Wahrheit und Tatsache

"Keine Wahrheit ist eine Tatsache, d.i. ein zeitlich Bestimmtes. Eine Wahrheit kann freilich
die Bedeutung haben, daß ein Ding ist, ein Zustand besteht, eine Veränderung von statten
geht u. dgl. Aber die Wahrheit selbst ist über alle Zeitlichkeit erhaben, d.h. es hat keinen
Sinn, ihr zeitliches Sein, Entstehen oder Vergehen zuzuschreiben." (Hua XVIII, S. 87)

---

"Die Wahrheit, daß von einem Paar [kontradiktorischer] Sätze nicht heide wahr sind,
enthält nicht den Schatten einer empirischen Behauptung über irgendein Bewußtsein und
seine Urteilsakte." (Hua XVIII, S. 105)

Literatur
• Hua XVIII

Entwicklung der Vorstellung vom intentionalen Gehalt n.

Drummond
Analyse des intentionalen Akts in der V. LU, 1. Auflage (§ 16):

"[Husserl] identifies three senses of 'intentional content':

[1] the intentional object of the act, and he further distinguishes this sense into
[1.1] the intentional object as the object 'which is intended' and
[1.2] the intentional object 'as intended';

[2] the act’s 'matter'; and

[3] the act’s intentional essence (413 [578]).

Husserl cautions us not to use the first sense of intentional contents because it is
ambiguous." (Drummond 2008, S. 115)

"[1] The act-matter is that which in the act determines the manner in which the object is
intended,
and it stands opposed to
[2] the act-quality that makes the act the kind of act it is." (Drummond 2008, S. 116,
Hervorhebungen durch mich)

"The difficulty, we have seen, is that act-matter, just insofar as it is intentional content,
does not properly belong to the phenomenological content – the real, descriptive-
psychological content – of the act. Given the fact that different acts can be directed to the
same object in the same determinate manner, Husserl claims that what is common to these
acts is an identical intentional essence – the union of act-quality and act-matter – that is
instantiated in the individual acts, and by virtue of that instantiation, an act of a certain
quality is directed toward an object in a certain manner. The instantiation of the essence,
including the matter, is really inherent to the individual act and is that by virtue of which
the act is 'really' intentional, but the intentional essence itself is not really inherent to the
act; it is the act’s ideal or intentional 'content'. The objective content or objective sense of
the act is understood not as a psychological reality but as an ideal species, and it is this
species that is the logical objectivity – the meaning as such – to which logical cognition
directs its attention." (Drummond 2008, S. 116)

-> Problem:
"On the one hand, the equation between the really inherent content and the
phenomenological content means that in his phenomenological account of intentionality
Husserl, as a matter of method, can rightfully appeal only to the really inherent contents of
the act. On the other hand, he cannot appeal solely to the really inherent contents if he is to
avoid psychologism in his account of our apprehension of logical objectivities. The
avoidance of psychologism requires that he account for how the 'ideal' or intentional
contents proper to (logical) objectivities are present to mind without being really inherent
in mind. Given his identification of real (reell) content and phenomenological content,
however, Husserl cannot appeal directly to such 'ideal' or intentional contents."
(Drummond 2008, S. 116 f.)

---

Die Entfaltung der "phänomenologischen Reduktion" verhilft Husserl zu einer veränderten

Sichtweise, die sich auch in der zweiten Auflage der LU manifestiert.

"[In Ideen I, Husserl essentially discards the language of intentional essence, and its
inclusion in the second edition of the Logische Untersuchungen is largely a consequence of
Husserl’s decision not to rework the Logische Untersuchungen in their entirety. As Husserl’s
views mature, there is no longer a need to describe ideal or intentional content in terms of
'species' or 'essences'; in its place will come the language of the 'irreal', which is also ideal
or abstract, but the ideality is other than that of a species. Furthermore, this abstract
component of an intentional experience can be shared by various acts because it is
intentional as the objective correlate of these acts rather than as their essence."
(Drummond 2008, S. 116, n. 11)

"Husserl no longer draws a distinction between phenomenological (i. e., really inherent,
descriptive-psychological) contents and intentional contents. Instead he draws a
distinction within the phenomenological contents of the act between its real and intentional
contents. Both kinds of contents are now conceived as moments within the whole that is
the intending act along with its intended object just as intended (411 [576])." (Drummond
2008, S. 117 f.)

"The intentional relation of consciousness to the world is now recognized as a

(cor)relational whole comprising non-independent parts, some of which are real and some
of which are intentional." (Drummond 2008, S. 118)

---

Ideen I: Noesis und Noema

Noesis: refers "to those features really or immanently contained in the act and by virtue of
which the act is intentionally directed to an object, i. e., those moments of the act which
'bear in themselves what is specific to intentionality' (Hua III, 192 [Husserl 1983, 203;
translation modified])." (Drummond 2008, S. 118)

Noema: refers "to the intentional correlate of the act, that to which the intending act is
directed, but he explicates the noema in multiple ways." (Drummond 2008, S. 118)

---

Weitere Schwäche der "Ganzes-Teil-Analyse" des intentionalen Akts/Gehalts:

"[It is] worthy of note that although both the noesis and the noema are identified as
non-independent parts of the whole that is the intentional correlation, and although
both the noesis and the noema are themselves subjected to a whole-part analysis, the
whole-part analysis of the noetic and noematic dimensions is insufficient to account
adequately for noetic and noematic structures since whole-part analysis abstracts from
the temporality of the experiences analyzed (Drummond 1980, 13–19; 1990, 86–99;
1992, 101–4; 1998, 114–16)." (Drummond 2008, S. 119, Hervorhebungen durch mich)

---

"Ir-reality"

"The intentional content of the act, its intentional object (the intended object just as
intended), is now recognized as an 'ir-real' moment of the act. The intended object
considered philosophically within a part-whole perspective is now recognized as an
abstractum. It is a moment of a larger whole: the intentional correlation between
consciousness and the world in its significance for us, a correlation that is itself an absolute
concretum. Within this view of intentionality, meaning is now understood as the intended
object just as intended, i. e., the intended object just in its significance for us as disclosed in
the intending act. Since the sense of the object is just the object in the particular
significance revealed by a particular act, the sense of the object is characterized by the
same 'ir-reality' as the intended object.

