Conditio Judaica 34

Studien und Quellen zur deutsch-jüdischen Literatur- und Kulturgeschichte

Herausgegeben von Hans Otto Horch

in Verbindung mit Alfred Bodenheimer, Mark H. Gelber und Jakob Hessing
Michael Mack

Anthropology as Memory
Elias Canetti's and
Franz Baermann Steiner's
Responses to the Shoah

Max Niemeyer Verlag

Tübingen 2001
Die Deutsche Bibliothek - CIP-Einheitsaufnahme

Mack, Michael:
Anthropology as Memory: Elias Canetti's and Franz Baermann Steiner's Responses to the Shoah /
Michael Mack. -Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2001
(Conditio Judaica; 34)
Zugl.: Oxford, Univ., Diss.

ISBN 3-484-65134-2 ISSN 0941-5866

© Max Niemeyer Verlag GmbH, Tübingen 2001

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Content

Acknowledgements VII

Introduction: The Holocaust, Literature, Anthropology and History 1

Part I: Elias Canetti - Anthropology as Literature 9

1 Science, Power, Literature and the Holocaust 9
1.1 The Lack of an Intellectual and a Historical Context:
The Holocaust and the Symbolic Exertion of Power 9
1.2 Canetti - A Ruler? 23
1.3 Canetti - A Scholar or a Writer? 29
2 Auto Da Fe as a Negative Poetics 32
3 Canetti's Literary Devices for the Exertion of Power 46
3.1 Canetti's Thinking in Images 46
3.2 Canetti's Use of Philosophical and Anthropological Literature . . . 60
3.3 Metamorphosis and Totemism 67
3.4 Death 74
3.5 Authority and Power 79

Part II: Franz Baermann Steiner - Anthropology and Totalitarian Terror . . . 81

4 Anthropology and the Perception of Non-Western Peoples 83
4.1 The German Background 83
4.2 The Influence of Marcel Mauss's Conceptual Approach 85
4.3 The Context of British Anthropology 88
4.4 Steiner's Relationship to British Anthropology 90
5 An Oriental Undermines Orientalism 105
5.1 Steiner's »A Comparative Study of the Forms of Slavery« and
Said's Orientalism 106
5.2 Taboo 118
5.3 Civilization 135

Part III: Style, Law and Danger 149

6 Elias Canetti's and Franz Baermann Steiner's Notion of
Literature as Scholarship 149
7 Coincidences Between Steiner's Anthropology and Poetry 157
8 Law, Myth and Danger 178
VI Content

Conclusion: Steiner's and Canetti's Contribution to Debates About

Postmodemity 191

Bibliography 205

Index 227
Acknowledgements

This study has been made possible by the assistance of many kind and helpful
individuals - more than I can possibly list: I am most grateful to John Milbank
and Catherine Pickstock for their careful and detailed supervision of this pro-
ject. I am also grateful to Jeremy Adler for his help and support. Mary Douglas
and Ritchie Robertson contributed a close and critical reading of the penulti-
mate version of this study. I thank them for all of their help and encourage-
ment. - I also thank Aleida and Jan Assmann, Gillian and John Beer, Ingrid
Belke, Rüssel A. Berman, James Bowman, Richard Pardon, Michael Fishbane,
Sander L. Oilman, Michael Hamburger, Wolf-Daniel Hartwich, Jakob Köll-
hofer, David Levin, Donald N. Levine, Francoise Meltzer, Michael Minden,
Sivan and Daniel B. Monterescu, Arno Reinfrank, Eric Santner, Oded Schlech-
ter, Jonathan Steinberg, Rudolf Siihnel, Guy G. Stroumsa, Andrew Webber,
Philip Ward, Liliane Weissberg, Harry Zohn and my parents for their generous
encouragement and help.
This book also has benefited from much institutional support: I thank the
British Academy and the Divinity School of the University of Cambridge, that
gave me a grant from the Burney trust. The German literary archive at Mar-
bach a. N. awarded me a »Marbach Stipendium«, l am most grateful to the
staff of this wonderful archive for all of their help, encouragement and hospi-
tality.
Parts of some of the chapters in this book have appeared in earlier versions
in other forums: a much earlier and shorter version of chapter 2 has appeared
in Orbis Litterarum (No. 2, 1999), some of the material in chapter 3.3, 3.4 and
3.5 in the Germanisch-romanische Monatsschrift (No. 3, 1998); an earlier
version of 5.2 appeared in the Journal of the Anthropological Society of Ox-
ford (No. 3, 1996). I thank the editors for their input and patience.
Last but not least, I am most grateful to Hans Otto Horch and his co-editors
of Conditio Judaica for all of their support and encouragement. I also thank
Kerstin Rückwald for her help preparing the book for print.
Introduction: The Holocaust, Literature, Anthropology
and History

There was a conspiracy against the sac-

redness of life. Banality is the adopted dis-
guise of a very powerful will to abolish
conscience.'

Can a literary depiction be more truthful than an historical account? This que-
stion has often been asked in relation to the representation of the Holocaust.
Geoffrey Hartman has recently argued that there is »a link between epistemol-
ogy and morality, between how we get to know what we know [...] and the
moral life we aspire to lead«.2 Hartman refers to Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi's
differentiation between Jewish historiography from the Bible up to the modern
Enlightenment after Spinoza and the modern discipline of history which
emerged from an Enlightenment critique. As Yerushalmi has shown, premod-
ern Jewish historiography passed historical knowledge on through the channels
of ritual and liturgy.3 The literary character of such transmission does, how-
ever, mean »that its poetic or legendary elements are not >fictions< in the mod-
ern sense [,..]«.4 The debate about literature, history and theology has recently
resurfaced in discussions about the concept of memory. Andreas Huyssen has
argued that the move from history to memory must not be confused with rela-
tivism and an espousal of the non-factual: »Without facts, there is no real
memory.«5 These reflections about the truth of scholarship and literature have
been anticipated by the Victorian interrelationship between literature and an-
thropology. As Gillian Beer has recently pointed out:

1
Saul Bellow: Mr. Sammler's Planet. Harmondsworth: Penguin 1972, p. 18.
2
Geoffrey Hartman: The Longest Shadow. In the Aftermath of the Holocaust. Bloom-
ington: Indiana University Press 1996 (The Helen and Martin Schwartz Lectures in
Jewish Studies; 1994), p. 102.
3
Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi: Zakhor. Jewish History and Jewish Memory. Seattle: Uni-
versity of Washington Press 1982 (The Samuel and Althea Stroum Lectures in Jew-
ish Studies), p. 40.
4
Ibid., p. 13.
5
Andreas Huyssen: Twilight Memories. Marking Time in a Culture of Amnesia. New
York: Routledge 1995, p. 256.
2 Introduction

Within the mid-Victorian period there was already an active interplay between an-
thropological writing and literature, even while anthropology was attempting to de-
termine its own independence and its own limits.6

Against this background it is not surprising that Elias Canetti (1905-1994) and
his friend Franz Baermann Steiner (1909-1952) turn away from purely literary
writing and engage in the literary-scientific discourse of social anthropology.
As I will argue throughout this essay, as a response to the Nazi genocide, both
Steiner and Canetti employ an empirical discourse in order to have the maxi-
mum ethical impact on the social behavior of their readership.
First, however, it is necessary to introduce Steiner and his relationship to
Canetti.7 Steiner was a poet and an anthropologist.8 Unfortunately, he is now
quite forgotten. Most of his work is still unpublished: his important correspon-
dence with the literary critic Rudolf Härtung, his thesis on slavery, many poems,
and twenty volumes of aphorisms on the Hebrew Bible, on civilization, psy-
chology and world literature, have been awaiting publication for forty-five
years.9 Steiner and Canetti were both born within the Habsburg empire. Child-
hood in such a multi-cultural society probably stimulated in the two writers an
interest in ethnological studies.10 Steiner as well as Canetti pursued scientific

6
Gillian Beer: Open Fields. Science in Cultural Encounters. Oxford: Clarendon Press
1996, p. 76.
7
For a more detailed account of Franz Baermann Steiner's biography see my article
»Franz Baermann Steiners Auseinandersetzung mit dem Nationalsozialismus«. In: Mit
der Ziehharmonka. Literatur, Widerstand, Exil 14 (1997), p. 17-21. There are two
short biographical monographs on Steiner without any detailed examination of his im-
portance to the work of Elias Canetti: one by Alfons Fleischli, the other by Jürgen
Serke. See: Jürgen Serke: Böhmische Dörfer. Wanderungen durch eine verlassene lite-
rarische Landschaft. Wien: Zsolnay 1987 and: Alfons Fleischli: Franz Baermann Stei-
ner. Leben und Werk. Hochdorf: Buchdruckerei Hochdorf 1970. Fleischli's examina-
tion has three parts. Part one traces Steiner's life, part two introduces the reader to
Steiner's prose-writings, and part three gives a formalistic analysis of Steiner's poetry.
Neither Fleischli nor Serke ground Steiner in modem intellectual history, nor do they
analyse Steiner's anthropology. Marcel Atze's examination has an excellent biographi-
cal account of the friendship between Steiner and Canetti. See: Ortlose Botschaft. Der
Freundeskreis H. G. Adler, Elias Canetti und Franz Baermann Steiner im englischen
Exil. Bearbeitet von Marcel Atze. Mit Beiträgen von Jeremy Adler und Gerhard
Hirschfeld. In Zusammenarbeit mit der Bibliothek für Zeitgeschichte Stuttgart. Mar-
bach a. N.: Deutsche Schillergesellschaft 1998 (Marbacher Magazin; 84). Space does
not permit an examination of H. G. Adler's important work in this book.
8
I am most grateful to Mary Douglas who gave me a lively account of Steiner's person-
ality and of his position in Oxford anthropology. Unfortunately, space does not permit
a biographical discussion of Steiner's situation in exile.
9
Steiner's Nachlaß was acquired by the Deutsche Literaturarchiv, Marbach am Neckar
in 1996.
10
Hana Arie-Gaifman emphasizes the openness of Prague intellectuals to multi-cultural
influences as follows: »Ich möchte behaupten, daß die Fremdheit oder, besser gesagt,
die Außenseiterrolle der Prager Intellektuellen nicht auf ihrer Abgeschlossenheit be-
The Holocaust, Literature, Anthropology and History 3

research in their youth (botany the former, chemistry the latter). A one year
long study of modern Arabic at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem reinforced
Steiner's interest in non-Western societies. Similarly, after World War II Ca-
netti went to Marrakesch and expressed his fascination with a non-Western
way of life in a travel account.11 In Jerusalem Steiner lived with the childhood
friend of Kafka, the Jewish philosopher Hugo Bergmann. His stay in Jerusalem
led to a break with political socialism and to a life-long affiliation with cultural
Zionism (see part II). However, it should be noted that this did not precipitate a
complete reversal of his socialist tendencies: until his death he was a member
of Poale, the socialist Zionist organization. Steiner's Zionism marks him off
from Canetti. In a reading of Canetti's interpretation of Steiner's life-long
occupation with the meaning of law, we shall see how Canetti relates himself
to his friend's loyalty to one specific religion: Judaism. As shall be discussed
in chapter 8 and throughout part II of this essay, Steiner as a Jew identified
himself with the >primitive< and the >Oriental<. This conflation is certainly
>unscholarly<; its truthfulness needs, however, to be seen against the back-
ground of Steiner's alienation from the limitless violence of a modern Western
world, as has been most shockingly perpetrated in the Nazi genocide. As I
shall make clear in the conclusion to this essay, Steiner did not idealize the
>primitive<: he simply perceived it as >safer< than the >modem<.
After his return from Jerusalem Steiner wrote his first Ph. D. thesis at the
German University in Prague on the roots of Semitic languages. As will be
discussed in chapter 4.1, he started his strictly anthropological studies in Vi-
enna before leaving for London in 1936 to do research in the British Library.
Malinowski invited him to attend his seminars at the London School of Eco-
nomics. In 1937 Steiner undertook field studies in the Carpathians. As a refu-
gee he continued with his research at Oxford, where he was supervised first by
Radcliffe-Brown and then by Evans-Pritchard. Steiner's health suffered from
the psychological and financial strains he had to endure as a refugee. His par-
ents were murdered by the Nazis, and following the German occupation of
Czechoslovakia in 1939, he received no financial support from home. At Ox-
ford he started his second doctoral thesis, which he saw as a sacrificial offering
for his survival outside the Nazi-occupied continent. In chapter 5.1, I will
discuss the topic of Steiner's thesis, namely, the comparative forms of slavery
which he composed as an anthropological response to the Holocaust. Steiner
was appointed a university lecturer on strong recommendations from his su-

ruhte, sondern eher durch die übergroße Aufgeschlossenheit den verschiedenen kultu-
rellen und ideologischen Strömungen gegenüber bedingt war.« See H. Arie-Gaifman:
Milena, Kafka und das Judentum. Wie tief wirkt die intellektuelle Toleranz? In: Ste-
phane Moses / Albrecht Schöne (Ed.): Juden in der deutschen Literatur. Ein deutsch-
israelisches Symposion. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp 1986 (Suhrkamp-Taschenbuch;
2063. Materialien), p. 257-268, p. 261.
Elias Canetti: Die Stimmen von Marrakesch. Aufzeichnungen nach einer Reise.
München: Hanser 1967 (Reihe Hanser; 1).
4 Introduction

pervisor Evans-Pritchard in 1950. Before he died in 1952 he gave lectures

respectively on the definition of labor, taboo and the work of Georg Simmel.
Until his death, Steiner went regularly to London to engage in long conver-
sations with his closest intellectual friend: Elias Canetti.12 These conversations
gave ever-new material for the aphorisms which both writers composed. But
they also had much else in common. Canetti and Steiner shared an anthropo-
logical response to the Nazi genocide. During the war, Canetti forbade himself
fictional work.13 Similarly, Steiner refused to publish his poetry until after the
war. We shall see (chapter 3.1) how Canetti employs literary devices in order
to present his scholarship in the light of >objective< factuality. In chapter 6, I
will show how Steiner develops his philosophical concerns in his poetry. In
contrast to Steiner, however, Canetti was an autodidact in the field of social
anthropology. It is against the background of their responses to the Holocaust
that both develop two respective theories of power which, as will be shown in
chapter 8, are closely linked to each other. Canetti predominantly discusses the
phenomenon of the crowd and Steiner advances a sociology of danger. Both
thinkers, as I shall argue in chapter 6, analyze violence that does not know any
limits. As Serge Moscovici has shown, the crowd epitomizes the loss of moral
inhibitions.14 John McClelland has rightly pointed out that for Canetti, it is not
so much the crowd, but the leader who is responsible for the limitless exertion
of violence:
If a leader were to emerge from the crowd, unschooled in the manners and morals of
existing elites, then there was literally no limit to what he might ask of his followers
to do, and there was certainly no limit to what his followers would be prepared to do
for him. 15

It will be shown in chapters 3.4, 3.5 and 6 that although he never mentions the
Holocaust, Canetti depicts a >univers concentrationnaire< in Crowds and Power.
In a similar manner Steiner argues for a philosophy of the limit, thus, as will be
shown throughout part II, anticipating a deconstructive concern with the limina-

12
Canetti himself draws attention to the importance of his conversation with Steiner.
See: Elias Canetti: Aufzeichnungen 1992-1993. München: Hanser 1996, p.17-24.
13
Canetti wrote aphorisms as a kind of recompense for his strictly nonfictional work
on Masse und Macht, München: Hanser 1973 (Reihe Hanser; 124/125). »Die Konzen-
tration auf ein einziges Werk, Masse und Macht, von dem ich wußte, daß es mich
vielleicht noch Jahrzehnte in Anspruch nehmen würde, und eine Art Verbot, mit
dem ich jede andere und besonders jede rein literarische Arbeit belegt hatte, erzeug-
ten einen Druck, der mit der Zeit gefahrliche Ausmaße annahm.« See: Elias Canetti:
Aufzeichnungen 1942-1985. Die Provinz des Menschen. Das Geheimherz der Uhr.
München: Hanser 1993, p. 5.
14
For an analysis of this point see: Serge Moscovici: The Age of the Crowd. A Histo-
rical Treatise on Mass Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1985.
15
John McClelland: The Place of Elias Canetti's Crowds and Power in the History of
Western Social and Political Thought. In: Thesis Eleven 45 (1996), p. 16-27, p. 20.
The Holocaust, Literature, Anthropology and History 5

lity of concepts in the work of Theodor W. Adorno and Jacques Derrida.16 How-
ever, whereas many other post-Holocaust Jewish thinkers - including Derrida -
have concentrated on a refusal of totality and celebration of >othemess<, Steiner
combines this emphasis with an equal stress on the >need< for certain collectively
acknowledged limits. In chapter 8 and in the conclusion I will show how Steiner
transcends deconstruction as - to use Drucilla Cornell's term - a philosophy of
the limit by simultaneously developing a sociology of danger, thereby mediating
between the limits of thought and a limited form of social action.
Steiner's detailed sociological work contrasts with Canetti's emphasis on the
necessity of shock. In chapters 3, 3.4, 3.5 and 6 I describe Canetti's response to
the Holocaust in Dominick LaCapra's terms of »acting out« trauma: I shall com-
pare Canetti's text (Crowds and Power) with the anthropological sources he
uses. This comparison brings to the fore Canetti's bleak depiction of humanity.
However, before I present Canetti's methodology, I show in chapter 1.3 and
chapter 2 his concern with an ethical impact on his readership, and, connected
with that, a rejection of both nihilism and positivism as is evidenced in his only
novel, Auto Da Fe. By contrast I will show that in his anthropology Steiner - in
comparison to Canetti - lays emphasis on >working through< the Holocaust, that
is to say, on overcoming the paralysis of trauma by reflecting critically on values
that might transform a damaged society. However, as I will make clear in chap-
ter 6, Canetti's depiction of humanity cannot entirely be seen in LaCapra's no-
tion of »acting out«: for through the shock of »acting out«, Canetti nonetheless
wants to bring about a >working through<. Similarly, despite the >working
through< shock and trauma are dramatized in Steiner's poetry and in his aphoris-
tic essays. Thus, as will be argued in chapter 5.3 and 7, a rigid binary opposition
between »acting out« and >working through<, though helpful for preliminary
purposes, does not do full justice to both Steiner's and Canetti's responses to the
Holocaust. The world Canetti declares to be >factual< constitutes an »acting-out«
of the shock of the Holocaust which should metamorphose his readers, by mak-
ing them actually approach a >working-through< similar to that developed by
Steiner in his anthropological project. It is a world dominated by the exertion of
power that does not open up alternatives to non-violent forms of living.
This essay is offered particularly as a contribution to the relationship be-
tween historical, theological and literary writings on the Holocaust. Steiner's
complex philosophy of the limit combined with his sociology of danger contrib-
utes to debates about both the importance of a contextualized, non-positivist
understanding of law and the necessity of a mediation between contextualizing
deconstructions of notionality, on the one hand, and context specific decisions,
16
Steiner's deconstructive critique of language needs to be seen against the back-
ground of a number of Jewish-German writers - like Karl Kraus and Ludwig Witt-
genstein - who developed a sensibility to the violence language can exert on groups
of people. For a discussion of this thematic see Leon Botstein: Judentum und Mod-
ernität. Essays zur Rolle der Juden in der deutschen und österreichischen Kultur
1848-1938. Wien: Böhlau 1991.
6 Introduction

on the other. How is this related to Holocaust studies? As will be shown through-
out this essay, recent discussions of the Holocaust emphasize a will for unlimited
transgressions of ethical norms.17 Daniel Jonah Goldhagen depicts the German
perpetrators enjoying the cruelty they inflicted upon their victims and points out
that »cold, mechanical executioners would have just killed their victims«.18 This
might indicate that anti-Semitism enables limitless cruelty by dehumanizing one
part of humanity, while a deliberate will to, and pride in, transgression reinforces
the loss of an ethical value system that has the preservation of life as its highest
priority. In this context, Steiner's work shows how a realization of the need for a
thoughtful conception of non-static, context-specific law could arise in direct
response to the Holocaust: as will shown in part III and the conclusion, Steiner
first develops his philosophy of the limit along with his sociology of danger with
reference to the limitless horrors of Nazi concentration camps in his aphoristic
essay »About the Process of Civilization« (1944).
It will be shown in part I that Canetti combines the anthropological and the
literary to a greater extent than Steiner (this is one reason why Canetti was
found wanting both from strictly >scholarly< and strictly >literary< perspec-
tives). By contrast, Steiner's theory is more complex not only in philosophical
but also in sociological terms. I therefore emphasize the literary in my discus-
sion of Canetti, and pay more attention to the theoretical issues in Steiner's
poetry than might otherwise be desirable. By this I do not mean to belittle the
aesthetic qualities of Steiner's work nor do I seek to disqualify Canetti as a
>thinker<, and, indeed, in general I would like to draw attention to the interde-
pendence between Steiner's and Canetti's aesthetics and ethics that originate in
a response to the Nazi genocide. Clearly, the most conspicuous similarity be-
tween the two writers is their emphasis on the recognition of the horrors perpe-
trated by the Nazis. Against the background of the Holocaust, hope becomes
suspicious, for it might all too easily result in complacent forgetfulness. An
unflinching confrontation with horrible facts needs to be seen in terms of his-
tory as well as theology. As Siegfried Kracauer has argued, an historical study
of facts has ethical validity on the basis of theology. The factual presentation

17
Hartman, for example, writes about a will to radical transgression as follows: »What
happened cannot be explained by an intolerance of difference, or disgust for the pa-
riah, or the need to blame and eliminate the victim. It really was violent evil rising
up against a punctilious moral knowledge and an Ahasverus-like conscience«. Hart-
man, The Longest Shadow (p. 1, note 2), p. 25.
18
Daniel J. Goldhagen: Hitler's Willing Executioners. Ordinary Germans and the Ho-
locaust. London: Abacus 1996, p. 228. As Dagmar Herzog has argued: »The undeci-
dability of the relationship between pleasure and evil - or to put it another way, the
problem of sadism - was one of the almost everywhere undertheorized but also
ubiquitously present elements of the frenetic debate about Daniel Goldhagen, Hit-
ler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust. See: D. Herzog:
Pleasure, Sex, and Politics Belong Together. Post-Holocaust Memory and the Sex-
ual Revolution in West Germany. In: Critical Inquiry 24 (1998), p. 393-^44, p. 443.
The Holocaust, Literature, Anthropology and History 1

of the Shoah must not be indifferent. Rather, it needs to be driven by compas-

sion with the victims. Kracauer develops this point as follows:
[...] the question as to the meaningfulness of technical history< would seem to be
unanswerable. There is only one single argument in its support which I believe to be
conclusive. It is a theological argument, though. According to it, the >complete as-
semblage of the smallest facts< is required for the reason that nothing should go lost.
It is as if the fact-oriented accounts breathed pity with the dead.19
This emphasis on truth, that is to say, on epistemology, is the prime motive for
Canetti's and Steiner's scientific approach to literature and their ethical treat-
ment of scholarly issues.20 Next to the wider significance of this book for dis-
cussions of Holocaust studies in relation to current theoretical and social is-
sues, it will also offer a new interpretation of Canetti's work. This is the first
detailed examination of Steiner's anthropology and philosophy and its relation
to the work of his close intellectual friend Elias Canetti.
Before giving a short account of each chapter a brief word about my metho-
dological procedure might be helpful. It will be noted that in this thesis I treat a
wide range of disciplines, authors and styles. The strangeness of this hybridiza-
tion makes sense if one takes into account that both Steiner and Canetti engage
different disciplines and adopt different voices. Canetti himself discusses this
fluidity by writing on the concept of metamorphosis. Indeed, he sees himself
more related to the everchanging contextuality of the spoken word as to the
written text: »There is something deceptive in words alone, without the lips
that uttered them. As a writer, I am still living in the age before writing, in the
age of shouts.«21 Sander L. Oilman has argued that this view of language as
context-specific and particular - rather than homogeneous and universal -
characterizes Canetti's complex post-Holocaust Jewish identity.22 In chapter 8
we will see how Canetti interprets Steiner's concern with Jewish law from the
perspective of orality, that is to say, of re interpretation rather than rewriting.
Connected with this issue of metamorphosis and interdisciplinarity is the con-
sistent attention given in this essay to the correspondences between form and

19
Siegfried Kracauer: History. The Last Things Before the Last. Completed by Paul
Oskar Kristeller with a new preface. Princeton: Wiener 1995, p. 136.
20
A similar emphasis on truth can be found in in the historical, sociological and liter-
ary work of Steiner's and Canetti's friend H. G. Adler. Space does not permit a dis-
cussion of Adler in this thesis.
21
Elias Canetti: The Human Province. Trans, by J. Neugroschel. New York: Seabury
Press 1978, p. 92. - The German original text: »Worte allein, ohne den Mund, der
sie ausgesprochen hat, haben für mich etwas Schwindelhaftes. Als Dichter lebe ich
noch in der Zeit vor der Schrift, in der Zeit der Rufe.«. Canetti, Aufzeichnungen
1942-1985 (p. 4, note 13), p. 126.
22
For an important and detailed discussion of Canetti's post-Holocaust Jewish identity
in relation to language see Sander L. Oilman: Jewish Self-Hatred. Anti-Semitism and
the Hidden Language of the Jews. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1986,
p. 325-332.
8 Introduction

content. Indeed, Steiner's and Canetti's occupation with different contextuali-

ties needs to be seen as a concern with the correlation between genre and sub-
ject matter. This fluidity of both styles and genres could be discussed in the
context of >satire< taken in its original meaning as a heterogeneous generic
style. Indeed, it will be argued in chapter 1 and chapter 3.1 that Crowds and
Power has (comparable to Auto Da Fe) satiric elements. Satire »nowadays
denotes a particular >tone< of prose«.23 However, as Catherine Pickstock, fol-
lowing Mikhail Bakhtin, has pointed out, »it referred originally to a textual
form which consisted in a diversity of genres [...]«.24 It is this polyphonic tex-
ture of genres and also disciplines which justifies both an analysis of different
styles and an interdisciplinary approach.
In chapters 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 I will discuss some major issues raised by the
secondary literature on Canetti's work; in chapter 2 I will analyze Canetti's
criticism of positivism in his only novel Auto Da Fe; and in chapters 3.2, 3.3,
3.4 and 3.5 I will examine the philosophical and anthropological sources of
Crowds and Power. A discussion of Steiner's sociological background in
chapters 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 serves as an introduction to an analysis of his
anthropological response to the Holocaust in chapters 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3. In chap-
ter 6 I will summarize my arguments about the relation between literature and
a scientific way of writing in Canetti's work and then analyze coincidences
between Steiner's anthropology and his poetry. Chapter 8 focuses on Canetti's
interpretation of his friend's relation to both Judaism and the notion of law.
The conclusion offers a short discussion of the relevance of Steiner's thought
about law for contemporary critical theory.

23
Catherine Pickstock: After Writing. On the Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy.
Oxford: Blackwell 1997, p. 213. For a further discussion of this point see Mikhail
M. Bakhtin's essay: From the Prehistory of the Novelistic Discourse. In: M. Bakhtin:
The Dialogic Imagination. Four Essays. Ed. by Michael Holquist. Trans, by Caryl
Emerson and Michael Holquist. Austin: University of Texas Press 1981 (University
of Texas Press Slavic Series; 1), p. 41-83.
24
Ibid.
Part I: Elias Canetti - Anthropology as Literature

While the German language annihilated

metaphor, turning humans into objects,
physicists turned matter into energy. The
step from language/formula to fact: deno-
tation to detonation.1

1 Science, Power, Literature and the Holocaust

1.1 The Lack of an Intellectual and a Historical Context: The Holocaust

and the Symbolic Exertion of Power

Crowds and Power is a philosophical essay. Canetti started preliminary work

on it in Vienna and Berlin from the late twenties till his emigration to Paris
(1938) and London (1939). He only embarked on the actual writing of Crowds
and Power in London. It was completed in 1959 and published in 1960. The
text has posed a great challenge to Canetti scholarship. This has recently been
noticed by R. H. Lawson: »Crowds and Power receives surprisingly little
attention from literary critics, possibly because they imagine it to be beyond
their purview.«2 The question of purview or >boundaries< is crucial in the as-
sessment of Crowds and Power, but there is also a wider issue here, namely,
the response to Canetti as such, not least the reaction to his being awarded the
Nobel Prize. Manfred Durzak has discussed the failure of German newspapers
to respond immediately to this event as representative of the general difficul-
ties critics have in dealing with Canetti, especially with Crowds and Power.3
According to Durzak, the biggest problem of Canetti criticism ensues from its
failure to locate him in an intellectual and historical context. In a similar vein
Dagmar Barnouw has argued that this location in a historical and philosophical
context is one of the most demanding tasks for future Canetti scholarship. She,
1
Anne Michaels: Fugitive Pieces. London: Bloomsbury 1997, p. 143.
2
Richard H. Lawson: Understanding Elias Canetti. Columbia: University of South Ca-
rolina Press 1991 (Understanding Modern European and Latin American Literature),
p. 54.
3
Manfred Durzak: Anmerkungen zu einer Vaterfigur der deutschen Gegenwartslitera-
tur. In: M. Durzak (Ed.): Zu Elias Canetti. Stuttgart: Klett 1983 (Literaturwissenschaft,
Gesellschaftswissenschaft; 63), p. 5-8.
10 Part I: Elias Canetti - Anthropology as Literature

too, focuses on Crowds and Power* But no book has so far appeared that
places Canetti's Crowds and Power in a context which could help to under-
stand the reasons why it was written in its highly idiosyncratic style, and, indeed,
why it was written at all (the style of Crowds and Power will be analyzed in
chapter 3.1). It is one of the aims of this essay to find just such an intellectual
and historical context for Crowds and Power in the anthropological project of
Canetti's close friend Franz Baermann Steiner.
What, precisely, makes Canetti's work so difficult to assess? It is in part a
question of genre. The various influences of Musil, Kraus and Kafka on
Canetti have not been overlooked by critics, and yet the writing of all these
three authors greatly differs from that of Canetti's magnum opus, in one crucial
respect: whereas all three writers abstain from scientific claims, Crowds and
Power is undoubtedly written as a scientific work in the sense of giving the
impression of representing objective truths. Critics have often found fault with
this, especially with Canetti's apodictic style and his totalitarian approach<
which I explain below. Indeed, Werlen and Steussloff argue that the desire to
present the totality of phenomena, so as to justify his theories empirically,
moves the author of Crowds and Power in close proximity to all those system-
atic and scientific writers whom he purports to despise.5
On the other hand, Canetti breaks with the rules of scholarly procedures: to
take one example, he does not engage in theoretical issues. We can infer from
Canetti's study of chemistry, for example, that he knows well the protocols of
scientific methods, and yet he violates some of them. This uneasy generic
status of Crowds and Power between the social sciences and literature partly
accounts for the perplexed reactions of most critics. These reactions are perhaps
understandable, since it is difficult to relate this hybridic work Crowds and
Power to any other literary-anthropological response to the Holocaust. In parti-
cular, no attention has been paid to the anthropological project that F. B. Steiner
developed in close intellectual exchange with Canetti. Comparisons with Kraus
and Musil are only of little help, if one takes into account that Kraus wrote in
the clearly defined genre of the satiric article (in the contemporary sense of the
term satire), engaging with contemporary matters, and Musil, although he open-
ed up the form of the novel to essayistic reflections, clearly defined the border-
line between theoretical discussion and pure narration.
Hermann Broch's Theory of Mass Hysteria (Massenwahntheorie) has been
the only work so far to be compared with Crowds and Power. Grounds for such

Dagmar Barnouw: Elias Canetti. Stuttgart: Metzler 1979 (Sammlung Metzler; 180),
p. 112.
Hansjakob Werlen: Ohnmächtige Hoffnung. Die Stimme des Individuums in Masse
und Macht. In: Michael Krüger (Ed.): Einladung zur Verwandlung. Essays zu Elias
Cannettis Masse und Macht. München: Hanser 1995, p. 151-162, p. 152; Axel G.
Steussloff: Autorschaft und Werk Elias Canettis. Subjekt - Sprache - Identität. Würz-
burg: Königshausen & Neumann 1994 (Epistemata. Reihe Literaturwissenschaft; 135),
p. 168.
/. Science, Power, Literature and the Holocaust 11

comparison are valid not only because the two writers study the phenomenon
of the formation of crowds, but also because both question the validity of lit-
erature as a medium in which to respond to the Holocaust.6 Critics tend to shift
sympathies towards Broch's side - depicting Canetti as a ruthless tyrant who
paradoxically criticizes the exertion of power - instead of analysing what they
both have in common. The antagonism between the various critics reflects that
between Canetti and Broch.7 In the second part of his autobiography The Play
of the Eye (Das Augenspief) Canetti indicates that there has been a strong sense
of rivalry between the two philosophers of the crowd. Canetti repeatedly pa-
tronizes Broch, claiming that the latter was a passive receiver of ideas in gen-
eral (»Broch always gave in; he only took in by giving in.«)8 and a blind fol-
lower of Sigmund Freud in particular.9 In the following I shall show that critics
have been misled by the competitive and hostile exchanges between the two
thinkers: Canetti's anxious concern to differentiate his thoughts and methods
from those of Broch should have alerted readers to similarities that these some-
times angry accentuations of difference are so desperately trying to refute.
Schmid-Bortenschlager characterizes Broch as someone who works with
scholarly methods, and who reflects on scholarly procedures, whereas Canetti
seems to be unable to think theoretically about his undertaking.10 This is true as
far as Canetti is concerned; however, it does not take into account that Broch's,
like Canetti's, notions of scholarship clash with standard notion of »value-free
6
Stieg and Kenk draw attention to Broch's and Canetti's shared doubts about the
validity of literature as a result of the Nazi genocide. Gerald Stieg / Fran9oise Kenk:
Broch und Canetti oder ist Canettis Rede auf Hermann Broch eine Kontrafaktur von
Thomas Manns Freud und die Zukunft In: Adrian Stevens / Fred Wagner (Ed.): Her-
mann Broch. Modernismus, Kulturkrise und Hitlerzeit. Innsbruck: Institut für Ger-
manistik 1994 (Innsbrucker Beiträge zur Kulturwissenschaft. Germanistische Reihe;
50), p. 149-162, p. 150.
7
Stieg and Kenk point out that Canetti speaks of an agon between Broch's and Canetti's
writing on the masses (Ibid., p. 150). Goltschnigg has drawn attention to the fact that
Canetti refused to discuss with Broch his theories about crowds and power. Dietmar
Goltschnigg: Robert Musil und Hermann Broch - (K)ein Vergleich unter besonderer
Berücksichtigung von Elias Canettis Autobiographie. In: Joseph P. Strelka / Hartmut
Steinecke (Ed.): Romanstruktur und Menschenrecht bei Hermann Broch. Bern et al.:
Lang 1990, p. 135-151.
8
»Broch gab immer nach, er nahm nur auf, indem er nachgab.« Elias Canetti: Das
Augenspiel. Lebensgeschichte 1931-1937. Ungekürzte Ausg., Frankfurt a. M.: Fi-
scher Taschenbuch Verlag 1988, p. 28. My translation.
9
Ibid., p. 231.
10
Sigrid Schmid-Bortenschlager: Der Einzelne und seine Masse. Massentheorie und
Literaturkonzeption bei Elias Canetti und Hermann Broch. In: Kurt Bartsch / Ger-
hard Melzer (Ed.): Experte der Macht - Elias Canetti. Graz: Droschl 1985, p. l -
32, p. 117-118. Ernestine Schlant, on the other hand, criticizes Broch for not hav-
ing used and discussed social scientific writings on the crowd - a criticism that has
also been served as a proof of Canetti's unscholarly methods. See E. Schlant: Die
Philosophie Hermann Brochs. Bern, München: Francke 1971, p. 112, note 5.
12 Part l: Elias Canetti - Anthropology as Literature

research«.11 It also ignores that Broch's reflections on his methods give an accu-
rate account of the style Canetti employs in Crowds and Power. Broch argues
for a scientific way of writing in which historical and sociological laws are estab-
lished that coincide in their claim to objectivity with the laws verified by the
natural sciences.12 Here, it seems, Canetti and Broch meet. Yet Canetti sets out
to vitiate this point of similarity in his autobiography. The Play of the Eye gives
an account of a conversation between Broch and Canetti in which the latter ar-
gues for the necessity of the construction of laws that depict the behavior of
crowds in a scientific manner. Broch replies in absolutely negative terms to such
an undertaking. He denies that anyone could excavate the laws that govern the
conduct of the crowd, since these laws do not exist in the first place. (»You can-
not find laws of the crowd, because they do not exist.«)13 This kind of refusal of
the existence of laws that precisely define the behavior of crowds is at odds with
Broch's own methodology in The Theory of Mass Hysteria in which - as has
been shown above - he pleads exactly for the establishment of such laws in
scientific terms. Either Canetti deliberately distorts his conversation with Broch
- thus underlining the originality of his own approach - or Broch indeed wants
to discourage his friend from a work which might pose a substantial challenge to
the hoped-for singularity of The Theory of Mass Hysteria. In the same manner
Canetti's description of Broch's concern to separate the poet's work from that of
the scholar contradicts the combination of poetry and scholarship in Broch's own
work.14 This hybridity between scholarship and a literary way of writing will be
discussed in chapters 2 and 3.1 as far as Canetti is concerned, and it will also be
central to the discussion in part III.
Another point of alleged dissimilarity between Broch and Canetti has been
noted by the critics: Broch's search for a construction of new values has been
missed in Canetti's Crowds and Power.15 It is true to say that Canetti offers no

1
' Barnouw even argues that Broch does not give any definition of his notion of > Wis-
senschaflx. Dagmar Barnouw: Massenpsychologie als Metaphysik. Zu Brochs Begriff
eines Irdisch-Absoluten. In: Musil Forum 3 (1977), p. 159-191, p. 176.
12
Broch discusses his claims to objectivity in the Massenwahntheorie. See H. Broch:
Kommentierte Werkausgabe. Hg. von Peter Michael Lützeler. Bd 12: Massenwahn-
theorie. Beiträge zu einer Psychologie der Politik. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp 1979,
p. 101-111.
13
»Sie können keine Gesetze für die Masse finden, weil es keine gibt.« Canetti, Das
Augenspiel (p. 11, note 8), p. 43. My translation.
14
In Canetti's account Broch says the following: »Sie sind ein Dichter. Sie können
sich nicht einer Wissenschaft widmen, die keine ist und nie eine sein wird.« Ibid.
15
Strelka misses such an attempt in Masse und Macht. See Joseph P. Strelka: Hermann
Brochs Modell einer umfassenden Massenpsychologie. In: Strelka / Steinecke (Ed.),
Romanstruktur und Menschenrecht bei Hermann Broch (p. 11, note 7), p. 57-69, p. 62.
Horst denies that Masse und Macht can have an ethical impact and he argues that
Broch's Massenwahntheorie influences the ethical reflections of its readers by offering
alternatives to a world in which the Holocaust could be enacted. See Karl August
Horst: Stereoskopie des Massenphänomens. In: Merkur 15 (1961), p. 491^496, p. 496.
/. Science, Power; Literature and the Holocaust 13

ethical alternatives to the Nazi genocide. Yet it is not Canetti's wish to affirm
such a world; rather - as I will show in chapter 3.1 - he wants to shock his read-
ers into a change of social behavior through a depiction of humanity as ruled by
death. Broch speaks of the redemptive capacity of research (»Forschungsarbeit
mit Heiltendenzen«),16 and Canetti - albeit by different methods - also tries to
free the reader from a damaged life. Both are convinced that scholarship - usu-
ally the preserve of scholars - is unable to do anything against the barbarity of
National Socialism. Pure imaginative texts, on the other hand, do not purport to
carry the authority of objective truth which one would associate with scholar-
ship. Fiction, according to received assumption, is a form of lying; it is true only
in a literary, figurative sense, whereas scholarship purports to represent factual
truth. This claim to facticity has a greater impact on the readership: it has the
power to change the ethical behavior of the >common readen. Having this po-
wer, Broch argues, scholarship should force values upon the reader, rather than
being value-free. This is what he means by »Forschungsarbeit mit Heiltenden-
zen«. Scholarship has to become a propaganda-machine for spiritual and democ-
ratic forms of life as a counter-attack to the pagan totalitarianism of the Nazis.17
In a highly individual way, a none the less related approach is taken by
Canetti. Though he does not state it in Crowds and Power, his aphorisms give
a clear indication that he conceives of a scholarly work which transcends the
boundaries of pure scholarship in that it aims at having an immediate impact
on the social behavior of its readership. Indeed, Canetti's idea of a new type of
scholarship that serves the ethical improvement of the public is close to
Broch's notion of the social sciences as laid down in his Theory of Mass Hy-
steria. Like Broch, Canetti criticizes scholarship for scholarship's sake:
Science betrayed itself by becoming an end in itself. It has turned into a religion,
the religion of killing, and it wants to make us believe that the step from the tradi-
tional religions of dying to this religion of killing is progress. We will soon have
to put science under the control of a higher drive, that demotes it to a servant
without destroying it. 18

Weigel accuses Canetti of resignation and an acceptance of violence. See Robert Wei-
gel: Elias Canettis Masse und Macht und Hermann Brochs Massenwahntheorie. Be-
rührungspunkte und Unterschiede. In: Joseph P. Strelka / Zsuzsa Szell (Ed.): 1st die
Wahrheit ein Meer von Grashalmen? Zum Werk Elias Canettis. Bern et al.: Lang
1993, p. 121-145.
16
Broch, Massenwahntheorie (p. 12, note 12), p. 35.
17
This refutation of a positivist notion will be discussed in chapter 2 and in part II.
18
Canetti, The Human Province (p. 7, note 21), p. 21. The German original text: »Die
Wissenschaft hat sich verraten, indem sie sich zum Selbstzweck gemacht hat. Sie ist
zur Religion geworden, zur Religion des Tötens, und sie will weismachen, daß von
traditionellen Religionen des Sterbens zu dieser Religion des Tötens ein Fortschritt
ist. Man wird die Wissenschaft sehr bald unter die Herrschaft eines höheren An-
triebs bringen müssen, der sie zur Dienerin herabdrückt, ohne sie zu zerstören«. Ca-
netti, Aufzeichnungen 1942-1985 (p. 4, note 13), p. 36.
14 Part I: Ellas Canetti - Anthropology as Literature

Canetti questions scholarship as secular religion, arguing that power uses death
as its servant. Scholarship which exerts power in its quest for scientific progress,
becomes a religion of death. From Canetti's perspective, it is cut off from any
social-ethical issues, and often serves the interests of those who are in power
without regard for those who have to suffer from the phantasies of rulers which
>value-free< scientific expertise helps to enact. This kind of scholarship enjoys
the worship of those who want a >scientific< justification of and instruction to
murder. According to Canetti, scholarship as an end in itself is a religion which
sacrifices life to death, the quantitative instrument of power. In this sacrifice,
secular power and secular knowledge triumph as quasi-supernatural, superhu-
man forces.19 Instead, scholarship should feature as a servant for ethical aims.
It has to address not only a scholarly audience, but also the >common reader< in
order to have an ethical impact on public life. Literary qualities (a narrative
way of argumentation, immediacy etc.) make scholarship more appealing to a
broader readership. Canetti wrote this aphorism in 1943, at a time, therefore,
when details about the Holocaust seeped through to the German and English
population.20 In this context the strong word »betray« (»verraten«) becomes
understandable: according to Canetti, standard science betrays its deadly ag-
gression in the Nazi genocide.21 Indeed, the Nazis called the inferiority of the
Semitic and Slavic races a »scientific fact«.22 German science and German
scholarship worked out a scientific theory that should prove the factual neces-
sity for eliminating the world's Jewry. For Canetti, this undoubtedly represents
science's betrayal. It is highly interesting that he makes no differentiation
between >racial science< and >value-free< research. Canetti does not perceive of
science as value-free in any respect, which is why he calls it a religion of kill-
ing; whereas the non-secular religions of dying cheat death by establishing
myths of reincarnation, the modern, scientific religion works into the hands of
death, facilitating, and propagating effective ways of killing. Yet the word
19
John Milbank affirms Canetti's critique of positivism as follows: »[...] we see the
bizarre character of positivism - to explain and replace religion it must itself become
religion. Supremely, it must be a programme of sacrifice [...].« J. Milbank: Stories of
Sacrifice. From Wellhausen to Girard. In: Theory, Culture & Society 12 (1995),
p. 15^6, p. 27.
20
Kaplan has shown that by 1942 reports about concentration camps filtered through
to the Allies. See Harold Kaplan: Conscience and Memory. Meditations in a Mu-
seum of the Holocaust. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1994.
21
Biagioli discusses the involvement of modern scientific methods in the experimenta-
tion on and murder of the victims in Nazi concentration camps. See Mario Biagioli:
Science, Modernity, and the Final Solution. In: Saul Friedlander (Ed.): Probing the
Limits of Representation. Nazism and the >Final Solutiom. Cambridge/Mass.: Har-
vard University Press 1992. Kaplan calls science the Nazis' »firm and consistent au-
thority for dealing with death«. Kaplan, Conscience and Memory (last note), p. 65.
22
Sander Oilman has drawn attention to racist strands within late nineteenth-century
and early twentieth-century medicine. For a discussion of this point see Sander L.
Gilman: The Jew's Body. New York, London: Routledge 1991.
/. Science, Power, Literature and the Holocaust 15

»Selbstzweck« (»an end in itself«) implies that science is >value-free< and

>innocent<. Canetti, however, argues that the very nature of being an end in it-
self, turns science into a fetish, into an idol, into a religion. According to Ca-
netti, science which is an end in itself needs to be supervised by an ethical
impulse that moves toward the overcoming of death. Science and scholarship
should thus become servants of ethics, they should promote the salvation of
life (Broch's »Heiltendenzen«), rather than facilitate its destruction. This su-
pervision of science should not destroy (»zerstören«) scientific procedures as
such, but these methods of elucidation are to be employed as a means of per-
suading the public to behave in a way that saves them from destruction.
Canetti based his identity as a scholar on this definition of a non-positivist
kind of science. His ethical project consists in advising his readers not to be-
lieve in death. In this way Canetti embodies a highly idiosyncratic religiosity
that he perceives to be a social reality in almost all world religions. In an inter-
view with Ruprecht Salvko Baur, Canetti calls the study of religions as far as
their relation to death is concerned, his passionate pursuit (»leidenschaftliches
Interesse«).23 Canetti characterizes fascist politicians by the wish for the death
of a multitude of people.24 Any acceptance of death opens the door to totalitar-
ian power. Canetti's religiosity occupies a position between disbelief and out-
rage grounded in belief: he disbelieves the necessity of death; his outrage at
death originates in a belief that transcends the socially and biologically given.
This position between disbelief and a radicalism deeply rooted in belief
needs to be seen against the background of the Holocaust.25 At first glance,
Canetti gives only a few indications of his non-secular response to the Holo-
caust in Crowds and Power. However, in this book he employs a - what John
Milbank has called - »ontology of violence« only to make the readers realize
how much violence, how much death they accept in their daily life. In Mil-
bank's words an »ontology of violence« gives »a reading of the world which
23
Ruprecht Slavko Baur: Gespräch mit Elias Canetti. In: Literatur und Kritik 65 (1972),
p. 272-279, p. 277.
24
Ibid.
25
Strolz refers to Canetti's hatred of death in the context of the murder of European
Jewry. See Walter Strolz: Sinnfragen nichtglaubender Juden. In: Frankfurter Hefte 3
(1979), p. 25-34, p. 29. Hädecke argues that Canetti's hatred of death presupposes be-
lief, and is in the final analysis nothing else but religious belief. See Wolfgang Hädek-
ke: Der alte und der neue Überlebende. In: Literatur und Kritik 123 (1978), p. 153-
158, p. 154. Similarly, Fiel sees Canetti as a theologian, whose belief rests on his refti-
sal to believe in death. See Edgar Fiel: Im Gehäuse der Hörigkeit läßt sich nicht leben.
Canettis Masse und Macht. Wissenschaft oder Mythos. In: John Pattillo-Hess (Ed.):
Canettis Masse und Macht oder die Aufgabe des gegenwärtigen Denkens. Referate ge-
halten auf dem 1. Internationalen kulturanthropologisch-philosophischen Canetti-
Symposion, 24. bis 26. April 1987. Wien: Bundesverlag 1988, p. 52-65, p. 52. Signifi-
cantly, Canetti dedicated a first edition of Crowds and Power to the Holocaust survivor
H. G. Adler as follows: »To H. G. Adler who lived what I only thought [...].« Quoted
from Atze, Ortlose Botschaft (p. 7, note 7), p. 119.
16 Part I: Elias Canetti -Anthropology as Literature

assumes the priority of force and tells how this force is best managed and con-
fined by counterforce«.26 In Crowds and Power Canetti reads human history
and human biology in terms of violence. He does not, however, tell the reader
»how this force is best managed and confined by counterforce«; rather his
exclusively brutal depiction of humanity evokes disgust with all forms of vio-
lence. Thus Canetti implies an »ontology of violence« in an entirely ironic
manner. Critics have not analyzed Canetti's ethical aims behind his shocking
presentation of humanity, since they have failed to focus on the historical con-
text in which Crowds and Power was written: the Holocaust, and the obliga-
tion which Canetti and his friend Steiner felt to respond to it in manner that
works for a change in the social behavior of their readership.27
As a result of Canetti's ironic use of an »ontology of violence«, Crowds and
Power oscillates in a tension between secular and non-secular discourses. It of-
fers no practical alternatives to the brutality it describes in an upsetting manner.
However, the theme of survival and death in Canetti derives from theological
reflections.28 By applying these highly religious notions to the sphere of secular
power, of the human triumph in survival, rather than to their bond to a non-
secular form of the transcendence of death, Canetti clearly evokes a theological
context for his thought ex negativo. Similarly, the way in which Canetti refuses
to differentiate between a mythical and non-mythical reality moves him into
close proximity to religious discourse. It is against this background that Adomo
criticizes Canetti for treating the social perception of mass phenomena (»Mas-
26
John Milbank: Theology and Social Theory Beyond Secular Reason. Oxford: Blackwell
1990, p. 4.
27
As a result of the neglect of Canetti's project as a response to the Holocaust, critics have
accused the writer of Masse und Macht of resignation. Marti misses any form of hope in
Masse und Macht. See Urs Marti: Canettis Begriff der Macht im Lichte der Auffassung
von Hannah Arendt und Michel Foucault. In: John Pattillo-Hess (Ed.): Verwandlungsver-
bote und Befreiungsversuche in Canettis Masse und Macht. Referate auf dem 3. Interna-
tionalen kulturanthropologisch-philosophischen Canetti-Symposion, im Volksbildungs-
haus Wiener Urania in der Zeit vom 3. bis 6. Mai 1990. Wien: Locker 1991, p. 86-94.
Stieg is one of the few critics, who argue that Masse und Macht serves the recognition
of truth (Erkenntnisinstrument) and that this attempt at recognition also constitutes the
blue-print for a modem ethics. Gerald Stieg: Masse und Macht - Das Werk eines >ver-
wilderten Gelehrtem. In: Pattillo-Hess, Venvandlungsverbote und Befreiungsversuche
in Canettis Masse und Macht (above), p. 95-102. However, he does not develop this the-
sis and neglects to show how Canetti's shock-therapy works. Petra Kuhnau criticises
Stieg for not analysing Masse und Macht as a blue-print for a modem ethics. While her
criticism is valid, she herself falls into the trap of simplistically denying Canetti any
ethical agenda. See Petra Kuhnau: Masse und Macht in der Geschichte. Zur Konzepti-
on anthropologischer Konstanten in Elias Canettis Werk Masse und Macht. Würzburg:
Königshausen & Neumann 1996 (Epistemata. Reihe Literaturwissenschaft; 195).
28
Holz has argued that Masse und Macht seems to be a sociological study, but that its
essential theme - death and survival - constitutes a religious work. See Hans Heinz
Holz: Elias Canettis Masse und Macht als religionsphilosophischer Entwurf. In:
Text + Kritik 28 (1982), p. 10-26, p. 11.
/. Science, Power, Literature and the Holocaust 17

sensymbole«) at the same level as the actual appearances of mass-formations. He

notes that Canetti takes the images of crowds and power (»Imagines von Masse
und Macht«) just as seriously as their factual social expressions.29 While Ador-
no's critique is valid from a purely empirical view, he does not take into account
the way in which the Holocaust demonstrates that imagined horrors have indeed
been translated into reality: the Nazi genocide realized the tortures that so far had
only been imagined in works of art and literature. Geoffrey Hartman has pointed
out that the Holocaust defictionalized fictions of unbearable suffering:
The artistic purpose, which cannot for once be distinguished from the historical, is
that reality has displaced fantasy; and this fact, at once terrible and incredible, means
that myth and fiction may now have to be devalued to playthings, discarded in the
light of their grim fulfillment. 30

After the Holocaust, it seems, fictions of violence, power and mass-formation

have to be taken as seriously as their realization. Canetti's method of treating the
imagined realm as if it were a reality moves him into theological disciplines.
The theological nature of this fusion is implicitly acknowledged by Canetti
himself, who discusses religious issues in his response to the Holocaust (see
chapter 3.3 and 3.4). He made it clear in an interview with Horst Bienek that
he wrote Crowds and Power as an attack on fascism:31
During this time, after all, my main work was an examination of the roots of fas-
cism. This was the aim of Crowds and Power. I forbade myself any form of literary
work in order to comprehend what had happened, not only as a phenomenon of the
time, but in its deepest origins and ramifications.32
29
Gespräch mit Theodor W. Adorno. In: Elias Canetti (Ed.): Die gespaltene Zukunft.
Aufsätze und Gespräche. München: Hanser 1972 (Reihe Hanser; 111), p. 66-93, p. 69.
30
Geoffrey Hartman: The Book of Destruction. In: Friedlander, Probing the Limits of
Representation (p. 14, note 21), p. 318-334, p. 333. For a discussion of how »brute
fact outfaced imagination«, see John Felstiner: Translating Paul Celan's >Todes-
fuge<. In: ibid., p. 240-254, p. 245.
31
Recently, Roberts has drawn attention to the interrelation between the phenomenon of
totalitarian terror and the writing of Masse und Macht. See David Roberts: Crowds and
Power or the Natural History of Modernity. Horkheimer, Adorno, Canetti, Arendt. In:
Thesis Eleven 45 (1996), p. 39-68. Fetscher's main interest in Masse und Macht is its
potential explanation of National Socialism. See Iring Fetscher: Masse und Macht und
die Erklärung totalitärer Gesellschaften. In: Pattillo-Hess, Verwandlungsverbote und
Befreiungsversuche in Canettis Masse und Macht (p. 16, note 27), p. 9-20. Schuh calls
National socialism the »Subgeschichte« of Masse und Macht. See Franz Schuh: Über-
legungen zur >Anwendbarkeit< von Masse und Macht. In: Wespennest 68 (1987),
p. 46-52, p. 50. Kaszynski has referred to Hitler's will to power as a desire to control
crowds. See Stefan Kaszynski: Canetti und Hitler. In: Adrian Stevens / Fred Wagner
(Ed.): Elias Canetti. Londoner Symposium. Stuttgart: Akademischer Verlag Hans-Die-
ter Heinz 1991 (Stuttgarter Arbeiten zur Germanistik; 245), p. 148-157, p. 151.
32
»Meine Hauptarbeit in dieser Zeit war doch die Untersuchung der Wurzeln des Faschis-
mus, das war der Sinn von Masse und Macht. Um zu begreifen was geschehen war,
und zwar nicht bloß als Phänomen der Zeit, sondern in seinen tiefsten Ursprüngen und
18 Part I: Elias Canetti - Anthropology as Literature

