Dragoljub "Draa" Mihailovi (Serbian Cyrillic: "" , known

to his supporters

E
Amol Dmol Amol E Amol
Mujo kuje konja po
mje se cu
Dmol E Johann Sebastian Bach (* 21. Mrzjul./ 31. Mrz 1685greg. in Eisenach; 28.

Juli 1750 in Leipzig) war ein deutscher Komponist, Kantor sowie Orgelund Klaviervirtuose des Barock. In seiner Hauptschaffensperiode war er Thomaskantor zu Leipzig.
Er ist der prominenteste Vertreter der Musikerfamilie Bach und gilt heute als einer der
bekanntesten und bedeutendsten Musiker berhaupt. Insbesondere von Berufsmusikern wird er oft
als der grte Komponist der Musikgeschichte angesehen.[2][3] Seine Werke beeinflussten
nachfolgende Komponistengenerationen und inspirierten Musikschaffende zu zahllosen
Bearbeitungen.
Zu Lebzeiten wurde Bach als Virtuose, Organist und Orgelinspektor hoch geschtzt, allerdings
waren seine Kompositionen nur einem relativ kleinen Kreis von Musikkennern bekannt. Nach Bachs
Tod gerieten seine Werke jahrzehntelang in Vergessenheit und wurden kaum noch ffentlich
aufgefhrt. Nachdem die Komponisten der Wiener Klassik sich mit Teilen von Bachs Werk
auseinandergesetzt hatten, begann mit der Wiederauffhrung der Matthus-Passion unter Leitung
von Felix Mendelssohn Bartholdy im Jahre 1829 die Bach-Renaissance in der breiten ffentlichkeit.
Seit der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts gehren seine Werke weltweit zum festen Repertoire der
klassischen Musik.

Inhaltsverzeichnis
[Verbergen]

1Leben
1.1Eisenach (16851695)
1.2Ohrdruf (16951700)
1.3Lneburg und Weimar (17001703)
1.4Arnstadt (17031707)
1.5Mhlhausen (17071708)
1.6Weimar (17081717)
1.7Kthen (17171723)
1.8Leipzig (17231750)
1.8.1Thomaskantor
1.8.2Weltliche Musik
1.8.3Die letzten Jahre
1.9berblick: Wohnorte und Reisen von J. S. Bach
2Musikalisches Schaffen
2.1Bach ein Autodidakt im Komponieren
2.2Verhltnis zu anderen Komponisten
2.3Die Kompositionen
2.3.1Vokalmusik
2.3.2Musik fr Tasteninstrumente
2.3.3Instrumentalmusik
2.4Musiksprache und Kompositionstechnik
2.5Instrumentenbau und Spieltechnik
2.6Bach und die musicalische Wissenschaft
2.7Verhltnis zur Religion
3Rezeption
3.1Zu Lebzeiten
3.2Tradierung durch Shne und Schler
3.3Einwirkung auf die Wiener Klassiker
3.4Bach-Renaissance im 19. Jahrhundert
3.520. und 21. Jahrhundert
3.6Gedenken
3.7Filme
4Literatur
5Siehe auch
6Weblinks

Komentari (0):
Za slanje komentara morate biti prijavljeni.

Poaljite komentar

Kosa.rs | MyDreams | Fast icon | Razmena linkova | Kontakt

E
Mujo
Dmol
Mu
Mujo

Amol Dmol
kuje konja po
E Amol E
jo kuje a majka
kuje a majka ga

Amol E
mje se
Dmol
ga ku
kune

Amol
cu
E
ne

Sine mujo iv ti bio majci

Ne kuju se konji po mjesecu
Ve po danu i arkome suncu
Mila majko ne kuni me mlada
Zna kad meni naumpadne draga
Zna kad meni naumpadne draga
Ja ne gledam sunca nit mjeseca
Nit moj ogo mraka nit oblaka
Ve me nosi dragoj pod penere

<< Povratak

Object 3

Object 4

Komentari (0):
Za slanje komentara morate biti prijavljeni.

Poaljite komentar

Kosa.rs | MyDreams | Fast icon | Razmena linkova | Kontakt

of Yugoslavia by Germany, Italy, Hungary, a small group of officers and soldiers led by
Mihailovi escaped in the hope of finding VKJ units still fighting in the mountains. After
skirmishing with several Ustae and Muslim bands and attempting to sabotage several
objects, Mihailovi and about 80 of his men crossed the Drina River into German-occupied
Serbia[a] on 29 April.[16] Mihailovi planned to establish an underground intelligence
movement and establish contact with the Allies, though it is unclear if he initially
envisioned to start an actual armed resistance movement.[17]

Formation of the Chetniks[edit]

See also: Uprising in Serbia (1941)

The Chetnik flag. The flag reads: "For King and Fatherland Liberty or Death".