The form of ideality that Husserl calls 'ir-reality' enables Husserl

[1] to dispense with the duplication of meaning (as ideal species and as instantiated),
[2] to locate meaning directly in the act-object correlation, and
[3] to preserve a non-psychologistic account of the relation of meaning to mind.

However one interprets the relation between the intentional object and intended object –
however, that is, one interprets what Husserl came to call the 'noema' – it is clear that
Husserl now conceives meaning as the ir-real, intentional correlate of acts rather than
as an ideal object really instantiated in acts." (Drummond 2008, S. 119)

Literatur
• Drummond, John J.: Wholes, Parts, and Phenomenological Methodology (III. Logische
Untersuchung). In: Mayer, Verena (Hrsg.): Logische Untersuchungen. Berlin 2008.

Subjekte, Intersubjektivität, Dimensionen der Zeitlichkeit

"Jedes Subjekt hat an verschiedenen Zeitdimensionen teil:

[1] zuerst seine besondere innere Zeit, der Fluß der immanenten Zeit, worin die
konstitutiven Erlebnisse ihren Platz haben;

[2] zweitens die Zeitdimension der konstituierten Erlebnisse, die (noch subjektive) Raum-
Zeit. Durch das Verhältnis der Gleichzeitigkeit, des 'davor' und 'danach', das zwischen
beiden Dimensionen herrscht, ist die ursprüngliche Einheit des erscheinenden Dinges in
seiner Dauer gleichzeitig mit der Kontinuität der Wahrnehmung und ihrer noetischen
Dauer.

[3] Es gibt drittens die objektive intersubjektive Zeit, die a priori eine Zeitordnung mit allen
subjektiven Zeiten schafft: Die objektive Zeit und der objektive Raum 'erscheinen' als
'gültige' Phänomene in den Ordnungen der Raum-Zeit.

Das ist der wahre Grund für die Austauschbarkeit der Plätze, die wir schon erwähnten. Die
kommunikative gemeinsame Umwelt setzt voraus, daß dasselbe mir jetzt in einer
besonderen Abschattung gegebene Ding (nämlich im intersubjektiven Jetzt) dem Anderen
im selben Modus im Fluß der intersubjektiven Zeit danach gegeben werden kann und
umgekehrt. Die Begriffe der Normalität und Anomalität der Erfahrung, denen wir in der
solipsistischen Analyse begegneten, erhalten jetzt eine neue intersubjektive Bedeutung."
(Schütz 1971, S. 62 f.)

Literatur
• Schütz, Alfred: Edmund Husserls "Ideen", Band II. In: Schütz, Alfred: Gesammelte
Aufsätze III. Den Haag 1971.
Der zeitliche Horizont in Merleau-Ponty's Phänomenologie der
Wahrnehmung
"[When] I look at a chair, I explicitly see its front, and I am implicitly presented with its
back. Similarly, my experience has temporal horizons that implicitly present me with what
has been and what is yet to come. In this way, the past and future are constituted in
experience as real yet absent. To account for time’s going by, Merleau-Ponty points out that
the life of consciousness is essentially characterized by possibilities. At each moment, I
perceive possibilities for action, some of which I take up by acting.

[-] Merleau-Ponty holds that time’s going by is constituted by this movement from
the possible to the actual." (S. 110)

Literatur
• Romdenh-Romluc, Komarine: Maurice Merleau-Ponty. In: Luft, S., Overgaard, S.
(Hrsg.): The Routledge Companion to Phenomenology. London/New York 2012.

en-soi, pour-soi, Situiertheit, Freiheit, Zeit in Sartres "Das Sein

und das Nichts"
"It begins by analyzing two distinct and irreducible categories or kinds of being:

[-] the in-itself (en-soi) and the for-itself (pour-soi), roughly the nonconscious and
consciousness respectively,

adding a third, the for-others (pour-autrui), later in the book. He concludes with a sketch of
the practice of 'existential psychoanalysis' that interprets our actions to uncover the
fundamental project that unifies our lives.

Being-in-itself and being-for-itself have mutually exclusive characteristics and yet we

(human reality) are entities that combine both, which is the ontological root of our
ambiguity.

[-] The in-itself is solid, self-identical, passive and inert. It simply 'is'.

[-] The for-itself is fluid, nonself-identical, and dynamic. It is the internal negation or
'nihilation' of the in-itself, on which it depends.

Viewed more concretely, this duality is cast as

[-] 'facticity' and 'transcendence'.

The 'givens' of our situation such as our language, our environment, our previous choices
and our very selves in their function as in-itself constitute our facticity. As conscious
individuals, we transcend (surpass) this facticity in what constitutes our 'situation'. In
other words, we are always beings 'in situation', but the precise mixture of transcendence
and facticity that forms any situation remains indeterminable, at least while we are
engaged in it. Hence Sartre concludes that we are always 'more' than our situation and
that this is the ontological foundation of our freedom. We are 'condemned' to be free, in
his hyperbolic phrase. [...]