Canetti does not want to give an account of fascism as a phenomenon of the twen-
tieth century, as this would only explain how fascism fits into the historical context
of its time. Rather than relativizing fascism by saying that it could have happened
only at the time at which it happened, Canetti shows that its roots lie in certain
forms of human behavior of the past as well as of the present. This means he must
give an account of fascism as something which still lives with us, which indeed
forms part of our daily life. The »Verzweigungen« of which Canetti speaks are the
ramifications of fascism as presented in the skyscrapers that dominate the image of
a modern city; they are our food-habits, and the habits which occupy our body-
language, signifying aggression, but they are also the ramifications which reach
deep into the past, into fascism's deepest origins (»tiefste Ursprünge«), as can best
be seen in accounts of primitive cultures. The brutality of these monolithic societies
still exerts its influence on contemporary society, as is clearly exemplified by fasci-
sm. The only difference between modern fascism and ancient violence consists in
the advanced technological expertise that helps to make this brutality more lethal.
By presenting fascist behavior as something which is still with us, Canetti
wants to shock the reader, and in order to shock the reader he needs to present
a world that is factual, and he achieves this by appeal to empirical scientific
research. The facticity of Crowds and Power aims to invoke the verisimilitude
of a documentary film. There are indeed many similarities between the aims of
Canetti's Crowds and Power and those of Lanzmann's film Shoah: as for
Lanzmann, so also for Canetti, the trauma of the Nazi genocide can never be
>history<, can never be a thing of the past, instead - and this is the reason for
his >ahistorical< approach - the trauma has always to be present; like Lanz-
mann, Canetti wants to have nothing to do with >fiction<. 33 The Holocaust and
its ethical implications force Canetti, Broch and Steiner, to abstain from exclu-
sively writing fiction, since fiction has not the authority of truth that can in-
deed shock the reader into a radical change of behavior.34

Verzweigungen hatte ich mir jede literarische Arbeit verboten«. See: Elias Canetti. Horst
Bienek. »Die Wirklichkeit wie mit einem Scheinwerfer von außen her ableuchten«.
Ein Gespräch. In: Durzak, Zu Elias Canetti (p. 9, note 3), p. 9-16. My translation.
33
For a discussion of how the »acting-out« of trauma abolishes the barrier between art
and life see Dominick LaCapra: Lanzmann's Shoah. »Here there is no why«. In:
Critical Inquiry 23 (1997), p. 231-269, p. 266. For a discussion of how Shoah depicts
the present rather than the past, see Soshana Felman: Film as Witness. Claude Lanz-
mann's Shoah. In: Geoffrey H. Hartman (Ed.): Holocaust Remembrance. The Shapes
of Memory. Oxford: Blackwell 1994, p. 90-103.
34
Broch alludes to Canetti's shock techniques in relation to Die Blendung as follows:
»[...] indem er [Canetti] seine Gestalten und damit den Leser in die Angst des Irrsinns
jagt, will er jene tiefste Zerknirschung erreichen [...].« Hermann Broch: Kommentierte
Werkausgabe. Hg. von Peter Michael Lützeler. Bd 9/1: Schriften zur Literatur l.
Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp 1975, p. 61. In his review of Masse und Macht Härtung
hopes that a follow-up to the book might offer the reader some hope, which the present
version lacks. Rudolf Härtung: Hinweis auf Elias Canetti (1960). In: R. Härtung: Elias
Canetti. Ein Rezipient und sein Autor. Hg. von Bernhard Albers Aachen: Rimbaud
I . Science, Power, Literature and the Holocaust 19

Canetti reflects on these ethical agenda which lie behind the scholarly under-
taking in his aphorisms. Scholarship offers a means of gaining knowledge which
yields the possibility of improving the reader's ethical behavior. As he writes in
The Human Province, knowledge is the prerequisite for human betterment:
To become better can only mean that one knows better. It must, however, be a know-
ledge that gives one no peace, a driving knowledge. A knowledge that relaxes is dead-
ly. It is very important to reject certain knowledge. One has to be able to await the mo-
ment in which knowledge becomes a goad: every inkling its own pain.35

Here we encounter the opposite of resignation, here we find a writer who wishes to
employ knowledge as a means for unsettling humanity.36 Canetti, it should be
recalled, is a moralist, and, as such, he, like Pope and Swift before him, employs a
satirical style of writing (in the contemporary sense of that term) with the aim of
shocking the reader, to precipitate recognition of truth. As a consequence, Canetti
emphasizes appalling aspects of everyday-life, aspects on which we prefer not to
dwell, and he does so in order to make his readership change in their perception of
reality and then in their behavior. Canetti sometimes uses such satirical techniques
in order to present knowledge in a way that makes the reader restless, and here we
reach a point at which literature and scholarship meet. Although Canetti is ex-
tremely learned and scholarly, he does not write for scholars only, but for the pub-
lic as such. He wants to evoke certain reactions in the public, and he could not
achieve this, if he only communicated knowledge; rather this communication of
knowledge has to tease the reader; it needs to be a kind of knowledge that causes
insomnia (»das einem keine Ruhe gibt«), it needs to be presented in a way that forces
the reader out of all complacency; it needs to be a kind of knowledge that under-
mines all forms of established truths; it needs to question radically the status quo.
However, knowledge alone does not suffice to make the reader challenge com-
monly accepted creeds: through its literary presentation knowledge has to work

1992, p. 29-34. Susan Sontag has spoken of Canetti as »registering shocks«. See
S. Sonntag: Mind as Passion. In: Michael Hulse (Trans.): Essays in Honor of Elias
Canetti. London: Deutsch 1987, p. 88-107. Georgiev has argued that the shocking ob-
ject of description has a transformative impact on the subject of the reader. See Palmen
Georgiev: Elias Canettis Werk Masse und Macht. Eine Reflexion des Humanismus
und der Philosophischen Intuition. In: John Pattillo-Hess, Canettis Masse und Macht
oder die Aufgabe des gegenwärtigen Denkens (p. 15, note 25), p. 132-141, p. 133.
35
Canetti, The Human Province (p. 7, note 21), p. 263. The German original text: »Bes-
ser werden kann nur heißen, daß man's besser weiß. Es muß aber ein Wissen sein, das
einem keine Ruhe gibt, ein hetzendes Wissen. Ein Wissen, das beruhigt, ist tödlich. Es
ist wichtig, daß man manches Wissen ablehnt. Man muß den Augenblick abwarten
können, in dem ein Wissen zum Stachel wird: jede Ahnung ihr eigener Schmerz.« Ca-
netti, Aufzeichnungen 1942-1985 (p. 4, note 13), p. 344.
36
Menke has rightly argued that for Canetti recognition itself is a form of practice which
is able to change what it recognises: the reality perceived in Masse und Macht. For dis-
cussion of this point see Christoph Menke: Die Kunst des Fallens. Canettis Politik der
Erkenntnis. In: Krüger, Einladung zur Verwandlung (p. 10, note 5), p. 38-67.
20 Part I: Elias Canetti - Anthropology as Literature

as a sting (»in dem Wissen zum Stachel wird«). This sting of knowledge invokes
that of death, which it opposes. What we encounter here is a modern version of
Enlightenment that does not generate hope in human betterment. Instead, it shows
what a dangerous path mankind is following, and in so doing, tries to make the
reader create alternatives, hopeful prospects of a world that can avoid catastrophe.
In chapter 2,1 shall show how Canetti's novel Auto Da Fe should be read as a cri-
tique of a kind of Enlightenment that has turned into positivism, thus invalidating
an ethical agenda. Whereas eighteenth-century Enlightenment set great store by
the intrinsic goodness of man, Canetti's twentieth-century version of Enlighten-
ment tries to better humanity by presenting such a bleak view of human matters
that the reader is persuaded both to generate his or her hopes, and, consequently,
to abandon established ways of behavior. In order to achieve such a bleak, ut-
terly enervating view of past and present societies, Canetti needs to be selective,
he needs to reject knowledge of communities that inspires hope: »Es ist wichtig,
daß man manches Wissen ablehnt.« That there is enough hopeful material in the
anthropological writing to which Canetti refers, I shall demonstrate in chapter 3.1.
Canetti deliberately neglects these hopeful aspects in the anthropological litera-
ture he uses, and this radical neglect is part of a satirical manner of writing that
seeks to turn knowledge into a sting: he dwells on the hopeless, so that the reader
generates his own hopes, giving him the impetus to change society.
Besides knowledge and its literary presentation, Canetti develops other strate-
gies in developing the unique genre of his work. Defamiliarization is one such
upon which I shall dwell while talking about Crowds and Power's style in chap-
ter 3.1. Here it might be useful to mention what Clifford Geertz says of Ruth Be-
nedict, as this shows how an anthropologist may sometimes be understood as a sa-
tirist. Geertz, in fact, compares Benedict to Swift, and he remarks on the rhetorical
strategy of defamiliarization, which is common to the two writers. He mentions:
[...] the juxtaposition of the all-too-familiar and the wildly exotic in such a way that
they change places. In her work as in Swift's (and that of others who have worked in
this tradition - Montesquieu, Veblen, Erving Goffman, and a fair number of novel-
ists), the culturally at hand is made odd and arbitrary, the culturally distant, logical
and straightforward. This strategy of portraying the alien as the familiar with the
signs changed is most often referred to as satire.37
Satire thus gives a one-sided as well as a topsy-turvy view of the world with
which we seem to be familiar; from this perspective, it is no wonder that a socio-
logist like Axel Honneth is unable to understand why Canetti pays no attention
both to the civilizing progress in history and to man's moral feelings.38 If he had
done so, the satirical force of Crowds and Power would have been lost.

37
Clifford Geertz: Works and Lives. The Anthropologist as Author. Cambridge: Polity
1988, p. 106-107.
38
See Axel Honneth: Die unendliche Perpetuierung des Naturzustandes. Zum theoreti-
schen Erkenntnisgehalt von Canettis Masse und Macht. In: Krüger, Einladung zur
Verwandlung (penultimate note), p. 105-127.
/. Science, Power, Literature and the Holocaust 21

This implies that one should be careful not to take Crowds and Power at
face-value.39 Critics often take Crowds and Power at face-value and accuse its
satirist of cynicism. The opposite is the case, especially if one notes an apho-
rism from The Secret of the Clock. Here Canetti reflects on the presentation, on
»die Form« of Crowds and Power: »The form of Crowds and Power will be its
strength. With a sequel you had ruined the book through your hopes. As it is
now, you are forcing the readers to seek their own hope.«40 With »die Form«
Canetti may also be referring to the satirical style in which Crowds and Power
is sometimes written. More generally, »form« here denotes the shocking repre-
sentation of anthropological material in Crowds and Power that has to be seen
in the context of a response to the Holocaust. Not a Canetti critic, but a Holo-
caust scholar has noticed that Crowds and Power depicts a univers concentra-
iionnaire: Harald Kaplan is the first to point out that »Crowds and Power
might have been written based on actual Holocaust experiences«.41
Canetti's response to the Holocaust can be described in Dominick LaCapra's
Freudian terms of »acting-out« and »working-through«.42 »Acting-out« denotes
the passive re-enlivening of a past experience of shock, the process of being pas-
sively taken in by trauma, whereas »working-through« implies the ability of gain-
ing a position from which critical examination is possible. »Working-through«
also entails thought about values whose lack in the present state of society needs to
be recognized.43 »Acting-out« traumatic events demonstrates that such values do
not exist, but it gives no indication as to how traumatic experiences could be pre-
vented. Whereas Steiner could be said to concentrate on »working-through« in
his anthropological writings, it might be said that Canetti lays emphasis on »act-
ing-out« in Crowds and Power. As will be discussed in part II, Steiner's »work-
ing-through« mainly consists in offering alternative models of social behavior
that are diametrically opposed to practices in the modem Western world. Canetti,
on the other hand, exclusively discusses »primitive« societies in terms of the
brutality found in »modernity«. Whereas Canetti - in a way that reminds one of
Steiner's anthropological project - plays off the »primitive« against the »mod-
em« in his interviews, essays and aphorisms, in Crowds and Power, as will be
39
If one does so, suicide would probably be the best way to transcend the horrible
everyday realities which Canetti describes. Similarly, if one takes Swift's A Modest
Proposal at face-value, one might end up eating underfed children.
40
»Es wird die Form von Masse und Macht noch zu seiner Stärke werden. Mit der
Fortsetzung hättest du dieses Buch durch deine Hoffnungen zerstört. So wie es jetzt
ist, zwingst du die Leser dazu, ihre Hoffnungen zu suchen.« Canetti, Aufzeichnun-
gen 1942-1985 (p. 4, note 13), p. 495. My translation.
41
Kaplan, Conscience and Memory (p. 14, note 20), p. 107.
42
It should be noted that LaCapra does not apply these terms to Canetti.
43
LaCapra describes this process as follows: »[...] working-through requires acknow-
ledging the problem of values and norms and recognizing their distinction from em-
pirical reality, which they do not redeem or transfigure but which they enable one to
evaluate and possibly to transform«. See Dominick LaCapra: Representing the Ho-
locaust. History, Theory, Trauma. Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1994, p. 201.
22 Part I: Elias Canetti - Anthropology as Literature

shown in chapter 3.4, he makes no distinction between past and present. What
LaCapra has written concerning Claude Lanzmann's Shoah holds true also for
Canetti's Crowds and Power. »Trauma becomes a universal hole in Being or an
unnamable Thing, and history is marginalized in the interest of History as trauma
indiscriminately writ large.«44 By means of shock-techniques Canetti drives the
reader into a traumatic situation in which he or she is confronted with the brutal-
ity of humanity. As the aphorism quoted above shows, Canetti knows that »act-
ing-out« cannot suffice. However, he clearly believes that the »working-through«
should be done by the reader. Thus, Canetti's »acting-out« means the motivation
for a journey towards a »working-through«: it should further a critical reading of
human violence in search of a transcendence of power and death. The generation
of hope might prevent such active readings.
But such a generation of motivation is to be distinguished from hope which -
Canetti fears - can lead to hopeless situations. As will be shown in chapter 6,
Steiner also evaluates the recognition of the truth of the horror of the Nazi geno-
cide over »hope«. In his play The Doomed (Die Befristeten) Canetti has shown
how lethal an effect »good news« can have. There the discovery of the death-
capsule's voidness leads to aggression rather than to freedom, so one can con-
clude that the discovery of truth must be uncomfortable and thorny in order to
have an ethical impact. The hope-inspired rebel Fünfzig who shows the people
the death-capsules which supposedly carry the prescribed date of each individ-
ual's death at a time at which they are killed by those who hold power, repre-
sents the intellectual who believes in the possibility of improving human life by
intimating how easy and comfortable it could be. He unconditionally holds on to
the idea of progress, but the progress which he promotes ironically turns out to
be a regression.45 As The Doomed shows, hope of human progress may only pro-
voke bestiality. The more hopeless humanity appears, the more shocked the reader
will be, and the more he has to generate new ways of living in order to feel secure
being alive. If The Doomed exemplifies what happens when an intellectual dis-
plays too much trust in a smooth way of human improvement, Crowds and Power
performs the kind of shock-therapy about which Canetti writes in his aphorisms.
Nevertheless, in Crowds and Power there are alternative models in the an-
thropological source material about »primitive« cultures, but Canetti does his
best to shift the emphasis from these alternatives for the ordinary human being
to that offered to himself: the immortality of the writer; a very dubious alterna-
tive indeed, as will be shown later. Rather than pointing out ways which lead
out of mankind's tragedy, Canetti forces upon the reader - as he clearly ad-
mits, when he writes »zwingst du die Leser dazu« - the vision of a humanity
trapped in its own destructiveness. Canetti might have encountered a view of
literature as the exertion of power, which transforms the moral indifference of

44
LaCapra, Lanzmann's Shoah (p. 18, note 33), p. 246.
45
For a discussion of Fünfzig's misplaced hope see Edgar Piel: Elias Canetti. Mün-
chen: Beck 1984 (Autorenbücher; 38), p. 119-120.
1. Science, Power, Literature and the Holocaust 23

the reader, in Kafka's famous letter to Oskar Pollak, where he writes that a
book should be like a punch, like an axe for the ice within humanity.46
Kafka's punch can be understood as a metaphorical expression of the same
idea as Canetti's »zwingen« (force): the two writers want to bring about a radical
change in the reader that is preceded by the death of the old self- Kafka uses
the word suicide (Selbstmord) - and through this metamorphosis of selfhood,
the reader's cold, indifferent heart is cut through, so that he is ready to act
against suffering in society as a whole. Far from being a tyrant, Canetti has
inevitably to use force in order to impress upon his readers a bleak vision of
their lives, which might provoke a change of social behavior. After circa 1980
Canetti criticism has often found fault with this kind of power-exertion.

1.2 Canetti - A Ruler?

Critics first come to notice this kind of power-exertion in Canetti's autobiogra-

phy. Writing about the Broch portrait in The Play of the Eye (Das Augenspiel),
Bernd Witte draws attention to the callous superiority with which the survivor
has his teacher speak of the impossibility of a psychology of the crowd (»Un-
möglichkeit einer Massenpsychologie«) which a priori condemns Canetti's
later work. Witte goes on to argue that this callous superiority is a strategic
sleight of hand within the context of a literary power-struggle of which one
would have believed the author of Crowds and Power to be incapable.47
In the same manner, Canetti's concept of the immortality of the writer, which
cheats death without having recourse to any form of the exertion of power, comes
under severe attack. Friederike Eigler, for example, argues that Canetti's claim for
originality is itself a product of that system whose power-structures he rejects.48
One might also think of Harold Bloom's theory of a literary agon according to
which all »strong writers« fight for immortality by trying to defeat their literary
antecedents. In this context the only alternative that Canetti offers to the brutality
of social and political life seems to be a mere would-be-alternative, a cover-up
for the aggression which the apparently »power-free« writer perpetrates.
The discovery of the exertion of power in the writing of someone who oppo-
ses power has consequently caused some confusion. As some critics have noti-
ced, Canetti's style sometimes strikes the reader as aggressive and apodictic.49

46
For the full quotation of this letter see Franz Kafka: Briefe 1902-1924. Frankfurt
a. M.: S. Fischer 1975 (Fischer-Taschenbücher; 1575), p. 27-28.
47
Bernd Witte: Der Einzelne und seine Literatur. Elias Canettis Auffassung vom Dichter.
In: Bartsch / Melzer, Experte der Macht - Elias Canetti (p. 11, note 10), p. 14-27.
48
Friederike Eigler: Das autobiographische Werk von Elias Canetti. Verwandlung, Identi-
tät, Machtausübung. Tübingen: Stauffenburg 1988 (Stauffenburg-Colloquium; 7), p. 3.
49
For a discussion of this point see Dagmar Barnouw: Blick, Rückblick, Verwandlung.
In: John Pattillo-Hess (Ed.): Tod und Verwandlung in Canettis >Masse und Macht<.
Referate gehalten auf dem 2. Internationalen kulturanthropologisch-philosophischen
24 Part I: Elias Canetti - Anthropology as Literature

This paradox of the coexistence of the exertion of power and a critique of power
leads Bartsch to conclude that the participation in the power-struggle is a prere-
quisite for the understanding of its machinations.50 Canetti himself realizes that
this participation in a power-struggle holds out the possibility of the true recogni-
tion of its working; indeed, he reflects on his relation to power in the apho-
risms:51 »I would never really have gotten to know power if I hadn't practiced it
and if I hadn't become the victim of of this my own practice of it.«52 Here
Canetti portrays himself as a ruler who falls victim to his own exertion of power
over theoretical opponents. This implies that in order to understand the process
of ruling, one has to suffer from, and at the same time exert, power, and it also
assumes that only experience guarantees true understanding.53 Such an interrela-
tion of knowledge and experience indeed figures largely in Canetti's concept of
the poet, and will be discussed in chapter 2, in relation to the novel Auto Da Fe.
The correlation between experience and knowledge, however, only partly
explains the paradox of power in Canetti's Crowds and Power. A more com-
plex picture surfaces if one again takes into account the historical context in
which Canetti's magnum opus was written: as has been pointed out above, the
motivations for writing Crowds and Power lie not only in the desire to under-
stand how fascism works, but also in the urge to oppose the Nazi power-
machinery with a book. As a result this book must itself exert power in order
to launch a counter-attack against fascism. In his aphorisms Canetti asks him-
self whether the mere exposure of power can yield satisfactory results:
You attempt to do the right thing: you want to unmask the inevitable murderousness
in a certain kind of greatness. But what kind of greatness that is dangerous enough
do you oppose it with?54

Canetti-Symposion, 21. bis 23. April 1989. Wien: Kunstverein Wien 1990, p. 132-140
and Franz Schuh: Von der Unsterblichkeit heute. Über Canettis >Menschenbilder<.
In: Krüger, Einladung zur Verwandlung (p. 10, note 5), p. 261-286. Barnouw and
Schuh wonder how a work like Masse und Macht - that opposes power - cannot do
without the exertion of power. Fischer calls Masse und Macht »ein herrisches
Buch«. See Ernst Fischer: Bemerkungen zu Elias Canettis Masse und Macht. In: Li-
teratur und Kritik 7 (1966), p. 12-20, p. 12. Ruppel depicts Canetti as ruler and
Masse und Macht äs »ein Werk der Macht«. See Ursula Ruppel: Der Tod und
Canetti. Essay. Hamburg: Europäische Verlagsanstalt 1995, p. 122.
50
Kurt Bartsch: Der größte Experte der Macht. Elias Canetti über Franz Kafka und den
Dichter als >Gegenbild< des Machthaber. In: Bartsch / Melzer, Experte der Macht -
Elias Canetti (p. 11, note 10), p. 133-147, p. 145.
51
»Ich hätte die Macht nie wirklich kennengelernt, wenn ich sie nicht ausgeübt und
nicht selber das Opfer dieser eigenen Übung geworden wäre.« Canetti, Aufzeich-
nungen 1942-1985 (p. 4, note 13), p. 115.
52
Canetti, The Human Province (p. 7, note 21), p. 84.
53
An interesting parallel can be found in Broch's Vergil who becomes part of the
crowd so as better to understand it.
54
Canetti, The Human Province (p. 7, note 21), p. 167. The German original text: »Du
versuchst das Richtige: du willst das notgedrungen Mörderische einer bestimmten Art
 Science, Power, Literature and the Holocaust 25

This is of course a rhetorical question: critics have already noted that the im-
mediacy of the style employed in Crowds and Power cannot but impress upon
the reader the image of the writer as a ruler who perpetrates symbolical vio-
lence. In the end, Canetti himself has no doubt about having successfully, not
only opposed, but even outdone his enemies. In the aphorisms he congratulates
himself for having laid his hands on the throat of this century: »Now I say to
myself that I have managed to lay my hands on the throat of this century.«55
Instead of understanding the brutality of fascism while refraining from attack-
ing it, Canetti himself uses force. In this context it is worthwhile to recall his
anger at Sonne's (the Hebrew poet greatly admired by Canetti in his autobio-
graphy) impotence in the face of the destruction of Guernica:
I wanted to hear a curse from him and it should be the curse of all Basques, of all
Spaniards, of all humanity. I did not want his petrifaction. It was powerlessness. I
could not bear his powerlessness.56

This desire to hear a curse from Sonne implies a strong belief in the power of
language: if Sonne had employed a curse against the barbarity of Guernica, he
would have transcended his powerlessness, and in so doing he would have
given power into the hands of those who are really powerless, into the hands of
victimized Basques and Spanish people, indeed into the hands of all human
beings who lack the power of speech.
Against this background it might be useful to discuss Canetti's perception
of Karl Kraus, for the latter exemplifies the figure of the writer as ruler (a kind
of anti-figure of the Hebrew poet Sonne, who abstains from any form of the
exertion of power). Canetti in fact calls himself one of the victims of Kraus's
apodictic and cogent condemnations. He would not lay hands on the books
which the master declared taboo:57
Once something was decided by this supreme authority, it was considered settled;
people would have regarded it as impudent to even test it for themselves, and so they
never so much as looked at any author condemned by Kraus.58
Here again Canetti experiences the power of words, the impact of symbolic vio-
lence: he was one who could not liberate himself from this symbolic exertion
of power.

von Größe entlarven. Aber welche Art von Größe setzt du dagegen, die gefahrlich ge-
nug ist?« Canetti, Aufzeichnungen 1942-1985 (p. 4, note 13), p. 221.
55
»Jetzt sage ich mir, daß es mir gelungen ist dieses Jahrhundert an der Gurgel zu
packen.« Ibid., p. 245.
56
Canetti, Das Augenspiel (p. 11, note 8), p. 279. My translation.
57
»Was dort, in dieser höheren Instanz, einmal beschlossen war, galt als ausgemacht, es
wäre einem vermessen erschienen, selber an eine Nachprüfung zu gehen, und so nahm
man keine der Autoren je in die Hand, die von Kraus verdammt waren«. See Elias Ca-
netti: Das Gewissen der Worte. Essays. Frankfurt a. M.: S. Fischer 1985, p. 51.
58
Elias Canetti: The Conscience of Words. Trans, by J. Neugroschel. New York: Sea-
bury Press 1979, p. 36-37.
26 Part I: Elias Canetti - Anthropology as Literature

There are also correspondences between Canetti's analysis of laughter in

Crowds and Power and his portrait of Kraus's »Lachen« in The Torch in my Ear.
In Crowds and Power Canetti establishes the connection between laughter and
an animalistic pleasure in eating the prey which one has a moment ago killed:59
Laughter has been objected to as vulgar because, in laughing, the mouth is opened
wide and the teeth are shown. Originally laughter contained a feeling of pleasure in
prey or food which seemed certain. A human being who falls down reminds us of an
animal we might have hunted and brought down ourselves. Every sudden fall which
arouses laughter does so because it suggests helplessness and reminds us that the
fallen can, if we want, be treated as prey. If we went further and actually ate it, we
would not laugh. We laugh instead of eating it. Laughter is our physical reaction to the
escape of potential food. As Hobbes said, laughter expresses a sudden feeling of supe-
riority, but he did not add that it only occurs when the normal consequences of this
superiority do not ensue. His conception contains only half the truth. Perhaps because
animals do not laugh, he did not see that our laughter is originally an animal reac-
tion. But neither do animals deny themselves obtainable food if they really want it.60

Laughter figures as a symbolical transposition of a feeling of superiority which

an animal has after killing another living being. It therefore also goes hand in
hand with the helplessness of the object about which one laughs; and it follows
from this that laughter paradoxically expresses through delight the capability of
one man to kill another. The people who are laughed at do not have the power to
defend themselves: they could be easy targets for a real, physical assault, and
afterwards their flesh could serve as a meal. (The important role of the descrip-
tion of everyday activities to which every reader can relate his or her own ex-
perience will be discussed in chapter 3.1) Instead of serving as a meal, the vic-
tims of laughter offer food for the intellectual hunger of the one who laughs.
Being a symbolical transmutation of a physical act (eating), laughter works intel-
lectually: it gives intellectual satisfaction, just as eating gives physical satisfac-

59
»Das Lachen ist als vulgär beanstandet worden, weil man dabei den Mund weit
öffnet und die Zähne entblößt. Gewiß enthält das Lachen in seinem Ursprung die
Freude an einer Beute oder Speise, die einem als sicher erscheint. Ein Mensch, der
fallt, erinnert an ein Tier, auf das man aus war und das man selber zu Fall gebracht
hat. Jeder Sturz, der Lachen erregt, erinnert an die Hilflosigkeit des Gestürzten; man
könnte es, wenn man wollte, als Beute behandeln. Man würde nicht lachen, wenn
man in der Reihe der geschilderten Vorgänge weitergehen und sich's wirklich ein-
verleiben würde. Man lacht, anstatt es zu essen. Die entgangene Speise ist es, die
zum Lachen reizt; das plötzliche Gefühl der Überlegenheit, wie es schon Hobbes ge-
sagt hat. Doch hat er nicht hinzugefügt, daß sich dieses Gefühl nur dann zum Lachen
steigert, wenn die Folge dieser Überlegenheit ausbleibt. Hobbes' Auffassung des
Lachens kommt der Wahrheit auf halben Weg entgegen; zu ihrem eigentlich anima-
lischem Ursprung ist er aber nicht vorgedrungen, vielleicht weil Tiere nicht lachen.
Aber Tiere versagen sich auch keine Speise, die ihnen erreichbar ist, wenn sie wirk-
lich Lust auf sie haben.« Canetti, Masse und Macht I (p. 4, note 13), p. 248.
60
Elias Canetti: Crowds and Power. Trans, by J. Neugroschel. New York: Seabury Press
1978, p. 223-224.
/. Science, Power, Literature and the Holocaust 27

tion. The eater knows that he is endowed with the power to hunt for food and the
one who laughs sees his superiority on an intellectual plane: someone who falls
to the ground bodies-forth physical as well as mental inferiority (clumsiness). On
account of this physical as well as mental inferiority, those who triumph laugh in
order to make visible their superiority. Laughter therefore signals triumph.
The pseudo-intellectual nature of such triumph comes to the fore in The Torch
in My Ear, when Canetti describes Kraus's audience. Here, laughter functions
as a bodily image that underlines the connection between intellectual activities
and the exertion of power:61
It wasn't individuals who were laughing, it was many people together. If I focused
on someone eater-corner in front of me in order to understand the distortions of his
laughter, the causes of which I couldn't grasp, the same laughter boomed behind me
and a few seats away from me on all sides. And only then did I notice that Hans,
who was sitting next to me and whom I had meanwhile forgotten, was laughing, too,
in exactly the same way. It was always many people, and it was always a hungry
laughter. It soon dawned on me that the people had come to a repast and not to cele-
brate Karl Kraus.62
Here we have the crowd which dances to the tunes of one ruler; and, in this
case, the ruler is a leading intellectual of contemporary Vienna.63 Eating func-
tions as a binding element that draws individuals together into a relationship of
complicity, so that they lose all their distinctive individuality. What is de-
scribed here is in fact the construction of a mass-identity that has theoretically
been laid down in Crowds and Power. (This will be discussed in further detail
in chapter 3.2) As a leader Kraus injects feelings of aggression and superiority
into the minds of his audience.64 These feelings become visible through the
laughter that permeates the audience in such a way that Canetti cannot recog-

61
»Es waren nicht einzelne, die lachten, sondern viele zusammen. Wenn ich einen schräg
links von mir ins Auge faßte, um die Verzerrungen seines Gelächters, dessen Ursachen
ich nicht erfaßte, zu begreifen, klang es hinter mir genauso und ein paar Sitze weiter
weg auf allen Seiten, und dann erst bemerkte ich, daß auch Hans neben mir, den ich
unterdessen beinahe vergessen hatte, auf genau dieselbe Weise lachte. Immer waren es
viele und immer war es ein hungriges Lachen. Ich hatte bald heraus, daß die Leute zu
einem Mahl gekommen waren und nicht, um Karl Kraus zu feiern.« Elias Canetti: Die
Fackel im Ohr. Lebensgeschichte 1921-1931. Ungekürzte Ausg., Frankfurt a. M.: Fi-
scher Taschenbuch Verlag 1987 (Fischer Taschenbücher; 5404). p. 69-70.
62
Elias Canetti: The Torch in My Ear. Trans, by J. Neugroschel. New York: Farrar
Straus Giroux 1982, p. 71.
63
For a discussion of Kraus's influence on intellectual life in Vienna see Edward Timms:
Karl Kraus. Apocalyptic Satirist. Culture and Catastrophe in Habsburg Vienna. New
Haven: Yale University Press 1986.
64
Canetti's charaterization of Kraus as a mass-leader is unfair. For a discussion of
Canetti's simplistic characterization of both Kraus and his audience see Josef Quack:
Über Elias Canettis Verhältnis zu Karl Kraus. Ein kritischer Vergleich. In: Interna-
tionales Archiv für Sozialgeschichte der deutschen Literatur 23 (1998), p. 118-141,
p. 129.
28 Part I: Elias Canetti - Anthropology as Literature

nize the distinctive, individual features of his friend Hans; the latter has in fact
discarded his individuality at this moment, as he turns from Hans into someone
who laughs, into someone who shares the feelings of aggression and superior-
ity with the rest of the audience, and indeed with Kraus himself. Aggression is
the right word here: the references to a meal (»Mahl«) make it clear that the
intellectual triumph only occupies a secondary place. Eating, as has been ar-
gued in Crowds and Power, is a form of killing, a form of the exertion of pow-
er, of destroying alien identities. In the process of eating, life is devoured in
order to annihilate and expel the alien and killed living being in form of faeces.
This is emphasized by the expression »hungriges Lachen« for »hungry« puts the
symbolical force of laughter into a category of minor importance: laughter func-
tions as a cover-up for the more animalistic drives of the audience. Canetti in fact
does nothing else but unveil these suppressed animalistic drives which come to
the fore in the act of laughing. For laughter, as Canetti writes in the passage from
Crowds and Power cited above, is a symbolic act that supplants the physical one
of eating. Yet, as the passage of The Torch in My Ear suggests, the aggressive
force is no less violent in the symbolic act than it was in the physical one; in-
deed, Canetti discovers that the content of Kraus's writings has no importance
whatever; what counts is their rhetorical force only, which in turn becomes trans-
lated into the corporeal through the meal-imagery: in the end, Kraus, and the
intellectual position for which he stands, has no meaning. What matters are his
ferocious attacks which produce dead bodies which can be eaten.
Canetti's portrait of Kraus strongly suggests that he is critical of the lat-
ter's symbolic exertion of power and it implies that he tries to employ rhe-
torical and intellectual might in a different manner, so as to effect a different
outcome. It remains to be seen how Canetti's exertion of power works. Crit-
ics have defended his vicious portraits of former friends in his autobiogra-
phy, by arguing that this aggression works as a reversal of past power-
structures. According to Friederike Eigler, Canetti dismantles the »sting of
command« (»Befehlsstachel«) which he makes responsible for the proper
functioning of power-structures in Crowds and Power, by reversing the
situation of past pressures.65 In this way, Canetti's autobiography might offer
an alternative to the bleak world depicted in his magnum opus. This may be
the case; one should, however, be careful not to apply to a text like Crowds
and Power, the criteria which one might apply to an autobiography. Crowds
and Power has a more complex structure as it is a work of both science and
literature, and, as such, its exertion of power is likely to have different aims
from those shown in an autobiography.

65
See Eigler, Das autobiographische Werk von Elias Canetti (p. 23, note 48), p. 166-
167; also see Gerhard Melzer: Der einzige Satz und sein Eigentümer. Versuch über
den symbolischen Machthaber Elias Canetti. In: Bartsch / Melzer, Experte der Macht -
Elias Canetti (p. 11, note 10), p. 58-72, p. 65.
/. Science, Power, Literature and the Holocaust 29

1.3 Canetti - A Scholar or a Writer?

As was emphasized at the beginning of this essay, the historical background of

the Nazi genocide needs to be taken into account for an attempt at understanding
Crowds and Power. Critics who ignore the historical context in which Crowds
and Power was written have tended to judge it as a scholarly work and find it
wanting. Several readers have missed the methods which, they believe, make for
high quality in scholarly writing. Ernst Fischer and Tom Nairn missed a discus-
sion of the writing on crowds that preceded Crowds and Power. Fischer attrib-
utes the lack of such a discussion to Canetti's will for power,66 while Nairn goes
further, suggesting that Crowds and Power is a work of barbarity. Canetti's
reticence about critical discussions amounts to a breach of civilized discourse:
Dr. Canetti may be reticent. What is certain is that such reticence conceals, not a reser-
voir of silent judgements upon the things that matter, but a lack of culture, be it histori-
cal, psychological, sociological, or simply that indispensable minimum of scholarly
culture without which an enterprise like Canetti's is bound to be vain. The fact that he
never refers to Marx's name is of no importance. That he refers once and disparagingly
to Freud's is of little importance. What matters is that he has paid no attention to the
substance of what they said, so that his own theoretical structure is, of necessity, a di-
shevelled medley of antediluvian commonplace, vulgarly anti-populist sentiments, and
private obsessions.67

Nairn, coming from the Marxist camp, establishes a hierarchy of »things that
matter«. He implies through this hierarchy a certain form of elitism: Marx and
Freud as the monarchs of intellectual discourse, all those who take up their argu-
ments might be called the courtiers, and those who reftise to follow are the barba-
rians, the plebs. This shows how Nairn contradicts himself: he accuses Canetti of
»anti-populist sentiments«, while at the same time stigmatizing him as a plebeian.
It is indeed interesting to see how critics of a post-Holocaust world still hold
on to the nineteenth-century idea of a kind of history that progresses as it evolves
(Hegel's »Weltgeist«, Marx's »age of communism«, Freud's »psychological
century«): from Nairn, via Fischer to Honneth, sociologists and literary critics of
the latter part of the twentieth century accuse Canetti of mixing the human with
the animalistic, and of paying no attention to human progress. In so doing they
ignore the fact that, by disagreeing with Hegel and other nineteenth century
philosophers, Canetti nonetheless takes up their thoughts, even if it is in a con-
tradictory way. Like Steiner, Canetti is in fact critical of history's »glorious
progress«; and the two writers arrive at such a critical attitude of history as part
of their response to the Holocaust.68 By learning from the brutality of twentieth-
66
Fischer, Bemerkungen zu Elias Canettis Masse und Macht (p. 24, note 49), p. 12.
67
Tom Nairn: Crowds and Critics. In: New Left Review 17 (1962), p. 24-33, p. 29.
68
Lawson argues for Canetti's historical advantage over Freud, referring to his know-
ledge of the »great wars«. See Richard H. Lawson: Understanding Elias Canetti. Co-
lumbia: University of South Carolina Press 1991 (Understanding Modern European
and Latin American Literature), p. 74
30 Part I: Elias Canetti - Anthropology as Literature

century history, Canetti and Steiner became distrustful of historians and their
notion of history. The historian implicitly accepts what he writes about; in a
sense, he approves of what has happened, regardless of how brutal it has been,
and, as a consequence, the deeds of dictators are, from Canetti's perspective,
affirmed in history-books:69 »I hate the respect of historians for Anything merely
because it happened, their falsified, retrospective standards, their impotence,
their kowtowing to any form of power.«70
Canetti's dislike of the academic discipline »history« highlights his general
critical attitude toward standard notions of scholarship: scholarship, in its posi-
tivist form is, to some extent, utterly powerless to oppose man's brutality;
instead of erecting its own value-system, it adopts that of those who are power-
ful; those who have got the political power to impose their notion of humanity
upon the socially and politically powerless. Canetti, however, does not accept
death: for him suffering and brutality are not given facts in the sense that they
have always existed, so that it is not possible to change them. Instead, they are
inventions, value-systems that have become accepted. Modern scholarship and
science accept death, and therefore, as we have seen, Canetti calls science a
»religion of killing« (»Religion des Tötens«).71 Correlatively (as will be dis-
cussed in chapter 3.4), Canetti calls death a social construct, that was disap-
proved of in »primitive« societies, but became socially acceptable in a modern,
scientific world. Against this background it is no surprise that Canetti tells
Joachim Schickel of the unnaturalness of death a thousand years ago:
I would like death to be completely separated and removed from that which is ac-
cepted. This has once been the case. For, if one speaks of life and death etc. one al-
ways overlooks that death was not at all always natural. It has become natural in the
thousand years of our history. 72

History as such only narrates the story of the acceptance of the unnatural as the
natural. What follows from this is that, according to Canetti, history, like any
other academic discipline, promotes that which is accepted, rather than being
»value-free«. As we shall see in chapter 3.4, Canetti calls history madness, in
order to assert the unnaturalness of what the historian describes. In contrast to
historians Canetti interprets power as pathological rather than as something

69
»Ich hasse den Respekt der Historiker vor Irgendetwas, bloß weil es geschehen ist, ihre
gefälschten, nachträglichen Maßstäbe, ihre Ohnmacht, die vor jeder Form von Macht
auf dem Bauche liegt.« Canetti, Aufzeichnungen 1942-1985 (p. 4, note 13), p. 41.
70
Canetti, The Human Province (p. 7, note 21), p. 24.
71
Canetti, Aufzeichnungen 1942-1985 (p. 4, note 13), p. 36.
72
»Ich würde wollen, daß der Tod wirklich ganz und gar ausgesondert und entfernt wird
aus dem, was akzeptiert ist, wie es eigentlich schon einmal war. Denn was man immer
übersieht, wenn man vom Tod und Leben usw. spricht, ist, daß ja der Tod keineswegs
immer etwas natürliches war. Er ist natürlich geworden, in den tausend Jahren unserer
Geschichte«. Gespräch mit Joachim Schickel. In: E. Canetti (Ed.): Die gespaltene Zu-
kunft. München: Hanser 1972 (Reihe Hanser; 111), p. 104-131, p. 124. My translation.
] . Science, Power, Literature and the Holocaust 31

which is naturally given. This pathological desire becomes real, becomes »his-
tory« through the exertion of violence.73
Against this background it is not surprising that conservative academics react
allergically to this attack on the »objectivity« of their disciplines. Nevertheless,
critics have also claimed that Crowds and Power is of use to scholars as well as
to non-scholars. According to Hädecke, for example, Canetti's analysis of ag-
gression, power-exertion, power-consolidation and power-expansion in the ani-
mal as well as the human sphere is backed up by the research of Heinroth, Tin-
bergen and Lorenz.74 Bamouw even calls Canetti's approach »scientific«:
His approach is scientific not so much in terms of conceptual rigor, of caution and
consistency concerning the investigation, but in terms of curiosity directed towards
the other, the undogmatic fascination with the marvels of the world.75

According to Barnouw, the fact that Canetti is fascinated by the world puts
Crowds and Power into the borderland between »literary genres« and »differ-
ent social sciences.«76 Canetti's approach is undoubtedly phenomenological,77
but this should not make the reader blind to the fact that there is a theory or
social agenda behind this type of phenomenology. (The strategies that Canetti
employs to preclude the emergence of any suspicions of developing a theory
will be discussed in chapter 3.2) Rather than expressing his admiration for the
»marvels of the world«, Canetti employs phenomenology in order further to
shock the reader. This again only becomes understandable if one takes into
account the historical context in which Crowds and Power was written.
Canetti's concern with an ethical impact on the social behavior of his reader
accounts for his »unscholarly« concept of truth. The true condition of his society
matters for him: he gives his readers what - according to him - the situation in
which they live requires. In this context a comparison between Herodotus's and
Canetti's scholarship might be useful, and John Bayley has brilliantly done so:
His favourite historian is Herodotus, a storyteller, with whom it hardly matters whether
the story told is factually true or not, because it is always true to the psychology of
the society it relates to.78

73
See also Winfried Georg Sebald: Summa Scientiae. System und Systemkritik bei
Elias Canetti. In: Literatur und Kritik 177/178 (1983), p. 398^104, p. 398.
74
Wolfgang Hädecke: Anmerkungen zu Ernst Fischers Aufsatz über Elias Canettis
Masse und Macht. In: Literatur und Kritik 20 (1967), p. 599-610, p. 604-605.
75
Dagmar Barnouw: Mind and Myth in Masse und Macht. In: Modern Austrian
Literature 16 (1983), p. 65-79, p. 72.
76
Ibid., p. 71.
77
Canetti's phenomenological approach has also been noted by Dietsch. StefTen Dietzsch:
Leben als Passion. Canettis Masse und Macht als Beitrag zum Verstehen der Moderne.
In: Pattillo-Hess, Verwandlungsverbote und Befreiungsversuche in Canettis Masse und
Macht (p. 16, note 27), p. 38^5.
78
John Bayley: Canetti and Power. In: Hülse, Essays in Honor of Elias Canetti (p. 19,
note 34), p. 129-145, p. 140.
32 Part I: Elias Canetti - Anthropology as Literature

Herodotus, like Canetti, tells stories, but he adopts the authoritative stance of a
scholar who always tells the truth so as to exert a powerful impact on the soci-
ety in which he lives. In this way Herodotian scholarship is poetry, while pur-
porting to be factual truth. The same holds for Canetti. The issue of a kind of
ethical way of writing history that has close connections to the work of a liter-
ary writer will be further developed in part III.

2 Auto Da as a Negative Poetics

This interrelation between an ethical kind of scholarship and the exertion of

power in language, which I discussed above, largely figures in the role which
Canetti represents. Canetti calls himself a »Dichter« and in response to Nazism
and the Holocaust in particular he casts himself in the role of an intellectual
who addresses a public audience. This self-depiction as a poet points to a cer-
tain trust in the force of language; and indeed in an interview with Joachim
Schickel, Canetti speaks of his »magical relation to names« (»wirklich magi-
sche Beziehung zu Namen«).79 By calling himself a poet, therefore, Canetti
makes it clear that he is aware of the power which his own words can exert.
The poet masters language, but he can also master through language.
This recognition of the power of language occurred to Canetti as a young
child. The Tongue Set Free opens with a threat: the threat of having the
tongue cut out.80 Here two spheres of power confront each other: one is
physical might, the other is the symbolical force that the tongue can set free.
In this way the opening of The Tongue Set Free can be read as a parable, a
parable of Canetti as a Dichter and an Intellektueller, as a poet, in that he
sets great store by language, and as an intellectual in that he is aware of the
force of language and consequently takes responsibility for it. As an intellec-
tual he has learned from his childhood experience that those who wield
physical power are most keen on eliminating the power of language which
might oppose them. Canetti saw the justification of his claim to public re-
sponsibility confirmed by the rise of fascism and the Holocaust. In the novel
Auto Da Fe, whose criticism of the positivist scholar Peter Kien will be dis-
cussed below, Canetti depicts a world which foreshadows the approach of
fascism and the crimes of the Nazis. Canetti emphasizes in an interview with

79
Gespräch mit Joachim Schickel (p. 30, note 72), p. 105. My translation.
80
See also discussions of this opening scene in Martina Barth: Canetti versus Canetti.
Identität, Macht und Masse im literarischen Werk Elias Canettis. Frankfurt a. M. et al.:
Lang 1994 (Europäische Hochschulschriften, Reihe 1; 1450), p. 34-35; and Hans
Reiss: The Writer's Task. Some Reflections on Elias Canetti's Autobiography. In: Ste-
vens / Wagner, Elias Canetti (p. 17, note 31), p. 45-58, p. 47.
2. Auto Da Fe as a Negative Poetics 33

Raphael Sorin that he wrote the novel under the impact of the upsurge of
Nazism:
Je sentais que des choses terribles se preparaient. Ce pressentiment fut confirme lors
de mon sejours ä Berlin en 1928 et 1929. Je vis alors les marches et les bagarres en-
tre les nazis et les socialistes. Mon livre est done ne dans un climat d'agitation et de
fureur. II porte en lui, sans que ce soit toujours bien cache, les marques de ces cir-
constances tragiques.81
In what follows, I shall show how Canetti criticizes an ethically non-committed
type of intellectual under the impact of the approach of Nazism. His protagonist,
Peter Kien the scholar, is deliberately seeking isolation, mirrors an atomized
society that drifts towards a totalitarian mass-state in which history realizes hor-
rid phantasies, and in which rationality serves irrational ends.82 The English title
Auto Da Fe refers to the apocalyptic burning of Kien and his library with which
the novel closes. The novel narrates stories of isolation and narcissistic obses-
sions that result in a catastrophic ending: Kien's housekeeper and wife Therese
only values sex and money, the porter of the house in which Kien lives can only
find pleasure in the sadistic exertion of power as realized in the sexual abuse of
his daughter, the bohemian Fischerle hunts narrow-mindedly after fame as chess-
champion, and Peter Kien's brother George sacrifices everything to a brilliant
career as a psychotherapist.
The rationalist scholar Peter Kien can be called a nihilist in that he devalues
any form of life that has nothing to do with the abstractions of his specialist
field of study. Kien's nihilism reflects the grotesque and nihilist form of repre-
sentation whose signs are either empty or tend to entropy. In an important es-
say Robert Elbaz and Leah Hadomi show how signification in Auto Da Fe
»hovers between being and non-being, much as the novel is caught between
the representation of a senseless reality and its nullification«.83 In his represen-
tation of a fragmented society and in his critique of the positivist Kien, Canetti
develops a negative poetics: he shows what a responsible poet should not be as
well as what he should work against. This poetics paves the way to a better un-
derstanding of Crowds and Power. In this text Canetti examines non-Western
communities; as an anthropologist he stands in close proximity to Kien's scho-
larly discipline, sinology. Crowds and Power is a scholarly book, written by
someone who spent years reading anthropological studies. Indeed, Canetti en-
courages his readers to do the same by offering them an extensive biblio-
81
Raphael Sorin: Souvenirs. In: Catherine Geoffrey / Gerald Stieg (Ed.): Elias Canetti.
Publication ä l'occasion de 1'exposition »Elias Canetti, l'ennemi de la mort«, pre-
sentee ä Paris, Bibliotheque publique d'information, 25 octobre 1995 - 22 Janvier
1996. Paris: Bibliotheque publique d'information, Centre Georges Pompidou 1995,
p. 51-57, p. 53.
82
Härtung has referred to the connection between atomization and lack of moderation.
See Rudolf Härtung: Fabel und Gestalt. In: Literarische Revue 3 (1948), p. 341-347.
83
Robert Elbaz / Leah Hadomi: On Canetti's Novelistic Sign. In: Orbis Litterarum 48
(1993), p. 269-280, p. 272.
34 Part I: Elias Canetti - Anthropology as Literature

graphy. Yet Canetti transgresses conventional scholarship by both writing in a

narrative manner and avoiding specialization.84
Given that Canetti presents himself as somewhat »bookish«, one might
wonder why he does not employ the notion of a poeta doctus, rather than that
of a Dichter. The reason he abstains from calling himself a poeta doctus or a
Gelehrter perhaps lies in the fact that all these scholarly words might move
him into a self-enclosed world as described in Auto Da Fe. Peter Kien repre-
sents the scholar as the anti-type of Canetti's image of the poet: if the poet is
»der Hüter der Verwandlung« (»the guardian of metamorphosis«), if the poet
makes room in his breast for all human and animal voices, then Kien's her-
meticism and his onesidedness preclude such openness.85 In Auto Da Fe
Canetti portrays the scholarly intellectual as someone who follows the deran-
gement of his time instead of opposing it.
When they focus on his alleged powerlessness, many critics fail to see that
Kien himself exercises power over his books.86 Following this line of thinking,
Jutta Paal has recently perceived a dichotomy between Peter Kien as an »en-
lightened intellectual« and the other protagonists of the novel who discard the
humanitarian ideals of the enlightenment.87 I shall show that Kien's scholarship
does not represent enlightenment ideals (it is far too cut off from social concerns
to do so) rather it depicts the realization of a positivist agenda. Kien is a madman
in a world that has generally turned mad: no protagonist can be called sane; all
are obsessed by an ideefixe.&i
This idee fixe turns each character into an isolated world, and, as a result,
each is unable to form intimate relationships: Therese loves money which,
she thinks, might better be acquired by marrying Peter Kien; Peter Kien, in
turn, only marries Therese because he is impressed by the care she appa-

84
Masse und Macht 's hybrid nature between the social sciences, religious studies and
literary forms of writing will be discussed in the next chapter.
85
For a discussion of Kien's one-sidedness see Doppier: >Der Hüter der Verwandlun-
gem. Canettis Bestimmung des Dichters. In: Friedbert Aspetsberger / Gerald Stieg
(Ed.): Blendung als Lebensform. Elias Canetti. Königstein/Ts: Athenäum 1985, p. 45-
55. Moser has argued that Die Blendung depicts the realization of mad obsessions. See
Manfred Moser: Musil, Canetti, Eco, Calvino. Die überholte Philosophie. Wien: Ver-
lag des Verbandes der Wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft Österreichs 1986 (Klagenfurter
Beiträge zur Philosophie), p. 72-73.
86
See Dieter Dissinger: Vereinzelung und Massenwahn. Elias Canettis Roman Die
Blendung. Bonn: Bouvier 1971 (Studien zur Germanistik, Anglistik und Komparati-
stik; 11), p. 185; and David Roberts: Kopf und Welt. Elias Canettis Roman Die
Blendung. Aus dem Englischen übersetzt von Helga und Fred Wagner. München:
Hanser 1975 (Literaturals Kunst), p. 164.
87
See Jutta Paal: Die Figurenkonstellation in Elias Canettis Roman >Die Blendung<.
Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann 1991.
88
For a discussion of the one-sidedness of all characters in the novel see Peter Russell:
The Vision of Man in Elias Canetti's Die Blendung. In: German Life & Letters 28
(1974), p. 24-35; and Edward Timms: Canetti, Kraus and China. In: Stevens / Wag-
ner, Elias Canetti (p. 17, note 31), p. 21-31.
2. Auto Da Fe as a Negative Poetics 35

rently bestows on books; Pfaff only courts his daughter and Therese in order
to satisfy his sadism, and Georg Kien has nothing on his mind apart from
being revered in his hospital like a god. It seems that every figure in the
novel has an absolutist approach to his or her interests; each is blind-folded
by the desires for which he or she lives; and this state of being blindfold is
well conveyed in the German title Die Blendung, which has etymological
connections with the word blind.&9 This act of blinding has a further con-
notation, as the noun »Blendung« or the verb »blenden« are often used in
connection with the blinding force of pure light: a Blendung can describe the
process of being blinded by the sun, and indeed Jakob and Wilhelm Grimm
define »blenden« as »blinding by the sun« (»das blenden der sonne«).90 Si-
milarly the title of Canetti's novel evokes the dazzling power of the sun.
Light often functions as a metaphor for enlightenment. This connection to
the idea of enlightenment is also present in the original title of the novel
»Kant fängt Feuer« which suggests the end of enlightenment in fire; and in
so doing it emphasizes the novel's concern with the deadlock, the utter help-
lessness of an enlightenment that is unable to reflect critically upon its own
enterprise, because it has lost touch with a non-atomized world.
A further dialectical movement operates here. In Auto Da Fe, light achie-
ves the opposite of enlightenment; light, as the title makes clear, dazzles tho-
se who come in contact with it, rather than clearing up their vision. Against
this background it is not surprising that Kien walls up the windows of his
room: his scholarly pursuits, his positivist approach makes him shy away
from the light of the sun. The rationalist can only survive as nihilist. The
positivist who devalues any form of material existence cannot face the sun,
whose light brings out the contour of things. Walling up the windows of his
study also serves as an image for the isolation to which, as discussed above,
all characters of the novel fall prey. In this respect one cannot find any dif-
ference in the behavior of Peter Kien, on the one hand, and his brother, Pfaff,
and Therese, on the other: each takes his or her world to be absolute. Whe-
ther it is a head without a world, or world without a head, what we encounter
is a universe which is atomized in the extreme; it is a world in which parts
exist on their own and shy away from making contact with their surround-
ings. It is this atomization of society that undermines the validity of a com-
bination of materialism and religiosity and which, as a consequence, disrupts
social cohesion. And precisely this atomization and its social and religious
consequences eventually leads to the madness of crowds.91

89
Friedrich Kluge: Etymologisches Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache. Berlin: de Gruy-
ter 1982, p. 92.
90
Jakob Grimm / Wilhelm Grimm: Deutsches Wörterbuch. Leipzig: S. Hirzel 1860,
Vol. 2, p. 106.
91
Dissinger discusses the dialectic between individualism and the craving for an emer-
gence in the crowd. Dissinger, Vereinzelung und Massenwahn (p. 34, note 86),
36 Part I: Elias Canetti - Anthropology as Literature

