kind
hOl/lo. Humans are charaeterised as "strange" animals. ft is remarkable, that a Son-
derstellung of this kind can be determined by simply applying Uexküll's theory of
organism. Following this approach, each member of a natural kind (e.g. a species)
has hy definition a Sonderstellung of its own. As we saw above, Uexküll claims the
specific Umwelt-eonstitution by the respective organisms. Consequently, as the
Umwelt of an earthworm differs fundamentally and irreducible from the Umwelt of
a mole or a horse, those organisms have, as members of a natural kind, a Sonder-
stellung.
Keeping this in mind, the aim of philosophieal anthropology is then to determine
the Sonderstellung of humans by stating at the same time the non-applicability of
this type of organism-theory for the description of the specificity itself. It is this
"indirect" applieation of organism-theory for the determination of the human
world, that constitutes one major topic of philosophical anthropology.

2.3.3
Human Beings as Deficient Animals

Following Platon, humans are to be charaeterised by their deficiency compared

with animals. In his Protaqoras' Prometheus/Epimetheus-myth Platon (1985:
320d-322a) charaeterises the difference between humans and animals insofar as the
latter were equipped either with special weapons or with skills and abilities that
allow the defenee against other animals 01' at least suceessful tlight. This eharacteri-
sation of humans by referring to speeific "organie" insutficieneies became a topie
of anthropologieal reasoning that ean be found even in modern philosophy. Fol-
lowing Herders deseription of humans as "deficient entities" (Mängel wesen),
Gehlen gives this determination a biologieal interpretation. In aeeordanee with
Herder, Gehlen deseribes Humans strietly as a biologieal problem, insofar as they
are biologically defieient:
Und er definiert den Menschen als Mängelwesen! Das neugeborene Kind "äußert weder
Vorstellungen noch Triebe durch Töne, wie doch jedes Tier in seiner Art; bloß unter Tiere
 Human Culture's Natures 215

gestellt. ist"s also Jas verwaisteste KinJ Jer Natur. Nackt und bloß. schwach unJ dürftig.
schüchtern und unbewallnet: und was die Summe seines Elends ausmacht. aller Leiterinnen
des Lebens beraubt. Mit einer so zerstreuten. gesdlw~ichten Sinnlichkeit. mit so unbestimmten.
schlafenden Flihigkeiten. mit so geteilten und ermatteten Trieben geboren. offenbar auf
tausend Bedürfnisse verwiesen. zu einem grol.len Kreise bestimmt ... Nein' ein sdleher
Widerspruch ist nicht die Haushaltung der Natur." (Gehlen 1986: 83)

But in eontrast to Herder, who interprets this difference between the natural
equipment of humans as the starting point for a specific development of free-
dom 2.1. Gehlen uses this deseription as basis for the explieation of the specific
biology of humans. In accordanee with Uexküll, an organism is surrounded by its
self-constituted Umwelt, into which it is rigidly embedded:
Die TenJenz der Naturentwicklung geht nämlich Jahin. organisch hochspezialisierte Formen
in ihre je ganz bestimmten Umwelten einzupassen. also Jie unübersehbar mannigfaltigen in
Jer Natur ZlIstanJe kommenJen "Milieus" als Lebensrliume für Jarin eingepaßte Lebewesen
ausl.Llnutzen. Die !lachen R~inJer twpischer Gewlisser wie Jie ozeanische Tiefsee. Jie kahlen
Abhünge niirJlicher Alpengebirge wie Jas Unterholz lichter Mischw~ilJer sinJ ebenso
sl'<,;ifische Umwelten für spezialisierte. nur Jarin IebensUhige Tiere, wie Jie Haut Jer
Warmblüter für Jie Parasiten. unJ so in unz~ihligen. je besonderen F~illen. (Gehlen 1986: 33 f.)

Evolutionary developed ~mimals are defined as sfJcciali::.cd entities that constitute

such strict relations with the respective Umwelt. From this point of view humans
are not primitive natural entities. For the sake of the definitions of humans as
deficient animals Gehlen applies two prineiples:
I. Organisms are eharaeterised by their strict adjustment (Fügung) into the
Umwelt.
.., This adjustment is eorrelated with speeialisation. (S. Gehlen 1986:86 f.).

From this point of view. humans cannot even be considered to be "complete

animals" and this result of the human-animal comparison is the basis for Gehlen 's
further considerations. In very contrast to animals, humans were incomplete.
Gehlen explains this idea referring to the instinct equipment. Whereas animals are
guided in all relevant aspeets by their instincts, this is not the case for humans:
Der Unterschied von Mensch und Tier ist in dieser Hinsicht außerorJentlich. Die Instinkte Jer
Tiere sinJ die Instinkte ihrer Organe. mit denen sie in ihre Umwelt eingepaßt sind, und so fol-
gen diese Instinkte Jen großen Rhythmen Jer Natur: zu gewissen Zeiten. wenn die Bedin-
gungen gegeben sind, erwacht der Wandertrieb. der Geschlechtstrieb. Jer Nestbauinstinkt oder
der Trieb. sich zum Winterschlaf zurücb:uziehen. (Gehlen 1986: 57)

The deficieney of instinct beeomes obvious and is expressed by the specific form of
human activity namcly by human "action" (Handlung). Humans must aet intention-
ally (in contrast to instinct behaviour of animals). And in eontrast to animals,
actions are not self-regulated, but must be guided 24 • This guidance cannot be found
within human nature itself. If this deseription is adequate, the question remains why

~3 Humans are the first "freedman of creation" (Herder 1985: 119).

2-1 It is obvious. that Gehlen follows an extremely conservative policital concept that leads to
unequivocal conclusions in respect of culture and civilisation (to the problem of criticisms of
culture s. Gutmann 1998).
216 Mathias Gutmann

humans as biologically insufficient entities were not evolutionary out-competed.

Gehlen tries to solve this problem by a specific transformation of Uexküll 's thenry
of organism 25 •

Culture as the Nature 0/ Humans. Uexküll's theury of the organism provides a

basis for the comparison of humans and animals, and it leads to the conclusion, that
humans do not have an Umwelt, but only a "welt" (world). They are "open-minded
for the world" (weltoffen). This character, understood as a deficiency, implies, that
Uexküll's concept is not adequate fur the description of humans in respect to their
world-constitution:

Der gut defini~rte. biologisch exakte Umweltbegriff ist also auf den Menschen nicht anwend-
bar, denn genau an der Stelle, wo beim Tiere die "Umwelt" steht, steht beim Menschen die
"zweite Natur" oder die Kultursphäre mit ihren eigenen, sehr besonderen Problemen und Be-
griffsbildungen. die von dem Umweltbegriff nicht erfaßt, sondern im Gegenteil nur verdeckt
werden. (Gehlen 1986: 79 f.)

But at the same time, the essential character of humans can be seen in its "second
nature", the culture. Humans have culture by nature. But despite the fact, that
Gehlen excludes a direct application of Uexküll's theory, the structure of humans
"second nature" allows at least an indirect application. This is possible by defining
culture in terms of biology. Culture becomes an anthropo-biological concept; and
consequently, an entity, whose biological fundament leads to a specific world-
constitution, can insofar be described as an animal, as its "non-animal" aspects are
derived from natural characters:
'Kultur" ist daher ein anthropo-biologischer Begriff. der Mensch von Natur ein Kultllfwesen.
Schon der Australier verfügt über etwa :WO Geräte und Techniken, mittels deren er sich in
seiner trostlosen Umgebung behauptet. Kultur ist also in erster Annäherung der Inbegriff der
Sachmittel und Vorstellungsmittel, der Sach- und Denktechniken, einschließlich der Institu-
tionen, mittels deren eine bestimmte Gesellschaft "sich hält", in zweiter Annäherung der
Inbegriff aller darauf fundierten Folgeinstitutionen. (Gehlen 1986: 80 f.)

The culture of humans becomes the "Umwelt" of this strange animal and within
this world, humans are adjusted exactly in the same manner, as animals within their
Umwelt. And it is cuIture, produced by humans as a necessary by-product of their
specific form of activity that allows humans to survive.
Die Kultur ist also die "zweite Natur" - will sagen: die menschliche, die selbsttätig bearbeitete,
innerhalb deren er allein leben kann - und die "unnatürliche" Kultur ist die Auswirkung eines
einmaligen, selbst "unnatürlichen", d.h. im Gegensatz zum Tier konstruierten Wesens in der
Welt. An genau der Stelle, wo beim Tier die "Umwelt" steht, steht daher beim Menschen die
Kullllnvelt, d.h. der Ausschnitt der von ihm bewältigten und zu Lebenshilfen umgeschaffenen
Natur. Schon deswegen ist es grundfalsch, von einer Umwelt des Menschen - im biologisch
definierten Sinne - zu reden. Beim Menschen entspricht der Unspezialisiertheit seines Baues
die Weltoffenheit, und der Mittellosigkeit seiner Physis die von ihm selbst geschaffene "zweite
Natur". (Gehlen 1986: 38)

25 We used Uexküll's theory of organism as an example of the applied theory-type. Gehlen. as

weil as Plessner refers to Driesch as another great exponent of theories of this type. For the
problem of theory-types s. Gutmann & Weingarten ( (999).
 Human Culture's Natures 217

Culture then holds the place of Umwelt. which as "world" allows the guidance of
human action. This guidance is possible, because of the existence of institutions,
instead of the fixed Funktionskreise, that guarantee effective behaviour of animals.

