Poiesis Prax (2008) 5:53–69

DOI 10.1007/s10202-007-0037-8

ORIGINAL PAPER

Towards a philosophy of interdisciplinarity

An attempt to provide a classification and clarification

Jan C. Schmidt

Received: 21 June 2007 / Revised: 9 September 2007 / Accepted: 16 September 2007 /

Published online: 27 October 2007
Ó Springer-Verlag 2007

Abstract This paper aims to contribute to the expanding discourse on inter- and
transdisciplinarity. Referring to well-established distinctions in philosophy of sci-
ence, the paper argues in favor of a plurality of four different dimensions:
Interdisciplinarity with regard to (a) objects (‘‘ontology’’), (b) knowledge/theories
(epistemology), (c) methods/practices (methodology), and further, (d) problem
perception/problem solving. Different philosophical thought traditions can be
related to these distinguishable meanings. The philosophical framework of the four
different dimensions will be illustrated by some of the most popular examples of
research programs that are labeled ‘‘interdisciplinary’’: nanoresearch/nanoscience/
nanotechnology, complex systems theory/chaos theory, biomimicry/bionics, and
technology assessment/sustainability research. Thus, a minimal philosophy of sci-
ence is required to understand and foster inter- and transdisciplinarity.

Zusammenfassung Inter- und Transdisziplinarität sind en vogue in Wissenschaft,

Wirtschaft, Politik und Öffentlichkeit. Doch die Bedeutung der Begriffe ist immer
noch weitgehend ungeklärt. Ziel des vorliegenden Aufsatzes ist die Stärkung und
Stützung dieser expandierenden Diskussion durch Systematisierung dessen, was
unter ,,Inter- und Transdisziplinarität‘‘ verstanden werden kann. Die Wis-
senschaftsphilosophie liefert mit der Unterscheidung zwischen Gegenständen/
Objekten (Ontologie), Wissen/Theorien (Epistemologie) und Methoden (Method-
ologie) ein Klassifikations- und Klärungsschema, das zu ergänzen ist durch (d)
Probleme, Problemwahrnehmungen und Problemlösungen. Die vier Dimensionen
der Interdisziplinarität werden anhand populärer Forschungsprogramme, die als
,,interdisziplinär‘‘ bezeichnet werden, erläutert: Nanoforschung/Nanotechnologie,
Komplexitätstheorie/Chaostheorie, Bionik und Technikfolgenabschätzung/Nach-

J. C. Schmidt (&)
School of Public Policy, Georgia Institute of Techology, Atlanta, GA, USA
e-mail: jan.schmidt@pubpolicy.gatech.edu

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haltigkeitsforschung. So zeigt sich, dass eine minimale Wissenschaftsphilosophie

notwendig und hilfreich ist, um Inter- und Transdisziplinarität zu verstehen und die
expandierende Diskussion inhaltlich zu fördern.

Résumé La référence à l’interdisciplinarité et à la transdisciplinarité est de plus en

plus présente dans les discours politiques, économiques et scientifiques, alors que le
sens de ces notions est encore en grande partie indéfini. Cet article vise à sys-
tématiser ce qui peut être entendu par «interdisciplinarité et transdisciplinarité».
Avec la distinction entre (a) les choses/objets (ontologie), (b) les connaissances/
théories (épistémologie), et (c) les méthodes/pratiques (méthodologie), la philoso-
phie des sciences fournit un schéma de classification et d’élucidation qui doit être
complété par (d) la perception des problèmes et de leur résolution. Le cadre
philosophique des quatre dimensions de l’interdisciplinarité est illustré par des
programmes de recherche importants, considérés comme «interdisciplinaires» : la
nanorecherche/nanotechnologie, la théorie de la complexité/théorie du chaos, la
bionique et l’évaluation des choix technologiques/la recherche sur le développement
durable. C’est pourquoi la philosophie des sciences constitue un outil nécessaire et
utile pour comprendre l’interdisciplinarité et la transdisciplinarité et pour favoriser
la discussion croissante quant au contenu.

1 The Challenge

Today, ‘‘interdisciplinarity’’ seems to be everywhere and nowhere. Since Erich

Jantsch coined the umbrella term in the early 1970s for a broader audience,1
‘‘interdisciplinarity’’ has become a popular label ascribed to innumerable research
programs: for example the NBIC scenario of the US National Science Foundation
for converging technologies claims to be ‘‘interdisciplinary’’,2 as does ethically
motivated and (‘‘real world’’) problem oriented research at the intersections of
science, technology and society such as technology assessment,3 global change
studies and sustainability research.4 In addition to the foregoing, ‘‘interdisciplina-
rity’’ serves as a fashionable catchword for innovative education programs.5
Obviously ‘‘interdisciplinarity’’ seems to be the distinguished criterion for the
diagnosis of a current shift in the mode of scientific knowledge production, most
popularly characterized by terms like mode-2-science,6 post-normal science,7

1
Jantsch (1972).
2
Roco and Bainbridge (eds) (2002).
3
For one core approach of technology assessment (TA), see: Decker (ed) (2001). More specifically:
Decker and Grunwald (2001), Decker (2004).
4
Kates et al. (2001), Norton (2005).
5
Kockelmans (ed) (1979). For a more organizational and psychological oriented approach, see: Davis
(1995).
6
Gibbons et al. (1994).
7
Funtowicz and Ravetz (1993), Elzinga (1995).