When one recalls Canetti's aim of avoiding arcane specialization in scho-

larship, the inability of a scholarly intellectual to offer an alternative to a
world that collapses into entropy, is quite striking. Kien is himself a carica-
ture of the specialist. Indeed, for him the »truth« can only be found if the
scholar ignores everything that does not pertain to his area of research. Does
this perhaps have an autobiographical reference in Canetti's chemical re-
search?92 LaCapra's definition of positivism as being a narrowly focused
discourse that »avoids or occludes the very problem of a critical theory of
society and culture« fits Kien's specialist pursuits well.93 Kien's undertaking
contrasts entirely with the anthropological projects of both Canetti and Stei-
ner, who want to have a social-ethical impact on modern Western society:94
»You draw closer to the truth by shutting yourself off from mankind. Daily
life was a superficial clatter of lies. Every passer-by was a liar. For that rea-
son he never looked at them.«95
The antithetical structure of the first sentence here mirrors Kien's way of
thinking, which only allows for absolutes: drawing closer to the truth has to
amount to a denial of social life; and any form of life in his own society anti-
thetically precludes a drawing closer to the truth. This antithesis between truth,
on the one hand, and ethics on the other, also bespeaks a deep split between
spiritual and concrete, physical reality. In Kien's mind there is a gap between
these two realities which cannot be bridged.
It is precisely this division between spirit and everyday reality which leads
to Kien's disgust with physical reality as such. The loss of a world view that
unites different parts of society by means of a combination of knowledge and
social responsibility - which finds its equivalent in the relation between truth
and ethics as propounded by Hayden White - figures as a main cause for
Kien's positivism.96 Kien's positivist nihilism that does not allow for a ra-
tionality embedded in a value system which transcends the instrumental con-
cerns of scholarly inquiries, ironically outdoes itself in its main point of re-

p. 99. One might note here that Steiner's analysis of atomization in his aphorisms
echoes Canetti's implicit critique of fragmentation in Auto Da Fe.
92
Meili has pointed out coincidences between Canetti's autobiography and his only
novel. See Barbara Meili: Erinnerung und Vision. Der lebensgeschichtliche Hinter-
grund von Elias Canettis Roman Die Blendung. Bonn: Bouvier 1985 (Studien zur
Germanistik, Anglistik und Komparatistik; 115).
93
Dominick LaCapra: Soundings in Critical Theory. Ithaca: Cornell University Press
1989, p. 13.
94
»Man näherte sich der Wahrheit, indem man sich von den Menschen abschloß. Der
Alltag war ein oberflächliches Gewirr von Lügen. Soviel Passanten, soviel Lügen.
Drum sah er sie gar nicht an.« Elias Canetti: Die Blendung. Frankfurt a. M.: S. Fi-
scher 1986, p. 14.
95
Elias Canetti: Auto Da Fe. Trans, from the German under the personal supervision
of the author by C. V. Wegdwood. Harmondsworth: Penguin 1965, p. 18.
96
White argues for an interpenetration between truth and ethics in his essay on the
Holocaust. See Hayden White: Historical Emplotment and the Problem of Truth. In:
Friedlander, Probing the Limits of Representation (p. 14, note 21), p. 22-36.
2. Auto Da Fe as a Negative Poetics 37

ference: David Darby has shown how Kien's repeated reference to Berke-
ley's Principles undermines his own scholarly objectives. Berkeley, »rather
than affirming the autonomy of the individual subject's perceptions«, argues
»against the scepticism implicit in the reading adopted by Kien and the
schoolmen«.97 Although Kien disbelieves any kind of creed that might inte-
grate his scholarship into a societal-religious context, Kien clings to a secular
religion. Is there not here a certain paradox? One can look, for example, to
John Milbank's analysis of positivism as replacing religion only to »become
itself religion.« This seems to fit well the idea of Peter Kien as imago Chri-
sti.98 Kien indeed identifies with Christ, though as a savior of books rather
man. His martyrdom testifies exclusively to the absolutism of specialist
scholarship.
How further might one elaborate this notion of a default religiosity? Kien's
secular religion results in a disgust with humanity. As a scholar who only
looks for the truth, he can never look at people with whom he walks on the
street. Although he actually walks along with these people, he strongly desires
to dissociate himself from them completely. As a consequence, he mentally
robs all these pedestrians of their humanity, calling them a »mass«. A mass is
by definition a quantitative term, precluding any notion of qualitative humani-
ty. This disgust with the »masses« also implies that Kien has no interest in
influencing the ethical behavior of the public. This becomes apparent when he
declares his solitude to be independent of the opinion of the »mob«:99 »[...] he
lived alone; the service of knowledge was more important than the opinion of
the mob.«100 This, then, is part of a somewhat private religion.
Indeed, Kien conceives of knowledge as something which cannot be
shared;101 that is why we never leam anything about the actual substance of his
scholarship. Edward Timms has noticed that Kien does not present any details
of scholarly inquiries:

Kien, as Canetti represents him, has no inner life. We may be told time and again
that his mind is filled with oriental erudition; but these values are never shown.
The reference in the opening scene of the novel to the wisdom of Mencius (Mong
Tse) raises expectations of an intellectual feast which are never fulfilled. This failure
to give the reader access to Kien's inner life seems to me to constitute the major
limitation of Canetti's novel. It is a novel about an intellect which tells us nothing
97
David Darby: Structures of Disintegration. Narrative Strategies in Elias Canettis
Die Blendung. Riverside/Cal.: Ariadne Press 1992 (Studies in Austrian Literature,
Culture, and Thought), p. 52.
98
John Milbank: Stories of Sacrifice. From Wellhausen to Girard. In: Theory, Cul-
ture & Society 12 (1995), p. 15-46, p. 27.
99
»[...] er lebe ja allein, was der Wissenschaft nütze, sei der Meinung der Menge an
Wichtigkeit voraus.« Canetti, Die Blendung (p. 36, note 94), p. 70
100
Canetti, Auto Da Fe (p. 36, note 95), p. 77.
101
For a discussion of Kien's reification of knowledge, see Russell A. Berman: The
Rise of the Modern German Novel. Crisis and Charisma. Cambridge/Mass.: Harvard
University Press 1986, p. 195-203.
38 Part I: Elias Canetii -Anthropology as Literature

about the intellect - the richness of a mind replete with scholarship or of an imagina-
tion fired by the vision of an alternative culture.102

In comparison to Kraus, Canetti does not give a vision of China that offers an
alternative to occidental shortcomings; yet one might ask whether this consti-
tutes a failure. It would be truer to say that Canetti consciously represents Kien
with this limitation in order to show the incommunicative character of this
kind of scholar.103 If the reader learned anything of the fruits of Kien's re-
search he or she would have the impression of someone who can engage in
dialogue. Kien's solipsism is, however, one of his most striking features, and
Canetti would have been inconsistent if he had presented the scholar's imagi-
native, or excitingly learned inward wealth. Kien perceives any form of com-
munication as succumbing to the lures of the »masses«, while Canetti wants to
have an impact on the social behavior of the public. In contrast to Kien the
scholar, Canetti the poet seeks to win the attention of a huge audience.
These marked differences between Canetti and Kien provide one reason
for the amazing scope of the issues and indeed the vast geographical distance
encompassed in Crowds and Power. Canetti here moves from Siberia to Af-
rica, from Australia to the North Pole, from America to India. Not only does
Canetti break down the barriers between specialized fields of scholarly re-
search; he also bridges the gap between the physical and the intellectual
which for Peter Kien remains unbridgeable. This radical difference can be
seen in a key aspect of the scholarly work: in Crowds and Power, the human
body features as a main point of departure to ground Canetti's theory of
human aggression. Unlike Kien he uses the empirical evidence gathered by
workers in the field, such as anthropologists and thinkers concerned with the
physical character of life.
The universalist approach of Canetti as a poet sharply contrasts with Kien's
specialization in ancient China. But it even goes further than that: Kien's scho-
larship depends on the intellectual force of the scholar alone, whereas Canetti's
notion of the Dichter presupposes the absence of a clearly defined individual-
ity. The scholar Peter Kien only exists when he holds on to his individuality as
a positivist scientist. The poet Elias Canetti, on the other hand, only comes into
being when the individual Elias Canetti falls silent. Kien, the scholar, wants to
affirm his distinctive personality; Canetti, the poet opens up his personality in
a chain of metamorphoses: »/ am not a poet. I cannot keep silent. But many
people are silent within me, people I do not know. Their outbursts sometimes
make me a poet.«104 Most important here is the italicized »ich« upon whose

102
Timms, Canetti, Kraus and China (p. 34, note 88), p. 28.
103
For a discussion of Kien's willful isolation see Detlef Krumme: Lesemodelle. Elias
Canetti. Günter Grass. Walter Höllerer. München: Hanser 1983 (Literatur als Kunst),
p. 64-69.
104
»Ein Dichter bin ich nicht: ich kann nicht schweigen. Aber viele Menschen in mir
schweigen, die ich nicht kenne. Ihre Ausbrüche machen mich manchmal zum Dich-
2. Auto Da Fe as a Negative Poetics 39

negation the existence of Elias Canetti as Dichter depends. This »I« would be
a poet as »I«, if it could always keep silent, but, as Canetti makes clear, he
cannot achieve this silence of the individual which is the prerequisite for the
true poet. As it is, Canetti's Dichtung can only come into being when the one
who writes falls asleep, and the alien voices which normally refrain from
speaking, burst into language. Only at these moments does Canetti write as a
Dichter, and yet at these moments he clearly loses his individuality.
One can perhaps best understand this notion of the poet as having lost all
features belonging to the individual person who writes, when one recalls John
Keats's notion of negative capability. Like Canetti's, Keats's poetics rely
heavily on the concept of metamorphosis: the poet is only capable of writing
poetry when he can negate his individuality and metamorphose into different
figures which speak through him. In this way Keats's negative capability char-
acterizes the poet as the mere receiver of voices other from himself. Keats the
poet appears as an Aeolian harp upon which the vocal pressure of his poem's
protagonists play. The Romantic image of the Aeolian harp, and the Keatsian
concept of negative capability greatly influenced modernist writers like T. S.
Eliot. One could draw attention to James Joyce's famous words: when Joyce
was in a cafe, he said that not he, but all the people around him actually wrote
his novels; it seems that rather than being a writer, Joyce is a listener, who
registers all that is given to the human in language.105 It is perhaps no accident
that Canetti arranged to be buried beside James Joyce in Zürich. He similarly
admired Fernando Pessoa who also assumed a dozen different individualities,
each having a distinctive poetic voice. There are many more references in
modernist writing (Pirandello for example) in which the poet transforms into
different personalities.
It is against the background of this Romantic and modernist understanding
of the poet that we should examine Canetti's notion of the Dichter. As a con-
sequence, writing verse does not characterize a poet; rather it is his ability to
undergo transformations; it is the openness which allows a multitude of voices
into the heart of the writer. After the Holocaust the voices that haunt Canetti
cannot be those set in tone by Keats's Aeolian harp; they need to be voices of
utter darkness filled with death and all possible imaginable brutalities that have
become a reality in the Nazi concentration camps. Canetti's study of the >mas-
ses< goes hand in hand with his listening to the voices of the victims of Nazi
terror. By contrast, Kien's monoperspectival view of life results in his hatred
of >uneducated< people:106 »[...] we must beware of these people of the masses.

ter.« Canetti, Aufzeichnungen 1942-1985 (p. 4, note 13), p. 254. Canetti, The Hu-
man Province (p. 7, note 21), p. 193.
105
This part is greatly indebted to Dr. Maud Ellmann's lectures on modernism which I
attended at the English faculty in Cambridge in Lent term 1994.
106
»Immer und ausnahmslos nehme man sich vor den Leuten der Masse in acht [...].
Sie sind gefahrlich, weil sie keine Bildung, also keinen Verstand haben.« Canetti,
Die Blendung (p. 36, note 94), p. 95.
40 Part I: Elias Canetti - Anthropology as Literature

They are dangerous because they have no education, which is as much as to

say no understanding.«107
Kien's hatred of the >masses< coincides with his refusal to have any impact on
the ethical behavior of his readership. He argued that such an impact cannot be
made because of the lack of education which one generally finds in the public.
For Kien, lack of education means absence of learning, and with this absence of
learning no understanding whatever is possible. As we will see later, Canetti the
poet makes >experience< part of his concept of education (Bildung). Kien, how-
ever, transposes any experience on the street into the realm of his library, and
there, we suddenly see him needing the masses; we encounter a paranoid ruler,
who would be unhappy without a mass-following. Canetti scholarship has often
taken George Kien's comment on the lack of a mass-drive in his brother as an
authorial commentary.108 George Kien argues that intellectuals like his brother
have no idea of a mass-drive:109
Ofthat far deeper and most special motive force of history, the desire of men to rise into a
higher type of animal, into the mass, and to lose themselves in it so completely as to for-
get that one man ever existed, they had no idea. For they were educated men, and educa-
tion is a cordon sanitaire for the individual against the mass in his own soul.110

If George Kien knew that his brother had an idea of a mass-drive, he would have
been able to anticipate the burning of the books with which the novel closes. The
reader, on the other hand, learns after the first hundred pages that Peter Kien
knows about the desire of losing oneself in a mass. In the chapter »Mobilisa-
tion«, Kien addresses books as a kind of rabble-rousing crowd (»Hetzmasse«); in
an interior monologue he wants to de-individualize each of them:111 »We are
107
Canetti, Auto da Fe (p. 36, note 95), p. 103.
108
Stephan Wiesenhöfer takes Georg to be an authoritative commentator on all protago-
nists of the novel. See Stephan Wiesenhöfer: Mythos zwischen Wahn und Kunst.
Elias Canettis Roman Die Blendung. München: Tuduv-Verlags-Gesellschaft 1987
(Tuduv-Studien. Reihe Sprach- und Literaturwissenschaften; 23), p. 145. Recently,
Nicola Riedner has followed George's interpretation in seeing Peter Kien as separa-
ted from the masses. See Nicola Riedner: Canettis Fischerle. Eine Figur zwischen
Masse, Macht und Blendung. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann 1994, p. 113. A
notable exception to this absolutization of George's view of his brother is Bollacher.
See Martin Bollacher: Elias Canetti. Die Blendung. In: Paul M. Lützeler (Ed.): Deut-
sche Romane des 20. Jahrhunderts. Neue Interpretationen. Königstein/Ts: Athenäum
1983, p. 237-254, p. 249.
109
»Von der viel tieferen und eigentlichen Triebkraft der Geschichte, den Drang des
Menschen, in eine höhere Tiergattung, die Masse, aufzugehen und sich darin voll-
kommen zu verlieren, als hätte es nie einen Menschen gegeben, ahnten sie nichts.
Denn sie waren gebildet und Bildung ist ein Festungsgürtel des Individuums gegen
die Masse in ihm selbst.« Canetti, Die Blendung (p. 36, note 94), p. 446.
110
Canetti, Auto da Fe (p. 36, note 95), p. 461.
1
'' »Noch sind wir in der Lage, als unverletzte, geschlossene Körperschaft, einer für
alle, alle für einen, zur Abwehr zu rüsten.« Canetti, Die Blendung (p. 36, note 94),
p. 96.
2. Auto Da Fe äs a Negative Poetics 41

still in the position, as a complete and self-sufficient body, to arm ourselves in

our own defence, one for all and all for one.«112 One for all and all for one is
exactly the kind of slogan Nazis used to nihilate their personality and immerse
themselves in the »all« of the crowd. The chiasmus of the »one for all and all
for one« construction stresses the lack of any distinction between the members
of the crowd. Kien, who so despised the >masses< on the street, turns into a
mass-organizer within the walls of his library, and even when he angrily calls
pedestrians a >mob<, he actually creates it by using the word.
However, Kien not only feels himself at one with the >masses< of his
books; in his interior monologue he also appears as a ruler who employs the
sting of death as his main weapon:113 »[...] 2) That traitors will be shot out of
hand. 3) That all authority is united in one hand. That I am commander-in-
chief, sole leader and officer in command.«114 »Commander-in-chief«, »sole
leader« »officer« and »command«; all of these words are used to describe the
character of the ruler in Crowds and Power. Kien in fact displays the disgust
of >masses< as the desire to bring them into existence precisely so he can rule
them.
Whereas Kien the scholar desires to create masses out of individuals,
Canetti the Dichter makes room in his heart for a variety of individual voices.
In order to find room for these voices the poet must have undergone experi-
ences which opened his heart for a multitude of different lives and sentiments;
and it is this kind of experience which Kien fears most. According to Canetti,
the poet must have experienced how other people think as well as feel in order
to be able to communicate with them, and Canetti perceives this union between
scholarship and experience (which is exactly what Kien lacks) in Herodotus.115
In contrast to Kien's scholarship, Herodotus's learning in Canetti's view is
innocent, because it wants to communicate. Whereas Kien confirms scholar-
ship only in terms of specialization, Herodotus subdivides different people not
according to further specialist fields of knowledge; rather, he wants to open up
space for different voices through this subdivision. By means of this experi-
ence of the >other< he makes room in the heart of his readers who experience
this >otherness< through reading him.
The interrelation between knowledge, belief and experience moves scholar-
ship into the realm of poetry, but this kind of poetry is not fictional since it is
invested with the authority of empirical (experience) and scholarly (know-
ledge) facts. In the work of Jacob Burckhardt, Canetti encountered just such
112
Canetti, Auto da Fe (p. 36, note 95), p. 104.
113
»[...] 2) die Verräter verfallen der Feme. 3) das Kommando ist zentralisiert. Ich bin
oberster Kriegsherr, einziger Führer und Offizier.« Canetti, Die Blendung (p. 36,
note 94), p. 98.
114
Canetti, Auto da Fe" (p. 36, note 95), p. 106.
115
For his view of Herodotus see Canetti's: Die gerettete Zunge. Geschichte einer Ju-
gend. Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag 1986 (Fischer Taschenbücher;
2083), p. 242.
42 Part I: Elias Canetti - Anthropology as Literature

bodily scholarship, which correlated well with his category of poetry as it

allows for an infinity of voices.116 According to Canetti, Burckhardt's scho-
larship is at the same time poetry because it bestows new names on a reality
that seemed to be isolated. A new name transforms the thing it denotes; it
creates a universe that dissolves into a flux of metamorphoses. This world of
transformation evokes a feeling of »bodily expansion« (»körperlicher Erwei-
terung«) 117 in the reader; the world which this kind of scholarship inhabits is
therefore indeed corporeal. The scholar as the guardian of metamorphoses
exactly covers Canetti's definition of the Dichter as »Hüter der Verwand-
lung«, and it is indeed very close to that of Steiner who calls the poet the
»the only guardian of the myths of all peoples« (»der einzige Hüter der
Mythen aller Völker«).118 For Canetti myths offer an immense richness of
metamorphoses. This connection between myth and the ability to believe in
the reality of ideas such as metamorphosis has been made in Edward B. Ty-
lor's Primitive Culture, a book which Canetti cites in his bibliography to
Crowds and Power and which Steiner would have been familiar with as an
anthropologist. Tylor sees the poet as a remnant of primitivism within mod-
ernity; the poet still belongs to the »mythologic stage of thought« that char-
acterizes primitive thinking:
A poet of our day has still much in common with the minds of uncultured tribes in the
mythologic stage of thought. The rude man's imaginations may be narrow, crude and
repulsive, while the poet's more conscious fictions may be highly wrought into shapes
of fresh artistic beauty, but both share in that sense of the reality of ideas which fortu-
nately or unfortunately modern education has proved so powerful to destroy.119
Modern poet and savage alike substitute ideas for reality. What they cannot
grasp as a reality proved by empirical test is nevertheless real, in fact, the
>primitive< does not differentiate between the empirical and the metaphysical,
between the immanent and the transcendent. For the >primitive< myths them-
selves are empirical. Tylor's concept of the »mythologic stage of thought«
coincides with Steiner's and Canetti's understanding of myths as grounded in
empirical reality. The empirical itself is seen as the mythological.120
Tylor's interpretation of the modern poet as a remnant of the >primitive< in
modern culture contributes a great deal to the understanding of Steiner's and
116
For Canetti's view of J. Burckhardt see ibid., p. 224.
117
Ibid. My translation.
118
Steiner coined this phrase as a result of his close intellectual friendship with Canetti
in the context of a commentary on his lyrical cycle Eroberungen. Ein Lyrischer Zyk-
lus. Mit einem Nachwort hg. von H. G. Adler. Heidelberg: Lambert Schneider 1964
(Veröffentlichungen der Deutschen Akademie für Sprache und Dichtung Darmstadt;
33), p. 125.
119
Edward B. Tylor: Primitive Culture. Researches into the Development of Mythology,
Philosophy, Religion, Art, and Custom. Vol. 1. London: John Murray 1871, p. 284.
120
The way Canetti treats the theme of metamorphosis in Masse und Macht will be
discussed in chapter 3.3.
2. Auto Da Fe as a Negative Poetics 43

Canetti's definition of the Dichter. Canetti's »guardian of metamorphosis«

(»Hüter der Verwandlung«) takes ideas of metamorphosis as a reality, other-
wise he would not be able to transform himself into a variety of animal and
human identities. The concept of metamorphosis presupposes a union between
knowledge and belief. The one who undergoes metamorphosis needs to have
an image of the empirical as a fluid entity, in which bodies can flood as easily
and as quickly as ideas in the mind. According to Steiner and Canetti, there-
fore, a mythological world presumes a perception of the empirical that is radi-
cally different from that of the modern scientific world; it has to be a percep-
tion that does not distinguish between ideas and empirical facts. It has to per-
ceive the empirical as driven by ideas. Metamorphosis can only be a real force
in a society which is mythical. In a mythical society knowledge has not been
separated from belief. As a consequence, the Dichter as »Hüter der Verwand-
lung« takes care of a mythological world that is deeply threatened by the ra-
tionalist-nihilistic world-view of modern science.121 Interestingly, Canetti, fol-
lowing Tylor and Steiner, explains the link between metamorphosis and myth
in »The Task of the Poet« (»Der Beruf des Dichters«):
What, however characterizes the essence of myths - disregarding all specific singu-
lar features - is the metamorphosis which is practised in them. It this by which hu-
manity has created itself.'22
Here Canetti discusses metamorphosis as the main characteristic of a mytho-
logical world, but whereas Tylor is doubtful as to the merits of such >primi-
tive< state of mind (»fortunately or unfortunately modern education has pro-
ved so powerful to destroy«) Canetti sees human identity as dependent on a
mythological world in which the empirical still offers the possibility of meta-
morphosis.
Like Canetti, Steiner mourns the loss of what Tylor calls »the mythologic
stage of thought« and following Tylor's concept of the poet as a >primitive<,
he calls the Dichter the preserver of the myths of all peoples; of myths, that
is to say, which embody a world capable of undergoing metamorphoses.
»Der einzige Hüter der Mythen aller Völker« moves the poet in fact into
close proximity to the anthropologist of religion. In Steiner we also encoun-
ter the scholar as poet, or rather the poet as scholar. What attracts Canetti and
Steiner to scholarship is not the standard of scholarly methods; instead it is
the authority of objective truth< that goes with scholarly writing: »[...] and

121
Heidegger has shown how much Nietzsche's nihilism is the outcome of Descar-
tes' rationalism. See Martin Heidegger: Nietzsche. Der europäische Nihilismus.
In: M. Heidegger: Gesamtausgabe. Hg. von Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. Bd
48, II. Abt., Vorlesungen 1923 - 1944. Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann 1986.
122
»Was aber neben allen spezifischen Einzelgehalten das Eigentliche der Mythen
ausmacht, ist die in ihnen geübte Verwandlung. Sie ist es, durch die sich der
Mensch erschaffen hat.« Canetti, Das Gewissen der Worte (p. 25, note 57), p. 289.
My translation.
44 Part I: Elias Canetti - Anthropology as Literature

they [Burckhardt's historical works] were not invented like fairy tales and
stories; if their names were mentioned, their factual truth-value was not to be
contested« (»[...] und sie waren nicht erfunden, wie in Märchen und Ge-
schichten, wenn man ihren Namen erwähnte waren sie nicht zu bestreiten«).123
Both Steiner and Canetti want to write poetry whose factual truth cannot be
argued against (»bestreiten«). This is why Canetti calls himself a poet, al-
though he has not published any poems: his scholarship is poetry since it is
so universalist that it allows for an infinity of metamorphoses. More impor-
tantly, Crowds and Power should itself bring about a major metamorphosis
in its readers, and it can only do so if the theory which lies behind Canetti's
enumeration of facts is taken as objective truth< that cannot be questioned
(»bestreiten«).
Scholarship itself, therefore, becomes a rhetorical device which works to-
wards a suspension of disbelief. However, it may be argued that the presenta-
tion of theory clothed in the objective truth< of undeniable facts amounts to
nothing other than a manipulative exertion of power. But surely this type of
self-conscious exertion of power as a reaction to the Holocaust fundamentally
differs from that of a dictator. This difference needs to be stressed. Canetti's
power serves not himself, but the attainment of ethical truth. In this context,
truth cannot be separated from ethics: it means the presentation of reality that
invites the readership to change certain patterns of their social behavior. In
order to grasp this kind of >truth< the poet has to be in touch with the reality of
his time. In his Broch speech Canetti calls the poet the »dog of his time«
(»Hund seiner Zeit«).124 Faced with the Holocaust the poet needs to become
uncouth in order to have an impact on the public, he needs to become as hard
and brutal as the twentieth century presents itself, so as to shock his readers
into a change, into a metamorphosis of their social conduct:125
Even after the first war, some writers were still able to content themselves with deep
breathing and crystal polishing. But today, after the second war, after gas chambers
and atomic bombs, being human requires more in its utmost imperilment and degra-
dation. One must turn to brutality as it always was, and coarsen one's hand and mind
on it. One must grab man as he is, hard and unredeemed. But one must not permit
him to lay his hands on hope. Hope can flow only from darkest knowledge, other-

123
Canetti, Die gerettete Zunge (p. 41, note 115), p. 224. My translation.
124
Canetti, Das Gewissen der Worte (p. 25, note 57), p. 13.
125
»Selbst nach dem ersten Krieg war es für manche Dichter noch möglich, sich mit
Atemholen und Kritallschliffzu begnügen. Aber heute, nach dem zweiten, nach Gas-
kammern und Atombomben fordert das Menschsein in seiner äußersten Gefährdung
und Erniedrigung mehr. Man muß sich der Rohheit zuwenden, wie sie immer war
und sich die Hände und Geist an ihr vergröbern. Man muß den Menschen fassen wie
er ist, hart und unerlöst. Man darf ihn aber nicht erlauben sich an der Hoffnung zu ver-
greifen. Nur aus der schwärzesten Kenntnis darf diese Hoffnung fließen, sonst wird
sie zum höhnischen Aberglauben und beschleunigt den Untergang, der näher und nä-
her droht.« Canetti, Aufzeichnungen 1942-1985 (p. 4, note 13), p. 251-252.
2. Auto Da Fe as a Negative Poetics 45

wise it will become a derisive superstition and speed up the destruction that looms
more and more ominously. 126

After the Holocaust the poet can attempt to save the world only if he imposes
his bleak vision of mankind upon the reader as >objective<, scholarly as op-
posed to fictional truth. Only then he can deprive his audience of the sort of
hope that might be conducive to complacency. Such complacency, as we have
seen, leads to stasis, which in turn affirms the status quo; thus the world re-
mains untouched and its gas chambers could again be built, for mankind has
been unable honestly to reflect upon its own destructive potential. According
to Canetti, we have to undergo change, if we want to prevent a repetition of
crimes similar to those committed by the Nazis. The >truth< which is appropri-
ate for Canetti's time is therefore one that furthers restless metamorphosis,
rather than the complacency that hope might evoke.
As a consequence, Canetti marks his notion of the Dichter off from that of
the »aesthetes« who are characterized by deception (»Schein«), lack of seri-
ousness (»Unernst«) and a misjudgment of reality (»Verkennung der Wirk-
lichkeit«).127 Like the scholar Peter Kien, the aesthetes shy away from experi-
ence, and this shying away from experience amounts to irresponsibility as far
as the public is concerned; rather than bring about a change that might provoke
mankind's metamorphosis into a state which is at one with the whole of crea-
tion, they affirm the status quo:128
The powerful man swaggers about with his biggest stomach, and the vain man is
iridescent in all the colors of his innards. Art plays a dance for the digesting and
suffocating. 129

The image of the dance here emphasizes the satisfying character of this kind of
art that generates illusions. Canetti wants to disrupt the digestive process that
makes exploitation and violence gratifying: in order to do so, he needs to exert
power. In the following section I will examine the devices which Canetti em-
ploys in Crowds and Power to impose his hopeless vision of the world upon the
reader.

126
Canetti, The Human Province (p. 7, note 21), p. 190.
127
Canetti, Das Gewissen der Worte (p. 25, note 57), p. 282-283.
128
»Der Mächtige stolziert mit seinen größten Magen, und der Eitle schillert in allen
Farben seines Eingeweides. Die Kunst spielt den Verdauenden und Erstickenden
zum Tanze auf.« Canetti, Aufzeichnungen 1942-1985 (p. 4, note 13), p. 144.
129
Canetti, The Human Province (p. 7, note 21), p. 107.
46 Part I: Ellas Canetti - Anthropology as Literature

3 Canetti's Literary Devices for the Exertion of Power

If the Holocaust is not also of universal

significance, cannot be understood pre-
cisely in those universalistic terms which
are what >pure< liberalism is really about,
then it, ironically, loses much of its uni-
queness, and much of its universal appli-
cability as a symbolic warning.130

3.1 Canetti's Thinking in Images

In the foregoing I have mainly focused on the alienation of the critics as regards
Canetti's claim to be scholarly, while, at the same time, failing to live up to the
standards of scholarship. Here I will focus on Canetti's literary style. Critics
have been perplexed by the style in which Crowds and Power is written: they
recognize that Canetti - although being in favor of metamorphosis - presents a
static view of the world by using short sentences which relate to the >objective<
reality of facts.131 Short factual sentences are, however, not the only means by
which Canetti tries to convince the reader of the objective truth< of the insights
that he presents. Among other things, he manipulates language in such a way as
to implicate the reader in the subject matter of his writing. This implication of
the reader is achieved through what I call a rhetoric of immediacy or a rhetoric of
fact. Canetti's evaluation of immediacy can be seen clearly in his appraisal of
Stendhal's way of writing. He attributes to Stendhal the ability to embrace life as
such; his style originates in his skill to be at the heart of every event:132
This man, who took nothing for granted, who wanted to discover everything for him-
self; who, as far as life is feeling and spirit, was life itself; who was in the heart of
every situation and therefore had a right to look at it from outside; with whom word
and substance were so intuitively one that it was as though he had taken on himself
to purify language single-handed [...].133

130
Steven Beller: >Your Mark is our Disgraces Liberalism and the Holocaust. In: Con-
temporary European History 4 (1995), p. 209-221, p. 220.
131
For a discussion of simple, short sentences which state facts see Georg Schmid: Masse
und Ohnmacht. Jenseits des immobilisierten Universums. In: Krüger, Einladung zur
Verwandlung (p. 10, note 5), p. 163-179, p. 170-171.
132
»Dieser Mann, der nichts voraussetzt, der auf alles selber stoßen wollte, der das Le-
ben selbst war, soweit es Gefühl und Geist ist, der sich im Herzen jeder Begebenheit
befand und sie darum auch von außen betrachten durfte, bei dem Wort und Gehalt
sich auf die natürlichste Weise decken, als hätte er die Sprache auf eigene Faust zu
reinigen unternommen [...].« Canetti, Masse und Macht I (p. 4, note 13), p. 310
133
Elias Canetti: Crowds and Power. Trans, by Carol Stewart. London: Gollancz 1962,
p. 277.
3. Canetti 's Literary Devices for the Exertion of Power 47

Stendhal can undergo metamorphoses, and as a corollary he makes sign and sig-
nified concur: in his language words do not only evoke the >thingness< of things,
for Stendhal pushes language to a point at which words become the things they
describe. With Stendhal the symbol and the signified meet (»decken«), so that
one experiences language as a physical reality. Canetti sees another reason for
this immediacy of style in Stendhal's desire to discover the intricacies of the
world himself, without the mediations of the abstract theories or second-hand
experiences, narrated in books or plays. From Canetti's perspective, there are
no books that intervene between Stendhal's mind and his personal experience
of life. Instead, his heart beats at the centre of life itself. One has the suspicion
that Canetti is here portraying his own style of writing, while praising that of
his French literary teacher. Canetti himself does not presuppose knowledge of
any kind of scholarly writing in Crowds and Power, no theories of crowds are
mentioned at the beginning. Rather than alluding to what the reader might have
read, Canetti presents his theories as objective reality<. If he had given an
account of conflicting theories about crowds and power, he would have relativ-
ized his own ideas: his theory would appear like one among many others. Con-
sequently, we do not learn anything about what Le Bon, Karl Marx, or Jose
Ortega y Gasset said concerning the masses; instead voice is given exclusively
to what Canetti thinks is the truth about human and animal matters, transcend-
ing the purported relativism of modern scholarship.
This is apparent in the very first sentence of Crowds and Power: »There is
nothing that man fears more than the touch of the unknown.« 134 Canetti does
not give the impression that he has derived this insight from his own experi-
ence, or indeed from the reading of various books. Rather, his epistemology
seems to surmount subjectivity and thereby also relativism: it appears like a
universal truth, true for every human being, including the reader of Crowds
and Power. Every reader of Crowds and Power is implicated in Canetti's
»der Mensch« (man as such), as few would not call themselves »human«. In
this way Canetti seems to reside at the heart of things from the very moment
he writes the first sentence of Crowds and Power, and this immediacy is
reinforced by the unconditional »nichts«. Here is a writer who apparently
knows about what he is writing: he must be familiar with every part of hu-
manity, or he would not be so outspokenly convinced that humanity as a
whole fears nothing more than the moment of physical contact with the un-
known. The immediacy of »der Mensch« combined with the unconditional
phrase »nichts« calls forth a sense of objectivity. This impression of objec-
tivity is underlined by Canetti's impersonal sentence construction. He does
not write: »As far as humanity is concerned I am especially struck by its fear
of the unknown«, but instead he cuts out everything that could arouse the
suspicion of subjectivity.

134
Ibid., p. 15. »Nichts fürchtet der Mensch mehr als die Berührung durch Unbekann-
tes.« Canetti, Masse und Macht I (p. 4, note 13), p. 1.
48 Part I: Elias Canetti - Anthropology as Literature

From the first page of Crowds and Power onwards Canetti's rhetoric of fact
develops climactically: at first we read the impersonal »der Mensch«, then we
encounter »man« (»one«), which draws still closer to the »I« of all readers,
until the whole readership of the book is embraced by the »uns« (»us«) and
»wir« (»we«) of the third paragraph. At the same time Canetti's usage of un-
conditional expressions like »überall« (»everywhere«), »überhaupt« (»in gen-
eral«) and »alle« (»all«) does not diminish in scale. This style of inclusiveness
that sets out to implicate the reader in the factuality of what is discussed per-
meates the whole book.135 Canetti takes pains to find examples which relate to
the experience of every reader, and he makes it clear himself that it is advis-
able to begin a discussion with a phenomenon which is well-known to every-
one: »It is advisable to start the discussion with a phenomenon that is familiar
to everyone.«136 Canetti's aspiration to be immediate, to have a direct rapport
with his readership, makes him ground his theories in physical features com-
mon to all humanity. He examines the function of hands, legs, teeth, and faces
closely in their relation to the exertion of power in order to show his readers
that they themselves are intrinsically related to brutality and barbarity.
The immediate implication of the reader in the factual reality of what is dis-
cussed works as one strategy for creating a style of writing that presents Ca-
netti's theory as transcending the subjectivity, and therefore the relativism, of
competing arguments within the social sciences. Another related strategy can
be seen when Canetti states a thesis and then supports it with empirical or
historical facts that are gathered from different corners of the universe. Clif-
ford Geertz has called this intermeshing of fact and theory »thick descrip-
tion«.137 Canetti draws on a variety of myths, but while doing so he takes pains
to present as >objective< truth what he considers to be their substance. This
emerges from Canetti's description of the mimetic anticipation of animals by
the bushmen who are going to hunt. Here Canetti takes great care in his de-
135
Bohrer has pointed out that Canetti simply states facts without any attempt at expla-
nation. See Karl Heinz Bohrer: Der Stoiker und unsere prähistorische Seele. Zu
Masse und MachK. In: Herbert G. Göpfert (Ed.): Canetti lesen. Erfahrungen mit sei-
nen Büchern. München: Hanser 1975 (Reihe Hanser; 188), p. 61-66. Similarly, Hat-
vani writes: »[...] es wird nichts erklärt [...]«. See Paul Hatvani: Ein großartiger Ver-
such. Fragment zur Neuauflage von Elias Canettis Masse und Macht. In: Literatur
und Kritik 86/87 (1974), p. 408^17, p. 410. For a discussion of Canetti's >naive< ap-
proach to reality see Theo Stammen: Lektüre des Anderen - Elias Canettis anthro-
pologischer Blick. In: Gerhard Neumann (Ed.): Canetti als Leser. Freiburg i. Br.:
Rombach 1996 (Rombach Wissenschaft. Reihe Litterae; 22), p. 161-176.
136
»Es ist geraten von einem Phänomen auszugehen, das allen vertraut ist [...].« Canetti,
Masse und Macht II (p. 4, note 13), p. 25.
137
See Clifford Geertz: Thick Description. Towards an Interpretive Theory of Culture.
In: C. Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures. Selected Essays. London: Hutchinson
1975, p. 3-30. For a discussion of »thick description« in relation to Canetti's Masse
und Macht see Ritchie Robertson: Canetti as Anthropologist. In: Stevens / Wagner,
Elias Canetti (p. 17, note 31), p. 132-145, p. 141.
3, Canetti 's Literary Devices for the Exertion of Power 49

scription to emphasize how the bushman's metamorphosis into an animal shows

the reader that the myths which have been narrated before are not fictions,
because the ideas incorporated in them can also be found in the real life
(»wirkliches Leben«) of the bushmen:138
[...] for, whatever myths and fairy stories can teach us about the subject, they are all
open to the objection that they are something »invented«, whereas here we learn
what an actual Bushman in real life feels when he thinks of an ostrich or a springbok
in the distance [...].139
Canetti tries to hide the theoretical character of his arguments by showing that
they meet with factual reality: every argument seems to be supported by a vari-
ety of illustrations taken from »real life«.140 In this way Canetti claims that, as
history evolves, masses feel the urge to grow, and this, he argues, can be illus-
trated by the rebellion against ceremonies within all religions of the universe. He
then gives the example of the Sermon on the Mount, as opposed to the preaching
in the temple, of Pauline Christianity, as a rebellion against standard Judaism,
and of Buddhism, as protest against the closed up crowds of Hinduism:141
The Sermon on the Mount in the New Testament comes to mind. It is enacted in the
open, thousands are able to listen and there is no doubt that it is directed against the
limiting ceremoniousness of the official temple. One remembers the tendency of of-
ficial Pauline Christianity to break out of the national and tribal boundaries of Juda-
ism and to become a universal faith for all men. One remembers the contempt of
Buddhism for the caste-system of contemporary India.142
Canetti invokes four world religions within the space of three sentences. A
sense of universality is emphasized through the »man denkt« (»one remem-
bers«) anaphora that have a hammering effect, and, at the same time, create an
impression of regularity and infinitude: by the time one reaches the third »man
denkt« sentence one might think that the list could go on for ever. Indeed,
Canetti breaks up his list of anaphora-enumerations only to start enumerating
138
»Denn gegen alles, was man darüber aus Mythen oder Märchen erfahrt, läßt sich der
Einwand erheben, daß es erdichtet sei. Hier aber erfahren wir, wie einem Buschmann
in seinem wirklichen Leben zumute ist, wenn er an einen Strauß oder einen Spring-
bock in der Ferne denkt [...].« Canetti, Masse und Macht II (p. 4, note 13), p. 69.
139
Canetti, Crowds and Power (Trans. C. Stewart, p. 46, note 133), p. 339-340.
140
See also Canetti's emphasis on the factual truth: »[...] es hat sich wirklich so zuge-
tragen [...]«. Elias Canetti: Die Selbstzerstörung der Xosas. In: Masse und Macht
(p. 4, note 13), p. 218.
141
»Man denkt an die Bergpredigt im Neuen Testament: sie spielt sich im Freien ab,
Tausende können zuhören, und sie ist, daran kann kein Zweifel bestehen, gegen das
begrenzende Zeremonien-Treiben des offiziellen Tempels gerichtet. Man denkt an
die Tendenz des paulinischen Christentums, aus den Volks- und Stammesgrenzen
des Judentums auszubrechen und zu einem universalen Glauben der Menschen zu
werden. Man denkt an die Verachtung des Buddhismus für das Kastenwesen des da-
maligen Indien.« Canetti, Masse und Macht I (p. 4, note 13), p. 17.
142
Canetti, Crowds and Power (Trans. C. Stewart, p. 46, note 133), p. 21.
50 Part I: Elias Canetti - Anthropology as Literature

again in his next paragraph, where he restates his thesis, carrying three world
religions as the body of evidence: »Temple, caste and church are always too
narrow«143 (»Immer ist Tempel, Kaste und Kirche zu eng.«).144 The »immer«
implies that the houses of worship taken from Judaism, Hinduism, and Christi-
anity only serve as an example for religions as such, and that the examples he
is going to present from Christianity only illustrate the tendency within all
religions to expand.
The »immer ist« constructions lead to another way of writing by means of
which Canetti evokes a sense of being at the heart of things. »Immer ist« claims
that something particular is generally true; it is therefore a way of establishing
laws of behavior, laws of processes, and it is finally a construction that might be
found in a biology or chemistry book which Canetti would doubtless have en-
countered. This scientific style of writing in his study of chemistry often
emerges in Crowds and Power. While reading Stendhal, Canetti might also
have developed a laconic manner of writing that is characteristic of a law
book: he used to copy out Stendhal, while the latter in turn copied the Code
Napoleon.145 Canetti wants to show his readers in what kind of situation they
are living; he wants to point out the undercurrent of law according to which
their life evolves, and above all he wants to convince them of the objective
truths< that his writing conveys, and he can best do this by employing the style
of a law book whose authority seems absolute, just as the Bible with all its
ethical laws enjoyed unquestioned authority in past centuries. Still, a striking
difference between the Hebrew Bible and Crowds and Power needs to be un-
derlined. The laws that Canetti establishes are laws of power and violence, and
he posits them in modern societies; they are laws of nihilism and as such they
are intended to be abolished rather than followed, as those laid down in the
Bible. (This does, of course, not mean that >law< in the Hebrew Bible reflects a
diremption between ethics and politics: biblical law also partakes of coercion,
but it does not have destruction as its aim.)146
Canetti's legal and scientific way of writing is perhaps most salient in the
chapter »Die Eigenschaften der Macht« (»Elements of Power«), where he indeed
sets out to lay down general laws for the existence of >masses<. It is written in a
style similar to, for example, the laws of Mendel: »The mass will always grow
[...]. Within the mass reigns equality.« (»Die Masse will immer wachsen [...].
Innerhalb der Masse herrscht Gleichheit.«)147 Here we again meet the »immer«,
and we are also confronted with a highly succinct, scientific way of writing that
143
My translation.
144
Canetti, Masse und Macht I (p. 4, note 13), p. 17.
145
For a discussion of Stendhal's copying of the Code Napoleon see Henri Beyle
Stendhal: The Red and the Black. Trans, and ed. by M. Adams. New York: Norton
1969, p. 15, noteS.
146
For a warning against a postmodernist idealization of the Hebrew Bible see Gillian
Rose: Judaism & Modernity. Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Blackwell 1993.
147
Canetti, Masse und Macht I (p. 4, note 13), p. 26. My translation.
3. Canetti 's Literary Devices for the Exertion of Power 51

omits everything which does not contribute to the understanding of the laws of
natural processes. Yet, if the reader is to trust the writer who establishes these
laws, the writing must do both: it must evoke a sense of authenticity, and it also
must aim at the reader's identification with the facts presented. Geertz has ar-
gued that it is this ability to establish a sense of authenticity, this manipulation of
language, which makes the reader believe that the anthropologist has actually
been part of a >primitive< community. This turns anthropological writing into
literature, transforming the anthropologist into a writer:
This ability of anthropologists to get us to take what they say seriously has less to do
with either a factual look or an air of conceptual elegance than it has with their ca-
pacity to convince us that what they say is the result of their having actually pene-
trated ( or, if you prefer, been penetrated by ) another form of life, or having one
way or another, truly »been there«. And that, persuading us that this offstage miracle
has occured, is where the writing comes in. 148
Geertz indeed compares Malinowski to Conrad and places Ruth Benedict in
the tradition of a satirist like Swift. The satirical features of Crowds and Power
will be discussed in detail below. For now it is important to emphasize that a
sense of authenticity goes hand in hand with the attempt at making the reader
identify with the writer, as we also know occurs with a Conradian narrator
such as Marlow. Geertz goes on to argue for a link between a feeling of »being
there« and identification:
Ethnographers need to convince us, [...] not merely that they themselves have truly
»been there«, [...] but that had we been there we should have seen what they saw,
felt what they felt, concluded what they concluded.149
Reading Crowds and Power, one detects Canetti's aspiration to evoke a sense
of his writing as having been at the heart of what is described; it is as if the
writer writes from the inside of his subject matter rather than about it.
This perhaps comes most clearly to the fore in the description of the hang-
man. Here Canetti seems to speak from within the mind of the executioner, just
as a Dostoevsky might write from within the mind of his protagonist:150
[...] killing others he frees himself from death. For him it is a clean business, with
nothing shocking or unnatural about it. He cannot find in himself any of the horror
he awakens in others. It is important to be quite clear about this: official killers are
contented in proportion as the commands they are given lead directly to death. A
prison warder's life is far more difficult than an executioner's.151
148
Geertz, Works and Lives (p. 20, note 37), p. 4-5.
149
Ibid., p. 16.
150
»Indem er selber tötet, befreit er sich vom Tod. Für ihn ist es ein reinliches und kein
unheimliches Geschäft. Das Grauen, das er in anderen erweckt, hat er nicht in sich.
Es ist wichtig, sich darüber klarzusein: die offiziellen Töter sind umso zufriedener in
sich, je mehr ihre Befehle direkt zum Tode fuhren. Selbst ein Gefängniswärter hat es
schwerer als ein Henker.« Canetti, Masse und Macht II (p. 4, note 13), p. 63.
151
Canetti, Crowds and Power (Trans. C. Stewart, p. 46, note 133), p. 331.
52 Part I: Elias Canetti - Anthropology as Literature

The »für ihn« (»in himself«) implies that Canetti knows exactly what is going
on in the mind of the hangman, and this impression of being right down in the
psyche of the executioner is reinforced by the »in sich« (the English translation
has »contented« where the original had contented »in themselves«): the writer
seems to be in close rapport with the hangman. The mind of the hangman
opens up without any mediation; Canetti is there immediately.
In order to make his theories appear to be an empirical truth, immediate to
everyone who cares to listen and see, Canetti also makes use of pictures. How
does he do this? He thinks in images, so that everyone can imagine them, and
in imagining them the reader's imaginative experience comes to meet that of
the writer. It is particularly difficult to reach a point of identification between
the reader and the narrator while dealing with abstract, theoretical issues.
Crowds and Power is a theoretical book; however, as we have seen, it is one
which wants to have an immediate impact on the social behavior of its reader-
ship. Canetti needs to influence his readers emotionally as well as intellectu-
ally in order to bring about such an impact. Emotions are rarely excited by
presentations of theory, and Canetti presents his theories in the form of images
with the aim of involving the emotive side of his readership: through visuali-
zing the images Canetti's metaphorical style of writing constructs, the reader
participates actively in Crowds and Power 's arguments, thus making possible
an identification between his or her experience and that offered in the book. A
striking example of Canetti's thinking in images and narratives is his discus-
sion of the command as an arrow:152
A command is like an arrow. It is shot from the bow and hits a target. The man who
gives a command takes aim before he shoots; like an arrow his command is intended
for a definite person. An arrow remains sticking in the flesh of the man it hits and he
has to pull it out in order to free himself of the threat it carries. When a command is
passed on it is as though a man pulled out an arrow which had hit him, fitted that
same arrow to his bow and shot it again. The wound in his body heals, but it leaves a
scar. Every scar has a story; it is the mark of a particular arrow.153
The chapter »The Recoil. The Anxiety of Command« (»Rückstoß und Befehls-
angst«) opens with a narrative and for the rest of the paragraph Canetti elabo-
rates on this abstract concept of the command in a metaphorical language. The
procedure can be seen above all in his use of verbs. We see the ruler as an
152
»Der Befehl ist wie ein Pfeil. Er wird abgeschossen und trifft. Der Befehlshaber
zielt, bevor er ihn abschießt. Er wird jemanden ganz Bestimmten mit seinem Be-
fehl treffen, immer hat der Pfeil eine gewählte Richtung. Er bleibt im Getroffenen
stecken; dieser muß ihn herausziehen und weitergeben, um sich von seiner Dro-
hung zu befreien. Tatsächlich spielt sich der Vorgang der Befehls-Weitergabe so
ab, als ob der Empfänger ihn herauszöge, seinen eigenen Bogen spannte und nun
den Pfeil wieder abschösse. Die Wunde in seinem eigenen Körper verheilt, aber sie
hinterläßt eine Narbe. Jede Narbe hat eine Geschichte, es ist die Spur dieses einen
bestimmten Pfeils.« Canetti, Masse und Macht II (p. 4, note 13), p. 35.
153
Canetti, Crowds and Power (Trans. C. Stewart, p. 46, note 133), p. 308.
3. Canetti 's Literary Devices for the Exertion of Power 53

archer, shooting and hitting the target, after which Canetti takes us back to the
point at which the archer aims for the target. Everything evolves in slow motion.
The passing on of commands as a result of having been commanded is translated
into a metaphorical language. At the end, the hybrid expression of the »Be-
fehlsstachel« (»sting of command«) is poised between the abstract and the con-
crete. It loses its conceptual dimension (»Befehl«), turning into an image of the
wound (»Wunde«) which heals, but leaves its mark as a scar (»Narbe«). In the
context of Canetti's thinking in images, it is useful to recall Wayne C. Booth's
distinction between the narrator as teller and as shower; the latter leaves the
reader »without the guidance of explicit evaluation«,154 but this only promotes
the immediately shocking impact of the images evoked through the writing:
there is no teller who can assure the reader of the intrinsic goodness of human
nature, rather the readers are left in the lurch as they themselves have to find
solutions, and generate hope.
As part of this thinking in images, Canetti translates the cinematic tech-
niques of the close-up and slow motion into a literary language, so as to satu-
rate the reader with detailed pictures that are more powerful than abstract
statements. This can be demonstrated by a passage from the »Der Dirigent«:155
The conductor stands: ancient memories of what it meant when man first stood up-
right still play an important part in any representation of power. Then, he is the only
person who stands. In front of him sits the orchestra and behind him the audience.
He stands on a dais and can be seen both from in front and from behind. In front his
movements act on the orchestra and behind on the audience. In giving his actual di-
rections he uses only his hands, or his hands and a baton. Quite small movements
are all he needs to wake this or that instrument to life or to silence it at will. He has
the power of life and death over the voices of the instruments; one long silent will
speak again at his command. Their diversity stands for the diversity of mankind; an
orchestra is like an assemblage of different types of men. The willingness of its
members to obey him makes it possible for the conductor to transform them into a
unit, which he then embodies.156

154
Wayne C. Booth: The Rhetoric of Fiction. Chicago: University of Chicago Press
1961, p. 7.
155
»Der Dirigent steht. Die Aufrichtung des Menschen als alte Erinnerung ist in vie-
len Darstellungen der Macht noch von Bedeutung. Er steht allein. Um ihn herum
sitzt sein Orchester, hinter ihm sitzen die Zuhörer, es ist auffallend, daß er allein
steht. Er steht erhöht und ist von vorn und im Rücken sichtbar. Vorne wirken seine
Bewegungen aufs Orchester, nach rückwärts auf die Zuhörer. Die eigentlichen An-
ordnungen gibt er mit der Hand allein oder mit Hand und Stab. Diese oder jene
Stimme weckt er plötzlich zum Leben durch eine ganz kleine Bewegung, und was
immer er will, verstummt. So hat er Macht über Leben und Tod der Stimmen. Eine
Stimme, die lange tot ist, kann auf seinen Befehl wieder auferstehen. Die Ver-
schiedenheit der Instrumente steht für die Verschiedenheit der Menschen.« Canetti,
Masse und Macht II (p. 4, note 13), p. 134.
156
Canetti, Crowds and Power (Trans. C. Stewart, p. 46, note 133), p. 395.
54 Part I: Elias Canetti - Anthropology as Literature

Canetti moves successively from one detail to another: first we see the conductor
standing, then we are given another detail, we see the conductor standing alone,
the image of the lonely conductor serves as a metaphor for the ruler per se - the
empirical falls into place with the abstract theory of the exertion of power as
paranoia - his standing alone is blown up, as it were, by the hammering repeti-
tion »es ist auffallend, daß er allein steht« (the English translation has »he is the
only person who stands«, the original, however, says »it is striking - »auffal-
lend« - that he is the only person who stands«). Then we receive another detail,
watching him conducting on a podium with his back turned to the auditorium.
Only then do we hear that the conductor uses a baton by means of which he
gives life to voices. From this portrait of the conductor presiding over the life
and death of his orchestra's instruments, Canetti starts to enlarge upon the gen-
eral process of ruling again, using the image of the instruments as metaphor
(»steht für«) for the variety of human beings which are ruled. Canetti takes his
time, dwelling on each detail of the picture, and he sets down many mil-stops in
order to make the reader pause after every new visual revelation.
This thinking in images is closely connected to Canetti's most salient tech-
nique of making the reader identify with what is described in Crowds and
Power. Geertz, as we have seen, argues that the creation of a sense of »being
there« falls into place with the process of identification between the narration
and the experience of the readership, and here it has been shown that thinking
in images on the part of the writer evokes a similar activity in the reader.
Thinking in images is, however, a very subtle process of identification, and
there are more expressive ones in Crowds and Power. Canetti confronts us
with such expressive attempts at evoking feelings of recognitions and sympa-
thy when he switches from his factual scientific way of writing to an emotive
one. At the end of his description of the self-mutilation of those who celebrate
Muharran, Canetti allows for the emotion of consternation (»Betroffenheit«):
»It is difficult not to be touched by such scenes: one feels at the same time
sympathy, compassion, and terror.«157 However, even this emotional aspect is
not put into a subjective formula like »I am touched« (»Ich bin betroffen«),
rather it is the emotional outburst of all humanity as the »one« (»man«) makes
clear. The reader is directly implicated when Canetti compares the possibility
of the political exertion of power in the >primitive< and even the most recent
past with those offered by modern technology: »What is Dschingis Khan, what
is Tamberlain, what is Hitler, compared with our possibilities: pathetic appren-
tices and amateurs.«158 The »uns« (us) abolishes all distances between the »I«
of the writer and the »we« of his readership.

