Alcmaeon of Croton On Human Knowledge TH

Christian Vassallo (Ed.
Physiologia
Topics in Presocratic Philosophy and its Reception in Antiquity

Jochen Althoff, Sabine Föllinger, Georg Wöhrle (Hg.)
Antike Naturwissenschaft
und ihre Rezeption
AKAN-Einzelschriften
Band 12
Christian Vassallo (Ed.)
Physiologia
Topics in Presocratic Philosophy

and its Reception in Antiquity
Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Trier

Physiologia. Topics in Presocratic Philosophy
and its Reception in Antiquity /
Christian Vassallo (Ed.).-
Trier : WVT Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Trier, 2017
(AKAN-Einzelschriften ; Bd. 12)
ISBN 978-3-86821-735-3
Gedruckt mit Unterstützung

der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft und
der Università della Calabria.
Umschlaggestaltung: Brigitta Disseldorf
© WVT Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Trier, 2017

ISBN 978-3-86821-735-3
Alle Rechte vorbehalten

Nachdruck oder Vervielfältigung nur mit
ausdrücklicher Genehmigung des Verlags
WVT Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Trier

Bergstraße 27, 54295 Trier
Postfach 4005, 54230 Trier
Tel.: (0651) 41503 / 9943344, Fax: 41504
Internet: http://www.wvttrier.de
E-Mail: wvt@wvttrier.de
Contents
Introduction. New Perspectives in Presocratic Studies ........................................... 1

Christian Vassallo
Part I.
Doxography, Literary Questions, and Philosophical Reception in Antiquity
1. Glaukon von Teos und die Anfänge des wissenschaftlichen Denkens ........... 9
Michael M. Pozdnev
2. Héraclite et Marc Aurèle : Sur une interprétation stoïcienne

des fragments d’Héraclite ............................................................................... 27
Maria Protopapas-Marneli
3. The Legacy of Heraclitean Logos in Plotinus’ Ontology ............................... 41

Christian Vassallo
4. Sind die δοκοῦντα? Grammatisch-Textkritisches zu Parmenides, Fr. 1, 32 ... 61

Manfred Kraus
5. On the Incipit of Melissus’ Treatise ............................................................... 77

Massimo Pulpito
6. La tradition « présocratique » des Placita ...................................................... 105

Gérard Journée
Part II.
Sciences, Knowledge, and Ethics
7. On the Principle of Anaximander ................................................................... 157

Aldo Brancacci
8. La théologie de Xénophane ............................................................................ 169

Sylvana Chrysakopoulou
9. Alcune osservazioni sul procedimento logico di Parmenide .......................... 199

Leonardo Franchi
10. Alcmaeon of Croton on Human Knowledge, the Seasons of Life,
and Isonomia: A New Reading of B 1 DK and Two Additional Fragments
from Turba Philosophorum and Aristotle ...................................................... 227
Andrei V. Lebedev
11. Democritus and the Ensuing Degeneration of Scientific Atomism:

A Suggestion .................................................................................................. 259
Victor Gysembergh
12. La riflessione sul piacere nell’Apologo di Eracle di Prodico di Ceo .............. 265
Michele Solitario
Abbreviations .......................................................................................................... 281
Index of Modern Names ......................................................................................... 283
The Contributors ..................................................................................................... 291

10.
Alcmaeon of Croton on Human Knowledge, the

Seasons of Life, and Isonomia: A New Reading of B 1 DK
and Two Additional Fragments from Turba Philosophorum
and Aristotle
Andrei V. Lebedev
1. The epistemological proem of Alcmaeon’s book: A new reading of B 1 DK

D.L., VIII 83 (= DK 24 B 1)
Ἀλκμαίων Κροτωνιήτης τάδε ἔλεξε Πειρίθου υἱὸς Βροτίνωι καὶ Λέοντι καὶ Βαθύλλωι·
περὶ τῶν ἀφανέων, περὶ τῶν θήιων* σαφήνειαν θεοὶ μὲν ἔχοντι, ὡς δὲ ἀνθρωπ<ίν>οις**
τεκμάιρεσθαι (...) [e.g. οὕτω ἔχει τὸ ἀληθὲς vel sim.]
*θήιων scripsi: ἀθηήτων Wachtler: θνητῶν codd., acc. Diels-Kranz, Timpanaro Cardini,
Marcovich, Dorandi: del. Zeller
** ἀνθρωπίνοις scripsi: ἀνθρώποις codd., acc. Diels-Kranz, Timpanaro Cardini, Marco-
vich, Dorandi alii.
Alcmaeon of Croton, the son of Peirithus, thus spoke to Brotinus, Leon and Bathyllus:
About things invisible, about divine things only gods possess precise knowledge, but in-
sofar as one can judge by human things [or insofar as one can infer from the evidence of
human things (scil. the truth is as follows)].
According to the transmitted text περὶ τῶν θνητῶν and ἀνθρώποις τεκμαίρεσθαι repro-
duced in Diels-Kranz, the subject of Alcmaeon’s work is both “invisible things” and
“mortal things.” Alcmaeon does not pretend to have exact knowledge (σαφήνεια) of
either, taking it as a prerogative of gods; all that is given to us humans is to infer: “uns,
aber als Menschen ist nur das Erschliessen gestattet” (DK, I, p. 214). According to this
reading, τεκμαίρεσθαι means an inferior type of cognition leading to results which
cannot be accepted as certain, and Alcmaeon’s theory of knowledge appears to be a
kind of scepticism.
This reading and interpretation have the serious disadvantage of being gramma-
tically impossible. The words uns, ist nur, and gestattet have no support in the Greek
text. They are based on H. Diels’ conjectural supplement <ἡμῖν?> δέδοται which is
reported only in the apparatus criticus ad loc.,1 whereas the Greek text itself means
“but as far as one can judge by humans,” and this does not make much sense. Diels’
1 Diels-Kranz, VS I, 214, n. 26.

228 Andrei V. Lebedev
supplement is unlikely since it results in faulty Greek with unnatural word order;2
τεκμαίρεσθαι with the dative means to judge by or to infer from, the word in dative
being the τεκμήριον, i.e. the empirical fact, evidence or ‘proof’ on which the con-
clusion or inference is based. The emendation of the meaningless ἀνθρώποις to
ἀνθρωπίνοις, an authentic term of Alcmaeon attested in a verbatim quotation, makes
the text sound and is confirmed by the words δύο τὰ πολλὰ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, a frag-
ment that may have followed directly after B 1.3 “Human things” must be opposed to
“divine things”; therefore, θνητῶν is most probably a corruption of a rare Doric form
θήιων (common θείων). The correction of two words transforms Alcmaeon’s episte-
mology from a form of scepticism into a kind of empiricism and changes the subject of
his book by defining it with more precision. In B 1 there is a clear opposition between
“invisible and divine things” on the one hand, and “human things,” i.e. things of hu-
man experience on the other. Since “invisible things” (τὰ ἀφανέα) correspond to “di-
vine things” (τὰ θήια), “human things” (τὰ ἀνθρώπινα) must correspond to “visible
things” (τὰ φανερά). Alcmaeon tells us in the opening sentence of his book that he is
not going to discuss “invisible and divine things” at all since they do not allow exact
knowledge; he restricts the subject of his book to “human things,” or at least takes
them as a reliable starting point of his discussion, and there is no reason to doubt that
he claims “precise knowledge” with regard to ἀνθρώπινα. In this context the verb
τεκμαίρεσθαι loses all its sceptical connotations implied by the Dielsian text and
acquires its natural meaning of a (valid) inference from empirical data, a meaning that
is abundantly attested in Greek science and medicine. Alcmaeon, then, is not a sceptic
who discussed everything, but a dogmatic empiricist who discussed only certain things.
What is the referential meaning of “visible things” and “human things”? We
know from reliable sources that Alcmaeon considered the Sun, the Moon, the stars and
the whole Heaven “divine” (DK 24 A 1 and 12). If our emendation of fr. B 1 is cor-
rect, Alcmaeon relegates astronomy and cosmology to the ars nesciendi. This is con-
firmed by the doxography that reports only a couple of astronomical placita and that
contains absolutely no traces of cosmogony and an explanation of meteorogical phe-
nomena, which constituted the main subject of the Milesian Περὶ φύσεως ἱστορία.
“Human things” apparently means “things of human experience” that we can directly
see, touch, etc. here on earth. It is through our senses that we can obtain σαφήνεια (what
2 Diels’s translation requires something like ἡμῖν δὲ ὡς ἀνθρώποις οὖσι τεκμαίρεσθαι

μόνον ἔξεστι. The proposal of Gemelli Marciano (2007) to construe ἀφανέων περί τῶν
θνητῶν (“what is unseen about things mortal”) is unlikely since it results in hard syntax.
Equally unlikely is colon after ἀφανέων in Dorandi’s edition of Diogenes Laërtius:
Dorandi (2013) 649.
3 This is apparently a verbatim quotation from Alcmaeon’s book attested by the con-
sensus of D.L., VIII 83 and Aristot., Metaph. Α 5, 986a31. It is hard to see why in DK
this philosophically important principle is printed only under testimonia in section A,
but is not included in section B as a fragment. The truth was seen by Zoumpos (1963-
1964) and Timpanaro Cardini (2010).
Alcmaeon of Croton on Human Knowledge 229
Xenophanes in Β 34 calls τὸ σαφές). “Things of human experience” are primarily the

human body and the living beings, both animals and plants. At the same time, the no-
tion of “human things” in Alcmaeon is firmly tied to the physical opposites: Aristotle,
in Metaph. Α 5, 986a33-34, exemplifies Alcmaeon’s general category of ἀνθρώπινα
by a list of sensible opposites, such as white and black, sweet and bitter, good and bad,
large and small.
Alcmaeon’s theory of knowledge appears to be a form of practical (medical)
scientific empiricism rather than a form of (theoretical) epistemological sensualism.
As Theophrastus reports, Alcmaeon distinguished sensation and intelligence and re-
garded sensation as an inferior type of cognition shared by humans and animals.4 The
opposition between ἀφανέα and ἀνθρώπινα has little in common with the Eleatic dis-
tinction between the intelligible being (τὸ ἐόν) and the sensible phenomena. The
ἀφανέα are not intelligible and incorporeal, but rather too distant from us and inacces-
sible to our senses and direct investigation. And the inductive inference (τεκμαίρεσθαι)
from ἀνθρώπινα apparently requires not only sensation, but also the power of under-
standing (συνιέναι). We may compare what the Hippocratic author of the Ancient Me-
dicine says in a similar polemical context:
διὸ οὐκ ἠξίουν αὐτὴν (scil. ἰητρικήν) ἔγωγε κενῆς ὑποθέσιος δέεσθαι, ὥσπερ τὰ ἀφανέα
τε καὶ ἀπορεόμενα· περὶ ὧν ἀνάγκη, ἤν τις ἐπιχειροίη λέγειν, ὑποθέσει χρέεσθαι· οἷον
περὶ τῶν μετεώρων ἢ τῶν ὑπὸ γῆν εἰ λέγοι τις καὶ γινώσκοι ὡς ἔχει, οὔτ’ ἂν αὐτέῳ τῷ
λέγοντι οὔτε τοῖσιν ἀκούουσι δῆλα ἂν εἴη, εἴ τε ἀληθέα ἐστὶν εἴτε μή· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι πρὸς ὅ
τι χρὴ ἐπανενέγκαντα εἰδέναι τὸ σαφές.5
It might seem that Alcmaeon did not adhere to his empirical credo to the end and com-
mitted, at least once, a sin of speculation in his discussion of the divinity of Heaven.
However, these doxographical reports almost certainly are based not on a special
astronomical section of Alcmaeon’s book but derive from a discussion of the paral-
lelism between micro- and macrocosmos, i.e. from a biological context. Here Alc-
maeon relied on the conjectural method known to Greek doctors as ἐκ τῶν φανερῶν τὰ
ἀφανέα γινώσκειν (or ὄψις ἀδήλων τὰ φαινόμενα according to Anaxagoras), and he
was explaining τὰ θεῖα ἐκ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων thus. Our reading of B 1 confirms the tra-
ditional view that links Alcmaeon with the tradition of Greek empirical medicine and
refutes the attempt of some scholars to represent Alcmaeon as a speculative φυσικός
rather than an empirical physician.6 Further confirmation of our reading is provided by
what seems to be a neglected doxographicum preserved in the medieval alchemical
tradition.
4 Theophr., De sens. 25 ff. (= DK 24 A 5).

5 VM I 3 (p. 119, 4-11 Jouanna).
6 Mansfeld (1975). Cf. Lloyd (1975).
2. A new fragment from Turba Philosophorum

(Locustor/Locuton = Alcmaeon)
Turba philosophorum is a medieval Latin (13th century) translation of an Arabic al-
chemical treatise composed circa 900 AD. Literarily, it is composed as the (fictitious)
proceedings of the “Third Pythagorean convention” of Greek philosophers discussing
cosmological and alchemical matters. The first 9 out of the 72 Sermones are of special
interest, since among the mist of worthless metaphysical and theological generalities
now and then are discernible traces of a Greek doxographical compendium that some-
times almost verbatim coincides with Hippolytus’ Philosophumena and sometimes
gives more than Hippolytus. One of the possible sources may be Porphyrius’ Philoso-
phos Historia, which in turn was based on Arius Didymus, the probable common
source of Hippolytus and Simplicius. 7 Diels, surprisingly, neglected the Turba in his
Vorsokratiker, though an English translation was available as early as 1896. The first
critical edition was made by J. Ruska in 1931,8 but the attention of classical scholars
was seriously drawn to this source only after the publication by M. Plessner in 1975 of
the Presocratic Sermones with new discussion and attributions.9 The names of Greek
philosophers in the Turba are consistently distorted (e.g. Eximedrus = Anaximander,
Lucas = Leukippos; Pandulfus = Empedocles, etc.) and sometimes hard to recognize
(e.g. Arisleus, Eximenus). The most mysterious of all is the author of the Sermo 7
whose name is given in various Mss. as Locustor, Locuston, Locuton or Locutor. Rus-
ka identified him with Bacoscus/Bacsem, the latter form being a distortion of the name
Paxamos, Greek philosopher and alchemist.10 This view was rightly refuted by Pless-
ner, but Plessner’s own identification of Locustor/Locuton with Ecphantus of Syracuse
is not persuasive, either.11 The doxography of Sermo 7 and that of Ecphantus of Syra-
cuse (DK 51) have nothing in common. The form Locuton comes close to Lecineo/
Letineon in the Latin translation (from Arabic) of Nicolaus’ De Plantis which certainly
stands for Alcmaeon (the Arabic text reads Alkmaun),12 and the Greek parallels from
Alcmaeon’s doxography quoted below leave no doubt that the author of Sermo 7 is
Alcmaeon of Croton. For the Neoplatonists Alcmaeon was a Pythagorean and a dis-
ciple of Pythagoras; this fact also makes his close association with Pictagoras more
plausible. To facilitate comparison, I divide the text of Sermo 7 into sections numbered
1 through 6 and then mark the parallels between each section and Alcmaeon’s frag-
ments and doxography. Verbal conicidences and close parallels are underlined in the
Latin text.
7 See our stemma doxographicum in Lebedev (2016) 619.