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post-paradigmatic science and societally oriented finalization,8 postacademic

science,9 technoscience,10 problem-oriented research,11 socio-ecological
research,12 post disciplinarity13 or ‘‘triple helix’’ research and innovation.14 Some
protagonists of ‘‘inter- and transdisciplinarity’’ go even further as they stress or
promise ‘‘joint problem solving among science, technology, and society’’.15 Other
authors prefer cognate words such as multi-, pluri-, cross-, meta- or infradiscip-
linarity.16 But do these programmatic catchwords carry any distinctive epistemic
content and any differentia specifica? Do they really indicate a new mode of
epistemic knowledge production or are they meaningless, referring just to
‘‘business as usual’’?17
Given the scope of this paper, I do not address the latter question in general;
rather, I seek to disentangle the umbrella term ‘‘interdisciplinarity’’ and to
critically assess what might be meant from the perspective of philosophy of
science.18 I will address foundational and key epistemological questions
underlying the term. The basic idea of this paper is therefore to provide a
philosophical fundament for a classification and criticism of the innumerable
usages of ‘‘interdisciplinarity’’. The philosophical thought tradition with
approaches like realism, rationalism, methodological constructivism and prag-
matism, instrumentalism, and others, provides different meanings. My descriptive
analysis will reveal that the term ‘‘interdisciplinarity’’ is intrinsically a multi-
faceted, but not an arbitrary one: ‘‘Interdisciplinarity’’ might be characterized by
referring to objects, theories/knowledge, methods, and problems. Consequently,
this paper intends to foster the discourse about ‘‘interdisciplinarity’’ and aims to
provide some elements of/for a philosophy of interdisciplinarity.19

8
Böhme et al. (1974), pp. 276f. See the epistemological analysis of ‘‘finalization’’ in: Böhme et al. (eds)
(1983).
9
Ziman (2000), Bammé (2004).
10
Haraway (1991), Latour (1987).
11
Chubin et al. (eds) (1986), De Bie (1970).
12
Becker and Jahn (eds) (2006), Becker (2002).
13
Norton (2005).
14
Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (eds) (1997).
15
Thompson Klein et al. (eds) (2001).
16
For an overview, see for instance: http://www.transdisciplinarity.ch/ and Kocka (ed) (1987) pp. 152–
158, Thompson Klein (1990), Weingart and Stehr (eds) (2000).
17
Carrier (2001).
18
The net for transdicplinarity in sciences and humanities (td-net; see: http://www.transdisciplinarity.ch/.)
has contributed to a clarification of inter- and transdisciplinarity during the last couple of years. See f.i. also:
Pohl and Hirsch Hadorn (2006).
19
See also the very helpful and substantial approach of: http://www.transdisciplinarity.ch/. However, this
paper focuses more broadly on interdisciplinarity. Transdisciplinarity is understood as an (important)
subset of interdisciplinarity.

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2 The tradition

‘‘Interdisciplinarity’’ is obviously en vogue in science, society, and economy. At the

same time, however, the term is quite misty, foggy, fringed, and shadowy. This
vagueness challenges (has challenged and should have challenged) philosophy.20
Yet on the one hand, philosophers seem to doubt whether the recent popularity of
the catchword ‘‘interdisciplinarity’’ is justifiable. Besides being a new catchword, no
specific semantic content seems to be implied (no-content assumption). So
‘‘interdisciplinarity’’ appears to be, more or less, merely a public, political or
ideological term—a meaningless rhetoric. By contrast, philosophers claim to focus
only on serious terms. On the other hand, the phenomenon of interdisciplinary
research seems to be too complex, heterogeneous, dynamical and contextual to be
accessible for philosophy (too-complex assumption). Interdisciplinary practice
obviously seems to restrict philosophical approaches. Implicitly, philosophers may
have regarded interdisciplinarity as a non-universal and non-theoretical context-
specific phenomenon, revealing limits of the philosophy of science.21
If we look more closely at the tradition of philosophy, however, it turns out that
this tradition provides a rich framework for clarifying ‘‘interdisciplinarity’’.
Although the word ‘‘interdisciplinarity’’ might be unfamiliar to philosophy, the
phenomenon and content are not.22 We can find aspects of approaches in domains
which are usually classified by keywords like ‘‘monism and pluralism’’, ‘‘unity of
sciences’’, ‘‘intertheoretic relations’’, ‘‘holism’’, ‘‘unification’’, ‘‘reduction’’, ‘‘ratio-
nality’’, etc. Here, ‘‘interdisciplinarity’’ might be understood as an integration
instrument in order to relate various patchworks of disciplinary knowledge—its
basic goal is to obtain a synthesis and to restore what is thought to be lost. Although
the functional differentiation and separation of disciplines has contributed to the
success of the evolution of science, there is a negative side. Today, a patchwork of
objects, knowledge, and methods can be found: plurality and a ‘‘disunity of science’’
have emerged.23
Thus, interdisciplinarity is not regarded as an end-in-itself, but rather as a means
to regain a presupposed unity from the (obvious) plurality of disciplines. Such
unification has been a well-established topic and the overall aim of philosophy since
the ancient Greeks. Leibniz’ ideas of a mathesis universalis can be regarded as one
leading background stance. Furthermore, scientific truth, according to Hegel, is
20
There are, of course, some philosophical approaches that attempt to clarify the situation in some
cognate branches but they mostly just refer to very specific cases, for example: (a) The Trading zone
concept: Galison (1996); (b) The Boundary object concept: Star and Griesemer (1989); (c) The Boundary
work concept: Gieryn (1983); (d) The thought-style (‘‘Denkstil’’) concept: Fleck (1979 [1935]). Some
general aspects are also discussed in: Schmidt (2003, 2005).
21
Then, any theoretical approach to the heterogeneous practice of interdisciplinarity seems to be
infeasible. The argument for this pessimism might be derived from the philosophy of physics or biology.
Until now, there has not been a consistent philosophical approach to physics or biology. Thus, insofar as
interdisciplinary research is even more complex and heterogeneous than disciplines such as physics and
biology, the prospect of a philosophical theory of interdisciplinarity seems to be miserable or practically
nil.
22
Particular aspects are also mentioned in: Thompson Klein (1990), pp. 19ff; Bammé (2004).
23
Galison and Stump (eds) (1996).