For the time being, Mihailovi established a small nucleus of officers with an armed guard,
which he called the "Command of Chetnik Detachments of the Yugoslav Army". [17] After
arriving at Ravna Gora in early May 1941, he realized that his group of seven officers and
twenty four non-commissioned officers and soldiers was the only one. [18] He began to
draw up lists of conscripts and reservists for possible use. His men at Ravna Gora were
joined by a group of civilians, mainly intellectuals from the Serbian Cultural Club, who took
charge of the movement's propaganda sector.[17]
The Chetniks of Kosta Peanac, which were already in existence before the invasion, did
not share Mihailovi's desire for resistance.[19] In order to distinguish his Chetniks from
other groups calling themselves Chetniks, Mihailovi and his followers identified
themselves as the "Ravna Gora movement".[19] The stated goal of the Ravna Gora
movement was the liberation of the country from the occupying armies of Germany, Italy
and the Ustae, and the Independent State of Croatia (Serbo-Croatian: Nezavisna Drava
Hrvatska, NDH).[20]
Mihailovi spent most of 1941 consolidating scattered VKJ remnants and finding new
recruits. In August, he set up a civilian advisory body, the Central National Committee,
composed of Serb political leaders including some with strong nationalist views such
as Dragia Vasi and Stevan Moljevi.[20] On 19 June, a clandestine Chetnik courier
reached Istanbul, whence royalist Yugoslavs reported that Mihailovi appeared to be
organizing a resistance movement against Axis forces.[21]Mihailovi first established radio
contact with the British in September 1941, when his radio operator raised a ship in
the Mediterranean. On 13 September, Mihailovi's first radio message to King
Peter's government-in-exile announced that he was organizing VKJ remnants to fight axis
the Axis powers.[21]
Mihailovi also received help from officers in other areas of Yugoslavia, such as Slovene
officer Rudolf Perinhek, who brought reports on the situation in Montenegro. Mihailovi
sent him back to Montenegro with written authorization to organize units there, with the
oral approval of officers such as orije Lai, Pavle urii, Dimitrije Ljoti and Kosta
Muicki. Mihailovi only gave vague and contradictory orders to Perinhek, mentioning the
need to put off civil strife and to "remove enemies".[22]
Mihailovi's strategy was to avoid direct conflict with the Axis forces, intending to rise up
after Allied forces arrived in Yugoslavia.[23] Mihailovi's Chetniks had had defensive
encounters with the Germans, but reprisals and the tales of the massacres in the NDH
made them reluctant to engage directly in armed struggle, except against the Ustae in

Serbian border areas.[24] In the meantime, following the Axis invasion of the Soviet Union,
the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ), led by Josip Broz Tito, also went into action and
called for a popular insurrection against the Axis powers in July 1941. Tito subsequently set
up a communist resistance movement known as the Yugoslav Partisans.[25] By the end of
August, Mihailovi's Chetniks and the Partisans began attacking Axis forces, sometimes
jointly despite their mutual diffidence, and captured numerous prisoners. [26]But Mihailovi
discouraged sabotage due to German reprisals (such as more than 3,000 killed
in Kraljevo and Kragujevac) unless some great gain could be accomplished. Instead, he
favored sabotage that could not easily be traced back to the Chetniks. [27] His reluctance to
engage in more active resistance meant that most sabotage carried out in the early period
of the war were due to efforts by the Partisans, and Mihailovi lost several commanders
and a number of followers who wished to fight the Germans to the Partisan movement. [28]
Even though Mihailovi initially asked for discreet support, propaganda from the British
and from the Yugoslav government-in-exile quickly began to exalt his feats. The creation of
a resistance movement in occupied Europe was received as a morale booster. On 15
November, the BBC announced that Mihailovi was the commander of the Yugoslav Army
in the Fatherland, which became the official name of Mihailovi's Chetniks.[29]

Conflicts with Axis troops and Partisans[edit]

Nazi wanted poster for Colonel Mihailovi from 9 December 1941.

1942 German proclamation and reward offer for Mihailovi, after the Chetnik killing of 4 German
officers.

Draa Mihailovi as a small pet in the hands of the supposedly Jewish-controlled United
States and United Kingdom, depicted in a poster from the Grand Anti-Masonic Exhibition.

Mihailovi soon realized that his men did not have the means to protect Serbian civilians
against German reprisals.[30][31] The prospect of reprisals also fed Chetnik concerns
regarding a possible takeover of Yugoslavia by the Partisans after the war, and they did not
wish to engage in actions that might ultimately result in a post-war Serb minority.
[32] Mihailovi's strategy was to bring together the various Serb bands and build an
organization capable of seizing power after the Axis withdrew or were defeated, rather
than engaging in direct confrontation with them.[33] In contrast to the reluctance of
Chetnik leaders to directly engage the Axis forces, the Partisans advocated open
resistance, which appealed to those Chetniks desiring to fight the occupation. [34] By
September 1941, Mihailovi began losing men to the Partisans, such as Vlado Zeevi (a
priest), Lieutenant Ratko Martinovi, and the Cer Chetniks led by Captain Dragoslav
Rai[34][35]
On 19 September 1941, Tito met with Mihailovi to negotiate an alliance between the
Partisans and Chetniks, but they failed to reach an agreement as the disparity of the aims
of their respective movements was great enough to preclude any real compromise. [36] Tito
was in favour of a joint full-scale offensive, while Mihailovi considered a general uprising
to be premature and dangerous, as he thought it would trigger reprisals. [30] For his part,
Tito's goal was to prevent an assault from the rear by the Chetniks, as he was convinced
that Mihailovi was playing a "double game", maintaining contacts with German forces via
the Nedi government. Mihailovi was in contact with Nedi's government, receiving
monetary aid via Colonel Popovi.[37] On the other hand, Mihailovi sought to prevent Tito
from assuming the leadership role in the resistance,[36][38] as Tito's goals were counter to
his goals of the restoration of the Karaorevi dynasty and the establishment of Greater
Serbia.[39] Further talks were scheduled for 16 October.[38]
At the end of September, the Germans launched a massive offensive against both
Partisans and Chetniks called Operation Uice.[30] A joint British-Yugoslav intelligence
mission, quickly assembled by the Special Operations Executive (SOE) and led by
Captain D. T. Hudson, arrived on the Montenegrin coast on 22 September, whence they
had made their way with the help of Montenegrin Partisans to their headquarters, and then
on to Tito's headquarters at Uice,[40] arriving on or around 25 October.[41] Hudson
reported that earlier promises of supplies made by the British to Mihailovi contributed to
the poor relationship between Mihailovi and Tito, as Mihailovi correctly believed that no
one outside of Yugoslavia knew about the Partisan movement,[42][43][44] and felt that "the
time was ripe for drastic action against the communists".[42]
Tito and Mihailovi met again on 27 October 1941 in the town of Brajii near Ravna Gora in
an attempt to achieve an understanding, but found consensus only on secondary issues.