---

[Sartre kein Cartesischer Substanz-Dualist:]

"Whatever dualism pervades his thought is one of spontaneity/inertia. His is not a 'two
substance' ontology like the thinking thing and the extended thing (mind and matter) of
Descartes.

[1] Only the in-itself is conceivable as substance or 'thing'. The for-itself is a no-thing, the
internal negation of things.
[2] The principle of identity holds only for being-in-itself. The for-itself is an exception to
this rule.

Accordingly,

[3] time with all of its paradoxes is a function of the for-itself's nihilating or 'othering' the
in-itself.

The past is related to the future as in-itself to for-itself and as facticity to possibility, with
the present, like 'situation' in general, being an ambiguous mixture of both. This is Sartre's
version of Heidegger's 'Ekstatic temporality', the qualitative 'lived' time of our concerns
and practices, the time that rushes by or hangs heavy on our hands, rather than the
quantitative 'clock' time that we share with physical nature."

Literatur
• Flynn, Thomas, "Jean-Paul Sartre", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2013
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/sartre/>.

Bewusstsein und Zeitlichkeit bei Sartre

"Transcendence appears under two general headings in Sartre's writing: the determinate
'this' and the 'all' or undifferentiated totality. He conceives 'this' and 'all' to be correlates, as
'figure' and 'ground' are correlates in Gestalt theory: each is defined in relation to the other
(although, for Sartre, the 'this-all' relation is the original source of the 'figure-ground'
relation). 'The negation constitutive of the this is a negation of externality. Thus we see that
determination appears as an external negation correlative with the radical and ekstatic
internal negation which I am' (BN 1 83).
The word 'ekstatic' unlocks the meaning of this passage. Consciousness stands beside itself
(that is, is ekstatic) by virtue of its temporality. Insofar as its temporal nature sets
consciousness beside itself, it disrupts the immediacy of the internal relation of
presence in terms of which knowledge has been defined. Thus the temporality of
consciousness introduces a mediation between knower and known. More accurately, it
introduces a mediation between knower and that-which-was-known or that-which-is-
to-be-known (BN 204).

Just as immanence resulted from the immediacy of the presence of knower to known, so
does transcendence result from the temporal mediation between knower and known. Thus,
reference to a transcendent object (be it ego or inkwell) involves an act of negation which
is mediated through time: I am not what I was; this inkwell is what-it-is-not-yet (that is, my
anticipations of future adumbrations are constitutive of my present cognitive grasp of an
object). [...]

In effect, realization is a negation of immediate presence: the determinate 'this' is not the
being revealed in absolute presence. The 'this' transcends immediate presence because, by
virtue of the temporality of the for-itself, it is internally related to past and future presences
which are not revealed in the immediate presence." (S. 41)

Aber:

"This account fails because it neglects a simple but crucial distinction:

[-] a genuinely past (or future) 'this' must be kept distinct from a 'this' now posited as
having been (or about to be).

The former is transcendent and the latter is immanent. In confusing them, Sartre attributes
the transcendence of the actually past (or future) 'this' to the immanent 'this' which a
present intention posits as in the past (or future). In effect, this confusion is the result of
Sartre's reduction of transcendence to an immanent meaning; paralleling this is his tacitly
idealistic conception of time; the result is an ontology which tends to construe
transcendence as an unmotivated construction produced by the fiat of immanent thought.

To explain: it is possible to distinguish between

[-] an immanent construct which is constituted as transcendent (for example, the

paranoid's self-induced 'belief' in the real existence of a malevolent agency
threatening his world)

and a perceptual object whose transcendence may be intrusive or even contrary to the
anticipations constitutive of one's immanent intention (for example, the pellet of shot
which breaks a tooth and disappoints my expectations of a tender bite of pheasant breast).
The point of the distinction is to show (to paraphrase Kant) that transcendence is not a
predicate, or, in other words, that
[-] the predication of transcendence (that is, the constitution of an immanent object
as transcendent) must be motivated, and the ground of that motivation must lie
beyond the sphere of immanence.

On the contrary view, consciousness must be held to be capable of successful self-deception

(which Sartre, elsewhere in Being and Nothingness, denies is possible). That is,
consciousness must be conceived as capable of convincing itself that its own constructs are
not its own constructs. If 'this' is experienced as past, as having receded irretrievably
beyond me, then it transcends me in a way that a 'this' now posited as a past 'this' does
not." (S. 42 f.)

Und:

"[The] transcendence of past and future cannot be reduced to the present positing of an
absence as having been or yet to be. Sartre's

[-] implicit reduction of time to an immanent structure

makes it impossible for him to explain the transcendence of objects appearing in time by
appealing to the (immanent) constitution of those objects as inherently involving a
reference to the past or future." (S. 43)

"[Either] the past 'this' is genuinely past and utterly transcendent, in which case it is not
present to consciouness and cannot function as a referent for the act of negation which
realizes the determinate 'this'; or the negated 'this' is immanent within an intention which
posits it as past, in which case the 'this' which is determined in contradistinction to it
cannot be regarded as transcendent. The first alternative objectifies time and regards it as a
sequence of discrete moments existing in themselves partes extra partes. The second
alternative collapses time into an eternal present within which past and future are merely
correlates arbitrarily assigned by an unmotivated intentionality. Sartre makes use of both:
he calls the former 'universal' time and the latter 'original' or 'ontological' time. However,
his attempt to bring them together fails: he has defined them in such a manner that there
can be no mediation between the transcendence of past and future in universal time and
the immanence of past and future in original time." (S. 43 f.)

