Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
PART I: INTRODUCTION
I was listening to a radio talk show a few months ago, and the host
was discussing recent radical attempts to extend abortion, not only
to later term abortion, but also to free doctors and others from aiding
children who were born alive after an attempted abortion failed. A
caller, who described herself as an Irish Catholic, said that she was a
practicing Catholic and was for the right of women to abort their chil-
dren—claiming the freedom of the women to have control over their
bodies. The radio host politely tried to tell her that the Catholic
Church defended the sanctity of human life and that her position was
at odds with the moral teaching of her Church. As the conversation
went on, the woman grew more and more indignant and finally she
hung up. Yet today such a position does not surprise any of us. We see
examples such as this in many Catholic political figures and in our stu-
dents and, well, pretty much everywhere. Why are there so many
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“Catholics” like this? How can one claim to be faithful Catholic and
yet reject one of the most fundamental teachings of the faith? What has
happened to the moral authority of the Church? Perhaps we can get
some insight into this problem from a recent letter written by Pope
Benedict XVI, a letter written to the Catholic bishops gathered in
Rome (February 21–24, 2019) to discuss the sex abuse crisis.1
In the first part of that letter, Pope Benedict writes about the
social context of the last fifty years and how that came to influence the
present situation in the Church. As a way of helping Catholics to
understand the issue of sexual abuse, he noted that moral theology has
undergone a dramatic shift during that period. He said that many
moral theologians came to accept that the Magisterium of the Church
“should have final competence [infallibility] only in matters of faith
itself,” but that the Church lacked the “competence [infallibility]”2 in
moral decisions. This split between matters of faith and matters of
morals required that theologians discover some “other” foundation
for a morality no longer linked to the truth of the faith. In the essay,
Pope Benedict notes that one of the directions that moral theology
took was to hold that “In the end, it was chiefly the hypothesis that
morality was to be exclusively determined by the purposes of the
human actions that prevailed. . . . Consequently, there could no longer
be anything that constituted an absolute good, any more than any-
thing fundamentally evil; (there could be) only relative value judg-
ments. There no longer was the (absolute) good, but only the rela-
tively better, contingent on the moment and on circumstances.”3 Such
moral theology rejects the claim that acts have an intrinsic intelligibil-
ity, i.e., that there could be intrinsically evil actions. The morality of an
act is “situational.”
Against these attempts to separate the moral life from the faith,
Pope Benedict points out that the connection between the truth of the
faith and what “one must do” is an essential point of the faith. One
sees this most clearly worked out by Pope John Paul II in the encyclical
Veritatis Splendour in which he exhorts us to “do the truth.”4 For
Pope Benedict and Pope John Paul II there is a clear connection
between the truth of the faith and the moral life.
1. Pope Benedict XVI, “The Church and the scandal of sexual abuse,”
catholicnewsagency.com/news/full-text-of-benedict-xvi-the-church-and-the-
scandal-of-sexual-abuse-59639, April 10, 2019.
2. Ibid., I (2).
3. Ibid., I (2).
4. Pope John Paul II, Veritatis Splendour, 84.
DANIEL HAUSER 65
5. Joyce Little, “Naming Good and Evil,” First Things, May 1992.
6. Ibid.
7. Many Franciscan scholars look to Teilhard de Chardin as model for this
approach to theology.
66 SACRAMENTAL REALISM
When I first studied with Keefe some years ago, he guided me into
his own study of theology by framing it in terms of the philosophical
question of the one and the many.12 In this process, he had me read
the various works of Mircea Eliade who divided religions into two
groups: the cyclic religions and historical religions. Eliade holds that
human experience is primarily that of the profane, fallen time and
space, and the goal of religion is to live in the sacred, the real—a reality
that is liturgically mediated. In the cyclic religions, space and time are
erosive of the real and are unable to mediate the divine and so one had
to escape space and time to enter the sacred—ab origine, in illo tem-
pore, the beginning.13 Only by participating in those primordial events
12. Like Keefe, Hans Urs von Balthasar begins his book A Theology of History
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1994) with the question of the one and the many.
He notes that “Since man began to philosophize he has sought to grasp things by
distinguishing two elements; the factual, singular, sensible, concrete and contin-
gent; and the necessary and universal (and, because universal abstract), which has
the validity of a law rising above the individual case and determining it” (9). He
points out that the emphasis can shift in such ways that either the universal is
emphasized and the particular “is regarded simply as the point where the rationally
ordered lines of being rather untidily intersect,” and all is reduced to the essential.
