Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Herausgegeben von
Mohr Siebeck
Rainer Hirsch-Luipold, geboren 1967; Studium der Ev. Theologie und Griechischen Philo-
logie; 2001 Promotion; 2010 Habilitation; seit 2011 Ordentlicher Professor für Neues Testa-
ment an der Universität Bern.
ISBN 978-3-16-152908-5
ISSN 1436-3003 (Studien und Texte zu Antike und Christentum)
Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen National-
bibliographie; detaillierte bibliographische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.dnb.de
abrufbar.
I. Einführung
KARIN ALT
Zum Phänomen des Bösen in der späteren Antike.
Generelle Fragen, Voraussetzungen und ein Ausblick auf
zwei Philosophen des 3. Jahrhunderts n.Chr. ....................................................... 3
II. Hintergründe
LUC BRISSON
Whence Comes Evil in Plato ................................................................................. 21
TROELS ENGBERG-PEDERSEN
Is the Stoic Account of the Origin of Evil Good Enough?
On Seneca’s De Providentia and Hercules Furens ............................................. 41
THOMAS RÖMER
The Origin and the Status of Evil According to the Hebrew Bible .................. 53
DAVID T. RUNIA
Clement of Alexandria and the Origin of Evil .................................................... 87
ZLATKO PLEŠE
Evil and Its Sources in Gnostic Traditions......................................................... 101
FABIENNE JOURDAN
Materie und Seele in Numenios’ Lehre vom Übel und Bösen ....................... 133
DENIS O’ BRIEN
Plotinus on Matter, Non-Being and Evil ........................................................... 211
IV. Ausblicke
BERNHARD NEUSCHÄFER
Der menschliche Wille als Wurzel des Bösen
Augustins willenstheoretischer Lösungsversuch
des unde malum-Problems ................................................................................. 261
DOROTHEE PIELOW
Vorstellungen über „das Böse“ im Koran ......................................................... 279
ZLATKO PLEŠE
But if they had known the scriptures and had been taught
the truth, they would know that God is not like men and
that his thoughts are not like human thoughts.
Irenaeus, Against Heresies 2.13.3
1
The term ‘Gnosticism’ was coined by the Cambridge Platonist Henry More (1614–
1687) in the context of anti-Christian polemic, and was applied as a generic label for
idolatrous heresy, both old (ancient Christian non-orthodox movements) and modern
(Catholicism).
“the same structure in the universe and in each living creature” (Plot. Enn.
II.9.7.25–27).
“just” god of Jewish scripture (Marcion).3 But the Gnostics, says Tertullian,
went a step further by laying the ultimate responsibility for evil to the
charge of a higher divine power and its presumptuous reasoning.4 They
agreed with other heretics that matter and the biblical creator-god are the
immediate and necessary causes of evil in the physical world, but they
made both of them derivative of a higher cause – of a “miscarried
calculation” (Praescr. 7.5: de enthymesi et ectromate) attempted by a power
residing in the spiritual realm. The existential problem unde malum et qua
re (ibid.), which Tertullian sees as the main concern of all heretics, acquires
among the Gnostics an ontological dimension and becomes virtually
synonymous with a more profound metaphysical question: Whence then is
matter, and whence the creator god? Unde materia atque deus creator?
Like other heresiologists, Tertullian ascribes such “morbid” preoc-
cupations with evil to uncritical appropriation of contemporary philo-
sophy, “that rash interpreter of the divine nature and order (7.1)”.
Following the standard anti-heretical topos of assigning each heresy to a
3
Tert. Marc. 1.2.2: “Like many in our days, and heretics in particular, Marcion had an
unhealthy interest in the problem of evil and its origin … So when he found the Creator
declaring, ‘It is I who create evil’ (Isa 45:7) … he interpreted with reference to this
Creator ‘the evil tree that bears evil fruits’ (Luke 6:43), namely evil things in general, and
assumed that there had to be another god for ‘the good tree bearing good fruits.’” On this
account, Marcion exposed the God of the Jews as the sole cause of evil by juxtaposing
seemingly analogous statements from Jewish scripture and from his abridged version of
the Gospel of Luke. But this simple dualist distinction between a good God and an evil
creator God is complicated by Tertullian’s claim (ibid. 1.15.5) that Marcion imputed
physical evil, ineradicable from the created world, to “unbegotten, uncreated, and eternal
matter”. Marcion’s radical dualism is further made problematic by his alleged designation
of the creator God as Lawgiver and as a cruel but just Judge (Tert. Marc. 2.11–19). This
would imply that the Old Testament God is not solely responsible for the imperfection of
the world and the fallen state of carnal humanity, and that his retributive justice, however
cruel and condescending, is in fact an attempt to mitigate the malefic influence exerted
by evil matter. The problem was recently explained away by positing various stages in the
development of Marcionite theology, from Marcion’s original doctrine of two gods to a
gradual elaboration on the part of his followers of a more complex, tripartite scheme, in
the form of either ‘good God – just God – evil matter’ or ‘good God – just God – evil
God; cf. S. M OLL, The Arch-Heretic Marcion, WUNT 250, Tübingen 2010.
4
Strictly speaking, the main target of Tertullian’s invectives is Valentinus and the
cohort of his followers. But unlike many modern scholars, Tertullian is not concerned
with drawing clear typological distinctions between the “Valentinians” and other Gnostic
groups; in his view, they all share the same distinctive world-hypothesis. Cf. Scorp. 1.1:
“When, therefore, faith is greatly agitated and the Church burning, as represented by the
bush (Ex 3:2), then the Gnostics break out, then the Valentinians creep forth, then all the
opponents of martyrdom bubble up, being themselves also hot to strike, penetrate, kill”;
Val. 39: “As a result the Valentinian doctrines, which budded in the manner described
above, have attained their full growth as a forest of Gnostic doctrines”.
5
See esp. A. LE BOULLUEC, La notion d’hérésie dans la littérature grecque IIe–IIIe
siècles, Paris 1985, 119–135.
6
Some Middle Platonists, however, did not always maintain this distinction; compare,
for instance, Plato’s pronouncement about the human soul as “no longer so pure” as the
world-soul, “but second or third in degree of purity” (Ti. 41d4–7), with Alcinous’s
statement that “both the soul of the universe and that of man would be of this kind (viz.
non-generated and indestructible) insofar as partaking of the same mixture” (Did.
25.178.18–21).
7
Enn. II.9 [33] 4.1–2: “But if they are going to say that the soul has made the world
when it had, so to speak, ‘shed its wings’ (Phdr. 246c), this does not happen to the Soul of
the All”; 5.8–16: “(They even say) that their soul, and the soul of the meanest of men, is
immortal and divine, but that the whole heaven and the stars there have no share in the
immortal soul, even though they are made of much better and purer material … as if the
immortal soul had taken care to choose the worse place and opted to retire from the
better in favor of the mortal (sc. material) soul!”