8 Ruska (1931).
9 Plessner (1975).
10 Ruska (1931) 24.
11 Plessner (1975) 64 ff.
12 Nic. Damasc., De plant. I 2, 44 (817a25), p. 140, 523 Drossaart Lulofs-Poortman. Cf.
Lebedev (1993).
Ait Locustor: (1) Omnes creaturae, quas Lucas descripsit, duae sunt tantum, (2) qua-
rum altera nescitur nec describitur nisi pietate, non enim videtur nec sentitur. Inquit
Pictagoras: Rem coepisti, quam subtiliter descripsisti. Si perficias. Notifica igitur, quid
est quod videtur et scitur. Respondit (scil. Locustor): Quod nescitur est coeli; quod vero
sentitur et videtur est quod sub coelo est usque in terram. (3) Et nescitur quod in hoc
mundo est ratione absque quinque suis clientibus, qui sunt visus, auditus, gustus, odora-
tus et tactus. Nonne videtis, philosophorum Turba, quod non nisi visu albedinem a ni-
gredine ratio potest discernere, et quod non nisi auditu verbum bonum a malo ratio po-
test discernere? Similiter bonum odorem a foetido non nisi odoratu, ac dulce ab amaro
non nisi gustus, et leve ab aspero nisi tactu ratio potest discernere. (4) Responderunt:
Tractans bene dixisti; dimisisti tamen tractare de ipso, quod nescitur nec describitur ni-
si pietate. Inquit: Festinatis. Scitote quod creatura, quae nullo istorum quinque cogno-
scitur, est creatura sublimis, quae non videtur nec sentitur, sed tantum ratione percipi-
tur; qua ratione natura percipiens Deum esse fatetur (?). Responderunt: Verum et opti-
me dixisti. (5) Et ille: Adhuc magis vobis exponam. Sciatis quod haec creatura, mundus
scilicet, lucem habet, quae est sol, qui omnibus est subtilior creaturis; quem posuit
Deus esse lucem, qua creaturae ad vitam in mundum perveniunt. Ablata autem hac su-
btili luce tenebrosae fiunt, nihil videntes nisi lunae luce vel stellarum vel ignis quae
omnia a solis lumine derivata sunt creaturis lucem praestantes. (6) Huic igitur mundo
Deus solem esse lumen constituit propter tenuem solis naturam. Et scitote quod hac so-
lis luce creatura sublimis non indiget, eo quod sol sub illa est creatura, quae eo subti-
lior est et lucidior. Illam autem lucem, quae est solis luce subtilior, a Dei luce ceperunt,
quae est eorum luce subtilior. Et scitote quod creatura, mundus scilicet, ex duobus den-
sis et duobus raris creata est, et nihil densorum sublimi inest creaturae. Ideoque et sole
et omnibus inferioribus est rarior creaturis.13
Notes. (1) Cf. DK 24 A 3: δύο τὰ πολλὰ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων. (2) The opposition between
quod non videtur (non scitur) and quod videtur (scitur) corresponds to the opposition
between ἀφανέα and ἀνθρώπινα (scil. φανερά) in Alcmaeon’s B 1 as emended above.
Quod nescitur (…) terram probably refers to the division of the cosmos into sublunar
and superlunar regions referred to in Alcmaeon’s A 1 (= D.L., VIII 83: καὶ τὴν σελήνην
καθόλου <τε τὰ ὑπὲρ> ταύτην ἔχειν ἀΐδιον φύσιν). (3) The discussion of the five senses,
their connection with the brain, and the physiology of perception were one of the central
topics in Alcmaeon’s book: DK 24 A 5-11. In the doxography of Placita tradition (DK
24 A 8), the function of the brain in Alcmaeon is described in Stoic terms as τὸ
ἡγεμoνικόν, originally a political or military metaphor. If reason is a ruler or com-
mander, then the five senses are his “clients” or subordinates. The connection of this
metaphor with the acropolis/kephale analogy is discussed in section 3 of this paper be-
low. Section 3 of Sermo 7 is the most valuable part. As a matter of fact, we can gain
from it some real additions to the fragments of Alcmaeon. In Aristot., Metaph. A 5,
986a31-34 (= DK 24 A 3), Alcmaeon’s general principle δύο τὰ πολλὰ is exemplified
by pairs of opposites: λευκὸν μέλαν, γλυκὺ πικρόν, ἀγαθὸν κακόν, μέγα μικρόν. In the
Turba philosophorum the same quotation (omnes […] duae tantum) is followed by five
sensible oppositions, three of which (albedinem a nigredine, bonum a malo, dulce ab
amaro) verbatim coincide with those quoted by Aristotle. The integrated paraphrase of
the complex DK 24 B 1 + A 3 in sections (1-3) provides the main proof of the identity
of Locuston/Locuton as Alcmaeon. (4) The section is based on a Neoplatonic inter-
13 Turba Philosoph., p. 113, 15 Ruska (= pp. 66-67 Plessner).

pretation of Alcmaeon’s distinction between the divine Heaven and the sublunar world:
DK 24 A 1; A 12. (5) The section contains a reminiscence of Alcmaeon’s fragment on
the Sun as the generative principle of plants (and other living beings) quoted in Nico-
laus’ De plantis I 2, 44 (see Lebedev [1994]). (6) The distinction between the sensible
light of the Sun and the sublime light of God seems to be a Neoplatonic elaboration on
the genuine material from Alcmaeon paraphrased in the sections 4 and 5, unless Alc-
maeon knew something about the Pythagorean theory of the Sun as a reflector of the in-
visible Central Fire (Philol., DK 44 A 19). The opposition between the “rarefied” and
the “dense” elements may preserve something from Alcmaeon’s text: the Sun and Earth
as “parents” of living beings in the De plantis quotation from Alcmaeon correspond to
the two elements of Parmenides’ Doxa: πῦρ (ἐλαφρόν) = φάος, γῆ (πυκινόν, ἐμβριθές) =
νύξ. Both in Parmenides and Alcmaeon (as well as in contemporary Heraclitus), fire is
the substance of the Sun and is conceived as a light, active, and demiurgical element in
opposition to the heavy and passive earth. In Alcmaeon it is immortal because of its
eternal circular motion.
The conjunction of B 1 and A 3 (extended version) in Turba allows us to reconstruct
the epistemological proem of Alcmaeon’s book as follows: “About invisible things,
about divine things only gods have a precise knowledge. But inasmuch as one can in-
fer from the evidence of things of humans (viz. perceived by the senses), most of them
go in pairs. Thus by sight we distinguish white from black and the large from the
small, by ears a good word from a bad word, by smell a pleasant odor from a disgust-
ing one, by taste sweet from bitter, and by touch smooth from rough.” From this series
of empirical τεκμήρια, Alcmaeon inferred that the duality of all sensibilia reflects the
dualistic nature of all sensible things, i.e. that all bodies are composed of opposite ele-
ments or δυνάμεις. Thus we can establish a direct connection between the proem and
the theory of health as equilibrium of opposite δυνάμεις in the human body. This theory
was central to Alcmaeon’s physiology and theory of health. The emphasis on sense
perception may also be linked with the detailed account of the physiology of senses in
Alcmaeon’s book.
The opposition between human and divine knowledge is typical for archaic
Greek philosophy. Apart from Alcmaeon, it is found in Xenophanes, Parmenides, and
Heraclitus. But the difference in Alcmaeon’s and Parmenides’ evaluation of the two
types of knowledge is no less remarkable. Alcmaeon speaks as a scientist: for him di-
vine knowledge is something that transcends human understanding. He does not de-
preciate human knowlege; on the contrary, he actually proclaims its superiority, since
only valid inference from ἀνθρώπινα leads to the knowledge of τὸ σαφές. In Parmeni-
des, on the contrary, the absolute trustworthiness of the Truth (ἀλήθεια) in the revela-
tion of the Goddess is contrasted with the deceptive “opinions of mortals” (βροτῶν
δόξαι). In Alcmaeon the duality of phenomena reflects the dualistic nature of things,
the reality of opposites. In Parmenides, the opposites are ‘doxastic’ and result from a
linguistic mistake of mortals (night, the corporeal element, is a misnomer of the absence
of light, the spiritual element, i.e. refers to a non-entity).14 Given that not too many
14 See Lebedev (2017b).

philosophical books were in circulation in Southern Italy ca. 500 BC and the following
decade or two, it is conceivable that Parmenides’ βροτῶν δόξαι echo Alcmaeon’s τὰ
ἀνθρώπινα, although the relationship is partly polemical. This does not exclude the pos-
sibility that both Alcmaeon and Parmenides depend on a common Pythagorean source,
i.e. on some early version of the Table of ten opposites. The duality of all sensible phe-
nomena was commonplace in archaic Greek metaphysics and physics. In Heraclitus,
exactly as in Parmenides, superior divine knowledge is “knowing all things as one” (ἓν
πάντα εἰδέναι),15 and inferior human knowledge is concerned with opposites. The epi-
graphical evidence on Parmenides as a highly esteemed member or scientific authority
of the medical school in Elea brings him closer to Alcmaeon and may point to a com-
mon South Italian medical tradition as another link between the two thinkers.
3. Alcmaeon and the origin of the ἀκρόπολις/κεφαλή analogy

in Greek philosophy and medicine.
The locus classicus for the ἀκρόπολις/κεφαλή (or ἀκρόπολις/ἐγκέφαλος or ἀκρόπολις/
νοῦς) analogy and the “inner citadel” metaphor is Plato’s Timaeus 69-70. In this pas-
sage, Plato allocates appropriate seats in the body for the three parts of the tripartite
psyche known from the Republic and Phaedrus. The seat of τὸ λογιστικόν is in the
head, from where it issues commands of λόγος “as if from ἀκρόπολις.” The high-
spirited part (τὸ θυμοειδές) is settled in the chest (ἐν θώρακι) above the diaphragm and
is described as δορυφορική οἴκησις. The seat of ἐπιθυμία is between the diaphragm
and the ὀμφαλός. It has been commonly assumed that the image of ἀκρόπολις/κεφαλή
originated with Plato and that all numerous instances of it in middle Platonists, Stoics,
medical doctors, and Church Fathers (up to Gregory Palamas in the 15th century) de-
rive from this single source. Two principal objections can be raised against this view.
Diocles of Carystus attributes this image to Hippocrates.16 The passage he quotes
cannot be located in the extant corpus Hippocraticum, which means it derives from a
lost work or from a lost portion of an extant work. In both cases it may well be Pre-
platonic, and in any case it is of non-Platonic origin. The second objection is that we
should distinguish between two versions of the ἀκρόπολις/κεφαλή analogy that are
partly different on the iconic level and totally different on the referential level. One of
them is ethical-psychological and is concerned with a fundamental problem of Greek
moral psychology, the relation between the λόγος and emotions/desires (πάθη,
ἐπιθυμία). The second version is medical and biological and is concerned with the
relation between the mind (brain) and the five senses (αἰσθήσεις); it also pays attention
to the μῆνιγξ, i.e. displays advanced knowlege of anatomy (a detail never mentioned in
the Platonic version). The ethical-psychological version is found in Plato, Marcus
15 For the defence of the Mss.’ reading, see my edition in Lebedev (2014) 146 with comm.
at 256.
16 Diocl., fr. 72 Van der Eijk.
Aurelius,17 Alcinous,18 Longinus,19 and some passages in Nemesius.20 The medical-

physiological version is found in the Hippocratic tradition, Diocles, Philo of Ale-
xandria,21 Galen, and some Church Fathers (Gregory of Nyssa, Theodoret). In the phy-
siological version, νοῦς in the brain is often described as βασιλεύς surrounded by “body-
guards” (δορυφόροι) or “messengers” (ἀγγελιαφόροι). Sometimes the king is called
μέγας βασιλεύς, alluding to the Persian kings. In the Platonic version there is no men-
tion of “king” or of the senses. In some cases we find the hybrid version, e.g. the Pla-
tonic version contaminated from the medical tradition: senses as guardians is found in
Heraclitus the Allegorist and Calcidius.22 From the time of Alcmaeon until Late anti-
quity, two traditions and schools of thought on the seat of mind coexisted in Greek
philosophy and medicine: the cardiocentric and the cephalocentric. The cardiocentric
tradition goes back to Homer and was advocated by Aristotle and the Stoics; the ce-
phalocentric originated with Alcmaeon and was appropriated by the Pythagoreans,
Plato, Hippocratics, Alexandrian medicine, and Galen, among others. Although the
ἀκρόπολις/κεφαλή analogy as an ethical topos was later used by some Stoics as well, it
must have been originally invented in the cephalocentric tradition. It was based on the
great discovery of Alcmaeon and was invented by someone to illustrate and to popu-
larize Alcmaeon’s new theory. Since the image of senses as “subordinates” (clientes)
of the mind is attested in Alcmaeon’s doxography in Sermo 7 of Turba philoso-
phorum, it is reasonable to conclude that the author of the analogy in all probability
was Alcmaeon himself and that the medical-physiological version derives from that
the section of Alcmaeon’s book in which he discussed the physiology of the senses
and their relation to the brain. In his theory of health, he used a similar political meta-
phor of the body as πόλις and opposite δυνάμεις as conflicting parties.23 The Platonic
17 Marc. Ant., In sem. ips. VIII 48, 3. Cf. Hadot (1998) 107 and 122.
18 Didask. 23.
19 De sublim. 32, 5.
20 De nat. hom. 6, 64: ἔστι δὲ ὁ θυμὸς τὸ δορυφορικὸν τοῦ λογισμοῦ.
21 De confus. ling. 19: δορυφόροι ψυχῆς ἀκοαὶ καὶ ὄψεις ὄσφρησίς τε καὶ γεῦσις καὶ
ξύμπαν τῶν αἰσθήσεων στῖφος. A useful survey and discussion of the relevant passages
is provided by Runia (1986) 395 ff. Pace Runia, the image of the king was not “super-
imposed” on Plato’s image in the Timaeus, but rather removed by Plato from Alc-
maeon’s original version. Jaeger’s conjecture that the source of Philo was Posidionius’
commentry on Timaeus (or a Stoic source at any rate) remains plausibe: in De somniis
1, 31-32 the ἀκρόπολις/κεφαλή analogy is combined with Chrysippus’ etymology of
ψυχή from ψύχεσθαι and the image of στόμωσις of iron that goes back to Heraclitus’ fr.
158 L[ebedev] and was appropriated by the Stoics. It is remarkable that the thesis
τέταρτον ἀκατάληπτον exemplified by οὐρανός (the fourth upper sphere after earth wa-
ter and air) in this passage of Philo echoes Alcmaeon’s empiricist proem and resembles
the nescitur motif in Sermo 7 of the Turba.
22 Quaest. Hom. 17, 8: τὸ λογικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀκρόπολίν τινα (…) πᾶσι τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις
ἐν κύκλωι δορυφορούμενον.
23 For a recent discussion of the ἰσονομία imagery see Kouloumentas (2014). For the early
history of the word see § 6 below.
version is a remake and a somewhat awkward adaptation of Alcmaeon’s original bril-