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associated with the whole, and not primarily with specialized, splintered, particular
knowledge of the disciplines. Although the arguments have changed during the
modern age, a striving for integration of knowledge and unification of the theories is
still prominent. We find an overall movement towards integration in nearly every
(modern) tradition of the philosophy of science (and, of course, in the individual
sciences24 themselves).25 Thus, those with different point of view argues in favor of
interdisciplines or interdisciplinary sciences—although it is seriously doubtful
whether such unification or integration can exist and the criteria which may be used
to specify these interdisciplines are unclear. As well the question of whether such
interdisciplines will or will not be transformed into new (or still existent) disciplines
in the future is still open.26
In contrast, or in addition, to these strong positions of integration and unification,
there are weaker and much more moderate ones. They focus particularly on the
‘‘partial, relative unity of the empirical object’’27—a local contextual unity with
regard to one object instead of an overall unity throughout the entire world. These
positions aim to address the ‘‘complexity, totality and unity of one single object’’.28
Often, these weak positions of unity are developed from a ‘‘problem-oriented’’ or
‘‘real-world’’ perspective; their goal is to address and to solve pressing problems of
society. The societal problems are so complex and interrelated that a disciplinary
approach is usually not feasible. Interdisciplinarity is regarded as a tool to tackle
these complex issues. Methodological considerations for a rational foundation of
technology assessment (TA) and an integrative science have been developed along
this line a thought.29 A local monism concerning objects and problems seems to be
in accordance with a global pluralism concerning methods, concepts, propositions,
and theories.
Both approaches—the strong and the weak—can be regarded as somewhat
instrumentalistic. Interdisciplinarity is viewed as a highly-valued tool in order to
restore the unity of sciences or to solve societal-pressing problems; the first position
is mainly motivated internally to sciences, the second externally. The approaches
share an optimism about the possible achievements of interdisciplinarity.30
24
Most prominently: Weinberg (1994).
25
Such as systems theory, methodological constructivism, methodological interpretationism, rational-
ism, structuralism, structural sciences, and, of course, epistemology in general and, to some degree,
pragmatism; further, the unity of science movement of the Vienna Circle is well known.
26
Then, interdisciplinarity would be a time-dependent phenomenon within the historical development of
sciences.
27
Schelsky (1961).
28
Hübenthal (1991).
29
See, for example: Decker (ed) (2001), Grunwald (2002).
30
In addition, there are other, more pessimistic traditions regarding ‘‘interdisciplinarity’’, such as the
philosophy of culture (‘‘Kulturphilosophie’’) that has been developed in the framework of New-
Kantianism. The latter did not really sympathize with interdisciplinarity, rather than with disciplinarity
and issues of demarcation, and highlighted the differences of various disciplines, particularly to the
humanities. In the late nineteenth century, H. Rickert, W. Dilthey, W. Windelband, and others developed
philosophical approaches to ‘‘natural and social sciences’’ or ‘‘natural sciences and humanities’’. They
referred to Kant’s classical work on the ‘‘conflict of the faculties’’—a milestone that reflect on the tension
between (traditional) disciplines. Later, in the late 1950s, C. P. Snow coined the term ‘‘The Two

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Hence, there are motives involved that I will briefly summarize. The first
motive—which determines the strong interdisciplinarity—is based on the wish to
integrate patchworks of disciplinary knowledge. The historically successful
functional differentiation within the science system seems to reveal limitations,
since the boundaries of the disciplines turned out to restrict scientific development.
Inter- and transdisciplinarity are deemed to be a way to (re-)gain and ensure
progress, to restore knowledge production, and to enable universal insight into the
object’s behavior in the real world. Traditionally, the truth was associated with the
whole.
However, we have two further motives. These motives do not share the intention
although they are structurally similar. Both emerge in the weak type of
interdisciplinarity. Second, the advocates of an economic motive regard science—
in the tradition of Francis Bacon, Adam Smith and Karl Marx—as a means for
obtaining and securing wealth, welfare, and prosperity. But, with respect to
academic sciences and disciplinarity of universities, serious deficits are obvious.
Real-world economic problems do not fit into the historically grown functional
differentiation and separation of academic disciplines. Third, the social, ethical and
problem-oriented motive is somewhat similar to the economic motive, although both
pursue different goals. Disciplinary reduction is undercomplex and, hence, cannot
cope with real-world problems because such problems are too new, complex,
wicked, hybrid, or too risky (for instance environmental/global change problems).
The foregoing is not an exhaustive list, but it at least stresses a plurality of
motives which can by no means be reduced to one core motive. Today, nearly all
those who talk about ‘‘inter- and transdisciplinarity’’ in scientific, personal, or public
debates are pursuing certain goals and motives: They do not aim to merely describe
science and/or education. Rather, they intend to change, to renew and to re-structure
science, and to shape science-based technologies and societies. Normative aspects
are always involved. In spite of (or because of) the normativity, however, an
analytical approach clarifying the meanings of ‘‘inter- and transdisciplinarity’’ is
indispensable.