8
Enn. II.9 [33] 4.15–17: “For if it (sc. the world soul) made the world by discursive
thinking (διανοίᾳ) and the making was not in its nature and its power was not a
productive one, how could it have made this universe?”; 6.1–5: “And what should one say
of the other hypostases they introduce – exiles, antitypes, repentances? For … they say
that these are affections of the soul when in repentance and antitypes when it
contemplates some sort of images of realities but not the realities themselves”.
9
Enn. II.9 [33] 8.18–22: “But it is false to say that the copy does not resemble (sc. the
intelligible); for nothing has been left out which a fine natural image could have; for the
copy (μίμημα) has to exist necessarily, and not as a result of discursive thinking and
contrivance; and indeed, the intelligible could not be the last, having as it were a double
activity: one in itself and one directed to something else”; 11.8–11: “But if it was by
forming a rational conception of the world that it (sc. the world soul) was able to illumine
as a result of its reasoning (λογισμός), why did it not make the world while illumining but
rather waited for the generation of the semblances (εἴδωλα)”?
10
See, for instance, Enn. II.3[52]17.1–9: “That which makes naturally is not
intellection or vision, but a power capable of modifying matter, which does not know but
only acts … while something else, different from what is called the power of growth and
generation, supplies it with what is required for this making. If this is so, the ruling
principle of the soul will make by modifying the generative soul in matter”.
11
A similar analogy between the cosmic and the individual soul seems to have guided
Plutarch’s speculations about the pre-cosmic soul, viz. the “soul in itself” (An. procr.
6.1014B) or “soul in the simple sense” (23.1024A), as a “disorderly and indeterminate but
self-moved and motive principle” (6.1014B) that is “from the beginning intimate with
body and sensitive to it” (28.1026E) and “has in herself the portion of evil” (28.1027A).
12
Plutarch attributes to his pre-cosmic soul (cf. n. 11) “inarticulate opinions and
disorderly motions, most of them dreamlike, deranged, and disturbing corporeality save
in so far as it would by chance encounter what is better (sc. the intelligible) – for it was
intermediate between the two and had a nature sensitive and akin to both, with its
perceptive faculty laying hold on matter and with its discerning faculty on the
intelligible” (An. procr. 23.1024B; cf. 24.1024E). Only when “a superior principle”, or
divine “intellect” (27.1026E), gets into this simple soul and “makes her turn towards
himself” (24.1024D–E) will such an ordered world-soul obtain “a (circular) motion which
is intellective and results in knowledge” (23.1024A). For the discerning faculty of the
“simple soul” which allows her to have “chance encounters” with the intelligible realm cf.
M. BALTES, La dottrina dell’anima in Plutarco, Elenchos 21 (2000), 245–270. For the
controversy among modern scholars over the simple soul’s access to the superordinate
forms see J. O PSOMER, Plutarch’s De animae procreatione in Timaeo. Manipulation or
Search for Consistency?, in: P. A DAMSON/H. BALTUSSEN/M.W.F. STONE (edd.), Philoso-
phy, Science and Exegesis in Greek, Arabic and Latin Commentaries, vol. 1, London
2004, 137–162.
(ii) The cosmic soul is not “the best of the things generated” (Ti. 37a1–
3) leading “a ceaseless and intelligent life” (ibid. 36e4–5), but an
imperfect communicator of misconceived forms onto the corporeal
substrate.
(iii) Evil in the sensible realm is not to be imputed to the necessity of
material causes (Ti. 47e–48a, 68e–69a) but to an irrational aspect of
the world-soul, or else to a separate evil soul-principle13.
(iv) Inasmuch as this irrational principle is inherent in corporeality,
human proneness to evil cannot be explained by “an ill disposition
of the body and bad education” (ibid. 86e1–2).14
13
According to a standard partition of Gnostic treatises into ‘Sethian’ vs.
‘Valentinian’, the first solution belongs to the latter group while the second reflects the
dualistic psychology of various ‘Sethian’ traditions.
14
These four postulates correspond to the arguments which Plotinus sets out to refute
in his late treatise On What and Whence are Evils (Enn. I.8 [51]). For Plotinus, who posits
matter as absolute evil, or “evil itself”, and as source of evil in the soul, (i) no evil exists
among things intelligible (I.8.2); (ii) the perfect (intelligent) soul is completely defined by
intellect and never approaches evil (8.4); nor can evil be imputed to its innate weakness,
and to its giving way to precipitous assent, confused imagination, and erroneous
judgment (8.14); (iii) there is no evil soul, but soul can only become evil by coming into
contact with matter (8.4); (iv) evil in humans can be mastered by that power in them
which is not in matter, viz. intellect (8.5): one must fly from wickedness (8.6) and win
virtue by separating oneself from the body (8.7).
15
Sources include not only genuine Gnostic treatises but also verbatim citations and
summaries in ancient heresiologists. For an overview see, e.g., Z. P LEŠE, Gnostic
Literature, in: R. H IRSCH-LUIPOLD/H. G ÖRGEMANNS/M. VON A LBRECHT (edd.), Religiöse
Philosophie und philosophische Religion der frühen Kaiserzeit: Literaturgeschichtliche
Perspektiven, Tübingen 2009, 163–198, esp. 168–174.
1. Malum Metaphysicum
Irrespective of their numerous doctrinal divergences, multiple Gnostic
traditions articulate reality as a multi-layered construction derivative of a
single transcendent principle beyond being and intellection. This
apophatic view of the first principle is deduced from two Platonic
postulates: first, that unity is not identical with anything and thus cannot
imply many; and second, that every attempt at determining this unity
amounts to its negation.16 The principal problem facing such a strong
monistic claim is how to account for the transition from unity to a finite
multitude of subordinate layers of reality. Since the Gnostic first principle
is superior to both being and intellect, this problem cannot be resolved by a
typical Middle Platonist formula, also appropriated by many proto-
orthodox theologians, of a self-thinking Intellect endowed with impreg-
nable stability of its thoughts and acting, often through intermediaries, as
the final cause of the universal order. In Gnostic systems, dialectical
deduction gives way to a symbolic narrative and the use of dynamic
analogies borrowed from physical, biological, linguistic, and psychological
domains. The passage from the original unity to plurality is thus variously
portrayed in terms of irradiation, emanation, elemental expansion, sexual
differentiation, sound articulation, and mental development. The following
excerpt from the Apocryphon of John, a fully narrated version of the classic
(‘Sethian’) Gnostic myth, illustrates this amalgamation of heterogeneous
metaphors and analogies (BG 2, p. 25,9–27,15; NHC III,1, p. 6,2–7,19) con-
veying the inner life of the absolute first principle:
It searches (αἰτεῖν) for its own self in the fullness of the light. It shall conceive (νοεῖν) the
unmixed life, the immeasurable greatness … It conceives (νοεῖν) its own self in its own
(ἴδιον) light that surrounds it, the fountain (πηγή) of the living water, the light full of
purity. The fountain (πηγή) of the spirit (πνεῦμα) streamed from the living water of the
light. And it was supplying (χορηγεῖν) all aeons (αἰών) and worlds (κόσμος). In every way
it conceived (νοεῖν) its own image (εἰκών) by seeing it in the pure luminous water that
surrounds it. And its conception (ἔννοια) became actual and was shown forth, and she
stood firm in his presence, in the brilliance (λαμπηδών) of the light – that is, the power
prior to the entirety, which was shown forth; the perfect forethought (πρόνοια) of the
entirety; the light, the likeness of the light, the image (εἰκών) of the invisible one; the
perfect (τελεία) power, Barbelo, the perfect aeon (αἰών) of the glory.