Literatur
• Dillon, M. C.: Merleau-Ponty's Ontology. Bloomington and Indianapolis 1988.
Ist eine vollstndige Durchführung der Epoché möglich?
Gurwitsch und Merleau-Ponty
"A general critique of Husserl's transcendental idealism has been set forth earlier, and the
main points of that critique apply to Gurwitsch's transcendental idealism as well. It does
not address the particular issue at stake here, however: does Gestalt theory, when its
genuine presuppositions are exposed, entail transcendental idealism, or does it rest on the
thesis of the ontological primacy of phenomena? Is the Gestalt properly understood a
phenomenon as Gurwitsch conceives phenomena or as Merleau-Ponty conceives them?

[-] Do we reach the phenomenon only by means of a reduction to the sphere of

immanence or does the transcendence of phenomena rule out the possibility of
completing the epoché?

In the process of answering the question, I hope to provide further elaboration of the
Gestalt-theoretical influences upon Merleau-Ponty's ontology. [...]

Gurwitsch is ... correct in pointing to the epoché as the issue that separates the
existentialists from more orthodox phenomenologists, like himself, who adhere more
closely to basic Husserlian doctrines. [...]

[Gurwitsch] maintains

[a] that it would be impossible to identify an object as the same over a period of time
unless the meaning of the object remained constant, and

[b] that it would be impossible to account for the experience of duration unless some
element of the perceptual field remained invariant against the background of temporal flux.

Here, then, is the crux of the dispute between Gurwitsch's idealism and Merleau-Ponty's
existentialism: Gurwitsch argues that the refusal on the part of Merleau-Ponty to
complete the epoché and conceive all meaning as ideal, atemporal, and originating
within the sphere of immanence precludes him from providing adequate resolutions to
the problems of phenomenal identification and phenomenal temporality." (S. 70 ff.)

Literatur
• Dillon, M. C.: Merleau-Ponty's Ontology. Bloomington and Indianapolis 1988.

An Eleatic strain in Husserl's thought - Husserl und

Parmenides?
"For Husserl, [the eidetic reduction] is necessary to fulfill the conditions for genuinely
rigorous science. Those conditions, already announced by Descartes under the headings
of clarity and distinctness, are

[-] apodicticity (that is, the certainty that requires absolute transparency) and
[-] univocity (that is, absence of ambiguity).

When science is conceived this way, its objects are no longer worldly things, but rather
essences: meanings, categories, ideal types, and laws. For Husserl, rigorous science
operates exclusively within the sphere of ideality - and must do so in order to meet the
standards of atemporality embodied in what he conceives as the very idea of science.
Although it is not identified as such by Husserl, this is an ancient idea which is generally
attributed to Parmenides:

[-] only that can be known which is, and that which genuinely is excludes coming into
being and passing away.

The objects of rigorous science must be atemporal essences whose atemporality is ensured
by their ideality.

This Eleatic strain in Husserl's thought culminates in the standpoint that meaning (Sinn) in
general is timeless and ideal. The ancient question of how atemporal meanings become
instantiated in the flux of everyday actuality can be addressed by calling upon a central
distinction in Husserl's theory of intentionality: the distinction between the act of intending
(noesis) and the meaning-content (noema) of the object intended. The noetic act is real in
the sense that it is a temporal event in which hyletic data (or 'sensory contents') are
synthesized and apprehended by consciousness as an intentional object. The noema, on the
other hand, is ideal: it conveys the atemporal meaning which provides the form (morphé)
according to which consciousness synthesizes its matter or sensory data (hylé).

[->] Thus, every intentional act (noesis) is an actualization or realization of a

timeless meaning." (S. 71)

Literatur
• Dillon, M. C.: Merleau-Ponty's Ontology. Bloomington and Indianapolis 1988.

Temporality and Identity

Husserl-Gurwitsch Account:

"[In Husserl's The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness] time is regarded as ideal:

objective time is an extrapolation from originary subjective (or phenomenal) time which, in
turn, is constituted by the transcendental ego. Although, as noted, Gurwitsch renounces
Husserl's notion of the transcendental ego in favor of a 'non-egological conception of
consciousness', he nonetheless continues to regard time as ideal, as originating in the
transformations in modes of appearance of intentional objects...

[-] [Consciousness] of time presupposes consciousness of an object as identical

which, in turn, presupposes atemporality of the meaning of the object." (S. 75)

Merleau-Ponty:

"[Merleau-Ponty] would deny that strict identity of meaning content is required for
consciousness of time. The root issue is this: need there be strict identity in its meaning in
order for there to be assertion of sameness or continuity of an enduring perceptual object?
[...]

[-] All that is required to produce the experience of change and duration is an
emergent/developing/changing theme set against a relatively stable horizon.

In fact, it is the nature of horizons to manifest themselves as static relative to thematic

foreground activity. This relative stability is a correlate of the generally undifferentiated
nature of horizons...

The issue is whether attribution of identity presupposes an abiding identity of nuclear

attributes... [If] one regards phenomena in the context of Merleau-Ponty's non-idealistic
ontology where they are construed as both immanent and transcendent, then attribution of
identity need not entail identity of attributes, and misidentification and uncertainty
become conceivable possibilities. The transcendence of phenomena - and the
transcendence of global time - makes identification a task at which we can succeed or
fail instead of a fiat on the part of consciousness. It also renders enduring identity
intrinsically ambiguous: it is both true and false that I am the man I was ten years ago."
(S. 76)

Literatur
• Dillon, M. C.: Merleau-Ponty's Ontology. Bloomington and Indianapolis 1988.