3 Dimensions

The motives listed above highlight a plurality of interests involved in claiming

‘‘interdisciplinarity’’. But, such differentiation of the motives is not at all sufficient
for a philosophical analysis of (possible) semantic contents—if there are any. A

Footnote 30 continued
Cultures’’ in order to characterize different convictions, habits, and socialization of the disciplinary
scholars. For interdisciplinarians, Snow’s clear thesis was frustrating. A bridge that might overcome the
two-culture-gap seemed to be impossible. In the mid 1990s, the gap became apparent again when A.
Sokal heated the ‘‘science wars’’ by an ‘‘experiment’’ with the other culture, the social scientists. The
‘‘wars’’ also illustrate that interdisciplinarity is a serious issue that cannot be taken for granted as its
popularity might indicate. But, although the ‘‘science wars’’ might have shown problems, and even
impossibilities, of interdisciplinarity, they also have provided us with a deep reflection on science, both on
disciplinarity and interdisciplinarity, on realism and constructivism.

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content-oriented analysis should address and describe epistemological issues at their

roots. In addition to what has already been accomplished in this field,31 I will
propose a classification framework of different dimensions of interdisciplinarity. A
plurality of meanings will be shown which do not have a unifying semantic core.
Considering different approaches and positions in philosophy, there is not one, but
various types of ‘‘interdisciplinarity’’.32
My approach is systematic and will make use of what the philosophy of science
has achieved.33 The well-established distinction between objects (‘‘ontology’’),
knowledge/theories (‘‘epistemology’’), methods/practices (‘‘methodology’’), and
further, problem perception/problem solution will provide a framework for a
classification of the multi-faceted term ‘‘interdisciplinarity’’.
First: ‘‘Interdisciplinary’’ may refer to objects or entities (‘‘ontological’’
dimension). The historically established functional differentiation into disciplines
does not seem to be totally contingent. Rather, it mirrors aspects of the structure of
reality itself. Edmund Husserl, Nicolai Hartmann, Alfred North Whitehead and
others argued for a structurally layered concept of reality. Boundaries between
micro-, meso- and macrocosm seem to be evident. Interdisciplinary objects are
thought to be located or constructed within the structure of reality. They lie on the
boundaries between different micro-, meso-, macro- and other cosms or within
border zones between disciplines; for example: brain-mind objects, nano objects, or
the hole in the ozone layer. In order to argue for this position one has to presuppose
an ontological realism, or at least a real-constructivism34 concerning the objects,
interlaced with a layered concept of reality, and, based on this, an ontological non-
reductionism.35 Old and ongoing issues about ontological monism, dualism, and
pluralism emerge in this debate. ‘‘Interdisciplinarity’’ here does not mainly refer to
knowledge, methods, or problems, but to an external, human independent reality—
some weaker versions of this position do not claim a timeless (‘‘Platonist’’)
existence of ‘‘interdisciplinary’’ objects: (a) The future development of science may
shift these objects to domains of new disciplines or, similarly, it may be shown that
they belong to fields of classical, already existing disciplines. (b) Interdisciplinary
31
For example, see: Thompson Klein (1990), Thompson Klein (1996), Decker (ed) (2001), Chubin et al.
(eds) (1986), Weingart and Stehr (eds) (2000), and many others.
32
Some philosophical traditions will argue reductionistically for one basic understanding and a particular
core content, for instance an approach from the perspective of the scientific realism. But I will not
presuppose such a position (see the end of this section); rather I will look at the various approaches.
33
See, for example: Vollmer (1988). As many philosophers (in the Kantian tradition), Vollmer
distinguishes between ontology, epistemology, and methodology. See also: Hacking (1983). Hacking
reveals cognitive short cuts, argues for a special type of realism, and shows various interdependencies
between the positions.
34
The position of the realconstructivism is not fully developed in the philosophy of science, although the
‘‘new experientalism’’ has broadly argued in favor of it. This position traces back to Francis Bacon in the
early seventeenth century. Also some aspects can be found in the pragmatist tradition. Today I. Hacking,
B. Latour and S. Woolgar argue in favour of this position: Latour and Woolgar (1979), Hacking (1983),
Latour (1987). Here, a severe debate between Latour (‘‘realconstructivism’’) and the Edinburgh School of
Constructivism (‘‘social constructivism’’, David Bloor et al.) has emerged; see for instance: Bloor (1999),
Latour (1999).
35
Ontological reductionism is known as the stance stating that the world consists (totally) of atoms or
other fundamental material entities (‘‘materialism’’) or, on the contrary, of mental entities (‘‘idealism’’).