liant analogy: the region of the heart (δορυφορικὴ οἴκησις) does not “surround” the
brain from all sides.24 On the contrary, in the physiological version, 4 out 5 sense or-
gans are directly attached to the brain and “encircle” it like bodyguards. One may
guess that in the original text, the senses were conceived of not only as “bodyguards,”
but also as “messengers” of the King Mind (in the Platonic version emphasis is given to
the commands issued from acropolis, not on messages delivered by messengers to the
acropolis). In some passages of the physiological version, the senses are described as
both bodyguards (δορυφόροι) and messengers (ἀγγελιαφόροι) of the brain: they bring
messages (ἀγγελίας), i.e. sense perceptions to their master ἐγκέφαλος.25 It is worth no-
ting that in Calcidius, in Tim. 231 (a passage contextually close to chapter 246 on the
anatomy of vision with mention of Alcmaeon), the paraphrase of the Platonic passage
is ‘supplemented’ by the addition of the physiologcal version and non-Platonic de-
scription of the senses as rationis comites et signiferi.26 In Herodotus ἀγγελιηφόροι are
associated with the “great king,”27 and in a number of passages on the ἀκρόπολις/
κεφαλή analogy, the “messengers” are directly linked to the Persian postal service, i.e.
presented as postmen bringing oral or written information to the brain. The δρόμοι
leading to ἀκρόπολις would represent the “channels” (πόροι) that in Alcmaeon’s the-
ory of sense-perception connect the sense organs with the brain. The image of postal
horses would emphasize the speed with which the senses transmit signals to the brain.
Around 500 BC the image of μέγας βασιλεύς must have been much more striking for
the Greek ear than after the Persian Wars and especially after Alexander, not to speak
of the Imperial times when the obvious image of absolute power was the emperor
rather than the Persian king: the Platonists speak about νοῦς αὐτοκράτωρ.28 If all this
24 Additional confirmation is provided by Plato’s theory of the two περίοδοι in the rational
part Tim. 43a ff. based on the microcosmos/macrocosmos analogy with the divine revolu-
tions of Heaven which has been often compared with Alcmaeon A 12 and A 1 DK. Can
the analogy between round head and celestial sphere in Plato also derive from Alcmaeon?
25 Greg. Nyss., De opif. hom. 156: Οἱ δὲ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον ἀφιεροῦντες τῷ λογισμῷ, ὥσπερ
ἀκρόπολίν τινα τοῦ παντὸς σώματος τὴν κεφαλὴν δεδομῆσθαι παρὰ τῆς φύσεως
λέγουσιν· ἐνοικεῖν δὲ ταύτῃ καθάπερ τινὰ βασιλέα τὸν νοῦν, οἷόν τισιν ἀγγελιαφόροις
ἢ ὑπασπισταῖς, τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις ἐν κύκλῳ δορυφορούμενον. Cic., Leg. I 26: et sensus
tamquam satellites attribuit ac nuntios (scil. natura). Nous is βασιλεύς and senses
ἄγγελοι in Plot., Enn. V 3 [49] 3, 44.
26 Calc., in Tim. 231 (p. 245, 3-8 Waszink): Rationabili velut arx corporis et regia (…) id
est domicilium capitis, in quo habitet animae principale, quod ad similitudiem mundi
est exaedificatum, teres et globosum (…) quidem domicilio sensus quoque habitent, qui
sunt tamquam comites rationis et signi<feri> etc. This last phrase must be a translation
of Greek δορυφόροι καὶ αγγελιαφόροι.
27 Cf. De mundo 398a31: βασιλεῖς, δοῦλοι τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως, ἡμεροδρόμοι τε καὶ
σκοποὶ καὶ ἀγγελιαφόροι κτλ.
28 Plut., De fac. 945D: ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἀπαθὴς καὶ αὐτοκράτωρ; Theod., CAG V 28 (from
Porphyry) οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν (Platonists and Pythagoreans) αὐτοκράτορα τὸν νοῦν ἔφασαν
εἶναι καὶ ἄγειν δύνασθαι, ᾗ ἂν ἐθέλῃ, τὰ πάθη; Phil., De confus. ling. 125; Leg. alleg. 3,
was implied in the original imagery, Alcmaeon not only discovered the function of the
brain but also made an important first step towards the discovery of the nervous
system.
A striking early parallel to Alcmaeon’s analogy is found in two passages of the
Hippocratic On Sacred Disease, chapters 16-17 (we make two emendations):
κατὰ ταῦτα νομίζω τὸν ἐγκέφαλον δύναμιν ἔχειν πλείστην ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ· οὗτος γὰρ
ἡμῖν ἐστι τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἠέρος γινομένων ἑρμηνεὺς, ἢν ὑγιαίνων τυγχάνῃ· τὴν δὲ
φρόνησιν αὐτῶι ὁ ἀὴρ παρέχεται. οἱ δὲ ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ τὰ ὦτα καὶ ἡ γλῶσσα καὶ αἱ χεῖρες
καὶ οἱ πόδες οἷα ἂν ὁ ἐγκέφαλος γινώσκηι, τοιαῦτα ὑπηρετέουσι· γίνεται γὰρ ἐν ἅπαντι
τῶι σώματι τῆς φρονήσιος <μόριον>,29 τέως ἂν μετέχηι τοῦ ἠέρος. ἐς δὲ τὴν ξύνεσιν ὁ
ἐγκέφαλός ἐστιν ὁ διαγγέλλων· ὁκόταν γὰρ σπάσηι τὸ πνεῦμα ὥνθρωπος ἐς ἑωυτὸν, ἐς
τὸν ἐγκέφαλον πρῶτον ἀφικνέεται κτλ. (…) (17) διὸ φημὶ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον εἶναι τὸν
ἑρμηνεύοντα <ἐς>30 τὴν ξύνεσιν.31
Accordingly, I believe that the brain has the greatest power in man, for it is the brain
who is for us the interpreter of what is caused by the air, while the air provides him with
intelligence. Eyes, ears, the tongue, hands, and feet execute like servants whatever he
decides. For in the whole body there is a portion of intelligence until it contains air. It is
the brain that transmits messages to the understanding: when man inhales the breath
inside, it first reaches the brain (…) For this reason I regard the brain an interpreter to
the understanding.
The language of this passage is peculiar. Διαγγέλλω is a hapax in corpus Hippocra-
ticum, and so is ἑρμηνεύς. Διαγγέλλων can be compared with the senses as ἄγγελοι
and ἄγγελιαφόροι, ὑπηρετέουσι with clientibus in Alcmaeon’s doxography in Sermo 7.
Ξύνεσις (σύνεσις) is a rare word in the corpus Hippocraticum, and only in two other
passages is it used in a similar sense of “perception.” More regular terms are φρόνησις/
φρονέω (33 instances) and especially γνώμη, “mind, intelligence” (101 instances). But
in Alcmaeon, ξυνίημι is an important term for the “intelligence” in humans, distin-
guished from αἰσθάνεσθαι in animals.32 There are some subtle differences as well. The
ἀκρόπολις/κεφαλή analogy has a binary structure: it correlates the opposition of the
mind/senses (or brain/sense organs) on the referential level with the opposition king/
messengers (or servants) on the symbolic level. In De morbo sacro 16-17, we have a
triadic structure of the nervous system: the brain is distinguished from the mind and
serves as a middleman between the understanding (intelligence) and the senses.
Ἐγκέφαλος is described as the “interpreter” or “translator” (ἑρμηνεύς, ἑρμηνεύων) “to
intelligence” (ἐς τὴν ξύνεσιν), and as “transmitting messages to intelligence” from the
sense organs described as his servants or assistants. The material substrate of the
198 etc.; already in Plato in the sense of dictator (Crat. 413c: ὃ λέγει Ἀναξαγόρας, νοῦν
εἶναι τοῦτο· αὐτοκράτορα γὰρ αὐτὸν ὄντα κτλ.).
29 <μόριον> supplevi. Cf. De morbis pop. II 6, 19: μέγιστον ἔχει μόριον συνέσιος (of “per-
ception” in nipples); De morbis I 30: τὸ αἷμα (...) πλεῖστον ξυμβάλλεται μέρος ξυνέσιος.
30 <ἐς> supplevi. Cf. ἐς ξύνεσιν (...) διαγγέλλων (p. 29, 11-12 Jouanna).
31 De morb. sacr. 16, p. 29, 4-16 Jouanna.
32 Theophr., De sens. 25 (= DK 24 B1a).
messages transmitted to the brain is air that man inhales with breath (πνεῦμα). The
metaphor of “interpreter” implies that the brain translates the language of the senses to
the mind and makes it intelligible. A close parallel is found in Heraclitus: eyes and ears
are “bad witnesses” for those who have “barbaric souls,” i.e. souls that, like bar-
barians, do not understand the language of the senses, i.e. cannot correctly read and
intepret the visible book of nature (λόγον τόνδε).33 Heraclitus calls those who fail to
understand the logos of the universe ἀξύνετοι, i.e. deprived of ξύνεσις.34 The verb
συνίημι is often associated with linguistic competence, with the ability to understand
language, text, or messages (e.g. an oracle).35 So ξύνεσις and ἑρμηνεύς in our passage
belong to the same metaphorical code with the central image of the “translator” en-
dowed with “understanding” of the language of the messages he translates. There is an
ongoing debate concerning the sources of the theory of the brain in De morbo sacro.
The traditional view of M. Wellmann (Alcmaeon as the main source) is disputed by J.
Jouanna, who favours Diogenes of Apollonia.36 Jouanna’s criticism of Wellmann’s
view of Alcmaeon as the father of the ‘pneumatic’ tradition is justified: air played im-
portant role only in Alcmaeon’s theory of smell, and perhaps of hearing, but not in his
theories of vision and taste. If there was a ‘mental’ element in Alcmeon’s psychology,
it was fire (πῦρ), the substance of the Sun and immortal stars.37 Ca. 500 BC this view
was shared by Heraclitus,38 Parmenides in Doxa,39 and Epicharmus,40 and later in the
5th century by the author of Περὶ διαίτης, Book 1.41 That said, the new evidence from
Turba philosophorum demonstrates that Alcmaeon may well have been one of the
main sources of the theory of the brain in On Sacred Disease.
4. The Seasons of Life: an additional fragment from Aristotle

(a) Aristot., GA Ε 5, 785a33
ὅτι δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν αὔανσις (scil. ἡ πολιότης), οὐδ’ ὥσπερ ἡ πόα αὐαινομένη λευκαίνεται
οὕτω καὶ ἡ θρίξ, σημεῖον ὅτι φύονται εὐθέως ἔνιαι πολιαί· αὖον δ’ οὐθὲν φύεται.
That the greyness of hair is not a kind of withering, and that the whitening of hair is not
something similar to the withering of grass, is proved by the fact that some hairs grow
already white, but no grass ever grows already desiccated.
33 Fr. 19 L/107 DK
34 Fr. 2 L/1 DK ; 9 L/34 DK; 29 L/51 DK.
35 LSJ, s.v. συνίημι Ι 3 (understand one another’s language). Cf. the instances (along with
ἑρμηνεῖς) in Xen., Cyr. I 6; Gal., De musc. diss. 18b, p. 1019, 7 Kühn; Strab., XV 1, 64.
36 Jouanna (2003) LXII-LXIX; cf. XVIII-XXII.
37 DK 24 A 12. According to Nicolaus Damascenus’ De plantis, Alcmaeon regards the
Sun the father of plants and Earth their mother.
38 πῦρ φόνιμον: fr. 39 L/64 DK, a verbatim quotation in Hippolytus.
39 Parmenid., DK 28 B 8, 56 : φλογὸς αἰθέριον πῦρ, ἤπιον ὄν, μέγ᾽ [ἀραιόν] ἐλαφρόν.
40 Epich., DK 23 B 8. Cf. Lebedev (2017).
41 De diaeta I 10: θερμότατον καὶ ἰσχυρότατον πῦρ (of the Sun) ὅπερ πάντων κρατεῖ (...)
ἐν τούτωι ψυχή, νόος, φρόνησις κτλ.
(b) Aristot., HA Γ 11, 518a 9

λευκαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἀπ’ ἄκρας ἡ θρίξ. αἱ δὲ πλεῖσται εὐθὺς φύονται λευκαὶ τῶν πολιῶν.
ἧι καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐχ αὑότης ἐστὶν ἡ πολιότης, ὥσπερ τινές φασιν· οὐδὲν γὰρ φύεται
εὐθὺς αὗον.
Hair can also become grey from the tips. But in most cases grey hairs grow already whi-
te. And from this it becomes clear that the greyness of hair is not a kind of withering, as
some (scil. physiologoi) say. For nothing grows already withered.
In both passages Aristotle apparently criticizes the same unnamed φυσιολόγος who
explained the greyness of hair in humans by analogy with the withering of plants. In
both cases Aristotle refutes this theory by the same empirical proof: unlike plants,
hairs grow grey from the start. (a) gives an additional point: this φυσιολόγος made a
particular reference to the withering of grass (πόα). (b) preserves some traces of the
original wording: the forms αὑότης and πολιότης do not occur elsewhere in the corpus
Aristotelicum, Aristotle’s regular words being αὔανσις and πολιά. We may conclude
that both words in (b) are verbatim quotations from the anonymous writer (τινές
φασιν). Τhe words πολιότης and αὑότης do not fit into hexameter for metrical reasons
and therefore rule out philosophical poets like Empedocles, Xenophanes or Parme-
nides. Aristotle quotes a physiologos who wrote in prose. The most promising candidate
seems to be Alcmaeon. Aristotle had a first-hand knowledge of his work since he wrote
a special monograph Against Alcmaeon’s views,42 and he repeatedly quotes Alcmaeon
(twice with disagreement) both in the Historia animalium and in the De generatione
animalium. One of these quotations is of special interest for our purpose since it also
refers to growing hair and looks like a “missing half” (σύμβολον) of the analogy be-
tween grey hair and withering:
φέρειν δὲ σπέρμα πρῶτον ἄρχεται τὸ ἄρρεν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἐν τοῖς ἔτεσι τοῖς δὶς ἑπτὰ
τετελεσμένοις· ἅμα δὲ καὶ τρίχωσις τῆς ἥβης ἄρχεται, καθάπερ καὶ τὰ φυτὰ μέλλοντα
σπέρμα φέρειν ἀνθεῖν πρῶτον Ἀλκμαίων φησὶν ὁ Κροτωνιάτης.43
When twice seven years old, in the most of cases, the male begins to engender seed; and
at the same time hair appears upon the pubes, in like manner, so Alcmaeon of Croton
remarks, as plants first blossom and then seed.44
Here, as in the anonymous quotations about the grey hair, we have a natural analogy
between age-related changes in the human body and in plants.45 If we combine the two
analogies, we can reconstruct a developmental model and a systematic natural analogy
between human (animal) and vegetable life cycles. Both start from semen, both ‘blos-
som’ in youth/early stage (flowers in plants, pubic hair in humans), both produce semen
and reproduce, and in the late stage both become desiccated and wither away. All this
42 Πρὸς τὰ Ἀλκμαίωνος in Diogenes’ catalogue of Aristotle’s works (V 25).