157
»Es ist schwer, von einer solchen Szene nicht betroffen zu sein: man fühlt Teil-
nahme, Mitleid und Schrecken zugleich.« Canetti, Masse und Macht I (p. 4, note
13), p. 167. My translation.
158
»Was Dschingis Khan! was Tamerlan! was Hitler! - an unseren Möglichkeiten
gemessen, klägliche Lehrlinge und Stümper!« Ibid., II, p. 218. My translation.
3. Canetti 's Literary Devices for the Exertion of Power 55

Canetti also tries to engage the emotions of his readers on an intellectual

level. This is especially the case when we encounter what I shall call a rhetoric
of revelation or discovery. This rhetoric is characterized by special markers in
the text which indicate that something is going to be unveiled which was pre-
viously covered by the darkness of hypocrisy. Here again Canetti discusses a
reality with which most of his readers are familiar, but, as these markers indi-
cate, by whose outward appearance they have been deceived. Words like »in
Wirklichkeit« (»in reality«) or »wirklich« (»really«) make clear that this de-
ception is now going to end. In this context Canetti's discussion of skyscrapers
is perhaps most striking. Canetti reveals that it is not functionality that led to
the building of skyscrapers, but the longing to imitate the smoothness of teeth:
»The uniformity of the whole row of front teeth and the regular spaces be-
tween them stood as models«159 for modern architectural arrangements. Mod-
ern architecture sets out to mirror the smoothness and regularity of teeth:160
Today smoothness has conquered our houses, their walls and all the objects we put
into them; ornament and decoration are despised and regarded as a sign of bad taste.
We speak of function, clarity of line and utility, but what has really triumphed is
smoothness, and the prestige of the power it conceals.161

Canetti debunks the myth of progress within modernity:162 from his perspec-
tive, what is called >primitive< appears to be nothing else but an expression of
aggression. If premodemism was marked by ornamentation, modernity aspires
to be purely functional; however, according to Canetti, this functionality is
nothing other than an indication of power in that the evenness of modern build-
ings copy the smoothness of teeth, which do the work of taking apart, killing
and devouring. By comparing modem architecture with teeth, Canetti again
places his argument in images, saying that modernity, rather than abolishing
brutality, promotes it. He chooses two images with which everyone would be
acquainted, so as to be in direct rapport with his readers. The process of revela-
tion unfolds itself via two pictures. First, we see modern houses and then a
tooth: the one falls in place with the other. Rather than being surrounded by

159
Canetti, Crowds and Power (Trans. C. Stewart, p. 46, note 133), p. 208. »Die
Gleichheit einer ganzen Reihe von Vorderzähnen, die sauberen Abstände, in denen
sie eingesetzt sind, waren vorbildlich für viele Anordnungen.« Canetti, Masse und
Macht I (p. 4, note 13), p. 330.
160
»Heute hat die Glätte auch die Häuser erobert, ihre Mauern, ihre Wände, die Gegen-
stände, die man in sie stellt, Zierat und Schmuck sind verachtet und gelten als Zei-
chen schlechten Geschmacks. Man spricht von Funktion, von Klarheit und Nützlich-
keit, aber was in Wirklichkeit triumphiert hat, ist die Glätte und das geheime Prestige
der Macht, die ihr innewohnt.« Ibid., p. 230.
161
Canetti, Crowds and Power (Trans. C. Stewart, p. 46, note 133), p. 208.
162
Canetti's demystification of the >modem< as the >primitive< has an interesting parallel in
Adorno and Horkheimer's Dialektik der Aujklärung. See Theodor W. Adorno and Max
Horkheimer: Dialektik der Aufklärung. Philosophische Fragmente. Frankfurt a. M.: Fi-
scher Taschenbuch Verlag 1996 (Fischer Taschenbücher Wissenschaft; 7404).
56 Part I: Elias Canetti - Anthropology as Literature

clarity or functionality, modem people are almost constantly confronted with

teeth on a superhuman scale, which symbolize the power and the desire to eat
every living being to its utter annihilation. Markers like »in Wirklichkeit« em-
phasize this process of revelation.163
At this point it is worthwhile asking what Canetti intends by these clamorous
revelation markers. Surely the emphasis on discovery cannot only be driven by
an impulse to excel intellectually; rather, Canetti wants to sensitize his readers as
to the unnaturalness of many appearances, or forms of behavior which are usu-
ally taken to be natural or normative. Strikingly, before embarking on an analysis
of the psychology of commands, Canetti quotes the »An order is an order«164
(»Befehl ist Befehl«) slogan,165 telling of the acceptance of orders as something
naturally given, something which one cannot do without:166 »They [commands]
seem to us as natural as they are necessary and we accept them as something
which has always existed.«167 In this way Canetti claims that the >common
readen lives in a world in which commands, of whatever kind, are received as
the natural, as something one cannot do without (»unentbehrlich«).
It is one of the main aims of Crowds and Power to put an end to this naturali-
zation of the culturally constructed, and Canetti does so by defamiliarizing the
reader's perception of objects or forms of behavior with which he seems to be
familiar.168 We have already seen an example of such defamiliarization in the
image of modem buildings which turn out to be teeth. Crowds and Power
abounds in examples of this kind. After having claimed that revulsion at collec-
tive killings was only born with modernity, Canetti turns this thesis on its head
by arguing that reading a newspaper is a far more comfortable and effective form
of participating in killings than the old one of the public execution:169

163
For a similar form of the revelationary marker see Canetti's opening paragraph to
the chapter »Überleben als Leidenschaft«, where he is at pains to make it clear that
he discovers the true motive which makes ordinary people turn into heroes. See
Canetti, Masse und Macht I (p. 4, note 13), p. 253; see also the revelation of the
motive behind the bushmen's metamorphosis into animals (ibid., II, p. 72), or the
revelation of the melancholic's refusal to eat as driven by the fear of being eaten
by the food one eats (ibid., p. 79).
164
Canetti, Crowds and Power (Trans. C. Stewart, p. 46, note 133), p. 303.
165
Canetti, Masse und Macht II (p. 4, note 13), p. 29.
166
»Man nimmt ihn [den Befehl] hin als etwas, das immer so da war, er erscheint so
natürlich wie unentbehrlich.« Ibid.
167
Canetti, Crowds and Power (Trans. C. Stewart, p. 46, note 133), p. 303.
168
Canetti's technique of defamiliarization might have been influenced by Nietzsche,
who interprets »apparently harmless or benevolent activities in such a way as to
disclose an underlying will to power«. See Ritchie Robertson: Between Freud and
Nietzsche. Canetti's Crowds and Power. In: R. Robertson / Edward Timms (Ed.):
Psychoanalysis in its Cultural Context. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 1992
(Austrian Studies; III), p. 109-124, p. 116.
169
»Der Abscheu vor dem Zusammentöten ist ganz modernen Datums. Man über-
schätze ihn nicht. Auch heute nimmt jeder an öffentlichen Hinrichtungen teil durch
3. Canetti 's Literary Devices for the Exertion of Power 57

Disgust at collective killing is of very recent date and should not be over-estimated.
Today everyone takes part in public executions through the newspapers. Like every-
thing else, however, it is more comfortable than it was. We sit peacefully at home and,
out of a hundred details, can choose those to linger over which offer a special thrill.
We only applaud when everything is over and there is no feeling of guilty connivance
to spoil our pleasure. We are not responsible for the sentence, nor for the journalists
who report its execution, nor for the papers which print them. [...] The baiting crowd is
preserved in the newspaper reading public, in a milder form it is true, but, because of
its distance from events, a more irresponsible one. One is tempted to say that it is the
most despicable and, at the same time, most stable form of such a crowd.170

The liberal, bourgeois newspaper reader suddenly appears to be a voyeuristic par-

ticipant in collective killings, a participant who takes no responsibility for what he
sees and hears. Rather than being a means for both enlightenment and democratic
involvement of every citizen in the political affairs of the world, the newspaper is
exposed as a show of factual deeds of horror that cater to the sadistic drives of its
readers. The civilized newspaper reader emerges as a monster. Once more a mod-
ern institution comes to light in its >true< archaic form. In a similar way Canetti
deprives the French revolution of all its progressive agenda, defamiliarizing it as
simply an urge to kill; it does not matter whether the revolutionaries discharge their
aggression on aristocrats or whether they cause a blood-bath among hares.171 A
modern invention that testifies to man's ability to control fire also appears in an
opposite, an archaic, light: a match-box turns out to be a remnant of the monolithic
forest fire, it is again a familiar object which every reader can carry in his pocket
(»Einen kleinen Überrest dieser wichtigen, alten Zusammenhänge trägt heute jeder
Mensch in seiner Tasche herum: die Zündholzschachtel.«).172
Defamiliarization of processes which concern the everyday life of the > com-
mon reader< is most striking in the chapters which go under the heading »The
Entrails of Power« (»Die Eingeweide der Macht«). Here again Canetti begins his
discussion by claiming that eating, the acts of apprehending and devouring food,
are nothing out of the ordinary for the reader:173 »The psychology of seizing and

die Zeitung. Man hat es nur, wie alles, viel bequemer. Man sitzt in Ruhe bei sich
und kann unter hundert Einzelheiten bei denen verweilen, die einen besonders er-
regen. Man akklamiert erst, wenn alles vorüber ist, nicht die leiseste Spur von Mit-
schuld trübt den Genuß. Man ist für nichts verantwortlich, nicht fürs Urteil, nicht
für den Augenzeugen, nicht für seinen Bericht und auch nicht für die Zeitung, die
den Bericht gedruckt hat. [...] Im Publikum der Zeitungsleser hat sich eine gemil-
derte, aber durch ihre Distanz von den Ereignissen um so verantwortungslosere
Hetzmasse am Leben erhalten, man wäre versucht zu sagen, ihre verächtlichste
und zugleich stabilste Form.« Canetti, Masse und Macht I (p. 4, note 13), p. 54.
170
Canetti, Crowds and Power (Trans. C. Stewart, p. 46, note 133), p. 52.
171
Canetti, Masse und Macht I (p. 4, note 13), p. 61.
172
Ibid., p. 85.
173
»Die Psychologie des Ergreifens und Einverleibens - wie die des Essens im allge-
meinen - ist noch völlig ununtersucht; es ist uns da alles extrem verständlich.«
Ibid., I, p. 223.
58 Part I: Elias Canetti - Anthropology as Literature

incorporating, like that of eating in general, is still completely unexplored. We

tend to take the whole process for granted.«174 However, by using words like
»ergreifen« (»seizing«) or »einverleiben« (»devouring«) Canetti evokes the
image of the hunt, rather than that of a civilized meal, thus defamiliarizing
modern eating-habits from the start. Yet Canetti does not analyze our customs
of eating in great detail; instead he concentrates on the result of the devouring
of food: he dwells on the importance of faeces in everyday life. For Canetti
faeces are all-important, because it is part of a reality we wish to ignore; from
Canetti's perspective, this is an indication of our guilt. According to Canetti,
faeces evince human cruelty; it proves that we are murderers, since it produces
the once living being in a lifeless form of which man frees himself in a toilet.
As a betrayal of murder, faeces also bear witness to the presence of the exer-
tion of power in the private life of all of us:175
But, quite apart from the person who wields power and knows how to concentrate so
much in his two hands, the relation of each and every man to his own excrement be-
longs to the sphere of power.176
Although faeces bear witness to most atrocious crimes, although it turns the
reader into a murderer, it is accepted as something self-evident. Canetti stres-
ses the acceptance of the criminal as the natural; the exertion of power forms
part of the everyday reality of the >common readen, and it is unconsciously
taken for granted:177
It [the process of power] is so much a matter of course, so automatic and so far be-
yond consciousness, that one underrates its importance. One tends to see only the
thousand tricks of power which are enacted above ground; but these are the least
part of it. Underneath, day in, day out, is digestion and again digestion.178
Behind this defamiliarization lies Canetti's aim to alert the reader to fascism in
what is considered >normality<. In the image of faeces, Canetti presents his ar-
gument according to which fascism still lives with us, that it forms part of our
daily reality and here again the reader is immediately implicated:179

174
Canetti, Crowds and Power (Trans. C. Stewart, p. 46, note 133), p. 203.
175
»Aber auch abgesehen vom Machthaber, der so viel in seiner Hand zu konzentrie-
ren versteht, gehört die Beziehung jedes Menschen zum eigenen Kot in die Sphäre
der Macht.« Canetti, Masse und Macht I (p. 4, note 13), p. 232.
176
Canetti, Crowds and Power (Trans. C. Stewart, p. 46, note 133), p. 210.
177
»Er [der Vorgang der Macht] ist so selbstverständlich, selbsttätig und jenseits alles
Bewußten, daß man seine Bedeutung unterschätzt. Man neigt dazu, nur die tau-
sendfachen Spaße der Macht zu sehen, die sich oberirdisch abspielen; aber sie sind
ihr kleinster Teil. Darunter wird tagaus, tagein verdaut und weiterverdaut.« Canet-
ti, Masse und Macht I (p. 4, note 13), p. 232.
178
Canetti, Crowds and Power (Trans. C. Stewart, p. 46, note 133), p. 210.
179
»Der Kot, der von allem übrigbleibt, ist mit unserer ganzen Blutschuld beladen. An
ihm läßt sich erkennen, was wir gemordet haben. Er ist die zusammengepreßte
Summe sämtlicher Indizien gegen uns. Als unsere tägliche, fortgesetzte, als unsere
3. Canetti 's Literary Devices for the Exertion of Power 59

The excrement, which is what remains of all this, is loaded with our whole blood
guilt. By it we know what we have murdered. It is the compressed sum of all the
evidence against us. It is our daily and continuing sin and, as such, it stinks and cries
to heaven.180

The »wir«, »uns« and »unsere« comprizes the whole of humanity in quotidian
murder that cries out to heaven. Canetti's religious language here moves him in
close vicinity to Karl Kraus, one of whose satirical techniques it is to contrast the
criminal dirt of human legality with the purity of divine justice. In part III I shall
discuss in what way Canetti religious indictment of the eating of meat harks back
to the books of Genesis and Leviticus. As in Swift's and in Kraus's satire, de-
familiarization in Crowds and Power serves as a means of making the readers
feel homeless in a world in which they might have thought themselves to be at
home. In general, defamiliarization, like satire, tries to make the readers restless
so that they have the impetus to change aspects in their society against which an
ethical or religious sensibility revolts.181 Canetti also focuses attention on > little
details< like the nervous play of the hands as an unconscious urge to seize and to
devour, on knives and forks as killing instruments, on the elastic tension of the
cushion of the easy chair which mirrors that of living flesh.182
By defamiliarizing familiar objects or familiar ways of behavior,183 Canetti
works on the way his reader perceives reality, and in doing so he opens up
their perceptive faculties to the possibility of reliving what appears to be harm-
less normality< as a shock. Such shock experiences indeed permeate Crowds
and Power, and in order to make their impact more forceful, Canetti often
picks out an acceptable form of human behavior like the reading of newspa-
pers, or even endearing activities like fondling, only in order to reveal a dark
aspect which is then described as the main motive: so the tender activity of
fondling serves as an exercize in the delicacy of the hands for destructive pur-
poses.184 In the same manner, Canetti first comments on aspects in >primitive<
cultures which might be seen as paths to the undoing of the proper functioning
of the machinations of power, but later on he characterizes these aspects as
sinister, thus disappointing the hopes which we might have had. In his discus-
sion about the Klagemeute (lamenting-crowd), Canetti argues, that those who
lament refuse to accept the death of a member of their community,185 and in

nie unterbrochene Sünde stinkt und schreit er zum Himmel.« Canetti, Masse und
Macht I (p. 4, note 13), p. 233.
180
Canetti, Crowds and Power (Trans. C. Stewart, p. 46, note 133), p. 211.
181
For a discussion of the connection between the trope of defamiliarization and the
concept of transformation see Tony Bennett: Formalism and Marxism. London: Me-
thuen 1979.
182
Canetti, Masse und Macht I (p. 4, note 13), p. 242, 247, 129.
183
Ritchie Robertson has emphasized the importance of defamiliarization in Masse und
Macht. See Robertson, Canetti as Anthropologist (p. 48, note 137), p. 132-145, p. 141.
184
Canetti, Masse und Macht I (p. 4, note 13), p. 241-242.
185
Ibid., p. 160.
60 Part l: Elias Canetti - Anthropology as Literature

his aphorisms he even argues that the lamentation-crowd aims at resuscitation.186

Yet in Crowds and Power Canetti turns this hopeful aspect into something hope-
less: he writes that lamentation serves as a liberation from pent-up feelings of
guilt for the act of killing. As a liberation from guilt, lamentation promotes the
perpetuation of murder, rather than refusing the acceptance of death:187 »Thus it
appears that religions of lament will continue to be indispensable to the psychic
economy of men for as long as they remain unable to renounce pack killing.«188
Another device for shocking the reader is to concentrate almost exclusively on
the bleak, brutal aspects of >primitive< culture, while neglecting alternative mod-
els that might inspire hope in man's creative and peaceful faculties. This will be
discussed in the following section of chapter 3.3.

3.2 Canetti's Use of Philosophical and Anthropological Literature189

Before showing how Canetti turns theories which he finds in anthropological

books on their head, it is important to demonstrate how Crowds and Power is
based on ideas about which its author keeps silent. This exemplifies Canetti's
anxiety about giving the impression of developing theories. He wants to pre-
sent >empirical< facts rather than theories. I shall show how he does not refer to
any theories in his anthropological and philosophical sources so as to be seem-
ingly engaged with facts alone.
First of all there is Canetti's debt to Freud, a debt that not only has to do
with a similar form of a kind of >modern< enlightenment,190 or with a similar
way of writing that sets out to understand the >normal< via an analysis of the
>abnormal< (in this context it is not accidental that the two writers write about
megalomaniac psychopath Schreber)191 but also with a substantial matter of a
concept of human behavior which underpins the description of mass-formation
in Crowds and Power. Both writers focus on psychic drives and call them by the
same word, namely, »Bedürfnisse« (»needs«): in his discussion of the Hetz-
186
Canetti, Aufzeichnungen 1942-1985 (p. 4, note 13), p. 253.
187
»Es zeigt sich so, daß die Klagereligionen für den seelischen Haushalt der Men-
schen unentbehrlich sind, solange sie das Töten in Meuten nicht aufgeben kön-
nen.« Canetti, Masse und Macht I (p. 4, note 13), p. 161.
188
Canetti, Crowds and Power (Trans. C. Stewart, p. 46, note 133), p. 145.
189
My discussion of anthropological and philosophical contexts of Masse und Macht
is not all-encompassing. For a reference to further contexts see Robertson, Canetti
as Anthropologist (p. 48, note 137), p. 143.
190
For a discussion of Freud's and Canetti's belief that the recognition of bestiality
leads to the taming of regression see Gerald Stieg: Canetti und die Psychoanalyse.
Das Unbehagen in der Kultur und Die Blendung. In: Stevens / Wagner, Elias Ca-
netti (p. 17, note 31), p. 60-73.
191
For a discussion of Freud's attempt to understand the >normal< from the perspecti-
ve of the >abnormal< see Mario Erdheim: Canetti und Freud als Leser von Schre-
bers Denkwürdigkeiten eines Nervenkranken. In: Akzente 3 (1995), p. 232-252.
3. Canetti 's Literary Devices for the Exertion of Power 61

masse (rabble-rousing crowd), Canetti speaks of the »Bedürfnis« not to kill on

one's own and this »Bedürfnis« caused the existence of collective killing
crowds.192 Canetti's usage of the word »need« has, however, satirical under-
tones: it partakes of his shocking depiction of human nature. Freud also argues
that there is a human need to lose one's identity in a crowd as this immersion
in a >mass< originates in a libidinal urge (»[...] weil ein Bedürfnis bei ihm [den
Einzelnen] besteht, eher im Einvernehmen mit ihnen als im Gegensatz zu ih-
nen zu sein [...]«).193 Interestingly, Canetti takes up Freud's notion of an intrin-
sic urge within the human psyche which makes most people want to lose their
individuality in crowd gatherings: Crowds and Power opens with a discussion
of the crowd as an abolishment of the burden of distance that causes feelings of
loneliness and general unhappiness; the immersion into a >mass< of people satis-
fies the libidinal needs for contact, the anxiety about contact having proved to
be unsustainable.
One fundamental difference between Freud's and Canetti's treatment of the
attitude of the mass to the leader needs to be emphazised. Borch-Jacobsen has
shown that Freud - standing in the tradition of Gabriel Tarde and William
Me Dougall - affirms the power of the leader by calling the relation between
the Führer and the masses a libidinal bond or an emotional tie. In contrast to
Moscovici, Borch-Jacobsen demonstrates that »Freud did not so much ana-
lyze totalitarian fantasies] as subscribe to« them.194 Hitler has demonstrated
that the >love< the leader shows to the masses functions as a cover for his
death wishes. Canetti responds to the Holocaust by investigating the link
between the leader, the masses and death. In concentration camps people are
coerced to work for their own destruction and/or the destruction of their
comrades through the threat of immediate murder. One can therefore speak
of a policy of >postponed death<, which proves Canetti's view of the masses,
death and power right, especially in relation to the Holocaust. The masses
about which Canetti writes are not the masses with which Freud is con-
cerned. Canetti's crowds are the piles of corpses that are daily produced in
the death-machineries of the Nazis.
There is also Canetti's debt to Le Bon's La Foule. Le Bon firmly establishes
a link between power and crowds which constitutes the title of Crowds and
Power. Le Bon characterizes >modernity< as the age which only knows one
form of power, namely, that of the crowds:

192
Canetti, Masse und Macht I (p. 4, note 13), p. 50.
193
Sigmund Freud: Kulturtheoretische Schriften. Frankfurt a. M.: S. Fischer 1986,
p. 87.
194
Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen: The Emotional Tie. Psychoanalysis, Mimesis, and Affect.
Stanford California: Standford University Press 1992, p. 26. McClelland contrasts
Canetti's approach with both Le Bon's and Freud's. McClelland, The Place of
Elias Canetti's Crowds and Power in the History of Western Social and Political
Thought (p. 4, note 15), p. 20.
62 Part I: Elias Canetti - Anthropology as Literature

[...] it is already clear that on whatever lines the societies of the future are organised,
they will have to count with one power, with the last surviving sovereign force of
modern times, the power of crowds. On the ruins of so many ideas formerly consid-
ered beyond discussion, and today decayed or decaying, of so many sources of au-
thority that successive revolutions have destroyed, this power which alone has arisen
in their stead, seems soon destined to absorb the others.195
Like Canetti, Le Bon pays no attention to the substance of any creed. What
matters for the two theorists is the psychology of the crowd: both see social
movements only as an opportunity for crowd gathering, whatever the political
aims of these movements are. Although Le Bon distinguishes between the
outcome of different mass formations - calling them either >criminal< or >he-
roic< - he does not perceive any difference in the psychology that drives all
forms of crowd gatherings. La Foule might also have encouraged Canetti to
focus on mass-formation in order to succeed in »laying his hands on the throat
of the twentieth-century«, since Le Bon makes it clear that the increase of the
number of people in a given community is the most striking feature in moder-
nity, writing »that for a while the philosophy of number seems the only phi-
losophy of history«.196 Consequently, Le Bon does not take any social events
seriously as a manifestation of a genuine political or metaphysical concept; in-
stead he treats any type of theoretical argumentation quantitatively rather than
qualitatively. In the discussion of totemism in Crowds and Power, we shall see
that Canetti does the same. Before Le Bon (1895), however, Tolstoy empha-
sized the importance of the masses for an understanding of modernity. In War
and Peace (1868/69) Tolstoy establishes a link between crowd and power: »The
strength of the justification of the man who stands at the head of the movement
grows with the increased size of the group.«197 As a reaction against the Holo-
caust, Canetti bases this connection between the power of the ruler and the
masses on the grounds of death: individuals exert power via the threat of death
to a large number of people.
Canetti might have found inspiration in La Foule to use accounts of >primi-
tive< societies as an illustration of how power works in modernity. Le Bon is
quite straightforward in his characterization of the crowd as the >primitive<:
»In this respect a crowd is closely akin to quite primitive beings.«198 Neverthe-
less Le Bon calls some forms of mass-formation in modern society a regres-
sion into the neolithic, whereas for Canetti the >modern< is only an intensifica-
tion of the violence within the the >primitive<. In contrast to Canetti, Le Bon
belongs to the school of evolutionism, the theoretical elements of which will
be discussed in chapter 4.3. Canetti describes the >modem< as a form of the
195
Gustave Le Bon: The Crowd. A Study of the Popular Mind. London: T. Fisher
Unwinl930, p. 14-15.
196
Ibid., p. 19.
197
Leo N. Tolstoy: War and Peace. Trans, by A. Maude. Oxford: Oxford University
Press 1958, Vol. Ill, p. 427.
198
Le Bon, The Crowd (note 195, above), p. 40.
3. Canetti 's Literary Devices for the Exertion of Power 63

>primitive<, undermining the nineteenth-century mode of evolutionary thinking

to which Le Bon adheres.
Canetti owes a far greater intellectual debt to Steiner than to Tolstoy, Le
Bon, or Freud. This has already been touched upon in the comparison between
Steiner's definition of the Dichter as the »einzige Hüter der Mythen aller Völ-
ker« and that of Canetti as the »Hüter der Verwandlung«. Likewise, Canetti's
discussion of »Massensymbole« (»crowd symbols«) can be better understood
by taking into account Steiner's theory of man's internalization of natural phe-
nomena. Steiner argues that in >primitive< cultures man avoids danger in nature
by keeping a distance from it - this kind of danger behavior he calls taboo
behavior (as will be discussed in the following chapters on Steiner's anthro-
pology) - whereas the >primitive< did not destroy dangerous sites in nature, the
>moderns< do destroy them. The outcome of such destruction is, however, not
the removal of threats; rather, man internalizes what he has eliminated in na-
ture. Thus, according to Steiner, the process of civilization unfolds a dialectic
of eradication and internalization; it removes mature's demons<, but only in
the external world: the dialectic of this process moves the demonic from the
sphere of nature into the sphere of man. As a consequence, contemporary civi-
lization does not need to be afraid so much of natural catastrophes, as of disas-
ters perpetrated by man alone.
Steiner's >civilising process< evolves in three stages: it starts with a neo-
lithic society that keeps a distance from dangers, while not actually destroying
them; it then moves on to modern society in which these dangerous spots are
eliminated, and at the same time internalized; and it closes in a future state in
which every individual is able to externalize the demons that he introjected
from nature in forms of mass-destructive weapons. According to Steiner the
>civilising process< does not control, or eliminate danger; on the contrary, it
faciliates its progress, marching into the heart of every living being. As I shall
show in the following chapter, Steiner discusses this point in his aphoristic
essay »About the Process of Civilisation« (1944).
Steiner's concept of civilization presupposes a theory of internalization. A
similar theory of internalization enables a better understanding of Canetti's
term »Symbol« in Crowds and Power. This can be illustrated by Canetti's
description of tribal fire-dancing. According to Canetti those who dance
around fire become fire by introjecting its external qualities. Canetti draws on
Hambly's Tribal Dancing and Social Development in order to illustrate his
theory of introjection. Yet he does not quote Hambly - he only refers to him in
his footnotes - and instead gives his own description of the Navajos' dancing.
In this description he formulates his thesis of the internalising of fire as fol-
lows: »They dance fire, they become fire. Their movements are those of
flames.«199 At no point of his account of the Navajos' fire-rites does Hambly

199
»Sie tanzen das Feuer selbst, sie werden zu Feuer. Ihre Bewegungen sind die von
Flammen.« Canetti, Masse und Macht I (p. 4, note 13), p. 86. My translation.
64 Part I: Ellas Canetti - Anthropology as Literature

say that the Indians dance the fire, or even that they become fire; he only de-
scribes how the dancers set their feathers alight, and how they lower and raise
the symbol of the sun.200 Here it can be seen how, as has been discussed in the
last section of this chapter, Canetti turns accounts found in anthropological
literature into thick descriptions of his own, and how he puts forward theories
while dealing with processes and facts found in empirical reality as narrated by
anthropologists. Above all, it can be seen how he argues in such a way that his
readers become hardly aware that they are being confronted with a new theory.
Canetti hides his theory of internalization by using an unsuspicious name: he
seems to call the process of the Navajos' turning into fire a >symbol<. A sym-
bol, however, is a signifying entity and in this signifying performance there is
always a split between the signified and the signifier; the two never quite meet,
there always remains a difference. Hence Canetti's seemingly ordinary use of
>symbol< conceals a further layer of meaning, the actual substance of his the-
ory. To be more precise, Canetti never calls the process of introjection a sym-
bol; instead, he depicts this process as driven by the urge to re-enliven a natu-
ral phenomenon that has become a symbol of something man desires to be.
Canetti rarely mentions a word that would imply any form of development: the
chapter-heading itself reads »Massensymbole« rather than, say, »the metamor-
phosis into a symbol of the masses«. Man derives the idea of forming crowds
from contemplating fire, and by actually constructing crowd-identities, he has
appropriated the symbol for what it stood. By turning into a crowd, man has
mentally metamorphosed into fire, which symbolizes mass gatherings. As will
be discussed below, whereas Steiner relegates to the >modern< the tendency of
internalising natural demons and then re-enlivening them by translating natural
phenomena into the sphere of the human, Canetti does not emphasize a differ-
ence between the neolithic and the contemporary.201
Nevertheless, Canetti outlines a historical demarcation, but this demarcation
is only mentioned once, and it is so subtle that the reader hardly realizes it.
Canetti, drawing on Steiner's concept of taboo behavior, argues that at the very
early stages of human society, man, like the animal, fled from fire:202

200 \y-jifrjd D. Hambly: Tribal Dancing and Social Development. With a Preface by
Charles Hose. London: H. F. & G. Witherby 1926, p. 238-239.
201
For an example of how Canetti depicts the introjection of fire into man as a phe-
nomenon that permeates world-history see Canetti, Masse und Macht I (p. 4,
note 13), p. 86.
202
»Die Tiere fliehen aus dem brennenden Wald. Massenangst ist die natürliche, man
möchte sagen die ewige Reaktion der Tiere auf große Feuer, und es war auch ein-
mal die Reaktion des Menschen. Dieser aber hat sich des Feuers bemächtigt, er
hält den Brand in seiner Hand, und er muß ihn nicht furchten. Über die alte Angst
hat sich die neue Macht gelagert, und beide sind ein erstaunliches Bündnis einge-
gangen. Die Masse, die vor Feuer früher davonjagte, fühlt sich jetzt aufs stärkste
von ihm angezogen.« Ibid., p. 84.
3. Canetti 's Literary Devices for the Exertion of Power 65

Animals flee from the burning forest; mass fear is the natural and perpetual reaction of
animals to large fires; and it was once man's reaction too. But man has taken posses-
sion of fire. He holds the firebrand in his hands and he does not need to fear it. His new
power has overlaid his old fear, and the two of them have entered into a strange alli-
ance. The crowd which used to run from fire now feels strongly attracted by it.203

Like Franz Steiner, Canetti argues that the control of nature's demons leads to
dangerous situations within human society: the violent in nature, once it has
been domesticated by man, becomes internalized in the human soul until it
breaks out in forms of weapons and other means for destructive ends. Conse-
quently both writers perceive man as deeply influenced by the surrounding
objects with which he seeks contact. This can be seen in the parallelism which
Canetti establishes between the domination of fire and the fear of it (»Dieser
aber hat sich des Feuers bemächtigt, er hat den Brand in seiner Hand, und er
muß ihn fürchten.«) The domination of what is frightening replaces fear - fear
that according to Steiner motivates danger behavior - with a feeling of power,
which in turn paves the way to the introjection of dangerous objects that are
now regarded as harmless to the one who mentally takes in their brutal mecha-
nizations. The absence of fear (Ȇber die alte Angst hat sich die neue Macht
gelagert«) increases the necessity of being afraid.This point will be discussed
in detail in both part II and part III. Like Steiner in his aphorisms, Canetti
argues in Crowds and Power that the control over nature's demons provokes
the desire in man to become like the monsters which he has subdued: those
who escaped from fire, now, after having learned to dominate it, turn into it,
are part of it (»Die Masse, die vor dem Feuer früher davonjagte, fühlt sich jetzt
auf das stärkste von ihm angezogen«).
Yet there are differences between Steiner's and Canetti's treatment of inter-
nalization: as part of his >working-through< approach to the Holocaust, Steiner
focuses on alternative models, whereas Canetti, on the other hand, devotes ample
space to what Steiner finds only in >developed< Western societies. Whereas
Steiner critically appreciates >primitive< societies that still avoid danger in nature
by keeping a distance from it, Canetti uses examples of these >primitive< socie-
ties (like the Navajos) as an illustration for what takes place when crowds gather
in >modern< civilizations. For Steiner the fire-rite of the Navajos would not have
been an example of the introjection of nature's demons; instead, the use of fire-
arms (or guns) with which the Indians were defeated by their European conquer-
ors would have been one; for Steiner, internalising the demons of nature auto-
matically leads to externalization by means of mechanical reproduction (guns,
bombs etc., i. e. all human products that work with fire). This again indicates that
Canetti wants to refrain from introducing alternatives to the violence described in
Crowds and Power. It also shows that he does not want to present his theories as
theories: the theses advanced in Crowds and Power purport to be objective

203
Canetti, Crowds and Power (Trans. C. Stewart, p. 46, note 133), p. 77. Translation
modified.
66 Part I: Elias Canetti - Anthropology as Literature

truths<, which is why they are clothed in empirical images of facts. Had Canetti
mentioned Steiner's concept of the internalization of nature's demons, he would
have weakened the impression of >objective< truth that he so tenaciously tries to
maintain in Crowds and Power. By keeping silent about everything that smacks
of theory, Canetti affirms his authority.
Not only does Canetti try to cover the theoretical approach of his writing,
but he also endeavors to turn upside down the theories put forward in the an-
thropological books he refers to: in the footnotes of Crowds and Power the
reader finds a number of books that are enlisted as giving evidence for the
>objective< and truthful character of what is described in the main text, and yet
it is only after having read these books that the reader realizes in what way
Canetti selects pieces of information or even contradicts the theories put for-
ward in his >source-material <. Canetti sets out to present numerous examples of
anthropological writing as >empirical data<, but the anthropologists on whom
he draws have often themselves distinctive theories which do not fit what is
offered in Crowds and Power as presentations of >factual reality<. A sensitive
reader such as the poet Durs Grünbein has seen that the >primitive< in Crowds
and Power sheds a disturbing light on the more efficient use of violence in
>modern< society. Grünbein has pointed out that Canetti's matter of fact treat-
ment of most horrifying forms of human brutality only increases the urge to
change radically the status quo of what constitutes >normality<.204
In order to declare a shocking perspective on humanity an >objective< reality,
Canetti has to be selective in the employment of facts gathered from anthropo-
logical books, and indeed he reflects on his method of selection in Nachträge aus
Hampstead: »I must have the courage to select what appears to me to be impor-
tant and significant. I must risk being called an ignoramus by all specialists of all
research areas.« 205 Canetti uses the word courage for this attempt at selection,
indicating that this selective procedure could lead to the suspicion of a non-
scholarly or non-scientific method. This shows just how aware the author of
Crowds and Power is about his preference for an ethical agenda over purely aca-
demic considerations: out of this urge to have an impact on his readership's ethi-
cal way of thinking, Canetti risks (»riskieren«) being called an ignoramus by
specialists. According to Canetti, such >specialists< seem to inhabit a closed
world, in which they communicate with each other; Crowds and Power, on the
other hand, is written for the common reader. Indeed, Canetti makes every effort
not to deter the common reader with a huge scholarly apparatus. This is borne
out by the fact that he never puts footnotes in the main text, instead annotations
204
Durs Grünbein: Wir Buschmänner. Erinnerungen an eine Lektüre. In: D. Grünbein:
Galilei vermißt Dantes Hölle und bleibt an den Maßen hängen. Aufsätze 1989-1995.
Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp 1996, p. 197-209.
205
» Ich muß weiter den Mut haben auszuwählen, was mir wichtig und bezeichnend
erscheint. Ich muß es riskieren, von sämtlichen Spezialisten sämtlicher Gebiete als
Ignorant verschrien zu werden.« Elias Canetti: Nachträge aus Hampstead. Auf-
zeichnungen 1954-1971. München: Hanser 1994, p. 21. My translation.
3. Canetti 's Literary Devices for the Exertion of Power 67

are hidden at the end of the book, where reference is also made to the page of the
main text; the main text itself does not give any indication of an apparatus.206
Against this background it is surprising that no attempt has been made in
Canetti-criticism to compare the argument in Crowds and Power with anthropo-
logical books which, as Canetti purports, serve only to give much empirical
evidence for the >truth< of what has been revealed in Crowds and Power itself.207
If one compares in detail the main text of Crowds and Power with the books to
which the footnotes or the bibliography refer, one cannot fail to notice Canetti's
technique of keeping silent about the selection of, and contradiction with, other
forms of anthropological literature. In the following section I shall discuss Ca-
netti's treatment of various texts within a thematic framework, starting with
metamorphosis, moving on to death, and closing with power and authority.

3.3 Metamorphosis and Totemism

Totemism is a form of metamorphosis: in totemic rites man is assumed to

undergo a metamorphosis into an animal or plant. The issues of metamorpho-
sis, transformation, myth and folklore are closely linked to the theme of totem-
ism. A comparison between the discussion of totemism and »Verwandlung« in
Crowds and Power, and the books which the footnotes cite at relevant points,
offers a variety of examples of Canetti's method of selecting and reinterpreting
anthropological theories. He interprets totemism as driven by man's urge to
increase the number of members of a given community. Animals are more nu-
merous than the human population. Canetti interprets man's desire to compete
with the increase in animal population as the only reason for totemism. Hence
Canetti views totemism as a quantitative instead of a qualitative phenomenon.
This quantitative interpretation of totemism distinguishes Canetti from his sou-
rces. Indeed he subjects his favorite term »Verwandlung« to the same quantita-
tive reduction. In Crowds and Power, »Verwandlung« is closely connected
with »Vermehrung« (»increase«):
This metamorphosis, which as well-guarded tradition, as a totem, denotes a kinship
of certain human beings with kangaroos, also means a connection with their num-
bers. The number of kangaroos was always greater than that of human beings; their
increase was desired, and it was connected with that of man. If they increased, he in-
creased too. The increase of the totem-animal was identical with his own. The co-
gency of this connection between metamorphosis and increase cannot be overesti-
mated: they go hand in hand. 208
206
This is a common elegant method: Canetti might have followed the example of
Georg Simmel.
207
Robertson has argued that such a comparison would yield fruitful results. Robert-
son, Canetti as Anthropologist (p. 48, note 137), p. 132-142.
208
»Diese Verwandlung, die als wohlbehütete Tradition, als Totem eine Verwandschaft
bestimmter Menschen mit den Känguruhs bezeichnete, bedeutete auch eine Ver-
68 Part I: Elias Canetti - Anthropology as Literature

Canetti is here writing about totemic rites in Australia. As we shall see, all an-
thropologists who discuss Australian forms of totemism come to more positive
conclusions about human nature than Canetti. According to this extract, totem-
ism originates in man's desire to become more powerful by dint of an increase in
numbers. One could argue that the word »also« (»auch«) indicates Canetti's to-
leration vis-ä-vis other interpretations and yet acknowledgement of the existence
of alternative aspects of totemism is rarely voiced in Crowds and Power.
The chapter in Crowds and Power on »Die Verwandlung« opens with an
account of metamorphosis in Bushman-culture, and from the outset Canetti
discusses metamorphosis not as a form of qualitative or inward change, but as
a capability which endowed man with power over the animal kingdom. Canetti
goes on to praise »Verwandlung« as a process that helps to promote man's best
intentions, and yet no word is voiced that might describe in what exactly the
>best< consists (»Aber wenige legen sich Rechenschaft darüber ab, daß sie ihr
[der Verwandlung] das Beste von dem, was sie sind, verdanken.«).209 This
corresponds to the methodology employed throughout Crowds and Power, as
Ritchie Robertson has pointed out, »Canetti moves from evolutionary anthro-
pology to symbolic anthropology without paying any attention to structural-
functionalist explanations«.210 In the second paragraph of this chapter (on Ver-
wandlung), Lloyd and B leek's book on Bushman-Folklore is praised as the
most valuable document of man's history,211 but all we learn of the bushman's
outstanding achievements is his excellence in sensing the whereabouts of the
animal he is going to kill. The treatment of Lloyd and Bleek reveals indeed
how selectively Canetti makes use of the factual material presented in anthro-
pological literature. As will be shown below, Lloyd and Bleek's collection of
bushmen-myths in fact offers a variety of alternatives to the subjection of the

bindung mit ihrer Zahl. Sie war immer größer als die der Menschen; ihre Zunahme
war erwünscht, sie war verbunden mit der des Menschen. Wenn sie sich vermehr-
ten, vermehrte sich auch er. Die Vermehrung des Totemtiers war identisch mit sei-
ner. Die Stärke dieses Zusammenhangs zwischen Verwandlung und Vermehrung
kann also nicht unterschätzt werden: sie gehen Hand in Hand.« Canetti, Masse und
Macht I (p. 4, note 13), p. 121. My translation.
209
Ibid., p. 66.
210
Robertson, Canetti äs Anthropologist (p. 48, note 137), p. 139.
211
Canetti and Steiner indeed highly valued Bleek and Lloyd's Specimens of Bush-
man Folklore. Canetti emphasizes their shared high regard for the Specimens as
follows: »Unter all diesen Tagen der Suche kam einer, an dem ich ihm [Steiner]
Specimens of Bushmen Folklore von Bleek und Lloyd zeigen konnte, eine der Herr-
lichkeiten der Weltliteratur, ohne die ich nicht leben möchte. Ich hatte es eben ge-
funden, [...], er wollte es nicht glauben, ich hielt es ihm hin, er blätterte mit - buch-
stäblich - zitternden Händen die Seiten um und gratulierte mir - nun, wie man ei-
nem zu einem wesentlichen Lebensereignis gratuliert.« Canetti, Aufzeichnungen
1992-1993 (p. 4, note 12), p. 23. Also see: Specimens of Bushmen Folklore. Col-
lected by W. H. I. Bleek and L. C. Lloyd. Ed. by the latter. With an Introduction by
George McCall Theal. London: G. Allen & Company 1911.
3. Canetti 's Literary Devices for the Exertion of Power 69

natural. Canetti, however, remains silent about these alternatives, only paying
attention to the bushman as a hunter. That Canetti felt guilty about this bleak
account of >primitive< cultures comes to the fore in the following aphorism: »I
have to return innocently to my bushmen, so as if I had used nothing from
them for my work.« 212 Canetti's proprietorial relationship to his sources is
stressed by the possessive-pronoun »my« (»meinen«). He does not want to
defile »his« bushmen, thus implying that they were originally pure and inno-
cent (»unschuldig«) and that it is only his treatment of their culture which put
them into the context of power and violence, a context to which they initially
do not belong.213 In what way did Canetti defile the experience of metamor-
phosis in the bushman's description of his daily life? He characterizes the
bushman's »Verwandlung« as exclusively directed at the outside world. Ac-
cording to Canetti, the bushman transforms into that which he hunts, so that he
can better get hold of his victim:
His own identity, which the bushman can abandon, is preserved in the metamorpho-
sis. He can be this or that, but this or that is separated from each other, because in
the meanwhile he is always himself.2 I 4

However, Bleek and Lloyd's study is full of examples which show that for the
bushman, metamorphosis has a lot to do with an inward change of identity.
Indeed, Specimens of Bushman-Folklore opens with the story of a man who is
called a »mantis«. Radin has shown that a »mantis« is another word for a trick-
ster, and a trickster is someone who can Proteus-like change form.215 In the
bushman-myth the mantis has changed from a man into a hartbeast. Children
are trying to cut the hartbeast-mantis' body to pieces, but the parts of his body
re-join themselves. Now the hunter is turned into the hunted: the hartbeast is
going to chase the children; afterwards, he returns to his home, again changed
into human physique, and hears how his former torturers tell their parents that
it is best to give up hunting altogether: »This fatigue, it is what we are feeling;
and our heart bums on account of it [...]. Therefore, we should not hunt [for

212
»Ich muß unschuldig zu meinen Buschmännern zurückfinden, so als hätte ich
nichts von dort für das Werk verwendet.« Canetti, Nachträge aus Hampstead
(p. 66, note 205), p. 34. My translation.
213
Canetti defiles the Bushmen by placing them into the context of a worldview de-
veloped as a response to the Holocaust. In this way Canetti acknowledges the his-
torical break that the Holocaust constitutes. Stephan Steiner has denied this in, Jen-
seits des Triumphs. In: Wespennest 96 (1994), p. 48-55.
214
»Die eigene Identität, die der Buschmann aufgeben kann, bleibt in der Verwand-
lung gewahrt. Er kann dies oder jenes sein, aber dies oder jenes bleiben voneinan-
der getrennt, denn dazwischen ist er immer wieder selbst.« Canetti, Masse und
Macht II (p. 4, note 13), p. 71. My translation.
215
For a discussion of the mantis as a trickster see Paul Radin: Primitive Religion. Its
Nature and Origin. London: Hamish Hamilton 1938, p. 202. The book is in Canet-
ti's bibliography.
70 Part I: Elias Canetti - Anthropology as Literature

food], for we should altogether remain at home.«216 Here transformation is un-

dertaken, neither for an increase in numbers nor as a means of facilitating an
effective hunt; on the contrary, the mantis undergoes a metamorphosis in order
to teach the children a lesson according to which an animal, even if it is dead,
should not be used purely as a food-supply for human society. The transforma-
tion of the mantis into a hartbeast illustrates that there is a difference between the
materialistic concept of >modern< civilization, in which animals are consumed in
large quantities without any concern about the ethical implications of such food-
consumption, and the animalistic world-view of the bushmen. The transforma-
tion of the mantis into a hartbeast also demonstrates that for the bushmen, the
boundaries between the sphere of the human and that of the animal are fluid.
Clearly, Bleek and Lloyd give ample evidence for a different conception of me-
tamorphosis in bushman-society than the one Canetti exclusively dwells on in
Crowds and Power. In their Specimens, an image of metamorphosis emerges
that consists in inward rather than outward change. The myths narrated in Bleek
and Lloyd's book are, indeed, filled with stories in which the human changes
into the animal, the vegetative, or even the planetary: we read of children throw-
ing into the air an old man who mentally metamorphoses into the sun, so as to be
able to dry the bushmen's rice,217 and we read of flowers which have formerly
been girls who had been taken away by the rain.
In his treatment of totemism, Canetti goes a step further than the suppression
of myths, collected by Lloyd and Bleek, which contradict his presentation of
the bushman as killer. In his treatment of totemism his thesis squarely negates
all the theories laid down in anthropological books to which reference as
source-material is made in the notes.218 In the tail-notes to Crowds and Power,
there are references to three anthropological accounts of totemism which are at
odds with the argument proposed in the main text. Canetti, however, intro-
duces these accounts in such a way as to give the impression that the facts
related in them affirm the validity of what is described in Crowds and Power.
He writes that, besides Spencer's and Gillen's and Strehlow's older standard
works, only Elkin's investigations into aboriginal culture are important for an
understanding of totemism, yet he fails to mention any differences between him-
self and these three authors: »Totem of the Australians. - Next to the older work
by Spencer and Gillen and C. Strehlow here are above all important: Elkin,
The Australian [,..].«219 Yet Elkin, Strehlow, Spencer and Gillen, instead of
providing illustrations for Canetti's claim, construct theories of totemism that
do not in any way correspond with the thesis advanced in Crowds and Power.

216
Bleek / Lloyd, Specimens of Bushmen Folklore (p. 68, note 211), p. 17.
217
Ibid., p. 51.
218
Notes to p. 122 in part I of Masse und Macht.
219
»Totems der Australier. - Neben den älteren Werken von Spencer und Gillen und
C. Strehlow sind hier besonders wichtig: Elkin, The Australian [...].« Canetti, Mas-
se und Macht I (p. 4, note 13), p. 315. My translation.
3. Canetii 's Literary Devices for the Exertion of Power 1\

Canetti does admittedly concede that some totemic veneration of animals or

plants can be interpreted as safeguarding the food-supply of the natives (such as
nuts, or larvae) and then gives examples of unusable animals such as scorpions
or mosquitoes in order to show that totemism, rather than ensuring the mainte-
nance of the daily diet, only expresses a desire of increase in human society:
What attracts him [man] can only be the immense number of creatures and when he
establishes his kinship with them, so is he only concerned to make sure to get hold
of their numbers. The man who descends from a mosquito-totem, only wants that his
people become as numerous as mosquitoes.220

By explaining totemism as being focused on the sphere of the human, and by

claiming that totemism only illustrates man's longing for increase in numbers,
Canetti reinterprets a form of religious behavior within the context of power.
What else is the motivation for an increase in the force of fellow-members of a
given society, if it is not driven by the will for power? The exclusive »only«
(»nur«) formulation gives the impression that Canetti's thesis is not so much a
theory, competing with a variety of other theories, but a >true< representation
of empirical reality.
In contrast to Canetti's concentration on issues of power, Strehlow inter-
prets totemism as a religious way of transcending death. In Arunda Traditions,
Strehlow argues that totemism opens up a world-view in which death has no
place. According to Strehlow, animals and plants are venerated, since the Aus-
tralians believe that their >dead< ancestors continue to live in them. Totemism
and a firm trust in bodily resurrection go hand in hand:
Hence no ancestor in these myths ever »dies«, in our sense of the term. His body
merely undergoes a transmutation into something that will weather all the assaults of
time, change and decay. Today natives still point out to each other the changed, im-
mortal, life-holding bodies of an ancestor and his sons: they are now become rocks
and tree and turunga. Wherever they wandered, they left behind them a trail of what
we might call potential life-cells, which are only waiting for an opportunity to as-
sume some visible corporeal form.221

Thus, instead of offering facts in support of Canetti's theory of totemism as the

desire for an increase in the number of members in a given human society,
Strehlow blatantly contradicts the thesis put forward in Crowds and Power.
Strehlow's account of totemism as transcending a world dominated by death
should have been attractive to Canetti, because the urge to avoid death as the
prime motive for the exertion of power underpins most of Canetti's writing. In
his aphorisms we can read that power originated in the desire of a few indi-
220
»Es kann nur die ungeheure Zahl der Wesen sein, die ihn anzieht, und wenn er eine
Verwandtschaft mit ihnen etabliert, so ist es ihm darum zu tun, sich dieser Zahl zu
versichern. Der Mann, der von einem Moskito-Totem abstammt, will, daß seine
Leute so zahlreich werden wie Moskitos.« Canetti, Masse und Macht I (p. 4, note
13), p. 122. My translation.
221
Carl Strehlow: Arunda Traditions. Melbourne: F. Allan 1947, p. 17.
72 Part I: Elias Canetti - Anthropology as Literature

viduals to sacrifice the life of others so as to put off their own death (some
aphorisms on death will be discussed below). Thus, Canetti's handling of
Strehlow seems, at best, cavalier. In Strehlow's Arunda Traditions, the reader
finds a hopeful alternative to the bleak reality described in Crowds and Power,
yet Canetti remains silent about this alternative. He attempts to understand the
specific religious and social sensibility of the Arunda. Canetti, on the other
hand, is not concerned with Australian tribes; rather he focuses on man's will
to power. Canetti writes about totemic rites in Australia in order to make clear
the connection between metamorphosis and the desire to increase: »In order to
recognize the close connection between increase and metamorphosis it is here
necessary to discuss the rites of the Australians.«222
Spencer and Gillen's The Arunta. A Study of a Stone Age People gives a more
sober account of totemism than Strehlow, although it is one which contradicts
Canetti's interpretation of totemic rites as expressive of a will for power. Ac-
cording to Spencer and Gillen, totemism serves to maintain the food-supply for
the Arunta:
That the totemic animal or plant is not regarded exactly as a close relative, whom it
would be wrong to kill or assist anyone else to kill, is very evident; on the contrary,
the members of one totem not only, as it were, give permission to those who are not
of the totem to kill and eat the totemic animal or plant, but further, [...] they will ac-
tually help in the destruction of their totem.223

According to Spencer and Gillen, totemism, instead of yielding insight into the
native's belief in the close kinship between the human and the non-human,
serves purely pragmatic purposes.
For Elkin increase rites are not magical performances aimed at subduing na-
ture for man's exploitations; instead, they express the desire to preserve the
precious balance of natural processes:
[...] the aborigines are guided by actual economic and geographical facts and make
no attempt to bend nature to any passing desires and needs which they might have.
Rather, they are concerned with the maintenance of nature's normal course through-
out the seasons. Their own life, like that of the natural species, is intimately bound
up with this [...]. The rites must be regarded as means of co-operation with nature in
the maintenance of the normal course of events, which should be manifested in the
regularity of the seasons, and the rain, and the increase of species at the usual times
[...]. In the rites [...] he [the aborigine] not only expresses his desires in words and
actions, but as in so many of the rites, he gives his own life, that is, his own blood, to
222
»Um den engen Zusammenhang zu erkennen, der zwischen Vermehrung und Ver-
wandlung besteht, ist es notwendig, hier auf die Riten der Australier einzugehen.«
Canetti, Masse und Macht I (p. 4, note 13), p. 120. My translation.
223
Baldwin Spencer / F. J. Gillen: The Arunta. A Study of a Stone Age People. London:
Macmillan & Co. 1927, Vol. 1, p. 85. For other references to totemism as serving the
maintenance of a tribe's food-supply also see Spencer / Gillen: The Northern Tribes
of Central Australia. London: Macmillan & Co. 1904, p. 197 and p. 327. Canetti cites
this book in his bibliography.
3. Canetti 's Literary Devices for the Exertion of Power 73

the species, through its sacramental symbol, so that nature, or at least, some parti-
cular natural species, may continue to live and increase.224
Elkin's account of the role of increase in totemism is at odds with both Canet-
ti's and Spencer and Gillen's theses. Whereas the latter argue that totemic rites
are guided by the pragmatic concern of ensuring the food-supply, Elkin insists
on the co-operative spirit that underpins totemism: the aborigines do not per-
form increase-rites to control nature magically, instead the increase-ritual ex-
presses man's awareness of being dependent on the well-being of nature. To-
temism not only voices this sense of interrelation between the human and the
natural in a symbolic form, but man's recognition of being bound up with the
life of nature is also affirmed, when the aborigine gives blood so that a natural
species can go on living. Elkin and Strehlow, while discussing totemism in
>primitive< Australia, come closest to offering an alternative to the materialistic
view which, according to many writers,225 constitutes modern society: Elkin
depicts the totemic system as both a symbolic representation and a perform-
ance of co-operation; it marks the interrelation between the natural and the
human. Strehlow portrays totemism as a religious way of living in which
death is cheated. As a consequence, he embeds the concept of totemism in an
animistic world view. Only Canetti leaves out alternative models or pragmatic
explanations: for him, totemism expresses man's wish to become more power-
ful. Consequently >primitive< Australian tribes do not display alternatives to
>modern< societies, since the longing for power - which is an increase in num-
ber available for the use of force - mirrors >modern< record-numbers in birth-
rates and production-procedures. In Crowds and Power's account of totemism
we hear nothing of co-operation or pragmatic thinking. Instead, we are con-
fronted by the >primitives< immoderate desire to increase their population so as
to be able to able to exert more power.
Surprisingly, Canetti does not refer to Freud's Totem and Taboo either in the
footnotes or in the bibliography to Crowds and Power. Nevertheless, he was
fascinated by Freud's intellectual rigour and it is likely he studied Totem and
Taboo in detail.226 Strikingly, Canetti reverses Freud's optimistic evolutionism.
According to Freud totemism constitutes the first move to the construction of a
moral code that prohibits murder. The origins of the injunction against the killing
of a totem reaches back to the murder of the father in the Urszene; out of this
224
A. P. Elkin: Studies in Australian Totemism. In: The Oceania Monographs 2 (1933),
p. 3-147, p. 36-37. For the aboriginals' desire to live in close harmony with nature
and to further nature's normal course, as expressed in totemic increase rites also see,
p. 145.
225
From Baudelaire to Davidson, Yates and Eliot.
226
In an interview with Adorno Canetti characterized Freud's influence on himself as
follows: »[...] ich bin der erste, zuzugeben, daß die Art, in der Freud Dinge neu an-
ging, ohne sich von irgendetwas ablenken oder abschrecken zu lassen, auf mich in
meiner formativen Periode, einen tiefen Eindruck gemacht hat.« Canetti, Gespräch
mit Theodor W. Adorno (p. 17, note 29), p. 66-92, p. 67.
74 Part I: Elias Canetti - Anthropology as Literature

prohibition of patricide evolves the law against fratricide which finally results in
the prohibition of murder as such. According to Freud, totemism expresses the
guilty conscience of the brothers who have killed their father. This feeling of
guilt leads to the creation of morality or the Ober-Ich on which the achievements
of Kultur are based.227 For Canetti totemism does not indicate any signs of a
guilty conscience; on the contrary, it demonstrates a will for power.