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objects might be created by the extended use of technologies (‘‘real-constructivism’’

or ‘‘materialistic constructivism’’) or cognitively constructed by sciences them-
selves (classical ‘‘cognitive constructivism’’, ‘‘idealistic constructivism’’), for
instance the hole in the ozone layer, nanobots, or some of the virtual objects
which are nowadays the objects of inquiry of the computer sciences.36
Second: The epistemological dimension focuses on knowledge, theories, and
concepts37—and not primarily on objects and reality, or on methods and practices.
Here, we ask whether interdisciplinary theories exist and how they may be specified
and identified. Can we demarcate interdisciplinary knowledge from disciplinary
knowledge and from non-scientific knowledge? Is there a unique context of
justification of interdisciplinary theories? Do interdisciplinary models, laws,
explications, descriptions and explanations exist? Possible candidates for theories
are meta-theories which can be applied to describe very different disciplinary
objects. An interdisciplinary theory highlights structural similarities between some
object properties of various disciplines. Such a theory is not reducible to a
disciplinary one—that is, interdisciplinary theories do not fit in the disciplinary
framework. An epistemological non-reductionism, with regard to disciplinary
theories, is the most compelling stance. This position doubts, however, the overall
unifying success of deductive-nomological explanations and of the the subsumption
of all phenomena under disciplinary laws.38
Third: A methodological dimension of interdisciplinarity might be identified. In
general, methodology refers more to knowledge production, to the research process,
the rule-based action of scientists, and to the languages in use. The central issue of
methodology is how (and by applying which rules) do we obtain knowledge?39 With
respect to interdisciplinarity, some of the central questions are: Do interdisciplinary
methods and actions exist? Is there a specific context of discovery within
interdisciplinary projects? Interdisciplinary methodologies are thought to be
irreducible to a disciplinary one.40 Outstanding prospects for interdisciplinary
methodologies are those that organize the transfer between disciplines or that
combine descriptive, normative and abductive methods of reasoning.
Fourth: We should add another level that focuses more on the starting points,
goals, purposes and motives of interdisciplinary research activities and on the
36
They do not exist since the beginning of the world. It might be disputed whether these objects are by
themselves ‘‘interdisciplinary’’ or, on the contrary, whether they are just perceived, described, or shaped
under an interdisciplinary perspective. Although it might be controversial whether a particular object is
evidently labeled ‘‘interdisciplinary’’—for instance, a technical object may be seen as a disciplinary
object of engineering sciences or as an interdisciplinary object, and it should not be doubted that these are
the same objects—interdisciplinary objects seem to exist at least for a certain time.
37
U. Hübenthal identifies ‘‘concept interdisciplinarity’’ as a specific type of interdisciplinarity, referring
to systems theory, cybernetics, synergetics, information theory, and others. See: Hübenthal (1991). See
for a general perspective of complexity and systems theory: Kline (1995).
38
Examples are the Hempel–Oppenheim-scheme of the covering laws model or, in opposition, a general
hermeneutics.
39
Mittelstraß (2005), Pohl and Hirsch Hadorn (2006).
40
In other branches it is clear that hermeneutics is not reducible to empirical measurement and
quantitative objectivity; empirical measurement and data analysis methodologies are not reducible to
hermeneutics.

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constitutional conditions—in other words, the problem framing and problem

perception dimension. Jürgen Habermas draws attention to the guiding interests of
the sciences and to the purposes of research processes:41 The volition to achieve a
certain knowledge and the intention to know something is the first step that precedes
both the context of discovery and the context of justification, i.e. the methods and
theories. This dimension of interdisciplinarity—sometimes called transdisciplina-
rity42—stresses the immanent teleological structure in the process of knowledge
production. However, the very first step of scientific inquiry is usually judged to be
an external contingent factor and, thus, has not attracted the attention of many
philosophers of science,43 although extended work has been done on problems
called ‘‘wicked problems’’.44 This lack of reflection turns out to be a deficit in
specifying this kind of interdisciplinarity. Reference to problems seems to be useful
in order to demarcate interdisciplinarity and disciplinarity. Interdisciplinary
problems are somewhat external to disciplines or to sciences: Such problems are
primarily societal ones which are mainly due to and defined by society, lay people,
politicians, and stakeholders.45 These problems demand a solution for the societal
prospect. Interdisciplinarity has a functional side in the future development of
scientific-technological civilization.
Not everyone will agree to all of the above mentioned dimensions of
‘‘interdisciplinarity’’. Philosophical stances and underlying convictions determine
which of the four dimensions one might consider as the most important and what
other dimensions are just viewed as inferences or mere consequences. With regard
to well-established positions in the philosophy of science, we may state in an
oversimplification: (a) Realists refer mainly to given or constructed objects of a
human-independent reality (‘‘ontological’’ dimension of interdisciplinarity). (b)
Rationalists focus primarily on knowledge, theories, and concepts, and on issues of
justification of knowledge; this orientation toward theories is shared by positivists
and some realists, e.g., the structural realists (epistemological dimension). (c)