43 Aristot., HA Η 1, 581a12 (= DK 24 A 15).
44 Transl. by A.W. Thompson.
45 On the distinction between natural analogy and metaphorical analogy see Lebedev
(2014) and Lebedev (2017a) 136-137.
perfectly fits Alcmaeon’s interests in biology and medicine known from other sources.
Apart from the theory of cognition, the physiology of sense-perception, and the func-
tion of the brain, he was interested in reproduction (the seat of semen) and embryol-
ogy: how the embryo is fed in the uterus, etc. (DK 24 A 13-17). Following the popular
view of the common people (A 16) he identified the white in the eggs as the “milk of
birds,” and he was rebuked for this by Aristotle, who claimed that birds’ milk is the
yolk of the eggs since it provides ‘food’ for the chicks. Incidentally, this is another
instance of a natural analogy, and it is also based on color: white milk/white in eggs.
In the elegant analogy between the blossom/withering of the plants and humans,
empirical science and Greek poetry/folklore peacefully coexist. Already in Homer the
change of human generations is compared with falling leaves.46 Greek popular con-
cepts of man’s maturity and ἀκμή (age of 40), ἀκμάζων, ὡραῖος are based on a similar
analogy. Man’s ages (ἡλικίαι) are often conceived as “seasons” (ὧραι), and the sea-
sons of life are correlated with the seasons of the year. Solon’s hebdomadic division of
ages of life was not particularly suitable for this purpose, but the eccentric Hippocratic
author of De hebdomadibus (5) did not hesitate to recognize seven seasons of life. The
more logical common version with 4 seasons seems to be this: boy (παῖς) = spring;
young man (νέος or νεανίσκος) = summer; ἀνήρ (sometimes νέος or παρακμάζων) =
autumn; old age (γέρων) = winter. The Pythagorean Opus tripartitum quoted by Dio-
genes Laërtius ascribes this version to Pythagoras:
διαιρεῖται δὲ (scil. Πυθαγόρας) καὶ τὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου βίον οὕτως· παῖς εἴκοσι ἔτεα,
νεηνίσκος εἴκοσι, νεηνίης εἴκοσι, γέρων εἴκοσι. αἱ δὲ ἡλικίαι πρὸς τὰς ὥρας ὧδε
σύμμετροι· παῖς ἔαρ, νεηνίσκος θέρος, νεηνίης φθινόπωρον, γέρων χειμών. ἔστι δ᾽
αὐτῶι ὁ μὲν νεηνίσκος μειράκιον, ὁ δὲ νεηνίης ἀνήρ.47
We do not possess direct evidence that explicitly ascribes to Alcmaeon this correlation
of four ages and four seasons, but there is some indirect evidence. The author of the
Aristotelian Problems quotes Alcmaeon’s remarkable dictum that explains why humans
are mortal:
τοὺς ἀνθρώπους φησὶν Ἀλκμαίων διὰ τοῦτο ἀπόλλυσθαι, ὅτι οὔ δύνανται τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶι
τέλει προσάψαι.48
What exactly mortals fail to connect we can better understand if we compare them
with immortals. The heavenly gods, the Sun, the Moon, the stars, and the “whole
Heaven” are immortal because they incessantly move, and they move in circles, con-
46 Hom., Il. VI 146: οἵη περ φύλλων γενεὴ τοίη δὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν.
47 D.L., VIII 10 (= Pythag., p. 171 Thesleff). On Opus tripartitum seems to depend Anonym.,
Diodori Fragm. 233: ὅτι οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι διῄρουν καὶ τὰς ἡλικίας τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰς
τέσσαρα μέρη, παιδός, νέου, νεανίσκου, γέροντος, καὶ τούτων ἑκάστην ἔφασαν ὁμοίαν
εἶναι ταῖς κατὰ τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν τῶν ὡρῶν μεταβολαῖς, τὸ μὲν ἔαρ τῷ παιδὶ διδόντες, τὸ δὲ
φθινόπωρον τῷ ἀνδρί, <τὸν δὲ> χειμῶνα τῷ γέροντι, τὸ δὲ θέρος τῷ νέῳ.
48 Probl. XVII 3, 916a33 (= DK 24 B 2) : “Humans,” Alcmaeon says, “perish because
they cannot attach the beginning to the end.”
necting the beginning of their route with its end.49 The cosmic cycle of seasons is also
circular: after winter (old age), there is again new spring (childhood). But in human
life the beginning (spring = childhood) cannot be attached to the end (winter = old
age), and so they die. The analogy between ages and seasons fits perfectly in this con-
text. Perennial plants, after shedding their leaves in autumn, will grow new green ones
in the spring. But human bodies, like annual herbs, wither away forever. That is why
Alcmaeon speaks of πόα. According to Aristotle, Alcmaeon shared the Pythagorean
belief in the immortality of the soul, so death afflicts only our bodies. Plato in the Ti-
maeus (90a6), speaking about the highest part of the soul located in the head, calls
man a celestial plant, οὐράνιον φυτόν. Plato, no doubt, knew that the connection of
mind with the brain was discovered by Alcmaeon and the Pythagoreans, so this may
be a reminiscence of and an elaboration on his imagery.
The parallelism of the four seasons and the four ages of man could also be ap-
plied to Alcmaeon’s theory of health (ἰσονομία, equilibrium of opposite forces in the
body) and disease (μοναρχία, domination of one excessive force). The relevance of
this correlation for medical nosology is elucidated by Galen in his De placitis Hippo-
cratis et Platonis (VIII 6, 14-22). He points out that Hippocrates always takes into
consideration “seasons, ages, and regions” as important nosological and therapeutic
factors. The four seasons are correlated with the four humors and with the four
δυνάμεις in the body (the hot, the cold, the dry, and the wet) ἰσχύει δ’ ἐν τῷ ἐνιαυτῷ
τοτὲ μὲν ὁ χειμὼν μάλιστα, τοτὲ δὲ τὸ ἔαρ, τοτὲ δὲ τὸ θέρος, τοτὲ δὲ τὸ φθινόπωρον·
οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τοτὲ μὲν τὸ φλέγμα ἰσχύει, τοτὲ δὲ τὸ αἷμα, τοτὲ δ’ ἡ
χολή, πρῶτον μὲν ἡ ξανθή, ἔπειτα δὲ ἡ μέλαινα καλεομένη: “Within the year now
especially dominates winter, now the spring, now the summer, now the autumn. In the
same manner inside a human organism now dominates the phlegm, now the blood,
now the bile, first the yellow one and then the black” (ibid., VIII 6, 14).
Subsequently, these four factors are further correlated with ages and regions: τὸν
αὐτὸν γὰρ λόγον ἐν ἡλικίαις ὁ παῖς ἔχει τῇ τοῦ ἦρος ἐν ὥραις, ὡσαύτως δ’ ὁ μὲν
νεανίσκος τῇ τοῦ θέρους, ὁ δὲ παρακμάζων τῇ τοῦ φθινοπώρου καὶ τελευταῖος ὁ
γέρων τῇ τοῦ χειμῶνος. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν χωρῶν ἡ μὲν εὔκρατος τῇ τοῦ ἦρος, ἡ δὲ
θερμὴ τῇ τοῦ θέρους, ἡ δ’ ἀνωμάλως ἔχουσα κατὰ θερμότητα καὶ ψυχρότητα,
πλεονεκτοῦσα δ’ ὅμως ψυχρότητί τε καὶ ξηρότητι τῇ τοῦ φθινοπώρου, ἡ δ’ ὑγρὰ καὶ
ψυχρὰ τῇ τοῦ χειμῶνος: “in the ages the same is the relation of the child with the
spring, of the young with the summer, of the senior with autumn, and of the old man
with the winter. And likewise of the regions; the one with temperate climate cores-
ponds to the spring, the hot to the summer, the region which is irregular with respect of
heat and cold, but has excessive cold and dryness, correponds to autumn, and finally
the wet and cold region correponds to winter” (ibid., VIII 16, 18-19). All these factors
and correspondences, according to Galen, should be taken into account in order to cor-
rectly apply the basic therapeutic principle of the allopathic method ὅτι τὰ ἐναντία τῶν
49 Aristot., De an. A 2, 405a 29 (= DK 24 A 12: κινεῖσθαι συνεχῶς ἀεί).

ἐναντίων ἐστὶν ἰάματα: “the opposites are cures of the opposites” (ibid., VIII 6, 20).
Although this therapeutic principle as such is not explicitly formulated in Alcmaeon’s
theory of health as ἰσονομία of opposite δυνάμεις, it is strongly implied by it, since
otherwise the whole theory would be medically useless.
5. The date of Alcmaeon and his relation to the Pythagoreans

The date of Alcmaeon is important not only for his biography and assessment of his
originality, but also is of special interest for the history of Greek science and medicine
because he has been often seen (not without reason) as the father of Greek biology,
physiology, embryology, and even of empirical medicine and has been credited with
the revolutionary discovery of the function of human brain. This view, commonly held
in earlier scholarship, has been challenged by some sceptics (notably L. Edelstein and
J. Mansfeld), who claimed that Alcmaeon was not a medical doctor practicing empiri-
cal medicine ca. 500 BC, but a Presocratic φυσικός like Empedocles and Philolaus
working around 450 BC or even later.50 A well-documented and on most counts per-
suasive refutation of Mansfeld’s thesis has been published by L. Perilli, 51 but it is still
taken seriousely by some. This sceptical view contradicts (both directly and in-
directly) available evidence for Alcmaeon’s chronology and the subject and purpose of
his work; it is based on unclarified assumptions about the possibility or impossibility
of ‘empiricism’ in Greek philosophy and science several decades before the early
works of corpus Hippocraticum. To point to Hippocrates’ On Ancient Medicine as al-
legedly providing terminus post quem for Alcmaeon would be begging the question.
Mansfeld’s thesis is based on a ‘evolutionist’ assumption that empirical science always
comes later and that cosmological speculation constitues an earlier stage of a postu-
lated ‘development.’ But the very same author of the Ancient Medicine tells us exactly
the opposite: Greek medicine from ancient times on was empirical; medicine based on
physical theories of first elements was a recent innovation that he combats with pas-
sion. Nothing can be farther from truth than K. Popper’s perception of the cosmologi-
cal doctrines of the first philosophers as bold theoretical constructions unrelated with
experience and observation. Popper perceived the first philosophers as allies in his
theoretical fight with the “Baconian myth” and the “dogma of empiricism,” but he was
misled by the deceptive ‘dogmatic’ character of the extant physical doxography, like
Placita philosophorum in which the doxai of the philosphers are presented as brief
assertorical statements without any proof or justification. This form is neither authentic
nor original: it derives from the collections of ἀρέσκοντα δόγματα compiled in the
Sceptical Academy whose aim was to demonstrate the impossibility of knowledge;
Greek sceptics provided Christian apologists with a powerful dialectical method of
refutation of the Hellenic philosophers by exposing their diaphonia.52 Fortunately, in
50 For a detailed doxography of modern opinions see Huffman (2017).