3.4 Death

Death plays a vital part in both Canetti's theory of command and in his examina-
tion of power. There are two aphorisms in the Aufzeichnungen22* that centre
around this link between death and various forms of power. The first reads:
The enormous structure of power was created out of the desire of individuals to ex-
empt themselves from death. The life of one individual demands countless deaths.
The confusion which resulted from this is called history. Here would start true
enlightenment, which is based on each individual's right to live on.229
Here we see the ruler as a helpless man trying to avoid death, and this desire to
cheat death makes him sacrifice numerous people to ensure his own longevity.
Strikingly, Canetti does not attribute the task of attacking this kind of ruler to a
»true form of enlightenment«. Rather, the end of any type of the exertion of
power is perceived in the recognition of each individual's right for everlasting
life. In another aphorism, Canetti complains about all those theorists who talk
about »Macht« without taking into account the interrelation between »Macht«
and »Tod«:
That those who comprehend the terror of power do not realize how much it [power]
employs death! Without death power would have remained harmless. They talk
away about power, think to oppose it and ignore death.230
227
For Freud's discussion of this point see Freud, Kulturtheoretische Schriften (p. 61,
note 193), p. 429-430.
228
Also see the following aphorism in Die Fliegenpein: »Wie sollte es keine Mörder
geben, solange es dem Menschen gemäß ist zu sterben, solange er sich nicht dafür
schämt, solange er den Tod in seine Institutionen eingebaut hat, als wäre er ihr siche-
res, bestes und sinnvollstes Fundament?« Elias Canetti: Die Fliegenpein. Aufzeich-
nungen. Frankfurt: S. Fischer 1995, p. 66.
229
»Aus der Bemühung Einzelner, den Tod von sich abzuwenden, ist die ungeheuerliche
Struktur der Macht entstanden. Unzählige Tode wurden für das Fortleben eines Einzel-
nen gefordert. Die Verwirrung, die daraus entstand, heißt Geschichte. Hier hätte die
wahre Aufklärung zu beginnen, die das Recht jedes Einzelnen auf Fortleben begrün-
det.« Canetti, Aufzeichnungen 1942-1985 (p. 4, note 13), p. 366. My translation.
230
»Daß die, die das Entsetzen der Macht begreifen, nicht sehen, wie sehr sie sich des
Todes bedient! Ohne den Tod wäre die Macht harmlos geblieben. Da reden sie über
Macht daher, meinen, gegen sie anzurennen und lassen den Tod links liegen.« Ca-
netti, Aufzeichnungen 1942-1985 (p. 4, note 13), p. 492. My translation.
3. Canetti 's Literary Devices for the Exertion of Power 75

According to Canetti, power employs death as its rationale. This connection be-
tween death and power is perhaps the most challenging idea developed in Crowds
and Power. Here Canetti is the least dependent on other thinkers. Against this
background, »Macht« would be the power of a few individuals to put numerous
people to death, and »Masse« would be the collection of individuals who can be
reduced to instruments, subject to arbitrary commands and ultimately killed.
This interrelation between death and power appears at various places in Crowds
and Power. Indeed, it virtually functions as a leitmotif. In part I we read of the de-
sire to circumvent death as permeating the whole of human history from its begin-
ning to the present day: »The evasion of death, the wish to avoid it, belongs to the
oldest and most tenacious tendencies of all rulers.«231 In part II Canetti interprets
the ruler's desire for power as a longing for the avoidance of death (»Der Macht-
haber schickt die anderen in den Tod, um selber vom Tode verschont zu bleiben: er
lenkt ihn von sich ab.«).232 Indeed, Crowds and Power closes with an invitation to
undermine power by taking away the sting of both death and the command:
Death as threat is the coin of power. Here it is easy to heap coin on coin and accu-
mulate enormous assets. Those who want to deal with power, have to face the com-
mand without fear and have to find means to rob it of its sting.233

The image of the coin echoes Canetti's discussion of money and inflation as ex-
pressions of >mass<-feelings, and the picture of coins piling up emphasizes power's
close relation to the formation of crowds. It is important to stress the idiosyncrasy
of Canetti's view: surely there is nothing paralleling this in other writers on crowd
psychology. The threat of death to individuals is supposed to testify to the potency
of the ruler, and in the threat of death to many people, the ruler manifests his
wished-for omnipotence. Omnipotence is the right word here, given that Canetti
tries to present as a fact that someone who commands or executes people sees the
probabilities of his own immortality rise in direct proportion to the increase in
corpses. Now, the closing sentence of Crowds and Power urges the reader to face
up to the force of commands so as to be able to rob them of their sting, but the
preceding words about »der Tod« as the »Münze der Macht« also imply that in
order to blunt the sting of command one has to abolish that of death. Canetti ad-
vises the reader to outdo the life-threatening operations of power. Nevertheless he
gives no indications as to how this may be possible. As has been discussed in chap-
ter 1, in an interview with Joachim Schickel, however, Canetti refers to >primitive<

231
»Das Umgehen des Todes, der Wunsch, ihm auszuweichen, gehört zu den ältesten
und zähesten Tendenzen aller Machthaber.« Canetti, Masse und Macht I (p. 4, note
13), p. 222. My translation.
232
Ibid., II, p. 190.
233
»Der Tod als Drohung ist die Münze der Macht. Es ist leicht, hier Münze auf
Münze zu legen und enorme Kapitalien anzusammeln. Wer der Macht beikommen
will, der muß den Befehl ohne Scheu ins Auge fassen und die Mittel finden, ihn
seines Stachels zu berauben.« Canetti, Masse und Macht II (p. 4, note 13), p. 220.
My translation.
76 Part I: Elias Canetti - Anthropology as Literature

cultures in which death was not accepted as something >natural<. In not accepting
death, the >primitives< undercut the workings of power, and in his converzation
with Schickele, Canetti calls this attitude to death a possible way out of history's
nightmares. By cultivating gradually more sophisticated ways of the exertion of
power, >modem< history has supported the naturalization of death. As the desire for
power increases, death is accepted as natural rather than perceived as an unnatural
occurrence: as »everyone has to die some day« nothing is wrong about dying for a
great ruler in war, for example. Yet in Crowds and Power the >primitive's< view of
death as unnatural is discussed as forming part of the machinations of power in-
stead of undermining them. Thus, the medicine-man of the Arunda, whose task it
is to find out the magician who is responsible for the death of a member of the
tribe, is stigmatized as an example of the paranoid ruler:
No bad thing comes of itself, everything is caused by malevolent men or spirits.
Whatever we would call cause is for them guilt. Every death is a murder and has to
be revenged as murder. The closeness to the world of the paranoid is in every re-
spect amazing.234
Canetti seems to be in favor of the >modem< naturalization of death, indeed he
plays off the >modem< understanding of death against its >primitive< counterpart,
arguing that what for the former is »Ursache« is »Schuld« for the latter.
It is no accident that Evans-Pritchard in Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among
the Azande - a book listed in Masse und Macht's bibliography - dwells on the
Azande's refusal to accept death as >natural<:
To them [the Azande] death, whatever its occasion, is murder and cries out for ven-
geance, for the event or the situation of death is to them the important thing and not
the instrument by which it was occasioned, be it decease or a wild beast, or the spear
of an enemy.235
Like Canetti, Evans-Pritchard argues that the cause of death does not concern
the >primitives<. What matters for Evans-Pritchard is the out-of-the-ordinary
character of the event as it is manifested in the ill-will of someone in the
community that brought about the demise of a member of the tribe. However,
unlike Canetti, Evans-Pritchard does not call this non-acceptance of death »para-
noia«. The passage quoted above from his interview with Schickele indicates
that Canetti was aware of the possible interpretation of death as an >unnatural<
occurrence. It also sheds light on Canetti's understanding of such a view of death
as transcending the totalitarian way of exerting power. Yet Canetti moves this
possible form of a transcendence of >modern< types of power to a close prox-
234
»Nichts schlechtes kommt von selbst, alles ist von einem übelwollenden Menschen
oder Geist veranlaßt worden. Was immer wir Ursache nennen würden, ist bei ih-
nen Schuld. Jeder Tod ist ein Mord, und als Mord muß er gerächt werden. Die Nä-
he zur Welt des Paranoikers in jeder Hinsicht ist erstaunlich.« Canetti, (penulti-
mate note), p. 19. My translation.
235
Edward E. Evans-Pritchard: Witchcraft, Oracles, and Magic Among the Azande.
Oxford: Oxford University Press 1937, p. 113.
3. Canetti's Literary Devices for the Exertion of Power 77

imity to the ruler's illness, paranoia. In the same manner, Canetti ignores possi-
ble ways of avoiding death to be found within the religious beliefs of >primitive<
societies. In one of his favorite books - Lloyd and Bleek's Bushmen Folkore -
there is a tale about the moon, which suggests that death only depends on believ-
ing in it: the moon tells man the story of the hare which, rather than considering
his mother to be asleep, assumes that she is dead. According to the moon this
non-belief in eternal life is death. Death, therefore can only be created by man,
and man would die and be bom again if he believed in this resurrection:236
Therefore, the moon spoke, he said: »Ye who are people, ye shall, when ye die, [...] alto-
gether vanish away. For, I said that, ye should, when ye died, ye should again arise, ye
should not altogether [...] die. For I, when I am dead, I again living return. I had intended,
that, ye who are men, ye should also resemble me [and] do the things that I do; [...] that I
do not altogether dying go away. Ye, who are men, are those who did this deed [...].237
The tale of the moon offers an alternative to a world which has not succeeded
in cheating death, and it is an alternative of which Canetti, as his conversation
with Schickele shows, is aware. A theoretical formulation for the moral of the
tale of the moon can be found in Malinowski's Magic, Science, and Religion
(a work that is also listed in Crowds and Power's bibliography). Malinowski
develops a thesis of >primitive< religion as being motivated by man's »desire
for life«: »Religion saves man from surrender to death and destruction [,..].«238
Religion in >primitive< societies functions as a means of overcoming death. Ca-
netti's views on a possible transcendence of death through religion are clearly
indebted to Malinowski, although in Crowds and Power, he does not voice
these views, nor does he allude to Malinowski's writing on religion.
A belief in bodily reincarnation also characterizes a world that does not
know death, and Ovid's Metamorphoses depict such a world in which even
»knaves« do not have to endure capital punishment, but instead undergo a
metamorphosis into marble (Niobe), or another into stone (Battus). Indeed, in
Book XV Pythagoras proposes a view of the world as being in constant flux:
according to Pythagoras everything changes and nothing dies (»omnia mutan-
tur, nihil interest«, XV, 165) and as a consequence nothing can be said to have
a firm identity (»nihil est toto, quod perset, in orbe« XV, 177). It is clear that
Canetti knew the Metamorphoses in detail. Yet there are no reflections on
Ovid's magnum opus in his book. Had Canetti included them, he would have
again opened up an alternative world to that depicted in Crowds and Power,
which is a world governed by death and the exertion of power. He does not
even draw attention to the concept of metamorphosis as bodily reincarnation, a
concept that runs through many of the anthropological works to which Crowds
and Power 's footnotes and bibliography refer.

236
Bleek / Lloyd, Specimens of Bushmen Folklore (p. 68, note 211), p. 61-64.
237
Ibid., p. 64.
238
Bronislaw Malinowski: Magic, Science, and Religion, and other Essays. London:
Souvenir 1974, p. 33.
78 Part I: Elias Canetti - Anthropology as Literature

Concentrating on the ill-will of the dead, Canetti alludes to Callaway's The

Religious System of the Amazulu as follows:
For the dead are not always just [...]. He [Callaway] shows that dead people who are
well-cared for and famous are also sometimes seized by a grudge against the living,
simply because they are still alive.239
He thus focuses on the supposed animosity of the dead, rather than on the non-
existence of death in a world of bodily reincarnation. Callaway's text gives
evidence for the belief of the Amazulus that injustice is done to the dead in
their reincarnated form. Such a view can be seen from the following extract:
Sometimes among black men a snake enters the house, when it is seen, they call one
another, saying, »There is a snake.« All the people hurry to look at the snake if it
does not run away. They say if it were a wild snake it would run away when it sees
men. But as it does not run away, it is a tame snake. Others say, »It is a beast, let it
be killed.« They dispute, and one kills it and throws it away. They go to sleep, and a
dream comes, and the dead man says: »How is it that you kill me when you see me?
It is me whom you have killed. I am so-and-so.«240
This bears witness to the Amazulus' belief in bodily metamorphosis which de-
nies the existence of absolute death. Canetti, however, does not pay any attention
to this interpretation of metamorphosis in Callaway's book. A belief in bodily
reincarnation would weaken the threat of death by means of which, at least ac-
cording to Canetti, a ruler achieves unconditional obedience to his commands.
The threat of death therefore functions as a means of disciplining society.
Nevertheless in >primitive< cultures, as many of the anthropological books
to which Canetti refers demonstrate, there are other non-violent ways of ensur-
ing that order persists in a given community. A description of a non-violent
version of social control can be found in Warner's A Black Civilisation, yet
here again Canetti selects only the brutal aspects by paying exclusively atten-
tion to the »Töter« in the Mumgin-tribe.241 Warner, however, advances a theo-
ry of social control that builds on the co-operation of man with nature. The
chiefs of the tribe do not threaten any individual with death; instead discipline
within such a society is established by a strong belief in the prosperity of na-
ture as being bound up with proper behavior on man's part. Nature's balance
depends on justice within human society. If humanitarian ideals are negated,
the natural order collapses. Consequently, the threat of death is replaced by the
239
»Denn die Toten sind keineswegs immer gerecht [...]. Er [Callaway] zeigt, daß
auch solche wohlverpflegte und gerühmte Tote manchmal ein Groll auf ihre Hin-
terbliebenen packt, bloß weil diese noch am Leben sind.« Canetti, Masse und
Macht I (p. 4, note 13), p. 296. My translation.
240
Henry Callaway: The Religious System of the Amazulu. Part 3: Izinyanga Zo-
kubula, or Divination as Existing among the Amazulu, in their Own Words. With a
Translation into English and Notes by the Rev. Canon Callaway. Natal: John A.
Blair 1870, p. 231.
241
Canetti, Masse und Macht I (p. 4, note 13), p. 279.
3. Canetti 's Literary Devices for the Exertion of Power 79

threat to nature if the practice of justice suffers in the tribe. Warner dwells on
the non-violent character of this kind of social control:
The thing that is important to notice is that in the general thought there is a syncretistic
association of social organisation and nature through the connection of the myth and
the symbol [...].The Murngin in their logic of controlling nature assume that there is a
direct connection between social units and different aspects of nature, and that the con-
trol of nature lies in the proper control and treatment of organization. The society is
disciplined by threat of what will happen to nature, the provider, if the members of the
group will disobey. This brings on an identification of the social organization with na-
ture, and they are treated as one and are expressed as such in the rituals.242

Warner describes a society governed by religious creeds that border on totem-

ism: the Murngin assume that there is a strong link between the human and the
natural. Man has to act responsibly so as to safeguard nature's support.

3.5 Authority and Power

Canetti, however, ignores alternative models of non-violent types of social con-

trol. Rarely does Canetti acknowledge hopeful and positive aspects in >primi-
tive< societies, but when he does so he leaves out any explanations of the social
organization that makes non-aggressive attitudes possible. This can best be il-
lustrated with the discussion of the Pueblo Indians in Crowds and Power.
Canetti explains the Pueblos' peaceful type of increase with their introjection
of calm and amicable natural phenomena. According to Canetti, the Pueblos'
peaceful way of life needs to be explained through their contemplation of natu-
ral phenomena rather than through the organization of their society:
One would like to say that they [the Pueblo Indians] only live for this kind of in-
crease, and it [the increase] is exclusively turned into the positive. That Janus-head,
which one knows from other people - on one hand, one's own increase, at the other,
diminution of the enemy - is unknown to them. They are not much interested in war.
Rain and sweetcorn have turned them mild. 243

Canetti explains the non-violent society of the Pueblo Indians with their sup-
posed introjection of sweet corn and rain, whereas Ruth Benedict, to whose
Patterns of Culture Canetti refers in his notes,244 shows how the social system

242
William Lloyd Warner: A Black Civilisation. A Social Study of an Australian
Tribe. New York: Harper & Bros 1937, p. 410-411.
243
»Man möchte sagen, daß sie [die Pueblo-Indianer] für diese Vermehrung allein
leben, und sie ist ausschließlich aufs Positive gewendet. Jener Janus-Kopf, den man
von so vielen anderen Völkern her kennt: eigene Vermehrung auf der einen, Ver-
minderung des Feindes auf der anderen Seite, ist bei ihnen unbekannt. An Kriegen
sind sie so nicht interessiert. Regen und Mais haben sie milde gestimmt.« Canetti,
Masse und Macht I (p. 4, note 13), p. 152. My translation.
244
See Canetti's notes to p. 146.
80 Part I: Elias Canetti -Anthropology as Literature

of the Pueblo Indians could be emulated by Western civilization. Benedict en-

counters absence of authority in the Zufii-tribe and the exertion of power is
prevented by the threat of being accused of witchcraft:
Personal authority is perhaps the most vigorously disparaged trait in Zufii: A man
who thirsts for power or knowledge, who wishes to be as they scornfully phrase it »a
leader of his people«, receives nothing but censure and will very likely be perse-
cuted for sorcery [...].245
Benedict goes on to show how children are taught not to be competitive:
The child grows up without either the resentments or the compensatory day-dreams
of ambition [...]. When the child becomes an adult, he has not the motivations that
lead him to imagine situations in which authority will be relevant.246
According to Benedict, the attainment of office does not represent a satisfac-
tion of ambitions in Zufli-society,247 and Benedict claims that a Zufii-husband
would never use violence against his wife in cases of adultery.248 Benedict's
description of Zufii-education and official life as well as her discussion of the
relation between husband and wife in the tribe of the Pueblo Indians easily
lend themselves to imitation by >modern< societies. Canetti, however, does not
give concrete examples of an alternative social structure, as Benedict does. For
Canetti the reader has himself to be creative, imagining ways out of a world
dominated by authority, command, and death.
Nevertheless, Canetti harbored doubts about the effectiveness of Crowds and
Power 's bleak depiction of humanity, as the following aphorism shows: »There
have never been greater barbarians than us. One has to look for humanity in the
past. (Objection against Crowds and Power.)« 249 Is the depiction of humane
behavior as found in anthropological accounts of >primitive< communities more
appropriate for the improvement of >modem< societies than the presentation of a
world governed by the exertion of power? This aphorism shows that in Canetti's
opinion, >savage< tribes are capable of displaying humanity. Nonetheless, a dis-
play of humanity is seldom to be found in Crowds and Power 's account of neo-
lithic cultures. The anthropological books cited in the bibliography of Crowds
and Power by contrast, frequently describe such humane behavior.

245
Ruth F. Benedict: Patterns of Culture. London: Routledge & Kegan 1952, p. 71.
246
Ibid., p. 73.
247
Ibid., p. 75.
248
Ibid., p. 77.
249
»Es hat nie größere Barbaren gegeben als uns. Man muß die Menschlichkeit in der
Vergangenheit suchen (Einwand gegen Masse und Macht).« Canetti, Nachträge
aus Hampstead (p. 66, note 205), p. 179. My translation.
Part II: Franz Baermann Steiner - Anthropology and
Totalitarian Terror

Whereas, as we have seen, Elias Canetti gives the impression of writing objec-
tive scholarship^ while using deliberately unscholarly methods in Crowds and
Power, his friend Franz Baermann Steiner (1909-1952) employs the methods of
standard scholarly inquiry in his purely anthropological writings. His scholarship
has an ethical goal, but the goal never intrudes into the representation of schol-
arly findings; rather, it appears to emerge from his discoveries. As I shall show
in greater detail in part III, the ethical agenda of Steiner's anthropological work
also figures highly in his aphorisms and in his poetry. In part II, I shall discuss
Steiner's aphoristic writings alongside his anthropological works. At this point it
is important to make clear the difference in style between his aphorisms and his
anthropological studies. Steiner has a different audience in mind when he writes
strictly anthropological texts like his lectures on taboo, from the readership he
engages with in his aphoristic writings: the writer of the aphorisms is a central
European intellectual as well as a scholar, whereas the author of Taboo speaks to
a learned audience - students at Oxford - from the position of a don. In his apho-
risms Steiner's viewpoint is outspoken, while in Taboo he veils his own creeds;
thus Marxist expressions like exploitation (»Ausbeutung«),1 a showy transfigura-
tion of endangered privileges (»gefährdete Privilegien eine protzige Verklä-
rung«)2 etc. employed in »About the Process of Civilization« (»Über den Prozeß
der Zivilisierung«) do not appear in Taboo.
Steiner writes aphorisms in German that are more subjective in tone than his
anthropological works, thus connecting himself with a long tradition of learned
literary discourse from Lichtenberg to Canetti, who advised Steiner to put his
ideas down in an aphoristic form.3 Steiner's strictly anthropological works are,
by contrast, exclusively written in English. He could see how much an anthro-
pologist like Frazer or Malinowski was able to influence English public life,
even if he did not adopt their style or method.4

1
Franz Baermann Steiner: Über den Prozeß der Zivilisierung. In: Akzente 42 (1995),
p. 213-229, p. 217.
2
Ibid., p. 215.
3
For a discussion of this point see my article: Franz Baermann Steiners Auseinander-
setzung mit dem Nationalsozialismus (p. 2, note 7), p. 17-21.
4
Frazer, for example, had shown that scholarship can exert an immense influence on the
European perception of non-European peoples: from 1911 till 1920 33.000 copies of
82 Part II: Franz Baermann Steiner - Anthropology and Totalitarian Terror

Steiner's attempt at having an impact on social issues can be seen in his ar-
ticle »Orientpolitik« (1936) and in his letter to Gandhi (1946). Here he re-
verses evolutionist convictions about the superiority of European civilization
as advocated by Frazer. As can be gathered from a close reading of »Orient-
politik«, Steiner conceived of scholarship as a possibility to further a peaceful
coexistence of different >Oriental< nations: according to Steiner an institute for
Egyptian studies should be founded in Tel-Aviv and a Jewish studies centre in
Cairo with the aim of creating brotherly relations between Arabs and Jews. In
his letter to Gandhi, Steiner argues for friendly contacts between all >Oriental<
peoples, calling Zionism a part of the »resurrection of Asiatic civilisation«.5
For Steiner, rather than being an end in itself, scholarship had an ethical func-
tion: it should help to diminish feelings of national or racial superiority.
As we have seen, Canetti, by writing Crowds and Power, also attempted to
influence the social behavior of his readership. Canetti tries to give a scholarly
impression, but as his cavalier treatment of his anthropological sources shows,
he does not restrain himself to scholarly methods. Steiner, on the other hand,
rigorously employs an Aristotelian logical method, and all the conventions of
modem scholarship, scrupulously quoting his sources, and commenting on them.
Only his aphorisms grant full insight into his ethical and political thought.
In »Anthropology and the perception of non-Western peoples« (chapters 4.1,
4.2, 4.3, 4.4) I will first give the relevant background knowledge for my dis-
cussion of Steiner's anthropological writings, and then analyze his anthropol-
ogy against the background of British perceptions of the non-European from
Frazer to Evans-Pritchard. In »An Oriental undermines Orientalism« (chapters
5.1, 5.2, 5.3) I compare Steiner's comparative study of forms of slavery with
Edward Said's Orientalism. Next, I discuss the style, the methodology, and the
theories developed in Steiner's Taboo. I will then demonstrate the divergencies
in style between Steiner's anthropological writing - which often makes use of
masks - and his aphoristic essay »Über den Prozeß der Zivilisierung« that
offers an open critique of the Western concept of civilization.

the abridged version of The Golden Bough were sold, and by that time Frazer's ideas
were widely disseminated through »academic, literary, and journalistic channels«.
See George W. Stocking: After Tylor. British Social Anthropology, 1888-1951. Lon-
don: Athlone 1996, p. 148, Similarly, Malinowski's books were widely disseminated,
and he took part in debates on topical issues. Anthropology held out the prospect of
serious social influence. This was proof positive that scholarship had a vital part to
play in public life.
Franz Baermann Steiner: Letter to Gandhi. In: F. B. Steiner: Selected Writings. Vol. 2:
Orientpolitik, Value, and Civilisation. Ed. by Jeremy Adler and Richard Pardon. New
York: Berghahn 1999 (Methodology and History in Anthropology; Vol. 2/3). - Also
see »Letter to Gandhi«, p. 2. Nachlaß Franz Baermann Steiner, Deutsches Literarturar-
chiv Marbach am Neckar.
4, Anthropology and the Perception of Non-Western Peoples 83

4 Anthropology and the Perception of Non-Western Peoples

In part 1, I discussed the interrelationship between Canetti's literary project and

his anthropological research. In contrast to Canetti, Steiner was trained as an
anthropologist at Prague, Vienna, London and Oxford - enjoying the privilege of
being taught by the three leading >stars< of British anthropology in his life-time:
Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown and Evans-Pritchard. Steiner's anthropological
background needs close scrutiny. In this chapter, I will discuss both anthropo-
logical concepts which are central to Steiner's work and anthropologists who had
an impact on it. I will open the discussion with the German background. I will
then briefly examine Marcel Mauss's influence on Steiner. An account of the
British anthropological context will finally stand in the focus of the discussion.

4.1 The German Background

Before giving a short account of the German anthropological context in which

Steiner was first trained, it is necessary to draw attention to three German soci-
ologists whose work Steiner studied throughout his life. Steiner read Karl Marx
thoroughly as a student in Prague.6 Even after his break with political socialism,
Steiner often adopted a Marxist way of analyzing >modern< society. Despite
being religious, and defending the concept of a >mythical culture<, Steiner agrees
with Marx's critique of religion and myth when used as a means of veiling the
brutalities of political life (religion as opium for the people). However, Steiner
criticizes Marxist belief in progress and production. Next to Marx, Simmel's
critique of reification and the loss of social cohesion helped Steiner to define the
>modern<.7 Money economy liberates the individual from social ties, and thus
promotes atomization.8 Simmel's questioning of economic liberalism helps us to
understand Steiner's concern with social fragmentation. In four unpublished lec-
tures - delievered in Michaelmas term 1952 - Steiner praises Simmel for doing
away with the mind-body dichotomy inherent in Kantianism, and he recom-
mends Simmel's debunking of systematic thought as a falsification not only of
facts, but also of philosophical inquiry as such.9 The relation of Simmel's writing
6
See my article, Franz Baermann Steiners Auseinandersetzung mit dem Nationalso-
zialismus (p. 2, note 7).
7
In Philosophie des Geldes (1900) Simmel criticizes an objectifying, quantitative
way of thought that characterises modernity. See Georg Simmel: Philosophie des
Geldes. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp 1996. For an examination of Simmel's critique
of modernity see Klaus Lichtblau: Georg Simmel. Frankfurt a. M.: Campus Verlag
1997 (Reihe Campus. Einführungen), p. 68-82.
8
Simmel, Philosophie des Geldes (last note), p. 555.
9
Franz Baermann Steiner: »4 Lectures on Georg Simmel«. Michaelmas Term 1952.
Nachlaß Franz Baermann Steiner, Deutsches Literaturarchiv Marbach am Neckar.
84 Part II: Franz Baermann Steiner - Anthropology and Totalitarian Terror

on the concept of law to Steiner's sociology of danger will be discussed in the

conclusion to this essay. Although Steiner does not enthuse about Max Weber
- as he does about Marx and Simmel10 - there are some points of intellectual
contact. Weber's analysis of a capitalist mode of life as secularized form of
ascesis (»innenveltliche Askese«) informs Steiner's critique of bourgeois mo-
rality. Weber's affirmation of liberalism and a capitalist economy,11 however,
explains Steiner's more sympathetic approach to SimmePs writings.
After this brief account of the relation of Marx, Simmel and Weber to Steiner's
sociological thought, in what follows I will give a short description of the Ger-
man anthropological background in which Steiner started his professional career.
At the university of Vienna, Steiner studied ethnology under Heine-Geldern,
Koppers and Pater Schmidt.12 Viennese ethnology was heavily influenced by the
Kulturkreislehre of Frobenius and Graeber. Anthropologists connected with the
Kulturkreislehre tried to replace scientific with historical methods of enquiry.13
Heine-Geldern, whom Steiner knew, criticized the ethnology of the Kulturkreis-
lehre for making up theories about a prehistoric archaeological past (as regards
culture circles) that run counter to empirical evidence.14 Of the German-speaking
anthropologists, Richard Thurnwald's comparative and universal approach influ-
enced Steiner noticeably. According to Heine-Geldern, Thurnwald was as much
interested in the analysis of >higher civilization< as in the study of Naturvölker
(primitive peoples).15 More importantly, Thurnwald »did not lay one-sided stress
on structure like Radcliffe-Brown, nor did he consider cultures as isolated units
as Malinowski«.16 He always regarded >social organization as part of the larger
whole of culture, whereas, according to Heine-Geldern, Radcliffe-Brown never
succeeded in making the link between a specific social structure and the totality
of activity within a culture. Steiner can, accordingly, be seen to be working in
Thurnwald's mode when he misses precisely such comparative linkage between
social structure and culture in J. P. Murdock's writing: »There is no attempt of
relating meaningfully the concepts of social structure and culture.^7 Thurn-

10
In an undated note Steiner asks whether a critique of Weber has been written (Nachlaß
Franz Baermann Steiner, Deutsches Literaturarchiv Marbach am Neckar).
1
' For a discussion of Weber's belief in the triumph of capitalism see Wolfgang Mom-
msen: Max Weber. Gesellschaft, Politik und Geschichte. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp
1974 (Suhrkamp-Taschenbuch Wissenschaft; 53).
12
Fleischli, Franz Baermann Steiner (p. 2, note 7), p. 17.
13
Illustrierte Völkerkunde. In zwei Bänden. Unter Mitwirkung von Dr. A. Byhan, Dr. A.
Haberlandt et. al. Hg. von Dr. Georg Buschan. Stuttgart: Strecker und Schröder 1922-
1926, p. 49.
14
Robert Heine-Geldern: One Hundred Years of Ethnological Theory in German Speaking
Countries. Some Milestones. In: Current Anthropology 5 (1964), p. 407-418, p. 414.
15
Ibid., p. 415.
16
Ibid.
17
Franz Baermann Steiner: Murdock, J. P. Social Structure. In: The British Journal of
Sociology 2 (1951), p. 366-368, p. 366.
4. Anthropology and the Perception of Non-Western Peoples 85

wald's notion of the adaptive methods of Naturvölker also influenced Stei-

ner's juxtaposition of the >primitive< with the >civilized< in the aphoristic
essay »Über den Prozeß der Zivilisierung«. Although Thurnwald, following
Levy-Bruhl, writes that Naturvölker confuse fiction with reality,18 he also
cautions against any assumptions of the superiority of the >civilized< over the
>uncivilized<. According to Thurnwald, instead of controlling nature, >primi-
tives< adapt to it.19 Such adaptation to the natural environment compensates
for the lack of control over nature. Thurnwald's theory of the >primitive< forms
of psychological and physical accommodation to nature had a deep impact on
Steiner's mature thought, particularly on his characterization of non-Western
peoples. Finally, Franz Boas, who came from the German anthropological
background and proved to be one of the major founders of American cultural
anthropology, also left some traces in Steiner's anthropology. Steiner felt
close to Boas not least because of a shared interest in Eskimoes. Adam Ku-
per has stressed Boas's method of questioning generalizations through refer-
ences to empirical particulars.20 As we shall see in chapters 5.1 and 5.2, this
is a method which Steiner radicalized. Boas's stress on the social integration
of foreigners within >primitive< society (a sharp contrast to xenophobic dis-
criminations within the >modern< world) has, as will be shown in chapter 5.1,
influenced Steiner's work on slavery.21

4.2 The Influence of Marcel Mauss's Conceptual Approach

Of the French anthropologists Marcel Mauss seems to have had a significant

impact on Steiner's conceptual approach. Mary Douglas recalls a seminar on
Mauss at which Steiner and Srinivas were present.22 In Risk and Blame and in
her introduction to The Gift Douglas argues that, rather than starting with the
switch from arm-chair anthropology to fieldwork (Rivers, Malinowski), modem
anthropology was inaugurated with Mauss's systematic and conceptual inquiry
in Le Don (1925).23 Like Mauss in The Gift, Steiner shows in »Notes on Com-

18
Richard Thurnwald / Konrad Theodor Preuss: Lehrbuch der Völkerkunde. 2., teil-
weise veränderte Aufl., Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke 1939, p. 50.
19
»Die geringe Naturbeherrschung kann nur durch weitgehende physische und psychi-
sche Anpassung an Örtlichkeit wettgemacht werden.« Ibid., p. 54.
20
»Critical arguments and empirical findings were marshalled in the first instance to
attack false science.« Adam Kuper: The Invention of Primitive Society. Transforma-
tions of an Illusion. London: Routledge 1988, p. 148.
21
»When an individual had been assimilated in culture, he merged readily in the mass of
population and his descendants soon forgot their foreign ancestry. Not so in our time.«
See Franz Boas: The Mind of Primitive Man. New York: Macmillan 1938, p. 25.
22
Mary Douglas told this the author of this essay in a conversation.
23
Mary Douglas: Risk and Blame. Essays in Cultural Theory. London: Routledge 1992,
p. 158.
86 Part H: Franz Baermann Steiner - Anthropology and Totalitarian Terror

parative Economics« that >modern< monetary systems have their equivalent in

primitive forms of exchange.24 Like at the end of Mauss's magnum opus Stei-
ner's book on >primitive economics< would - as Steiner's letter of 13 April, 1947
to Paul Bruell shows - have concentrated on the difference between con-
structions of value in >primitive< societies, and the market economy of the >mod-
ern< world of the West. Fleischli quotes Steiner's letter of 13 April, 1947 to Paul
Bruell as follows
My greatest ambition is to write a comparative account of primitive economics. I
have completely new theories about the construction of value in societies without a
market economy: above all about the construction of value in sacrifice rather than in
competitive forms of exchange.25
Whereas the economics of free enterprise (»marktwirtschafliche[n] Gesell-
schaften«) are based on competitive forms of exchange (»Tauschverfahren«)
>primitives< construct value (»Wertbildung«) through sacrifice that contrasts
with the possessiveness which Mauss criticizes in >modern< European econo-
mies. In Le Don Mauss shows how in non-European societies wealthy people
feel obliged to distribute their possessions in forms of gifts. It is not the accu-
mulation of wealth that guarantees rank and nobility, but rather generosity. The
exchange of gifts contrasts with market economies. Whereas market econo-
mies have their rationale in accumulation, the economy of gift exchange is
based on the principle of the traffic of goods which are not abstractly equiva-
lent. Market economies do not offer security to the whole of a given popula-
tion, distributing wealth only to the >lucky few<. Mauss posits a principle of
reciprocity in >primitive< society.26 At the end of his book Mauss explicitly
criticises >modern< man who has become »a calculating machine«.27 Similarly
Steiner compares the »distorting exchange« of the >moderns< with the life of
the >savages< in his lyrical cycle Eroberungen:

Gab er alles, behielt jene trümmer nicht

[...]
Wie guter der wilden, jener beharrlichen stamme,
Die den verfälschenden handel nicht kennen.

24
Franz Baermann Steiner: Notes on Comparative Economics. In: The British Journal
of Sociology 5 (1954), p. 118-129.
25
»Meine größte Ambition ist eine vergleichende Oekonomie [!] der Naturvölker zu
schreiben. Ich habe ganz neue Theorien über Wertbildung in nicht marktwirtschaft-
lichen Gesellschaften, vor allem über Wertbildung in Opfer - statt in Tauschverfah-
ren.« Fleischli, Franz Baermann Steiner (p. 2, note 7), p. 24. My translation.
26
For a discussion of Mauss' principle of reciprocity as opening up a contrast to capi-
talist economies see Kuper, The Invention of Primitive Society (p. 85, note 20),
p. 219.
27
Marcel Mauss: The Gift. Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies.
Trans, by Ian Cunnison. With an Introduction by E. E. Evans-Pritchard. London:
Cohen & West 1954, p. 66.
4. Anthropology and the Perception ofNon- Western Peoples 87

Gave he everything, did not keep these ruins

[...]
Like the goods of savages, these steadfast tribes,
who do not know the distortion of trade.28

Like >savages< who do not know the distortions of the free market (»han-
del«) the poet can give his possessions away. The poet's passing on of his
inward wealth itself constitutes a gift that is grounded in reciprocity: the
reader of Steiner's poem receives from, but also gives back to the poet, by
bringing to life the letters printed on the page. Indeed the Eroberungen close
with the poet's renunciation of proprietorial attitudes to his conquests (»er-
oberungen«):

[...] den fernen

Ganz übergeben
Sind die eroberungen:
Weggerollt, abgeglüht, fremd, verloren [...]

[...] to the distant

completely given
are the conquests
rolled over, faded away, foreign, forlorn [...]29

The poet in a humble and selfless manner hands over (»übergeben«) his con-
quests. Like a >savage< he thus constructs value through sacrifice, through self-
less acts, rather than through free enterprise in which the trader hopes to in-
crease the quantity of his possessions. The construction of value that Steiner
posits in >primitive< cultures diminishes the esteem that possessions enjoy in
the >modern< Western world.30 Mauss contrasts the generosity of >primitive<
communities with the »calculating machine« into which man has been trans-
formed in >modern< societies. Steiner compares the proprietorial and individu-
alist attitudes of >modern< economics with the humility of non-European eco-
nomies that are based on the notion of sacrifice which implies the readiness to

28
Steiner, Eroberungen (p. 42, note 118), p. 29-30. My translation.
29
Ibid., p. 60. My translation.
30
In his letter to Gandhi Steiner argues that the Oriental character of the state of
Israel can be seen in its economics which are not based on competition and pos-
sessiveness. Steiner invites Gandhi and other Indians to visit Israel, so that they
can see how anti-individualist (collective settlements) and non competitive life is
in Israel: »[...] whenever you and your people want information, some of us are
ready to come to India and devote our life to the task of mutual understanding.
And - be it soon! - when your young and gifted students should venture on their
journeys between Europe and their land, to stop at Palestine, we shall show them
all that is to be seen: first of all our village communities, our varied experiments
in collective settlements and non competitive economic units.« Steiner, Letter to
Gandhi (p. 82, note 5), p. 145.
88 Part II: Franz Baermann Steiner - Anthropology and Totalitarian Terror

hand over possessions to the whole of the community which in turn gives gifts
to support the life of all of its members. Steiner as well as Mauss, therefore,
play off >primitive< economics against competitive forms of exchange. The
theme of sacrifice will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 6.

4.3 The Context of British Anthropology

There are two concepts that are crucial for the discussion of Steiner's scholarly
work in the context of British anthropologists' perception of non-European
peoples in section 4.4: evolutionism and functionalism. Stocking lists the fol-
lowing elements as essential to evolutionism: »[...] the psychic unity of man-
kind, the uniform stages of development, the doctrine of survival, and, of course,
the comparative method [,..].«31 »Psychic unity« means the belief that all races
have the same intellectual development, all races go through the same stages of
intellectual growth (»uniform stages of development«), but >primitive<, non-
Western peoples are retarded, which is why their present state has the status of
a »survival« of bygone European history. A long time ago Europeans were as
>primitive<, as intellectually underdeveloped, as non-European peoples are now,
seen to be. On account of this doctrine of survival Ernest Gellner calls evolu-
tionism a »science of retardation«:
For such an approach [evolutionism] a »survival« becomes a tool of discovery, in-
deed the tool of discovery. It consists of using a fragment of something past which,
precisely, was not fit to survive properly, in its full original function or essence, as
crucial evidence of a past condition. Once the alien is seen as the retarded, a science
of retardation is required, and anthropology becomes that science.32

Survivals of the past become signs of the alien. Non-Europeans who are consid-
ered to be aliens occupy the place of present representatives of a savage and
primitive past within evolutionary discourse. Anthropology as »the science of
retardation« delineates where »aliens« have not kept intellectual pace with
»Westerners«. The »comparative« method consists in comparing the intellec-
tual development of the »modernized Western world« with the under-deve-
lopment in the retarded non-modernized parts of the earth. Evolutionists set
themselves the task both to prove the intellectual superiority of the >modern
Europeam over the retarded non-European< and to eradicate any regression
into a primitive state of life from present Western society (Tylor therefore

31
Stocking, After Tylor (p. 82, note 4), p. 10.
32
Ernest Gellner: Zero of Cracow or Revolution of Nemi or The Polish Revenge in
Three Acts. In: Roy F. Ellen, et. al. (Ed.): Malinowski Between Two Worlds. The
Polish Roots of an Anthropological Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press 1988, p. 164-194, p. 170.
4. Anthropology and the Perception of Non-Western Peoples 89

called anthropology »a reformer's science«).33 Although evolutionists take the

psychic unity of mankind for granted, they believe in racial difference, and it is
this racial difference between Europeans and non-Europeans that accounts for
the slow intellectual development of the latter.
Bronislaw Malinowski replaced Frazer's and Tylor's evolutionism with
functionalism. Malinowski's functionalism differed from evolutionism in that
it abandoned a diachronic for a synchronic approach:
In 1932 he [Malinowski] explicitly offered an »evolutionist recantation«, insisting
that (though he did »still believe in evolution«) any attempt to reconstruct the past
would be possible only on the basis of a systematic knowledge of the »laws and
regularities« of process in the present.34

Rather than making conjectures about the past, Malinowski spoke for a tho-
roughly empirical and scientific analysis of present data as can be gleaned
from >primitive< tribes. Malinowski tried to make anthropology more scien-
tifically acceptable through a synchronic functionalist method,35 discarding
vague reconstructions of the past, and introducing a systematic method. As
the quotation from Stocking's After Tylor mentions, Malinowski »did >still be-
lieve in evolutiom«. Functionalism should be seen as closely related to evo-
lutionism:
Functionalism was the result of modern fieldwork, which - ruthlessly banishing con-
jecture, but not theory - demonstrated that »every custom, material object, idea and be-
lief fulfils some vital function« and »represents an indispensable part within a working
whole.« But it was also the inevitable outcome of evolutionism properly considered -
not as a »sequence of forms,« but as »the gradual crystallisation of well-defined insti-
tutions« and the »better adaption of [each] institution to its function.«36

Whereas evolutionists like Frazer and Tylor speculated about the past, Mali-
nowski's functionalism derived from field-work within contemporary socie-
ties. Nevertheless, as Stocking argues, there are still evolutionist assumptions
within functionalism: Malinowski shows how primitive institutions have a
function, but these functions are not as well »crystallised« in >primitive< socie-
ties as they are in modern Europe. For Malinowski the >primitive< is still
intellectually retarded, in need of an anthropologist who can give a clear
account of the functions of the institutions by which the native is surrounded.
Radcliffe-Brown tried to give anthropology a stronger scientific grounding
through a »comparative method«:

33
For a discussion of Tylor's concept of a »reformer's science« see Stefan Collini:
Outsiders and the Reformer's Science. The Heroic Age of Anthropology. In: Times
Literary Supplement (28 June, 1996), p. 4-5.
34
Stocking, After Tylor (p. 82, note 4), p. 290.
35
For a discussion of Malinowski's concern with a representation that has the author-
ity of »scientific objectivity« see ibid., p. 269.
36
Ibid., p. 289.
90 Part II: Franz Baermann Steiner - Anthropology and Totalitarian Terror

The first step toward a science of society was [...] the creation of an adequate taxon-
omy, »and in the first instance, a classification of social systems themselves.« These
were to be studied by a »comparative method« that would differ fundamentally from
Tylor's study of »adhesions« (or the trait-diffusion comparisons that had been de-
rived from it), in seeking to obtain »natural laws«: that is to say, generalizations with
an ever-greater precision and probability.37
Whereas Tylor compared the diffusion of specific traits (for example animism)
over a range of non-European societies with the absence of such >primitive<
religiosity among Western societies, Radcliffe-Brown works out an accurate
taxonomy by studying one >primitive< society in detail and then applies such
taxonomy to similar forms of behavior in different >primitive< societies.38 The
notion of »social value« is an example of Radcliffe-Brown's »scientific taxon-
omy«: all forms of ritualistic behavior are non-verbal expressions of value,
they teach a specific tribe what they should cherish. Thus the term »social
value« embraces all forms of ritual value for the totality of all >primitive< cul-
tures (according to Radcliffe-Brown, in all >primitive< societies rituals are the
representation of values).39 In chapter 5.2 I shall show how Steiner attacks
Radcliffe-Brown's patronising and rather dismissive approach to the concept
of ritual. It is important to notice here that Radcliffe-Brown »in principle in-
cluded« complex societies as »other >types< in a comparative science of soci-
ety«.40 According to Radcliffe-Brown, the natives cannot reflect on their own
thought from a relatively detached position. They are not aware that their feel-
ings express values and concepts. This is borne out by Radcliffe-Brown's
comment on the Andaman Islanders:
In attempting to put into precise words the \aguefeelings of the Andaman Islander
there is always the danger that we may attribute to him conceptions that he does not
possess. For he is not himself capable of thinking about his own sentiments.41

4.4 Steiner's Relationship to British Anthropology

Marginalization within European culture furthered Malinowski's sometimes

sympathetic attitude toward people who suffered under Western imperialism.
This marginalized position within western Europe personally connects Steiner
to Malinowski. One can indeed draw an interesting comparison between Mali-
nowski as Polish outsider within mainstream western European life and Franz

37
Ibid., p. 359-360.
38
For a discussion of Malinowski's critique of Radcliffe-Brown's inductive method
see ibid., p. 364.
39
For Stocking's reference to the term »social value« see ibid., p. 330.
40
Ibid., p. 431.
41
Alfred R. Radcliffe-Brown: The Andaman Islanders. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press 1952, p. 324.
4. Anthropology and the Perception of Non-Western Peoples 91

Steiner who, as a Jew, discovers his cultural origins in the Orient. Malinowski
characterizes himself as being, on account of his Slavonic background, more
akin to the >savage< than a Western-European anthropologist. According to
Malinowski, an Eastern European can more easily participate in the daily life
of the natives than anthropologists from West-Europe:
I am not certain if this [the participation in the daily life of the natives] is equally
easy for everyone - perhaps the Slavonic nature is more plastic and more naturally
savage than that of western Europeans - but though the degree of success varies, the
attempt is possible for everyone.42

Malinowski's expression »Slavonic nature« refers to his Polishness, implying

that he, as a Pole, is able to have better contact with >savages< than western
Europeans. The description of this »Slavonic nature« as being both »plastic«
and »naturally savage« defines his Polish identity as intrinsically closer to the
native's way of life (»naturally savage«) as well as more capable of switching
from one cultural background to another (»plastic«) than that of anthropolo-
gists whose origins lie in the West of Europe. Being »plastic« as well as »natu-
rally savage« a Pole can mediate between >primitive< worlds and the sphere of
Occidental civilization. Jan Jerischna connects Malinowski's Polishness with
his implicit critique of the Hegelian concept of »historic nations«:
[...] the philosophy of Hegel was too deterministic. According to Hegel, whatever
happened in the course of human history was necessary, and since it was necessary
it must consequently have been both just and right. Poles, as the citizens of a parti-
tioned country, could not possibly have recognised the conspiracy of three military
superpowers, Russia, Prussia and Austria (i. e. the actual partitioners) who were in-
strumental in the destruction of their statehood, as being prompted by absolute his-
torical necessity, let alone ethically justifiable. [...] Hegel differentiated between the
»historic nation« and the »non-historic« ones, i. e. nations »disappearing« in the course
of history from the political maps of the world. Given that Poland was victimised by
a »historic« nation and state, it was implied that Poland must for Hegel be of »non-
historic« nature. All this was totally inadmissible for Poles.43

According to Jerischna, in his philosophy of history Hegel passes judgment on

those nations whose »weakness« is proven by their subjugation to other, »stron-
ger« nations. Poland as a partitioned state, as a »victimised« country, resembles
colonized societies, non-European peoples who »had to yield to the strength of
European forces.« Ernest Gellner establishes a link between Hegel's Weltge-
richt and the judgmental tone in evolutionist writing ä la Frazer:

42
Bronislaw Malinowski: Argonauts of the Western Pacific. An Account of Native En-
terprise and Adventure in the Archipelagoes of Melanesian New Guinea. With a pre-
face by Sir James George Frazer. London: Routledge 1922 (Studies in Economics
and Political Sciences; 65), p. 21.
43
Jan Jerischna: Polish Modernism and Malinowski. In: Roy F. Ellen (Ed.), Malinow-
ski between Two Worlds (p. 88, note 32), p. 128-148,p. 132.
92 Part II: Franz Baermann Steiner - Anthropology and Totalitarian Terror

Though Frazer's pervasive evolutionism is clearly inspired by Darwin rather than by

Hegel, nonetheless he too sees the global pattern of development as passing an ulti-
mate moral verdict. Weltgeschichte still remains Weltgericht. Reason, though of a
British empiricist variety this time, still guides history, albeit loosely. How pleasing
can these world-historical verdicts be to a member of a nation whose political insti-
tutions have apparently not been fit to survive?44

Gellner explains the Malinowskian functionalist >revolution< by referring to

the anthropologist's Polish background: his synchronic approach was as much
motivated by personal stimuli (»Polish revenge«) as it was by >objective< scien-
tific endeavors.45 Coming from a nation which leading European intellectuals
(Hegel, Frazer) implicitly degraded as unfit for survival, Malinowski was, ac-
cording to Gellner - himself a Central European - bound to be more sympa-
thetic than his fellow anthropologists to non-European nations that have been
victimized by European powers. Malinowski's self-depiction as »more natu-
rally savage« should be seen against the background of this Polishness.
Steiner who posits his identity as partly Western (having been born in the
West) and partly Oriental (locating, as a Jew, his cultural identity in >the East<)
mediates between the European and the non-European too. Nevertheless there
are differences between Malinowski's sense of identity and that of Steiner. Mali-
nowski's usage of »more« in the passage quoted above shows that he still con-
sidered himself predominantly European, saying that Slavs are ethnically closer,
as well as more adaptable, to the mind of the >savage< than their neighbors in the
West of Europe, but they still belong to an essentially European intellectual
tradition. Malinowski was, through his Polish background, sensitive to the pecu-
liarities of marginalized countries under colonial rule, but he still perceived him-
self as an European. Steiner's self-characterization as an »Oriental bom in the
West«, on the other hand, points towards a differently-balanced identity, an iden-
tity that is equally Oriental (having its roots in the East) as it is Occidental (hav-
ing been born and brought up in the West). Fleischli has interpreted Steiner's
characterization as an Oriental in the West.46 In Fleischli's account, Steiner feels
as much at home in the East as in the West. He also points out that this self-
perception as an »Oriental born in the West«47 has striking implications for Stei-
ner's scholarship: Steiner does not derive his scholarly measurements from a
European intellectual frame-work, while talking about >primitive< societies; ra-
ther he is aware that non-European societies have different ways of life, and dif-
ferent manners of conducting rational enquiries from those practized in the West.
Like Malinowski, Steiner considers the >primitive< to be on equal footing with
the European, but in contrast to Steiner, Malinowski obtains from a predomi-
nantly European tradition the measurements by which to judge >primitive<
44
Gellner, Zero of Cracow (p. 88, note 32), p. 164-194, p. 170.
45
For a discussion of the Malinowskian revolution that dethrones »history« see ibid.,
p. 192.
46
See Fleischli, Franz Baermann Steiner (p. 2, note 7), p. 17-20.
47
Ibid., p. 15.
4. Anthropology and the Perception of Non-Western Peoples 93

worlds. Malinowski makes sense of >savage< customs by comparing them to the

emotional, economic, and libidinal needs of his European readers, arguing that
non-Europeans share those needs with Europeans; what differs is only the way
by means of which the fulfilment of those longings is attempted.
Nevertheless both anthropologists did not unequivocally belong to a Western-
European frame of reference, and, connected with this marginality within Eu-
rope, both shared an openness towards marginal, colonial peoples >in the East<.
A sympathetic approach towards >savage societies< can be gleaned from Mali-
nowski's The Argonauts of the Western Pacific (1922). In the introduction to
the Argonauts Malinowski complains about the prejudices with which »white
men« approach >savages<:
And they [»white men« living in the Archipelagoes of Melanesien New Guinea] were
for the most part, naturally enough, full of the biased and pre-judged opinions inevita-
ble in the average practical man, whether administrator, missionary, or trader, yet so
strongly repulsive to a mind striving after the objective, scientific view of things.48

Malinowski's complains about, but he does not condemn »white men's« pre-
judices: he shows his understandings of these prejudices, using expressions like
»naturally enough« or »inevitable«, and says that only his scientific search for
objective truths< makes him critical of claims that cannot be backed up by empi-
rical investigations. His clear differentiation between the »practical man« of the
colonial administration and the »disinterested« anthropologist who only wants to
work out a scientifically justified view of >savage life< without mingling with
the colonial context, indicates that Malinowski is not interested in undermining
attitudes that help to justify colonialism.49 As I will show in chapter 5.2, in
Taboo and in his study of forms of slavery Steiner not only mentions, but fo-
48
Malinowski, Argonauts of the Western Pacific (p. 91, note 42), p. 5-6.
49
Malinowski's stance towards colonialism has often been discussed. George Stock-
ing, for example, sees Malinowski's functionalism as a requirement for the proper
administration of colonies: »A kind of schematized outline history of the relation-
ship of anthropology and clonialism is of course readily available today. It hinges on
the emergence of functionalism after World War I. Before that, in the expansive
phase of Western colonialism, evolutionism in anthropology was both the reflection
of and the justification for the invasion, appropriation, and subjugation of the >sav-
age<, >barbarian<, or >semi-civilised< regions of the earth by the representatives of
European >civilisation< - the actors being conveniently color-coded in social terms.
But with the establishment of European colonial power, what was required was no
longer simply the justification of dominance in terms of difference, but the more de-
tailed knowledge of functioning societies that would facilitate and maintain an eco-
nomical and trouble-free colonial administration - with the stress on the values of
traditional native culture or social organisation serving as a counterweight to urban-
izing progressive natives who identified too closely with European models of equal-
ity and democracy.« See G. Stocking: Colonial Situations. In: G. W. Stocking (Ed.):
Colonial Situations. Essays on the Contextualization of Ethnographic Knowledge.
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press 1991 (History of Anthropology; 7), p. 3-8,
p. 4.
94 Part II: Franz Baermann Steiner - Anthropology and Totalitarian Terror

cuses on scholarly inaccuracies of Western writings on non-European con-

cepts. Rather than showing an understanding for such incorrect perceptions,
Steiner adapts a dry, donnish and ironic style in his analysis of major misun-
derstandings within the discipline of anthropology.
Malinowski often stresses that an anthropologist has to slip into the mind of a
>primitive<. His functionalism toned down the crude evolutionism in Frazer's
writings. This new tone becomes the more audible if one compares both Mali-
nowski's attempt at plunging into the native's way of life, and the functionalist
interpretation of >savage< customs which evolves from such attempts, with Frau-
zer's evolutionistic language that confronts the reader in the preface to the first
edition of the Argonauts. In the preface, Frazer alludes to his theory of the evolu-
tion of mankind, progressing from magic to religion and finally from religion to
science. His anger at the >tenacity< of superstition in contemporary >savage<
society is clearly discernible:
This conspicuous predominance of magic over religion, at least over the worship of
the dead, is a very notable feature in the culture of a people so comparatively high in
the scale of savagery as the Trobriand Islanders. It furnishes a fresh proof of the ex-
traordinary strength and tenacity of the hold which this world-wide delusion has
had, and still has, upon the human mind.50
Such value judgment is rarely to be found in Malinowski's writing. His func-
tionalist approach helps to show how an apparently nonsensical institution or rite
has a function if the anthropologist looks at the whole organization of >savage<
society.51 What Frazer calls a »delusion« in his preface to the Argonauts, Mali-
nowski interprets as important for the economic life of the Trobriands: according
to Malinowski, magic »and its associated ceremonial are instrumental in secur-
ing the co-operation of the community, and the organisation of communal la-
bour«.52 The magician is shown to be a work leader. Frazer's judgmental tone
sharply contrasts with Malinowski's wish to let the natives >speak for them-
selves<. Via his functional method of inquiry (i. e. undertaking synchronic rather
than diachronic studies, deciphering the meaning of native institutions and ritu-
als) Malinowski shows that the >savage< is on equal footing with >white men<.
The needs of >white men< are not »essentially different from that of the na-
tives«53 and yet Malinowski's functionalism often bears traces of evolutionism.
Following Levy-Bruhl's theory of the >primitive's< pre-logical mind in both How
Natives Think and Primitive Mentality,54 Malinowski argues that peculiarly
50
Malinowski, Argonauts of the Western Pacific (p. 91, note 42), p. XIV.
51
For a discussion of Malinowski's functionalism see Audrey I. Richards: The Concept
of Culture in Malinowski's Work. In: Raymond Firth (Ed.): Man and Culture. An
Evaluation of Bronislaw Malinowski. London: Routledge & Kegan 1957, p. 15-31.
52
Malinowski, Argonauts of the Western Pacific (p. 91, note 42), p. 116.
53
For a discussion of Malinowski's theory of needs see Ralph Piddington: Malinow-
ski's Theory of Needs. In: Firth, Man and Culture (note 51, above), p. 33-51.
54
Levy-Bruhl defines »prelogical thought« as not taking account of contradictions:
»By designating it [primitive mentality] >prelogical< I merely wish to state that it
4. Anthropology and the Perception of Non-Western Peoples 95