Cultural Institutions as Natural Devices Jor Survival. One necessary conse-

quence of the missing human adjustment to the Umwelt, the Weltoffenheit, is the
absence of natural filters, which allow aselection of stimuli. Following UexküU's
1'unctionalistic concepts of organism, a fixed adjustment is a necessary precondition
of such a selection. As a consequence of this lack of selection, humans are thought
to suffer from an overload of stimuli. This overload must be compensated. The
structures that provide a compensation are to be found within the structures of
human Umwelt, namely in form of institutions.

Um mit wenigen Worten zusammenzufassen: Die Formen, in denen die Menschen miteinander
lehen oder arbeiten. in denen sich die Herrschaft ausgestalret oder der Kontakt mit dem
Übersinnlichen - sie alle gerinnen zu Gestalren eigenen Gewichts, den Institutionen, die
schließlich den Individuen gegenüber etwas wie eine Selbstmacht gewinnen, so daß man das
Verhalten des einzelnen in der Regel ziemlich sicher voraussagen kann, wenn man seine Stei-
lung in dem System der Gesellschaft kennt, wenn man weiß, von welchen Institutionen er
eingefaßt ist. (Gehlen 1993a: 71)

The institutions are those structures that guarantee the (biological!) survival of a
dcficient animal within a world that is not constituted as a natural Umwelt. Guiding
the actions of individuals they guarantee the stability of this world, which can
accidentally function as an Umwelt in the original sense of Uexküll. Accordingly,
each development that threatens these institutions must be assessed as a direct
attack on the viability of humans. Consequently, such a development "back to
nature" would result in a "naturalisation" of humans. This contradicts the very
nature of humans, namely culture with its institutions that serve as devices 01'
human survivaF6:
Sofern nun auch normalerweise der Fortschritt der Zivilisation abbauend wirkt, nämlich
Traditionen. Rechte, Institutionen schleift, insofern vernatürlicht er den Menschen, primitivi-
siert ihn und wirft ihn zurück auf die natürliche Unstabilität seines Instinktlebens. Die Bewe-
gungen nach dem Verfall zu sind stets natürlich und wahrscheinlich, die Bewegungen nach der
Größe, dem Anspruchsvollen und Kategorischen hin sind stets erzwungen und unwahrschein-
lich. Das Chaos ist ganz im Sinne ältester Mythen vorauszusetzen und natürlich, der Kosmos
ist göttlich und gefährdet. (Gehlen 1993b: 59)

The resulting description leads to a very restrictive concept of society, with obvious
political consequences. However, Gehlen's concept of human beings, which is
based on specific biological theories, leads to the definition of humans as deficient
animals (similar to Klages "invalid animai"; s. Scheler 1947 and Rothacker 1934).

26 The Anti-Darwinist intention that Gehlen adopted by referring to Uexküll's theory of organism
can now be understood from a political point of view. Because of the very light connection
between Darwinism and individualism, the former can be seen as a danger for the community-
oriented approach of Gehlen.
218 Mathias Gutmann

Humans as a Continuation 0/ Animals. The weak point of Gehlen's argument 27

is obviously his interpretation of the animal-human-eomparison. The status of
humans is defined as a bi%giclI/ "sonderstellung". For the sake of this result.
several strong assumptions have to be made: thus, biologieal as weil as methodo-
logieal objections are possible.
From a biologieal point of view, the value of the two prineiples, Gehlen applies
(in aceordance e.g. with Uexküll, Bulk, Bytendijk etc.) can be doubted. Neither is
the correspondence of a progressive evolutionary state with a high degree of
specialisation self-evident, nor is it the assumption of astriet adjustment of organ-
isms to their respeetive Umwelt. Following both assumptions, an Anti-Darwinian
point of view seems to be inevitable. Conseqllently, the principle of seleetion looses
its relevanee for the development of functional-types that are the very subjeet-
matter of the underlying developmental-theory2x. Development ean only be
eonceptualised as a form of internal differentiation referring to the respeetive
funetional-type. Additionally, the transition between types - if possible at all - ean
only be of a saltationist mode.
From a methodologieal point of view, the formal eorreetness of the comparison
itself ean be doubted. An indicator for the insllftieieney uf this eomparison ean be seen
in the faet that the eontradieting eunclllsions ean be drawn from the same type of
eomparison (see e.g. Portmann 1951; for further eonsiderations s. GlItmann in press).

3
Reflexive Theory of Human Being

Having started with the introduction of a biologieal description (Uexküll) followed

by philosophieal application (Gehlen) which were object of the preceding section,
we will begin the introduction of the rellexive mode of thought within a wider
eonceptual framework, namely the criticism of typical philosophical dualism. In
order to redeem e. g. the Cartesian dualism by introdllcing an all-inclusive category
of "life", Plessner localises human beings within the "levels of living organisation"
that constitute nature. Consequently, Plessner's results differ in so me respects from
Gehlen's conclusions. The starting point of Plessner's approach is a methodological
consideration of the subject-matter of philosophical anthropology itself. The ob-
jects of philosophical anthropology are human beings as "persons". Personality
then describes the specific eonstitution of humans in respect to all culturally given
"objectivations":
Ihre Objektivationen: Wissenschaft, Kunst, Sprache usw. werden also das Medium. in dem
sich die Betrachtung des Menschen bewegt; wohlgemerkt. die Betrachtung des ganzen
Menschen als konkreter Lebenseinheit. Die Kultur soll als spezifische Äußerung dieser
Lebenseinheit untersucht werden. Art und Form ihrer Objektivationen sollen Auskunft geben

27 This is meant exclusively methodologically; the fact, that Gehlen interprets the results of his
"biologieal" comparison within an extremely conservative framework shows the true motives
of his interpretation of the animal-human-comparison.
28 The term is insofar adequate in this case, as from Uexküll's point of view thcre is no
categorical difference between evolution and development.
 Human Culture's Natures 219

über die Stn:ktur des menschlichen Lebenssystem in der Gesamtheit aller seiner Schichten.
(Plessner 1975: 32 f.)

This "horizontal" unfolding of human objectivations must be complemented by the

"vertical" localisation of humans within the hierarchical order of nature. The
specific constitution of humans as persons represents one level within this hier-
archy. But this particular level is not primarily defined by its proximity to the level
of animal organisation. In very contrast, the subject-object-distinction that is con-
stitutive for transcendental and phenomenologicaJ29 approaches, becomes the
constant factor of this localisation:
In diesen beiden Richtungen kann man hoffen, den Menschen als Subjekt-Objekt der Kultur
und als Subjekt-Objekt der Natur wirklich zu umfassen, ohne ihn in künstlichen Abstraktionen
aufzuteilen. Denn der eine Grundaspekt der Lebenserfahrung wird gewahrt, den der Mensch in
seiner Existenz zu sich und zur Welt einnimmt: naturgebunden und frei, gewachsen und
gemacht, ursprünglich und künstlich zugleich. (Plessner 1975: 32)

Accordingly, humans must be conceptualised as subject-object of nature as weil as

subject-object of culture. Only this comprehensive description allows to determine
the entire30 human existence in all its aspects. But despite these methodologically
tine tuned considerations, Plessner chooses a starting point, which is not methodo-
logically but ontologically detined, namely by the "pre-cursers" of the human level
within nature. This shi1't from methodology (based upon some fundamental aspects
01' a transcendental theory of knowledge.l l , such as the subject-object-di1'ferem:e) to
ontology results in an order of disciplines that signiticantly ret1ects this "vertical
ontology":
Der Zweck heißt: Neuschöpfung der Philosophie unter dem Aspekt einer Begründung der
Lebenserfahrung in Kulturwissenschaft und Weltgeschichte. Die Etappen auf diesem Wege
sind: Grundlegung der Geisteswissenschaften durch Hermeneutik, Konstituierung der Herme-
neutik als philosophischer Anthropologie, Durchführung der Anthropologie auf Grund einer
Philosophie des It:bendigen Daseins und seiner natürlichen Horizonte und ein wesentliches
Mittel (nicht das einzige), auf ihm weiterzukommen ist die phänomenologische Deskription.
(Plessner 1975: 30)

This foundation of "Geisteswissenschaft<!n" - which leads finally into a new-

creation of philosophy itself - requires a philosophy of nature as the first step of the
determination of human nature.