Two kinds of analogies dominate this passage: one that emphasizes God’s
superabundance and the excess of creative power (“the fountain of the spirit
streaming from the living water of the light) and the other expressing the
inner tension of antagonistic drives – the duality of involution and expansion,
16
These two postulates are clearly articulated in Plato’s first deduction about the
“one” in Parmenides, 137c–142a.
17
This common tendency among the Gnostics to describe God in terms of human
psychology not only bears witness to the essential unity and continuity of their theology
but also indicates a serious engagement with contemporary epistemological and ethical
theories. A cognitive model likely to have informed this peculiar developmental theology
is a Platonizing revision of the Stoic theory of “self-conciliation” (oikeiôsis), of a kind
The problem, of course, is that the Gnostic first principle is beyond intel-
lect and reason, so that its attempt at self-determination ends up, on one
hand, in the manifestation of its positive characteristics, symbolically
represented as the spiritual realm (plêrôma), and, on the other, in the
discovery of the unfathomable kernel that cannot be rationally articulated.
This dark side of God’s nature, variously described in Gnostic accounts as
deficiency, darkness, ignorance, miscarriage, shadow, or non-being, will be
“cut off” from the spiritual realm and serve as the material substrate of the
visible world.
We are now in the position to propose the first postulate of Gnostic
theodicy, as evidenced in both ‘Sethian’ and ‘Valentinian’ sources:
The ontological roots of evil lie in the miscarried attempt on the part of the
transcendent One to comprehend and explicate its incomeprehensible
ground of existence. This necessary move towards selfrealization and self-
knowledge yields not only a positive thought-content (the spiritual realm or
“fullness”) attained by intellection but also the entropic residue (prime
matter or “deficiency”), which resists rational identification and is conse-
quently secluded from the spiritual realm.
2. Malum Ratiocinativum
Now it appears that the Gnostics were generally aware of the dangerous
consequences of presenting God as a developing human and the reality he
creates as a sequence of cognitive dispositions and qualities. Pursuing this
analogy would make God the sole cause of an ever-increasing disorder in
his spiritual edifice. For this reason, many Gnostic authors turned God’s
mental faculties – intellect, reason, discursive thinking, wisdom – into
independent entities (hypostases) responsible for all negative aspects
involved in the dissolution of God’s unity into plurality. Tertullian explains
this turn from introspective theology to mythological genealogy as a
doctrinal development within the Valentinian “school of thought”. As we
read in his brief historical survey of Valentinianism (Tert. Val. 4.1–4),
Valentinus had originally “included the aeons in the totality of the godhead
as mental states (sensus), dispositions (affectus), and movements (motus)”,
but then his student Ptolemy took a different turn and “segregated the
aeons by names and number” (Tert. Val. 4.2).18 This projection of
personified “aeons” apart from their divine source, characteristic not only
for the protology of Ptolemy and his followers but also for contemporary
‘Sethian’ accounts, delivers a system of rational mythology in which
individual hypostases act as fully autonomous agents guided by their
specific purposes and their increasingly problematic impulses. Among
these multiple agents, it is the ones positioned near the lower limits of the
spiritual realm that play a subversive role of disclosing its fragile equi-
librium and its dark, unruly ground. This brings us to the second postulate
of Gnostic theodicy:
The immediate responsibility for the generation and the subsequent
illumination of a dark residue, or prime matter, is laid to the charge of God’s
rational faculty hypostasized as wisdom (Sophia) or discursive reason
18
A thorough analysis of the two types of “Valentinian protology” can be found in
E. T HOMASSEN, The Spiritual Seed. The Church of the ‘Valentinians’ (NHMS 60), Lei-
den/Boston 2006, 263–268.
(κατανεύειν) without the Spirit’s will and without the acquaintance (sooun, γνῶσις) with
her partner, and she brought forth. And because of the invincible power in her, her
rational consideration (meeue, ἐνθύμησις) did not remain unrealized. And out of her
was shown forth an imperfect product that was different from her form (smot), because
she had made it without her consort; and compared to the likeness of its mother it was
misshapen, having another form (μορφή). And when she saw that her will had changed
into a shape (τύπος) of a lion-faced serpent … she cast it away from her, outside those
places, so that none of the immortals might see it; for she had made it in ignorance.
19
For its blending of epistemology and sexual metaphors, the description of Sophia’s
situation leading to her fatal miscarriage closely resembles the Platonic image of the
soul’s “travails of birth” in Plato’s Theaetetus (147c–151d) and the situation of Socrates’
disreputable students after abandoning their teacher, a sort of “spiritual midwife”, and
“giving birth to a phantom and falsehood”. Cf. Socrates’ words in 150b9–c3: “The highest
point of our art (of midwifery) is the power to test, by any means, whether the though
(διάνοια) of a young man gives birth to a phantom and falsehood (εἴδωλον καὶ ψεῦδος)
or something fertile and true”. The same theme of the individual soul’s passage from the
fixed state of unity with God to the unbalanced and alienated state of a thinking subject
producing false value-judgments about God is scattered throughout the work of Philo of
Alexandria. Here is the passage that illustrates Philo’s distinction between the virginal
soul living in the organic unity with god and the soul living in the state of an impious
“self-love” and self-conceit, constantly asserting its epistemological autonomy (LA 1.52):
“One has to think of God as without qualities and one and incorruptible and un-
changeable. Whoever does not conceive in this way fills his soul with a false and godless
opinion. Did you not see that, even if He brings us into virtue and even if, when brought
in, we plant no fruitless thing but ‘every tree good for food’, He yet bids us ‘thoroughly to
cleanse its uncleanness’ (Lev 19:23)? Indeed, he demands the cutting away of self-conceit
(ἀποτεμεῖν οἴησιν); and self-conceit is in its nature unclean”.