51 Perilli (2001) passim.
52 Lebedev (2016).
many cases we know from independent parallel evidence that these doxai in their orig-
inal forms were argued for and based on proofs, often on empirical proofs or τεκμήρια
as well as on natural analogies.53 Τεκμαίρεσθαι/τεκμήρια along with the related and
partly synonymous terms σημεῖα and μαρτύρια are the key terms of the Hippocratic
evidence for rational medicine both in diagnosis and prognosis.54 Τεκμαίρεσθαι τοῖς
σημείοις means to infer from signs, i.e. from symptoms that can be observed in human
body, i.e. τὰ ἀνθρώπινα. It is this empirical method of inference from what is visible
that Alcmaeon sets out from the start in the programmatic epistemological-methodo-
logical proem of his treatise.
The unique direct chronological evidence on the date of Alcmaeon is found in
Aristotle’s Book Α of Metaphysics, chapter 5, devoted to “Italian” philosophers, viz.
the Pythagoreans, Alcmaeon, and the Eleatics. The matter is complicated by a diver-
gence of the two main families of manuscripts. The Parisinus (E) and other manu-
scripts of the (α) family give the longer version (with underlined words); the Lauren-
tianus (Ad) and other manuscripts of the (β) family transmit the shorter version without
underlined words 986a29-31: καὶ γὰρ ἐγένετο τὴν ἡλικίαν Ἀλκμαίων ἐπὶ γέροντι
Πυθαγόραι, ἀπεφήνατο δὲ παραπλησίως τούτοις. H. Diels in VS accepted the longer
version with a conjectural supplement <νέος> after Ἀλκμαίων. W.D. Ross, followed
by W. Jaeger and recently by O. Primavesi, bracketed the underlined words as addi-
tions to the original text. In his indispensable introduction to the new critical edition of
Metaphysics Α, Primavesi, while recognizing that preference should be given “to the
wording of the α-version in passages which are transmitted both versions,” relegates
our passage to suspicious “α-supplements” that are both omitted in (β) and unknown to
Alexander. Primavesi finds in the underlined words “neo-Pythagorean contents,” dates
it to post-Hellenistic times, and regards the remark on relative chronology of Alc-
maeon and Pythagoreans nonsensical on the grounds that “the context in which this
53 Thales’ dictum πάντα πλήρη θεῶν is commonly quoted without any reason or confirma-
tion, Diogenes Laërtius I 24 quotes it with empirical proof (τεκμήριον) mentioned by
Aristotle and Hippias τεκμαιρόμενον ἐκ τῆς λίθου τῆς μαγνήτιδος καὶ τοῦ ἠλέκτρου.
Since τεκμαίρεσθαι is not found in Aristotle’s passage from De anima, is must derive
from Hippias, a Pre-Aristotelian 5th century source. The Stromata of Ps.-Plutarch at-
tribute to Xenophanes a proofless theory of a gradual dissolution of earth in the sea (DK
21 A 32); a superior doxographical source, Hippolytus, quotes abundant paleontological
evidence (ἀποδείξεις) on which this theory was based (DK I, 123, 1-5). SP-Placita as-
cribe to Anaxagoras what seems to be prima facie a bold and proofless hypothesis on
the nature of the Sun μύδρον διάπυρον (scil. εἶναι τὸν ἥλιον), “the Sun is a blazing lump
of iron.” But Anaxagoras’ theory was in all probability based on the observation of the
iron meteorites (siderites). Supposing that the material of the meteorite that fell from the
sky in Aegospotami was similar to that of the Sun (A 12), Anaxagoras concluded that
the Sun was made of iron and set ablaze by swift motion like a lump in a forge. Ex-
amples can be multiplied.
54 Teste TLG, there are 43 instances of τεκμαίρεσθαι, 40 τεκμήρια, 178 σημεῖα, 25 μαρτύρια
in corpus Hippocraticum.
special kind of synchronism naturally occurs are traditions about teachers and their
pupils.”55 Our reading and evaluation of the two versions is different. To begin with,
although Diels was right endorsing the longer version, his supplement <νέος> quali-
fying the accusative τὴν ἡλικίην is unnecessary and mistaken. In this context, ἡλικίη
does not mean “person’s age” but refers to historical age, the time in which someone
lived or was active.56 H. Bonitz, who is generally impeccable when it comes to the fine
distinctions and nuances of Aristotle’s usage, saw the truth one and a half centuries
ago: in his Index Aristotelicus, he quotes our passage under the special heading aetas
(= historical time). This usage is comparatively rare, but it is not uncommon in con-
texts that deal with the comparative chronology of two persons or schools (like the one
under discussion), and it is well documented in Aristotle. A striking parallel (com-
parative chronology of Anaxagoras and Empedocles) is provided by the chapter 3 of
Metaphysics A (984a11-13: Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ ὁ Κλαζομένιος τῆι μὲν ἡλικίαι πρότερος
ὢν τούτου [scil. Empedocles] τοῖς δ᾽ ἔργοις ὕστερος [...]). Once we realize that the
transmitted text of the longer version is sound, it becomes obvious that ἐγένετο (like
γέγονε in Suda) refers to floruit (ἤκμαζε),57 viz. the time when the philosopher was
active and known. Neither the shorter nor the longer version implies that Aristotle
regarded Alcmaeon as a disciple of Pythagoras or as a Pythagorean. He clearly distin-
guishes between Πυθαγόρειοι and Alcmaeon while recognizing that their theory
(λόγος) of opposites as first principles is similar. The question of relative chronology
is raised exactly by this similarity; its purpose is to establish who depends on whom,
i.e. who was older and who was younger. But this is a difficult question as they were
contemporary. Let us summarize the logic of both versions and see which is more
meaningful and more sound. The logic of the shorter version is this: “Both the Pytha-
goreans and Alcmaeon posited the opposites as first principles. But who borrowed this
theory (λόγος) from whom is not clear since (γάρ) Alcmaeon affirmed something
similar to what the Pythagoreans affirmed.” The logic of the longer version is like this:
“Both the Pythagoreans and Alcmaeon posited the opposites as first principles. But
who borrowed this theory (λόγος) from whom is not clear since (γάρ) Alcmaeon’s
time (= philosophical activity) coincides with that of Pythagoreans.” There is no logic
at all in the shorter version since the explanatory γάρ-clause explains nothing; it is tau-
tological, and instead of explaining, just restates the explanandum: the similarity of the
Pythagorean and Alcmaeon’s theory of first principles. On the contrary, the logic of
the longer version is clear and sound. Primavesi’s assumption that the discussion of
55 Primavesi (2012) 447-448.

56 LSJ, s.v. ἡλικία III (time). Τhis usage comes close to LSJ, s.v. ἡλικία IV (age, genera-
tion) as in phrase ἡ νῦν ἡλικία. Laks-Most (2016) V, 740 print the correct Greek text, but
mistranslate it “Alcmaeon attained maturity.” “Mature, adults” in normal Greek is οἱ ἐν
ἡλικίαι, “to attain maturity” would be ἐν ἡλικίαι γενέσθαι, but not τὴν ἡλικίαν γενέσθαι
(faulty Greek). For those who reject Diels’ supplement there is no alternative to the
view of Bonitz.
57 Rohde (1878).
relative chronology concerns the relation of teachers and disciples is questionable.

There are at least three other passages in Aristotle that discuss relative chronology of
two thinkers or historical persons in similar terms (ἡλικία).58 In none of them are the
two thinkers related as teacher and disciple. Equally questionable is the conjecture
about the alleged neo-Pythagorean and middle-Platonic elements in the longer version.
Once we accept the transmitted text and remove Diels’ unnecessary supplement, the
supposed parallel from Iamblichus59 becomes invalid since Aristotle does not mention
Alcmaeon’s youth. Far from being in any sense Platonizing or Pythagorizing, the lon-
ger version may well contain an anti-Platonic and anti-Pythagorean hyponoia directed
against Pythagorizing Platonists like Speusippus and Xenocrates. All neo-Pythago-
reans and and all Platonists (starting with the Ancient Academy and possibly with
Plato himself) regarded Pythagoras as the ‘divine’ philosopher and the main source of
Plato’s wisdom. None of them would ever admit even as possibility that Pythagoras or
the first generation of Pythagoreans borrowed the fundamental first principles of their
metaphysics from Alcmaeon or anybody else.
Chapter A 5 starts with a brief remark on the chronology of the Pythagoreans
(985b23: ἐν δὲ τούτοις καὶ πρὸ τούτων οἱ καλούμενοι Πυθαγόρειοι [...]: “Contem-
porarily with these thinkers and before them [...]”). “These thinkers” are certainly the
Atomists, and possibly Empedocles and Anaxagoras as well, discussed by Aristotle in
the preceding chapter, i.e. philosophers of the middle and second half of the 5th cen-
tury BC Aristotle distinguishes between two groups of Pythagoreans, one from the
second half of the 5th century and one “before them.” The “contemporary” group al-
most certainly includes Philolaus, but who are the Pythagoreans of the earlier group?
These two chronologically distinct groups of Pythagoreans correspond to the double
exposition of the Pythagorean theory of the first principles in chapter A 5: according to
the first exposition (986a15-a21), the Pythagoreans regarded number as the first prin-
ciple and the elements of number (viz. odd and even) as the limit and the unlimited.
“Other philosophers of the same school” (986a22: ἕτεροι δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων [...])
posited as archai ten pairs of opposites arranged in two columns. This second group of
ἕτεροι apparently correponds to the second chronologically distinct group (καὶ πρὸ
τούτων) mentioned in the beginning of the chapter. And it is this second group of ear-
lier Pythagoreans (and not the contemporaries of the Atomists), i.e. the author(s) of the
Table of ten opposites, that Aristotle compares with Alcmaeon and wonders whose
logos was original. In other words, Aristotle ascribes the Table of ten opposites to
Pythagoreans “before” Philolaus, i.e. to Pythagoras and/or the first generation of
Pythagoreans. This is in perfect agreement with the longer version of the remark on
the date of Alcmaeon and the mention of Pythagoras by name. But even if we admit
for a moment that the longer version does not exist and that all manuscripts confirm
58 Aristot., Metaph. Α 3, 984a12 (Anaxagoras and Empedocles); Cael. Δ 2, 308b31 (Plato

and atomists on weight); Ath. pol. XVII 2-3 (Peisistratus and Solon).
59 Iambl., VP 104, p. 60, 1-7 Deubner. Cf. Primavesi (2012) 447.
the shorter version, Aristotle’s uncertainty about who borrowed the theory of opposites
from whom remains in the text, and this uncertainty implies that Aristotle regarded
Alcmaeon as a contemporary of the earlier group of Pythagoreans. Since the “old age”
of Pythagoras corresponds to the 6th/beginning of the 5th century BC, we conclude
that Aristotle dated Alcmaeon’s Περὶ φύσεως ca. 500 BC or late 6th century BC.
The wording of the Table of ten opposites as cited by Aristotle is probably not
100% authentic; it may have been partly rephrased and modernized by a 4th century
source or by Aristotle himself. But in its original form it may indeed be very ancient
and go back to Pythagoras and the first generation of Pythagoreans. Its antiquity is at-
tested by a plausible parody of Epicharmus.60
If there was indeed any “borrowing” or “reception” (παραλαβεῖν) suggested by
Aristotle, there would be no doubt that the borrower was Alcmaeon. But this term is
imprecise: Alcmaeon’s λόγος about opposites is anything but a mechanical borrowing
from the Pythagoreans. The formal difference noticed by Aristotle (a fixed number of
opposites in the Pythagorean Table but an indefinite number in Alcmaeon) is philo-
sophically insignificant. Much more significant is the striking difference in the kind
and nature of opposites selected in the two theories. Aristotle’s remark that Alcmaeon
spoke of “any kind” of opposites (τὰς ἐναντιότητας [...] τὰς τυχούσας) is also im-
precise and should be corrected on the ground of the new fragment from Turba philo-
sophorum. In Alcmaeon’s book there were at least two detailed discussions of op-
posites: first in the epistemological proem reconstructed above, and second in his
theory of health and disease. In both cases, opposites were carefully selected. Op-
posites adduced in the proem correspond to the five senses: they constitute empirical
τεκμήρια that prove the main theoretical thesis δύο τὰ πολλά τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων: “most
things of human experience go in pairs.” “White and black” (λευκὸν μέλαν) we dis-
cern by sight, “good and bad word” (bonum et malum verbum) 61 by hearing, “pleasant
and unpleasant odor” (foetidus et bonus odor) 62 by smell, “sweet and bitter” (γλυκὺ
πικρόν) by taste, “smooth and rough” (leve et asperum)63 by the sense of touch. In his
theory of health as ἰσονομία τῶν δυνάμεων, a crucial role no doubt was played by the
two pairs of opposites “hot and cold” and “dry and wet,” though other δυνάμεις like
“sweet and bitter” were also mentioned.64 For Alcmaeon these constituents of the hu-
man body were not πάθη inherent in a substrate as in Aristotle’s Physics; rather, they
were conceived of as dynamic forces that can encroach upon each other, dominate
(disease), or sustain an equilibrium (health). In all likelihood, not only the key term
60 Lebedev (2017c).
61 The Greek original is probably λόγος ἀγαθὸς καὶ κακὸς (cf. the proverb κρεῖσσον λόγος
ἀγαθὸς ἢ δόσις).
62 The Greek original must be εὐῶδες δυσῶδες or εὔσμον δύσοσμον.
63 The Greek original must be λεῖον καὶ τραχύ.
64 The two classical pairs are also quoted by Plato in the Sophist (242): cf. Patzer (1983).
The new fragment from Turba philosophorum probably contains an additional pair of
opposites “rare and dense” (leve et asperum): see our comment on Sermo 7, § 6 above.
ἰσονομία, but the whole phrase ἰσονομία τῶν δυνάμεων in B 4 is a verbatim quotation
from Alcmaeon.65
All these “opposites” in Alcmaeon’s Περὶ φύσεως are directly perceived by the
senses. With the exception of ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν, none of them is found in the Pytha-
gorean Table of ten opposites that includes predominantly abstract and mathematical,
as well as ethical concepts. Note that even the “good and bad” in Alcmaeon were cited
not as moral terms, but as characteristics of “pleasant and unpleasant” sensations. With
a possible exception of “light and darkness,” there are no physical δυνάμεις in the
Pythagorean Table. To sum up: Alcmaeon’s theory of the polarity of sense-perception
and of opposite powers (δυνάμεις, not ἐναντία in his language) that constitutes the
human body has much more in common with Ionian empirical science and Hippocratic
medicine than with Pythagorean mathematical metaphysics, theology, and ethics.
Parmenides’ theory of opposites appears more ‘Pythagorean’: seven out of ten pairs of
opposites from the Table are either directly attested or alluded to in his Doxa.66
Parmenides agrees with Pythagoras, while Alcmaeon agrees with Heraclitus. Both
Heraclitus and Alcmaeon declared empiricism as their method and appealed to what is
directly perceived by the senses.67 Both Pythagoras (the author of the Table of ten
opposites) and Parmenides were extreme rationalists who based their speculative
metaphysics on pure reason. Aristotle theoretically sided with the empiricists and re-
lentlessly criticized both the Pythagoreans and the Eleatics who provided the theoreti-
cal foundation for his main opponents in ancient Academy, Speusippus and Xeno-
crates, as well as for Plato’s Unwritten Doctrine. The leitmotif of Metaphysics Α is
that, as a survey of all previous theories of first principles demonstrates, no philos-
opher ever proposed as ἀρχή something different from the one or several of the four
ἀρχαί/αἰτίαι established in Aristotle’s own Physics: this fact provides a dialectical
argument e consensu omnium in support of Aristotelian Metaphysics.68 It is no ac-
cident that the first book on “first philosophy” starts with empiricist epistemology: the
process of cognition starts with sense perception. Physics for Aristotle by definition is
concerned with objects that are in motion, not with ἀκίνητα like Platonic forms or
Pythagorean numbers. My guess is that Aristotle much better understood the dif-
ference between Alcmaeon’s and Pythagoreans’ theories of opposites than it might ap-
pear from the beginning of the chapter A 5. In the final sections of chapter A 5, Aris-
totle actually interprets Pythagorean metaphysics as a kind of aprioristic mathematical
65 For the refutation of Mansfeld’s scepticism see § 6 below.