>savage< institutions and rites have a social function, >savages< themselves, how-
ever, are not able to reflect on these functions:
They [the natives] have no knowledge of the total outline of any of their social
structure. They know their own motives, know the purpose of individual actions and
the rules which apply to them, but how, out of these, the whole collective institution
shapes, this is beyond their mental range. Not even the most intelligent native has
any idea of the Kula as a big, organised social construction, still less of its sociologi-
cal function and implications.55
The term Kula describes voyages around the Trobriand Islands in which neck-
laces are exchanged in a ritualistic manner. Malinowski depicts the native as
lacking any understanding of the >primitive< way of life. Natives are not able
to reflect upon the intricacies of their social organization (»social structure«),
and they are also incapable of comprehending the process by means of which
the specific institutional body (»the whole collective institution«) of their soci-
ety came into being. Malinowski's expression »this is beyond their mental
range« underlines his doubts about the cognitive qualities of the >primitives<.
Not only has the native not enough distance to see the structure of his society
as a whole, he also lacks the cognitive faculties that makes possible such func-
tionalist abstractions:
The natives obey the forces and commands of the tribal code, but they do not com-
prehend them; exactly as they obey their instincts and their impulses but could not
lay down a single law of psychology. The regularities in native institutions are an
automatic result of the interaction of the mental forces of tradition, and of the mate-
rial conditions of environment.56
The individual native appears to be completely passive. This sense of passivity
is underlined by the repetition of the verb »obey« with which Malinowski
contrasts the act of comprehension that would make possible active resistance
to commands. Natives seem to fall prey to their impulses, they seem to be in
complete obedience to the »tradition« of their society. They are not able to
reflect on their own way of life in a detached, analytical manner. Malinowski
depicts >primitives< as being at the mercy of both their geographical »environ-
ment« and »the material conditions« that this environment imposes on them. In

does not bind itself down, as our thought does, to avoiding contradiction.« See
Lucien Lovy-Bruhl: How Natives Think. Authorized Translation by Lilian A. Clare.
London: G. Allen & Unwin 1926, p. 78. Logical thought, however, takes account of
contradictions. Logic and the ability to abstract thinking are connected, and in
Primitive Mentality Levy-Bruhl indeed claims that primitives are incapable of ab-
straction: »In short, the entire mental habit which rules out abstract thought and rea-
soning, properly so-called, seems to be met with in a large number of uncivilized
communities, and constitutes a characteristic and essential trait of primitive mental-
ity.« See L. Levy-Bruhl: Primitve Mentality. Authorized Translation by Lilian A.
Clare. London: G. Allen & Unwin 1923, p. 29.
55
Malinowski, Argonauts of the Western Pacific (p. 91, note 42), p. 83.
56
Ibid., p. 11.
96 Part II: Franz Baermann Steiner - Anthropology and Totalitarian Terror

Malinowski's account the >savage< appears to be a child who cannot take re-
sponsibility for himself, but blindly follows either his emotional drives, or the
the commands of his society. The correlation between the historical stage of
>primitivism< and the psycho-biological state of childhood has always been made
in evolutionist writing. Frazer is a classic example. Malinowski's depiction of
the >primitive< as being at the mercy of »the material conditions« of his »en-
vironment« also finds its equivalent in nineteenth-century evolutionist writing.57
The underlying evolutionism within Malinowski's functionalism comes per-
haps most strikingly to the fore in his essay »The Problem of Meaning in
Primitive Languages«. Here Malinowski proposes that the primitive's inability
to reflect leaves its traces on his language: primitive language »is a mode of
action and not an instrument of reflection«.58 Malinowski goes on to align the
savage's use of language with that of children or illiterate members of the
>civilized world< by writing that »[t]he illiterate members of civilised commu-
nities treat and regard words very much as savages do, that is as being strongly
bound up with the reality of action«.59 Malinowski regards the language of
>savages< as evidence of their >primitive< mentality that cannot embark on
abstractions. According to David Richards, evolutionist anthropology made
language the prime source of theories about >primitive< tribes, saying that
although Frazer disagreed with some contemporary linguistic research, he
nevertheless concurred with:
[...] the essentially eighteenth-century notion that the evolutionary progress of mankind
is mirrored in the visible transformations of language. Language study is anthropology
in miniature [...] Their languages [the languages of >primitives<] did not have the ca-
pacity for abstract generalisation, since they possessed neither the conceptual capacity
nor the vocabulary for subtle distinctions and the perception of their »error«.60

By writing that the language of >primitives< serves a way of action rather than
of reflection, Malinowski follows the eighteenth-century evolutionary tradi-

57
Stocking paraphrases evolutionist writing on the passivity and helplessness of >pri-
mitives< as follows: »Not yet, or no longer, able to subject themselves to the disci-
pline of labor and delayed gratification, indulgent of their instinctive passions, sav-
ages were at the mercy of the forces of nature. By contrast, civilization, whether one
viewed it as a natural outgrowth of human capacity or as a divinely assisted process,
tended to be seen as a triumph over rather than expression of the primal nature of
man, just as it was a triumph over external nature.« See George W. Stocking: Victo-
rian Anthropology. New York, London: Free Press, Collier Macmillan 1987.
58
Bronislaw Malinowski: The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages. In: Charles
K. Ogden / Ivor A. Richards (Ed.): The Meaning of Meaning. A Study of the Influence
of Language upon Thought and of the Science of Symbols. London: Paul, Trench, Trub-
ner& Co 1923, p. 451-510, p. 474.
59
Ibid., p. 489.
60
David Richards: Masks of Difference. Cultural Representations in Literature, Anthro-
pology, and Art. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994 (Cultural Margins; 2),
p. 179.
4. Anthropology and the Perception of Non-Western Peoples 97

tion, >proving< via linguistic studies that >savages< are incapable of thinking in
an abstract manner.We shall see in chapter 5.2 how Steiner ironically takes
sides with the >primitive< view of language - in the Malinowskian description
- as a mode of action. Here suffice it to notice that Malinowski describes the
natives in evolutionist terms, arguing that they have not yet reached the level
of cognition that would enable them to analyze the meaning of various institu-
tions within their society.61
The irrational side of Malinowski's personality comes to the fore in his dia-
ries - as they were published in 1967 Steiner could not have read them - in
which certain abusive expressions for natives »greatly disturbed a later genera-
tion of anthropologists«.62 Firth claims that Malinowski kept these diaries in
order to separate an irrational, racist private self from his desired eighteenth-
century Enlightenment, rational outlook.63 The rational anthropologist could
not deal with the irrational danger in himself. This is the very issue that Steiner
tackles in Taboo and in »Über den Prozeß der Zivilisierung«, which will be
discussed below in chapter 5.3.
George W. Stocking has pointed out Malinowski's ambiguous attitude toward
primitive societies, showing how, on the one hand, he identified, as a Pole, with
marginalized >primitives< and how, on the other, he believed in the progressive
power of European civilization. Even when this belief in the superiority of Euro-
61
Malinowski on >primitive< language's incapability of abstractions: »We have to realise
that language, originally, among primitive, non civilised people, was never used as a
mere mirror of reflected thought. The manner in which I am using it now, in writing
these words, the manner in which the author of a book, or a papyrus or a hewn inscrip-
tion has to use it, is a very far-fetched and derivative function of language. In this, lan-
guage becomes a condensed piece of reflection, a record of fact or thought. In its
primitive uses, language functions as a link in concerted human activity, as a piece
of human behaviour. It is a mode of action and not an instrument of reflection.«
Malinowski, The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages (p. 96, note 58),
p. 474. By allocating the language of >primitive< peoples to the past, Malinowski fol-
lows the deductive, evolutionist method of anthropologists like Frazer and Tylor
which Nash describes as follows: »Their [Frazer's and Tylor's] deductive, evolu-
tionist principles ranked the Western world as the Civilised pole of an historic con-
tinuum in which other contemporary cultures were only examples of earlier stages of
savagery and barbarism.« See June Nash: Nationalism and Fieldwork. In: Annual
Review of Anthropology 4 (1975), p. 225-245, p. 227.
62
Stocking, After Tylor (p. 82, note 4), p. 261. Richards comments on the shock-
waves that the publication of Malinowski's diaries have sent through the anthropo-
logical community as follows: »As James Clifford and Clifford Geertz and many
others have shown, the hidden authorial voice of Argonauts becomes abundantly and
shockingly expressive in the diary.« Richards, Masks of Difference (p. 96, note 60),
p. 191.
63
Raymond Firth makes this claim in »Bronislaw Malinowski«, in: Sydel Silverman
(Ed.): Totems and Teachers. Perspectives on the History of Anthropology. New
York: Columbia University Press 1981, p. 101-137. Harry C. Payne agrees with
Firth in: Malinowski's Style. In: Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society
125(1981), p. 416-440, p. 435.
98 Part Π: Franz Baermann Steiner - Anthropology and Totalitarian Terror

pean rationality waned in the thirties, Malinowski still did not question the con-
cept of indirect colonial rule:
Though he had come to recognize and even to identify with the stirrings of African na-
tionalism, Malinowski did not envision the end of the colonial system, except perhaps
in some »ultimate« (a)historical moment - and the same can probably be said for most
of his anthropological contemporaries.64

One of Malinowski's anthropological contemporaries did indeed oppose the

belief in the superiority of Western culture that offered an intellectual justifi-
cation for colonial rule.65 Whereas Malinowski predominantly analyzes the
way >primitives< think, Steiner gives detailed and ironic accounts of schol-
arly and intellectual failures within the Western discipline of anthropology.
In his aphorisms Steiner replaces the systematic methodology of his an-
thropological writings with an associative, speculative way of writing. In
these more private reflections, we can find his explicit views on Malinowski
and the approach that Malinowski represents. In one of his aphorisms, Stei-
ner wonders whether Malinowski admired the Enlightenment on account of
his Polishness. He in effect offers a thorough demolition of Malinowski's
method:

64
George W. Stocking: Maclay, Kubary, Malinowski. Architypes of the Dreamtime of
Anthropology. In: Stocking, Colonial Situations (p. 93, note 49), p. 9-74, p. 65.
65
Maquet comments as follows on the feelings of Western superiority that evolu-
tionist anthropology confirms: »[...] it seems clear that the existence of a particu-
lar discipline dedicated exclusively to the study of non-Western cultures reflected
the Victorian sense of superiority of 19th century Europe and was perfectly con-
sistent with, and useful to, the colonial expansion ofthat period.« See Jacques J.
Maquet: Objectivity in Anthropology. In: Current Anthropology 5 (1964), p. 47-
55, p. 51. Talal Asad interprets the gathering of accurate information, the empiri-
cal, synchronic approach associated with Malinowski's and Radcliffe-Brown's
functionalism as follows: »But anthropology is also rooted in an unequal power
encounter between the West and the Third World which goes right back to the
emergence of bourgeois Europe, an encounter in which colonialism is merely an
historical moment. It is this encounter that gives the West access to cultural and
historical information about the societies it has progressively dominated, and thus
not only generates a certain kind of universal understanding, but also reinforces
the inequalities in capacity between the European and the non-European worlds
[...].« See Talal Asad: Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter. London: Ithaca
Press 1973, p. 16. In a similar manner Bhabha associates the power of accurate
knowledge about the function of institutions in non-Western societies with the
power to establish >otherness<: »Colonial power produces the colonized as a fixed
reality which is at once >other< and yet entirely knowable and visible.« Bhabha:
The Other Question. Difference, Discrimination, and the Discourse of Colonial-
ism. In: Francis Barker (Ed.): Literature, Politics, and Theory. Papers from the Es-
sex Conference 1976-1984. London: Methuen 1986 (New Accents), p. 148-172,
p. 156.
4. Anthropology and the Perception of Non-Western Peoples 99

Malinowski subscribed to an oddly rationalist materialism, believing that you can

explain an institution by describing its functions and investigating these in terms of
the aims they appear to fulfil, in terms of the satisfaction of »needs«. Primary among
these needs are the desire for nourishment, shelter, sexual relations. All this is as-
serted in an age when the calculation of relations has been so greatly loosened by
debates surrounding causality and probability, and when determining an »aim« un-
equivocally had been rendered impossible by psychology! [...] Did this Pole not
yearn after the values of reason? His people did not experience a particularly pro-
nounced Age of Enlightenment of the kind that would have forced him to regard it
skeptically [...].66

Here Steiner criticizes Malinowski for explaining social behavior in the taxo-
nomy of European Enlightenment thought. He fastens on to several of Mali-
nowski's key categories and contextualizes them within the history of ideas.
Enlightenment ideology, he notes, gave rise to rationalist materialism. Advo-
cates of such a position maintain that everything can be rationally explained by
common sense-like references to basic »natural needs«: the peculiar behavior
of >savages< can be deciphered if read as a strange way of fulfilling the mate-
rial »needs« common to the whole of mankind.67 Steiner questions the ra-
tionalistic confidence in explaining the functions of human actions, implicitly
alluding to ambiguity that modern psychology discovers in seemingly straight-
forward, and harmless thoughts and activities (slips of the tongue, dreams
about wolves and horses etc.). What is notable here is that Steiner unmasks
Malinowski's modern >functionalism< as little more than a revival of Enlight-
enment teleology. According to Steiner, Malinowski still believes in the effi-
ciency of European Enlightenment thought, at the very time when psycholo-
gists like Freud have shown the failures of such common sense explanations of
the ambiguous. As a Pole Malinowski was less exposed to Western-European
rationality, and as a consequence, he was less sceptical about the achievements
of the Enlightenment. Reason, enlightenment, and civilization were, however,
the slogans that propagated the superiority of the Western world over the East.
In the most recent history of modern anthropology, Stocking implicitly agrees
with Steiner's interpretation of Malinowski's admiration of Western Enlight-
enment. He writes:
Malinowski was no systematic doubter of the values of science or civilisation. Ar-
guing in his essay for the »objective« validity of scientific laws, he had insisted
that »even if only one normal man remained on the earth, and all others had lost
the ability to make judgements which we would consider normal and logical, that
one man would not need to doubt the value of the material and scientific con-
quests of mankind,« since their »tremendous practical importance« would »enable
him to completely annihilate his adversaries outright«: »the relation of the white

66
Franz Baermann Steiner: Malinowski and Conrad. In: F. B. Steiner, Selected Writ-
ings 2 (p. 82, note 5), p. 238-239, p. 238.
67
For a discussion of Malinowski's theory of needs see Piddington, Malinowski's
Theory of Needs (p. 94, note 53), p. 33-51.
100 Part H: Franz Baermann Steiner - Anthropology and Totalitarian Terror

man to his less civilised colored brethren illustrates this sadly and emphatically.«
Knowledge and power - the laws of science and the Gattung gun - in the hands of
a »normal« individual (male, white, European and civilised) thus sustained each
other, sadly but emphatically.68

Malinowski's positivism - indicated by expressions like »tremendous practical

importance« - leads to a matter of fact - albeit mixed with »sadness« - ascer-
tainment of the superiority of Western civilization over >savage< tribes. In the
aphorism quoted above, Steiner criticizes Malinowski for his blind admiration
of Enlightenment ideology that helped to develop positivism (»rationalistischer
Materialismus«) which in turn affirmed - in down-to-earth practical terms -
the supremacy of the >civilized< over the >primitive<.
In this way Steiner takes issue with Malinowski's belief in the >material< su-
periority of >white men< over natives. Steiner wrote his aphorism on Malinowski
in 1947, at a time, when he was also working on »Prayer in the Garden« (»Gebet
im Garten«). This poem originates to a great extent in reflections about the
slaughter of the Jews. The »practical efficiency« and »technical rationality« in
the annihilation of human life in Nazi concentration camps has indeed called
Malinowski's belief in the unambiguous functionality of social institutions into
doubt. In the poem »Elephantcapture« (»Elefantenfang« also written in 1947)
Steiner implicitly reverses the views of Malinowski and the evolutionists when
he reflects on the irrationality of the civilized who kill the »Wildlinge« (»die
Wilden«, »the savages«) not out of >materialist< reasons (»hunger«) - the poem
makes it clear that the tame animals are well-fed (»wohlgenährt«) whereas,
ironically, the »Wildlinge« are somewhat pathetic kafkaesque hunger-artists
(»bemeistert von hungertagen«) - but out of irrational and >non-functionalist<
enjoyment in punishing and killing (»Strafte mit Lust«). The fact that no needs
are involved is stressed as the tame animals exclusively take pleasure in killing
rather than in stilling a need (»hunger«).69
Despite Steiner's criticism of Malinowski's rootedness in an eighteenth-
century kind of >materialist rationality<, Steiner was attracted to the Polish an-
thropologist. Reasons for this attraction may be found in Malinowski's sensiti-
vity towards the divide which lies between the European and the non-Euro-
pean, between the >modem< and the >civilized<, between the >familiar< and the
>alien<. 70

68
Stocking, After Tylor (p. 82, note 4), p. 247.
69
»Elephantcapture« as a reflection on the Holocaust will be discussed in greater detail
in chapter 6.
70
Thornton sees Malinowski's originality not in his >functionalism< but in his aware-
ness of the distance which lies between European and non-European cultures: »Ma-
linowski's experience in the field was not the cradle of functional ism, as he himself
frequently asserted, but it was among the most deliberate of personal and intellectual
confrontations between the >European< and the >Savage< that had yet been attemp-
ted.« See R. J. Thornton: »Imagine Yourself Set Down ...«. Mach, Frazer, Conrad,
4. Anthropology and the Perception ofNon- Western Peoples 101

Malinowski's influence on Steiner can most clearly be seen in »Notes on

Comparative Economics«.71 Here Steiner draws comparisons between >primi-
tive< practices of exchange and >modern< economics, albeit without the feeling
of European intellectual superiority that can sometimes be found in Mali-
nowski's writing. In »Notes« Steiner discusses the transformation of empirical,
into non-empirical value, the metamorphosis of the utilitarian into the ritualis-
tic in >primitive< societies. Steiner calls this process »negative translation«. He
discusses the hoarding of yam in the Trobriand Islands, as opposed to the em-
pirical usage of it, which is supposed to stop the hunger for this fruit and to
make the Islander's appetite turn to food which is easier to obtain. In this way
values have been bestowed upon the fruit which transcend empirical facts. Yet
Steiner does not ridicule the >savages< for their lack of abstract thinking (as
Malinowski sometimes does). On the contrary, he draws attention to the ap-
pearance of »negative translation« within a modern economy which is based
on money, thus showing that a >primitive< society has the same form of con-
scious abstraction as the Western >civilized< world:
The principle stated above is general; it applies not only to simpler economies. After
all, the conquest of the Western civilization by a total money economy meant the
bestowing of transcending values on money. The holding of money, the position in
which a person's money is »working« for him and does not lie »idle«, are aims the
evaluation of which transcends the evaluation of the goods which can be purchased
with this money used. The rise of capitalist economy came in the guise of a gospel
of saving and ascetic rejection of the use of goods.72
Steiner shows that the apparently rational system of money exchange in the
West depends as much on »belief« as the creation of value in the Trobriand
islands. Money, like rotting yam, has no intrinsic empirical value, and it
becomes invested with meanings which transcends that of objects for mate-
rial usage (»the bestowing of transcending values on money«). In this way
»Notes on Comparative Economics« demonstrate that Western civilisation
falls as much prey to >superstition< - money »does not lie >idle<«, it »is
>working<« for someone, although it does not, in an empirical sense, do any
work - as in the world of >savagery<.
Malinowski's Enlightenment idea of universal human needs does not im-
ply that the intellectual level of all people is the same. Indeed, as we have
seen, he denied the >savages< the ability to abstract from empirical facts. Stei-
ner's notion of »negative translation«, on the other hand, implies that >primi-

Malinowski and the Role of the Imagination in Ethnography. In: Anthropology Today
1 (1985), p. 7-14, p. 14.
71
Godfrey Lienhardt has characterised »Notes on Comparative Economics« as a »study«
that »deserves more consideration than its modest title might attract«. See G. Lien-
hardt: Social Anthropology. London: Oxford University Press 1964 (The Home Uni-
versity Library of Modern Knowledge; 253), p. 111.
72
Franz Baermann Steiner: Notes on Comparative Economics. In: The British Journal
of Sociology 5 (1954), p. 118-129, p. 129.
102 Part II: Franz Baermann Steiner - Anthropology and Totalitarian Terror

tives< are able to make abstractions away from the empirical to the non-
empirical or ritualistic (»affirmation of nonempirical value is accompanied
by and made possible by destruction or rejection of empirical values«).73 The
empirical value of yam transforms into ritualistic value. Rotten yam has -
like money - a ritualistic value. It cannot be used empirically. While discuss-
ing >savage< forms of exchange, Steiner works out complex formulas so as to
underline the complexity of such primitive economics. The formulas that
Steiner develops also indicate the universal character of complex economic
transactions. It belongs to the character of a formula to be applicable in every
society - the abstraction is driven to a point at which it subsumes every
given context.
Against this background of universal applicability, the word »compara-
tive« in the title of the »Notes« is significant, not least if one also takes into
account that Steiner called his work on slavery a »comparative« study. In the
opening chapter to Taboo, Steiner complained about the lack of »compara-
tive« studies, in the wake of a rising interest in field work:
[...] contributions to comparative sociology became fewer and fewer, and definitely
less significant. No comparative study of any importance has been published in this
country during the last twenty years.74
Field work laid the ground for the functionalism which concentrated on the
study of one particular society. The history of the word »comparative« with-
in the discipline of anthropology has to be taken into account, if one wants to
understand from what kind of context Steiner marks himself off by his usage
of the term »comparative sociology«. In evolutionary anthropology, the »com-
parative method« was employed in order to characterize past societies and
the anthropologist depicted these past societies by comparing them with con-
temporary >savage< cultures.75 The empirical facts gathered from contempo-
rary >savage< communities were represented so as to support theses about the
superiority of modern Europe over both a >primitive< past and backward non-
European people of the present. In his aphorisms, Steiner does the opposite
in that he compares >primitive< cultures to >complex< societies drawing atten-
tion to the dangers of modern forms of the control of nature.
Malinowski's field-studies of one society put an end to comparative anthro-
pology with a single evolutionist outlook. Malinowski's concentration on one
society only, and his lack of >abstraction< were later strongly criticized by
Evans-Pritchard and Radcliffe-Brown.76 In »The Present Position of Anthropo-

73
Ibid., p. 128-129.
74
Franz Baermann Steiner: Taboo. With a Preface by E. E. Evans-Pritchard. Harmonds-
worth: Penguin 1967 (Pelican Anthropology Library), p. 16.
75
See Stocking, Victorian Anthropology (p. 96, note 57), p. 15.
76
For a discussion of Evans-Pritchard's dissatisfaction with Malinowski's lack of
>abstraction< see Adam Kuper: Anthropology and Anthropologists. The Modern
British School. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1983, p. 83.
4. Anthropology and the Perception of Non-Western Peoples 103

logical Studies«, an essay cited in the bibliography to Taboo, Radcliffe-Brown

marks off a new kind of anthropology from both nineteenth-century evolution-
ist speculation about by-gone societies and a Malinowskian way of speculating
about the psychological necessities of all mankind. According to Radcliffe-
Brown, these speculations fail to yield scientifically accurate insights into the
>objective< nature of humanity. Such insight can only be obtained if anthro-
pologists adopt the »generalising method of the natural sciences«:
It [>modern< anthropology] rejects as being no part of its task the hypothetical recon-
struction of the unknown past. It therefore avoids all discussion of hypotheses as to
historical origins. It rejects all attempts to provide psychological explanations of par-
ticular social or cultural phenomena in favor of an ultimate psychological explana-
tion of general sociological laws when these have been demonstrated by purely so-
ciological inquiries. [...] It applies to human life in society the generalizing method
of the natural sciences, seeking to formulate the general laws that underlie it, and to
explain any given phenomenon in any culture as a special example of a general or
universal principle. The newer anthropology is therefore functional, generalizing and
sociological.77

Evolutionists like Frazer and functionalists like Malinowski also considered their
anthropological approach to be scientific. Radcliffe-Brown is therefore not say-
ing something new when he locates anthropology in a scientific context (only
Evans-Pritchard revolutionized the discipline when he called it an art in 1951).78
What is new about Radcliffe-Brown's essay is its emphasis on universal laws of
human behavior. It was, however, very difficult to establish such universal laws
on an empirical basis, if one studied only one society. According to Radcliffe-
Brown, in fact the field-anthropologist was alone able to develop an abstract
theory, as he was in close contact with the empirical data from which generaliza-
tions could be made.79 A field anthropologist has to concentrate his time on a
small number of societies. Steiner, later, criticizes Radcliffe-Brown and >mod-
ern< anthropologists for their failure to engage fully with »comparative socio-
logy« precisely because their data were necessarily limited. Steiner shows that
Radcliffe-Brown's theory could not in fact live up to his own standards. He
openly polemicizes against Radcliffe-Brown's desire to compare the totality of
societies with each other as integrative wholes:
Comparison, mark you, of whole societies, of whole structures, and not of attitudes,
systems of values, cultural idioms or institutions. It sounds extremely plausible; it is,
in fact, very desirable. But Radcliffe-Brown himself has compared only institutions,
those of kinship. »Whole structures« - this implies at the present stage of research

77
Alfred R. Radcliffe-Brown: The Present Position of Anthropological Studies. In: My-
sore N. Srinivas (Ed.): Method in Social Anthropology. Selected Essays by A. R. Rad-
cliffe-Brown. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1958, p. 41-95, p. 64-65.
78
Evans-Pritchard: Social Anthropology. London: Cohen & West 1951, p. 84.
79
For a discussion of the importance of field-anthropology for the construction of theo-
ries that pose as >objective< truths see Radcliffe-Brown, The Andaman Islanders (p. 90,
note 41), p. 230-231.
104 Part H: Franz Baermann Steiner - Anthropology and Totalitarian Terror

such a wealth of detail, such a complexity of abstractions, that comparison becomes

an impossibility. 80
Steiner, having learned from the German tradition of anti-systematic thought
(from Lichtenberg to Nietzsche), questions Radcliffe-Brown's pretensions to
scientific totality.81 Despite Steiner's criticism of Radcliffe-Brown's inductive
method, a desire for abstraction is clearly discernible in »Notes on Compara-
tive Economics«, »Towards a Classification of Labour«, in Taboo, and in his
comparative study of forms of slavery. While criticising Radcliffe-Brown's ap-
proach, Steiner nevertheless sometimes employs an inductive methodology,
but he uses it in a highly reflective way, making clear where the disadvantages
of such a method lie.
Evans-Pritchard was probably more influential in this attempt at abstraction
than Radcliffe-Brown. As far as structural abstraction was concerned, Evans-Prit-
chard's The Nuer was a revolutionary work.82 Evans-Pritchard's book on the Nuer
had a deep impact on Steiner's comparative study of slavery: Evans-Pritchard,
like Steiner, stresses the importance of non-governmental bodies (kinship
groups) for the organization of societies in which there is no central power.83
From Evans-Pritchard, he learned to value the importance of kinship-groups
for an understanding of the political system of >primitive< societies, but where-
as Evans-Pritchard focuses on one society, his pupil compared a whole range
of tribal communities.
The major difference between Steiner and his three anthropological men-
tors, Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown and Evans-Pritchard, consists in his interest
in the West's failure to understand Eastern concepts. In his study of slavery,
Steiner even shows that this misunderstanding also serves as a deliberate justi-
fication for enslavement or, to use a more >modern< term, colonialism. Where-
as Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown and Evans-Pritchard were primarily interested
in how >savage< societies work, Franz Steiner's main concern was to shed light
on how Western philosophy and anthropology constructed fictions about the
non-European other, so as to excuse the colonization of >primitive< peoples.
Thus Steiner is mainly an anthropologist of Western thought. How this approach
was further developed by Louis Dumont - with whom Steiner gave a seminar
on the sociology of language in Oxford (1952) - will be discussed in the con-

80
Steiner, Taboo (p. 102, note 74), p. 16.
81
For a discussion of Steiner's critique of positivism and >theory< see Jeremy Adler: An
Oriental in the West. The Originality of Franz Steiner as Poet and Anthropologist. In:
Times Literary Supplement, 7 October 1994, p. 16-17, p. 17.
82
For a discussion of the significance of Evans-Pritchard's book on the Nuer for struc-
turalism see Mary Douglas: Purity and Danger. An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollu-
tion and Taboo. Repr. London: Routledge 1995, p. VII-VHI, as well as M. Douglas:
Evans-Pritchard. Brighton: Harvester 1980, p. 16.
83
For the importance of kinship-groups for an understanding of the political life of the
Nuer see Edward E. Evans-Pritchard: The Nuer. A Description of the Modes of Liveli-
hood and Political Institutions of a Nilotic People. Oxford: Clarendon 1940, p. 143.
4. Anthropology and the Perception of N on- Western Peoples 105

elusion to this essay. Whenever Steiner sheds light on the function or structure
of >primitive< society he only does so by, at the same time, elucidating where
Western theorists have gone wrong. In this way, Steiner became the first an-
thropologist who was more interested in the wrongs of Western thinking, than
in the shortcomings of >uncivilized< states.

5 An Oriental Undermines Orientalism

In chapter 4.3 above, I set out to examine anthropological concepts that formed
Steiner's thought. Here I shall analyze two anthropological works and an aphoristic
essay by the late Steiner. His work in the forties and fifties in many ways antici-
pates postmodern concerns and yet in some respects, as will be argued in part III
and the conclusion, offers an alternative to certain tendencies within postmodernist
thought. Steiner's thesis on slavery, in particular, encourages a comparison with
Said's writing on orientalism. Some thirty-five years before Edward Said pub-
lished Orientalism, Steiner set out to question the »epistemic violence«84 of an-
thropologists who construct fictions about non-western peoples. This chapter ana-
lyzes Steiner's D. Phil, thesis »A comparative Study of the Forms of Slavery«, his
Taboo, and his aphoristic essay »Über den Prozeß der Zivilisierung«.
The thesis on slavery is a fragment of a larger work;85 it has a systematic
structure, it is concerned with kinship relationships, and it is comparative. Stei-
ner compares institutions in different communities. He also compares the kinship
organization as well as the institution of the chieftain so as to show how Western
writers on slavery misapplied the term in a variety of >primitive< societies. As far
as the anthropological context is concerned, Evans-Pritchard's The Nuer was
most influential on Steiner's focus on kinship relationships. In his comparative
study of slavery Steiner examines how kinship status rather than political norms
taken from Western societies establishes whether someone is a slave or not.
Evans-Pritchard's insight into the importance of the relation between groups
within a social system - he called an analysis of these relations »structure«86 -
also influenced Steiner's analysis of slavery. Evans-Pritchard explained his me-
thod of »social abstraction« as making »some part of the social life intelligible
by showing how it is integrated with other parts«.87 Steiner sheds light on the in-
tegration of such groups as foreigners or criminals into a >primitive< society, by
84
For a discussion of »epistemic violence« see Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak: Can the
Subaltern Speak. In: Laura Chrisman / Patrick Williams (Ed.): Colonial Discourse and
Post-Colonial Theory. A Reader. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf 1993, p. 66-104.
85
For a discussion of this point, see Fleischli, Franz Baermann Steiner (p. 2, note 7),
p. 23.
86
Evans-Pritchard, The Nuer (p. 104, note 83), p. 263.
87
Evans-Pritchard, Social Anthropology (p. 103, note 78), p. 104.
106 Part II: Franz Baermann Steiner - Anthropology and Totalitarian Terror

comparing such an integration with relationships in kinship groups. He defines

slavery by the lack of kinship relations. I shall show how this definition influ-
enced Miers and Kopytoff s Slavery in Africa (1977) and Claude Meillassoux's
Anthropologie de l'esdave via Paul Bohannan's Social Anthropology (1986).
Next I shall show how Steiner analyzes Western discussions of the non-
European concept >taboo< in order to question European attitudes towards the
>other<. At the beginning as well as at the end of his lectures, Steiner opposes
such Western distortions of an »Oriental«88 concept with his own theory: I am,
therefore, going to argue that Evans-Pritchard was wrong when he wrote in his
preface to the 1967 edition89 of Taboo that Steiner does not »reach any positive
conclusions himself«.90 The implication of such a theory of taboo for a critique
of modern civilization I shall discuss later in an analysis of »Über den Prozeß der
Zivilisierung«.

5.1 Steiner's »A Comparative Study of the Forms of Slavery« and

Said's Orientalism

In Orientalism Said states that »the relationship between Occident and Orient is
a relationship of power«,91 and he goes on to argue that his study was motivated
by personal reasons, by the discriminations he had to endure as an »Oriental«:
Much of the personal investment in this study derives from my awareness of being
an »Oriental« as a child growing up in two British colonies. [...] In many ways my
study of Orientalism has been an attempt to inventory the traces upon me, the Orien-
tal subject, of the culture whose domination has been so powerful a factor in the life
of all Orientals.92

Said attempts to trace the history of the intellectual superstructure - to use

Marx's term — that makes possible, that indeed creates a relationship of power
between master (»European«) and slave (»Oriental«). Orientalism is a fiction
that poses as >objective< truth: »Once we begin to think of Orientalism as a kind
of Western projection onto the will to govern over the Orient, we will encounter
88
The term »Oriental« here conflates historic civilizations and >primitive< societies and the
>East<. This conflation is the outcome of Steiner's polemical binary opposition between,
on the one hand, the concept of the Jew that stands for everything non-western -
whether it is Judaism, Zionism, primitivism or the >Orient<, and, on the other, the con-
cept of the Roman that represents the western civilization (Christianity, science etc.).
89
Evans-Pritchard's foreword was already included in the 1956 edition.
90
Steiner, Taboo (p. 102, note 74), p. 12. Asad has first argued that out of Steiner's
»critical effort emerged a positive conclusion«. See Talal Asad: Genealogies of Re-
ligion. Discipline and Reason of Power in Christianity and Islam. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press 1993, p. 146.
91
Edward Said: Orientalism. Western Conceptions of the Orient. Reprint. With a new
afterword. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books 1995 (Penguin History), p. 5.
92
Ibid., p. 25.
5. An Oriental Undermines Orientalism 107

few surprises.«93 According to Said, Orientalism is nothing but a scholarly con-

struction of fictions about the Orient which justifies Europe's colonial con-
quests.94 Said, therefore, unmasks so-called >disinterested< scholarly pursuits as
serving the erection and maintenance of superstructures that make possible eco-
nomic exploitations, and in so doing Said's scholarship itself becomes political:
he is trying to call into question European convictions of superiority by showing
that these convictions are built not on >objective< evidence, but rather on ficti-
tious entities. Said's scholarship serves a wider political aim, and this political
agenda has its root in the scholar's personal experience as a colonial subject.
There is a striking convergence between Said's and Steiner's approach, notwith-
standing major differences: Said has a wider net, he writes about the European
treatment of Islamic societies in general, whereas Steiner focuses on specific
non-European communities; Steiner makes clear what the >Oriental< position is
and where exactly Western anthropologists and philosophers go wrong, whereas
Said »rejects a notion of Orientalism as the misrepresentation of a Oriental es-
sence«.95 Said abstains from asking for forms of knowledge about specific non-
European societies where such forms do not justify colonial ways of thinking.
This has recently been criticized by Dennis Porter who asks
whether alternatives to Orientalism are possible, whether a knowledge as opposed to
an ideology of the Orient can exist, Said is of no help in spite of the acknowledge-
ment that such alternatives are a pressing need.96

In a similar vein Robert Young detects that the >Orient< as an objective cate-
gory haunts Said's text which, paradoxically, seems to deny such essential
entities:
[...] if Said denies that there is any actual Orient which could provide a true account
of the Orient represented by Orientalism, how can he claim in any sense that the rep-
resentation is false?97

93
Ibid., p. 95.
94
Said's sequel to Orientalism, Culture and Imperialism, was criticised by Ernest Gellner
for not taking account of the actual >realities< of an Arab country like Algeria. See
E. Gellner: The Mightier Pen? Edward Said and the Double Standards of Inside-Out
Colonialism. In: Times Literary Supplement, 19 February 1993, p. 3-4, p. 3. Gellner's
writing on Islam was, in turn, criticised by Said, D. Davies, and E. Ahmad for omis-
sions, mistakes, and the lack of being able to both speak and read Arabic. D. Davies:
Culture and Imperialism. In: Times Literary Supplement, 19 March 1993, p. 15; Cul-
ture and Imperialism. In: Times Literary Supplement, 14 June 1993, p. 17.
95
Bhabha: The Other Question. Difference, Discrimination, and the Discourse of Co-
lonialism. In: Barker, Literature, Politics, and Theory (p. 98, note 65), p. 148-172,
p. 158
96
Dennis Porter: Orientalism and its Problems. In: Chrisman / Williams, Colonial Dis-
course and Post-Colonial Theory (p. 105, note 84), p. 150-161, p. 151.
97
Robert Young: White Mythologies. Writing History and the West. London: Rout-
ledge 1990, p. 130.
108 Part : Franz Baermann Steiner - Anthropology and Totalitarian Terror

Steiner analyzes specific non-European forms of life and shows that they
have been misrepresented by Western intellectuals. Connected with his re-
fusal to accept any essences pertinent to the >Orient<, Said discards the idea
of a ranking of cultures,98 whereas Steiner depicts the non-European as the
less oppressive.
However, both writers perceive themselves as >Oriental<. As with Said's
literary-historical investigations, Steiner's anthropology is motivated by per-
sonal experience. Said suffered from colonial history and Steiner was a victim
of European anti-Semitism. As Young puts it,
the Jews come to represent the Orient within, uncannily appearing inside when they
should have remained hidden, outside Europe: thus the logic of their expulsion, or
extermination, becomes inextricably linked with Orientalism itself."

Steiner's characterization of his study of slavery as a sacrifice100 underlines the

personal motives that lie behind his scholarship. Orientalism and anti-Semitism
are closely linked, as Said emphasizes:
In addition, and by an almost inescapable logic, I have found myself writing the his-
tory of a strange, secret sharer of Western anti-Semitism. That anti-Semitism and, as
I have discussed it in its Islamic branch, Orientalism, resemble each other very
closely is a historical, cultural, and political truth that needs only be mentioned to an
Arab Palestinian for its irony to be perfectly understood.101
Steiner was convinced about this connection between Orientalism and anti-
Semitism well before it was established by Said. Steiner conceived of his Jew-
ish identity as >Oriental<. Under the impact of his journey to Palestine (in the
summer 1930), Steiner wrote the article »Orientpolitik« for the Zionist news-
paper Selbstwehr, in which he rejects violent reactions against the activities of
an Arab terrorist group:
For many of us who have to occupy a completely passive position in Europe's hos-
tile chaos, it would have been a soul-felt release to be able to identify with heroic
battles (according to the notion of heroism within our environment) even though it
would be an a priori senseless battle which reason rejects.102

98
Gellner criticizes Said for such refusal, saying that ranking could also be on anti-
evolutionist, non-Eurocentric grounds: Discussing evolutionist writing Gellner wir-
tes: »all cultures were legitimate but later ones more so. This imposed a ranking of
cultures, which is unacceptable to Said, though ranking, as such, can be separated
from the Eurocentric versions once prevalent [...].« Gellner, The Mightier Pen?
(p. 107, note 94), p. 3.
99
Young, White Mythologies (penultimate note), p. 139.
100
Fleischli, Franz Baermann Steiner (p. 2, note 7), p. 24.
101
Said, Orientalism (p. 106, note 91), p. 27-28.
102
»Vielen von uns, die ganz passiv im feindseligen Chaos Europas stehen müssen,
wäre es eine seelische Erleichterung gewesen, sich mit heroischen Kämpfen (ge-
mäß dem Heroismusbegriff unserer Umgebung) identifizieren zu können, auch
wenn es einem von vornherein unsinnigen Kampf gälte, den die Vernunft ablehnt.«
5. An Oriental Undermines Orientalism 109

Steiner depicts Europe as a chaos that is hostile to its Jewish population. This
article was written in 1936, at a time when anti-Semitism was publicly propa-
gated in Nazi Germany. Steiner's perception of Palestine as Oriental, as non-
European, also indicates his view on Europe as aggressive, powerful (»feind-
selig«) and dangerously chaotic (»Chaos«). In Europe, violent heroic deeds
(»Heroismus«) are cultivated, but the European Jewry should not, Steiner argues,
import such Western ideals of power, danger, and brutality into the >Orient<. If
the Jews were to react violently against the terrorist activity of a small Arab
group, they would act according to (»gemäß«) the values of their European envi-
ronment, but in so doing they would not be true to themselves: they would act
both in a nonsensical way and in a manner that mirrors the behavior of those
>Europeans< from whose aggressiveness they suffered. By contrasting the Jews'
inner nature with their outward European environment, Steiner constructs a
binary opposition between >Europeans< who refer to nonsensical violence and
Jews who live in Europe, but are »with their heart« at home in the Orient. Stei-
ner's construction of this binary opposition deconstructs the standard binary op-
position of anti-Semitism. In anti-Semitic writing the Jews represent the »other«,
and as such, they embody violence, danger, sexuality and all the other uncanny
features from which the self wants to be dissociated.103 Steiner's text reacts
against the context of anti-Semitic scapegoating by undoing the referential
system of the Jews as dangerous, and the Gentiles as representative of
harmless, unalienated and unalienating selfhood. In reversing the binary oppo-
sition between Jew and Gentile, Steiner's textual reaction to an anti-Semitic
European context accords with the first criterion that LaCapra establishes as a
characteristic of deconstructionism:
[...] one might maintain that a deconstructive strategy requires a double inscription
or a dual procedure involving two interacting »phases«: reversal of dominant binary
oppositions that inscribe relations of discursive and sociopolitical power, and gen-
eral displacement and rearticulation of relations in a manner that resists binarism (as
well as its attendant scapegoating) and enacts supplementary relations of mutual
marking in a transformed field.104
Steiner's deconstructive method only converges with the first part of the pro-
cedure that LaCapra describes as the general technique of poststructuralist
theory. For he does not do away with binary oppositions as such. The reversal
of the referential system of binary oppositions within anti-Semitic discourse
enables the victim of anti-Semitism to gain a strategic position from which he
can undermine the power of those who victimize him.

Franz Baermann Steiner: Orientpolitik In: Selbstwehr 30 (1 October 1936), p. 6-7,

p. 6. My translation.
103
For a detailed discussion of this point see Oilman, The Jew's Body (p. 14, note
22).
104
LaCapra, Soundings in Critical Theory (p. 36, note 93), p. 101-102.
110 Part H: Franz Baermann Steiner - Anthropology and Totalitarian Terror

After the war, in a long letter to Gandhi (1946), Steiner compares the Jews
to other Oriental peoples who suffered from European tyrannies. Steiner re-
gards his people »as an Oriental nation and the Zionist effort (however critical
I may be of some of its phases) as part of the resurrection of Asiatic civilisa-
tion«.105 His reservations about Zionism concern Herzl's ideas of a European
Jewish state in Palestine. Having called emancipation the first error of the Jews,
Steiner goes on to attack Herzl's Zionism:
Connected with our first error [emancipation], our second came: the desire to build
in Palestine a national state on European lines and possibly with European support.
We conceived of our revival in European terms. This was the real consummation of
our first error, emancipation. Again, we are not alone in this situation. Is there any
oriental nationalism which has not been influenced decisively by Europe? How long
will it take for all of us to shake off this alien fanaticism.106
According to Steiner, the Jewish Renaissance should be part of an Oriental
revival. Like other Oriental peoples the Jews have been enthralled by the al-
lurements of European civilization, but the »fanaticism« found in Europe is
»alien« to the true nature of the Oriental mind. From Steiner's perspective,
Herzl's Der Judenstaat (1896) is »a completely westernized product of eman-
cipation«,107 an offspring of the long process of forgetting about cultural roots.
With Steiner the discovery of suppressed cultural roots goes hand in hand with
the liberation of the Jewish people from assimilation and denigration. The
emphasis that Steiner places on culture as a way of freeing the Jews from their
European oppressors has an intellectual parallel in the writings of anti-
colonialists like Frantz Fanon and Amilcar Cabral.108 Opposing Herzl's Euro-
peanizing tendencies, Steiner sides with the Zionism of an East-European Jew
who »shed his name in order to take a Hebrew one which is the most humble
possible: one of the people, Ahad Ha-Am«.109 Ahad Ha-am was, next to Mar-
tin Buber, one of the leading proponents of cultural Zionism. The circle around
the newspaper Selbstwehr - to which Steiner belonged - was the most influen-
tial intellectual centre of cultural Zionism in middle Europe.110 Ahad Ha-am,
105
Steiner, Letter to Gandhi (p. 82, note 5), p. 129-146.
106
Ibid., p. 142.
107
Ibid.
108
For a discussion of the importance of culture within anti-colonialism see Frantz
Fanon: On National Culture. In: Chrisman / Williams (p. 105, note 84), p. 36-52.
109
Steiner, Letter to Gandhi (p. 82, note 5), p. 143.
110
For a discussion of cultural Zionism and Selbstwehr see Hartmut Binder: Kafka
und die Wochenzeitschrift >Selbstwehr<. In: Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für
Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte 41 (1967), p. 283-304; Steven E.
Aschheim: Brothers and Strangers. The East European Jew in German and German
Jewish Consciousness, 1800-1923. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press 1982;
Ritchie Robertson: Kafka. Judaism, Politics, and Literature. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press 1985, p. 142; Guiliano Baioni: Kafka. Literatur und Judentum. Stutt-
gart: Metzler 1994, p. 12, p. 144; Elisabeth Boa: Kafka. Gender, Class, and Race in
the Letters and Fictions. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1996.
5. An Oriental Undermines Orientalism 111

so Steiner argues, negated European civilization. For Steiner, the return to

Israel amounts to a withdrawal from the European way of life, whereas for
Herzl the Jews would modernize Palestine, thus creating a European outpost in
the Orient. The slaughter of the Jews of Europe confirmed Steiner's critical
attitude to any form of Euro-centrism.
In his aphorisms Steiner characterizes the German reign of terror as being
connected to a modern European instrumentalization of reason:
On the other hand the troop of the upright in Western Europe was especially disturbed
by the fact that the German reign of terror dealt in such a cold mechanical way with its
victims: after all such things must not take place in an orderly manner!'''