Compared with the account of Sophia’s fault in the Apocryphon of John, the
passage outlines more clearly a three-level ontological hierarchy dependent
on the transcendent first principle. The highest level is the “incorruptible”
realm of “limitless aeons”; the intermediate soul-level is “a heavenly
likeness” of these aeons, such as conceived by Sophia; the lowest level is a
“shadow” resulting from the blockage of divine light by the opaque
“heavenly likeness” interposed as a “veil”. Secluded or “cast apart” from the
superior levels, this “shadow” becomes “matter”, taking on impressions
from Sophia’s “heavenly likeness” and reflecting them as a distorted or
“miscarried” semblance.20 What thus emerges from the “shadow” is yet an-
20
This ontological hierarchy, ultimately grounded in Plato’s onto-cosmological
distinction between the ideal model, its well-founded resemblance (the world-soul), and
its false semblance or simulacrum (the pre-cosmic chaos), corresponds rather closely to a
monistic reinterpretation of the Timaeus in the light of Plato’s discussion of the One and
the Other in the second part of the Parmenides (135d–166c), of a kind advanced in con-
temporary Neopythagorean circles. Particularly interesting for comparative purposes is
Simplicus’ summary of the metaphysical system of Moderatus of Gades (Simpl. In Ph.
230,34–231,24 Diels): “He (sc. Moderatus) declares that … the first One is above Being
and all essence; the second One, which is truly real and intelligible, is on his account the
forms; and the third, which is the level of soul, participates in the One and in the forms;
following this, the last nature, which is that of sensible things, does not even partake (of
other duality, the last in a series of internal cleavages defining the Gnostic
model of procession, which distinguishes between a pre-cosmic corporeal
substrate and a “self-willed lion-like beast” reminiscent of Plato’s “multi-
form beast” as a metaphor for the irrational soul (R. 9.590a8).21 It is only at
this lowest level and at the stage immediately preceding the formation of
phenomenal reality that the principle of evil, conceived as a positive
irrational force, comes into being, creates the sense-perceptible world, and
bears ultimate responsibility for its malfunctioning and imperfection. As
the Hypostasis of the Archons goes on to explain (NHC II,4, p. 94,19–95,5):
the higher levels) but is ordered according to their reflection (κατ’ ἔμφασιν ἐκείνων); and
matter in them is a shadow (σκίασμα) of Not-Being, whose primary form is Quantity, but
this matter has descended still further even from that (sc. Quantity)”. Simplicius next
adduces a passage from Porphyry’s On Matter, which clarifies Moderatus’ distinction
between Quantity as the formal expression of Not-Being and the derivative “matter” as its
“shadow”. The former stands for the intelligible or prime matter, bears the characteristics
of Plato’s “receptacle of becoming” from the Timaeus, and is “conceived by privation of
the unitary Logos (κατὰ στέρησιν τοῦ ἑνιαίου λόγου) which comprises in itself all rational
principles (λόγοι) of beings”. The latter, in turn, is “the matter of bodies, also called
quantity … yet not as a form but rather by privation and dissolution and extension and
dispersion and on account of deviation from Being”, so that it “also seems evil since it
flees from the Good”. Structural similarities between Moderatus’ system and the Gnostic
derivational model are indeed striking, and so are those between their respective accounts
of the derivation of the intelligible matter from the ordering rational principle
(Moderatus’ “unitary Logos” and Sophia or Logos in Gnostic texts). Similar, too, is their
“morally” loaded view of the material substrate of bodies as somewhat responsible for evil
in the sensible reality; but whereas Moderatus blames this evil on matter’s not partaking
of forms (contrary to its intelligible counterpart), on its dyadic propensity to “dissolution,
extension, and dispersion”, and on its “deviation from Being and fleeing from the Good”,
Gnostic theodicies conceive matter as evil insofar as it is dominated by the irrational soul
as a positive evil force.
21
Compare the way in which the treatise On the Origin of the World (II,5 p. 98,23–
99,22) describes the emergence of the same duality out of the projected shadow: “Now the
eternal realm has no shadow <within> it, for the immeasurable light is everywhere within
it; but its exterior is a shadow, which has been called darkness. From it there appeared a
power set over the darkness, and the powers that came afterward called the shadow
limitless chaos. … Then shadow perceived that there was something stronger than it and
so became jealous. And when it became pregnant of its own accord, suddenly it gave birth
to Envy. Since then the principle of Envy has appeared among all the aeons and their
worlds. And that Envy was found to be an abortion without any spirit in it: it came to be
as a shadow in a vast watery substance. Then <matter> that had come into being out of
shadow was cast into a part of chaos. Since that day, watery substance has become visible;
and what sank in it flowed out, being visible in chaos. Just as a woman gives birth to a
child and her residues flow out, so matter came to be out of shadow and was cast out.
Matter, however, did not depart from chaos; rather, it was in chaos, being in a part (ἐν
μέρει) of chaos”. Cf. Iren. Adv. haer. 1.4.5.
It (sc. the lion-like miscarriage) opened its eyes and saw a vast limitless matter (ὕλη). And
it became arrogant, saying, “It is I who am God, and there is none but me (Isa 45:5–6,
46:9)”. When it said this, it sinned against the (spiritual) entirety. And a voice came forth
from above the tyrannical realm (αὐθεντία), saying: “You are mistaken (πλανᾶσθαι),
Samael” – which means ‘blind god.’ And it said, “If anything exists before me, let it be
shown forth to me!” And immediately Sophia stretched out her finger and brought light
into matter; and she pursued it down to the region of chaos (χάος). And she returned up
to her light … This ruler, being androgynous, fabricated a vast aeon for itself, an expanse
(μέγεθος) without limit. And it considered fabricating for itself offspring, and it
fabricated for itself seven offspring, androgynous like their parent. And it said to its
offspring, “It is I who am the god of the entirety”.
3. Malum physicum
The establishment of an arrogant impostor intimately related to materiality
brings us to a third postulate of Gnostic theodicy:
Physical or cosmic evil (malum physicum) is not identified with the
deficiency of matter but rather lies in the egotism of an active evil cause
which, insofar as it resides in the secluded substance of matter, exercises its
propensity for absolute domination while remaining ignorant of the higher
reaches of reality.
Despite their general agreement about the presence of an autonomous evil
force in matter, multiple Gnostic traditions offer diverging accounts of its
nature, activity, and sphere of influence. As shown in the preceding
sections, the ‘Sethian’ accounts personify this evil force as a monstrous
impostor, variously called Ialdabaoth, Saklas, Samael, or Nebro, who
combines the negative characteristics of the biblical creator god (jealousy,
envy, self-proclaimed unity) with the faculties of the Platonic non-rational
or “mortal” soul (ignorance of forms, reliance on sense impressions, carnal
desire, disorderly motion). Driven by the undifferentiated pulsation of his
blind drives, this ugly mutant is initially incapable of any creative activity.