Or, as the “empirical tradition” holds, the unique is emphasized as real, historical,
and concrete, and abstract thought is unable to master the factual world. In con-
trast to these two options, the Christian claim is the existential union of God and
man in a unique “subject” (14ff.). By virtue of the “hypostatic union, there is noth-
ing in the person of Christ that does not serve God’s self-revelation” (20). Jesus
Christ is the center of world, who by his existence unites the historical and essential
being (21).
13. See Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and Profane, trans. Willard R. Trask (New
York: Harcourt and Brace, 1959) and The Myth of Eternal Return, trans. Willard
R. Trask (New York: Pantheon Books, 1949). Keefe argues that in cosmological
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thinking, the central desire was the “reintegrating of experienced reality.” There is
no historical resolution for this metaphysical dualism. As a result, it is necessary to
escape history in order to find the underlying unity of reality. See Keefe, Covenan-
tal Theology, 381ff.
14. Eliade, The Sacred and Profane, 28ff.
15. Donald Keefe, S.J., “Toward a Theology of History,” Unpublished Man-
uscript, April 24, 1988, 14.
16. Donald Keefe, S.J., Covenantal Theology (Novato, CA: Presidio Press,
1996), 3ff, 249. It is precisely the need to return to the historical liturgical worship
of the Church that is the focal point of this book.
17. Donald Keefe, S.J., “The Relation of Nuptial Symbolism to Eucharistic
Realism,” The Pacific Journal of Theology series II, issue 21 (1999): 88.
DANIEL HAUSER 69
23. Keefe, Covenantal Theology, 379–380. Also see Donald J. Keefe, S.J.,
“Authority in the Church,” Communio 7.4 (Winter 1980): 344.
24. Ibid., 381. One sees a like analysis of much of modern thought in Eric
Voegelin, Science, Politics and Gnosticism (Washington, D.C.; Regnery Gateway,
1968). In this work he describes the modern imposition of reason on reality.
25. Ibid. Here Keefe notes that liturgical symbolism of marriage is the most
profound expression of the pagan experience of history. These symbols are trans-
formed by the autonomous reason “into the radical expression of the standing
problem confronting the new metaphysical quest: the unity of the One and the
many in all its manifestation” (Keefe, Covenantal Theology, 384). For Keefe
autonomous rationality cannot ever overcome the dichotomies of historical exis-
tence and so remains ultimately irrational.
26. Ibid., 380.
27. Ibid., 383.
28. Ibid.
DANIEL HAUSER 71
33. Keefe, Covenantal Theology, 384. See a like analysis of Marxism and other
modern thought in Voegelin, Science, Politics and Gnosticism, 23ff.
34. Donald Keefe, “Rescuing History from Historicism,” 88. It should be
noted that historicism would at first appear to be a means by which the particular
time or age or historical period is given significance. But in the end history is ide-
alized and subject to the either an pattern; e.g. historical dialectics or to an “ideal-
ized end’ that gives a comprehensive account of reality which undermines the free-
dom and significance of personal human freedom.
35. Keefe, “The Sacrament of the Good Creation,” 133.
DANIEL HAUSER 73
Keefe writes. “But the flesh, sarx, is only one dimension of historical
existence, of the economy of salvation, not the whole of it; for de
Lubac as for the Catholic tradition, this whole, the gratuitous econ-
omy of salvation, is the only meaning history has, and that meaning is
free: the intrinsically, sacramentally, efficaciously-signed interrelation
of the Old Covenant and the New Covenant to the Kingdom of
God.”39 The “Flesh” is the “first moment,” it is simply fallen history,
which as fallen is fragmented and unfree. In the “flesh” we are aware
of our inability to choose freedom and redemption. This fallen human-
ity in the “flesh” (sarx) longs for what is lost—the freedom and unity
lost in the Original Sin of the first Adam and Eve. Only a free covenan-
tal order can account for such a fall. The fall, then, is from the fullness
given in the Good Creation, which as historical is mediated by the
Eucharistic worship of the Church. The result of this free rejection of
our created existence in Christ has not been annihilation but the
“diminution of being” the loss of the free original order of existence.40
Such a fall is substantial.