We can summarise now: In order to avoid biological reduction Plessner uses the
preservation of the subject-object-difference as a precondition of anthropology.
This choice of the subject-object-difference is foremost a methodological pre-
condition of anthropology. However, Plessner interprets it as an ontological

29 This is true at least for some representative phenomenological concepts; see fOT example
Husserl (1992).
30 Obviously, the reference to this "entirety" contains a severe methodological problem, because
no criteria for the completeness of adescription of human beings and number of their
"aspects" is given.
31 Indeed, even within the theoreticaI writings of Plessner, this naivety in respect to the problem
ofbegillllillg can be identitied.
220 Mathias Gutmann

representations. From this point of view, the differenec betwccn nature and eulture
is reproduecd by the ditferencc between animals and humans 12 .

3.1
The Concept of Boundary and Positionality

In order to localise the speeific level of human organisation, Plessner dcscribcs the
difference between living and non-living entities in terms of boundary, the consti-
tution of this boundary, and finally the charaeter of "wholeness". As a constitutive
property of living entities the "double-aspect" of the inside-outside- difference is
stated:
Infolgedessen darf man dem Satz, daß lebendige Körper erscheinungsmäßig eine prinzipiell
divergente Außen-Innenbeziehung als gegenständliche Bestimmtheit aufweisen, die Form
geben: lebendige Körper haben eine erscheinende, anschauliche Grenze. (Plessner 1975: 1(0)

This inside-outside-di1'ference is constituted by the boundary of a Iiving entity. But

in very contrast to non-living entitics, whieh "have" a boundary that defines one
body in respect to a second body, Iiving entities posses this boundary as a self-
constituting aspect 01' their own organisation. And insofar as living entities Izave a
boundary and embody a boundary, they can bc charaeterised by their "wholeness":
Die Antwort lautet paradox: wenn ein Körper außcr seiner Begrenzung den Grenzübergang
selbst als Eigenschaft hat, dann ist die Begrenzung zugleich Raumgrenze und Aspektgrenze
und gewinnt dcr Kontur unbeschadet seines Gestaltcharakters den Wert der Ganzheitsform.
(Ples~ner 1975: 1(3)

Thc difference between boundaries of living and limits of non-living entitics is

demonstrated by the following example. Let A and B be two non-living entities,
e.g. two wooden cubes. The boundary of such "non-wholes" then is the "cut-line"
between the surface of body A that touches a surfaee of body Band this surface of
body B. The boundary itself neither "belongs" to body A nor to body B insofar as it
simply marks the interruption of material continuity between both surfaecs
(Plessner 1975: 103); aceordingly we called thc respectivc surfaces the limits 01'
body A and B regarding this material eontinulty. In very contrast, the houndar\' of a
whole is de1'ined by the fact that it is not only of a "virtual" character. This
boundary is a "real" boundary, insofar as it constitutively belongs to one body, and
not only exists in reference to a second body but "per se":
Nicht insofern das anstoßende Medium aufhört, fängt der Körper an (oder umgekehrt), son-
dern sein Anfangen bzw. Authören ist unabhängig von außer ihm Seiendem. obwohl die
sinnliche Feststellung nicht in der Lage ist, diese Unabhängigkeit an sinnlichen Merkmalen
direkt aufzuzeigen. (Plessner 1975: 1(4)

This coneept of boundary is the definiens of a further constitutive concept in

Plessner's anthropology, namely positionality. Positionality describes an inherent
eharacter of living entities. If a boundary as areal entity is defined by perpetual
self-constitution, then the "inside" of the respective living entity ean only be

32 Consequently the redemption of the subject-object-difference in terms of a philosophy of life

must fail (for further considerations s. Lohmar 1997).
 Human Culture's Natures 221

defined in relation to the "outside", and the "outside" is the outside of a partieular
inside. Based on this double aspeet of boundary, the self-identity of the whole must
be reprodueed by the self-eonstitution of the boundary. This proeess of reproduet-
ion is thought as identieal reproduetion:
Unter diesem A,pekt zeigen sich die statischen Wesenscharaktere der Positionalität in Rein-
heit. Der Sinn der Forderung an das Körperding: zu bleiben, was es ist, dem ewigen Wechsel
gegenüber zu beharren und der völligen Veränderung gegenüber die Monotonie des einmal
gegebenen Wasbestandes zu behaupten, wird jetzt erst verständlich und in seiner Auswirkung
faßlich. (Plessner 1975: 156)

Consequently, living entities are eoneeptualised as harmonie wholes that equili-

brate their parts in aeeordanee to the eonditions of the reproduetion of the whole 33 :
Indem in jedem Element des lebendigen Raumdinges und zugleich gegenüber jedem Element
die Einheit als Vermögen vertreten ist, sind die Elemente äquipotentiell und bilden als Insge-
samt ein harmonisch äquipotentielles System. (Plessner 1975: 162)

The development of sueh a harmonie system is eharacterised as the identical repro-

duction of the relations between its eonstituting parts and the parts in relation to
the whole. The form of this development is a proeess of unfolding, aetualising the
"enteleehy" of the whole.14. The organism as a whole is defined by three unit-
functions that provide the eriteria for the eonstitution and reproduetion of the
respective harmonies:
Denn der Körper ist selbst das lebendige Ding, das Ding, das mit der Eigenschaft der Posi-
tionalität, das Ding, das in ihm selber, zu dessen Struktur die Gegenwart der Einheit in jedem
seiner Teile gehört. Er ist in ihm selber doppelt, aber in dieser Verdoppelung einheitlich:
Einheit für sich (Kern, Subjekt des Habens), Einheit in der Mannigfaltigkeit der Teile
(Wirkeinheit, Gestalt, übersummenhafte Gesamtfunktion, Objekt des Habens), Einheit in
jedem Teil (harmonisch äquipotentielles System). (Plessner 1975: 187)

Aecordingly, a living entity as a body is an unit insofar as it is subject and object of

the unity and the relation between both of them. By eonstituting the boundary,
a living entity has a body, is a body, and it is the whole as the expression of the har-
monie relations of its eonstituting parts. These three Ilnit funetions guarantee the
self-idcntity of the system under eonsideration. The relation between the organism
and its sphere (the position within a the field of its action) is then eonsidered as the
realisation of adaptation:

33 The definition of an organism and the resulting relations between the Umwelt of an organism
and this organism itself (in terms of the living wholel is similar to Kant's definition in his
Critics of Judgement (Kant 1974:318 ff.) in central aspects of the term: "Im Organ hat das
Lebewesen sein Mittel: zum Leben. In seinem Körper vermittelt sich das Ganze zum Ganzen.
Die in ihm Gesetztheit des organischen Körpers ist wirklich vermittelte Unmittelbarkeit. Das
Ganze ist in allen seinen Teilen durch ihre in divergenter Spezialität gegebene Übereinstim-
mung zum Ganzen gegenwärtig, die Teile dienen dem Ganzen. Oder kurz ge faßt: der wirkliche
Körper ist in jeder seiner faktisch erreichten Phasen in ihm selbst Zweck." (Plessner 1975: 169)
The mediated-immediacy is explained here by the relation between the organs that serve as
means for the living entity to realise and reproduce its postitionality. On the other hand and at
the same time, life appears immediate(ly) from this mediation .
.14 The specitic functional type in the sense 01' a Driesch- resp. Uexküll-type-definition of organ-
ism defines this entelechy.
222 Mathias Gutmann

Der lehendige Körper bildet als grenzenthaltender Körper den Übergang zwischen ihm und
dem umschließenden Medium. Er wird damit als Mitte und Peripherie in Einem gekenn-
zeichnet. In seinem Verhältnis zum Positionsfeld sind die beiden, als Extreme geschilderten
Möglichkeiten zu einer Wirklichkeit verbunden, insofern er als Element der Peripherie zum
Feld mitgehört. als Mitte dagegen sieh dem Feld gegenüher befindet. Wlessner 1975: 2(3)

The organism is a monade-like entity embedded into its own Umwelt. Here, the
similarity becomes obvious between Plessner's approach of the constitution of
boundary and Uexküll's description of the organismic inside-outside-relation. In
Plessner's approach this embedding is necessarily conceptualised as a harmonic
relation, because the inside-outside relation has to be maintained ("grenz-
erhaltend' in the citation above). Therefore, it is not a simple static, but a dynamic
equilibrium that allows regulatory processes. But even if the adaptation of an
organism is not assumed to exist in such a rigid way as Uexküll proposed, the
relation to its Umwelt is characterised by harmony and equilibration. These aspects
follow from the definition of the self-constitution of the boundary as a process of
identical reproduction. Insofar, Plessner - in very contrast to Gehlen on the one
hand and Scheler on the other hand.l S - does not argue from a strictly biological or a
metaphysical point of view. The systematic restrietions of this approach follow
from the categorical construction itself and can be exemplified by considering the
application of this concept of boundary to the description of the three levels within
the realm of living organisation.