Only upon receiving (or “stealing”) a portion of Sophia’s spiritual power,
he is moved to action and fabricates the visible world as a third-rank
semblance, a simulacrum, of Sophia’s rational conception of the spiritual
realm. The imperfection of phenomenal reality is thus attributed not to
material or mechanical causes (negative evil) but to the inadequacy of its
creator (positive evil). Separated from the eternal model and completely
devoid of rationality, the ‘Sethian’ demiurge must settle for ordering a
distant and chaotic “likeness” of this model, as reflected in the mirror of
dark matter, and operate within the confines of his unfounded imagina-
22
In the ‘Sethian’ tract Zostrianos (NHC VIII,1, p. 10,1–7), the demiurge’s inferior
status of an incompetent semblance-maker is described in the following fashion: “He saw
a reflection (εἴδωλον), and with reference to the reflection (εἴδωλον) that he saw in
himself, he fabricated the world (κόσμος). With a reflection (εἴδωλον) of a reflection
(εἴδωλον) he worked upon the world, and then even the reflection (εἴδωλον) of what had
appeared was taken away from him”.
23
This Platonic distinction between accurate resemblance (εἰκών) and perverted
semblance (φάντασμα or εἴδωλον), such as outlined in the Sophist (235a–236c, 239b–
242c), is rendered in Coptic as a hierarchy of two kinds of “likenesses” (ine): the
“likeness” of Sophia’s rational conception to its superior model vs. the remote “likeness”
of Ialdabaoth’s ordered world, which is two degrees removed from the original.
Ialdabaoth is virtually identified with Plato’s “painter” (R. 10.597b–598d), the producer
of deceiving simulacra, and with the “sophist” engaged in “the craft of semblance-
making” (Sph. 239c–242b).
24
The demiurge uses the devil as his “hand” and “mouth”, which is exactly the way in
which he himself is used by the superior Logos. The interaction between the members in
each couple is defined by recourse to the Middle Platonist theory of πρόσχρησις and to its
basic principle that, in a multi-layered universe, a superior cause remains active in the
next subordinate layer by “making use” of its presiding power. Numenius of Apamea
applies the same principle to resolve the paradox of the transcendent first god who, albeit
“inactive”, can still be viewed as productive in the sense of “using” the creative capacity of
the second god (Fr. 12 des Places). Philo of Alexandria also speaks of the divine Logos as
the cause ᾧ καθάπερ ὀργάνῳ προσχρησάμενος (θεὸς) ἐκοσμοποιεῖ (Deus 57).
25
The devil, also called the “world-ruler” (κοσμοκράτωρ), is a mixture of two
substances, spiritual and material, and in this way both inferior and superior to the
demiurge – inferior in rank and substance because his superordinate creator is made of a
more refined soul-substance, but also superior inasmuch as endowed with the spiritual
element issued from the Logos’ presumptuous thought and thus not as completely
ignorant as the demiurge of “the superior (spiritual) things”; cf. Iren. Adv. haer. 1.5.4.
the lowest order consists of the powers of “envy and jealousy” that
constantly labor on a “fluent matter” (p. 104,4), perpetuating the change of
its elemental constituents and maintaining the continuity of their genera-
tion and passing away.26
The passage contains a number of overt references to the world-model
outlined in the Timaeus and thus provides an excellent case in point for
assessing the key divergences between the Platonic and Gnostic views of
the sublunary world. The “spiritual Logos” acts very much like the Platonic
craftsman, ordering the material realm and informing it with a specific
finality (οἰκονομία); the irrational powers “commanding the constitution
below them with necessity” (ἀνάγκη) personify the mechanical processes
which Plato attributes to an unintelligent “errant” cause (Ti. 47e–48b); and
the lowest or “servant” powers are subject to the same continuous process
of generation and destruction as Plato’s shifting images of elemental bodies
that appear in and slip away from the cosmic receptacle (49d–52c). The
idea that the sublunary realm is filled with various “orders” of powers has
no explicit correlate in Plato, but it could easily have been derived from the
later Platonist dogma that “no part of the world is without a share in soul
or in a living being superior to mortal nature” (Alcin. Did. 15, 171.18–19).
What is profoundly non-Platonic, however, is a morbid condition that
permeates the Valentinian physical universe, instigated by the cosmocrator
and his “spiritual order”. Confusion and indetermination that characterize
only the initial condition of Plato’s phenomenal world, prior to the demi-
urge’s imposition of geometrical configurations on the pre-cosmic flux of
elemental vestiges, continue to dominate the Valentinian realm below the
heaven until its final dissolution into nothingness. In this radical re-
configuration of Platonic hierarchies, the physical world retains, for as long
as it lasts, the status of a simulacrum, filled with “phantoms, shadows, and
illusions … whose end will be like their beginning: coming from what was
not, they will return to what will not be “ (Tri. Trac. NHC I,5, p. 78,32–
79,3). The imperfection of this perverted semblance of perfect reality
cannot be identified with negative evil, in the Platonic sense of a necessary
defect in the spatial realization of the ideal pattern. We are dealing here
26
For a very similar description of the three domains within the sublunary realm, see
Clement of Alexandria’s Excerpts from Theodotus 48.2–3: “And of the material elements
he (sc. the demiurge) made one out of grief, creating according to substance “the spiritual
forces of wickedness with whom is our contest” (Eph 6,12) … And another he made from
fear, the wild beasts, and yet another from consternation and perplexity, the elements of
the (physical) world”. Cf. also Iren. Adv. haer. 1.5.4. For the figure of the devil in
Gnosticism and in various other currents of second-century Christianity see esp. A.
O RBE, En torno al Diablo, in: id., Estudios sobre la teología cristiana primitiva, Madrid
1994, 187–235.
4. Malum morale
In addressing the problem of human evil and its etiology, multiple Gnostic
traditions looked for solutions that could simultaneously resonate with
Platonist psychological doctrines and with Judeo-Christian conceptions of
the origin, nature, and destiny of the human being. This ambitious
intertextual enterprise had an important precedent in the Alexandrian
tradition of biblical interpretation, best evidenced in the monumental
exegetical work of Philo of Alexandria, where the Genesis account of the
creation of Adam and his threefold makeup (God-inbreathed spirit – soul
– flesh) was accommodated and partly integrated to Plato’s tripartite
anthropology (intellect – soul – body). The adoption of this hybrid blend
of two structurally analogous but conceptually diverging positions per-
mitted Gnostic authors a considerable degree of latitude in their expla-
nations of human condition and its evil inclinations. By constantly shifting
between Jewish and Platonist traditions of theodicy, Gnostic narratives of
incarnate humanity produce a parallax effect in which evil is alternately
blamed on the recalcitrant substrate (corporeal matter or flesh), on exter-
27
Cf. Plot. Enn. 2.9 [33] 11.24–27: “But if it (sc. the “image of Soul”, or the reflection-
in-matter of Sophia’s rational conception of the universe) is a concept (ἐννόημα), first of
all they must explain the meaning of this name, and then how it exists, unless one will
give the thought power to make; but how can the making be attributed to a figment of
thought (πλάσμα)?” The Gnostics probably borrowed the term ἐννόημα from Stoic
epistemology, where it designates the product of empty imagination (τὸ φανταστικόν), a
class of universal concepts (e.g. universal Man) or fictitious entities (e.g. the Giants) that
have no reality outside the mind. The physical world as the solidified construct of an
illicit deliberation by the Logos (or by Sophia in other ‘Valentinian’ accounts) is an
ontological chimaera (ἐννόημα) which, similarly to the Stoic concept of the “all” (a
fictitious combination of the corporeal universe and the incorporeal void that surrounds
it), transgresses both physical and conceptual boundaries between bodies and
incorporeals. See, for instance, Exc. Theod. 46, where the Savior is said to “have drawn
these (sc. Sophia’s passions) and changed them from incorporeal and accidental passion
into matter as yet incorporeal, and next, in the same fashion, into compounds and
bodies”.
