Herbert Feigl
36, Reichesbach, Hans. Experience and Prediction. Chicago: Univeity of Chic
Pres 1958, ee eee
37 Schell, fuel. The Anatomy of Inui, New Yok: Koop 1963,
35 SS Mons Algemene Ecce 2d, Bein Spring, 925 (it
2. Sat J.C. ewe Sand Phi. New Yo: Random Ho,
49, Woodger, Joueph Henry. The Techniqes of Theory Constrecton, Chicago: Unk
verity of Chiago Pres, 1939,
PAUL K, FEYERABEND —————
Against Method: Outline of
an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge
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0Paul K. Feyerabend
‘thoughtful observers, “From this [character of the historical process
‘writes Lenin, continuing the pasage just quoted, “follow two very im
portant practical concosions: Sst that in order to full its task, the
revolutionary clas (ie, the class of those who want to change either
pat of society, such at science, or society asa whole] must be able to
raster al forms and sides of socal activity [it mast be able to under
stand, and to apply not only one particular methodology, but any meth-
cology, and any variation threo it can imagine), without exception;
second it] must be ready to pass from one to another in the quickest
and mast unexpected manne.” * “The external conditions,” writes Eine
stein, “which ae set for [the scientist] by the facts of experience do
not permit him to let himself be too much restricted in the construc:
tion of his conceptual world by the adherence to an epistemological sj
tem. He therefore mast appear tothe systematic epstemologist asa type
of unserupalous opportunist. .£"*
‘The difference between epistemological (politcal, theological) theory
snd sient (politica, religious) practice that merges from these quo-
tation i sually fommulated asa difference between “certain and infal-
ible” (or, at any rate, clear, systematic, and objective) rules, o standards,
and “our faible and uncertain faculties (which) depart from them and
{al into exo." Science ait should be third-world science ® agrees with
the proscribed rules. Science at we actually find it in history isa com-
bination of sch rules and of ero. I follows thatthe scientist who works
ina particular historical sitaation must lear how to ecognize or and
Tow to lve with it, always Keeping ia mind that he himself is lable
to add fresh erior at any tage ofthe investigation. He needs a theory of
‘error in addition to the “certain and infallible” rules which define the
“approach to the truth
"Now error, being an expression of the idiosyncrasies of an individual
thinker, observer, even of an individual measuring instrument, depends
‘on circumstances, on the particular phenomena or theories one wants
to analyze, and it develops in highly unexpected ways. Error is itself a
historical phenomenon. A. theory of error will therefore contain rules
of thumb, usefl hints, heuristic suggestions rather than general laws,
and it will relate these hints and these sugestions to historical episodes
$0 that one ses in detail how some of them have led some people to
succest in some situations. It will develop the imagination of the st
dent without ever providing him with eutanddried prescriptions and
8
AGAINST METHOD
procedures. It will be more a collection of stories than a theory in the
proper sense and it will contain a sizable amount of aimless gossip from
‘which everyone may choose what ft in with his intentions. Good books
‘on the art of recognizing and avoiding error will have much in common
with good books on the art of singing, or boxing, or making love, Such
books consider the great variety of character, of vocal (muscular, gland-
lar, emotional) equipment, of personal idiosynerases, and they pay at
tention to the fact that each element of this variety may develop in
‘most unexpected directions (a woman's voice may bloom forth after her
fist abortion). They contain numerous rules of thumb, useful hints, and
‘they leave it to the reader to choose what fits his cae. Clearly the reader
will not be able to make the correct choice unless he has already some
knowledge of vocal (muscule, emotional) matters and this knowledge
Ihe can acquite only by throwing himself into the process of learning
and hoping for the best. In the case of singing he must start using his
congans, his throat, his brain, his diaphragm, his buttocks before he relly
Jknows how to wie them, and he must learn from their reactions the
‘way of leaming most appropriate to him, And this is true ofall leam-
ing: choosing a certain way the student, or the “mature scientist,” ere-
ates a situation as yet unknown to him from which he must learn how
‘best to approach situations of this kind, This is not as paradoxical as
it sounds as long as we keep ous options open and as long as we refuse
to vette fora particular method, including a particular st of rules, with-
‘out having examined alternatives, “Let people emancipate themselves,”
says Bakunin, “and they will instruct themselves of their own accord.” *
In the case of science the necessary tact can be developed only by di
rect participation (where “participation” means something different for
different individuals) or, if such dliect paticipation cannot be had, oF
seems undesirable, from a study of past episodes in the history of the
subject, Considering their great and difficult compleity these episodes
‘must be approached with a novelst’s love for character and for detail,
‘or with a gossip columnit’s love for scandal and for surprising turns;
they must be approached with insight into the positive function of
strength as well as of weakness, of intelligence as well as of stupidity,
‘of Jove for truth as well as of the will to deceive, of modesty as well
as of conceit rather than with the crude and laughably inadequate instru:
‘ments of the logician. For nobody can say in abstract terms, without
paying attention to idiosyncrasies of person and circumstance, what pre-
19Paul K. Feyerabend
cisely it was that led to progres in the pest, end nobody can say what
moves will succeed in the future.
[Now it is of course possible to simplify the historical medium in
which a scientist works by simplifying its main ator. The history of sci
‘ence, after all, consists not only of facts and conelusions drawn there-
from. It consist also of ideas, interpretations of facts, problems created
by a clash of interpretations, actions of scientists, and so on. On closer
analysis we even find that there are no “bare facts” at all but that the
facts that enter our knowledge are aleady viewed in a certain way and
are therefore essentially ideational. This being the case the history of
science will be as complex, as chaotic, as fall of ertor, and as entertain
ing as the ideas it contains and these ideas in turn will be a complex,
as chaotic, as fll of enor, and as entetaning as are the minds of those
who invented them. Conversely, a litle brainwashing will goa long way
in making the history of science more simple, more uniform, more dull,
more “objective,” and more accesible to treatment by “certain and in
fallible” rules: a theory of errors is superfluous when we are dealing with
welltained scientists who are kept in place by an internal slave master