66 Lebedev (2017b).
67 Fr. 18L/55 DK: ὅσων ὄψις ἀκοὴ μάθησις, ταῦτα ἐγὼ προτιμέω.
68 Aristot., Metaph. A 10, 992b11-13 ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὰς εἰρημένας ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς αἰτίας
ζητεῖν ἐοίκασι πάντες, καὶ τούτων ἐκτὸς οὐδεμίαν ἔχοιμεν ἂν εἰπεῖν, δῆλον καὶ ἐκ τῶν
πρότερον εἰρημένων.
essentialism (incidentally, this interpretation is correct):69 they conceive the One, the
Limit, and the Unlimited as self-subsisting substances, not as qualities of physical bo-
dies (983a13-19). Alcmaeon’s defence of the empirical science as a reaction to Pytha-
gorean speculative metaphysics prefigured Aristotle’s own polemics with the Plato-
nists. So by admitting the possibility that the metaphysical λόγος of Pythagoreans de-
rives from the φυσικὸς λόγος of Alcmaeon rather than the other way around, Aristotle
may have been alluding to Alcmaeon as his theoretical ally and at the same time subtly
teasing the Platonists. The new fragment from the Turba philosophorum provides an
example of influence of Alcmaeon’s theory of sense perception on Aristotle’s explana-
tion of αἴσθησις as μεσότης between two opposites.70
6. Alcmaeon B 4, Herodotus, Heraclitus, and the early history of ἰσονομία

J. Mansfeld71 tries to prove the late date of Alcmaeon (ca. 440 BC) by pointing out that
the contrast of ἰσονομία and μοναρχία is first attested in Herodotus’ discussion of the
best constitution (III 80-83). After this attempt, he tries to cast doubt on the authenti-
city of the term ἰσονομία itself by claiming that it is a “Herodotism in Aëtius.” 72 As a
whole this thesis seems to be inconsistent and self-refuting, since the second claim
invalidates the first: if ἰσονομία in B 4 is doxographical, and not Alcmaeon’s own
term, then there is no verbal coincidence of the two terms on which the first claim is
based. Ἰσονομία is a prosaic word: it could not be used in poetry. It could be used in
philosophical and historical prose. But Greek prose starts (for us) with Herodotus and
Hippocrates. Therefore, the silence of the supposed pre-Herodotean sources means
nothing; there are no such sources. Many prosaic words (δημοκρατία, ὀλιγαρχία among
them) are attested in Herodotus for the first time simply because he is the first prose
writer whose works survive, not because he invented them. If we make Mansfeld’s
methodology the basis of our historical lexicography, we will have to conclude that
Herodotus was not only the father of historical prose, but also the father of the Greek
language. Ἰσονομία has been commonly (and rightly) regarded as an early term for
(moderate) democracy, which in the second half of the 5th century in Athens was re-
placed by δημοκρατία, a new term of the radical democracy. It is a rare word:73 apart
from Herodotus there are only 7 instances in classical prose before 400 BC in Thucy-
dides, Plato, and Isocrates, in contrast with 344 of δημοκρατία for the same period. In
Aristotle and corpus Aristotelicum, the number of instances is already zero, which
means it had been totally eclipsed by δημοκρατία. In later authors it is a bookish word,
69 The reasons of our disagreement with modern naturalistic interpetations of Pythagorean

first principles (like those of W. Burkert and C.A. Huffman) are explained in Lebedev
(2013) and (2017b).
70 Aristot., De an. B 11, 424a4: ἡ αἴσθησις μεσότης τις τῆς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἐναντιώσεως.
71 Mansfeld (2013).
72 Mansfeld (2013) 93 ff.
73 See Vassallo (2014) passim.
not a term of contemporary political lexicon.74 The collocation and contrast of the
words ἰσονομία and μοναρχία (μουναρχία) is indeed very rare (a TLG proximity
search gives, besides Alcmaeon B 4 and Herodotus, only one instance: Dio Cass., Hist.
Rom. XLVII 42, 4), but it is rare only because the word ἰσονομία itself is rare. The
contrast between democracy and monarchy (tyranny, δυναστεία, etc.) intended by this
phrase is not at all rare or specific to Herodotus; rahter, it is trivial and ubiquitous: a
proximity TLG search for δημοκρατία/μοναρχία in the full corpus within 15 words
yields 89 instances.75 Thus,76 Herodotus III 80-83 is not a “spectacular parallel” to the
Alcmaeon quotation in Placita; these two text are unrelated. Mansfeld’s attempt to
present ἰσονομία as a ‘late’ word looks like a desperate attempt to find (non-existing)
evidence for his late date of Alcmaeon himself. The chronological priority of ἰσονομία
over δημοκρατία has been argued by Vlastos.77 This thesis may well be correct to
some extent, but it should not be overstated. Even if the word δημοκρατία was officially
applied to the Athenian constitution in Pericles’ time only, it was not unknown in
Athens in the 460s.78 We woud like to draw another and no less important distinction: it
seems that ἰσονομία was originally a Ionian word for popular rule, and δημοκρατία
74 More than half (64 out of 106) instances of ἰσονομία in TLG full corpus search come
from the Church Fathers, Byzantine authors, scholia and late commentators. This is not
a proof of the ‘late’ character of the word: the total volume of the preserved texts of the
Church Fathers is enormous when compared with what we have from classical prose,
hence the disproportion. Surprisingly, there is not a single instance of ἰσονομία in Neo-
platonists. Is it because the Neoplatonic thought is always structured hierarchically and
an egalitarian concept like ἰσονομία is alien to their mentality? In most late instances the
word ἰσονομία is a somewhat colorless and more abstract term for “equality”, “equal
rights,” etc., only seldom a democratic form of government. The commentary of Asheri-
Lloyd-Corcella on Herod., III 80 ff. is invaluable, but the following remark seems to be
an overgeneralization: ἰσονομία “is not, however, a synonym of democracy or of any
other political regime: it is rather the slogan of free regimes, especially democracies
(…)” (p. 474). It is true for many contexts, especially in later authros, but not for all. In
the contexts where isonomy is contrasted with or opposed to monarchy, aristocracy or
oligarchy, as in Herodotus, it is a word for democratic regime.
75 Of these only one (Plut., Mor. 826E) mentions, inter alia, Herodotus’ Book 3. So, the
proportion of passages contrasting monarchy and democracy with reference to Herodo-
tus to those without any reference and relation to Herodotus is 1 to 88! As Raaflaub
(2002) 161 points out, discussions of advantages and disadvantages of democracy were
a “hot topic” in Herodotus’ time, so there is no need to postulate a certain sophistic
source of the constitutional debate.
76 Pace Mansfeld (2013) 93.
77 Vlastos (1953) 89-96.
78 Aesch., Suppl. 406 : δήμου κρατοῦσα χείρ. We agree with V. Ehrenberg (contra Vlastos
[1953] 90) and the Brill Dictionary of Ancient Greek, s.v. δημοκρατία, that this is a
word pun on δημοκρατία, cf. Suppl. 699: τὸ δάμιον, τὸ πτόλιν κρατύνει. But G. Vlastos
is right in his refutation of Ehrenberg’s ‘aristocratic’ interpretation of isonomia as
“equality of nobles.”
originally an Attic one. In Herodotus the two traditions converge; he uses the two
words as synonyms,79 but it is worth noticing that he prefers (with one exception)
ἰσονομία when he speaks about Ionia and Asia, and δημοκρατία when he speaks about
Cleisthenes’ reforms.80 This explanation makes the somewhat implausible assumption
that a nosological theory of a physician from Croton was influenced by the language of
Cleisthenes’ political reforms in Athens unnecessary. The dialect of Alcmaeon᾽s pro-
em presents a peculiar mixture of Doric and Ionian forms: Doric ἔχοντι, θηίων
alongside with Ionian Κροτωνιήτης, and even Ἀλκμαίων is the Ionian equivalent of
the Doric Ἀλκμάν.81 From the late 6th century on, ἰσονομία seems to have been the
standard Ionian word for popular rule, and this common Ionian usage has been inde-
pendently followed both by Herodotus and Alcmaeon. There is no technical ter-
minology in Herodotus; he writes for the general public and the ‘novellistic’ parts of
his work bear the stamp of oral story-telling.82 Nothing can be more distant in lan-
guage and style from the pedantic Stoic-Aristotelian-Academic jargon of SP-Placita.
Ἰσονομία (4 instances) and δημοκρατία (2 instances) in Herodotus are apparently
synonymous, but the preference of the first word must reflect the standard Ionian
usage of his time.83
79 From the comparison of two passages in Herodotus it becomes clear that he used
ἰσονομία and δημοκρατία as interchangeable synonyms: V 37 (Aristagoras): μετεὶς τὴν
τυραννίδα ἰσονομίην ἐποίεε τῆι Μιλήτωι, but VI 43: τοὺς γὰρ τυράννους τῶν Ἰώνων
καταπαύσας πάντας ὁ Μαρδόνιος δημοκρατίας κατίστα ἐς τὰς πόλις. The phrase τὸ
πλῆθος ἄρχον explaining the essence of ἰσονομίη looks like a paraphrase of δήμος
κρατέων.
80 Contrast Herod., V 37 (Ἀρισταγόρης [...] μετεὶς τὴν τυραννίδα ἰσονομίην ἐποίεε τῆι
Μιλήτωι) with VI 131 (Κλεισθένης [...] τὴν δημοκρατίην Ἀθηναίοισι καταστήσας); VI
43 is an exception.
81 Like Pythagoras, Alcmaeon may have been a refugee from Ionia, that would provide a
simplest explanation of his close relation with the Ionian science and medicine. The use
of Doric in philosophical prose at such an early date is unparalleled, so it is conceivable
that the original was written in Ionian dialect, and the Doric forms derive from a later
copy made in Doric milieu. But this is uncertain.
82 Dovatour (1958); Slings (2002); Murray (2007).
83 It would be hazardous to infer from the absence of the term δημοκρατία in the “consti-
tutional debate” that at the time of writing Herodotus ignored it, pace Vlastos (1953) 89.
Herodotus knew that the dramatic date of the debate (522/521 BC) antedates the re-
forms of Cleisthenes whom he credits with the introduction of δημοκρατία, and so he
probably tried to avoid the anachronism and used the common Ionian word for the pop-
ular rule. One might object to our explanation by pointing out to the Attic skolion which
glorifies the tyrannicides for making Athens ἰσονόμους; the skolion may well date from
the time soon after 510. We do not intend that the word ἰσόνομος, ἰσονομία were un-
known in Athens or that the idea of popular rule in Ionia was not closely tied to the rule
of demos, we only indicate the prevalent catchwords in Ionian and Athenian usage. Hera-
clitus ca. 490 BC in his invective against the rule of οἱ πολλοί speaks about the insane
laws of δῆμοι (fr. 130L/104 DK), on δῆμος in the specific sense of democracy, as in the
phrase κατάλυσις τοῦ δήμου, see Powell (1977) s.v. (4); Vlastos (1953) 89, n. 5. But the
A possible third independent piece of evidence on ἰσονομία as a common early

Ionian word for popular rule can be found in the Heraclitean tradition, and in particular
in a passage of Philo of Alexandria:
ἡ δὲ εἰς μέλη τοῦ ζῴου διανομὴ δηλοῖ, ἤτοι ὡς ἓν τὰ πάντα ἢ ὅτι ἐξ ἑνός τε καὶ εἰς ἕν,
ὅπερ οἱ μὲν κόρον καὶ χρησμοσύνην ἐκάλεσαν, οἱ δ’ ἐκπύρωσιν καὶ διακόσμησιν,
ἐκπύρωσιν μὲν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ θερμοῦ δυναστείαν τῶν ἄλλων ἐπικρατήσαντος,
διακόσμησιν δὲ κατὰ τὴν τῶν (209) τεττάρων στοιχείων ἰσονομίαν, ἣν ἀντιδιδόασιν
ἀλλήλοις.84
Philo’s οἱ μέν refers to Heraclitus, οἱ δέ to the Stoics, and his source seems to be
Chrysippus (SVF II 616). After the quotations from Heraclitus, frs. 106 L/10 DK (ἐκ
παντων ἕν, ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα) and 41 L/65 DK (χρησμοσύνην καὶ κόρον) follow a
political analogy that correlates the domination of fire at the stage of ἐκπύρωσις with
δυναστεία, and the world of the four elements based on equal share and mutual recom-
pense with ἰσονομία. Empedocles is ruled out not only by the verbatim quotation from
Heraclitus, but also by the parallel passage from De aeternitate mundi (cited below) in
which the same elements are “transformed into each other,” i.e. have a single common
substrate. In Empedocles the four elements can only be mixed, never transformed into
each other. We have argued in our edition of Heraclitus that in fr. 44 L/31 DK, πρηστήρ
stands for air (“storm wind”); this fragment has nothing to do with ‘chemical’ cosmo-
gony and material change but describes the great Cosmic War of the Polemos frag-
ment 32 L/53 DK and a calendar of the Great Year with four sucessive ‘dominations’
of the four world masses. We also have argued in detail that when the authentic text
(without Diels’ unnecessary and impossible ‘corrections’) of frs. 44-45 L/31 DK and
42 L/90 DK is restored and their metaphorical language is correctly understood, the
‘old quarrel’ about ἐκπύρωσις in Heraclitus’ cosmology should be relegated to the ar-
chives, since ἐκπύρωσις is directly attested in two fragments by Heraclitus’ own ipsis-
sima verba. The Stoics did not ‘project’ their own theory into Heraclitus’ cosmology
but borrowed it from him; they simply ‘translated’ it from archaic metaphorical lan-
guage in Ionian dialect into plain Hellenistic prose of their time. The second passage
from Philo with ἰσονομία in Heraclitizing context runs as follows:
(108) χρὴ μέντοι καὶ τὴν ἐνυπάρχουσαν ἰσονομίαν τῷ κόσμῳ κατανοήσαντας ἢ δεῖσαι ἢ
αἰδεσθῆναι τοσούτου θεοῦ κατηγορεῖν θάνατον· ὑπερβάλλουσα γάρ τις τῶν τεττάρων
ἀντέκτισις δυνάμεων ἰσότητος κανόσι (109) καὶ δικαιοσύνης ὅροις85 σταθμωμένων τὰς
language of a popular song is not a documentary source of the official political ter-
minology. The prosaic word δημοκρατία, even if it existed at that time, could not be
used in a song both for stylistic and metrical reasons.
84 Phil., De spec. Leg. I 208-209.
85 οὖροι (= ὅροι) “set limits” is one of the key-terms in Heralitus’ theory of cosmic justice.
The Heraclitus quotation in P.Derveni, col. IV 7-9 (= Heraclit., fr. 56 L) seems to sup-
port the reading of Plut., De Is. 370D οὐχ ὑπερβήσεται τοὺς προσήκοντας ὅρους rather
than De ex. 604a ὑπερβήσεται μέτρα (= DK 22 B 94). In fr. 55 L (= DK 22 B 120)
οὖρος αἰθρίου Διός means the “limit of the (period) of clear sky,” i.e. autumnal equinox
ἀμοιβάς.86 καθάπερ γὰρ αἱ ἐτήσιοι ὧραι κύκλον ἀμείβουσιν ἀλλήλας ἀντιπαραδεχόμεναι