nal agency (celestial rulers, the devil, demonic powers), and on human
choices (the lower or irrational soul, the spirit of wickedness).
The revisionist interpretation of the biblical story of Adam in the
‘Sethian’ Apocryphon of John provides an illustrative example for this
constant shifting of exegetical viewpoints. Two accounts of the creation of
Adam in the opening chapters of Genesis, first of “the man after image”
(Gen 1,26–27) and then of the “molded man” (2,7), are interpreted not as
complementary versions of the same event, but rather as consecutive
moments in a gradual formation of a tripartite human being. The under-
lying exegetical framework for this curious cut-and-paste approach to the
biblical text is made up of heterogeneous textual segments borrowed from
Plato’s narrative of the creation of man in the Timaeus (69c–d; 73b–76e),
Philo of Alexandria’s philosophically-driven interpretations of the same
biblical verses (e.g. Opif. 134; LA 1.31–42; Det. 82–83), and various
versions of the astrological doctrine of planetary melothesia. Filtered
through this intertextual grid, the creation of Adam is turned into a three-
stage process which unfolds in the following fashion (BG 2, p. 47,14–55,18;
NHC III,1, p. 21,16–27,4; NHC II,1, p. 14,13–21,16):
(i) the molding of Adam’s “psychic body” and its sevenfold framework
by the irrational demiurge and his seven celestial archons after the
image of a spiritual prototype (“Geradamas”), which is then pro-
jected onto the primeval water (Gen 1,26–27);
(ii) the correction of the resulting incongruity between the spiritual
prototype and its psychic replica, unable to stand up and move, by
the demiurge’s inadvertent infusion of his spiritual “power”,
previously taken from Sophia, into the psychic Adam (Gen 2,7);
(iii) the relegation of the spirit-endowed psychic Adam to the realm of
matter on the part of the demiurge and his planetary rulers and the
subsequent formation of Adam’s material body (Gen 2,7).28
28
The distinction between the archetypal Adam (“Geradamas”) and his molded copy
is Philonic (cf. Opif. 134), and so is the correction of the gap between the two by the act
of divine “inbreathing”; cf. Det. 82–83 and esp. LA 1.36–38: “Now the expression
‘breathed into’ is equivalent to ‘inspired’ or ‘be-souled’ that which is inanimate … The
expression reveals some more physical rationale; for there must be three things, that
which breathes in, that which receives, and that which is inbreathed. Now that which
breathes in is God, that which receives is the (inactive) intellect, and that which is
inbreathed is the spirit. What then is to be inferred from these premises? A union of the
three comes about, as God extends the power that proceeds from him through the spirit,
which is the intermediary, until it reaches the subject. And for what purpose save that we
may obtain a conception of him? For how would the soul have conceived of God if he had
not breathed into it and touched it according to his power?” The order of composition of
The end product of this complicated duel of wits between the cosmic and
spiritual powers is a composite being that internalizes all levels of the
Gnostic ontological hierarchy: the spiritual (pneumatic) level of the trans-
cendent One and its aeons; the intermediary animate (psychic) realm of the
demiurge and his minions in charge of the celestial sphere; and the
material (hylic) world below the moon. Among these constitutive aspects
of the protoplast human, the psychic body stands out as his original and
distinctive nature, a sort of receptacle for the other two substances, spirit-
ual and material, which will be acquired in the next two formative stages.
By its median position and its mediating function, Adam’s soul-element
closely corresponds to a “mortal kind of soul” of the Timaeus, deliberately
“built on” by the lesser cosmic gods (69c–d) to ensure the intellect’s
control over the body; and it also corresponds, to the extent allowed by the
counter-pressure of the Genesis narrative, to the Middle Platonist
construct of a “simple” soul – an entity intermediate between the intel-
ligible and the material domains, laying hold on both and serving as a locus
of their struggle for mastery.29
Adam’s body (animate body – spiritual power – material body) reflects the sequence that
Plato’s postulated for the framing of the visible world (Ti. 30b–c): (i) creation of soul; (ii)
intellect fashioned within soul; (iii) soul fitted within body. The creation of the seven
parts of Adam’s psychic body and its subsequent incarnation is based on Plato’s account
of how the lesser gods “built on the mortal kind of soul” for a newly incarnated
“immortal principle of soul” (Ti. 69c–d) and then encompassed these two kinds of soul
within a sevenfold bodily frame (73b–76e). In the Apocryphon of John, as well as in Philo,
the exigencies of exegesis led to the suppression of any reference to Plato’s doctrine of the
pre-incarnate individual soul and its descent into the body. (Interestingly, this classical
Platonic doctrine of the pre-existent intellectual souls entering the physical body will be
introduced in the later sections of the Apocryphon of John to explain the formation and
composite makeup of the post-Adamic lineage; cf. II,1 p. 24,26–25,9). In both instances,
the archetypal Adam figures as the model for the creation of its imperfect copy, but this
spiritual prototype does not get dragged down into a disorderly material substrate.
Finally, the fashioning of each of Adam’s seven psychic bodily elements by a different
heavenly ruler reflects the astrological rule whereby the individual constituents of the
human physique belong to a separate celestial power. For various forms of planetary
melothesia, see for instance Ptol. Tetr. 3.11; Hermippus 1.13 and 2.3 (18–20, 37–39 Kroll);
Herm. Iatromath. 1.1–6 (Phys. med. gr. min. 1, 387); Procl. In Ti. 42e (3, 354–355 Diehl).
A more detailed account of various traditions that contributed to this creative misprision
of two Genesis accounts of the creation of Adam in the Apocryphon of John, see Z. PLEŠE,
Poetics of the Gnostic Universe. Narrative and Cosmology in the Apocryphon of John,
Leiden/Boston 2006, 200–210.