Derridas Dekonstruktion metaphysischer Texte

"Metaphysisch sind solche Texte, deren schriftliche Produktion (écriture) sich durch ein
besonderes Verständnis des Verhältnisses von Denken - Sprechen (voix) - Schreiben sowie
durch einen entsprechenden Gebrauch sprachlicher Zeichen auszeichnet. Metaphysisch sind
diese Texte, weil das sie kennzeichnende Verständnis der Sprache durch metaphysische
Begriffe sowie durch metaphysische Prozesse der Unterordnung, Negation, Tilgung,
Ausschließung ... dieser Begriffe bestimmt ist. In der philosophischen Tradition treten diese
metaphysischen Begriffe meist in Form von Begriffspaaren bzw. begrifflichen Gegensätzen
auf: Anwesenheit/Abwesenheit, Essenz/Existenz, Substanz/Akzidenz,
wirklich/eingebildet, ewig/zeitlich... Das metaphysische Denken ordnet diese Begriffspaare
einem hierarchisch strukturierten Begriffssystem ein und ordnet innerhalb jedes einzelnen
dieser Begriffspaare den einen Begriff dem andern unter. So ordnet etwa Augustinus das
zeitlich Seiende dem ewig Seienden unter sowie das zeitlich Abwesende (Vergangenheit)
dem zeitlich Anwesenden (Gegenwart bzw. gegenwärtige Erinnerung der Vergangenheit).
Derrida unterstreicht immer wieder die ethisch-wertende Komponente dieses
hierarchisierenden Vorgehens und bezeichnet - in Anlehnung an Heideggers Rede von der
'onto-theologischen Verfassung der Metaphysik' (Heidegger 1957, 35 ff.) - dieses Denken
als 'ethisch-ontologisch' (éthico-ontologique) (Derrida 1977, 236, 211; Derrida 1972b, 74).
Wie schon Heidegger, so kennzeichnet auch Derrida dieses metaphysische Denken als ein
Einebnen bzw. Vergessen der Differenz." (S. 21 f.)

Literatur
• Bernet, R.: Die ungegenwärtige Gegenwart. Anwesenheit und Abwesenheit in Husserls
Analyse des Zeitbewußtseins. Phänomenologische Forschungen Vol. 14, Zeit und
Zeitlichkeit bei Husserl und Heidegger (1983), pp. 16-57.

Traditionelles philosophisches Verständnis der Zeit

"Das traditionelle philosophische Verständnis der Zeit findet seinen prägnantesten
Ausdruck wohl in der klassischen Physik und insbesondere in Newtonschen Weltbild.
Infolge des 'Einströmens' wissenschaftlicher Theorien in die lebensweltliche Praxis
bestimmt dieser traditionelle, philosophisch-physikalische Zeitbegriff auch das alltäglich-
vorwissenschaftliche, 'natürlich-objektivierende' (Hussel) bzw. 'vulgäre' (Heidegger)
Zeitbild des heutigen Menschen. Die Zeit wird darin eng mit dem Raum assoziiert und als
ein Referenzsystem verstanden, das Dinge lokalisiert. Die Raum-Zeit als System
mannigfaltiger Orte erlaubt es, verschiedene Dinge zugleich voneinander zu unterscheiden
und zueinander in Beziehung zu setzen: Die Dinge werden durch ihre Besetzung eines
raum-zeitlichen Punktes individuiert, ihre Bewegung bestimmt sich als sukzessive
Besetzung verschiedener Raumpunkte, und die Bewegung eines Körpers gibt den Anstoß
zur Bewegung anderer Körper. Die Zeit ist somit wie der Raum ein formales bzw. leeres
Ordnungssystem, das inhaltlich bestimmte Entitäten lokalisiert, das jedoch unabhängig von
diesen, d. h. an-sich bzw. 'absolut' (Newton) besteht. Dieses formale System möglicher
zeitlicher Orte ist ein umfassend-einheitlicher Zusammenhang, ein determinierender
Behälter von mannigfaltigen, in Beziehung zueinander absolut determinierten Ereignissen.
Ereignisse sind zeitlich bestimmt, insofern sie eine Platz ineerhalb dieses umfassenden
Systems einnehmen, sie sind in der Zeit vorhanden bzw. 'innerzeitig Vorhandenes'
(Heidegger).

Als einheitlich-umfassender, leerer Behälter bezieht sich die Zeit vorzüglich auf eine
besondere Klasse physikalischer Tatsachen, nämlich auf die Bewegung der Körper. Die
berühmten und noch immer lehrreichen Überlegungen, die Aristoteles dem
Zusammenhang von Zeit und Bewegung in Physica D gewidmet hat, ergaben, daß die Zeit
messendes und gemessenes Maß eines unumkehrbaren Ablaufs ist, dessen
Elementarstruktur als Übergang von einem Ort zu einem anderen Ort gefaßt wird. Das sich
dabei aufdrängende Analogon, gegen dessen Verführung sich Aristoteles allerdings bereits
tapfer wehrt, ist die sich im Übergang von einem Punkt zu einem anderen Punkt
erzeugende Linie. Die Punkte vertreten dabei das stets neu auftetende Jetzt, und die Linie
vertritt den zeitlichen Ablauf, der als kontinuierlicher Übergang vom Jetzt zu einem
unmittelbar darauf folgenden neuen Jetzt usw. begriffen wird. Die Bewegung des
Uhrzeigers, welcher die festen Einteilungen des Zifferblattes in unaufhaltsamem Lauf
bestreicht, wurde als eine derart glückliche Darstellung dieser Zeitauffassung empfunden,
daß die Bewegung der Uhr mehr und mehr als die Bewegung der Zeit selbst galt ... Schon
die flüchtige Betrachtung einer klassischen Uhr stößt jedoch auf die Grenzen und
Unzulänglichkeiten eines linearen Zeitbildes. Das durch die kontinuierlich neuen
Stellungen des Sekundenzeigers bezeichnete Jetzt ist einerseits stets ein anderes Jetzt und
andererseits eben doch stets dasselbe, jetzige Jetzt. Es wird also fraglich, ob das Jetzt im
zeitlichen Strömen mitfließt oder nicht vielmehr beständig-stehend die zeitliche Bewegung
skandiert. Und man beginnt dann auch zu zweifeln, ob das punktuelle Jetzt überhaupt noch
zeitlich genannt werden darf.