A second point to be made here is that the fallenness of creation
is not “structural.” There is no inherent principle or principles that are
the cause of the “fallenness” of the world. The source is moral. Of
course to say that the fall is moral presupposes that reality has an order
that is ultimately not monadic, but relational/covenantal. This
covenantal order would hold that human existence is not condemned
to the necessary order of an unfree reality; but, as free, humans freely
fall in the first Adam and in the second Adam are freely offered salva-
tion. Both the fall and the New Covenant are primordial. As Keefe
writes in reference to St. Paul’s letter to the Romans: “There the fall
of the first Adam is interpreted in the context of the restoration
effected by the last Adam who is Christ: the fall and the restoration are
alike Adamic, and are therefore alike primordial.”41 It presupposes that
the primordial creation in Christ, the New Covenant, is the metaphys-
ical foundation from which the “first Adam” fell. Since it is covenantal,
this creation is free, and the fall is a result of the refusal by the first
Adam of the order of the Good Creation. This rejection is free, it
needs to be ex nihilo, with no prior “cause.” We can choose either the
goodness of the free covenantal order for which we are created or the
unfree, servile existence that ends in death.
45. Gerehard Ebeling, The Problem of Historicity, trans. Grover Foley (Phila-
delphia: Fortress Press, 1967), 84.
DANIEL HAUSER 77
46. Keefe, “Authority in the Church,” 352–353. Keefe here briefly notes that
the Reformation pessimism leads to a dehistoricized faith. “The discovery of the
absolute unworthiness of all of the structures of finitude, the proclamation of their
inability to mediate the infinity of God, these light our contemporary return to the
ancient denial of the goodness of the human condition, our contemporary reappro-
priation of a pagan pessimism and of the salvation which is extinction. This redis-
covery belongs to the Reformation.” These comments reflect Luther’s insistence
upon the total corruption by the Fall. Further, Luther’s rejection of the sacrifice of
the Mass further empties history of any sacramental significance.
47. See Keefe, Covenantal Theology, 44–49, 88, 104, 108. The Eucharist
offering of the One Sacrifice of Christ is the free cause—ex nihilo—of the Church.
Keefe notes that this has been a common Catholic emphasis since Vatican II. At
the same time, this doctrine has been found to be an affront to those promoting
the ordination of women and ecumenism. For it is the Eucharist as sacrifice that
sustains the priesthood and the holiness and therefore the authority of the Church.
Apart from this foundation, one would have to define ministry and “remake” the
Church in order to avoid the inherent injustices of the sacramental order. It is here
that many contemporary theologians after Vatican II tried to impose a “cosmolog-
ical” rationality of the faith. One result of this is the politicization of theology and
much of the public life of the Church. The examples of such reductionistic efforts
are plentiful and provide the proximate background for Keefe’s writing his
Covenantal Theology. See the introduction to Covenantal Theology, 3–117.
From this perspective, the Eucharist was not only established at the Last
Supper, but literally becomes the central worship of the Church at that point. There
has been some dispute about the significance of the Eucharist in the worship of the
early Church. See Joachim Jeremias, The Eucharistic Words of Jesus, (Philadelphia:
Fortress Press, 1966), 220ff. In this work, Jeremias argues that from the very begin-
ning the Eucharist was the central worship of the Church. The Church precedes the
writing of the scriptures, and scripture reflects the influence of a community whose
central worship is that of the representation of the one sacrifice of the cross. As an
example of this “Eucharistic” influence, one need only note the Eucharistic refer-
ences that pervade the gospel of John. Jeremias also argues that the Church has
always understood the Eucharist as a sacrifice. He defends the sacrificial nature of
the words of consecration. In a like manner, Durrwell argues that the Eucharist is
essential to any understanding of the parousia in the early Church. See Francois-
Xavier Durrwell, “Eucharist and Parousia: The Fundamental Basis of the Interpre-
tation of the Real Presence,” Lumen Fidei 26 (June 1971), 273–315.