Immediately following the meeting, Mihailovi began preparations for an attack on the
Partisans, delaying the attack only for lack of arms.[46] Mihailovi reported to the Yugoslav
government-in-exile that he believed the occupation of Uice, the location of a gun factory,
was required to prevent the strengthening of the Partisans.[43] On 28 October, two Chetnik
liaison officers first approached Nedi and later that day German officer Josef Matl of the
Armed Forces Liaison Office, and offered Mihailovi's services in the struggle against the
Partisans in exchange for weapons.[31][46] This offer was relayed to the German general in
charge of the Territory of the Military Commander in Serbia, and a meeting was proposed
by the German for 3 November. On 1 November, the Chetniks attacked the Partisan
headquarters at Uice, but were beaten back.[47][48] On 3 November 1941 Mihailovi
postponed the proposed meeting with the German officers until 11 November, citing the
"general conflict" in which the Chetniks and Partisans were engaged requiring his presence
at his headquarters.[48][49] The meeting, organized through one of Mihailovi's
representatives in Belgrade, took place between the Chetnik leader and an Abwehr official,
although it remains controversial if the initiative came from the Germans, from Mihailovi
himself, or from his liaison officer in Belgrade.[b] In the negotiations Mihailovi assured the
Germans that "it is not my intention to fight against the occupiers" and claimed that "I
have never made a genuine agreement with the communists, for they do not care about
the people. They are led by foreigners who are not Serbs: the Bulgarian Jankovi, the Jew
Lindmajer, the Magyar Borota, two Muslims whose names I do not know and the Ustasha
Major Bogani. That is all I know of the communist leadership."[50] It appears that
Mihailovi offered to cease activities in the towns and along the major communication
lines, but ultimately no agreement was reached at the time due to German demands for
the complete surrender of the Chetniks,[51][52][53] and the German belief that the
Chetniks were likely to attack them despite Mihailovi's offer. [54] After the negotiations, an
attempt was made by the Germans to arrest Mihailovi.[55] Mihailovi carefully kept the
negotiations with the Germans secret from the Yugoslav government-in-exile, as well as
from the British and their representative Hudson.[51][47]
[45]

Mihailovi's assault on the Partisan headquarters at Uice and Poega failed, and the
Partisans mounted a rapid counterattack.[46][56] Within two weeks, the Partisans repelled
Chetnik advances and surrounded Mihailovi's headquarters at Ravna Gora. Having lost
troops in clashes with the Germans,[57] sustained the loss of approximately 1,000 troops
and considerable equipment at the hands of the Partisans,[58] received only one small
delivery of arms from the British in early November,[59] and been unsuccessful in
convincing the Germans to provide him with supplies,[48] Mihailovi found himself in a
desperate situation.[58][60]
In mid-November, the Germans launched an offensive against the Partisans, Operation
Western Morava, which bypassed Chetnik forces.[56][61][62] Having been unable to quickly
overcome the Chetniks, faced with reports that the British considered Mihailovi as the
leader of the resistance, and under pressure from the German offensive, Tito approached
Mihailovi with an offer to negotiate, which resulted in talks and later an armistice
between the two groups on 20 or 21 November.[61][56][63] Tito and Mihailovi had one last
phone conversation on 28 November, in which Tito announced that he would defend his
positions, while Mihailovi said that he would disperse.[30][52][62] On 30 November,
Mihailovi's unit leaders decided to join the "legalized" Chetniks under General Nedi's
command, in order to be able to continue the fight against the Partisans without the
possibility of being attacked by the Germans and to avoid compromising Mihailovi's
relationship with the British. Evidence suggests that Mihailovi did not order this, but
rather only sanctioned the decision.[54][64] About 2,0003,000 of Mihailovi's men actually
enlisted in this capacity within the Nedi regime. The legalization allowed his men to have
a salary and an alibi provided by the collaborationist administration, while it provided the
Nedi regime with more men to fight the communists, although they were under the
control of the Germans.[65] Mihailovi also considered that he could, using this method,
infiltrate the Nedi administration, which was soon fraught with Chetnik sympathizers.
[66] While this arrangement differed from the all-out collaboration of Kosta Peanac, it
caused much confusion over who and what the Chetniks were. [67] Some of Mihailovi's
men crossed into Bosnia to fight the Ustae while most abandoned the struggle.