3.2
Plants, Animals, and Humans

The differences between the three levels of living entities, namely plants, animals
and humans are conceptualised in terms of the specific constitution of inside-
outside-relations. The activity of the respective organism in relation to its Umwelt
is structuralized by the specific concretisation of the boundary itself. Plessner's
conceptualisation of three 1e,e1s of living organisation can be reconstructed as the
ontological interpretation of methodological assumptions as mentioned already in
the introduction. The first level is represented by plants, which are described as
"open forms":
Offen ist diejenige Form, welche den Organismus in allen seinen Lehensäußerungen un-
mittelbar seiner Umgehung eingliedert und ihn zum unselbsWndigen Ahschnitt des ihm
entsprechenden Lehenskreises macht. (Plessner 1975. 219)

The openness of the vegetative-form is determined by the missing of a "centralised

organisation"; there is no "individuality" (that's the reason why plant are described
as "dividuums"). The plant is not subject of a transformation. In a way. plants are
thought of as plastic material in the mould of the environment. In very contrast to
the more or less passive constitution of boundary of plants, animals are determined
as c10sed forms:

1, For the reconstruction of Schelers concept of human being s. Gutmann in press.

 Human Culture's Natures 223

Geschlossen ist diejenige Form. welche den Organismus in allen ,einen Lebensäul3t:rungen
mittelbar seiner Umgt:bung eingliedert. und ihn zum selbständigen Abschnitt des ihm ent-
sprechenden Lebenskreises macht. Wenn es zur offenen Form gehört, den Organismus mit
allen seinen an die Umgebung angn.:nzcnden Flächen Funktionsträger sein zu lassen. so wird
die geschlossent: Form sich in einer möglichst starken Abkammerung des Lebewesens gegen
seine Umgebung äußern müssen. (Plessner 1975: 226)

In contrast to plants, animals have a "concentric" from of organisation, which finds

its highest expression in the existence of a "central organ". The "concentric" form
of organisation that can be found within the field of animals implies the difference
between the inside (as the body itself which is the centre of all the sensations
coming from the Umwelt) and the outside, which the animals constitute in accord-
ance with their Bauplan 36 • But the concentricity of animal organisation provides
only a reduced form of retlexivity. On the one hand, all sensations are related to the
animal budy; this body itself does not become an isolated object of consideration.
The aspects of the Umwelt on the other hand are related to the body although not
become the aspects uf a concrete "thing". Animals have neither a perception of
themselvcs as "subjects" nur a perception of the objects of sensation; they do not
constitute "thing-schemes":
Positional bildet ein Tier als einzelnes Ding. als Individuum ein Hier-letzt. gegen welches
Außen feld und eigener Körper konzentrisch stehen und aus dem heraus eigener Körper und
Außent'.:ld Einwirkungen erhalten. Es merkt und es handelt. der Unterschied von Fremdem
und Eigenem ist zonen mäßig klar gegeben. Von Fremdem trennt es die Kluft. kraft derer es das
außer dem Leibt: Gegebene hat. merkt. (Plessner 1975: 239)

The resistant aspects.17 of the Umwelt are grouped "concentric" around the consti-
tuting animal. The convergent-point of both, the body as a subject of these resistant
aspects does not become an aspect of its own right. Between the open form of
plants and the c10sed form of animals smooth transitions are pussible, but only in
the sense of empirically ambiguous cases (s. above). Plessner makes a systematic-
ally similar difference between animals and humans, whereas animals show a pri-
mordial form of retlexivity. But insofar as they remain adjusted to the limits of the
Funktionskreise, the here-and-now form of their immediate perception of Umwelt

.16 The dilTerence between plants and animals is conceptualised as an ideal difference. Empiric-
ally. according to Plessner, smooth transitions are possible: "Ptlanze und Tier lassen sich nicht
nach empirischen Merkmalen wesensmäßig unterscheiden. Ihre Differenz ist in voller Realität
ideell. Offene Form und geschlossene Form sind Ideen. nach denen die wirklichen lebendigen
Körper organisch sein müssen; unter welche Lebendiges tritt. wenn es den Weg des Organischen
geht. Im Empirischen kann man die Grt:nzlinit: zwischen dem ptlanzliehen und dem tierischen
Reich nicht linden; hier gibt es Übergänge neben den ausgesprochenen Formen." (Plessner
1975: 235) This interesting concept of the relationship between ideas and the empirical
differences between plants and animals has important consequences. For example, the very
form of vegetative- and animal-organisation does not allow to derive empirically defined
phyla. dasses etc. These organisation-forms are "ideas" and insofar they canno! themselves be
concretised; however, the concrete entities can be understood by reference to those ideas.
Therefore. Plessner's connection between ontology and its ideal expression as organisational-
forms remains within the limits of"idealist morphology". (See e.g. Troll 1984)
.17 This circumscription allows to avoid the term "object" or thing, which - in accordance to
Plessner - is not available on the level of animal organisation.
224 Mathias Gutmann

and body does not provide a fully developed retlexivity. HUlllans however, are
defined as "being" and "possessing" a body at the same time, and as being aware of
this double aspect of their own existence. Therefore, the organisational form of
humans can be called "eccentric":
Der Mensch als das lebendige Ding, das in die Mitte seiner Existenz gestellt ist, weiß diese
Mitte, erlebt sie und ist darum über sie hinaus. Er erlebt die Bindung im absoluten Hier-Jetzt,
die Totalkonvergenz des Umfeldes und des eigenen Leibes gegen das Zentrum seiner Position
und ist darum nicht mehr von ihr gebunden. (Plessner 1975: 291)

The eccentricity follows from the "personality", which is determined in three

aspects that are derived from the relation between being and possessing a body:
Positional liegt ein Dreifaches vor: das Lehendige ist Körper, im Körper (als Innenleben oder
Seele), und außer dem Körper als Blickpunkt, von dem aus es beides ist. Ein Individuum,
welches positional derart dreifach charakterisiert ist, heißt Person. Es ist Subjekt seines
Erlebens, seiner Wahrnehmung und seiner Aktionen, seiner Initiative. Es weiß und es will.
Eine Existenz ist wahrhaft auf Nichts gestellt. (Plessner 1975: 293)

Being an animal in respect to its body-organisation per se, the constitution of the
Umwelt cannot longer be described within the framework of Uexküll's Funktions-
kreise. Humans don't have "Umwelt" but they have a differentiated environment
that consists of an "external world", an "inner world" and "contemporaries"
(Mitwelt). These three aspects of human personality define the human "Umwelt"
as "Welt" (world). Animals have Umwelt and humans have Welt. The distinctiun
between anirnals and humans is analogously completed as the difference between
plants and animals. Remaining an animal in respect of their body constitution,
humans are as persons irreducible to any known aspect of animal constitution 1X :
Wenn der Charakter des Außersichseins das Tier zum Menschen macht, SO ist es. da mit
Exzentrizität keine neue Organisationsform ermöglicht wird. klar. daß er körperlich ein Tier
hleiben muß. Physische Merkmale der menschlichen Natur haben daher nur einen empirischen
Wert. (Plessner 1975: 293)

Despite the fact, that humans cannot be characterised by their Umwelt, the vcry
structure of the world has similar central aspects as the structure of Uexküll's
original definition of Umwelt. But P1essner's considerations differ from lJexküll's
concept in at least one fundamental aspect. Because humans are not adjusted to
their environment in a biologically relevant sense, they must be adjusted to the
world within which they live as non-biological entities. They are adjusted in refer-
ence to their respective "culture". Cultures are the adequate "Umwelten" to which
humans are existentially adapted:
Erst innerhalb eines kulturell geprägten Daseinsrahmens findet der Mensch sein Zuhause. Die
Regionen der Geborgenheit und Vertrautheit. des Selbstverständlichen und Natürlichen liegen
in einer spezifisch geistigen Ebene: heimatliche Landschaft. Muttersprache, Familie und
Sitte. Überlieferung, Gesellschaftsordnung, Vorbilder, die eigene Stadt, Straße, Heim, Zimmer.
die Gebrauchsdinge und heiligen Zeichen. das ganze Drumherum des Lebens. (Plessner
1983: 185)

.1X Plessner emphasises this distinction referring to the speculation 01' Daque who considered the
possibility 01' alluvial hominids (s. Plessner 1975:293).
 Human Culture's Natures 225

The existential eccentricity guarantees the biulogical irreducibility. Humans are not
"deficient" animals in a biological sense as Gehlen puts it. But they are animals
with the aspect of perfect reciprocity that assures their personality39. As persons
their relation to the external world is categorically similarly structured as the
Umwelten of Uexküll's organisms.