41
Habermas (1970).
42
See f.i. the net for transdicplinarity in sciences and humanities (td-net; http://www.trans
disciplinarity.ch/.) and Jaeger and Scheringer (1998).
43
To some extend the school of methodological constructivism has tackled this question, f.i.: Janich (ed)
(1992), and see below. However, until now it is unclear what the basic criteria are to specify anything as a
‘‘problem’’. The term ‘‘problem’’ remains an unspecified label. A ‘‘philosophy of problems’’ has not been
developed until now. However, regarding ‘‘interdisciplinarity’’ a demarcation is assumed to exist.
‘‘Interdisciplinarity’’ considers that its problems are science-external, societal pressing, and policy
relevant. Obviously, sciences (= societal-external = sciences-internal) are regarded from the perspective
of society (= science-external = societal-internal). See for this issue from a sociological perspective:
Cozzens and Gieryn (eds) (1990).
44
The term ‘‘wicked problem’’ was originally coined by: Rittel and Webber (1973). See the
epistemological discussion in: Norton (2005), pp. 131ff/159ff. Particular aspects have been discussed in a
general and inspiring way by: Jaeger and Scheringer (1998), pp. 10–25; Thompson Klein (2000), pp. 3–
24.
45
Usually a distinction is presupposed between science-internal and science-external problems; this
traces back to heated debates in the philosophy of science on internalism and externalism (cp. Böhme
et al. (1974), pp. 276f).

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Methodological constructivists46 and most pragmatists (Peircianists) reflect on

methods, on actions, or on cognitive rules (methodological dimension). (d) And
instrumentalists, utilitarians and critical theorists refer to problems, to problem
perception, and how to handle and solve problems pragmatically; the impact, effect,
and outcome of knowledge is of utmost relevance (problem-oriented dimension).
Hence, different philosophical positions determine (and give substance to) the
different meanings of ‘‘interdisciplinarity’’. This again highlights the fact that
philosophy of science is indispensable for providing clarity.
Insofar as these philosophical positions do coexist, the various understandings of
‘‘interdisciplinarity’’ are not at all reducible to a single one:47 This is also evident
with regard to the debates surrounding the philosophy of science; taking the
plurality of traditions in the philosophy of science into account, an elimination of
the plurality of ‘‘interdisciplinarity’’ and a unification towards one semantic core is
not possible. Science—both disciplinary and interdisciplinary—is and will remain a
multi-faceted phenomenon. However, in order to enable communication about
‘‘interdisciplinarity’’ and to shape and promote interdisciplinary research projects,
we should be aware of the plurality of different philosophical backgrounds for any
meaningful understanding of ‘‘interdisciplinarity’’.48

4 Examples

The philosophical framework of the four dimensions can be illustrated by some

popular examples of research programs which are labeled ‘‘interdisciplinary’’.
These examples also give substance to and additional arguments in favor of the
analytical approach exemplified above.
Interdisciplinary objects (‘‘ontological’’ dimension): Nanoresearch is one of the
most prominent examples that is proclaimed to be ‘‘interdisciplinary’’.49 In 1959
nanoresearch protagonists such as Richard Feynman stressed that there are ‘‘white
and unconquered domains’’ on the ‘‘disciplinary map of sciences’’:50 There seems to
be ‘‘plenty of room at the bottom’’. Unknown (given or theoretically possible) nano-
objects are thought to exist, or at least it is thought that they can exist.51 Feynman
46
This is a well-known position in German speaking countries, one which is not adequately recognized
by the international community of philosophy of science: Lorenzen (1974), Janich (ed) (1984), Janich
(ed) (1992).
47
This depends again on the philosophical background influencing one’s stance: most pragmatists (in the
tradition of C. S. Peirce) and methodological constructivists (in the tradition of H. Dingler and P.
Lorenzen) would argue that objects, knowledge, and problems/solutions are a mere consequence of
methods. Reality is deducible from methods. They believe that methods constitute objects, knowledge
and problems/solutions. They would reduce interdisciplinarity to interdisciplinary methods.
48
This is related to the various motives mentioned in Sect. 3. Both, the economic motive and the
societal-ethical motive mainly guide problem-interdisciplinarity and to some degree method-interdisci-
plinarity; whereas the theory-motive arises mostly in theory- and in object-interdisciplinarity.
49
Roco and Bainbridge (eds) (2002); see further: Mehta (2002).
50
Feynman (2003 [1959]).
51
Nano research is based on technological advancements: the scanning tunneling microscopy (STM) and
the atomic force microscope (AFM), which stem from developments in the early 1980’s.

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Poiesis Prax (2008) 5:53–69 63