Throughout November, Mihailovi's forces had been under pressure from German
forces, and on 3 December, the Germans issued orders for Operation Mihailovic, an attack
against his forces in Ravna Gora.[62] On 5 December, the day before the operation,
Mihailovi was warned by contacts serving under Nedi of the impending attack, [62] likely
by Milan Aimovi.[68] He closed down his radio transmitter on that day to avoid giving the
Germans hints of his whereabouts[69] and then dispersed his command and the remainder
of his forces.[62] The remnants of his Chetniks retreated to the hills of Ravna Gora, but
were under German attack throughout December.[70] Mihailovi narrowly avoided capture.
[71] On 10 December, a bounty was put on his head by the Germans. [55] In the meantime,
on 7 December, the BBC announced his promotion to the rank of brigade general.[72]
[67]

Activities in Montenegro and the Territory of the Military

Commander in Serbia[edit]
Mihailovi did not resume radio transmissions with the Allies before January 1942. In early
1942, the Yugoslav government-in-exile reorganized and appointed Slobodan Jovanovi as
prime minister, and the cabinet declared the strengthening of Mihailovi's position as one
of its primary goals. It also unsuccessfully sought to obtain support from both the
Americans and the British.[73] On 11 January, Mihailovi was named "Minister of the Army,
Navy and Air Forces" by the government-in-exile. [74] The British had suspended support in
late 1941 following Hudson's reports of the conflict between the Chetniks and Partisans.
Mihailovi, infuriated by Hudson's recommendations, denied Hudson radio access and had
no contact with him through the first months of 1942.[75] Although Mihailovi was in
hiding, by March the Nedi government located him, and a meeting sanctioned by the
German occupation took place between him and Aimovi. According to historian Jozo
Tomasevich, following this meeting, General Bader was informed that Mihailovi was
willing to put himself at the disposal of the Nedi government in the fight against the
communists, but Bader refused his offer.[71] In April 1942, Mihailovi, still hiding in Serbia,
resumed contact with British envoy Hudson, who was also able to resume his radio
transmission to Allied headquarters in Cairo, using Mihailovi's transmitter. In May, the
British resumed sending assistance to the Chetniks, although only to a small extent,
[76] with a single airdrop on 30 March.[77] Mihailovi subsequently left for Montenegro,
arriving there on 1 June.[78] He established his headquarters there and on 10 June was
formally appointed as Chief-of-Staff of the Supreme Command of the Yugoslav Army in the
Fatherland.[79] A week later he was promoted to the rank of General of the Army. [1] The
Partisans, in the meantime, insisted to the Soviets that Mihailovi was a traitor and a
collaborator, and should be condemned as such. The Soviets initially saw no need for it,
and their propaganda kept supporting Mihailovi. Eventually, on 6 July 1942, the station
Radio Free Yugoslavia, located in the Comintern building in Moscow, broadcast a resolution
from Yugoslav "patriots" in Montenegro and Bosnia labeling Mihailovi a collaborator. [80]

Mihailovi confers with his men.

In Montenegro, Mihailovi found a complex situation. The local Chetnik leaders, Stanii
and urii, had reached arrangements with the Italians and were cooperating with them
against the communist-led Partisans.[81][82] Mihailovi later claimed at his trial in 1946
that he was unaware of these arrangements prior to his arrival in Montenegro, and had to
accept them once he arrived,[83][84] as Stanii and urii acknowledged him as their
leader in name only and would only follow Mihailovi's orders if they supported their