3.3
Reflexivity as a Property

Sofar, our reconstruction has showen that for Plessner Uexküll's theory of organism
provides the standard-concept for the introduction of humans as animals. Antici-
pating an empirical scheme, namely the hierarchy of living organisation, the
categorical construction ofboundary is ontologically interpreted in reference to this
hierarchy. The Sonderstellung of humans is seen in their personality. Following the
saltationalist mode of evolution that is implied by Uexküll's theory of organism,
this unique character cannot be reduced to characters of evolutionary pre-cursors.
Nevertheless, Plessner's central idea is the constitution of human nature starting
with the primordial expressions of life and resulting in the specific organisation of
humans. Human nature has a biological basis. The further development of humans
will take place not within the biological Umwelten but within their specific worlds,
the cultures, to which they belong (Plessner 1981).
From a methodological point of view, Plessner's approach contains similar
aspects as Gehlen'solo. However, following Plessner, the biological comparisons
emphasise the fundamental ditference between the "underlying" biological aspects
of human existence and the non-biological speciticity of humanity itself. If we
consider Uexküll's theory of organism-Umwelt-relation as the threshold value,
both cuncepts, namely Gehlen's criteriological as weil as Plessner's retlexion-
theoretical approach converge towards this threshold from opposite directions. This
may explain the fact that Plessner wonders about Gehlen's purely biological
description of humans within his approach of philosophical anthropology (Plessner
1983). If we reconsider Plessner's approach as an attempt to redeem the subject-
object-difference (s. Pietrowicz 1992), it becomes reasonable that it is this differ-
ence that serves as a constant of the developmental line from plants via animals
towards humans. The ditference between nature and culture becomes reproduced
by the difference of being and possessing a body on the one hand, and the aware-
ness uf this being and possessing on the other hand. The methodological consider-
ations on the constitution of boundary are the rational of Plessner's approach. They
become ontologically interpreted and empirically (namely in form of the hierarchy
of life) exemplified. Consequently the systematic starting point (namely the
explication of human constitution) becomes inverted to the ontological terminus ad
quem of a sequence of living organisation. The misinterpretation of the methodo-

39 It should not be neglected, that particularly in his "Macht und menschliche Natur" Plessner
considers the necessity of the guidance of human action in a way that resembles Gehlen's
argument. Nevertheless, the fact remains, that the starting point of Plessner's approach is an
ontologically interpreted methodological scheme.
40 This is not a historical but a systematic statement!
226 Mathias Gutmann

lo!!ieal preretlul~ltes as ontologieal pre-eursers reduees retlexivity to a simple

eharaeter within the framework of classieal substance-ontology. A categorieally
possible retlexion-theoretical approach collapses into simple criteriology.

4
Grammatological Objections

Criteriological approaches as weil as retlexive-theoretieal eoncepts are confronted

with so me familiar grammatological objections. If we define human being in terms
of several differing scientific descriptions of human beings, some human per-
formances and features will necessarily be excluded. But even if one accepts the
premise of the fundamental grammatological difference41 between the description
of human beings as persons on one side and as subject-matter of scientific theories
on the other side, a serious conceptual problem remains: Whereas there are no
doubts, that seientific methods (of course mainly in the sense of natural sciences)
can properly be applied to non-human living entities such as animals and plants,
and that the results of these applieations are "seientifie deseriptions" of the
respeetive objeets with determined claims of validity, the situation differs in the
ease of the human world. In this ease, the suffieieney of a seientifie deseription in
the sense of a biologieal deseription ean be denied. Kambartel diagnoses a fallaey
of eategory, beeause the "philosophieal grammar" of human world differs funda-
mentally from the grammar of physieal or biological description. He shows the
methodological problems by analysing the possibilities of evolutionary ex plan-
ations of the human world, by starting his eonsiderations with the fundamental
ditlerenees that are made within everyday-lifeworld eontexts by dealing with
physieal and living objeets on the one hand and with autonomous actors on the
other hand. In aecordance with this differentiated "grammar", everyday-lifeworld
itself is articulated. This articulation is relevant also when we deal with evolution-
ary explanations. Those explanations neeessarily refer to a situation that must in a
first step be deseribed by applying a language, wh ich is (grammatieally) rieher than
the languages that are used as a basis for the explanation. Consetluently, the trans-
ition from "physieally or ehemically" described situations to situations of per-
ception or moral judgement is grammatically excluded:

-11 Kambartcl (19X9) emphasizes this grammalOlogical dilfcrcnce in order to reject the relevance
of evolutionary explanations and descriptions f(lr the cOl1stitution of the "humane world": "Wir
kennen andere Fälle mit einer ähnlichen Problem lage, und zwar insbesondere Fälle. die für
eine Beurteilung evolutionstheoretischer Texte wesentlich sind: etwa die grammatischen
Differenzen im sprachlichen Umgang mit natürlichen und physikalischen Objekten auf der
einen Seite, wahrnehmungsfähigen Lebewesen. schließlich mit handlungs- und verantwor-
tungsfähigen Personen auf der anderen Seite - und den Physikalismus oder einen kybernetisch
(technisch) orientierkn Funktionalismus als grammatisch undifferenziertc Einheitssprachen.
Der Mensch ist mehr, sagen wir dagegen dann etwa, als die Summe der physikalischen und
chemischen oder der technischen Aussagen über seinen Körper und dessen Veränderungen und
Bewegungen." (Kambartel 1989: 66)
 Human Culture's Natures 227

Entwicklungen in diesem Sinne können die Grammatik, in der die Anfangssituation und die
Prinzipien ihrer Veränderung beschrieben werden, nicht verlassen. Von physikalischen und
chemischen Zuständen und Ereignissen führt, weil kein sprachlicher. so auch kein evolutio-
närer naturgeschichtlicher Weg zur Weltwahrnehmung oder gar zu in moralischen Termini
beschriebenen Situationen; (. .. ). (Kambartel 1989: 67)

Following this line of argument, evolutionary discourse can only be understood as

a narrative report of transformations from grammatically poorer to grammatically
richer situations. As one important result of this approach, a shift from one lan-
guage of description to a second (with its respective unique grammar) must not be
conceptualised as a transition from one state to a following stare of nature within a
developmentalline. There are two states, described with two different languages of
description. The shift, understood as a real transition (in the sense of an evolution-
ary transformation) from one situation to the second can only be narrated:
Die grammatisch neue Situation kann aus dem. was ihr vorausgeht. dann auch nicht erklärt
oder verstanden werden. Zu ihren Ursprüngen kann man sich nur historisch erzählend im
engeren Sinne verhalten, auch wenn sie. diese Ursprünge. der Ausgangspunkt neuer Entwick-
lungen werden. Entwicklungen, welche dann durchg[ingig eine grammatisch reichhaltigere
Beschreibung verlangen. (Kambartel 1989: 67)

On the first glance this grammatical differentiation. wh ich allows a powerful

rejection of "reductionist" scientific approaches (not only within the narrow limits
of evolutionary biology), seems also to provide a solution for the problem we deal
wilh here. If we have to state a multitude of situations, that are "given" with a
specitic, adequate language of description and an adequate grammar, then a hiatus
had to be stated. that divides the human world from the world of animals. plants,
physical and chemical object. Consequently. the connections between these dif-
ferent language-worlds can only be constructed by the composition of narrative
"explanations". However, we have to pay a high price for this liberation. If the con-
nection between the different worlds is only of a narrative form. the relevl/nce of
scientilic descriptions (e.g. but not exclusively evolutionary) of humans becomes
unclear. If no further connections exist but a coincidence between a specific pro-
perty or faculty in the language-world with a specitic set of cvents in another language-
world. the claims of validity of scientitic descriptions and praxis remains unsettled.
The "natural processes" become separated from their respective description:
Wohl gibt es andererseits nicht bereits grammatische Einwände dagegen. daß Ereignisst! oder
Ergebnisse einer bestimmten Entwicklung von einem bestimmten Stadium an hegleitet sind
durch Geschehnisse. welche jenseits der grammatischen Grenze dieser Entwicklung liegen.
Ein Beispiel dafür wäre etwa das Auftreten sprachlicher Zeugnisse parallel zu einer bestimm-
ten Größe und Ausdifferenzierung des (menschlichen) Gehirns. (Kambartel 1989: 67)