78 SACRAMENTAL REALISM
the Eucharist is not only the “source and summit of the life of faith,” but
that “the most holy Eucharist contains the Church’s entire spiritual
wealth: Christ himself, our passover and living bread. Through his own
flesh, now made living and life-giving by the Holy Spirit, he offers life to
men.”48 Pope John Paul II notes that this “wealth,” this truth, is “reca-
pitulated” in the One Sacrifice of the Cross and “re-presented” in the
sacrifice of the Mass. “The Church was born of the paschal mystery. For
this very reason the Eucharist, which is in an outstanding way the sacra-
ment of the paschal mystery, stands at the centre of the Church’s life.”49 It
is in the Eucharist that the gift of the paschal Triduum is “concentrated”
and entrusted to his Church. “With it he brought about a mysterious
‘oneness in time’ between the Triduum and the passage of centuries.”50
So in effect, the one event of our salvation is sacramentally represented
in the Eucharistic sacrifice. “The sacramental re-presentation of Christ’s
sacrifice, crowned by the resurrection, in the Mass involves a most special
presence which—in the words of Paul VI—‘is called “real” not as a way
of excluding all other types of presence as if they were “not real,” but
because it is a presence in the fullest sense: a substantial presence
whereby Christ, the God-Man, is wholly and entirely present.’”51 What
Pope John Paul II does here is reaffirm the importance of the sacrifice of
the Mass in the Church and, in the process, assert the event character—
the real and substantial presence of Christ, a historical presence.
In like manner. Keefe sees the Paschal Mystery as the key to under-
standing the Eucharist. Following Augustine, Keefe notes that “the
meaning of the sacrifice is grounded in the death on the Cross which
had as its effect the One Flesh covenantal union (the sancta societas) of
the risen Christ and his bridal Church, by which alone we can be in
48. Pope John Paul II, Ecclesia De Eucharistia (April 17, 2003), 1. Here he
is quoting Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, Decree on the Ministry and Life
of Priests, Presbyterorum Ordinis, 5. What is interesting in this encyclical is the
extensive emphasis placed on the relationship of the Eucharist to the passion of
Christ. The pope emphatically reaffirms the Catholic doctrinal teaching that the
Mass is a sacrifice, the representation of the one perfect sacrifice of Christ. He
teaches that the faith lives by its unity with the paschal event, and that the sacra-
ments are instituted to mediate those salvific events. Pope John Paul II explains
that “This sacrifice is so decisive for the salvation of the human race that Jesus
offered it and returned to the Father only after he had left us a means of sharing in
it as if we had been present there” (11).
49. Ibid., 3.
50. Ibid., 5.
51. Ibid., 15. Here the Pope quotes the encyclical letter Mysterium Fidei (3
September 1965): AAS 57 (1965), 764.
DANIEL HAUSER 79
union with God.”52 The Eucharistic worship is the offering of the sac-
rifice of Christ that “creates” the Church: “santa societas qua inhaerrea-
mus Deo.”53 It is this sacramental order, as event, that is central to
Keefe’s thinking. It is in events that God is present in history. “In short,
it is the faith of the Church that the Eucharistic One Sacrifice is the
same historical event as the Sacrifice offered on the Cross by Jesus, the
eternal Son of the eternal Father, and the Son of Mary, one and the
same.”54 It is precisely in this event, mediated by the Eucharist, that we
image God by entering into the one Sacrifice by which we are saved.
Again, it is important that Keefe sees this as an event and not a
structure. As event this sacrifice is free and covenantal, the historical
presence of God in fallen history. It reflects the tri-relationality of the
divine economy: the Father sending of the Son to give the Spirit.55 It
is in this event that the “conversion” of the cosmological marital sym-
bols to the free unity of the New Covenant takes place—the One Flesh
union of Christ and his Bridal Church. “These symbols of creation,
sacrifice, and marital covenant coalesce in the Eucharist, the creative
union, una caro, of him who is God with his covenanted and elect
people, the Bridal Church.”56 It is in the concrete and integrative
nature of this event that the true nature of reality is revealed.
The Church receives her life from its participation in the New
Covenant. The Church can trust no other security than the Eucharist
to guarantee her “perdurance in Truth.”57 This reaffirms the primacy
of the liturgy over theology. This liturgical participation in these
events, then, is never abstract, but always concrete, always historical.
For the Christ, the Truth, is immanent in history. Therefore the faith
cannot be reduced to abstraction. As Keefe says, “For such a Catholic
theology, history is time concretely qualified by the immanence of
Christ, by the worship of the Church.”58 Theology must begin and
end in this historical truth.
52. Keefe, Covenantal Theology, 66, fn.37. Here Keefe references an article by
G. de Broglie, S.J., “La notion Augustinienne du sacrifice ‘visible’ et ‘vrai,’”
Recherches de Science Religieuse 48 (1960): 135–165. Broglie defends the tradi-
tional notion of sacrifice.