interests.[84] Mihailovi believed that Italian military intelligence was better informed than
he was of the activities of his commanders.[84] He tried to make the best of the situation,
and accepted the appointment of Blao ukanovi as the figurehead commander of
"nationalist forces" in Montenegro. While Mihailovi approved the destruction of
communist forces, he aimed to exploit the connections of Chetniks commanders with the
Italians to get food, arms and ammunition in the expectation of an Allied landing in the
Balkans. On 1 December, urii organised a Chetnik "youth conference" at ahovii. The
congress, which historian Stevan K. Pavlowitch writes expressed "extremism and
intolerance", nationalist claims were made on parts of Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and
Italy, while its resolutions posited the restoration of a monarchy with a period of
transitional Chetnik dictatorship. Mihailovi and ukanovi did not attend the event, which
was entirely dominated by urii, but they sent representatives. [85] In the same month
Mihailovi informed his subordinates that: "The units of the Partisans are filled with thugs
of the most varied kinds, such as Ustaas the worst butchers of the Serb people Jews,
Croats, Dalmatians, Bulgarians, Turks, Magyars, and all the other nations of the world."[86]
In the NDH, Ilija Trifunovi-Biranin, a leader of pre-war Chetnik organizations, commanded
the Chetniks in Dalmatia, Lika, Bosnia and Herzegovina. He led the "nationalist" resistance
against Partisans and Ustae and acknowledged Mihailovi as formal leader, but acted on
his own, with his troops being used by the Italians as the local Anti-Communist Volunteer
Militia (MVAC). Italian commander Mario Roatta aimed to spare Italian lives, but also to
counter the Ustae and Germans, to undermine Mihailovi's authority among the Chetniks
by playing up local leaders, and to have possible links with Mihailovi and the Allies in case
the Axis lost the war.[citation needed] Chetniks, led by Dobroslav Jevevi, came from
Montenegro to help the Bosnian Serb population against the Ustae. They murdered and
pillaged in Foa until the Italians intervened in August. The Chetniks also asked the Italians
for protection against Ustae retribution. On 22 July, Mihailovi met with TrifunoviBiranin, Jevevi, and his newly appointed delegate in Herzegovina, Petar Baovi. The
meeting was supposedly secret, but was known to Italian intelligence. Mihailovi gave no
precise orders but expressed his confidence in both his subordinates, adding, according to
Italian reports, that he was waiting for help from the Allies to start a real guerrilla
campaign, in order to spare Serb lives. Summoned by Roatta upon their return, TrifunoviBiranin and Jevevi assured the Italian commander that Mihailovi was merely a "moral
head" and that they would not attack Italians, even if he should give such an order. [87]
Having become more and more concerned with domestic enemies and concerned that he
be in a position to control Yugoslavia after the Allies defeated the Axis, Mihailovi
concentrated from Montenegro on directing operations, in the various parts of Yugoslavia,
mostly against Partisans, but also against the Ustae and Dimitrije Ljoti's Serbian
Volunteer Corps (SDK).[79] During the autumn of 1942, Mihailovi's Chetniksat the
request of the British organizationsabotaged several railway lines used to supply Axis
forces in the Western Desert of northern Africa.[88] In September and December,
Mihailovi's actions damaged the railway system seriously; the Allies gave him credit for
inconveniencing Axis forces and contributing to Allied successes in Africa. [89] The credit
given to Mihailovi for sabotages was maybe undeserved:
But an S.O.E. 'appreciation on Jugoslavia' of mid-November said: "... So far no telegrams
have been received from either of our liaison officers reporting any sabotage undertaken
by General Mihajlovi, nor have we received any reports of fighting against the Axis
troops." In Yugoslavia, therefore, S.O.E. could claim no equivalent to the Gorgopotamos
operation in Greece. From all this it might seem that since the autumn of 1941 the British
had - wittingly or unwittingly - been co-operating in a gigantic hoax.[90]
Early in September 1942, Mihailovi called for civil disobedience against the Nedi regime
through leaflets and clandestine radio transmitters. This prompted fighting between the
Chetniks and followers of the Nedi regime. The Germans, whom the Nedi administration
had called for help against Mihailovi, responded to Nedi's request and to the sabotages
with mass terror, and attacked the Chetniks in late 1942 and early 1943. Roberts mentions
Nedi's request for help as the main reason for German action, and does not mention the
sabotage campaign.[79] Pavlowitch, on the other hand, mentions the sabotages as being

conducted simultaneously with the propaganda actions. Thousands of arrests were made
and it has been estimated that during December 1942, 1,600 Chetnik combatants were
killed by the Germans through combat actions and executions. These actions by the Nedi
regime and the Germans "brought to an abrupt conclusion much of the anti-German action
Mihailovi had started up again since the summer (of 1942)". [91]
Mihailovi had great difficulties controlling his local commanders, who often did not have
radio contacts and relied on couriers to communicate. He was, however, apparently aware
that many Chetnik groups were committing crimes against civilians and acts of ethnic
cleansing; according to Pavlowitch, urii proudly reported to Mihailovi that he had
destroyed Muslim villages, in retribution against acts committed by Muslim militias. While
Mihailovi apparently did not order such acts himself, and disapproved of them, he also
failed to take any action against them, being dependent on various armed groups whose
policy he could neither denounce nor condone. He also hid the situation from the British
and the Yugoslav government-in-exile.[92] Many terror acts were committed by Chetnik
groups against their various enemies, real or perceived, reaching a peak between October
1942 and February 1943.[93]

Terror tactics and cleansing actions[edit]

See also: Chetniks Terror tactics and cleansing actions
Chetnik ideology encompassed the notion of Greater Serbia, to be achieved by forcing
population shifts in order to create ethnically homogeneous areas.[94] Partly due to this
ideology and partly in response to violent actions undertaken by the Ustae and the
Muslim forces attached to them,[95] Chetniks forces engaged in numerous acts of violence
including massacres and destruction of property, and used terror tactics to drive out nonSerb groups.[96] In the spring of 1942, Mihailovi penned in his diary: "The Muslim
population has through its behaviour arrived at the situation where our people no longer
wish to have them in our midst. It is necessary already now to prepare their exodus to
Turkey or anywhere else outside our borders."[97]

"Instrukcije" ("Instructions") of 1941 attributed to Mihailovi ordering the cleansing of non-Serbs from
territories claimed by the Chetniks as part of a Greater Serbia.

Serbian Wikisource has original text related to this article:

Instrukcija D. Mihailovia Pavlu uriiu od
20.12.1941.
Mihailovi's role in such actions is unclear as there is "... no definite evidence that [he]
himself ever called for ethnic cleansing".[98]Instructions to his Montenegrin subordinates
commanders, Major Lai and Captain Pavle urii, which prescribe cleansing actions of
non-Serb elements in order to create Greater Serbia have been attributed to Mihailovi by
some historians,[99][100][101][102] but some historians argue that the document was a