πρὸς τὰς ἐνιαυτῶν οὐδέποτε ληγόντων περιόδους,87 [εἰς] τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἀντιθεῖ88 καὶ
τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου ταῖς εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβολαῖς,89 τὸ παραδοξότατον. θνῄσκειν
δοκοῦντα ἀθανατίζεται δολιχεύοντα ἀεὶ καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ὁδὸν ἄνω (110) καὶ κάτω
συνεχῶς ἀμείβοντα.90 ἡ μὲν οὖν προσάντης ὁδὸς91 ἀπὸ γῆς ἄρχεται· τηκομένη γὰρ εἰς
ὕδωρ [μετα]λαμβάνει τὴν μεταβολήν, τὸ δ’ ὕδωρ ἐξατμιζόμενον εἰς ἀέρα, ὁ δ’ ἀὴρ
λεπτυνόμενος εἰς πῦρ· ἡ δὲ κατάντης ἀπὸ κεφαλῆς, συνίζοντος μὲν πυρὸς κατὰ τὴν
σβέσιν εἰς ἀέρα, συνίζοντος δ’ ὁπότε συνθλίβοιτο εἰς ὕδωρ ἀέρος, ὕδατος δὲ [τὴν
πολλὴν (111) ἀνάχυσιν] κατὰ τὴν εἰς γῆν πυκνουμένου μεταβολήν. εὖ καὶ ὁ Ἡράκλειτος
ἐν οἷς φησι· “ψυχῇσι θάνατος ὕδωρ γενέσθαι, ὕδατι θάνατος γῆν γενέσθαι.”92 ψυχὴν
γὰρ οἰόμενος εἶναι τὸ πνεῦμα τὴν μὲν ἀέρος τελευτὴν γένεσιν ὕδατος, τὴν δὲ ὕδατος
γῆς πάλιν γένεσιν αἰνίττεται, θάνατον οὐ τὴν εἰς ἅπαν ἀναίρεσιν ὀνομάζων, ἀλλὰ τὴν
εἰς ἕτερον στοιχεῖον μεταβολήν. (112) ἀπαραβάτου δὴ καὶ συνεχοῦς τῆς αὐτοκρατοῦς
ἰσονομίας ταύτης ἀεὶ φυλαττομένης κτλ.93
Chapters 109-112 come from a long series of doxographical excerpts with arguments
against destructibility of the cosmos. The preceding chapters from 76 contain argu-
ments against Chrysippus’ and ancient Stoics’ theory of periodical conflagration. The
chapters that follow 117-137 with the defence of the eternity of the world are based on
Theophrastus (who is quoted by Philo from the start). Theiler prints them as a frag-
ment of Posidonius, fr. 130 (deest Edelstein-Kidd), supposing that Posidonius’ com-
mentary on Plato’s Timaeus is an intermediate source between Theophrastus and Philo.
Philo’s source for De aet. 108-112 remains uncertain.94 This passage is remarkable in
two aspects. First, it is one the most impressive concatenations of Heraclitean quota-
tions/reminiscences in Philo,95 and it is also paradoxical and unique in its use of Hera-
clitean quotations and imagery against Stoic ἐκπύρωσις: Heraclitus and the Stoics are
86 Heraclit., fr. 52 L (cf. DK 22 B 84ab): ἀμοιβὰς ἀναγκαίας ἐκ τῶν εναντίων (verbatim

quotation in Plotinus); fr. 42L (= DK 22 B 90): πυρὸς ἀνταμείβεται πάντα.
87 Heraclit. fr. 57L (cf. DK 22 B100): μεταβολὰς καὶ ὥρας.
88 Fr. 51c L: ἀντιθεῖ scripsi, τίθησι codd.
89 Fr. 80 L (= DK 22 B 84a): μεταβάλλον ἀναπαύεται
90 Fr. 51 L, not in DK (cf. fr. 33d2 M[arcovich] = 66b M).
91 Fr. 50 L (= DK 22 B 60): ὁδος ἄνω κάτω μία καὶ ὡυτή.
92 Fr. 69 L (= DK 22 B 36).
93 Phil., De aet. 108-112.
94 Cf. Sharples (2008) 64-66. On Philo’s doxographical sources in general see Runia
(2008).
95 It is surpassed only by the long passage in Quis rerum divinarum heres, 207-214 (=
Heraclit., fr. 106b L) with extensive list of Heraclitean opposites, the thematical order of
which exactly corresponds to the structure of Heraclitus’ book: see our commentary in
Lebedev (2014) 415-417. The source of Philo is excellent: the phrase ὁ τῶν φύσεως
ἑρμηνεὺς γραμμάτων (213) reveals perfect understanding of Heraclitus’ liber naturae
metaphor (λόγος ὅδε). We advance the hypothesis that the whole text printed in DK as
22 B 139 (= fragmenta dubia et spuria 9 L) derives from Philo and contains traces of
the genuine agonistic model of the cosmos in Heraclitus (δρόμος of the stars).
commonly joined together in the doxography as supporters of ἐκπύρωσις, and the an-
cient Stoics themselves must have quoted Heraclitus’ theory of κόρος and χρησμοσύνη
in support of their own ἐκπύρωσις and διακόσμησις. Here we have an interesting case of
περιτροπή, a kind of self-refuting argument: Heraclitus quoted by the Stoics in support
of ἐκπύρωσις in fact provides arguments in support of the eternity of cosmos by his
doctrine of cosmic equilibrium, ἰσονομία. The main opponents of the Stoic periodical
conflagration were the Peripatetics, so a Peripatetic like Critolaus would fit the bill as the
source of Philo, though a dissident Stoic who rejected ἐκπύρωσις is also conceivable.
The fact that 3 out of 5 instances of the word ἰσονομία in Philo are found in the
contexts of verbatim quotations from Heraclitus is hardly due to chance. It seems very
likely that he got this word along with Heraclitean quotations from his sources, and the
Stoic/Peripatetic sources, in turn, got it from Heraclitus. Heraclitus’ interest in cos-
mology was driven not by scientific curiosity of a φυσικός of the Milesian type, but by
the interest of an ethical and political thinker in natural law and the Cosmopolis or
Πολιτεία τοῦ Διός.96 It is conceivable that Heraclitus in the second chapter of his book
(λόγος πολιτικός) developed a kind of historiography that was conceived of as an al-
ternative to the myth of ages in Hesiod. This historiosophy was not based on “poetic
fables” but on the great epos recounted in the visible book of nature (λόγος ὅδε). The
successive domination and defeat, gain and loss, growth and decay of the four great
cosmic δυνάμεις in the Cosmopolis of Zeus, Fire (Hot = Summer), Prester or Storm
Wind (Cold = Winter), Thalassa (Wet = Autumn) and Earth (Dry = Spring), may have
been correlated with μεταβολὴ πολιτειῶν in human πόλεις.97 In Heraclitus’ psychol-
ogy the wet soul is the hedonistic soul of οἱ πολλοί obsessed with sex, food, and
drink.98 In the Hippocratic On Sacred Disease as well, it is the excess of the wet ele-
ment in the brain (ὑπερβολὴ τοῦ ὑγροῦ) that causes epilepsy and τὸ μαίνεσθαι.99 The
dry soul in Heraclitus is σοφωτάτη καὶ ἀρίστη, i.e. both intellectually and morally su-
perior. It is the soul of the wise and of the heroes slain by Ares in battle who will be
awarded with a “better portion” after death and will become commensals of the
96 D.L., IX 15: (the grammarian Diodotus wrote an exgetical commentary on Heraclitus)

ὃς οὔ φησι περὶ φύσεως εἶναι τὸ σύγγραμμα, ἀλλὰ περὶ πολιτείας, τὰ δὲ περὶ φύσεως ἐν
παραδείγματος εἴδει κεῖσθαι. It is from Diodotus that D.L., IX 5 probably quotes also
the division of Heraclitus’ book into three logoi (λόγος περὶ τοῦ παντός, λόγος πολιτικός,
λόγος θεολογικός).
97 For details of our reconstruction of Heraclitus’ cosmic cycle see Lebedev (2014) 114-
121 and especially comm. to frs. 41-47 L (= DK 22 B 65, B 90, B 67, B 31, B 126, B
76).
98 Frs. 73 L (= DK 22 B 118) ; 74 L (= DL 22 B 117) ; 74 L (= DK 22 B 71); 69 L (= DK
22 B 36); 70 L (DK 22 B 77).
99 Hippocr., De morb. sacr. 14 : καὶ μαινόμεθα μὲν ὑπὸ ὑγρότητος. Heraclitus compared
imagination (οἴησις) with the “sacred disease” (ἱερὰ νόσος) in fr. 8 L (= DK 22 B 46):
οἴησις may be a later paraphrase of the original ἰδίη φρόνησις or the like, but ἱερὰ νόσος
as a metaphor for ‘madness’ of the doxastic imagination of poets and hoi polloi is au-
thentic (contra Marcovich). Cf. Lebedev (2014) 272-273.
gods.100 The crowd (οἱ πολλοί) worships Dionysus, the God associated with liquids
like wine and sperm.101
The ἄριστοι follow Apollo associated with the Sun and the celestial region, which
is completely moisture-free. There are indications in the Heraclitean tradition that ac-
cording to Heraclitus, we live now in the period of the Winter of the Great Year when
the cold element (Prester) dominates and the hot element (Fire) is at a poverty stage
(χρησμοσύνη): the size of the Sun, the remainder of the original Pyr Aeizoon, is just
one foot in width when compared with the huge measures (λόγοι) of Air, Sea, and
Earth. The dynamis of the Wet element, the Sea, is still considerable: the peak of its
domination falls in the autumnal equinox. In Hippocratic texts the changes of seasons
(μεταβολαὶ τῶν ὡρέων) produce various diseases. In Heraclitus’ cosmic medicine,102
the changes of the cosmic Seasons of the Megas Eniautos affect the behavior of masses
and their νόος for long periods of time. This explains, according to Heraclitus, the cur-
rent madness of crowds in politics, religion, and morality. In his interpretation of Hera-
clitus’ fr. 42 L (= DK 22 B 90), Plutarch correlates the period of cosmic χρησμοσύνη
with three winter months when the paean of Apollo is replaced by the dithyramb of
Dionysus. Apollo (the god of “non-plurality,” ἀ- privativum + πολλῶν, according to
Plutarch) is correlated with the One and ἐκπύρωσις, Dionysus with the Many and
διακόσμησις (= διαμελισμός).103 In the first passage cited above, Philo describes
ἐκπύρωσις as δυναστεία τοῦ θερμοῦ and διακόσμησις of the four elements as
ἰσονομία. All this makes a Heraclitean origin of the terms δυναστεία/ἰσονομία in Philo
plausible. Heraclitus’ book was written in the early 5th century during or around the
time of the Ionian revolt, when Aristagoras denounced tyranny and proclaimed
ἰσονομίην in Miletus. There are reasons to believe that Heraclitus was one of the ideo-
logues of the Ionian revolt and that his idea of the Cosmopolis had practical implica-
tions and served as a divine paradigm for a revolutionary political project of creation
of a federal Ionian state with a unifying common cult of Apollo in order to withstand
the might of the Persian empire.104 The apotheosis of the fallen in battle at the time of
the Ionian revolt could only be perceived as exhortation to fight the enemy.105 In the
incipit of his book and in the parabel about Sibyl, Heraclitus speaks as a prophet of
100 Fr. 159 L (cf. DK 22 B 13) and new fr. 159A L.

101 Fr. 148 L (= DK 22 B 15). We take the “bacchants” as a parable about humanity.
102 We attribute the phrase ἐξ ἐπομβρίας αὐχμὸν ποιῆσαι attested by three independent
sources to Heraclitus’ fr. 112 L. The doctor who knows how to change inundation into
drought is the cosmic god. The unsuccessful self-healing of Heraclitus in Diogenes
Laërtius is a parody of his theory of natural medicine. Heraclitus, like Pythagoreans, be-
lieved that the katharsis of the soul can be attained not only by wisdom, but also by
special diet. He was a vegetarian, Plutarch correctly interprets fr. 143 L (= DK 22 B 9:
νέκυες κοπρίων ἐκβλητότεροι) as a prohibition of animal food.
103 Heraclit., fragmenta probabilia 12 L.
104 Lebedev (2014) 17-21 and comm. to fr. 131 L (= DK 22 B 114).
105 Heraclit., frs. 102-105 L (= DK 22 B 29, B 24, B 136, B 26).
Apollo. Heraclitus’ historiosophy is both pessimistic with regard to our present condi-
tion and optimistic with regard to the future: after the Tropai of the Great Winter, the
Fire will shift from ὁδὸς κάτω to ὁδὸς ἄνω, and its power will increase until the sum-
mer solstice, the Day of Katharsis by Fire in which the Persian Magi along with Bac-
chic initiates will be burnt, so there is hope that the madness of crowds will stop and
the interrupted paean of Apollo will be resumed in the Spring months of the Great
Year. A striking parallel to the ἰσονομία of the four world masses (as well as the four
seasons of the year and of the Megas Eniautos) in Heraclitus’ cosmology is provided
by Empedocles, who was δημοτικὸς ἀνήρ in politics106 and whose four elements dom-
inate successively in a kind of democratic rotation of power.107 One difficulty remains:
Heraclitus attacks the supporters of popular rule in sarcastic and denigrating term: they
lack mind and understanding since they rely on “demotic laws” and ignore the wisdom
of Bias οἱ πολλοὶ κακοί.108 Heraclitus’ political ideal seems to be a kind of ‘enlight-
ened monarchy,’ the rule of “one the best.”109 He would never approve of an ἰσονομία
conceived as πλῆθος ἄρχον. But ἰσονομία was often opposed to δυναστεία and tyran-
ny, which Heraclitus hated no less that the rule of the crowd. In this respect he can be
compared with Plato, a severe critic of Athenian democracy, in whose political lexicon
ἰσονομία nevertheless is a positive concept, nay a distinctive feature of an ideal and
just form of government.110 The seeming contradiction between the principle rule of
“one the best” and the demand for ἰσονομία can be resolved on the assumption that it
is “one the best” who stands above the crowd and like an Umpire (βραβεύς, σκοπός) in
ἀγῶνες imposes on the conflicting groups the strict rules of “equal sharing”
(ἰσομοιρία) and reciprocity which preclude πλεονεξία. In Heraclitus it is the Sun (Fire)
who regulates the change of the seasons and sets the limits of minimum and maximum
in growth and decrease of opposite δυνάμεις. And as an ideal ruler, he strictly obeys
the ‘common’ rules himself and at the precise date of Summer τροπαί every year,
shifts from the “way up” to the “way down” to sustain the cosmic order.111
106 D.L., VIII 64.