Aristoteles ist diesen Fragen auf den verschlungenen Wegen seiner Meditation über die
Seinsweise und die Natur der zeit auch schon begegnet. Es findet sich bei ihm die
Überlegung, daß das als Punkt gefaßte gegenwärtige Jetzt nicht zeitlich ist und daß das
zeitliche Jetzt entweder noch-nicht oder nicht-mehr gegenwärtig ist und somit überhaupt
nicht ist. Daraus läßt sich dann entweder folgern, daß nur das Jetzt 'ist' und die Zeit somit
nicht ist, oder aber, daß die Zeit nicht aus Jetztpunkten aufgebaut ist und soit nur als
aktueller Prozeß der sich selbst erzeugenden Linie 'ist'. Die beiden Folgerungen ergeben
sich aus einer verschiedenen Bestimmung des Verhältnisses von Punkt und Linie, und
Aristotetels rückt dieser dialektischen Spannung mit der wundertätigen Anwendung der
metaphysischen Unterscheidung von Akt und Potenz zu Leibe." (25 ff.)

Literatur
• Bernet, R.: Die ungegenwärtige Gegenwart. Anwesenheit und Abwesenheit in Husserls
Analyse des Zeitbewußtseins. Phänomenologische Forschungen Vol. 14, Zeit und
Zeitlichkeit bei Husserl und Heidegger (1983), pp. 16-57.

Die "vitale Zeit" bei K. Jaspers

"... die biologische Frage nach dem zeitlichen Geschehen des Lebens und damit auch des
Seelenlebens. Jedes Leben hat die zu seiner Art (der Eintagsfliege oder dem Menschen)
gehörende Zeit, die Länge seiner Lebensgestalt, die Periodik seiner Lebenskurve. Diese
vitale Zeit ist eine objektive, biologische, qualitativ erfüllte Zeit. Im physiologischen
Geschehen findet eine Zeitbewertung statt, z. B. für den Eintritt der hormonalen Impulse,
welche zur rechten Zeit die Pubertät bewirken, ferner in aller Regulation, die nicht nur ein
etwa nach Temperatur verschieden schnelles chemisches Geschehen ist, sondern ein
rhythmischer Aufbau, ein zeitlich geordnetes Zusammenspiel der Reize, schließlich in der
wunderlichen 'Kopfuhr', welche nach vorhergehender Absicht und nach hypnotischer
Suggestion außerbewußt den Zeittermin genau bestimmen kann.
Angesichts der Wirklichkeit dieser vitalen Zeit sind Fragen möglich wie diese:

[-] Hat das Zeitgeschehen, wenn es artweise verschieden ist, auch innerhalb der Art seine
Schwankung an Kraft, Impuls, Beschleunigung oder Hemmung?

[-] Kann dieses Geschehen als Geschehen im Ganzen, nicht bloß in Momenten der in ihm
wirksamen Faktoren gestört sein?

[-] Wird in unserem Zeiterleben etwa das Geschehen als solches bewußt und daher
verwandelt durch jede Störung des Geschehens?

[-] Was nimmt unser Zeiterleben wahr, etwa ein objektives Weltgeschehen, wie wir mit den
Sinnen die Dinge wahrnehmen, oder das vitale Geschehen, ein Etwas oder sich selber in
seinem Grunde, oder beides?

[...]

Wir können das Zeiterleben nicht erklären und ableiten, sondern nur beschreiben. Die
Frage nach der Ursache ist bei abnormen Zeiterlebnissen zwar unausweichlich, aber
beweisbare Antworten lassen sich bisher nicht geben." (70)

Literatur
• Jaspers, Karl: Allgemeine Psychopathologie, 9. unveränderte Auflage. 1973 [JAP]

Alexis Carrel über den Strom des Zeitbewusstseins

"Möglicherweise erreicht die von den Geweben vorgenommene Bewertung die Schwelle
unseres Bewußtseins und erklärt das tief in uns ruhende , unbestimmbare Gefühl wie von
schweigend dahinfließenden Wassern, auf denen unsere Bewußtseinszustände schwanken
wie der Schein eines Suchlichts auf der dunklen Flut eines mächtigen Stroms. Wir merken,
daß wir uns verwandeln, daß wir nicht identisch sind mit unserem früheren Ich. Und
trotzdem merken wir: wir bleiben dasselbe Wesen." (Carrel, A.: L'Homme, cet inconnu. Zit.
n. JAP 70)

Literatur
• Jaspers, Karl: Allgemeine Psychopathologie, 9. unveränderte Auflage. 1973 [JAP]

Das "Problem der metaphysischen Wahnideen" bei K. Jaspers

Es geht auch um die Differenzierung von Wahn und Glauben, Schizophrenen und Mystikern

"Wir können das schizophren gebundene Erleben studieren, in seiner Prozeßbedingtheit

feststellen und doch begreifen, daß in diesem Wahnerleben entstandene metaphysische
Anschauungen (Bilder, Symbole) aus ganz anderen Motiven in den Köpfen Gesunder
kulturelle Bedeutung gewinnen."