forgery made by urii after he failed to reach Mihailovi in December 1941 after the
latter was driven out of Ravna Gora by German forces.[98][103][104] It is important to note
that if the document is a forgery, it was forged by Chetniks hoping it would be taken as a
legitimate order, not by their opponents seeking to discredit the Chetniks. [98] The
objectives outlined in the directive were:[105]
1. The struggle for the liberty of our whole nation under the scepter of His Majesty,
King Peter II;
2. the creation of a Great Yugoslavia and within it of a Great Serbia, which is to be
ethnically pure and is to include Serbia [meaning also Vardar
Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Srijem, the Banat,
and Baka];
3. the struggle for the inclusion into Yugoslavia of all still unliberated Slovene
territories under the Italians and Germans (Trieste, Gorizia, Istria, and Carinthia)
as well as Bulgaria, and northern Albania with Scutari;
4. the cleansing of the state territory of all national minorities and a-national
elements [i.e. the Partisans and their supporters];
5. the creation of contiguous frontiers between Serbia and Montenegro, as well as
between Serbia and Slovenia by cleansing the Muslim population
from Sandak and the Muslim and Croat populations from Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
Whether or not the instructions were forged, Mihailovi was certainly aware of both the
ideological goal of cleansing and of the violent acts taken to accomplish that goal. Stevan
Moljevi worked out the basics of the Chetnik program while at Ravna Gora in the summer
of 1941,[106] and Mihailovi sent representatives to the Conference of Young Chetnik
Intellectuals of Montenegro where the basic formulations were expanded. [107] urii
played the dominant role at this conference. Relations between urii and Mihailovi were
strained, and although Mihailovi did not participate, neither did he take any action to
counter it.[108] In 1943, urii followed Chetnik Supreme Command orders to carry out
"cleansing actions" against Muslims and reported the thousands of old men, women and
children he massacred to Mihailovi.[109] Mihailovi was either "unable or unwilling to stop
the massacres".[110] In 1946, Mihailovi was indicted, amongst other things, of having
"given orders to his commanders to destroy the Muslims (whom he called Turks) and the
Croats (whom he called Ustashas)."[111] At his trial Mihailovi claimed that he never
ordered the destruction of Croat and Muslim villages and that some of his subordinates hid
such activities from him.[112] He was later convicted of crimes that included having
"incited national and religious hatred and discord among the peoples of Yugoslavia, as a
consequence of which his Chetnik bands carried out mass massacres of the Croat and
Muslim as well as of the Serb population that did not accept the occupation."[111]

Relations with the British[edit]

Winston Churchill became increasingly doubtful about Mihailovi.

"General Mihaylovitch saw his contribution to the common cause in turning

anti-German feeling into anti-partisan feeling. Only on the most Jesuitical
grounds can his action be represented as anything but damaging to the cause
of the Allies."[113]
Basil Davidson, member of the British mission
On 15 November 1942, Captain Hudson cabled to Cairo that the situation was problematic,
that opportunities for large-scale sabotage were not exploited because of Mihailovi's
willingness to avoid reprisals and that, while waiting for an Allied landing and victory, the
Chetnik leader might come to "any sound understanding with either Italians or Germans
which he believed might serve his purposes without compromising him", in order to defeat
the communists.[114] In December, Major Peter Boughey, a member of SOE's London staff,
insisted to ivan Kneevi, a member of the Yugoslav cabinet, that Mihailovi was
a quisling, who was openly collaborating with the Italians.[115] The Foreign Office called
Boughey's declarations "blundering" but the British were worried about the situation and
Mihailovi's inactivity.[116] A British senior officer, Colonel S. W. Bailey, was then sent to
Mihailovi and was parachuted into Montenegro on Christmas Day. His mission was to
gather information and to see if Mihailovi had carried out necessary sabotages against
railroads.[114] During the following months, the British concentrated on having Mihailovi
stop Chetnik collaboration with Axis forces and perform the expected actions against the
occupiers, but they were not successful.[117]
In January 1943, the SOE reported to Churchill that Mihailovi's subordinate commanders
had made local arrangements with Italian authorities, although there was no evidence that
Mihailovi himself had ever dealt with the Germans. The report concluded that, while aid to
Mihailovi was as necessary as ever, it would be advisable to extend assistance to other
resistance groups and to try to reunite the Chetniks and the Partisans. [118] British liaison
officers reported in February that Mihailovi had "at no time" been in touch with the
Germans, but that his forces had been in some instances aiding the Italians against the
Partisans (the report was simultaneous with Operation Trio). Bailey reported that Mihailovi
was increasingly dissatisfied with the insufficient help he was receiving from the British.
[119] Mihailovi's movement had been so inflated by British propaganda that the liaison
officers found the reality decidedly below expectations.[120]
On 3 January 1943, just before Case White, an Axis conference was held in Rome, attended
by German commander Alexander Lhr, NDH representatives, and by Jevevi who, this
time, collaborated openly with the Axis forces against the Partisans, and had gone to the
conference without Mihailovi's knowledge. Mihailovi disapproved of Jevevi's presence

and reportedly sent him an angry message, but his actions were limited to announcing
that Jevevi's military award would be withdrawn.[121]
On 28 February 1943, in Bailey's presence, Mihailovi addressed his troops in Lipovo.
Bailey reported that Mihailovi had expressed his bitterness over "perfidious Albion" who
expected the Serbs to fight to the last drop of blood without giving them any means to do
so, had said that the Serbs were completely friendless, that the British were holding King
Peter II and his government as virtual prisoners, and that he would keep accepting help
from the Italians as long as it would give him the means to annihilate the Partisans. Also
according to Bailey's report, he added that his enemies were the Ustae, the Partisans, the
Croats and the Muslims and that only after dealing with them would he turn to the
Germans and the Italians.[122][123]
While defenders of Mihailovi have argued that Bailey had mistranslated the speech, [c] and
may have even done so intentionally,[124] the effect on the British was disastrous and
marked the beginning of the end for British-Chetnik cooperation. The British officially
protested to the Yugoslav government-in-exile and demanded explanations regarding
Mihailovi's attitude and collaboration with the Italians. Mihailovi answered to his
government that he had had no meetings with Italian generals and that Jevevi had no
command to do so. The British announced that they would send him more abundant
supplies.[125] Also in early 1943, the tone of the BBC broadcasts became more and more
favorable to the Partisans, describing them as the only resistance movement in Yugoslavia,
and occasionally attributing to them resistance acts actually undertaken by the Chetniks.
[126] Bailey complained to the Foreign Office that his position with Mihailovi was being
prejudiced by this.[127] The Foreign Office protested and the BBC apologized, but the line
did not really change.[127]