107 Emped., fr. 26, 3 DK: ἐν δὲ μέρει κρατέουσι περιπλομένοιo κύκλοιο. For the four-spoke
wheel as Apollonian symbol of time and cosmic cycle in Heraclitus and Empedocles see
the diagram in Lebedev (2014) 343.
108 We accept the following text based on Clement’s version, not on Proclus (contra DK
and Marcovich): fr. 130 L (= DK 22 B 104): τίς γὰρ αὐτῶν νόος ἢ φρήν; δήμων
ἀοιδοῖσι ἕπονται καὶ νόμοισι (scil. δήμων) χρέονται, <οὐκ> εἰδότες ὅτι οἱ πολλοὶ κακοί,
ὀλίγοι δὲ ἀγαθοί.
109 Fr. 128 L (= DK 22 B 49): εἷς ἐμοὶ μύριοι, ἐὰν ἄριστος ἦι. Heraclitus’ cosmology in a
sense was a parable about ἡ κατὰ φύσιν πολιτεία: look at the polis of Zeus, it is ruled by
“one the best,” not by the many!
110 Plat., Epist. VII 326d. I accept the authenticity of the Seventh letter. Vlastos (1953) 97,
n. 34 contrasts this passage with the scornful use of ἰσονομικός many years earlier in
Resp. VIII 561e (cf. 563b).
111 Heraclitus’ quotation in col. IV of the Derveni papyrus is exactly about this.
Bibliography
Alesse (2008): F. Alesse (ed.), Philo of Alexandria and Post-Aristotelian Philosophy,
Leiden 2008.
Asheri-Lloyd-Corcella (2007): D. Asheri-A.B. Lloyd-A. Corcella (eds.), A Commen-
tary on Herodotus I-IV, ed. by O. Murray and A. Moreno, Oxford 2007.
Bakker-de Jong-van Wees (2002): E.J. Bakker-I.J.F. de Jong-H. van Wees, Brill’s
Companion to Herodotus, Leiden 2002.
Dorandi (2013): T. Dorandi, Diogenes Laertius: Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Cam-
bridge 2013.
Dovatour (1958): A. Dovatour, Nauchnyi i povestovatel’nyi stil’ Gerodota, St. Peters-
burg 1958.
Drossaart Lulofs-Poortman (1989): H.J. Drossaart Lulofs-E.L.J. Poortman (eds.), Ni-
colaus Damascenus: De plantis, Amsterdam 1989.
Gemelli Marciano (2007): M.L. Gemelli Marciano, Lire du début: Quelques observa-
tions sur les incipit des présocratiques, “PhA”, 7 (2007) 7-37.
Hadot (1998): P. Hadot, The Inner Citadel: The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius,
transl. by M. Chase, Cambridge (MA) 1998.
Huffman (2014): C.A. Huffman (ed.), A History of Pythagoreanism, Cambridge 2014.
Huffman (2017): C.A. Huffman, Alcmaeon, in: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philos-
ophy (Spring 2017 Edition), ed. by E.N. Zalta (URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/spr2017/entries/alcmaeon).
Jouanna (2003): J. Jouanna (éd.). Hippocrate, tome II, 3e partie, La maladie sacrée,
Paris 2003.
Kouloumentas (2014): S. Kouloumentas, The Body and the Polis: Alcmaeon on Health
and Disease, “BJHP”, 22 (2014) 867-887.
Laks-Most (2016): A. Laks-G.W. Most, Early Greek Philosophy, 9 vols., Cambridge
(MA)-London 2016.
Lebedev (1993): A.V. Lebedev, Alcmaeon on Plants: A New Fragment in Nicolaus
Damascenus, “PdP”, 48 (1993) 456-460.
Lebedev (2013): A.V. Lebedev, Idealism in Early Greek Philosophy: The Case of
Pythagoreans and Eleatics, in: V. Sharova-E. Trufanova-A. Yakovleva (eds.),
Philosophy: Theory and Practice, Moscow 2013, сс. 220-230.
Lebedev (2014): A.V. Lebedev, Logos Geraklita: Rekonstrukciia mysli i slova: S
novym kriticheskim izdaniem fragmentov (The Logos of Heraclitus: A Recon-
struction of his Thought and Word: With a New Critical Edition of the Frag-
ments), St. Peterburg 2014.
Lebedev (2016): A.V. Lebedev, The Origin and Transmission of the Doxographical
Tradition Placita Philosophorum (Arius Didymus, Ps.Plutarch, Stobaeus, Theodo-
ret, Nemesius, Porphyrius), “Indo-European Linguistics and Classical Philology”,
22, ed. by N.N. Kazansky, St. Petersburg 2016, 573-633.
Lebedev (2017a): A.V. Lebedev, The Liber Naturae Metaphor and Alphabet Analogy
in Heraclitus’ Logos-Fragments (With Some Remarks on Plato’s “Dream Theory”
and the Origin of the Concept of Elements), in: E. Fantino-U. Muss-Ch. Schu-
bert-K. Sier (hrsg.), Heraklit im Kontext, Berlin-New York 2017, 233-269.
Lebedev (2017b): A.V. Lebedev, Parmenides the Pythagorean: Monistic Idealism
(Mentalism) in Archaic Greek Metaphysics, “Indo-European Linguistics and
Classical Philology”, 21, ed. by N.N. Kazansky, St. Petersburg 2017, 1-28.
Lebedev (2017c): A.V. Lebedev, Epicharmus on God as Mind (νόος): A Neglected
Fragment in John Stobaeus. (With Some Remarks on Early Pythagorean Meta-
physics), “Aristeas”, 2017, in press.
Lloyd (1975): G.E.R. Lloyd, Alcmaeon and the Early History of Dissection, “ZWG”,
59 (1975) 113-147.
Mansfeld (1975): J. Mansfeld, Alcmaeon, φυσικός or Physician? With some Remarks
on Calcidius’ On vision compared to Galen’s Plac. Hipp. Plat. VII, in: J. Mans-
feld-L.M. de Rijk (eds.), Kephalaion: Studies in Greek Philosophy and its Con-
tinuation, Assen 1975, 26-38.
Mansfeld (2013): J. Mansfeld, The Body Politic: Aëtius on Alcmaeon on “Isonomia”
and “Monarchia”, in: V. Harte-M. Lane (eds.), “Politeia” in Greek and Roman
Philosophy, Cambridge 2013, 78-95.
Murray (2007): O. Murray, Herodotus and Oral History, in: N. Luraghi (ed.) The His-
torian’s Craft in the Age of Herodotus, Oxford 2007, 16-44.
Patzer (1983): A. Patzer, De Alcmaeonis Crotoniatae apud Platonem vestigio, “WJA”,
N.F. 9 (1983) 79-80.
Perilli (2001): L. Perilli, Alcmeone di Crotone tra filosofia e scienza: Per una nuova
edizione delle fonti, “QUCC”, n.s. 69 (2001) 55-79.
Plessner (1975): M. Plessner, Vorsokratische Philosophie und griechische Alchemie in
Arabisch-Lateinischer Überlieferung: Studien zu Text und Inhalt der Turba Phi-
losophorum, Wiesbaden 1975.
Powell (1977): J.E. Powell, A Lexicon to Herodotus, Hildesheim 1977 (2nd repr.).
Primavesi (2012): O. Primavesi, Aristotle, Metaphysics A: A New Critical Edition with
Introduction, in: Steel-Primavesi (2012) 387-541.
Raaflaub (2002): K. Raaflaub, Philosophy, Science, Politics: Herodotus and the Intel-
lectual Trends of his Time, in: Bakker-de Jong-van Wees (2002) 149-186.
Rohde (1878): E. Rohde, Γέγονε in den Biographica des Suidas, “RhM”, 33 (1878)
161-220.
Runia (1986): D.T. Runia, Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato, Leiden 1986.
Runia (2008): D.T. Runia, Philo and Hellenistic Doxography, in: Alesse (2008) 13-54.
Ruska (1931): J. Ruska, Turba philosophorum: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Al-
chemie, Berlin 1931.
Sharples (2008): R.W. Sharples, Philo and the Post-Aristotelian Peripatetics, in: Alesse
(2008) 55-73.
Slings (2002): S.R. Slings, Oral Strategies in the Language of Herodotus, in: Bakker-
de Jong-van Wees (2002) 53-78.
Steel-Primavesi (2012): C. Steel-O. Primavesi (eds.), Aristotle’s Metaphysics Alpha,

Oxford 2012.
Timpanaro Cardini (2010): M. Timpanaro Cardini, Pitagorici Antichi: Testimonianze e
frammenti, Milan 2010 (repr.).
Van der Eijk (2000): P.J. Van der Eijk, Diocles of Carystus: A Collection of the Frag-
ments with Translation and Commentary, vol. I, Leiden-Boston-Cologne 2000.
Vassallo (2014): Ch. Vassallo, Il ruolo della retorica tra democrazia e oligarchia:
un’ipotesi di attribuzione di un supposto frammento socratico (PSI XI 1215),
“Elenchos”, 35 (2014) 195-231.
Vlastos (1953): G. Vlastos, Isonomia, “AJPh”, 74 (1953) 337-366 [= Id., Studies in
Greek Philosophy, ed. by D. Graham, vol. I, Princeton 1996, 89-111].
Zoumpos (1963-1964): A.N. Zoumpos, Εἰς Ἀλκμαίονα, “ZAnt”, 13 (1963-1964) 75-
76.

Alcmaeon of Croton On Human Knowledge TH

Hochgeladen von

Dokumentinformationen

Originaltitel

Copyright

Verfügbare Formate

Dieses Dokument teilen

Dokument teilen oder einbetten

Freigabeoptionen

Stufen Sie dieses Dokument als nützlich ein?

Sind diese Inhalte unangemessen?

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

Alcmaeon of Croton On Human Knowledge TH

Hochgeladen von

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

Christian Vassallo (Ed.

Topics in Presocratic Philosophy and its Reception in Antiquity

Topics in Presocratic Philosophy

Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Trier

Gedruckt mit Unterstützung

Umschlaggestaltung: Brigitta Disseldorf

© WVT Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Trier, 2017

Alle Rechte vorbehalten

WVT Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Trier

Introduction. New Perspectives in Presocratic Studies ........................................... 1

2. Héraclite et Marc Aurèle : Sur une interprétation stoïcienne

3. The Legacy of Heraclitean Logos in Plotinus’ Ontology ............................... 41

4. Sind die δοκοῦντα? Grammatisch-Textkritisches zu Parmenides, Fr. 1, 32 ... 61

5. On the Incipit of Melissus’ Treatise ............................................................... 77

6. La tradition « présocratique » des Placita ...................................................... 105

7. On the Principle of Anaximander ................................................................... 157

8. La théologie de Xénophane ............................................................................ 169

9. Alcune osservazioni sul procedimento logico di Parmenide .......................... 199

11. Democritus and the Ensuing Degeneration of Scientific Atomism:

Abbreviations .......................................................................................................... 281

Index of Modern Names ......................................................................................... 283

The Contributors ..................................................................................................... 291

Alcmaeon of Croton on Human Knowledge, the

1. The epistemological proem of Alcmaeon’s book: A new reading of B 1 DK

1 Diels-Kranz, VS I, 214, n. 26.

2 Diels’s translation requires something like ἡμῖν δὲ ὡς ἀνθρώποις οὖσι τεκμαίρεσθαι

Xenophanes in Β 34 calls τὸ σαφές). “Things of human experience” are primarily the

4 Theophr., De sens. 25 ff. (= DK 24 A 5).

2. A new fragment from Turba Philosophorum

7 See our stemma doxographicum in Lebedev (2016) 619.

13 Turba Philosoph., p. 113, 15 Ruska (= pp. 66-67 Plessner).

14 See Lebedev (2017b).

3. Alcmaeon and the origin of the ἀκρόπολις/κεφαλή analogy

Aurelius,17 Alcinous,18 Longinus,19 and some passages in Nemesius.20 The medical-

version is a remake and a somewhat awkward adaptation of Alcmaeon’s original bril-

4. The Seasons of Life: an additional fragment from Aristotle

(b) Aristot., HA Γ 11, 518a 9

42 Πρὸς τὰ Ἀλκμαίωνος in Diogenes’ catalogue of Aristotle’s works (V 25).

49 Aristot., De an. A 2, 405a 29 (= DK 24 A 12: κινεῖσθαι συνεχῶς ἀεί).

5. The date of Alcmaeon and his relation to the Pythagoreans

50 For a detailed doxography of modern opinions see Huffman (2017).

55 Primavesi (2012) 447-448.

relative chronology concerns the relation of teachers and disciples is questionable.

58 Aristot., Metaph. Α 3, 984a12 (Anaxagoras and Empedocles); Cael. Δ 2, 308b31 (Plato

65 For the refutation of Mansfeld’s scepticism see § 6 below.

6. Alcmaeon B 4, Herodotus, Heraclitus, and the early history of ἰσονομία

69 The reasons of our disagreement with modern naturalistic interpetations of Pythagorean

A possible third independent piece of evidence on ἰσονομία as a common early

ἀμοιβάς.86 καθάπερ γὰρ αἱ ἐτήσιοι ὧραι κύκλον ἀμείβουσιν ἀλλήλας ἀντιπαραδεχόμεναι

86 Heraclit., fr. 52 L (cf. DK 22 B 84ab): ἀμοιβὰς ἀναγκαίας ἐκ τῶν εναντίων (verbatim

96 D.L., IX 15: (the grammarian Diodotus wrote an exgetical commentary on Heraclitus)

100 Fr. 159 L (cf. DK 22 B 13) and new fr. 159A L.

106 D.L., VIII 64.

Steel-Primavesi (2012): C. Steel-O. Primavesi (eds.), Aristotle’s Metaphysics Alpha,

Das könnte Ihnen auch gefallen