As a consequence of the plurality of language-worlds. the fundamental distinction

between nature and culture remains intact and can only be accepted. To avoid the
resulting dualism, the relationship between scientific description and the "mani-
fest" image of humans demands further consideration. The concept of human
beings as "persons" that "have intentions, desires or thoughts", refers to a language
of description that cannot be reduced to scientific descriptions:
228 Mathias Gutmann

To think of a featherless biped as a person is to think 01' it as a being with wh ich one is bound
up in a network 01' rights and duties. From this point 01' view, the irreducibility of the personal
is the irreducibility 01' the 'ought' to the 'is'. But even more basic than this ( ... I, is the fact that
to think of a featherles, biped as a person is to construe its behaviour in terms 01' actual 01'
potential membership in an embracing group each mcmber of which thinks of its.:lf as a
member of the group. (Sellars 1963: 39)

Following Sellars it can be concluded that the combination of a scientific descript-

ion of human beings as specimen and the description of human beings as persons
transcends the limits of a scientific explanation and results finally in a profound
confusion of language levels. When we deal with humans as persons, the sprach-
spiel of intentions is assumed to be adequate:
Now, the fundamental principles of a community, which define what is 'correct' or 'incorrect',
'done' or 'not done', are the most general common intentions 01' that community with respect
to the behaviour 01' the members of the group. It follows that to recognise a featherless biped or
dolphin or Martian as a person requires that one think thoughts of the form, 'We (one) shall do
(or abstain from doing) actions of kind A in circumstances 01' kind C'. To think thoughts 01' this
kind is not to c1assify or explain, but to rehearse an intention. ( ... ) (Sellars 1963: 40)

Sellars suggests a unity of anthropology by joining the concept of person to the

scientific image of man, thereby assuming that the resulting completion of the
scientific image allowed even the revision of the dualism between man and nature
(described in terms of scientific theories):
Thus the conceptual framework 01' person is not something that needs to be reconciled with the
scientitic image, but rather something to be joined to it. Thus, to complete the scientitic image
we need to enrich it not with more ways of saying what is the case, but with the language uf
community and individual intentions, so that by construing the actions we intend to do and the
circumstances in wh ich we intend to do them in scientitic terms, we directly relate the world as
conceived by scientilic theory tn nur purposes, and make it our wnrld and nn longer an alien
appendage tn the world in wh ich we do our living. (Sellars 1963: 40)

But even if we accepted the possibility to connect scientitic descriptions of humans

with the manifest image, and additionally adopted the resulting dialectics between
both images, the problem, which descriptions should be chosen remains unsolved.
From this point of view. at least a preceding theory of knowledge must be available
that allows the reconstruction of both, natural as weIl as social sciences. Sellars
seems to be aware of the problem and he concedes that the systematic relationship
of nature and culture remains unclear. Therefore the redemtion of the resulting
dualism remains the work of imagination:
We can of course. as malters now stand, realise this direct incorporation 01' the scientitic image
into our way of life only in imagination. But to do so iso if only in imagination, to transcend the
dualism of the manifest and scientific images of man-of-the-world. (Sellars 1963: 40)

At this point, in our reconstruction of criteriological and reflexion-theoretical

approaches on the one hand, grammatological objections on the other hand, we
arrive at the methodologically important result, that in all three cases the separation
between nature and culture is an essential aspect of theses approaches. In the' next
section we will analyse an approach wh ich is directed toward overcoming this
separation. For such a purpose we have to require that the separation of nature and
culture shall be redeemed within culture itself. In this case, the term culture cannot
 Human Culture's Natures 229

be conceptua!ised sufficiently within the framework of a substance-ontology.

Culture can neither be understood as the nature of humans nor as one of their
relevant 'characters'.

5
Med iation-Oriented Approaches

Despite the differences in detail, one premise has been shared by all considered
forms of descriptions of human beings, namely the difference between culture and
nature. Featuring humans on the basis of a substance-ontology led to the inability to
give an ans wer to the question "how to characterise a human being". Mediation-
oriented approaches may provide an alternative. Here both aspects, namely nature
and culture are interpreted as the constituents of a relation, not as specifically
"given" determinations per se. This field of argument can be exemplified by
Cassirer's functionalist approach of symbolic forms. Cassirer reconsiders the
question of "what is manT' itself, by stating a specific relation between nature and
culture, and between this relation and the concept of human being, that can be
traced back to the very beginning of the history of thought:
In the first mythologieal explanations 01' the uni verse we always find a primitive anthropology
side by side with a primitive cosmology. The quest ion of the origin of the world is inextrieable
interwoven with the question of the origin of man. (Cassirer 1972: 3)

From this point of view, the relation between nature and culture cannot be defined
in terms of derivation. Neither the reduction of human existence to natural states,
nor the exclusion of natural aspects from the human world, but the reconstruction
of culture-nature-relation is demanded. And this relation must be traced back to its
interindividual and intersubjective roots:
Truth is by nature the offspring 01' dialectic thought. It cannot be gained, thereforc. except
through a constant cooperation 01' the subjects in mutual interrogation and reply. It is not
therefore like an empirical objeet; it must be understood as the outgrowth of a soeial aet. Here
we have the new. indirect answer to the question "What is man'?" Man is dcelared to be that
creature who is constantly in search of himself - a creature who in every moment of his
existence must examine and scrutinize the eonditions of his existenee. In this serutiny. in this
eritical attitude toward human life, consists the real value of human life. 'A life which is
unexamined'. says Sokrates in his Apology. 'is not worth living.' (Cassirer 1972: 5 f.)

The form of the specific human reference to the "world" structures the "search far
himself'. This reference is a form of mediation that allows to preserve the
specificity of nature as weil as culture and to constitute at the same time their inner
mutual connection. Nature and culture correspond to each other in terms of a
contrast, not of a simple continuity:
Nicht sowohl die Kontinuität, die wir zwischen beiden (spirit and nature, Geist und Natur.
MG) entdecken, als vielmehr der Kontrast, der sich zwischen ihnen auftut, scheint uns das
eigentliche Wesen beider erst wahrhaft aufzuschließen. Keine der beiden Welten wird uns
wahrhaft durchsichtig, solange wir sie lediglich in sich selbst und in ihrem eigenen be-
stimmenden Autbauprinzip betrachten - wir müssen gleichsam sie vielmehr gegeneinander
halten, wir müssen die eine in der anderen sich retlektieren lassen, um in solcher "wieder-
holten Spiegelung" ein Bild von beiden zu gewinnen. (Cassirer 1995: 45)
230 Mathias Gutmann

This mutual "retle;;tion" (sensu verbis) refers to a common medium within which
natural and cultural aspects of human activity are constituted. The medium is
constituted by "symbolic forms", for example language, myth, art, knowledge etc.
h enable~, structures, determincs and restricts human reference to worlds; thus, a
human being is to be conceptualised as an "animal symbolicum". In very contrast
to the attempts described above which tried to gain a concept of human being
by reference to specific characters, this approach does refer primarily to the
"objectivations" of human activity. They represent a collective, super-individual
medium, in regard to wh ich subject-subject- as weil as subject-object-relations
hecome constituted. The very structure of this mediation cannot be reduced to a
simple dyadic relation. The polyadic-relation (i.e. the nature-culture-difference
within a symbolic form, e.g. the form of scientitic knowledge) allows to describe
the human world as a region of mediated-immediacy, and within this relation the
constitution ur human beings as cultural entities can be reconstructed. Conse-
quently, the "constitution" of humans cannot be conceptualised as a nature-culture-
transition, but as the articulation of nature-culture-differences during the cultural
development of these forms themsclves. Nature is not the other side of culture; both
terms refer to the same referent, namely to human activity, more precisely to human
\l"ork. Within work, understood as collective, tool-mediated activity. thc nature-
culture-dil"ference is steadily produced and reproduced. Reproduction does not
me an identical reproduction, but the development of tools. whose application
generates the nature-culturc-diffcrence. The following quote is an example of
this form of non-identical-rcproduction with the developmcnt of language during
its use:
Sie (die Sprache. MG) ist nur im Akt des Sprechens. und dieser vollzieht sich niemals in genau
derselben Weise. Hermann Paul hat in seinen "Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte" darauf
hingewiesen. welche hedeutsame Rolle dem Umstand zuHillt, daß die Sprache nur dadurch
hesteht. daß sie von einer Generation an die andere weitergegeben wird. Dieses Weitergehen
kann niemals in der Art erfolgen. daß dabei die Aktivität und Selbständigkeit des einen Teils
ausgeschaltet wird. Der Empfangende nimmt die Gabe nicht gleich einer geprägten Münze. Er
kann sie nur aufnehmen. indem .:r sie gebraucht. und in diesem Gebrauch drückt er ihr eine
neue Prägung auf. So spricht der Lehrer und der Lernende. so sprechen Eltern und Kinder
niemals streng "dieselbe" Sprache. (Cassirer 1994: 114)

Because tools, applicd in the light of a medium, playa significant role fm thc
constitution of nature-culture-differencc within culture, the relation betwecn means
and tools must be considercd. Thee relevant differcncc between means and tools as
a specitic class of means can bc explicated by the diffcrcncc between signal and
symbol.