"Die ständige Bewegung in der Zeit kann alles unwirklich erscheinen lassen, die
Vergangenheit ist nicht mehr, die Zukunft ist noch nicht, und die Gegenwart ist in
unaufhaltsamen Verschwinden. Die zeitliche Realität ist nicht die Wirklichkeit selber. Diese
Wirklichkeit liegt gleichsam quer zur Zeit und alles metaphysische Bewußtsein ist die
Erfahrung und Vergewisserung dieser Wirklichkeit. Wird sie echt begriffen, nennen wir es
Glauben; wenn sie objektiviert wird zu einem handgreiflichen Dasein in der Welt (d. h.
wenn sie wieder bloße Realität wird), nennen wir sie Aberglauben. [...] Der Aberglaube ist
gleichsam der normale Wahn. Nur der Glaube kann, transzendierend in der Welt, ohne in
die Bodenlosigkeit zu geraten, gleichsam im Schweben über beiden, des Seins in der
Symbolik allen Daseins vermöge der Unbedingtheit seines eigenen Lebens und Tuns gewiß
sein."

"Man sagt, die Erschütterung des Ichs spiegele sich im Weltuntergangserlebnis der
Schizophrenen. Das ist jedoch kein zureichendes Verständnis. Das Weltuntergangserlebnis
ist seinem Gehalt nach ein tiefes religiöses Erlebnis - von einer durch die Jahrtausende
gehenden symbolischen Wahrheit für die Existenz der Menschen, - und ist als solches und
nicht nur als verkehrtes psychologisches und psychopathologisches Phänomen anzusehen,
wenn wir es verstehen wollen. Religiöse Erfahrung bleibt, was sie ist, ob sie ein Heiliger
oder ein Geisteskranker vollzieht, oder ob der Erfahrende beides in einem ist."

"Der Wahn ist die kranke Erscheinungsform des Wissens und des Irrens, wenn es sich um
empirische Realität, das Glaubens und Aberglaubens, wenn es sich um metaphysische
Wirklichkeit handelt." (90)

Literatur
• Jaspers, Karl: Allgemeine Psychopathologie, 9. unveränderte Auflage. 1973 [JAP]

Überblick über "Sein und Zeit" (de Warren)

Im Artikel "Time" im "Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology" (?) - sehr guter
Kurzüberblick

Heidegger stellt sich in Opposition zur "herkömmlichen" westlichen Philosophie als "a
metaphysics of presence". Daraus ergeben sich für ihn zwei Aufgaben:

[1] "developing a fundamental ontology through an existential analysis of Dasein"

[2] "a destruction of the history of Western metaphysics through the problem of time"

Sein und Zeit beinhaltet im Wesentlichen [1]. [2] bleibt unvollständig, teilweise
durchgeführt in Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik (GA I.3) und Die Grundprobleme der
Phänomenologie (GA II.24).
"Heidegger rejects stamping the difference between being and beings in terms of any
presumed difference between eternity and time." - Abgrenzung von Parmenides, Heraklit,
Aristoteles

"[The] metaphysical collusion of being and presence is reflected in the privilege accorded
to the now as exclusively defining the essence of time. What it fundamentally means for
something 'to be' is for something 'to be present in the now'." - Dagegen stellt sich
Heidegger: dies sei in "vulgäres" oder unauthentisches Konzept der Zeit. Die Zeit ist keine
endlose Aneinanderreihung von Jetzt-Punkten und definiert weder "the form of presence"
noch "the form ... of being present".

"Heidegger advocates a reduction of time to the temporality of Dasein (not subjectivity

traditionally construed as a distended soul, a cogito or a transcendental consciousness."
Aus der Frage "Was ist die Zeit?" wird die Frage "Wer ist die Zeit?"

Der methodische Bogen von Sein und Zeit - ontologisches Forschungsprogramm - drei
existentielle Strukturen: Dasein's being-in-the-world -> constitutive structure of Sorge ->
primordial structure of temporality

Vierfache Bedeutung der Zeitlichkeit (temporality) für die Argumentationsstruktur von

Sein und Zeit:

[1] temporality is the constitutive ground of Dasein's being as care, by which Heidegger
understands the basic way in which Dasein concerns itself with its own being-in-the-world

[2] Dasein's temporality possesses a threefold 'ecstatic' structure of having-been, the

present and the future

[3] temporality grounds the finitude of Dasein's existence as well as the modes of its
inauthentic and authentic being

[4] temporality is the ground from which the 'vulgar' conception of time (time as a
chronological ordering of now-points) is derived

"Heidegger arrives at the ontological structure of Dasein as care (Sorge) through an

existential analysis of Dasein's being-in-the-world." Leitfaden hierfür ist aber "an
inauthentic mode of existence".

---> demonstration of Dasein's authentic potentiality for being through reflections on

anxiety, Dasein's 'being-towards-death', the call of conscience and anticipatory
resoluteness

---> Heidegger develops different ways in which temporality underpins the ontological
constitution of Dasein's existence as care as well as the origin of the distinction between
between authentic and inauthentic modes of Dasein's being, each revealed as a different
'temporalization' of temporality.
---> the structure of Dasein's temporality:
primordial temporality comprises three declensions = ecstases: having-been, present,
future
"Each temporal 'ekstasis' is an horizon or 'schema' for a particular temporalization of
Dasein's existence. Accordingly, the three 'existential structures' of Dasein' being as care
(attunement, understanding and discourse) correlate to the three temporal 'ecstasies'.
[1] The 'has-been' permeates Dasein's attunement;
[2] entities are manifest in discourse in the present;
[3] the horizon of the future, circumscribed by the finitude of Dasein's being-towards-
death, delimits the projection of (self-) understanding."