Defeat in the battle of the Neretva[edit]

During Case White, the Italians heavily supported the Chetniks in the hope that they would
deal a fatal blow to the Partisans. The Germans disapproved of this collaboration, about
which Hitler personally wrote to Mussolini.[128] At the end of February, shortly after his
speech, Mihailovi himself joined his troops in Herzegovina near the Neretva in order to try
to salvage the situation. The Partisans nevertheless defeated the opposing Chetniks
troops, who were in a state of disarray, and managed to go across the Neretva. [129] In
March, the Partisans negotiated a truce with Axis forces in order to gain some time and use
it to defeat the Chetniks. While Ribbentrop and Hitler finally overruled the orders of their
subordinates and forbade any such contacts, the Partisans benefited from this brief truce,
during which Italian support for the Chetniks was suspended, and which allowed Tito's
forces to deal a severe blow to Mihailovi's troops.[130]
In May, the German intelligence service also tried to establish a contact with Mihailovi to
see if an alliance against the Partisans was possible. In Kolain, they met with a Chetnik
officer, who did not introduce himself. They assumed they had met the general himself,
but the man was possibly not Mihailovi, whom Bailey reported to be in another area at
the same period. The German command, however, reacted strongly against any attempt at
"negotiating with the enemy".[131]
The Germans then turned to their next operation, code-named Schwarz, and attacked the
Montenegrin Chetniks. urii appears to have suggested to Mihailovi a short-term
cooperation with the Germans against the Partisans, something Mihailovi refused to
condone. urii ended up defending his headquarters at Kolain against the Partisans. On
14 May, the Germans entered Kolain and captured urii, while Mihailovi escaped. [130]

[132]
In late May, after regaining control of most of Montenegro, the Italians turned their efforts
against the Chetniks, at least against Mihailovi's forces, and put a reward of half-a-million
lire for the capture of Mihailovi, and one million for the capture of Tito. [133]

Allied support shifts[edit]

In April and May 1943, the British sent a mission to the Partisans and strengthened their
mission to the Chetniks. Major Jasper Rootham, one of the liaison officers to the Chetniks,
reported that engagements between Chetniks and Germans did occur, but were invariably
started by German attacks. During the summer, the British sent supplies to both Chetniks
and Partisans.[134]
Mihailovi returned to Serbia and his movement rapidly recovered its dominance in the
region. Receiving more weapons from the British, he undertook a series of actions and
sabotages, disarmed Serbian State Guard (SDS) detachments and skirmished with
Bulgarian troops, though he generally avoided the Germans, considering that his troops
were not yet strong enough. In Serbia, his organization controlled the mountains where
Axis forces were absent. The collaborationist Nedi administration was largely infiltrated
by Mihailovi's men and many SDS troops being actually sympathetic to his movement.
After his defeat in Case White, Mihailovi tried to improve his organization. Dragia Vasi,
the movement's ideologue who had opposed the Italian connection and clashed with
Mihailovi, left the supreme command. Mihailovi tried to extend his contacts to Croats
and traditional parties, and to revitalise his contacts in Slovenia. [135] The United
States sent liaison officers to join Bailey's mission with Mihailovi, while also sending men
to Tito.[136]The Germans, in the meantime, became worried by the growing strength of the
Partisans and made local arrangements with Chetnik groups, though not with Mihailovi
himself. According to Walter R. Roberts, there is "little doubt" that Mihailovi was aware of
these arrangements and that he might have regarded them as the lesser of two evils, his
primary aim being to defeat the Partisans.[137]
From the beginning of 1943, British impatience with Mihailovi grew. From the decrypts of
German wireless messages, Churchill and his government concluded that the Chetniks'
collaboration with the Italians went beyond what was acceptable and that the Partisans
were doing the most severe damage to the Axis. [138]

German warrant for Mihailovi offering a reward of 100,000 gold marks for his capture, dead or alive,
1943.

With Italy's withdrawal from the war in September 1943, the Chetniks in Montenegro found
themselves under attack by both the Germans and the Partisans, who took control of large
parts of Montenegrin territory, including the former "Chetnik capital" of Kolain. urii,
having escaped from a German camp in Galicia, found his way to Yugoslavia, was captured
again, and was then asked by collaborationist prime minister Milan Nedi to form
a Montenegrin Volunteer Corps against the Partisans. He was pledged to Nedi, but also
made a secret allegiance to Mihailovi. Both Mihailovi and urii expected a landing by