5.1
Signal and Symbol

Adopting a criteriological or a retlexive-theoretical point of view, the difference

between humans and animals can be viewed as a ditTerence in grade or as a funda-
mental, unbridgeable difference. Accordingly, on the one hand one may assume,
that animals have developed so me speech-ability. This leads to the assumption that
human communication is an evolutionary derived character and consequently,
 Human Culture's Natures 231

animals sho\\ "communicative" ability, which (in principal) has the form of human
communication-l 2•
On the other hand one may assume, that animals posses speecJl-like ahilities that
merely resemble human communication in so me aspects.
From a mediation-oriented point of view, the difference between humans and
animals as weil as their similarities is seen as being expressed within the medium of
human activity itself. From this point of view the use of a signal has to be distin-
guished from the form of symbolic expression and representation. A signal can be
introduced to indicate a distinct situation. Cassirer uses Pavlov's experiments as an
example:
A bell, foc example, may become a "sign for dinner", and an animal may be trained not to
touch its food when this sign is absent. But from this we learn only that the experimenter, in
this case. has succeeded in changing the food-situation 01' the anima!. He has complicated this
situation by voluntarily introducing into it a new element. (Cassirer 1972: 82)

This signal is an indicator and can even be used as an indicator in specific

situations. But the use of a signal is restricted to this particular form of application.
A signal will be "consumed" and not developed, differentiated, re-used, "abused"
or reproduced. In contrast, it is exactly this "r.on-consumptive" aspect, which
distinguishes a symbol from a signal:
Symhpls - in the proper sense 01' this tenn - cannot he reduced to mere signals. Signals and
symbols belong to two different universes 01' discourse: a signal is apart 01' the physical world
01' being; a symhol is apart 01' the human world 01' meaning. Signals are "operators"; symhols
ale "designators". Signals, even when understood and used as such. have nevertheless a sort 01'
physical or suhstantial heing; symhols have only a functional value. (Cassirer 1972: 32)

Symbols then are not fixed signals, but detincd by thcir "vcrsatility" (Cassircr
1972:36). The form of symbolic representation, articulation and constitution of
human relation, of their respective rcferencc of action-l] cannot bc reduced to :lllY
substantial characteristics of animal bchaviour. In very contras!, the identification
of animal behavioural structures, the analogy betwcen animals and humans in
respect to the application of signals is only possible fmm the poim of view of !zWI/Wl
action (md he!zaviour. Consequently, the difference between signal and symbols
should not be misundcrstood as a distinction by definition in thc sense that animals
used signals and humans used symbols. In very contrast, humans use signals (md
symbols, apply means a/l(1 tool; humans show behaviour as weil a.\' action. And it is
only the reference to those human interrelationships that allows the description of
distinct aspects of animal motions as behaviour. The description of animal move-
ment and motion, of their application of means and signals, is done in the mode of
hypothetical attribution, that is, they are described as (I' they applied means and

-I~ This assumption can be found very often within the field 01' evolutionary theories; e. g. the
principles 01' animal communication (s. Maynard Smith & Szathmary 1996).
-13 This includes first 01' all other human beings and only in a derived sense "things" to be used
and handled. But even this application 01' things tor specific purposes bears all signs 01'
"symholic" function. as it constitutes the difference between means (that are consumed like
signals) and tools that are developed and reproduced (for further reading s. Gutmann 1999).
232 Mathias Gutmann

signals. From this point of view, the relation of culture and nature is constituted via
symholic articulation and representation within culture itself.

5.2
The Definition of Human Being, or: What Constitutes Humanity

On the one hand we saw, that criteriological as weil as retlexive-theoretical

detinitions of humans are insufficient. On the other hand, both forms of determin-
ation of humans are in a way present and contained within the form of symbolic
mediation. Humans must be defined in terms of cufture, but the term culture itself
cannot be given in terms of a character. If on the contrary culture is detined by the
sum-total of the symbolic representation of humans, at least the following two
methodologically relevant questions remain:
I. What is the reference of the term "symbolic forms"?
2. What prevents a criteriological conceptualisation of symbolic forms them-
selves?
The reference of and to symbolic farms can be seen in the specific kind of inter-
individual. collective and mediated human activity. -;ummarised as the field of
work. This activity - understond as collective, concerted and cooperative action -
marks the very starting point for a symbolic reconstruction:
Man's outstanding characteristic, his distinguishing mark. is not his metaphysical or physical
nature - but his work. It is his work. it is the system of human activities. which defines and
determines the circle of "humanity". Language. myth. religion. art. science. history are the
constituents. the variolls sec tors of this circle. (Cassirer 11)7'2: 68)

The description of the "work" of humans can neither be reduced to simple "organic
activity", nor is work understood as a synonym for production. [t is characterised
by the procedure, the applied means and tools, the producers and the resulting
products. Consequently, the relation between product and procedures are taken into
consideration not only as the process of the correct choice of adequate means fnr
given goals. [n very contrast, the development of the relation between means and
goals, between means and means and between symbols and symbols is the referent
of a comprehensive detinition of human. Such a "generic definition" comprises two
aspects of the term development. On the one hand, the systematic relations between
the named constituents anti at the same time the historie relations as their respective
"objectivations" are taken into account. The "giveness" of symbolic forms, their
historie expression and their systematic unfolding build the aspects of this defini-
tion. This can be seen as an ans wer of the second question, insofar as a develop-
mental point of view++ provides the basis for criteriological characterisation, but it
cannot be reduced to it. It is the same relation that exists between means and tonls
or between signals and symbols. Tools can be used as means. symbols as signals.
But too[s as tools and symbols as symbols become reproduced and not merely
applied .

.j.j The term "development" is not meant with biological implications.

 Human Culture's Natures 233

Finally it ~hould be noted, that Cassirers considerations remain in a way within

the boundaries of a c1assical background, insofar as the symbolic forms he refers tu
are derived from the field of more or less canonical and traditional determinations
of human concretisation (Vergegenständlichung-+5 ). Nevertheless, the concept of
symbolic farms as the basis of a generic definition of human being as a developing
entity, leads from the narrow limits of substantialism towards the wide and
seemingly unrestricted area of functional characterisation of humans:
Language, art, myth, religion are no isolated, random creations. They are held together by a
common bond. But this bond is not a vinculum substantiale, as it was conceived and described
in scholastic thought; it is rather a vinculum functionale. It is the basic function of speech. of
myth, of art, of religion that we must seek far behind their innumerable shapes and utterances,
and that in the last analysis we must attempt to trace back to a common origin. (Cassirer
1972:68)

This double-movement of tracing back the origin and analysing the expression of
mediated human activity ean be seen as a main leitmotif of Culturalism. Con-
c1uding this overview of anthropological reasoning from a systematie point of view.
a short outline of some systematic perspectives of a culturalist anthropology is
presented. This approach follows in so me respeet Cassirer's philosophy of eulture,
within which anthropology must be embedded in order to avoid the shortcomings
we reconstructed above (s. Cassirer' critics of philosophieal anthropology in
Cassirer 1995). At the same time a methodologieal starting point is provided, that
allows to eireumvent a specific kind of relativism. which can be assumed to follow
from Cassirer's approach (see e.g. Luhmar 1997).