29
For the “simple soul” in Plutarch, see the passages cited supra n. 11; for Atticus, cf.
Fr. 11 and 15 des Places. It is true that, in contrast to Adam’s psychic body, this simple
soul is “from the beginning intimate with body” (Plut. An. procr. 28.1026E) and thus, as
Atticus put it, “irrational and disorderly” (Fr. 11). As already suggested, the neutral status
The passage is filled with the Platonist and biblical clichés for the physical
body and the material world (“the shadow of death”, “cave”, “the bond of
forgetfulness”), suggesting that the deficiency of the earthly Adam and his
progeny results from the accretion of material elements. But the elemental
mélange is not the only ingredient used in Adam’s “second modeling”, and
certainly not the principal cause of irrational affections (“desire”) that give
rise to disorderliness, vice, and the loss of superior knowledge (“forget-
fulness”). Matter is the locus of evil in the earthly Adam as well as its
necessary precondition, but the true cause of evil lies in the “adversary” or
“counterfeit” spirit which takes up residence in the material body to
counteract the beneficent work of Adam’s spiritual helper and to prevent
his deliverance from the inexorable laws of physical fate.
The same counterfeit spirit exerts its nefarious influence in the sub-
sequent history of earthly humanity and constitutes an inextricable part of
its material condition. Interestingly, the formation of individual members
of the human race does not reflect the pattern applied to the creation of
of Adam’s soul-substance (neither rational nor irrational but capable of moving in either
direction) probably results from a mutual readjustment of the base biblical text and the
superimposed Platonist model.
30
The Apocryphon of John appears to follow the Middle Platonist formula of
conditional fate whereby, in the realm of human rational decision, the chain of causation
becomes ineluctable only upon being triggered by acts of free will. The general laws of
consequence in the physical realm are firmly established, including the insertion of the
pre-existent souls into bodies, but thanks to the activity of a higher providence, it is “in
our power” (τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν) to choose between these two causal patterns – “one of divine
happiness and the other of godless misery” (Plato, Tht. 176d–e; cf. Ti. 42a–b). Cf. Alcin.
Did. 26,179.3–13: “For fate occupies the status of a law: it does not say, as it were, that
this person will do this and the other will suffer that, for that would entail an infinity of
possibilities … and then what is in our power would also vanish as well as praise and
blame and everything like that; but (fate rather says) that if a soul chooses this or that
kind of life and performs such-and-such deeds, such-and-such consequences will follow
for it”; Ps.-Plutarch, De fato 6.571D: “Of these (species of contingency) what is in our
power is the more general; for it has two kinds, the one arising from passion and anger
and desire, and the other from rational calculation or mind; of these we can speak as a
matter of choice (κατὰ προαίρεσιν)”.
31
Eternal punishment is reserved solely for the apostates, or those who “have gained
knowledge” but thereupon, on their own will, “turned away from it” (NHC II,1, p. 27,21–
30).
32
Striking similarities between the opposite spirits in the Apocryphon of John and the
Qumran Instruction on the Two Spirits, the spirit of truth and the spirit of wickedness
(1QS 3:13–4:26) have not passed unnoticed by scholars; cf. e.g. A. BÖHLIG, Zum
antimimon Pneuma in den koptisch-gnostischen Texten, in: Id., Mysterion und
Wahrheit, Leiden 1968, 162–174, esp. 173–174. Affinities are striking indeed, and so are
divergences – thus, in the Qumran text, the dualism of the opposite spirits is instituted
and enforced by a single divinity; cf. J.J. C OLLLINS, The Origin of Evil in Apocalyptic
Literature and the Dead Sea Scrolls, in: Id., Seers, Sybils, and Sages in Hellenistic-Roman
Judaism, Leiden 1997, 287–299, esp. 292–296. The hypothesis of a direct borrowing does
not seem as plausible as that of a common source. In all likelihood, this source is Jewish
wisdom tradition, which also posits a radical antagonism of the opposite forces at all
levels of creation: ethical and physical, cosmological and psychological. As stated by Ben
Sira, “All things are twofold, one opposite to the other, and he has made nothing
deficient” (Sir 33:9); see J. FREY, Different Patterns of Dualistic Thought in the Qumran
Library, in: M. BERNSTEIN/F. G ARCÍA M ARTÍNEZ/J. K AMPEN (eds.), Legal Texts and Legal
Issues, Leiden 1997, 275–335. In the case of the Apocryphon of John, this multidimen-
sional pattern of dualism is incorporated into a Platonist cosmological framework and its
distinction between physical fate and metaphysical providence. An important inter-
mediary in this process of the creative fusion of heterogeneous traditions might have
been Philo of Alexandria, whose exegesis of Exodus 12,23 (“The Lord will pass over that
door and will not let the destroyer enter your houses to strike”), preserved only in
Armenian translation, offers an attractive intertextual link between Platonist philosophy,
Wisdom literature, the Instruction on the Two Spirits from Qumran, and the Apocryphon
of John: “But as for the deeper meaning (of Ex 12,23), this must be said. Into every soul at
its very birth there enter two powers, the salutary and the destructive. If the salutary one
is victorious and prevails, the opposite one is too weak to see. And if the latter prevails,
no profit at all or little is obtained from the salutary one. Through these powers the world
too was created. People call them by other names: the salutary one they call powerful and
beneficent, and the opposite one unbounded and destructive. … But the nation is a
mixture of both, from which the heavens and the entire world as a whole have received
this mixture. Now, sometimes the evil becomes greater in this mixture, and hence (all
creatures) live in torment, harm, ignominy, contention, battle and bodily illness. … And
this mixture is in both the wicked man and the wise man, but not in the same way. For
the souls of foolish men have the unbounded and destructive rather than the powerful
and salutary (power), and it is full of misery when it dwells with earthly creatures. But the
prudent and noble (soul) rather receives the powerful and salutary (power) and, on the
contrary, possesses in itself good fortune and happiness, being carried around with the
heaven because of kinship with it” (Quaest. Ex. 1.23 Marcus).
33
The intermediate or “psychic” kind of human beings has its cosmic counterpart in
Sabaoth, the son of the supreme cosmic ruler (Ialdabaoth). According to Eleleth’s
revelatory account, Sabaoth came to understand the limitations of his father’s animate
nature. Upon “condemning his father and his mother matter”, he was appointed by
Sophia “in charge of the seventh heaven, below the veil between above and below”, and
was even instructed about the things that exist in the “eight haven” (95,13–96,3). Sabaoth
thus attains the status of an intermediary “between the cosmic and spiritual realms, but
because of his inferior nature (the son of Ialdabaoth and matter) he is unable to ascend to
“the limitless light” and join the “spiritual” race.
in the final ages (καιρός), and these authorities (ἐξουσία) will be dominated. And these
authorities cannot defile you or that race (γενεά); for your abode (μονή) is in
incorruptibility, where the virgin spirit (πνεῦμα παρθενικόν) dwells, which is superior to
the authorities of chaos (χάος) and to their world (κόσμος). (93,22–32)
34
For the Stoic scale of nature and the logic of asymmetric dichotomy see D. H AHM,
Self-Motion from Aristotle to Newton, Princeton 1994, 175–225; various Gnostic
appropriations of this classification are discussed in A. O RBE, La definición del hombre
en la teología del s. II., Gregorianum 48 (1967) 522–576.