the Western Allies. In Serbia, Mihailovi was considered the representative of the victorious
Allies.[139] In the chaotic situation created by the Italian surrender, several Chetnik leaders
overtly collaborated with the Germans against the reinforced Partisans; approached by an
Abwehr agent, Jevevi offered the services of about 5,000 men. Momilo uji also went
to the Germans for cover against the Ustae and Partisans, although he was distrusted.
[140] In October 1943, Mihailovi, at the Allies' request, agreed to undertake two sabotage
operations, which had the effect of making him even more of a wanted man and forced
him, according to British reports, to change his headquarters frequently. [141]
By November and December 1943, the Germans had realized that Tito was their most
dangerous opponent; German representative Hermann Neubacher managed to conclude
secret arrangements with four of Mihailovi's commanders for the cessation of hostilities
for periods of five to ten weeks. The Germans interpreted this as a sign of weakness from
the Mihailovi movement. The truces were kept secret, but came to the knowledge of the
British through decrypts. There is no evidence that Mihailovi had been involved or
approved, though British Military Intelligence found it possible that he was "conniving".
[142] At the end of October the local signals decrypted in Cairo had disclosed that
Mihailovi had ordered all Chetnik units to co-operate with Germany against the Partisans.
[143] This order for cooperation was originally decrypted by Germans, and it was noted in
the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht War Journal.[144][d]
The British were more and more concerned about the fact that the Chetniks were more
willing to fight Partisans than Axis troops. At the third Moscow Conference in October
1943, Anthony Eden expressed impatience about Mihailovi's lack of action.[145] The report
of Fitzroy Maclean, liaison officer to the Partisans, convinced Churchill that Tito's forces
were the most reliable resistance group. The report of Charles Armstrong, liaison officer to
Mihailovi, arrived too late for Anthony Eden to take it to the Tehran Conference in late
November 1943, though Stevan K. Pavlowitch thinks that it would probably been
insufficient to change Churchill's mind. At Tehran, Churchill argued in favor of the
Partisans, while Joseph Stalin expressed limited interest but agreed that they should
receive the greatest possible support.[146]
On 10 December, Churchill met King Peter II in London and told him that he possessed
irrefutable proofs of Mihailovi's collaboration with the enemy and that Mihailovi should
be eliminated from the Yugoslav cabinet. Also in early December, Mihailovi was asked to
undertake an important sabotage mission against railways, which was later interpreted as
a "final opportunity" to redeem himself. However, possibly not realizing how Allied policy
had evolved, he failed to give the go-ahead.[147] On 12 January 1944, the SOE in Cairo sent
a report to the Foreign Office, saying that Mihailovi's commanders had collaborated with
Germans and Italians, and that Mihailovi himself had condoned and in certain cases
approved their actions. This hastened the British's decision to withdraw their thirty liaison
officers to Mihailovi.[148] The mission was effectively withdrawn in the spring of 1944. In
April, one month before leaving, liaison officer Armstrong noted that Mihailovi had been
mostly active in propaganda against the Axis, that he had missed numerous occasions for
sabotage in the last six or eight months and that the efforts of many Chetnik leaders to
follow Mihailovi's orders for inactivity had evolved into non-aggression pacts with Axis
troops, although the mission had no evidence of collaboration with the enemy.[149]
In the meantime, Mihailovi tried to improve the organization of his movement. On 25
January 1944, with the help of ivko Topalovi, he organized in Ba, a village near Ravna
Gora, a Chetnik meeting also meant to remove the shadow of the previous congress held
in Montenegro. The congress was attended by 274 people, representing various parties,
and aimed to be a reaction against the arbitrary behaviour of some commanders. The
organization of a new, democratic, possibly federal, Yugoslavia, was mentioned, though
the proposals remained vague, and an appeal was even made for the KPJ to join. The
Chetnik command structure was formally reorganized. urii was still in charge of
Montenegro and uji of Dalmatia, but Jevevi was excluded. The Germans and
Bulgarians reacted to the congress by conducting an operation against the Chetniks in
northern Serbia in February, killing 80 and capturing 913. [150]

After May and the withdrawal of the British mission, Mihailovi kept transmitting radio
messages to the Allies and to his government, but no longer received replies.
In July and August 1944, Mihailovi ordered his forces to cooperate with the Office of
Strategic Services (OSS) and 60th Troop Carrier Squadron (TCS) in the successful rescue of
hundreds downed Allied airmen between August and December 1944 in what was
called Operation Halyard;[151][152] for this, he was posthumously awarded the Legion of
Merit by United States President Harry S. Truman. Details of this rescue mission are
described in The Forgotten 500, by Gregory A. Freeman, published in 2007. [1]
According to historian Marko Attila Hoare, "On other occasions, however, Mihailovi's
Chetniks rescued German airmen and handed them over safely to the German armed
forces ... The Americans, with a weaker intelligence presence in the Balkans than the
British, were less in touch with the realities of the Yugoslav civil war. They were
consequently less than enthusiastic about British abandonment of the anti-communist
Mihailovi, and more reserved toward the Partisans." Several Yugoslavs were also
evacuated in Operation Halyard, along with Topalovi; they tried to raise more support
abroad for Mihailovi's movement, but this came too late to reverse Allied policy. [153] The
United States also sent an intelligence mission to Mihailovi in March, but withdrew it after
Churchill advised Roosevelt that all support should go to Tito and that "complete chaos"
would ensue if the Americans also backed Mihailovi.[151]
In July, Ivan ubai formed the new Yugoslav government-in-exile, which did not include
Mihailovi as minister. Mihailovi, however, remained the official chief-of-staff of the
Yugoslav Army. On 29 August, upon the recommendation of his