6
Same Perspectives of a Culturalist Approach

The ambiguity of the term nature was already mentioned, and the use of this term
with reference to the subject-matter of modern scienees is a case in point. Partic-
ularly biologieal objects, such as eeological, genetic or evolutionary units, provide
appropriate examples for the identification of nature with the objeets of hiologieal
theories. From a methodologieal point of view, this meaning is appropriate only
within the narrow limits of seientific theories. This does not imply a general
inappropriateness of its applieation, but it indieates the neeessity of a "reloeation"
of seientifie knowledge within the human world. This reloeation ean be done only
in terms of retleetion upon the origin of seiences and their respeetive relation to
non-scientifie knowledge and know-how on the one hand. On the other hand, this
retleetion has to be done even with respect to the development of this kind of
knowledge itself. If we understand the referenee to "symbolie forms" as a retlexive
double-movement of eonstitution and reeonstruetion, they provide a specifie

-+) Concretisation should not be confused with alienation; the latter is a characteristic feature e. g.
of cultural criticisms. (See e. g. Simmel 1996, Horkheimer & Adorno 1988). For so me metho-
dological problems of such approaches s. Gutmann 1998).
234 Mathias Gutmann

knowledge that illuminates the term "human beings" comprehensively, hut frolll a
specific point of view. The comprehensive conceptualisation has to be done for
each form of human work, regarding its product (in the case of sciences e.g. the
~cientific theories as weil as the underlying prax.is that is often neglected; s. Janich
1996 & 1997a), the tool and mean-mediated procedures of the generation of these
products (in our example e. g. the systematic development of the individual
sciences) and finally the course of historic development of the respective form of
knowledge. Because the field of human work cannot be restricted to a selection of
activities that are assumed to be basic activities in the sense that they fulfil "basic
needs", the resulting "generative detinition" of "human" will be a "regulative idea"
in the sense of an infinite process of retlection. Of course basic activities can be
identified, but only in the horizon of a medium within which they serve as
fundamentals jllT other purposes. The respective media become the collective
background tor the articulation of needs, and it is the retlection of this process of
development, which is the very subject-matter of culturalist reasoning. The
elaboration of the term "human" has to be done iteratively in reference to both,
constitutional as weil as reconstructive aspects.

6.1
Constitutional Aspects

The culturalist approach - referring to grammatological considerations on the one

hand and so me aspects of symbolic representation on the other hand - suggests to
view sciences as the product of human action and operations, guided by ex.plicitly
proposed aims and goals. Conseljuently, the ohjects and results of those goal-
guided human actions are not productsof "nature", but the outcome of the
respective human actions or operations themselves. Scientific languages then do
not primarily refer to nature, but to the re~pective human actions, their results and
products.
This culturalist point of view has some signiticant effects on our understanding
of nature, because nature can no longer he conceptualized according to an under-
Iying and very often unexplicated "object-subject"-structure. In very contrast to
such approaches, the term "nature" stands for some aspects of the results of ~uc­
cessful or unsuccessful human actioll and intervention.
In order to provide well-founded and sound scientifk theories, the formulation
of the conditions for the possibilities of sciences is the task of the so-called
"prototheories". These theories explicate the non- and pre-scientific knowledge,
which can on the one hand be shown to be valid, even without referring to scientific
knowledge 01' theories. It is possible to show, that sciences themselves are neces-
sarily based upon such everyday lifeworld knowledge and know-how, wh ich is
usually provided within everyday lifeworld practices. This has been shown in
numerous cases (Weingarten 1992 & 1993, Janich 1997b, Janich & Weingarten
1999, Gutmann 1996, Hanekamp 1997, Hartmann 1998, Schonefeld 1999, Lange
1999 Grunwald 2000). In the case of biological theories the reference to culti vation
and breeding practice, the know-how for the achievement of specified breeding-
purposes, very exact knowledge about the animals 01' plants, which are to be
 Human Culture's Natures 235

This knowledge does not have to be 01' a hiological provenance. Otherwise

breeding would only he possible in reference to hiology. On the other hand, the
practices 01' breeding and cultivation provide some knowledge and know-how,
wh ich can be applied in order to gain at least the very beginning for the introduction
01" biological objects: Darwin's own reference to breeding and cultivation for
evolutionary theory may serve as an excellent example here. Such a beginning is
called a "methodological starting point", in contrast to a merely historicalor
"matter 01' fact" starting point. The constitution 01' the primary objects proposed
here, refers to biotic entities, to animals and plants. The resulting scientific
language is consequently a biological language, which allows the construction 01'
scientific explanations and descriptions even of objects, which cannot be found
within everyday lifeworld itself. The successive extension of the scientific
language, the introduction of such "objects", which are 01' purely seientific origin,
is achieved by the consequent performance of protobiological retlection.
In regard to the respective sciences, chemistry, mathematics, physics eet. proto-
theories are construeted, whieh allow the foundation 01' these scienees. For all these
seiences. the methodologieal starting-point ean be found within every-day life-
world praxes. Similarly, by referring to different aspeets of human colleetivity in
the broader sense 01' eooperative interindividual behaviour and action. even the
methodological starting point for "eultural-sciences" ean be determined (for further
reading s. Weingarten 1998, Gutmann 1998 & 1999).
Obviously, after the constitution 01' the primary seientific objeets and the con-
struetion of fundamental concepts this narrow context is left. But the methodo-
logieal starting-point remains the very rational invariant 01' the further development
01' the respective sciences themselves. These invariants beeome the subject-matter 01'
the reconstructive part 01' the double-movement that determines the second aspect
01' the symbol ic form of sciences that served as an example here.

6.2
Reconstructive Aspects

The reconstruetion of the development of scientific theories demands a methodo-

logical starting point that was identified within everyday lifeworld. This starting
point is named a methodologieal in contrast to a merely historical starting point,
because the eonstitution 01' the primary objects of scientitic theories must provide
a justified. reprodueible and unequivocal basis for the further development 01'
the respective theories (s. Janich 1997b). This starting point, the results 01' the
prototheoretical considerations. becomes the eonstant 01' the second step, namely
the reconstruetion 01' the development 01' such theories. The mcthodologically
relevant aspect of this proeedure (for the proeedure in greater details s. Gutmann
1998, Gutmann & Weingarten 1999) in our eontext here is the fact that the
development of the (in this case scientific) means and tools becomes determined.
And it is the sequence of the systematically developed means and tools, which
provide the starting point for a systematic "cultural history of nature". Nature in
this connection with (specified) human work becomes the designator of specific
aspects within the procedures themselves. The form of the concretisation of
the mean-application determines the possible intension of the term nature. The
236 Mathias Gutmann

nature-culture-relation in the horizon of a symbolic form becomes an aspect of the

definition of "human being".

6.3
The Term Culture

From a culturalist point of view, anthropology preferably deals with the concept of
human as a cultural entity. The term culture is introduced as a "term of reflection",
a special kind of theoretical concept. Such an introduction starts with the recon-
struction of everyday-lifeworid practices, poietic as weil as "non-poietic" practices,
regulative practises, successful inter-individual, inter-personal and inter-subjective
relations etc.
After providing a comprehensive concept of culture, natural sciences gain their
methodological place within this culture, as particular cultural practices. In this
view, biology itself is identified as a particular cultural- here a scientific - practice.
Consequently biology does not provide an external point of view, from which
"culture" as the sum-total of human work could be understood and described suf-
ficiently. To put it in other words and thereby empha~ise this point: the diflerence
hetween human and non-human heillgs must already be availah/e in order to
cOl1stitute natural sciences. To a certain extend this difference is already available
within everyday lifeworid. Starting with the rcconstruction of sciences within
everyday lifeworId, we already are endowed with the possibility of successful
communication and action, of successful substantiation of statements and pro-
positions as weil as the justification of actions, decisions etc. But the double move-
ment of culturalist retlection cannot be reduced neither to everyday-lifeworld nor to
the single constituted and reconstructed aspects of human practice. In very contrast
a medium of retlection is provided within which the articulation of a compre-
hensivc concept of human being is possible. If we make a difference between the
methodological position of an ohserver and the position of a participant, successful
observation is only possible, if we already are participant - of and within human
practices.

7
Conclusion

Following the culturalist considerations above. the description of a human being in

terms of e. g. functional anatomy, physiology, or genetics is possible. As a goal-
guided human action it might even be useful. e. g. for medical of societal purposes.
However, from this point of view, the scientific (e. g. biologica!) description of
humans is not an example for natural sciences of humans. The culturalist relocation
of the nature-culture-difference within culture finally results in a shift from the
concept of sciences ()lhumans towards sciencesfor humans. If we take humans as
objects of natural sciences, the term "human" becomes a metaphor. If we - on the
other hand - take natural sciences as means for human purposes, the same will be
the case for the term nature. Consequently, the denomination of the "variation and
changing" of non-human-entities as their history is metaphoricaIly. because sensu
 Human Culture's Natures 237

stricto we deal with their evolution or develupment. Conversely, the denomination

of the "variation and changing" of human heings as "development and evolution" is
metaphorically, because sensu stricto we deal with their history.
Human beings do not have an "evolution". On the contrary we can reconstruct
several aspects of human beings applying biological knowledge. Hence, e. g.
evolution, the differing approaches of evolution, the development of the con-
ceptualisation of evolution itself, become part of a cultural history of nature
(for further reading see Gutmann & Weingarten, 200 I). The term nature becomes a
rejlection of specific aspects of human work:
Zum Ekel find' ich ewig nur mich in allem, was ich erwirke!
R.W.

8
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