Steiner mocks Europe's pride in a >systematic< way of living. In Steiner's

reading, West-Europeans are not terrified by the slaughter of the Jews; the only
thing that worries them is the >civilized<, well-organized manner in which the
killings take place. The Holocaust shows how the rationality of the West can
be used for irrational ends. The systematic and well-organized extermination
ultimately calls sentiments about Europe's superiority into question. Whereas
Steiner sees the Holocaust - planned and executed by the Germans - as a cul-
mination of the Western tendency to systematic domination, Daniel Goldhagen
and indeed Jürgen Habermas, deny any similarities between Nazi Germany
and modern European civilization.112 The Holocaust, Goldhagen argues, has
nothing to do with modern history; it is exclusively bound up with an alien
tribe, the Germans. Indeed, Goldhagen sets out to study the Germans as an
anthropologist would study a distant barbaric people. He makes it clear that the
Holocaust has nothing whatsoever to do with »modern western civilization«:
It [the Holocaust] constituted a set of actions, and an imaginative orientation that
was completely at odds with the intellectual foundations of modern western civiliza-
tion, the Enlightenment, as well as the Christian and secular ethical and behavioral
norms that had governed modern western societies.113

11
' »Andererseits hat es das Fähnlein der Aufrechten in Westeuropa besonders beun-
ruhigt, daß die deutsche Schreckensherrschaft so kaltblütig mechanisch mit ihren
Opfern verfuhr. Derlei darf doch nicht ordentlich zugehen!« Franz Baermann Stei-
ner: Feststellungen und Versuche. In: F. B. Steiner: Fluchtvergnüglichkeit. Fest-
stellungen und Versuche. Eine Auswahl von Marion Hermann-Röttgen. Stuttgart:
Flugasche 1988 (Edition Walfisch), p. 73. My translation.
112
Pecora criticizes Habermas' approach to the Nazi genocide as follows: »It is not
simply that, in reaffirming the primacy of the political culture of the West< and Ger-
many's moral salvation within it, Habermas inadvertently manages to re-demonize
all that is non-Western. It is also that such rhetoric subtly serves precisely to absolve
the West from its own obvious complicity, not only in Germany's war crimes, but
also in the long narrative of Western imperial power.« See Vincent P. Pecora: Haber-
mas, Enlightenment, and Antisemitism. In: Friedlander, Probing the Limits of Repre-
sentation (p. 14, note 21), p. 155-170, p. 160.
113
Goldhagen, Hitler's Willing Executioners (p. 6, note 18), p. 28.
112 Part H: Franz Baermann Steiner - Anthropology and Totalitarian Terror

As the past tense indicates, for Goldhagen, the Holocaust belongs to a far away
age; no connection can be made to any form of modern western civilization,
whether it is the era of the Enlightenment or our contemporary civil society.114
This use of the adverb »completely« emphasizes that the »intellectualism« of
the Enlightenment project lies worlds apart from any type of the exertion of
brutal and systematically organized power such as perpetrated by the Germans
to an extent that is unequalled in the history of mankind. Whereas Goldhagen
claims that the Holocaust »marked« the »departure« of the Germans »from the
community of >»civilized peoples<«,115 Steiner argues that the Germans devel-
oped certain traits within this civilization to a point of extremity. In the manner
of Nietzsche, Weber, Foucault, Said and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Steiner
pinpoints the logocentrism of the >modern< West and particularly intellectual-
ism as »epistemic violence«.
In the same way, Steiner conceives of anti-Semitism within elements of mod-
ern Christianity as participating in the »epistemic violence« whose denotation
can lead to detonation. Goldhagen accurately speaks of Hitler's »apocalyptic
war«.116 Steiner takes account of secularized Christianity within German anti-
Semitism. According to Steiner, colonialism is complicit with a Christian phi-
losophy that has its rationale in oppressing non-modern ways of life. Steiner
makes it clear that the Nazi-Germans replaced oppression with extermination.
Faced with extermination, the Jews cannot adopt Gandhi's non-violent methods
against colonial exploitation: they have to fight for their survival. With this ar-
gument Steiner defends the state of Israel. Thus, in his letter to Gandhi, Steiner
opposes the view that exterminatory anti-Semitism and the slaughter of the Jews
of Europe are inconsistent with the ideologies of Christian Europe:
My conclusion has been that the fact of anti-Semitism is essential for the understand-
ing of Christian Europe, it is a main thread in that fabric. No non-European power has
ever built a colonial empire. Do you regard the ceaseless encroachment on the life and
lands of other races, that of Asia in particular as inconsistent with European civilisa-
tion? [...] Would you not say that European civilisation that does no more hold other
cultures in tutelage or suppression ceases to be the Europe we know? And if they do so
to Asiatic countries what they have done to yours, how must they treat an Oriental
people which lives among them and is always at their mercy?117
Here Steiner establishes a connection between anti-Semitism, colonialism, and
slavery. Colonialism refers to slavery via the expressions »tutelage« and »sup-
pression«: Europeans enslave and colonize Asiatic nations by erasing existing
kinship ties and introducing »tutelage« instead, in which the solidarity an indi-
vidual can command in the context of kinship is suppressed. In his letter to
114
For a view in which the Enlightenment is depicted as being implicated in the Nazi
genocide see Berel Lang: Act and Idea in the Nazi Genocide. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press 1990.
115
Goldhagen, Hitler's Willing Executioners (p. 6, note 18), p. 4.
116
Ibid., p. 150.
117
Steiner, Letter to Gandhi (p. 82, note 5), p. 132.
5. An Oriental Undermines Orientalism 113

Gandhi, Steiner restricts the practice of colonialism to Europeans, and, simi-

larly, in his Oxford thesis he regards slavery as a purely European category.
Anti-Semitism is connected to colonialism and slavery in that Europeans treat
>Orientals< at home in a manner equal to or even worse than the way they deal
with the native populations in the Orient itself (»how must they treat an Orien-
tal people, which lives among them«).
According to Edward Said and Nigel Leask,118 Europeans were and still are
proud of the liberty they are enjoying as opposed to the >despotism< and the
>slavery< from which >primitives< or >Orientals< are suffering. In Europe the term
>slavery< is used so as to mark the >European< off from the >savage< who still
lives under the rule of despotism. By referring to >slavery<, the West shows off
its moral perfection. Steiner criticizes the same European understanding in an
aphorism where he questions the West's insistent pride in the abolition of
horrors. He maintains that, rather than consider an identification with the
slaveholders, Europeans puff themselves up, saying that they have abolished
slavery.119 Steiner takes issue with the pride the West display about the aboli-
tion of slavery. Such pride immediately stifles any self-critical approach. Pride
in the abolition of slavery makes impossible any identification between the
slave-holder and the >European<. Steiner's study of slavery does precisely this:
it establishes a close link between European history and the evolution of ser-
vile institutions.
In his analysis of forms of slavery Steiner indeed turns Frazer on his head.
He argues that slavery does not have its roots in >primitive< societies. Rather, it
originates in the beginnings of >modern< European history and undergoes a
rapid evolution. If evolutionists located >slavery< in the Orient or in >primitive<
cultures, Steiner places it exclusively in a European context, as can be seen in
the following passage:
If we accept the continuity of slavery from Mediterranean antiquity down to the co-
lonial slavery of modern times, if we recognise that slavery played an important role
in Mediterranean economics through the ages, and was tied to money economy in all
parts to which Mediterranean capitalism (Roman, Mediaeval or modern) spread, we
have to regard modern colonial slavery as the culmination of this tendency and as
the consummation of an European economic inheritance; and that it developed in the
wake of the cultural Renaissance of Europe, is hardly surprising.120

118
For a discussion of feelings vis a vis the Orient in nineteenth-century British writing
see Nigel Leask: British Romantic Writers and the East: Anxieties of Empire. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press 1992 (Cambridge Studies in Romanticism).
119
Like many other still unpublished letters, poems and aphoristic essays, this apho-
rism can be read in the Franz Baermann Steiner-Nachlaß, Deutsches Literaturar-
chiv, Marbach am Neckar.
120
Franz Baermann Steiner: Slavery. In: F. B. Steiner: Selected Writings 2 (p. 82,
note 5), p. 155-159, p. 159. (This is a selection from Steiner's unpublished manu-
script »A Comparative Study of the Forms of Slavery«.)
114 Part II: Franz Baermann Steiner - Anthropology and Totalitarian Terror

Here, Steiner reverses evolutionism: instead of freeing the world of slavery,

European history reinforces servile institutions. The words »culmination« and
»consummation« ironically allude to an evolutionist context. Steiner reverses the
eurocentric ranking of culture as practized in evolutionary writing: Europeans
are no longer the abolitionists of slavery; instead they create and develop it.
Steiner holds on to a developmental frame of thinking, using expressions like
»tendency«, »culmination« and »consummation«, but here the evolution of
Western societies has distinct negative connotations. In Steiner's anthropologi-
cal, and indeed in his aphoristic writings, evolution does not mean the progress
away from violence and »superstition« to rational forms of peaceful productiv-
ity, but the opposite, namely, an increase in brutality. Slavery was born in and
developed with >modern< Europe. This view of slavery would have been shock-
ing to a European readership that was more accustomed to cruel reports about
slavery in developing countries. Steiner is the first and, as far as I can see, re-
mains the only anthropologist who confines the concept of slavery exclusively to
modern Europe.121 In this aspect, his study occupies a radical position.
In the first part of his study, Steiner discusses the etymology of the word
>slave< in Europe. He aims to show how Europeans, from antiquity onwards,
inscribed into the very word >slave< many fictions about race. According to
Steiner, in ancient Greece the word sklavenoi and sklabenoi, and in ancient
Rome the word sclaveni, closely associated the word slave with the ethnical
term >slav<, denoting all the peoples living north of the Balkans. This close
association between the race of the >slavs< and the state of being a >slave< per-
meates modern English and modern German (»Sklave« - »Slawe«). In Stei-
ner's account, slavery surfaces as something which voices the superiority of
one race over another, as a word that has economic as well as racial conno-
tations, and he underlines this point by claiming that the Hindi term dasa
means both slave and the pre-Aryan race.
Steiner examines how European taxonomy misrepresents particular non-
European social practices: what Westerners call slavery in >primitive< or >Ori-
ental< societies describes a form of social integration. There is no intrinsic
relation between European taxonomy and the non-European social reality it is
supposed to denote. Steiner deconceptualizes >slavery< by deconstructing the
Western usage of the word slave. Commenting on Deut. XXI, 10, for example,
Steiner argues that what has been taken to be the enslavement of conquered
women by the Hebrews is nothing else but a form of concubinage that serves
the integration of the disintegrated or conquered women into a new society. In
the same manner the expulsion of an a-social individual from one Hottentot
group (in Africa) does not mean that the expelled is a slave to the other com-
121
Recent studies on slavery, like Orlando Patterson's: Slavery and Social Death. A
Comparative Study (Cambridge/Mass.: Harvard University Press 1982) discuss
slavery in non-European countries using accounts of 17th century travellers - like
Paul Rycaut's The Present State of the Ottoman Empire (London 1668) to back up
their theses.
5. An Oriental Undermines Orientalism 115

munity into which he or she becomes integrated. In non-European societies,

Steiner argues, the expulsion of an individual from the family or other societal
units does not lead to slavery, as the expelled is given a new social context in
which he or she can command solidarity.
In order to prove that Western scholarship distorts particular social realities
in non-European societies Steiner examines French, German and English En-
cyclopaedias of the eighteenth and nineteenth century. He argues that in these
dictionary entries the term slavery is defined in way that fulfills the needs of
contemporary ideologies. European or for that matter >Aryan< (like dasa) words
for slave create fictions of superiority. After the abolition of the slave-trade,
British encyclopaedias link slavery to >savage< societies, and, following Mon-
tesquieu, European writers depict >slavery< as a practice only found in non-
European societies. Steiner sums up his discussion of modern European char-
acterizations of slaves as >savage<, arguing that such generalizations are made
from a Western perspective, one that is in keeping with the ideologies that
grow out of evolutionism.
Steiner anticipates Said's arguments about Orientalism, by claiming that the
European generalizes about the >primitive< on grounds of purely European
institutions. Steiner goes beyond Said by pinpointing evolutionism as a key
source of error. According to Steiner, the European anthropologist imposes his
measurements on a >primitive< society and in so doing he >primitivizes< or, as
Said calls it, »orientalizes« this society.
For Steiner, as later with Said, European philosophers, anthropologists, and
sociologists create fictions by locating servile institutions within >primitive<
societies, and, as with Orientalism, such fictions serve an economic and politi-
cal purpose: the European claims that >savages< treat each other as >slaves< in
order to have an excuse for the enslavement of >primitives< or >Orientals<.
Steiner devotes a whole chapter to Aristotle's Politics in order to argue that
European scholarship, from ancient Greece onwards, fabricated fictions about
the >primitive<, fictions which should confirm European feelings of superiority.
Steiner begins by questioning why Aristotle only focused on household slavery
in contemporary Greek society. He draws attention to the fact that in ancient
Greece there were many slaves in industry and agriculture, precisely so as to
demonstrate the contrast between the state of affairs in Aristotle's own >civi-
lized< society and the >savage< one described in the Politics. Modern Aristotle
commentators agree with Steiner, arguing that for Aristotle, the term >slavery<
itself depends on nationality. Miller writes that
Aristotle's in-egalitarianism is based on the alleged natural inferiority of whole classes
of persons as defined by nationality, gender and profession. Natural slavery is defined
on the grounds that natural slaves lack wisdom and the capacity to deliberate.122

122
Fred D. Miller: Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aritotle's Politics. Oxford: Claren-
don 1995, p. 242. For a further discussion of Aristotle's concept of »natural slav-
116 Part II: Franz Baermann Steiner - Anthropology and Totalitarian Terror

Aristotle focuses on household slavery, because he tries to depict >primitive<

society as being characterized by a lack of differentiation. Aristotle states that
>primitives< do not differentiate between a member of their own household and
a slave, and, since they regard each other as slaves, they might as well be
treated by the Greeks as such. Shusky has shown that Aristotle indeed says that
barbarians can only behave in a slavish manner:
Aristotle explains as follows why some monarchies can securely exercise almost
despotic powers: »It is because barbarians are more slavish in their character than
Greeks (those in Asia being more so than in Europe) that they put up with a master's
rule without making any difficulty.« 123
Aristotle argues that Asian peoples are slaves by nature. Steiner has, therefore,
textual evidence for attacking Aristotle's racist theory about non-European
peoples. He translates barbaroi as >primitives<, thus embedding Aristotle's dis-
cussion into the context of contemporary colonialism. He argues that Aristo-
tle's own scholarship fulfils a social function, namely, the justification of the
enslavement of the >primitives< by the the Greeks, just as the racism that Said
later detected in the writing of orientalists fulfilled the function of justifying
the European colonization of the East. Steiner's analysis of Aristotle's dis-
course on the barbaroi comes to the conclusion that the specific discursive
practice discussed itself modifies the domain to which it relates. Steiner does
not discuss Aristotle's argument about the barbaroi on its own level; rather, he
links Aristotelian discursive practice with the colonization and enslavement by
the Greeks of non-European peoples. Michel Foucault justifies such approach
in the social sciences as follows:
It is no use establishing specific relations that can be analysed only at their own
level - the effect of these relations is not confined to discourse alone: it is also felt in
the elements that they articulate upon one another. The hospital field, for example,
did not remain unaffected when clinical discourse was put into relation with the
laboratory [...].124
Steiner shows that Aristotelian discourse - arguing that >primitives< lack dif-
ferentiation - has a lasting impact on the way Greeks (Europeans) treat non-
European people. Steiner contrasts Aristotle's fiction with the reality that the
Aristotelian category misrepresents. Before his analysis of Politics, Steiner
discusses what Aristotle calls household slavery as a form of dealing with
danger within society. In so called »household slavery« dangerous people -
i. e. the ill or the asocial - are taken out of their old communities and are rein-
ery« see also Richard Kraut: Aristotle on the Human Good. Princeton: Princeton
University Press 1989 (Princeton Paperbacks), p. 242.
123
A. N. Shusky: Aristotle on Economics and Politics. In: Carnes Lord / David O'Con-
nor (Ed.): Essays on the Foundations of Aristotelian Political Science. Berkeley:
University of California Press 1991, p. 74-111, p. 98.
124
Michel Foucault: The Archaeology of Knowledge. Trans, by A. M Sheridan Smith.
London: Tavistock Publications 1972 (World of Man), p. 75.
5. An Oriental Undermines Orientalism 117

tegrated into new societal units until they are no longer dangerous. Once the
danger has passed, they enjoy full membership of their community. In this
respect Steiner discusses taboo behavior as something that various anthropolo-
gists and travellers described as a form of slavery. Lecturing on the concept of
taboo Steiner was going to establish as one of the aims of social forms of
avoidance the »[...] protection of individuals who are in danger, and [...] the
protection of society from those endangered - and therefore dangerous - per-
sons«.125 Thus Steiner calls the act of avoiding dangerous people a part of
taboo behavior. In >primitive< society, the a-social, the sick or foreigners are
perceived as dangerous, but Steiner argues that those endangered and therefore
dangerous individuals do not fall prey to slavery. Instead, they are first isolated
and then, once they are free from danger, are reintegrated into new communities.
What makes one a slave according to Steiner's definition? Steiner defines
the estate of slavery as one in which one is cut off from any forms of kinship
ties or other kinds of associations with groups in which one can command
solidarity. This is a highly striking definition, not least within the context of an
anthropology that was starting to define itself in terms of kinship studies. Stei-
ner's idea is revolutionary: he defines slaves as people wholly outside society.
They have no kin, nor anyone who could feel an obligation toward them. They
are open to any function, manipulation or use that their owner decides upon.
They are essentially perceived as non-human.
Steiner's definition of the slave as a person who is cut off from kinship ties
was taken up by Paul Bohannan, a friend of Steiner at Oxford. In Social An-
thropology Bohannan writes that »Slaves are essentially kinless people; kin-
lessness is an essential of slavery wherever it is found [,..]«.126 Miers and
Kopytoff refer to Bohannan, discussing the concept of the slave as a kinless
individual,127 showing that >slaves< in African societies indeed have kinship
relations.128 However, Miers and Kopytoff still call this state of enjoying kin-
ship relations >slavery<, arguing that African societies have institutionalized
>slavery<.129 In a more recent study, Claude Meillassoux agrees with Steiner's
definition of the kinless status of slaves - referring to Bohannan's Social An-
thropology as one of the first books that establish the link between kinlessness
and slavery - writing about »un caractere qui apparaitra dans toutes les formes
d'esclavage, un trait qui est l'essence meme: l'incapacite sociale de Pesclave ä
se reproduire socialement [...]«.13° Eli Sagan also underlines the importance of

125
Steiner, Taboo (p. 102, note 74), p. 21.
126
Paul Bohannan: Social Anthropology. New York: Holt, Rinehardt and Winston
1963, p. 180.
127
Suzanne Miers and Igor Kopytoff: Slavery in Africa. Historical and Anthropologi-
cal Perspectives. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press 1977, p. 35.
128
Ibid., p. 24.
129
Ibid., p. 16.
130
Claude Meillassoux: Anthropologie de PEsclavage. Le Ventre de Per et d'Argent.
Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 1986 (Pratiques theoriques), p. 35.
118 Part H: Franz Baermann Steiner - Anthropology and Totalitarian Terror

the absence of kinship relations in cases where violence is exerted. Like Steiner,
Sagan argues that the targeted use of cruelty requires the administrative dislo-
cation of family ties and the treatment of the individual concerned as a stranger
within his new social environment:
When the kinship system is broken, when people begin to rule over people whom
they don't know and are not related to, then the equality of political life in primitive
society is destroyed; [...] social class becomes a weapon of dominance. This suggests
that people can tyrannize over others only after they first make them into strangers,
that people would much rather enslave strangers than their own relatives.131

Some forty years after Steiner wrote his comparative study of forms of slavery,
Sagan points out the importance of the absence of any kinship relations for the
exertion of violence and enslavement. Thus, Steiner's view has established itself
in modern critical theory on slavery, exclusion and the exertion of violence.

5.2 Taboo

In the first part of this section, I will analyze Steiner's style and methodology
in his book Taboo, focusing on his deconstructive particularism and his socio-
logical preference for generalization. In the second part, I will discuss Steiner's
theory of taboo as the avoidance of danger and power. Rather than being a
superstition or an emotional expression of values, Steiner argues, taboo is a
carefully thought-out structure of social behavior.
As in his thesis on slavery, Steiner's lectures on >taboo< deconceptualize
narrow categories that are supposed to embrace a whole range of social prac-
tices within non-European societies. Steiner's first lecture opens with a discus-
sion of the inadequacies of the comparative method as advocated by Radcliffe-
Brown and of the general defects of using a European terminology in translating
non-European concepts. Steiner's critique of Radcliffe-Brown's comparative
method and his attack on an unreflective usage of European words for the de-
finition of non-European ways of behavior are closely connected. Radcliffe-
Brown examines one particular society in detail and then establishes from it
categories which have general validity. For Steiner, the structures of >primi-
tive< societies are so complex that they differ to a great extent among them-
selves, and he criticizes Radcliffe-Brown's inductive approach toward the
comparative method from this angle. The terminology Radcliffe-Brown uses
for the society he has studied in the field is often not valid for any other one,
even though he claims this to be the case in his search for scientific, universal
laws. Broad sociological categories like >taboo< and totemism change meaning
when an anthropologist talks about a range of particular societies; indeed, »the

131
Eli Sagan: At the Dawn of Tyranny. The Origins of Individualism, Political Op-
pression, and the State. London: Faber and Faber 1985, p. 239.
5. An Oriental Undermines Orientalism 119

meaning of words appearing in the terminologies of comparative and of ana-

lytic sociology have drifted apart without our noticing it«.132
Two characteristics of Steiner's anthropological approach can be gathered
from his criticism of Radcliffe-Brown: one is a sociological desire for
generalization, the other a strong tendency toward deconstructive particularism.
Steiner's critique of RadclifTe-Brown's use of categories also shows evidence of
Max Weber's influence on his deconstructive particularism. After all, it was
Weber who argued that the establishment of scientific laws with generally valid
applications distorts the singularity of a variety of cultural contexts. Like Weber,
Steiner questions the transfer of a positivist methodology into the field of cultu-
ral studies.133 For Steiner, as for Weber, recognition of social phenomena exclu-
sively unfolds itself within a referential system and therefore has to reflect criti-
cally upon the medium of reflection (Weber speaks of the discursiveness of our
epistemology: »die diskursive Natur unseres Erkennens«).134 Radcliffe-Brown's
positivism, by contrast, places anthropology within the natural sciences.
Throughout his lectures, Steiner criticizes the unreflective usage of general
signifiers for a whole range of divergent particular social phenomena. He analy-
zes a passage from R. J. B. Moore's article »Bwanga among the Bemba«135 with
the aim of illustrating how a European taxonomy is insufficient for the under-
standing of »primitive thinking«. Steiner comes to the following conclusions:
[...] what the native thinks cannot be satisfactorily summarized under the categories.
[...] The writer thinks of the observable attitudes of individuals and of particular
situations against the background of sociological categories.136
Here we encounter Steiner's critique of the use of a European terminology as a
means of describing >primitive< ways of life: the anthropologist introduces Euro-
pean categories, taken from the discipline of sociology (»sociological catego-
ries«), into the analysis of a >primitive< society. However, he argues that the im-
position of the European on to the non-European results in a distorted image of a
singular >primitive< community (»What the native thinks cannot be satisfactorily
summarized under the categories.«). Such purportedly >primitive< thinking is too
complex to fit into the broad categories of a European taxonomy.
Steiner attacks the confusion of categories resulting from Radcliffe-Brown's
comparative method - which, as we have seen from Steiner's analysis of Moore,
is premised on induction - but he also examines the problem of translatability

132
Steiner, Taboo (p. 102, note 74), p. 20.
133
For an example of Weber's criticism of the transfer of positivist methodology into >Kul-
tunvissenschaften< see, for example: Die Objektivität sozialwissenschaftlicher Erkennt-
nis. In: Max Weber: Soziologie. Weltgeschichtliche Analysen, Politik. Hg. von Johan-
nes Wickelmann. Stuttgart: Kröner 1956 (Kröners Taschenausgabe; 229), p. 186-262.
134
Ibid., p. 239.
135
R. J. B. Moore: Bwanga Among the Bemba. In: Africa 23 (1940), p. 211-234.
136
Steiner, Taboo (p. 102, note 74), p. 19.
120 Part II: Franz Baermann Steiner - Anthropology and Totalitarian Terror

from a European into a non-European language.137 This is a matter of concern

in both Taboo and the comparative study of slavery: in both contexts, Steiner
analyzes European mistranslations of non-European concepts, often perceiving
these mistranslations as motivated by a will to generate fictions about >primi-
tive< societies. This recalls Nietzsche's view of the will to power as the ability
to impose fictions upon other people. For Nietzsche, all exertions of power work
through deception (»Schein«): they are fictions that pose as truth (»Schein ist
für mich das Wirkende und Lebende selber« - »for me deception equals the
influential and the active itself«).138 Nietzsche, like Weber,139 radically ques-
tions the supposed convergence between signifier and signified. Instead of
having an intrinsic effect, an object has impact by virtue of the outward glitter
that man imposes on it. The discourse analysis in which Steiner engages brings
to light the fictions that specific political interests attach to the things language
denotes. His examination of European (mis)translations of non-European
social practices, shows how the inaccurate description of native ways of life
establishes the conviction of the West's superiority over the East: >savage<
forms of the integration of foreigners are fictitiously labelled >slavery<, while
the taboo behavior of >primitives< is entered under the heading of >supersti-
tion< in order to prove the supremacy of European rationality.
Steiner's methodology consists in subjecting the work of a number of
prominent Western intellectuals to close critical scrutiny. Examining Tre-
gear's translation of the Maori word tapu,m Steiner points out that European
interpreters introduced »artificially« the »distinction between prohibition and
sacredness«.141 The reduction in the meaning of the word »taboo« to the
»sacred«, while excluding any connotation of the »prohibited«, is explained
with reference to the Christian agenda of »missionaries«.142 Similarly, Stei-
ner examines a passage from A Voyage to the Pacific Ocean in which the
traveller and missionary James Cook describes taboo behavior. Steiner de-

137
For a discussion of the importance of the concept of translation in the Oxford
school of anthropology after the war see David Pocock: Social Anthropology. 2nd
Revised Edition, London: Sheed and Ward 1971 (Studies in Anthropology and
Comparative Religion), p. 74-75; also see Thomas O. Beidelman (Ed.): The Trans-
lation of Culture. Essays to E. E. Evans-Pritchard. London: Tavistock 1971.
138
Friedrich Nietzsche: Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Bänden.
Hg. von Giorgio Colli und Mazzino Montinari. Bd 3: Morgenröte. Idyllen aus Mes-
sina. Die fröhliche Wissenschaft. München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag 1980;
Berlin: de Gruyter 1988 (dtv; 2223), p. 417. My translation.
139
For a discussion of the influence of Nietzsche's deconstructive approach on Weber
see Dominick LaCapra: Emile Durkheim. Sociologist and Philosopher. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press 1972, p. 178.
140
Edward Tregear: The Moari-Polvnesian Comparative Dictionary. Wellington 1904,
p. 472.
141
Steiner, Taboo (p. 102, note 74), p. 34.
142
Ibid.
5. An Oriental Undermines Orientalism 121

tects in this passage143 »that superior and slightly irritated indulgence which
some people have for others who cannot think clearly«.144
Steiner rejects the idea that >primitive< cultures are uniform, that differences
in particular communities are only accidental, and he quotes Margaret Mead's
article on »Tapu« in the 1937 edition of the Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences
in order to show that >modern< anthropologists still tend to reduce the com-
plexities of >primitive< worlds. Mead demands that »comparative discussions«
of »taboo« should be »stripped of all accidents of interpretations«.145 Steiner
opposes this quotation in a polemical spirit as follows:
These are severe restrictions indeed. And one cannot expect much success from such
an attempt; the world accepts an extension of meaning much more readily than it al-
lows for any loss of connotation.146

Irony pervades this quotation. The polite and donnish tone of this extract
shows Steiner mimicking the style of the typical Oxford Senior Common
Room.147 It also shows the extent to which Steiner uses masks in his anthropo-
logical writing. Foucault has argued that it is not only writers of fiction who
adopt different voices:
[...] it is in the nature of literature that the author should appear to be absent, [...]
delegate his authority, or divide himself up [...]. Yet this gap is not confined to
literature alone. It is absolutely general in so far as the subject of the statement is a
particular function, but is not necessarily the same from one statement to another; in
so far as it is an empty function, that can be filled by virtually any individual when
he formulates the statement; and in so far as one and the same individual may oc-
cupy in turn, in the same series of statements, different positions, and assume the
role of different subjects.148
In his anthropological work, Steiner adopts different voices, different ways of
writing which he uses to undermine authoritative texts of sociological thought.
Steiner's comments on Margaret Mead's article show how he attacks anthro-
pological writings head on - in striking contrast to Canetti who only cites em-
pirical observations, while never mentioning that there are any theories pro-
posed in the anthropological books he uses. Steiner quotes Mead to show the
simplistic nature of what is being put forward in the quotation and criticizes

143
James Cook: A Voyage to the Pacific Ocean. Undertaken, by the command of His
Majesty, for making discoveries in the Northern hemisphere, to determine the posi-
tion and extent of the west side of North America. London: Printed by W. & A.
Strahan, for G. Nicol & T. Cadell 1784, Vol. Ill, p. 10-11.
144
Steiner Taboo (p. 102, note 74), p. 25.
145
Margaret Mead: Tapu. In: Edwin R. A. Seligman (Ed.): Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences. London: Macmillan 1937, Vol. VII, p. 502-505, p. 502.
146
Steiner, (penultimate note), p. 22.
147
This point was made by Adler, An Oriental in the West (p. 104, note 81), p. 17.
148
Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (p. 116, note 124), p. 93-94.
122 Part II: Franz Baermann Steiner - Anthropology and Totalitarian Terror

her as a representative of the >modern< social sciences for not being willing to
engage with a complex concept.
For Steiner, the quotation from Mead's article serves as an illustration of the
undifferentiated way in which >modern< anthropologists still write about >primi-
tive< culture. Steiner also gives us the history of the translation of the word >ta-
boo< from Polynesian into European languages, illustrating that Mead's simplifi-
cation stands in a long tradition of Western writing about non-Western peoples.
After quoting various glosses of >taboo< which make an artificial distinction be-
tween the sacred and prohibited, Steiner makes use of an ironic style of writing:
Up to this point my report is straightforward, and I only wish I could continue, as so
many have done, with the following words: »A brief glance at any compilation of
the forms and meanings of this word in the various Polynesian languages shows that
in all of them the word has two main meanings from which the others derive, and
these meanings are: prohibited and sacred.« The comparison of the data, however,
suggests something rather different to me; namely, (1) that the same kind of people
have compiled all these dictionaries, assessing the meaning of words in European
terms, and (2) that, with few exceptions, there are no Polynesian words meaning ap-
proximately what the word »holy« means in contemporary usage without concomi-
tantly meaning »forbidden«. The distinction between prohibition and sacredness can-
not be expressed in Polynesian terms. Modern European languages on the other hand
lack a word with the Polynesian range of meaning; hence Europeans discovered that
taboo means both prohibition and sacredness. Once this distinction has been discov-
ered, it can be conveyed within the Polynesian cultural idiom by the citation of exam-
ples in which only one of the two European translations would be appropriate.149
I have quoted this long passage because it says a lot about Steiner's style and
about his criticism of Western attitudes towards the non-Western. Here too
Steiner draws attention to the simplistic way of thinking of the >modem< social
sciences. It is important to catch Steiner's jocular seriousness in expressions like
»I only wish I could continue, as so many have done [...]«. More recently, Harry
J. Payne has drawn attention to Malinowski's irony vis-ä-vis the >savages<:
[...] on frequent occasions, he [Malinowski] could not resist his apparently innocent
assertion of the superiority of science over native lore. Such irony allowed him a bit
of playful detachment [...].150
Similarly, in the extract above, Steiner shows, with joking aloofness, how West-
ern scholarship does not reach up to its own standards, having failed to verify
theories with empirical evidence (»comparison of the data«). Steiner argues that
Western beliefs in the intellectual simplicity of >primitives< have blinded anthro-
pologists to the complexity of a >savage< concept. Instead of engaging with this
complexity, the anthropologist imposes a European taxonomy on a Polynesian
word which is too complex for a one-way translation. The word »holy« does not

149
Steiner, Taboo (p. 102, note 74), p. 33-34.
150
Harry C. Payne: Malinowski's Style. In: Proceedings of the American Philosophi-
cal Society 125 (1981), p. 416-440, p. 424.
5. An Oriental Undermines Orientalism 123

embrace all the connotations of the Polynesian »taboo«, which almost always
means prohibited and dirty as well as sacred. Here Steiner argues that it is mod-
ern >Europeans< rather than the >primitives« who are being simplistic. Instead of
trying to understand an alien concept, the anthropologist >Europeanizes< a Poly-
nesian word.151 At the anthropological department at Oxford, Steiner would
certainly have found ample support for the idea that concepts are not isomorphic
between cultures.152 Evans-Pritchard may have been lecturing on the complexity
of Nuer religious ideas around this time. Fortes would have been lecturing on
Tallensi ancestors.153
Steiner critically examines the writings of late nineteenth-century scholars. At
all points, his discussion of Western interpretations of >taboo< involves a critique
of European thought about the >primitive<. Steiner gives pride of place to Robert-
son Smith, whom he presents as an outstanding Victorian scholar. In this ap-
praisal of the Scottish philosopher of religion Evans-Pritchard's influence can
clearly be discerned.154 As Gellner points out, while Frazer provokes Evans-
Pritchard »into sustained and effective criticism«,155 the latter enthuses about
Robertson Smith.156 Steiner criticizes Frazer as a »debunker« of religion, but
pays respect to Robertson Smith as an anthropologist of religion:
[...] while Robertson Smith was a Semitic scholar, James Frazer was a classical one,
and while the latter became one of the chief debunkers of religion in his period, re-
ligion, in the fullest meaning of the word, was the most dutiful concern of Robertson
Smith throughout his life.157
151
For a reference to Steiner's inversion of the Europeanization of >primitive< culture
see Jeremy Adler: The I-Witness and His Wife. Malinowski, Marriage, and the
Foundation Myth. In: Time Literary Supplement, 28 June 1996, p. 4.
152
For the issue of translation at Oxford see, next to Pocock, Social Anthropology
(p. 120, note 137), p. 74-75; Beidelman, The Translation of Culture (p. 120,
note 137).
153
I owe this information to Professor Richard Pardon.
154
The extent of the admiration for Robertson Smith in post-war Oxford anthro-
polgy can be gathered from Beidelman's book on him: »It can be claimed confi-
dently that Smith is the founder of modern sociology of religion. Smith's work
contains many flaws, some due to the prejudices of his time, some due to his
own personal involvement in scholarship and religion. Yet no other Victorian
seems to have touched upon so many different issues still vital to our anthropo-
logical interest, or seems so enduring in the quality and freshness of his insights. Of
all the great Victorian anthropologists, he seems nearest to being our contemporary.«
See Thomas O. Beidelman: W. Robertson Smith and the Sociological Study of Relig-
ion. With a Foreword by E. E. Evans-Pritchard. Chicago: University of Chicago Press
1974, p. 68. Beidelman has long been an admirer of Evans-Pritchard.
155
E. Gellner: Introduction. In: Edward E. Evans-Pritchard (Ed.): A History of An-
thropological Thought. London: Faber and Faber 1981.
156
For Evans-Pritchard's high praise of Robertson Smith see Edward E. Evans-
Pritchard: A History of Anthropological Thought. Ed. by Andro Singer. London:
Faber and Faber 1981, p. 80.
157
Steiner, Taboo (p. 102, note 74), p. 53.
124 Part II: Franz Baermann Steiner - Anthropology and Totalitarian Terror

Robertson Smith's interest in Semitic cultures was closer to Steiner's heart

than the classical and deeply secular studies of Frazer. Nevertheless Steiner
does not accept Robertson Smith's evolutionist agenda. The latter marks the
>holy< off from the >primitive< form of >taboo<.158 It would run counter to his
understanding of Christianity if he were to argue that what belongs to God can
be tabooed. How can the Christian God who loves man be considered >taboo<?
This causes deep revulsion in the Victorian theologian who firmly holds that
>modern< crises of faith can only be overcome by a strong belief in the per-
sonal relationship between man and Christ. According to Beidelman, Christi-
anity was the yardstick for Robertson Smith's assessment of all religions:
For Smith, Christianity was the true measure by which all other religions were de-
fined; it was a religion of love, fellowship, joy, and communion with God, with little
emphasis on sin, suffering, and guilt.159
In »Christianity and the Supernatural«, Robertson Smith stresses the direct
character of such relationships, between the human and the divine:

A true consciousness must embrace a right conception of God's moral and personal
character, and must therefore be based on an historical manifestation of God. We
must learn that God is ready to enter into deeper relations with man than those of na-
ture. [...] God must enter as an actor into human history so that even the eye dimmed
by sin cannot fail to recognise His presence. [...]
The divine revelation must be primarily an immediate manifestation of God; a
manifestation of God in events that are at once seen to form no part of the chain of
nature but to be directly personal and explicable only as acts of God.160

Robertson Smith stresses that God is closer to man than to nature, and further,
that any divine manifestation goes through human history rather than through
an agency grounded in nature. For the Protestant theologian Robertson Smith,
God speaks directly to man, and any connection between the divine and the
tabooed must, therefore, be termed »heathenish«:
The irrationality of laws of uncleanness, from the standpoint of spiritual religion or
even of the higher heathenism, is so manifest, that they must necessarily be looked
on as having survived from an earlier form of faith and of society.161
Robertson Smith's evolutionism is prominent in this quotation. He follows the
evolutionist ranking of societies, constructing a hierarchy which moves from
158
For an example of Robertson Smith's discrimination between the >tabooed< and
the >holy< see William Robertson Smith: Lectures on the Religion of the Sem-
ites. London: Adam and Charles Black 1894, p. 446.
159
Beidelman, W. Robertson Smith and the Sociological Study of Religion (p. 123,
note 154), p. 61.
160 \villiam Robertson Smith: Lectures and Essays. Ed. by John Sutherland Black and
George Chrystal. London: Adam and Charles Black 1912, p. 126-127.
161
Robertson Smith, Lectures on the Religion of the Semites (p. 124, note 158),
p. 449.
5. An Oriental Undermines Orientalism 125

heathenism to »higher heathenism« and which finds its peak in »spiritual relig-
ion«. The history of religion progresses from »paganism«, which lives in su-
perstitious dread of the supernatural, to Judaism, which has a more personal
relationship to the »holy«, to its perfection in Christianity, where God and man
engage in a close, intimate dialogue. Steiner does not share Robertson Smith's
evolutionist views. Like Beidelman, Steiner, while admiring the Victorian so-
ciologist of religion, sees that Robertson Smith's Christianity blinds his critical
perception as far as certain elements in Judaism are concerned. Steiner high-
lights Robertson Smith's search for Christian meaning. He criticizes the theo-
logian for making his material fit his own interpretative framework while ne-
glecting the social context of Hebrew society. As we have seen, the criticism
of >Europeanizing< non-European ways of behavior, of constructing fictions
about the >alien< by neglecting the complexity of the available data, runs
through Steiner's major anthropological writing like a leitmotif. Here it is the
Christian theologian who is fantasizing about the >primitive<:
It is always the meaning that is explained and always the recorded behaviour that is
used as explanation. This procedure derives from Robertson Smith's leading inter-
est, which is theological. However much watered down, it is always the doctrine that
demands explanation and not the ways of man.162
»Meaning« here denotes theological explanations in which the Old Testament
is seen as prefiguring the New (as an example, Steiner refers to the »relation«
made »between the ancient sacrificial feast and the Eucharist«).163 Discussing
Robertson Smith's theological search for meaning, Steiner ironically estab-
lishes a relationship between the nineteenth-century scholar and a seventeenth-
century poet: »the ways of man« refer to Milton's famous justification - or ra-
ther lack of justification - of »God's ways to man«. In making this polemical
allusion, Steiner is implying that Robertson Smith, instead of engaging in socio-
logical discourse, is embarking on a theodicy or defence of Christian >doctrine<.
However, the jocular seriousness that goes with this polemical allusion to Milton
does not imply any of the resentment which can be clearly perceived in Steiner's
writing on Frazer. Rather, Steiner is trying to understand why Robertson Smith
wrote as he did. This is corroborated by the fact that Steiner acknowledges that
his critical remarks are easily made in the present context: »I have also made a
few critical remarks - easily made after sixty years of research have gone by.«164
Steiner sets out to undermine Robertson Smith's understanding of Judaism
through a linguistic analysis of the Hebrew hitborah. Linguistic analysis, as we
have already seen, is one of Steiner's most common deconstructive methods. He
argues that there is a problem of translatability between Hebrew and English,
and that there is no European equivalent which could embrace the full range of
meanings of the Hebrew word. Thus, the word hitborah has never had the same
162
Steiner, Taboo (p. 102, note 74), p. 56.
163
Ibid., p. 55.
164
Ibid., p. 68.
126 Part H: Franz Baermann Steiner - Anthropology and Totalitarian Terror

signification as the English term »blessing«, by which it is frequently translated.

Unlike hitborah, »blessing« does not have the connotations of »contagion«. Stei-
ner embarks on this detailed linguistic analysis in order to question Robertson
Smith's conception of »contagion« as the »lowest form of superstition«. The
examination of hitborah shows that »blessing« involves contagion:
But however we look at it, contagion is the principle of the transfer in blessing no less
than in Robertson Smith's »primitive« pollution taboos. How, then, are we to say that
the priest spreading his hands over the congregation, or the father touching the head of
the child, is not indulging in one of the »lowest forms of superstition?«165

Steiner undermines Robertson Smith's evolutionist belief in the progress of re-

ligion from paganism to Christianity, by claiming to detect »paganism« as an
element in the »advanced form« of Christianity. Robertson Smith's binary oppo-
sition between >primitive< superstition and >modern< Christianity dissolves under
Steiner's critical inquiry. The question mark at the end of the last sentence of the
passage quoted above illustrates Steiner's dialogical way of writing in what was
originally a series of lectures. He asks his audience directly, making his listeners
think critically about the assumed superiority of developed forms of faith.
Another way in which Steiner subverts such feelings of superiority over the
>primitive< consists in his stylistic sleights of hand. He often adopts a patroniz-
ing tone while writing about such >grand old men< as Frazer and Robertson
Smith. He declines, for example, to discuss Robertson Smith's characterization
of the >primitive< as irrational by assuming that such evolutionist assumptions
have themselves become anachronistic: »Instancing irrationality as proof of
primitiveness is such a strange procedure to the twentieth-century mind that I
do not think it necessary to refute it.«166 By saying that »the twentieth-century
mind« does not call the >primitive< irrational, Steiner establishes a direct iden-
tification with his audience, who all belong to the twentieth-century and would
not like to be out of touch with the progress being made in their age. Steiner
makes clear the ethical agenda of his scholarship when he identifies himself as
an anthropologist, with the >primitive<. 167 Rather than using the singular pro-
noun, he employs the first person plural pronoun, thus implicating the reader,
drawing him or her in to his >primitive< point of view. This identification of the
»we« of the author and the audience with >primitiveness< is established at the
end of a discussion about qodesh (»holy«):
God himself - this comes as a shock to most superficial Bible readers - is never called
holy, qodesh, unless and in so far as He is related to something else. He is holy in His
capacity as Lord of Hosts, though He is not related to man. Very often the Bible says,
165
Ibid., p. 64.
166
Ibid., p. 67.
167
For a discussion of an ethical agenda in the ethnology of James Clifford and Clifford
Geertz see Viktoria Chen / W. Barnett: Ethnology as Semiotic: The Rhetorics of Clif-
ford Geertz and James Clifford. In: Herbert W. Simons (Ed.): Rhetoric in the Hu-
manities. London: Sage 1989 (Inquiries in Social Construction), p. 119-132.
5. An Oriental Undermines Orientalism 127

The Holy One, blessed be He, or blessed be His name. The name is, in the framework
of the doctrinal logic of the Pentateuch, always qodesh because it establishes a rela-
tionship; it has, so we primitives think, to be pronounced in order to exist.168

Steiner ironically conflates Judaism (or the >Oriental<) with >primitiveness<.

Apart from implicating his audience, the »we« also refers to Steiner's Jew-
ishAOrientak identity. This quotation needs more contextualization. Steiner
refutes Robertson Smith's claim of a personal relationship between the divine
and the human by arguing that nowhere in the Pentateuch can authority be
found for qodesh meaning a »relation with humanity«.169 The Christian and
>modern< European Robertson Smith holds that God reveals himself directly in
human history. The Jew and self-declared >Oriental< Franz Steiner, on the
other hand, argues that the attributes of God are known relationally. According
to Steiner, the manifestations of such relationships constitute danger spots that
are to be avoided, thus making a connection between power and danger. As we
shall see, this also occurs in Steiner's discussion ofmana as a form of >taboo<,
though at this point human power is meant. Here, though, Steiner focuses on
divine power and equates it with danger. This paves the way for his own the-
ory of >taboo< as developed in the last chapter of Taboo and as elaborated
theoretically in his »Über den Prozeß der Zivilisierung«.
What is important to note in this context, however, is Steiner's identifica-
tion of himself as a Jew with the >primitive<. Not only does a strong binary
opposition emerge between the Jew as the >primitive< and the Christian as the
>modem< European, but the conflation between Jew and >primitive< is em-
ployed in serious scholarly discourse so as to mark off the Christian, scientific
West, from the non-Christian, non-modem rest of the world. Indeed, in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, from Herder onwards, the Oriental >Sem-
ites< were contrasted with the Christian >Aryans<. Herder and Renan believed
that the resistance of the Jews to attempts to convert them to the new religion
of Christianity symbolized the conservatism of >Orientals< as such.170 As Jean
Starobinski has pointed out, in the twentieth century a reversal took place: the
Jews were now blamed for all the disagreeable features of »modernity«.171
Steiner implicitly alludes to the discussion of Jews as >modern< in anti-Semitic
discourse. Eric J. Hobsbawm, among others, has shown that anti-Semites saw
>the Jews< as symbols of >modernity<: »They [the Jews] could serve as sym-
bols of the hated capitalist/financier; of the revolutionary agitator; of the cor-
168
Steiner, Taboo (p. 102, note 74), p. 85-87.
169
Ibid., p. 85.
170
For a discussion of Herder's ranking of cultures and his belief in the supremacy of
Christian revelation as opposed to the spiritual and scientific >underdevelopment< of
non-Western, non-Christian civilizations see Maurice Ölender: Die Sprachen des
Paradieses. Religion, Philologie und Rassentheorie im 19. Jahrhundert. Vorwort von
Jean-Pierre Vernant. Nachwort von Jean Starobinski. Frankfurt a. M.: Campus Ver-
lag 1995, p. 52-57.
171
For a discussion of this reversal see Jean Starobinski: Nachwort. In: Ibid., p. 144-150.
128 Part II: Franz Baermann Steiner - Anthropology and Totalitarian Terror

roding influence of Bootless intellectual and the new mass media [,..].«172
The capitalist, the revolutionary and mass media all represent modernity. Op-
posing anti-Semitic discourse, Steiner argues that Jews have nothing in com-
mon with >modern< Europe. As a >primitive< Steiner confronts the anti-Semitic
conflation of the Jewish with the modem. Like a >primitive<, Steiner as a Jew
believes in the physical reality of names: man can establish some form of rela-
tionship with God by pronouncing the word qodesh. However, this relationship
is never a direct one, as Robertson Smith argues; rather, the pronunciation of
the Hebrew word for God is itself tabooed in Judaism. By writing that »we
primitives« believe in the power of words to bring something into existence,
Steiner also alludes to the tabooed Hebrew name of God. In this way he again
stresses the difference between Robertson Smith's Christianity and the >primi-
tive< context of the Hebrew Bible.
Steiner also attacks Frazer's evolutionism.173 Whereas Robertson Smith's
evolutionism is based on a belief in the progress of religion from pagan su-
perstition to Christianity, Frazer argues for evolution in terms of scientific
achievements. It is this utter absence of any religious background that irritates
Steiner most, as can be seen in the following criticism of Frazer's »bourgeois
anti-clericalism«:
An ill-disguised anti-clerical bias which attacks, faut de mieux, the priests of bygone
Polynesia; an exhibition of evolutionism at its slickest and least appetising; a justifi-
cation, to a point, of what he regards as the most horrible superstitions, because they
produced, according to his belief, a law of property and sexual propriety. All that
fear and self-inflicting torture, all that pondering about life and death, all those proud
and humble and desperate patterns of obedience in order to produce the summum
bonum of the late nineteenth-century bourgeoisie.174
These are well-calculated and at the same time passionate and highly modu-
lated formulations by which Steiner constructs a complex scholarly persona.
Foucault has defined »discursive practice« as »a body of anonymous, his-
torical rules, always determined in the time and space that have defined a
given period«.175 Steiner's voice is determined by the ironic and at the same
time polite way of writing of an anthropologist like Evans-Pritchard: »faut de

172
Eric J. Hobsbawm: Age of Extremes. The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991.
London: Joseph 1994, p. 119. Similarly, Bauman writes, »The first impact of moder-
nity on the situation of European Jews was their selection as the prime target of anti-
modernist resistance.« See Zygmunt Bauman: Modernity and the Holocaust. Cam-
bridge: Polity Press 1989, p. 46
173
Steiner's strong dislike of Frazer needs to be seen in the context of Steiner's own
anthropological project. In the following I will interpret Steiner's discussion of
Frazer, without necessarily subcribing to it. As Gillian Beer has argued, a dismissal
of Victorian anthropological writers as racist »flatters ourselves«. See Beer, Open
Fields (p. 2, note 6), p. 77.
174
Steiner, Taboo (p. 102, note 74), p. 93.
175
Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (p. 116, note 124), p. 117.
5. An Oriental Undermines Orientalism 129

mieux« is an expression adapted to the francophilia of British intellectuals

like Radcliffe-Brown or indeed Evans-Pritchard. Steiner also uses a comic
way of speaking by exploiting the vocabulary of disgust (»at its slickest«,
»least appetising«). The »all that« anaphora are built up, only to lead to the
polemical bathos of the nineteenth-century bourgeoisie.
Steiner exposes Robertson Smith's scholarship as an attempt to justify
Christian doctrine, and he unmasks Frazer's >scientific< approach as a de-
fence of pathetic bourgeois values: he associates the latter's anthropology
with the lifelessness of sexual hypocrisy, a bourgeois conviction about the
right of property, and of self-sacrifice for the cause of capitalism. Frazer
emerges from Steiner's critique as a pathetic petty bourgeois. Having stigma-
tized Frazer thus, he criticizes his scholarly method and, as with Robertson
Smith, finds fault with the wilful interpretation of meaning while neglecting
social contexts. Robertson Smith isolates social phenomena so as to
construct fictions about the superstitions of >primitives<. Frazer disconnects
social phenomena in order to fit some empirical facts into his theory of the
evolution of the human psyche: »[...] analysis is reserved for the meaning, in
psychological terms, of the isolated items but no degree of analysis is neces-
sary for distinguishing or evaluating social contexts«.176
Steiner also repudiates his teacher Radcliffe-Brown. He closes his discus-
sion of Radcliffe-Brown with the following terse words:
What have we learned from Radcliffe-Brown's Taboo essay? At least two things:
(1) that it is impossible to describe danger behaviour in terms of value, and (2) that
one cannot describe supposedly non-human sanctions without some reference to so-
cial pressure. This result is wholly negative, but it is, I believe, rather salutary.177
Most of the time, Steiner's discussion of Western anthropology yields negative
results. His deconstruction of a Europeanizing discussion of a non-European
concept serves as a backdrop for his own theory of >taboo<, which is presented
at the end of the book. What Steiner resents most is Radcliffe-Brown's attempt
at »explaining danger behaviour in terms of negative values«.178 Radcliffe-
Brown holds that >primitives<, though unable to work out an abstract moral
system, give voice to values in the form of emotive rites. Rites - including
ritual taboos - express the moral sentiments of the natives. We thus encounter
a patronizing approach to the >primitive<. Steiner tackles this by patronizing
Radcliffe-Brown in turn, as the school-masterly »what-have-we-learned« for-
mulation makes clear. He shows that the natives are self-reflexive when they
follow taboos which, rather than being the emotional expression of values, are
values themselves. Consequently he proposes that one should »explain value

176
Steiner, Taboo (p. 102, note 74), p. 98.
177
Ibid., p. 125.
178
Ibid., p. 124.
130 Part II: Franz Baermann Steiner - Anthropology and Totalitarian Terror

behaviour in terms of positive danger«.179 Whereas Radcliffe-Brown belittles

the effectiveness of taboo-commands by arguing that they are enforced by an
irrational belief in a supernatural power, Steiner argues that there are well-
calculated social pressures that motivate taboo behavior. These social pressures
are organized so as to keep disruptions through violence at bay. In Steiner's
discussion, taboo emerges as a complex form of behavior and as a social value
whose importance all the natives agree on. Steiner also discerns a patronizing
attitude toward taboo behavior in Freud's Totem and Taboo. Like Robertson
Smith and Frazer, Freud separates the prohibited from the sacred.180 Steiner
therefore places Freud within the nineteenth-century evolutionist tradition:
»[...] Freud has given us a very lucid resume of the views of Robertson Smith
and Frazer.«181 Ironically, although Freud is called an important psychologist,
he is placed in a nineteenth-century context:
In his entire discussion of the ethnographic material Freud has really stressed two,
and only two, points: the difference between, and distinctiveness of, sacredness
and horror, and the automatic nature of taboo sanction. There is a certain arbitrari-
ness in this narrowing down of the rather complex problems and institutions in-
volved. Nevertheless, in so doing, Freud remains in the best tradition of the Victo-
rian intellectualists. 182

By saying that Freud »remains in the best tradition of the Victorian intellectual-
ists«, Steiner ironically undermines the psychologist's claim to be progressive.
Indeed, Freud follows Frazer's tripartite evolutionist framework when he writes
about the three stages through which mankind passes on its way to intellectual
improvement: »Die Menschheit hat [...] drei große Weltanschauungen im Laufe
der Zeiten hervorgebracht: die animistische (mythologische), die religiöse und
die wissenschaftliche.« (»through the centuries mankind has produced three great
world-views: the animistic [mythological], the religious and the scientific.«)183
Psychoanalysis is the science that rationalizes man's irrational elements and, in
so doing, liberates him or her from a neurotic fear of danger. Steiner, however,
argues that fear of danger is not >irrational, that, on the contrary, it gives rise to
rational and practical actions that help prevent the outbreak of violence.
As well as deconstructing Western attempts at understanding >primitive<
concepts, Steiner tentatively suggests a theoretical discourse on >taboo<: »As I
suggest tentatively later, taboo is an element of all those situations in which
attitudes to values are expressed in terms of danger behaviour.«184 Steiner
makes it clear that instead of being an irrational superstition, taboo behavior

179
Ibid.
180 por Freud's distinction between the prohibited and the sacred see Freud, Kultur-
theoretische Schriften (p. 61, note 193), p. 357.
181
Steiner, Taboo (p. 102, note 74), p. 130.
182
Ibid., p. 133.
183
Freud, Kulturtheoretische Schriften (p. 61, note 193), p. 366. My translation.
184
Steiner, Taboo (p. 102, note 74), p. 21.
J. An Oriental Undermines Orientalism 131

operates according to a rationale in that it constitutes »values« regarding the

avoidance of »danger«. Here Steiner develops a highly significant theory of
>taboo<. It seems slight on account of its fluent, modest formulation, for which
reason Evans-Pritchard may have overlooked its significance. Yet every word
counts. As the words »all those situations« in the above passage illustrate,
Steiner generalizes on an abstract level, but, as his word »tentatively« demon-
strates, he is also aware of the danger of such generalizations. His use of the
word »element« is both cautiously modest and scientifically exact. It defines
>taboo's< specific role. He uses a cautious terminology while talking about
>taboo< on an abstract level, again underlining the fact that the forms of taboo
behavior differ from society to society. This outline of >taboo< is part of his
methodology: it serves to give a positive backdrop to the negative discussions
of Western philosophers, theologians and anthropologists. Steiner shows that
the concept of >taboo< is more complex than some anthropologists like to think.
Steiner draws the reader's attention to the confusion of this non-European
form of behavior in European discussions:
A warning is necessary at the very outset that several quite different things have
been and still are being discussed under the heading »Taboo«. Taboo is concerned
(1) with the social mechanisms of obedience which have ritual significance;
(2) with specific and restrictive behaviour in dangerous situations.185
Here he establishes what, for him, are the most significant parts of a theory of
>taboo< which have hitherto been made, and the words »a warning is neces-
sary« as well as the formulation »different things« makes the reader aware of a
highly complex rather than >primitive< - in the sense of >simple< - topic. The
»social mechanisms« of the first point refers to Durkheim's notion of laws that
are accepted as valid by the whole of a community. As Dominick LaCapra
pointed out in his detailed discussion of Durkheim's concept of repressive
sanctions or social mechanisms, these are enforced, but, rather than being
individualistic, unethical and arbitrary, the force behind them originates in the
values shared by the whole community. LaCapra points out both the element
of enforcement and the communal and ethical aspect of such force.186 Social
mechanisms also have a religious dimension: they »have ritual significance«.
Steiner's second point defines the value of such rituals as brought forth by
the action they entail, making all members aware of limits whose transgression
leads to an encounter with danger giving a precise description (»specific«) of
behavior that confines itself (»restrictive«) to limits »in dangerous situations«.
Thus using a Durkheimian understanding which Steiner seems to subscribe to
here, >taboo< partakes of religion and, at the same time, lays down rules for
ethical behavior - behavior that avoids violence - in the dangerous situations
of everyday life. According to LaCapra, for Durkheim the question of value

185
Ibid., p. 20.
186
LaCapra, Emile Durkheim (p. 120, note 139), p. 90-159.
132 Part II: Franz Baermann Steiner - Anthropology and Totalitarian Terror

and meaning goes hand in hand with the notion of boundaries, limits and ta-
boos. Indeed, Durkheim contrasts the anomie found in modern societies with
the awareness of limits in >primitive< cultures: characterizing anomie »as the
absence of a normative sense of legitimate limits«.187 Steiner goes on to add a
third and fourth element inherent in the concept of >taboo<:
One might say that taboo deals with the sociology of danger itself, for it is also con-
cerned (3) with the protection of individuals who are in danger, and (4) with the pro-
tection of society from those endangered - and therefore dangerous - persons.188
Here Steiner explains how behavior in response to danger has as its aim pro-
tecting individuals who, having become endangered, pose a danger to their
environment. As we have seen, the comparative study of slavery gives a de-
tailed analysis of the latter point. What Europeans called >slavery< consist in a
type of taboo behavior: it differentiates and then reintegrates »endangered -
and therefore dangerous - persons«. Like other forms of taboo behavior, this
form of differentiation and integration has to be seen as a way of avoiding
violence: the individual who is endangered is also in turn dangerous, and,
according to Steiner, to face danger is to face another power. This encounter
with danger or power is circumvented through social differentiation of the one
who is dangerous. In this way, >taboo< - by laying down rules of avoidance
rather than control and, therefore, contact with power or danger - protects
»individuals who are in danger« (3) and also offers protection to those who are
connected with the endangered by integrating these same individuals into new
societal units (4). Steiner sensitizes us to possible understandings of >primitive<
culture in terms of behavioral responses to danger. As a corollary of such un-
derstandings, it follows that the >primitive< differentiates him- or herself from
the >civilized< through an awareness of danger and the willingness to avoid all
its specific manifestations in everyday life. But although Steiner analyzes
behavior in response to danger in a highly detached anthropological manner in
Taboo and in his comparative study of forms of slavery, in »Über den Prozeß
der Zivilisierung«, as we shall see, he contrasts the >primitive< eagerness to
avoid every type of danger with the readiness of modem European civilization
to establish contact with the dangerous.
By describing >taboo< as danger behavior, Steiner attempts an abstract in-
terpretation of all >primitive< cultures. As we have seen, he makes it clear
that the >primitive< also encompasses the >Oriental< by identifying himself as
an >Oriental< Jew with the >primitive<. Furthermore, as Roberston Smith's
writing on Hebrew superstition demonstrates, the notion of >taboo< and the
Hebrew concept of law are closely related. Steiner, however, qualifies this
abstraction by saying that >taboo< finds different forms of expression in dif-
ferent societies:

187
Ibid., p. 159.
188
Steiner, Taboo (p. 102, note 74), p. 20-21.
5. An Oriental Undermines Orientalism 133

Now we cannot see all this in terms of a single problem, whether we solve it or leave
it unsolved. There is no sociological-situational unity in the attitudes and customs
under discussion; a psychological unity is equally absent. [...] We are thus in the po-
sition of having to deal, under »Taboo«, with a number of diverse social mecha-
nisms expressed in forms which, from the psychological standpoint, stretch beyond
this one category.189

Although >taboo< always has to do with danger, forms of avoiding danger

differ from one society to another: each culture has its own distinctive way of
life and its own situational context.
In only one culture does taboo have complex convergencies with other con-
cepts. Steiner elaborates on the complexity of the Polynesian notion of >taboo<.
He writes that »mana« and taboo were often independent aspects of one thing.190
The former is the power that marks certain individuals off from others. Such
demarcated individuals have >mana< on account of their ability to impose >ta-
boos<: >mana< is the power to call something a >taboo<. By interrelating the
notion of >taboo< with that of >mana<, Steiner claims that Polynesians organize
their society according to taboo behavior. Hence >taboo<, while being a ritual,
is at the same time a socio-political way of life. Rather than being a superstition,
as nineteenth-century evolutionists like Frazer and Robertson Smith held, or an
unreflective form of practice voicing emotions about values, as Radcliffe-
Brown claimed, Steiner argues that >taboo< is a carefully thought-out structure
of social behavior. >Taboo< limits contacts with danger/power and violence in
the context of socio-political interactions:
The power to restrict was the yardstick by which power was measured; here was the
social manifestation of power. Second, the exercise of this veto was in terms of ta-
boo, that is, the actual sphere of any person's or office's power was delimited by the
kind of taboo he could impose. Taboo thus provided the means of relating a person
to his superiors and inferiors.191

Taboo gives notice of anything that, if touched without permission, disrupts

peace and thus leads to dangerous situations. Far from being an expression of
superstition or a form of emotional assertion about values, >taboos< are care-
fully thought-out rituals that help prevent social tensions and violent divisions
within societies. The objects which are tabooed must not be touched on pain of
their inflicting danger - here a manifestation of social power - on the violator
as a result of the communal acceptance of such prohibition. In Polynesia, so-
cial disruptions are avoided. The tabooed is always the powerful and must
therefore be avoided. Polynesian society as a whole is conscious of power and
the dangers it engenders. It is from this consciousness of the danger of power,
that the highly complex notion of >taboo< developed.