located non-disciplinary objects between the microscale of physics and the

mesoscale of chemistry and biology. Some of them are constructed by scientists
and then constitute a new reality;52 others come to existence independently before
nanotechnology emerged but they are discovered or controlled by making use of
nanotechnology. These objects are created on disciplinary boundaries or between
borders whereas the boundaries themselves mirror some deeper ‘‘ontological’’
structure of reality.53 This object-oriented interdisciplinarity has not yet been
perceived as a type of interdisciplinarity by the philosophy of science. However,
interdisciplinary objects seem to be at the core of the heterogeneous and diverse
fields of the umbrella term ‘‘nanotechnology’’, including electron-beam and ion-
beam fabrication, molecular-beam epitaxy, nanoimprint lithography, projection
electron microscopy, atom-by-atom manipulation, quantum-effect electronics,
semiconductor technology, spintronics and microelectromechanical systems. In
these cases, interdisciplinary objects are essential as a part of reality (‘‘ontological
level’’): the (constructed) nanoobjects between physics, chemistry, biology and
engineering sciences are technoscientific objects. Similarly, the objects in neuro-
sciences are located on the various boundaries of disciplines, i.e. between natural
sciences, social sciences, and humanities. Neuroscientific objects appear to be more
complex than nanotechnological objects.
Interdisciplinary knowledge, theories, and concepts (‘‘epistemological’’ dimen-
sion): ‘‘Structural sciences’’ such as complex systems theory are prominent
examples that illustrate interdisciplinary theories and interdisciplinary knowledge.
Cognitive integration and theoretical synthesis of knowledge are here the goal that
has partly been attained. Very similar to complex systems theory are theories such
as: self-organization theory, dissipative structures, synergetics, chaos theory,
nonlinear dynamics, fractal geometry, catastrophe theory, etc. Most of these
theories were established in the late 1960s and early 1970s—although some
foundational work dates back to the late nineteenth century.54 Hermann Haken, the
founder of synergetics, regards synergetics as an ‘‘interdisciplinary theory of general
interactions’’.55 Erich Jantsch views self-organization theory as a unification
approach with multidimensional ‘‘scientific and human implications’’.56 Klaus
Mainzer identifies within the complex systems theory ‘‘the basic principles of a
common systems science in the 21st century, overcoming traditional boundaries
between natural, cognitive, and social sciences, mathematics, humanities and
philosophy.’’57 In fact, this type of interdisciplinarity—which might be character-
ized as metadisciplinary theories or at least as non-disciplinary abstract conceptual
52
This situation is quite similar to that in biomedical engineering. New technoscientific objects
(‘‘hybrids’’) emerge (cp. Latour (1987)).
53
Indeed, there may an ‘‘ontological’’ boundary or a boundary zone between the microscale and the
mesoscale exist on which the given or constructed objects can be located (‘‘layered-view of
physicalism’’). The best arguments we have might be derived from physics. But it is, of course, an
open question whether this view is convincing.
54
Mainzer (1996), Schmidt (2001), Kornwachs (ed) (1984).
55
Haken (1980).
56
Jantsch (1980).
57
Mainzer (2005), pp. v.

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64 Poiesis Prax (2008) 5:53–69

knowledge or ‘‘cognitive integration’’58—is not new. Explicitly, it can be found in

work from the 1950s. The physicist and philosopher Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker
coined the term ‘‘structural sciences’’;59 as Weizsäcker writes, structural sciences
‘‘study their objects regardless of disciplinary origin and in abstraction from
disciplinary allocation’’.60 Today, a theoretical framework has been developed and
the field of application has been extended by complex systems theory—the most
prominent recent example of an interdisciplinary theory. Complex systems theory
investigates nonlinear, instable, and chaotic behavior in dynamical systems. It
describes process phenomena in time evolution, such as: pattern formation, self-
organization, critical behavior, bifurcations, phase transitions, structure breaking,
and catastrophes. It addresses old questions about the emergence of new
phenomena, about new properties, patterns, entities, and qualities. One important
lesson of complex systems theory for all sciences is the fundamental role of
instability in nature, technology and even in social processes. Thus, a kind of a
structure-based interdisciplinary unification program arises.61
Interdisciplinary methods and practices (‘‘methodological’’ dimension): Bionics/
biomimicry could be regarded as an example of an interdisciplinary method.62 The
core of the bionic (and biomimicry) methodology is the exchange between two
disciplines: biology and engineering sciences. Bionics claims to be a transfer
methodology from biology to engineering sciences, and probably—what is mostly
not admitted—vice versa.63 The central and popular idea of bionics can be
summarized as follows: ‘‘Learning from Nature’’ in order to ‘‘inspire technological
innovations’’ and to optimize artifacts and processes.64 Nature seems to provide
inventions and innovations that can be used to construct technology. The
protagonists of bionics are convinced that Nature ‘‘reaches its goals efficiently
and economically, with a minimum of available energy and resources. The
experience available in Nature can be applied to conduct technological research and
development.’’65 Interdisciplinarity in a methodological sense means to provide a
‘‘translation’’ between ‘‘Nature and technology’’. However, translations are based
on models. ‘‘Learning from Nature’’ means therefore learning from models of
Nature. What is called ‘‘Nature’’ is not a given but is constructed, as Immanuel Kant

58
Nersessian (2005). In the framework of complexity and systems theory: Kline (1995).
59
The German term for ‘‘structural sciences’’ is: ‘‘Strukturwissenschaften’’. Cp. Weizsäcker (1974), pp.
22f.; Küppers (2000), pp. 89–106.
60
Weizsäcker (1974), pp. 23. Structural sciences focus on mathematical structures. In the 1950s,
Weizsäcker had in mind conceptual approaches such as Information Theory, Cybernetics, Game Theory,
and the (biological based) General Systems Theory.
61
According to Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, structural sciences such as complex systems theory
reveal an ‘‘abstract structural unity of reality (‘Nature’)’’ (Weizsäcker (1974), pp. 23). Klaus Mainzer
shows this explicitly: Mainzer (2005). An advanced and classical structuralist approach of the philosophy
of science is provides by: Worrall (1989).
62
See, for example: Benyus (2002), Nachtigall (1994). In a slightly different way Julie Thompson Klein
speaks about ‘‘borrowing’’ with regard to methods; see: Thompson Klein (2000), pp. 3–24.
63
Maier and Zoglauer (eds) (1994), Schmidt (2002).
64
Benyus (2002).
65
Hill (1998).