Die "ekstatische" Zeitlichkeit des Daseins ist Heideggers Alternative zu Husserls

"ursprünglichem Zeitbewusstsein", zu Descartes' "definition of subjectivity as the
interiority of the cogito" und zu Kants "idea of time as the form of inner sense".

"Dasein does not transcend from the sphere of its own temporal immanence towards the
world; Dasein transcends from the world towards being. [Temporality] is not an entity, an
'inner-worldly being' or 'something present', but an unfolding event-horizon, constitutive
of Dasein's basic manner of existing in the world."

Die drei Ekstasen sind "'co-originary and implicated with each other; temporality is not
centered on the present, but, in light of the analysis of anticipatory resoluteness, it is
aligned towards the future as the primary phenomenon of (authentic) temporality.
[Dasein] exists in all three temporal horizons at once, yet in each differently. Temporality
'temporalizes' itself as a future that 'renders present' through 'having-been'."

Zu "Dasein's existence as a whole": "Heidegger transforms the traditional issue of the

'subsistence' or 'selfhood' of subjectivity, the endurance or permanence of self through
time, into the question of the temporalization of Dasein's existence. [...] Rather than posit
an unchanging self, Heidegger regards th self as constituted through a primordial
temporalization that, in its concrete form, is identified with an original meaning of
'historiality'. Dasein's being-in-the-world is historical through and through."

Zum "vulgar concept of time": "The traditional debate between 'subjective' and 'objective'
notions of time reflects a falsely construed distinction between 'inside' and 'outside' that an
analysis of Dasein's 'ecstatic' temporality undermines. [...] Captive to an inauthentic mode
of fretting about the world, Dasein reaches for what is present-at-hand, contracts the
authentic future into the inauthentic future of the now-yet-to-come, and renders the
authentic past of 'having-been' into the availability of the just-now. In this manner, the
'vulgar' concept of time emerges as a relational and successive order of datability."

---

"According to Heidegger, Dasein turns away from confronting its own mortality and
responsibility for its entire being in becoming distracted in the everyday ebb and flow of its
being-in-the-world. Dasein exists, in this sense, 'inauthentically'. Facing its own possibility
of death, however, Dasein gathers itself as a whole and takes up directly the responsibility
of its own, unique existence."

---

"In wanting to be a future conception of myself, I am, in this sense, ahead of myself; in
having had to to be something definite in order to become something in the future, I am
also behind myself. As Heidegger underlines, 'ahead' and 'behind', in this existential context
of analsysis, do not mean 'after' and 'before' in the sense of a 'now-as-past' and the 'not-yet-
now'. I am in an important sense already the person I want to become, much as I still am
the person I once was. In this manner, Heidegger breaks with the traditional or 'vulgar'
conception of time as a linear progression of now-points, centered on the primacy of the
present."

Heidegger und Aristoteles

"On Heidegger's interpretation (see Sheehan 1975), Aristotle holds that since

[-] every meaningful appearance of beings involves an event in which a human being
takes a being as - as, say, a ship in which one can sail or as a god that one should
respect -

what unites all the different modes of Being is that

[-] they realize some form of presence (present-ness) to human beings.

This presence-to is expressed in the ‘as’ of ‘taking-as’. Thus the unity of the different modes
of Being is grounded in a capacity for taking-as (making-present-to) that Aristotle argues is
the essence of human existence. Heidegger's response, in effect, is to suggest that although
Aristotle is on the right track, he has misconceived the deep structure of taking-as. For
Heidegger,

[-] taking-as is grounded not in multiple modes of presence, but rather in a more
fundamental temporal unity ... that characterizes Being-in-the-world (care)."

Literatur
• Wheeler, Michael, "Martin Heidegger", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Winter 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL =
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/heidegger/>. Accessed 2018-
11-30.
"Sein" (großgeschrieben, engl. "Being") bei Heidegger
Eine Art und Weise, nach der Bedeutung von Sein zu fragen ("the question of the meaning of
Being"):

"Was bedeutet es, zu existieren?" ("What does 'to exist' mean?")

Hintergrund:
"Consider some philosophical problems that will be familiar from introductory
metaphysics classes: Does the table that I think I see before me exist? Does God exist? Does
mind, conceived as an entity distinct from body, exist? These questions have the following
form: does x (where x = some particular kind of thing) exist? Questions of this form
presuppose that we already know what ‘to exist’ means. We typically don't even notice this
presupposition. But Heidegger does ..."

Aber Vorsicht mit der Großschreibung, die - im Englischen noch stärker, aber auch im
deutschen Original - zur Reifikation einlädt:
"The question of the meaning of Being is concerned with what it is that makes beings
intelligible as beings, and whatever that factor (Being) is, it is seemingly not itself simply
another being among beings. Unfortunately the capitalization of ‘Being’ also has the
disadvantage of suggesting that Being is, as Sheehan (2001) puts it, an ethereal
metaphysical something that lies beyond entities, what he calls ‘Big Being’. But to think of
Being in this way would be to commit the very mistake that the capitalization is supposed
to help us avoid. For while Being is always the Being of some entity, Being is not itself
some kind of higher-order being waiting to be discovered."

Literatur
• Wheeler, Michael, "Martin Heidegger", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Winter 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL =
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/heidegger/>. Accessed 2018-
11-30.