35
For the concept of the “material soul” see Exc. Theod. 50.1: “’Taking dust from the
earth’ (Gen 2,7) – not of the dry land but a portion of manifold and variegated matter –
he fashioned a soul, earthly and material, irrational and consubstantial with that of the
beasts. This is the man ‘according to the image’ (Gen 1,26)”; ibid. 50.2: “the material soul
which is the body of the divine soul”; cf. also Plotinus’s critique of this Gnostic construct
in Enn. II.9 [33] 5.16–22: “Foolish, too, is their introduction of this other soul, which they
compose of the elements; for how could the compound of the elements have any sort of
life? … And how can the soul be what holds the four elements together if it has come to
be out of them? And what can one say when they attribute to that soul apprehension and
deliberation and countless other things as well?”
36
For the Platonist background of this “mortal kind of soul” cf. supra, pp. 122–123.
37
Cf. e.g. Tri. Trac. (NHC I,5) p. 106,9–14: “Regarding the substance (οὐσία) of these
psychic ones, its condition is twofold, for it has an understanding and acknowledgment
(ὁμολογία) of what is superior, but it also inclines toward evil because of the inclination
of the (erroneous) thought”.
38
Many scholars maintain that the differences between the three races are not genetic
but rather behavioral. But this non-deterministic reading of the extant evidence can
hardly explain the following account of a threefold Adamic lineage from Exc. Theod.
55.2–56.3: “Therefore Adam sows neither from the spirit nor from that which was
breathed into him (the soul); for both are divine and both are put forth through him and
not by him. But his material element is active toward seed and generation, as though
mixed with seed and unable to separate from this linkage in physical life. In this sense
Adam is our father, ‘the first man from the earth, a man of dust’ (1Cor 15,47). Now if it
had sown from the animate element and the spiritual in the same way as from the
material, they (his offspring) would all have become equal and righteous and the teaching
would have been in all. For this reason, many are material, but not many are animate, and
only few are spiritual. Now the spiritual is saved by nature, but the animate is free-willed
and has the capacity for faith and incorruptibility as well as for unbelief and corruption
according to its own choice; but the material perishes by nature”.
39
See Tri. Trac. (NHC I,5) p. 122,12–27: “Now the Election (viz. the pneumatics) is of
the same body (σῶμα) and substance (οὐσία) with the Savior, being like a bridal chamber
on account of its oneness and unity with him; for more than anything else it was for its
sake that Christ came. The Calling (viz. the psychics), in its turn, occupies the region
(χώρα) of those who rejoice at the bridal chamber, and who are content and happy about
the union of the bridegroom and the bride. Thus, the place (τόπος) that the Calling will
come to possess is the aeon (αἰών) of the images (εἰκών), where the Logos has not yet
been united with the fullness (πλήρωμα)”.
40
Cf. supra, pp. 112–114, 118–121.
41
In Iamblichus’s survey of previous theories of the soul’s descent, “the Gnostics” are
presented as laying blame precisely on mental derangement and deviation from
normality (An. 24: κατὰ δὲ τοῦς Γνωστικοὺς παρανοίας ἢ παρεκβάσεως; but it may well
be that Iamblichus summarizes here the myth of Sophia and her wrongful motivation,
and not the motivation of individual human souls).
(the heavenly Seth, Jesus the Savior, etc.): to enter the contest with the
cosmic rulers and their demonic powers; to experience evil and im-
perfection in order to re-assert its own perfection; to renounce the illusory
nature of the material world as a complete perversion of the true ideal
order;42 and, finally, to receive the gift of knowledge, through divine re-
velation and the mystery of baptism, and thereby to exchange this material
deficiency, to sublate it so to speak, for spiritual incorruptibility.43 By
entering this burdensome “ministry of exchange” (cf. 2Cor 5,18: διακονία
τῆς καταλλαγῆς), immortal humanity becomes an indispensable agency in
the universal design of salvation (οἰκονομία); the fate of this world and the
final restoration of spiritual unity depend on its actions.
Human wickedness (malum morale) results from the malignant activity of a
deceptive irrational force inherent in matter, which perpetuates the
imprisonment of humanity in the material body through the rule of physical
fate. Those humans who possess an immortal soul (or spiritual power, or
intellect) are capable of choosing between good and evil, but only upon being
“awakened” to salvation through a redemptive visitation from the spiritual
realm. They are the agents of universal salvation (“reintegration with the
fullness”) and their renunciation of the physical world contributes to its
ultimate perdition.
42
See, for instance, the following section from the ‘Valentinian’ Authoritative
Teaching (NHC VI,3, p. 31,24–32,15): “But the (immortal) soul who has tasted these
things (viz., fleshly desires induced by the Adversary) has come to understand that sweet
passions (πάθος) are transient. She had learned about evil (κακία), forsaken these
passions, and adopted a new conduct (πολιτεία). Following this, she disdains this life
because it is transient, and she seeks the kinds of food (τροφή) that will bring her life; she
leaves behind the food of falsehood and learns about her light; she walks about stripped
off this world (κόσμος) and her true garment clothes her within … and she learns about
the deep (βάθος) and runs into her sheepfold as the shepherd stands at the door. For all
the shame and scorn that she has received in this world (κόσμος) she received ten
thousand times as much grace (χάρις) and glory”.
43
Cf. e.g. the ‘Sethian’ Gospel of the Egyptians, NHC III,2, p. 63,4–18: “He (the great
Seth) passed through the three advents (παρουσία) … to save that (race) which went
astray (πλανᾶσθαι), by way of the exchange (hwtp, καταλλαγή) of the world (κόσμος)
and baptism (βάπτισμα) through a Logos-born (λογογενής) body (σῶμα) that the great
Seth prepared for himself, secretly through the virgin (παρθένος), in order that the holy
ones may be born (again) through the holy spirit, by invisible (ἀόρατον) secret symbols
(σύμβολον), through the exchange of one world (κόσμος) for the other world (κόσμος),
and by renunciation (ἀποτάσσεσθαι) of the world and the god of the thirteen aeons
(αἰών)”. The passage seems indebted to Paul’s dialectic of redemptive participation and
exchange (sublation, reconciliation); cf. 2Cor 5,17–21.
Conclusion
44
Translated by B. LAYTON, The Gnostic Scriptures, New York 1987, 253.