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Poiesis Prax (2008) 5:53–69 65

argued: We have to be aware that Nature is perceived and cognitively constructed

from the perspective of technology; bionics constructs models of biological Nature
based on the perspective of engineering sciences. Thus, the transfer method is not a
one-way street; a robot, for example, mimics an ant, but at the same time the ant has
been investigated and described from a technological perspective. Construction and
reconstruction, intervention and representation, and in particular here: technology/
engineering science and biology are merged, at least to some degree. Bionics not
only aims to produce knowledge but to produce technical artifacts. Analogies play
an important methodological role.66 So bionics turns out to be an outstanding
paradigm of a technoscience that is based on a transfer method across the border or
trading zone between biology and engineering.67 Besides bionics, there are other
examples of interdisciplinary methodologies. Econophysics, which methodologi-
cally organizes a transfer between physics and finance/economics, is very similar to
bionics.68 Thus, we can conclude, interdisciplinary methods exist.69
Interdisciplinary problems and solutions (problem dimension): Technology
assessment (TA) and sustainability research might serve as excellent examples of
interdisciplinarity in a specific sense—that of interdisciplinarity regarding ‘‘problem
perception’’ and ‘‘problem solution’’ based on ethical considerations.70 In the late
1960s, the major reason for Erich Jantsch, at a OECD-conference, to demand
‘‘interdisciplinarity’’ was not just an internal academics but also a societal reason.
The academic university system and the research system in general are accused of
being unable to tackle and solve society’s pressing ‘‘real-world problems’’,71 e.g.,
problems in warfare with atomic, chemical, or biological weapons; environmental
problems such as global warming; the loss of biodiversity; problems of waste in
terms of both total amount and contamination; the problems of shrinking natural
resources, like energy; problems with water quality, food, and soil; and the
‘‘anthropological problems’’ of ambivalent attitude towards biomedical progress,
the dignity of humankind, death and birth, etc. These problems are sometimes called
‘‘transdisciplinarity’’ because they are not just internally academic. For the most
part, these new (‘‘transdisciplinarity’’) problems do not fit into the established
scheme of academic disciplines. The criteria that are used to distinguish inter-/
transdisciplinarity and disciplinarity are based on different sets of problems; inter-
and transdisciplinary problems will never be reducible to any disciplinary problem
or to any disciplinary framework. Transdisciplinarity—as a specific type of
interdisciplinarity—has, to put it metaphorically, problems with the problems. From
66
The transfer of bionics can be characterized as an analogy method. Analogies as instruments for
scientific discoveries and explanations are discussed by: Nersessian (2002), Nersessian and Magnani (eds)
(2002). Methodological aspects of interactions, ‘‘analogy and homology’’, ‘‘roles of analogy’’ and
‘‘metaphors’’ reflected by Cohen (1994).
67
Galison (1996).
68
Mantegna and Stanley (2000), McCauley (2004).
69
Another very convincing approach to a methodologically-based understanding of interdisciplinarity
(as a scientific practice) is given in: Hoffmann (2005).
70
See, for instance: Decker (ed) (2001), Decker (2004), Chubin et al. (eds) (1986). In more detail, for
example: Gethmann et al. (2004). For detailed information contact: http://www.transdisciplinarity.ch/.
71
Jantsch (1972), also: Jantsch (1970).

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66 Poiesis Prax (2008) 5:53–69

the disciplinary perspective the problems appear to be misty, fringed, and shadowy.
Instead of an internal orientation of the system of sciences that immunizes from
society, ‘‘societal relevant knowledge’’ with regard to the external problems is
demanded. Technology Assessment aims to obtain knowledge about the future
societal effects and side-effects of new lines of technologies in order to shape
technologies and to solve the problems as early as possible from the prospective
perspective.

5 Conclusion

It appears that a minimal philosophy of science is the prerequisite in order to

understand (and probably to promote) ‘‘interdisciplinarity’’. With regard to
established positions in the philosophy of science, different dimensions of
interdisciplinarity can be distinguished: the object dimension, the knowledge/
theory dimension, the method dimension, and the problem/solution dimension. The
four dimensions of interdisciplinarity have been illustrated by recent research fields
that claim to be ‘‘interdisciplinary’’. (a) Nanotechnology and neurosciences address
interdisciplinary objects. (b) Complex systems and chaos theory show an integrated
type of theory—a structural theory—which describes different disciplinary objects.
(c) An interdisciplinary methodology is illustrated regarding the transfer processes
in biomimicry/bionics and econophysics. (d) An understanding of interdisciplinarity
as problem perception and solving is realized in TA and sustainable research. This
type of interdisciplinarity is often called ‘‘transdisciplinarity’’.
Thus, philosophy is effectively helpful in analyzing and classifying interdisci-
plinarity. But, a philosophy of interdisciplinarity still remains a desideratum. By the
approach presented here some core elements for a philosophy of interdisciplinarity
may have been proposed.

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