53. Keefe, “The Sacrament of the Good Creation,” 129.
54. Keefe, “Rescuing History,” 82.
55. Keefe, Covenantal Theology, 391.
56. Keefe, “The Sacrament of the Good Creation,” 130.
57. Keefe, Covenantal Theology, 398–399.
58. Donald J. Keefe, S.J., “Toward a Renewal of Sacramental Theology,” The
Thomist 44.3 (1980): 366. “So to regard theology, however, is to place it in the
context of worship, only as correlative to worship, as fides quaerens intellectum, can
80 SACRAMENTAL REALISM
theology exist, for only there is the mystery given to the mind in a posturing of
questioning inseparable from faith.” Keefe, “Mary as Created Wisdom,” 397.
59. Keefe, “Authority in the Church,” 361.
60. Ibid., 391. Some of the “classic integrations” of the sacramental integra-
tion to which he refers are: the Old Covenant, the New Covenant, and the King-
dom; sarx, mia sarx, pneuma; res tantum, res et sacramentum, res tantum; and the
three senses of scripture—the literal, allegorical and anagogical.
61. “There is no salvation that is not thus Eucharistically and therefore eccle-
sially mediated: the Spirit is given on no other basis. This does not mean that one
must be a Catholic in order to live and die in the grace of Christ; it means only that
Christ’s Spirit is given to the world only in consequence of the offering of his One
Sacrifice, on the Cross and on the Altar, inseparably.
These three moments of the Eucharistic liturgy are distinguished as (1) the
sacramentum tantum which is a sign only, pointing to and signing that which it is
not, has no proper significance of its own but was instituted by Christ efficaciously
to sign, and so infallibly to cause, a historical effect, the Event of the One Sacrifice
instituting the New Covenant, which would itself be also an efficacious sign. This
infallible effect, the One Sacrifice instituting the New Covenant, is (2) the res et
DANIEL HAUSER 81
process unfolds in such a way that all of creation and history is “drawn
into” that worship. Apart from this Eucharistic worship, the event of
the Cross would recede into the past as any historical event.62
This historical unity in the worship of the Church is not merely a
unity of past, present and future, but it unites all dimensions of the
covenantal creation. As Keefe notes, “Historical consciousness, onto-
logical realism, and sacramental worship are at one with existence in
Christ, and cannot be isolated from it; the event of the Eucharist and
the event of Gift of the Creator Spiritus are inseparable. This is the
event of creation in Christ, at once historical, ontological and sacra-
mental.”63 For Keefe, then, “sacramental efficacy is in the order of sub-
stance, i.e., of creation, not some lesser kind of change or accidental
transformation.”64 Keefe once again links this to the ex opere operato
doctrine in which he says that the sacramental event is identified with
the event of the New Covenant, which is creation in Christ.65
Finally, as Keefe holds the event character and the integrative
nature of a sacramental order of history, he insists that that order must
also be nuptially ordered and therefore free. As we have seen, for cre-
ation to have a covenantal order means that the union between Christ
and his Church is not merely organic, but marital and free. When
speaking of this covenantal presence, Keefe says “it is clear that this
presence must be free if it is to be historical; a divine immanence ex
machina, so to speak, cannot be historical, for it is neither human or
free.”66 The New Covenant, the perfect sacrifice of Christ, is the free
gift of the Father who sends the Son to give the Spirit. This covenantal
sacramentum, the One Sacrifice instituting the One Flesh of Christ and his Church,
which is the objectively given, concrete historical effect of the sacramentum
tantum. Yet it is itself liturgically visible under the signs of bread and wine, and so
is itself a further sacramental sign, with its own inherent causality: it signs and by
its signing causes the fulfilled Kingdom of God. This effect, (3) the res tantum, per-
sonal union with the risen Christ in his fulfilled Kingdom, is effect only, the final
effect of the Eucharistic signing. This final effect, the res tantum, is not visible, and
therefore it is not a sign, but it is that final result of sacramental realism to which
all sacramental signing points and, by which signing, history itself is freely signifi-
cant of salvation, of the achieved Kingdom of God. This final effect, the effect
which is only an effect, is the full gift of the Spiritus Creator which the Son was sent
by the Father to give: it is the fullness of the Good Creation, the goal of all histor-
ical freedom.” Keefe, “Rescuing History from Historicism,” 91.
62. Keefe, “Rescuing History from Historicism,” 83.
63. Keefe, “Toward a Renewal of Sacramental Theology,” 370.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. Keefe, “The Sacrament of the Good Creation,” 130.
82 SACRAMENTAL REALISM