189
Ibid., p. 21.
190
Ibid., p. 41.
191
Ibid., p. 39.
134 Part II: Franz Baermann Steiner - Anthropology and Totalitarian Terror

In the first two chapters of Taboo, Steiner lays the ground from which to at-
tack Western thinkers' simplistic interpretations of this complex term. At the
end of the book, Steiner returns to his interpretation of >taboo< as a way of
avoiding the encounter with risks, taking up the most important elements he
has developed in his discussion of >taboo<. He equates danger with power, and,
proceeding with his critique of Radcliffe-Brown, calls >taboo< a value:

To face danger is to face another power. Indeed, the older meaning of the English
word danger is »power«, »jurisdiction«, »dominion«, »the power to dispose of or
to harm«.192

[...] it is a major fact of human existence that we are not able, and never were able,
to express our relation to values in other terms than those of danger behaviour.193
Here Steiner develops his theory about power and danger. >Taboo< emerges as
the key to solving the problems that power and danger pose to any society.
Communities in which the social pressure to follow >taboos< embraces the whole
of the society are free from violent encounters with danger and power, which
Steiner explicitly pairs. He alludes to the conditio humana, saying that human-
ity has always been surrounded by danger. >Primitive< societies circumscribe
power and therefore, limit danger to certain places that are to be avoided.
Those areas that belong to the chief or king are not to be entered. Similarly,
danger spots in nature, in which the power of the divine is believed to dwell,
are not to be touched. >Taboo< is a value in that it prescribes the avoidance of
any form of power and gives instructions concerning such avoidance by indi-
cating exactly where the danger lies:
Danger is narrowed down by taboo. A situation is regarded as dangerous: very well,
but the danger may be a socially unformulated threat. Taboo gives notice that danger
lies not in the whole situation, but only in certain specified actions concerning it. These
actions, these danger spots, are more challenging and deadly than the situations as a
whole, for the whole situation can be rendered free from danger by dealing with or,
rather, avoiding the specified danger spots completely.194
Steiner argues for a form of »dealing with« danger in »avoiding« it. The ethi-
cal connotation of >taboo< consists precisely in this avoidance of violence. At
the end of his book, >primitive< culture emerges as a well-thought-out form of
establishing human relations and relations with the natural world by keeping a
distance from both power and danger. Steiner theorizes the concept of >taboo<
as a constitutive way of putting power into a setting. In depicting >taboo< as a
rational way of avoiding danger, Steiner also opposes Robertson Smith's view
of religion as being an expression of a loving and personal relationship be-
tween God and man. Religious behavior, like the following of taboos, has for

192
Ibid., p. 146.
193
Ibid., p. 147.
194
Ibid., p. 146-147.
5. An Oriental Undermines Orientalism 135

Steiner also a practical rationale in that it helps create a society in which dis-
tance from power and danger is established. In contrast to this Robertson
Smith argues that taboo is a remnant of an inferior primitive society:
It is not with a vague fear of unknown powers, but with a loving reverence for
known gods who are knit to their worshippers by strong bonds of kinship that relig-
ion in the true sense of the word begins.195
Whereas Robertson Smith tries to convince us of the irrationality of >taboo<,
calling the powers that are to be avoided »unknown«, Steiner draws attention
to the precise localization of danger in >primitive< society.

5.3 Civilization

As we have seen, Steiner refrains from a full-scale comparison between the

>primitive< and the >modern< in his strictly scholarly book Taboo. In the essay
»Über den Prozeß der Zivilisierung«, however, Steiner, while expounding his
theory of boundaries or taboos in an aphoristic style, compares non-violent
>primitive< ways of living with the control of nature in >modern< Western soci-
ety. »Über den Prozeß der Zivilisierung« participates in Steiner's deconstruc-
tive project in that it deconceptualizes the concept of >civilization<, and the
idea associated with this concept, of the supremacy of the >modem< West. In
the following, I shall contrast Norbert Elias's Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation
with Steiner's »Über den Prozeß der Zivilisierung« in order to bring fully to
the fore the latter's radical stance towards European feelings of superiority.
There is also a major difference between the scholarly approach of the two
writers which is connected with the historical context in which they have stud-
ied >modern< civilization: Elias wrote his book in the thirties (it was first pub-
lished in 1939), whereas Steiner completed his aphoristic esssay in 1944. Stei-
ner mentions concentration camps; Elias, however, did not foresee the path
which >modern< civilization was taking. Steiner's essay offers an impressive
reading of the impact of the Holocaust on sociological and anthropological
thought which, according to Zygmunt Bauman, is still a desideratum:
By and large, the lessons of the Holocaust have left little trace on sociological com-
mon sense, which includes among many others such articles of faith as the benefits
of reason's rule over the emotions, the superiority of rationality over (what else)
irrational action [...].196
I shall show that, as early as 1944, Steiner set out to undermine such articles of
faith through a critique of >modern< civilization against the background of the
Holocaust. In the first part of this section, I will discuss differences in ap-
195
Robertson Smith, Lectures on the Religion of the Semites (p. 124, note 158),
p. 54-55.
196
Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (p. 128, note 172), p. 10.
136 Part H: Franz Baermann Steiner - Anthropology and Totalitarian Terror

proach and style between Elias's and Steiner's treatment of the concept of
civilization. I shall contrast the centrality of danger in Steiner's writing on civi-
lization with Elias's emphasis on fear and violence. In the second part I will
give a detailed analysis of the argument developed in Steiner's essay and place
it within the context of recent discussions about the Holocaust. In the final
part, I shall describe Steiner's sociological psychology with which he sets out
to influence a >modern< way of life.
Elias characterizes his method of investigation as empirical and non-dogmatic.
He writes about civilization with the premise that >value-free< research can de-
velop theories only with evidence of >empirical facts<, while he abstains from
passing any judgement on what has been happening or is still in the process of
happening. Elias voices a critical attitude to absolutist definitions, denying that
anything can accurately be called completely civilized:197
One can never say with certainty that people of a society are civilized. But on the
basis of systematic investigations referring to demonstrable evidence, it can be said
with a high degree of certainty that some groups of people have become more civi-
lized, without necessarily implying that it is better or worse, has a positive or nega-
tive value, to become more civilized.198

Elias first shows that he is wary of a careless use of terminology, arguing that
there is no such thing as an absolute state of civilization. He then goes on to
argue that there are only degrees of civilization as found in various societies,
and that the state of being civilized should not be judged in terms of positive or
negative value.
In his strictly anthropological writings Steiner also employs a standard schol-
arly method, which comprizes quoting data, and criticising various anthropologi-
cal theories for not having taken accurate account of the complexity of such data.
However, he employs this method in order to show where exactly anthropolo-
gists have failed as scholars, where their theories simplify the complexity of
information about a particular >primitive< society. In his aphoristic writings, he
abandons the donnish masks of his strictly anthropological works and openly
declares his allegiances with the >primitive<. It is important to bear in mind that,
for Steiner, the word >primitive<, like the words >Oriental< and >Jewish<, denote
everything that is non-European, that has nothing to do with the >modern< West-
197
»Man kann nie mit Bestimmtheit sagen, daß die Menschen einer Gesellschaft
zivilisiert sind. Aber man kann aufgrund von systematischen Untersuchungen unter
Hinweis auf nachprüfbare Belege recht wohl mit hoher Bestimmtheit von einigen
Menschengruppen sagen, daß sie zivilisierter geworden sind, ohne notwendiger-
weise damit den Gedanken zu verbinden, daß es besser oder schlechter ist, daß es
einen positiven oder negativen Wert hat, zivilisierter geworden zu sein.« See Nor-
bert Elias: Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation. Soziogenetische und Psychogeneti-
sche Untersuchungen. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp 1976 (Suhrkamp-Taschenbuch
Wissenschaft; 158/159), p. XX.
198
Norbert Elias: The Civilizing Process. The History of Manners and State Forma-
tion and Civilization. Trans, by Edmund Jephcott. Oxford: Blackwell 1994, p. 188.
5. An Oriental Undermines Orientalism 137

em world. This opposition between, on the one hand, the >primitive< and the
>Oriental< and, on the other, the >modern Western European^ the scientific, and
the Christian comes most succinctly to the fore in Steiner's construction of a
Jewish and a Roman identity. The characteristics of the West, namely >moderni-
ty<, science and Christendom all feature in some form or other in the Holocaust.
As we have seen, in his letter to Gandhi Steiner characterises anti-Semitism as
the central element of Christian Europe.199 Several scholars have drawn attention
to the systematic and bureaucratic organization of the Nazi genocide - Steiner
himself discusses it in his aphorisms - as part of general aspects of >modern<
life.200 In the concentration camps, science »was the firm and consistent author-
ity for dealing with death«.201 The Jews, Steiner argues, represent the opposite of
the >modern<, the Christian, and the scientific, whereas the Romans embody the
power and violence of >modem< Europe. As will be shown later on, Steiner per-
ceives in the Roman empire the first colonial power. The destruction of the tem-
ple by the Romans manifests colonialism as such - whether it is the colonializa-
tion of the >primitive< or the >Oriental<.
Elias, however, seems to be convinced of the supremacy of the >modern<
West. In contrast to Steiner he posits intellectual and technological inferiority
as a major fact about non-Western societies. The >uncivilized<, Elias argues, is
incapable of controlling either himself or nature:202 »The development that led
to more adequate knowledge and increasing control of nature was therefore,
considered from one aspect, also a development toward greater self-control by
men.«203 Elias's view of the >primitive< as contrasted to the >modern< can be
199
More recently George Steiner writes about »Christian and post-Christian Europe«
and its relation to the Holocaust as follows: »In regard to the >Jewish problerm,
Nazism spoke out loud and enacted what Christian and post-Christian Europe had
long harbored as an obsessive, half-avowed dream and fantasy.« See G. Steiner:
The Long Life of Metaphor. An Approach to the Shoah. In: Berel Lang (Ed.):
Writing and the Holocaust. New York: Holmes & Meier 1988, p. 154-171.
200
For a discussion of >modernity< and the Holocaust see, for example, Kaplan, Con-
science and Memory (p. 14, note 20); White, Historical Emplotment and the Prob-
lem of Truth (p. 36, note 96), p. 37-53, and Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust
(p. 128, note 172).
201
Kaplan, Conscience and Memory (p. 14, note 20), p. 65. Biagioli writes that
»Mengele was using Auschwitz as a scientific institution which offered excep-
tional possibilities to study usually rare individuals. These studies on twins and the
handicapped were then used to confirm a discourse of racial hygiene which lent
scientific legitimation to the institution of the concentration camp and to the geno-
cide to which that institution had been dedicated.« Biagioli, Science, Modernity,
and the Final Solution (p. 14, note 21), p. 202.
202
»Die Entwicklung, die zu einer sachgerechteren Erkenntnis und zu einer wachsen-
den Kontrolle von Naturzusammenhängen durch Menschen führte, war also von
einer anderen Seite her betrachtet zugleich auch eine Entwicklung zu größerer
Selbstkontrolle der Menschen.« Elias, Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation I (p. 136,
note 197), p. LVII1.
203
Elias, The Civilizing Process (p. 136, note 198), p. 208.
138 Part II: Franz Baermann Steiner - Anthropology and Totalitarian Terror

clearly seen from this quotation. More adequate knowledge (»Sachgerechtere Er-
kenntnis«) characterizes the >civilized<, whereas the >uncivilized< cannot objec-
tively analyze his or her surrounding world. This accurate perception of nature
also leads to its control. The control of nature eventuates in the self-control of
>civilized< man. Elias presupposes that the >civilized< excels the >primitive< in
intellect and, as a consequence, in emotional refinement. Steiner, on the other
hand, argues that the seemingly irrational way of life of the >primitives< has a
rational agenda, whereas the rationality of the >civilized< is itself driven by >irra-
tional< desires. This clearly evaluates the >uncivilized< above the >civilized<.
Elias is cognizant of the fact that the word >civilization< was used as a justifi-
cation for colonialism in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries,204
but he also endorses a belief in occidental superiority, by calling it a fact. In
Elias's account >civilization< developed from the Middle Ages onwards: power
had been monopolized in the king and later in the state. This monopolization
resulted in an increased interdependence between different sections of society.
The dependence of all social groups on each other eventuated in a change of
personality: everyone has to make compromises and has to control his or her
immediate desire in order to communicate with the rest of the community.
Here Elias follows a Freudian psychoanalytical method. The psyche of the
civilized obeys Freud's super-ego and is, therefore, able to control the sexual
and aggressive drives of the ego. By Elias's definition >civilization< means a
psychological superiority over the >uncivilized<. The psyche of modern Euro-
pean man has control over himself or herself and nature. Elias denies that the
superiority of the >civilized< over the >uncivilized< is a subjective evaluation.
He argues that it is an objective hallmark: »Civilization is the decisive mark of
the Occident which allows for superiority.«205 He here agrees with colonial
upholders of >civilization<, claiming that the West has to be differentiated in
terms of superiority. The definition of the word >civilization< in turn depends
on the Western concept of what it means to be >civilized<. Elias imposes West-
ern criteria while contrasting the >Orient< with the >Occident<, and, in line with
this imposition of European values on to the non-European, he can only see the
end of colonialism in a time at which the >Orient< has become fully occidental,
that is to say, >civilized<. Only then has it reached the same degree of power
and control as its former exploiter.206 As we shall see, it is precisely this aspect
of control which Steiner criticizes.
Elias acknowledges disadvantages within the process of >civilization<, but
these drawbacks are not real, in the sense of factual, but rather >psychological<.

204
For a discussion of this point see Elias, Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation I (p. 136,
note 197), p. 64.
205
»Diese Zivilisation ist das unterscheidende und Überlegenheit gebende Kennzei-
chen des Okzidentalen.« Elias, Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation II (p. 136, note
197), p. 347. My translation.
206
For a discussion of this point see ibid., p. 348.
5. An Oriental Undermines Orientalism 139

Civilized man does not so much fear external powers, but falls prey to anxie-
ties about repressed drives:207
People's fear of external powers diminish without ever disappearing; the never-absent,
latent or actual anxieties arising from the tension between drives and drive-control
functions become relatively stronger, more comprehensive and continuous.208

>Civilized< man does not need to be as much afraid of external powers as his
>primitive< counterpart, but, his control of him or herself and of nature has to
be paid for by a struggle between the rational ego and alien, irrational drives.
These anxieties within the present state of >civilized< humanity are proof posi-
tive for Elias that the process of >civilization< has not stopped. >Civilization<
will find its perfection when a permanent balance between the individual and
the duties of society has been struck:209
[...] a more durable balance, a better attunement, between the overall demands of
man's social existence on the one hand, and his personal needs and inclinations on
the other.210

Elias harks back to the Kantian tension between social duty and individual
inclination which is to be resolved in a >civilized< society. This tension be-
tween social duty (»Forderungen«) and individual inclination (»Neigungen«)
creates anxieties in the psyche of individuals. By liberating man from fear,
>civilization< frees man from all irrational anxieties. In Elias's account >civili-
zation< appears to be the process in which humanity first of all emancipates
itself from a dependence on nature's unpredictabilities, then controls violence
within the human sphere, and finally subdues psychic tensions within indivi-
dual members of society.
In contrast to Elias who applauds the process of >civilization< as man's lib-
eration from drives and anxieties, Steiner characterizes this same process as
the march of danger into the heart of creation. Whereas Elias worked on his
study in the twenties and thirties, Steiner wrote his aphoristic essay when the
drawbacks of >modern< society were all too obvious. It was a time when dan-
ger broke upon cities in the form of mass-destructive weapons. In Elias's study
danger does not play a leading role. What dominates his discourse is a concern
with fear and violence. Both writers have in common a psychological approach
207
»Die Ängste des Menschen vor äußeren Mächten werden - ohne je zu verschwin-
den - geringer; die niemals fehlenden, latenten oder aktuellen Ängste, die aus der
Spannung zwischen Trieb und Ich entstehen, werden im Verhältnis zu ihnen stär-
ker, allseitiger und beständiger.« Ibid., p. 408-409.
208
Elias, The Civilizing Process (p. 136, note 198), p. 498.
209
»[...] ein dauerhafteres Gleichgewicht oder gar einen Einklang zwischen seinen
[des Menschen] gesellschaftlichen Aufgaben, zwischen den gesamten Anforderun-
gen seiner sozialen Existenz auf der einen Seite und seinen persönlichen Neigun-
gen und Bedürfnissen auf der anderen.« Elias, Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation II
(p. 136, note 197), p. 454.
210
Elias, The Civilizing Process (p. 136, note 198), p. 524.
140 Part II: Franz Baermann Steiner - Anthropology and Totalitarian Terror

towards sociology and an awareness of power for the development of society,

but whereas Steiner's psychology is to some extent influenced by Freud, and to
some extent by Pedersen's interpretation of the perception of the Hebrews,
Elias strictly follows Freud's paradigm of the ego, the id and the super-ego.
While Steiner equates power with danger, Elias regards power as the outcome
of humanity's self-control and its control over nature.
Following E. B. Tylor,2" Steiner marks off >modern< European society from
>primitive< communities in terms of an increase in the control of nature, and he
combines the issue of the domination of nature with the question of power.
Steiner compares the >primitive's< relation to nature to that of the >civilized<.
He picks out Eskimos212 as an example of the >primitive<, mentioning their
technical achievements, but he discounts the significance of sophisticated wea-
pons like harpoons with balls and socket joints as mere tools for the adaptation
to nature. As Franz Boas noticed in The Mind of Primitive Man - a book that
was in Steiner's anthropological library - cultures are estimated according to
»the play with techniques that furnish the amenities of life«.213 Steiner argues
that those technical criteria are misleading in that they represent European
categories superimposed on to non-European culture:
[...] the mental shift that we are making in order to move from the image of the Es-
kimo to that of the European, is simply a shift in technological conceptions. What
can indeed be distinguished is not the potential in power of the compared individu-
als, but the boundaries of both societies.214

In making the question of technical achievements a criterion for comparing the

>primitive< with the >civilized<, the anthropologist remains within the paradigm
of a European technological imagination. The issue of a struggle between man
and nature is equally a theme produced by capitalism, an ideology created in
and with >modern< Europe (»Dies ist bloß der banale Mythos des Kapitalis-
mus« - »this is only the trite myth of capitalism«)215. Rather than being a ques-
tion of man's competition with nature, the difference between the >savage< and
the >civilized< consists in the ability to erect boundaries (»Grenzen«) between

211
Tylor characterizes the >primitive's< lack of control of nature as follows: »Ac-
quaintance with the physical laws of the world, and the accompanying power of
adapting nature to man's own ends, are, on the whole, lowest among savages,
mean among barbarians, and highest among modern educated nations.« See Tylor,
Primitive Culture (p. 42, note 119), p. 24.
212
Steiner had a long-standing anthropological interest in Eskimos.
213
Boas, The Mind of Primitive Man (p. 85, note 21), p. 182.
214
»[...] die Verschiebung, die wir vornehmen, um von dem Bilde des Eskimo zu dem
des Europäers zu gelangen, ist lediglich eine Verschiebung innerhalb einer techno-
logischen Vorstellungsreihe. Was sich wirklich unterscheidet, ist nicht das Macht-
potential der verglichenen Individuen [der Eskimo und der Europäer], sondern die
Grenzen der beiden Gesellschaften.« Steiner, Über den Prozeß der Zivilisierung
(p. 81, note 1), p. 216. My translation.
215
Ibid. My translation.
5. An Oriental Undermines Orientalism 141

society and a sphere of danger. The difference between the >primitive< and the
>modern< is found in behavioral responses to danger. In concentration camps
the absence of any normative, ethical limits is clearly manifested, and as a
result, violence and danger permeate every facet of life. Steiner tries to fathom
the horror of such absence of boundaries that would create spheres that are free
from danger by emphasizing the utter novelty of such pain as inflicted in the
univers concentrationnaire (»Und diese Qual ist neu [,..]«)216. Recent work on
the Holocaust indeed emphasizes the absence of boundaries in the thinking of
the perpetrators. LaCapra calls the transgression of all normative limits a
»negative sublime«, writing that
one should at least entertain the possibility of a Nazi sublime that, in a fascination
for radical transgression, complicated the desire for a »beautiful« and rational total-
ity that would exclude Jews - although (as Himmler's 1943 Posen speech indicates)
a quest for the sublime could also legitimate extermination.217

In a similar vein Berel Lang characterizes the Nazi genocide »as moved by an
impulse not only to transgress limits but to deny that such limits apply at all«.218
Steiner counterposes his shock at a world of absolute transgression with a
way of life in which ethical boundaries are respected. In this way his con-
struction of a binary opposition between >primitive< and >civilized< smacks
of what LaCapra calls »working-through.« »Working-through« does not mean
resistance or repression; on the contrary it describes an attitude that allows
for mourning and critical engagement with a traumatic event. A critical en-
counter with the Holocaust entails a concern with ethical values that have
been radically negated in the Nazi genocide:
In addition, working-through requires acknowledging the problem of values and norms
and recognizing their distinction from empirical reality, which they do not redeem or
transfigure but which they enable one to evaluate and possibly to transform.219

Steiner's focus on boundaries, on taboos, on normative limits within non-

European societies offers a radically different account of empirical realities as
found in the >modern< West, an account which could set free energies for an
ethical desire to transform an empirical reality in which power and danger are
not avoided by means of behavioral responses to danger. Steiner wants to have
an impact on the way of thought - and eventually on the way of life - of his
readership. He, therefore, focuses on human psychology, on different mind-
sets. In terms of technical achievements, the Eskimo equals the >modern<
European. For Steiner, the difference between the >civilized< and the >uncivi-
lized< has to be sought in different ways of thinking: the Eskimo adapts him-

216
Ibid., p. 218.
217
LaCapra, Representing the Holocaust (p. 21, note 43), p. 95.
218
Berel Lang: The Representation of Limits. In: Friedlander, Probing the Limits of
Representation (p. 14, note 21), p. 300-317, p. 305.
219
LaCapra, Representing the Holocaust (p. 21, note 43), p. 201.
142 Part H: Franz Baermann Steiner - Anthropology and Totalitarian Terror

self or herself to nature, while the >modern< European refrains from any form
of adaptation. Elias explains >primitive< communities' lack of efficient ways to
control nature by referring to the >savage's< intellect as having a weak ability
in abstract comprehension. Elias, influenced by Freud, argues that this power of
comprehension (»sachgerechtere Erkenntnis«) eventuates in both self-control
and the control of nature. Steiner, on the other hand, calls >primitive< forms of
adapting to nature a psychological and intellectual accomplishment unequalled
in the West:
However, it is not the harpoons and ball-and-socket joints, not the arrowheads with
spiral threads which command our respect, but their process of adaptation. Who is
able to build houses out of snow in those winter nights? Eskimos build little houses
out of snow and behold, snow is a warm place to live in.220

The »Who is able« question underlines the Eskimos's unique capability for
psychologically and physically adapting to nature. Europeans would not be
able to construct houses while living with, from a European perspective, unfa-
vorable natural conditions. The »behold« exclamation, introduces the Western
reader to a new way of life in which man can comfortably live in a world of
snow. The >modern< Western paradigm does not allow for an adaptation to
nature. Rather Europe's >Enlightenment< tradition seeks to perfect man's con-
trol of nature. In tackling the issue of the adaptation to, as opposed to the >con-
trol< over nature, Steiner touches upon problems about which Adorno and
Horkheimer wrote in American exile. The latter authors blame the Enlighten-
ment for a will to dominate nature. As they claim in the »Selbstanzeige« to
Dialektik der Aufklärung: »They [Adorno and Horkheimer] look for the ori-
gins of the manifest crisis of modern culture in history and in the process
through which mankind established its rule over nature.«221 Steiner contrasts
Western rule over nature with non-Western adaptation to nature. As Wigger-
shaus has pointed out, such a contrast is missing in Adorno's and Horkheimer's
work,222 which is primarily concerned to show how the >modern< and the >pri-
mitive< are two sides of the same coin: >primitive< myth thematizes the control
of nature and the instrumentalized Enlightenment project itself turns into a
myth.223 By contrast, Steiner focuses on elements in >primitive< life which
could transform >modern< forms of control and power. Thus Steiner argues that

220
»Doch sind es nicht die Harpunen mit Kugelgelenken, [...] die uns solchen Respekt
einflößen, sondern Anpassungsvorgänge. Wer kann in jenen Winternächten, deren
Schneestürme alles bedecken, Häuser bauen? Die Eskimos bauen Häuschen aus
Schnee, und siehe da, im Schnee wohnt sichs warm.« Steiner, Über den Prozeß der
Zivilisierung (p. 81, note 1), p. 214. My translation.
221
Rolf Wiggershaus: Die Frankfurter Schule. Geschichte, theoretische Entwicklung,
politische Bedeutung. München: Deutscher Taschenbuch-Verlag 1988 (dtv; 4484.
dtv-Wissenschaft), p. 373.
222
Ibid.
223
Adorno / Horkheimer, Dialektik der Aufklärung (p. 55, note 162), p. 50-87.
5. An Oriental Undermines Orientalism 143

the mind of the >savage< does not have any qualms about sleeping in snow, and
living happily in snow houses. He calls this psychological readiness for living
with, rather than opposing the cycles of nature, an achievement that is the more
striking as it is absent in >modern< Western societies.
According to Steiner, the Eskimos' ways of adapting to nature appear to be
arbitrary to the European, but in fact they are far from arbitrary. They make
this impression, because the Eskimos do not have a systematic science; how-
ever, this lack of scientific paradigms does not indicate that there is no ration-
ale behind the >primitive< way of life:
the Eskimos have no scientific system out of which specialized disciplines could be de-
rived of which one might be shipbuilding and another snow-house construction. This
explains why the achievements of the Eskimos seem to us accidental. But they are not.
Rather, they presuppose a rational, albeit always empirical, research approach. [...] So
we would have on the one hand an unsystematic empiricism and on the other a system
and a theory.224
Steiner defines the >prhnitive's< manner of adapting to nature as rational em-
piricism. »Unsystematische Empirie« is a form of research far more appealing
to a >modern< philosophical sensibility than systematicism. Nietzsche and the
philosophers who walked in his footsteps (i. e. Barthes, Derrida, Foucault) are
highly suspicious of a systematic way of thinking. By calling >primitive< inves-
tigations unsystematic empiricism, Steiner ironically argues that the Eskimos
are more >modern<, more philosophically sensitive than the >moderns<. Nietz-
sche urges that intellectual inquiries should always stand in the interest of life:
science, therefore, has to become empirical; it has to find out what kind of
issues concern the empirical needs of man. In Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der
Historic für das Leben, Nietzsche argues that scholarly investigations should
not find their fulfilment in the recognition of facts or truths alone, but in mak-
ing life more livable for humanity.225
So far we have seen how Steiner contrasts the rational empiricism of the >un-
civilized< with the systematic mind of the >civilized<. From this position he laun-
ches his attack against >modern< Europe. According to Steiner, the systematic
control of nature extends boundaries that have formerly been drawn to ward off
dangers. He defines society by the boundaries which it constructs in order to
externalize danger and, therefore, power: »Eine Gesellschaft grenzt an Gefahr.«

224
»[...] die Eskimo haben keine systematische Wissenschaft, aus der sich angewandte
Wissenschaften ableiten, von denen ein Zweig der Schiffbau, ein anderer der Schnee-
hausbau wäre. Daher wirken diese Eskimo-Errungenschaften auf uns zufallig. Sie
sind es aber nicht, sie setzen ein rationales (allerdings immer bloß empirisches) For-
schungsverfahren voraus. [...] So hätten wir auf der einen Seite unsystematische Em-
pirie, auf der anderen Systematik und Theorie.« Steiner, Über den Prozeß der Zivili-
sierung (p. 81, note 1), p. 214. My translation.
225
For Nietzsche's discussion of scholarship see Nietzsche, Kritische Studienausgabe
(p. 120, note 138), p. 271-278.
144 Part : Franz Baermann Steiner - Anthropology and Totalitarian Terror

(»A society borders on danger.«)226 Mary Douglas has commented on the con-
struction of boundaries in a section entitled »Physical Nature Assigned to
Classes and Held to Them by Rules« in which she also reprinted an excerpt of
Taboo under the title »The Head«. Douglas interprets Steiner's thought on the
concept of taboo as follows: »the [...] assessment and drawing of boundaries
proceeds through the whole social process. Physical nature is masticated and
driven through the cognitive meshes to satisfy social demands for clarity [,..].«227
While adapting himself to nature, the >primitive< also adapts to the dangers in
nature, but does so by establishing taboos, which should keep man out of reach
from any form of risk.
Boundaries have been established so as to ensure a way of life that is free
from danger and, therefore, free from power. During the process of civiliza-
tion, however, power and danger penetrate society:
The process is one of gradually expanding the boundaries of society. The transformation
wrought by these expansions are changes on which everything else depends. Nothing
more telling about the process of civilization than to equate it with this expansion.228
Steiner equates the process of civilization with the act of pushing the bounda-
ries of society outside into a range of danger. This displacement of boundaries
changes the shape of society as a whole in several ways. First of all, by intro-
ducing danger into the human community, man gathers material strength. In
order to control danger spots in nature, he has to get in contact with specific
dangers. Secondly, this contact with the dangerous paves the way for its intro-
jection into man's mind. Thus, in controlling danger, the >European< transfers
it to himself and becomes a source of danger. Thirdly, having incorporated
danger, the >civilized< world becomes more powerful than the >uncivilized<,
but also more dangerous, more destructive. In >modern< society the maximum
of danger can be found (»[...] das Maximum der Gefahr [liegt] innerhalb der
Gesellschaft« - »the lion's share of danger lies within society«).229
Steiner regards modern warfare and concentration camps as strong evidence
for the accuracy of his depiction of civilization. Whereas >primitive< man had
to fear dangers outside society, >civilized< society itself generates danger, more
powerful than that created by nature:

226
Steiner, Über den Prozeß der Zivilisierung (p. 81, note l), p. 216. My translation.
227
Mary Douglas (Ed.): Rules and Meanings. The Anthropology of Everyday Know-
ledge. Selected Readings. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books 1977 (Penguin Modern
Sociology Readings), p. 113.
228
»Im Verlaufe eines Prozesses werden die Grenzen der Gesellschaft immer weiter hin-
ausgeschoben. Die Veränderungen dieser Verschiebung sind jene Änderungen, von
denen alles andere abhängt. Und wir können nichts Genaueres über den Prozeß der
Zivilisierung aussagen als wenn wir ihn mit jener Verschiebung gleichsetzen.« Stei-
ner, Über den Prozeß der Zivilisierung (p. 81, note 1), p. 217. My translation.
229
Ibid., p. 217.
5. An Oriental Undermines Orientalism 145

Never will I forget how comfortable and funny a thunderstorm looked which I recently
experienced after a bomb raid, how childishly touching these powers appeared of
which mankind had been afraid for the last thousand years. [...] The demonic sphere
is within society. Would anyone who has been in a concentration camp believe rapa-
cious animals are more terrible than human tormentors? And this agony is new: this
trapping of human masses in closely knit nets, this construction of gigantic cages
past which »healthy« life floats.230
Steiner compares the strength of power in nature's dangerous phenomena (like
lightning) to the power of danger which man himself exerts in >civilized< soci-
ety (»Bombenangriff« and »Konzentrationslager«). By controlling nature civi-
lization has not diminished violence; on the contrary, it has increased brutality,
and as civilization progresses, danger has gathered in strength too. Steiner uses
the word »Qual«, thus implying that it is not only physical, but also psycho-
logical and metaphysical suffering (in the sense of anguish) that concentration
camps inflict upon their victims and those who hear about the horror of the
universe concentrationnaire. He creates the neologism »Riesenkäfig« so as to
come to terms with the indescribable terror of the Holocaust. Similarly, the
image of closely knit nets for the capturing of »human masses« indicates Stei-
ner's helplessness while being confronted with the unnaturalness of the Nazi
genocide. Moreover, »Riesenkäfig« has kafkaesque connotations: one is re-
minded of the »Riesenmaulwurf« (giant mole) in »Der Dorfschullehrer« (»The
Village-School-Teacher«), or of the father in »Das Urteil« (»The Judgment«)
who becomes »ein Riese« (»a giant«).
Whereas Elias foresees the progress of civilization as leading towards a
harmonious balance between individual desires and social duties, Steiner per-
ceives a future grimmer even than that of concentration camps. Concentration
camps show that society itself has become dangerous, yet the civilising process
reaches its perfection only when each individual is capable of exerting the
power that now only society as a whole can unleash on »outsiders«:
What had in past ages been outside society, what was later on inside society, will at
one time be, when society will have triumphed, inside the individual. This is the
process. The process of civilization is the conquest of man through the powers of na-
ture, through demons. It is the march of danger into the heart of creation.231

230
»Nie werde ich vergessen, wie gemütlich und komisch sich ein Gewitter ausnahm,
das ich kurz nach einem Bombenangriff erlebte, wie kindlich rührend jene Kräfte
wirkten, vor denen die Menschheit jahrtausendelang gezittert! [...] Der dämonische
Bereich ist innerhalb der Gesellschaft. Wird jemand, der in einem Konzentrations-
lager gewesen ist, glauben, reißende Tiere seien ärger als die menschlichen Peiniger?
Und diese Qual ist neu: dieses Fangen von Menschenmassen in dichtmaschigen Net-
zen, dieses Bauen von Riesenkäfigen, an denen das >gesunde< Leben vorbeiflutet.«
Ibid., p. 218. My translation.
231
»Was früher außerhalb der Gesellschaft, was später innerhalb der Gesellschaft war,
wird einst, wenn diese Gesellschaft triumphiert, innerhalb der Individuen sein. Dies
ist der Prozeß. Der Zivilisierungsprozeß ist die Eroberung des Menschen durch die
146 Part : Franz Baermann Steiner - Anthropology and Totalitarian Terror

Here Steiner develops a pessimistic variant of the Dreischritt der Geschichte

(as described by Joachim of Fiore, Hegel, Marx or indeed Norbert Elias).232
Steiner sees a tripartite process unfolding that begins with a >primitive< society
which, by heeding taboos, avoids danger and, therefore, the cultivation of
power. This process then envelops the >civilized< society which controls dan-
ger and thereby becomes a source of danger to itself. Steiner sees the catastro-
phic end of this process in a future age which will have given birth to the >civi-
lized< individual who will be capable of producing the full force of potential
destruction before which society could only have been created by a united
effort. At that time man will have fully introjected the danger and power of
nature which was a taboo for the >primitives<. Steiner's term for this introjecti-
on of nature's dangers into the psyche of man is »Eroberung« (»conquest« -
»Der Zivilisationsprozeß ist die Eroberung des Menschen durch die Naturkräf-
te«). »Eroberung« invokes Steiner's lyrical cycle Eroberungen. Here, how-
ever, the term differs strikingly in meaning from the one used in the poem
where the individual erobert the infinite variety of human life (the task of the
anthropologist!), by sacrificing memory, and a sense of possessions (including
the possession of a birthplace as the only homeland). »Eroberung« in the lyri-
cal cycle is always an activity, but here man is conquered by danger, rather
than conquering a position from which he could liberate himself or herself
from the encounter with dangerous situations.
Where could Steiner have found inspiration for this theory of introjection?
A likely source is Freud's theory of the introjection of feelings of guilt that
eventuate in the foundation of a moral conscience. Freud propounds this theory
in Totem and Taboo, a book whose psychological insights as opposed to its
sociological discoveries, Steiner praises in Taboo. In this study, Freud argues
that the brothers who kill their father in the Urszene internalize feelings of
guilt with which the murdered one now haunts them.233 While the father was
still alive, the psyche of his sons was not open to obey him; having killed him,
however, feelings of guilt force the brothers to internalize all the commands
that their father has laid down for them while being »amongst the living«.
According to Freud, the mind is open to sundry sorts of influences and it needs
the right psychological circumstances for moral commandments to be »verin-
nerlicht« (internalized or introjected). As with Freud, Steiner conceives of the
soul as a precarious entity, always open to outside stimuli.
This image of the human psyche as being exposed to various external influ-
ences Steiner might also have found in Johannes Pedersen's Israel. Its Life and

Naturkräfte, die Dämonen. Es ist der Marsch der Gefahr ins Herz der Schöpfung.«
Steiner, Über den Prozeß der Zivilisierung (p. 81, note 1), p. 219. My translation.
232
For an account of the secularised version of a messianic view of human history see
Jacob Taubes: Abendländische Eschatologie. Bern: Francke 1947 (Beiträge zur So-
ziologie und Sozialphilosophie; 3).
233
For Freud's account of the brothers who kill their father see Freud, Kulturtheore-
tische Schriften (p. 61, note 193), p. 427.
5. An Oriental Undermines Orientalism 147

Culture - a book that is in the bibliography of Taboo. Pedersen argues that the
Hebrews perceived everything external, however small it might be, as capable
of influencing the interior of man:
[...] there is a decisive difference between what is outside and what is inside the
soul. That which is received into the soul must influence the character of the whole,
just as, in its turn, it takes its character from the given stamp of totality. He who
writes truth and faithfulness on the table of his heart (Prov. 3,7) lets these forces en-
ter into his soul and determine its direction.234

Pedersen depicts the psychology developed by the Hebrews as based on a theory

of introjection: the psyche, or heart, appears as recipient of whatever outside
stimuli. Taboo, or the law is a psychological necessity for those who would like
to see their heart untainted by danger or power.
The process of civilization, so Steiner argues, erases taboos that kept man at a
distance from dangerous influences. As part of his »working-through« approach
to the Holocaust, Steiner gives a blueprint of social behavior that might trans-
form the empirical reality of the present. The civilising process can be reversed
or stopped through the reintroduction of taboos, through the establishment of a
society in which boundaries are not expanded but limited, through a society in
which these boundaries are respected as ethical values. Having given vent to his
sense of despair, Steiner closes his essays by offering alternatives:

Who ever realizes this [that civilization is the march of danger into the heart of crea-
tion] lives in a night of despair. It is only lightened up by one guiding star, the star of
a dual teaching:
of man who is created in His image
of society whose boundaries are immutably set within the community.235

Here Steiner unites sociology with theology in arguing that man can only liberate
himself from a >modern< civilization that has betrayed its destructive potential,
by reminding himself of a super-human, divine authority - he who created man
in His image. Together with this monition of a divine authority goes a plea for a
society that has unalterable boundaries, a society in which taboos that guard
against danger are unanimously accepted as ethical, normative limits. The ex-
pressions »Stern« and »Bund« indicate that Steiner has the society of Israel in his
mind: »Stern« invokes the star of David, and »Bund« harks back to the covenant
of the Hebrews. »Bund« has indeed connotations of the Hebrew covenant be-
tween God and his people: forming a »Bund«, making an alliance, presupposes

234
Johannes Pedersen: Israel. Its Life and Culture. Trans, by Aslaug Miller. London:
Humphrey Milford 1926, p. 106.
235
»Wer dies erkennt [daß der Zivilisierungsprozeß der Marsch der Gefahr ins Herz der
Schöpfung ist], lebt in einer Nacht der Verzweiflung. Die erhellt nur ein einziger Stern,
der Stern einer Doppellehre: vom Menschen, der in Seinem Ebenbilde geschaffen, von
der Gesellschaft, deren Grenzen im Bund unverrückbar festgelegt sind.« Steiner, Über
den Prozeß der Zivilisierung (p. 81, note 1), p. 219. My translation.
148 Part H: Franz Baermann Steiner - Anthropology and Totalitarian Terror

some form of covenant to which all members of the society have subscribed. In
this way »Bund« - alluding to both alliance and covenant - also invokes the idea
of the law, ofthat which is laid down as a limit, as a rule, as a taboo.
In another aphorism Steiner outlines two ways of life, reinforcing the con-
trast between the bleak reality of present >civilization< and the possibility of a
less violent society as described in »Über den Prozeß der Zivilisierung«. Stei-
ner takes up an old dichotomy: that of the Jew and Roman. According to
Steiner, Rome represents Western ways of thinking, and Israel those of non-
Western communities. The Jews were the only people who unitedly resisted
the invasion of Romans in words and deeds (»Das einzige Volk, das als ganzes
Volk, mit seinem Denken, und mit Waffen den Römern Widerstand leistete,
war das der Juden« - »The Jews were the only people, which unitedly, with its
thoughts and weapons, resisted the Romans«).236 Steiner hopes that the Jews
will rebuild the Temple which the Romans destroyed:
European power raises its head on the ruins of the temple. As long as this power lasts, the
Jews will be hated. As long as this power lasts the temple cannot rise up into existence.
Now the reign of violence approaches its end. All over the world, it is easy for Europe to
give in. However, the Europeans want to prevent the resurrection of the temple.237
This aphorism was written in 1946, shortly before the founding of the state
of Israel. Steiner here depicts a spiritual battle between two ways of life -
Rome's way of life and that of Jerusalem. Rome and the West, however,
exert violence, whereas the Jews as the representatives of the East (»Ver-
treter Asiens«),238 by advocating taboo behavior, show the way out of the
tragedy engendered by the internalization of power and danger (»Nun also
geht der Gewalt Herrschaft zu Ende«). The Temple functions as a chiliastic
symbol for a society that respects ethical limits, that can restrict itself to a
contact with things other than danger and power. As in a palimpsest, one can
read in and beneath the lines of Steiner's anthropological writings: beneath
his comparison between >modern< and >premoderm, between >primitive< and
>civilized<, lies the confrontation of Israel with Rome; the conflict of the
chosen people with the prototype of imperial power. Steiner only alludes to
this series of contrasts in his strictly scholarly, scientific texts. In his literary
or aphoristic works, however, he fully drops the mask of the >impartial< sci-
entist. It is against the background of the Holocaust that Steiner felt this
impartiality to be ethically non-acceptable. The civilization he lived in was
too dangerous to be left uncriticized.

236
Ibid., p. 222. My translation.
237
»Auf den Ruinen des Tempels erhebt sich die europäische Macht. Solange sie dauert,
werden die Juden verhaßt sein. Solange sie dauert, kann der Tempel nicht erstehen.
Nun also geht der Gewalt Herrschaft zu Ende. Überall fällt es Europa leicht nach-
zugeben. Doch das Wiedererstehen des Tempels wollen die Europäer verhindern.«
Ibid., p. 223. My translation.
238
Ibid.
Part III: Style, Law and Danger

Elias Canetti's and Franz Baermann Steiner's Notion of

Literature as Scholarship

History is amoral: events occurred. But me-

mory is moral; what we consciously remem-
ber is what our conscience remembers.1

As we have seen in chapter 1, Canetti doubts the validity of literature as a

response to the Holocaust. I have discussed how this approach is also peculiar
to Canetti's friend Hermann Broch. Here the similarities between Steiner's
treatment of scholarly issues and his understanding of poetry as not opposed to
the epistemological process of theoretical disciplines such as philosophy, an-
thropology, and theology, but rather as being at one with them, will be further
examined. We have already seen how the issue of literary presentation plays a
central role for transforming knowledge into a >sting< with which the anthro-
pologist Canetti sought to influence the social practice of his readership. The
representation of violence by means of the citation of empirical data from
quotidian life depicts fascism as a contemporary phenomenon. In doing so,
Canetti hopes to shock the reader into a transformation of social behavior. In
chapter 3., I have shown how in Crowds and Power Canetti sought to convince
his audience of the objective truth of his writing through short, factual sen-
tences. He tried stylistically to implicate the reader by means of what I have
called a »rhetoric of immediacy«. This is achieved by a »thinking in images«,
by the absence of any discussion of theories, by the use of unconditional ex-
pressions and by Canetti's grounding of his own theory in physical features
that are common to all humanity. Ethnographic examples, in particular, have
the authority of >real life<. Another way of attempting to convince the reader of
the objective character of what is put forth in Crowds and Power consists in
employing a laconic way of writing in which laws are subtly established.
While using this highly impersonal mode of expression, Canetti still implicates
the reader by constantly switching from the scientific to the emotive thus
drawing the reader closer into his discourse. In chapter 3.1 we have also seen
how Canetti's technique of rhetorical defamiliarization sought to unsettle the
naturalization or normativity of the culturally constructed. This feature figures
1
Michaels, Fugitive Pieces (p. 9, note 1), p. 138.
150 Part HI: Style, Law and Danger

most significantly in the image of faeces: faeces show what we have killed, pre-
senting the proof of violence immanent in everyday life. In this context I have
discussed the satirical strategy of defamiliarization: this trope makes the reader
feel restless so that he or she has the impetus to change aspects in society which
an ethical and religious sensibility detests. Thus the ethical concern of Canetti's
scholarship can only be practized thanks to the employment of literary devices.
Here lies the moot point of Canetti's hybridization of anthropology and litera-
ture: the anthropologist who transcends the irresponsibility of positivism also
becomes a writer. In chapter 2, I have shown how the satirical treatment of the
positivist Peter Kien helps to understand Canetti's scholarly as well as literary
agenda in Crowds and Power. Kien's irresponsibility resides in the refusal to
engage in social critique and a theory of culture. The writer, on the other hand,
who composes fictions that are true only in a non-factual sense disclaims any
responsibility in a way similar to that of the positivist scholar. »The disclaimer«,
writes Peter Mack, »is therefore an attempt to deny the responsibility for what
she [Terry McMillan] has written, and reflects an anxiety by writers in English
all the way back to Chaucer«.2 By contrast, Canetti's insistence on the factuality
of his subject matter underlines his claim to responsibility. If one argues, as
Northrop Frye has done, that in literature »questions of fact or truth are subordi-
nated to the primary literary aim of producing a structure of words for its own
sake«,3 then Crowds and Power is certainly not a work of literature. However,
there are undoubtedly strong literary elements in this philosophical essay, and,
most importantly, without taking account of these elements an attempt at under-
standing Crowds and Power is bound to failure. Crowds and Power offers there-
fore a strong case for the hybridization of academic disciplines and it poses a
warning to academic compartmentalization which Frye sometimes seems to
advocate.4 A sociologist who works on Crowds and Power and, as recommen-
ded by Frye,5 exclusively examines it with purely sociological concerns without

Peter Mack: Thou art not he or she. Authors' Disclaimers and Attitudes to Fiction.
In: Times Literary Supplement, 15 December 1995, p. 12-13, p. 13.
Northrop Frye: Anatomy of Criticism. Four Essays. Harmondsworth: Penguin 1990,
p. 74. Frye's emphasis on the entertaining aspect of literature also disqualifies
Crowds and Power for an inclusion into the rubric of >literature<: »In literature, what
entertains is prior to what instructs, or, as we may say, the reality-principle is subor-
dinated to the pleasure-principle.« Ibid., p. 75.
The question of ethics plays a vital part in a defence of hybridization. Thus LaCapra
refers to »intellectual and sociopolitical grounds«: »I would even argue that in cul-
ture one >begins< with the hybrid and that >pure< genres or disciplines are the result
of exclusionary procedures that are suspect on both intellectual and sociopolitical
grounds.« Dominick LaCapra: History, Politics, and the Novel. Ithaca: Cornell Uni-
versity Press 1987, p. 6.
»The critic may want to know something of the social sciences, but there can be no
such thing as, for instance, a sociological >approach< to literature. There is no reason
why a sociologist should not work exclusively on literary material, but if he does he
should pay no attention to literary values.« Frye, Anatomy of Criticism (p. 150,
note 3), p. 12.
6. Canetti 's and Steiner 's Notion of Literature as Scholarship 151

paying attention to »literary values«, is likely to read it as the work of an intellec-

tual who has succumbed to resignation or even as that of a cynic. As we saw in
part I, many critics have succumbed precisely to that trap.
Canetti employs literature not for the construction of a fictitious world, but
for achieving an impact on the behavior of his readers in factual everyday
practice. This means that his literary techniques are constitutive of his acting-
out approach to the Holocaust, as has been discussed in chapter 3.1. It has
recently been pointed out that faced with the Holocaust, writers in general try
to efface the fictionality of their writings.6 This will be pertinent to a discus-
sion of Steiner's poem »Gebet im Garten«. Here differences between La-
Capra's account of »acting-out« in relation to Claude Lanzmann's film Shoah
and the »acting-out« performed in Crowds and Power need to be delineated.
While it is true to say that Lanzmann's film and Canetti's book both try to
avoid any impression of fictionality and that this insistence on factuality only
makes possible the shock of »acting-out« trauma, of re-enliving it,7 Canetti's
»acting-out«, in the final analysis, cannot be distinguished from a »working-
through«. For Canetti's »acting-out« of trauma is not so much reincarnated, as
presented as still being present in the everyday life of the reader. Throughout
part I, I have shown how this representation of everyday life, that is to say, of
what has been accepted as >normality<, needs to be seen against the back-
ground of the Nazi genocide, which was the main impetus for writing Crowds
and Power. Whereas Lanzmann relives history in his film, Canetti represents
the contemporary in terms of the past Nazi genocide: Canetti perceives the
pleasure of survival, the will to kill as much life as possible, and a modern

Lang writes as follows about this attempt at abolishing fictionality in literary treat-
ments of the Holocaust: »It is as though the writers here are impatient with history
for not being >historical< enough; they thus intend by their >fiction< to fill out the his-
torical record - but for the sake of history, not of fiction.« Lang, Act and Idea in the
Nazi Genocide (p. 112, note 114), p. 134. Young argues that literary and historical
truths are part of the same epistemological process: »Instead of isolating events from
their representations, this approach recognizes that literary and historical truths of
the Holocaust may not be entirely separable. That is, the truths of the Holocaust -
both the factual and interpretive - can no longer be said to lie beyond our under-
standing, but must now be seen to inhere in the way we understand, interpret, and
write its history.« James E. Young: Writing and Rewriting the Holocaust. Narrative
and the Consequences of Interpretation. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1988,
p. 1. For a general discussion of >history< and >literature< see Hayden White: Tropics
of Discourse. Essays in Cultural Criticism. 2nd Print. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity Press 1985, and Dominick LaCapra: History and Criticism. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press 1985, as well as the work of Kenneth Burke.
»One difficulty in discussing Shoah as a >fiction of the real< is that in it survivors
both play and are themselves. Any boundary between art and life collapses at the
point trauma is relived, for when the survivor breaks down, the frame distinguishing
art from life also breaks down and reality erupts on stage or film.« LaCapra, Lanz-
mann's Shoah (p. 18, note 33), p. 266.
152 Part HI: Style, Law and Danger

worship of power that consists in seeing one's immortality rise in direct pro-
portion to the increase in corpses, embodied in the cultural constructs which
surround his readers (skyscrapers, for example) and in the body-language
which his readers unquestionably adopt. This representation of the >normal< as
the psychopathic should result in a metamorphosis of social practice. At the
end of chapter 3.5, I drew attention to the doubts which the late Canetti har-
bored about the possibility of such a transforming effect via a shocking depic-
tion of humanity. These doubts, however, only emphasize Canetti's concern
with a response to the Nazi genocide that transforms contemporary social
practices and it is precisely such transformative potential with which LaCapra
characterizes his advocated »working-through« response to the Holocaust.8
We have seen in chapter 1.2, that the responses of the critics often confirm the
calling into question by the late Canetti of the Shockwaves which pass through
Crowds and Power. There can, however, be no doubt that the intention behind
Canetti's philosophical essays needs to be described in terms of metamorpho-
sis, of a transformation of social practice. This, as has been shown in chapter
3.2, has not been overlooked by more sensitive readers like Durs Grünbein.
Indeed, it is not very surprising in a thinker who has appreciated and analyzed
the concept of metamorphosis in general as a way of robbing death of its sting.
A transformation of violent ways of behavior in contemporary society helps to
prevent the emergence of traumatic situations. As has been shown here and in
chapter 3.1, this was the driving force behind Canetti's work on Crowds and
Power in the thirties up to its publication in 1960. Thus, in relation to Crowds
and Power, the binary opposition between »acting-out« and »working-through«
dissolves if, as has been argued in chapter 3.1, »acting-out« is understood as a
provocation for a »working-through«. Canetti employs, as we have seen, liter-
ary devices in order to shock, and thus to precipitate the later respective stages
of »acting-out« and »working-through«. Consequently Canetti does not sepa-
rate >pure< scholarship dissociated from social concerns and >pure< literature
which distances itself from issues of responsibility through disclaimers of
factuality. As has been discussed in chapter 1.3, many critics have been misled
by a focus on Crowds and Power as a work of scholarship alone. It has been
shown here that Crowds and Power is neither a work of >pure< scholarship nor
a work of >pure< literature. Its insistence on factuality removes Crowds and
Power from Frye's definition of literature; at the same time its structure is
»ironic« and therefore qualifies for Frye's definition of the »literary«: »The
literary structure is ironic because >what it says< is always different in kind or
degree from >what it means<«.9 This is true precisely of a »discursive« work
like Crowds and Power, and readers who have exclusively interpreted it as

8
LaCapra, Representing the Holocaust (p. 21, note 43), p. 201.
9
Frye goes on to attempt a description of the »discursive« as follows: »In discursive
writing what is said tends to approximate, ideally to become identified with, what is
meant.« Frye, Anatomy of Criticism (p. 150, note 3), p. 81.
6. Canetti 's and Steiner· 's Notion of Literature as Scholarship 153

such have failed to understand it at a level other than that of face-value. Ca-
netti, however, engages in an ironic, literary discourse when he writes about
the pleasures of killing and survival. As has been discussed in chapter 1.1,
Canetti's ironic use of an ontology of violence marks Crowds and Power off
from a glorification of power and violence.
The employment of literary techniques does not mean that Canetti abandons
his claim to produce scholarship. Instead, his work implies a non-positivist
definition of scholarship as a precondition for his self-understanding as a poet
(see chapter 2). I shall show below that Steiner's scholarly project as an anthro-
pologist coincides with the epistemological and ethical project of his poetry.
First, however, I shall discuss correlations between Steiner's and Canetti's
rejection of a positivist notion of scholarship. As we have seen in chapter 5.3,
Steiner clearly differentiates between a literary and a more scholarly mode of
writing: in his lecture on >taboo< he often adopts masks, while in his aphorisitic
essay on the process of civilization he makes clear his allegiances. However,
the lecturer at the Institute of Social Anthropology at Oxford makes his own
personal views clear enough, so as to be able to have an impact on the ethical
disposition of his audience. Steiner's academic methods therefore serve to per-
suade the reader of the factual accuracy on which the arguments of his dis-
course are built. In this way academic method in Steiner's scholarship fulfils
the function of what I have called a »rhetoric of discovery« in Canetti's Crowds
and Power: both attempt to convince the reader of the factual pertinence of
what is being discussed. Steiner's and Canetti's different scholarly methods
meet as far as ethics are concerned.
In what sense does Canetti's critique of positivism affect Steiner's under-
standing as a professional scholar? As has been discussed in chapter 1.1, Canetti
defines standard scholarship as a »religion of killing« (»Religion des Tötens«).10
Does this not amount to an attack on Steiner's professional interests? If one
realizes that Steiner employs standard scholarly procedures only to undermine a
positivistic notion of scholarship the apparent gap between the free lance writer
Canetti and the university lecturer Steiner vanishes. Indeed, Canetti's critique of
standard scholarship describes precisely what Steiner illustrates with concrete
examples in his anthropological work. He shows that scholarship as an end in
itself- Canetti's »Selbstzweck«11 - is far removed from the innocence of >objec-
tive< research. Anthropologists and philosophers who, as we have seen in chapter
5.1, attribute a slavish character to non-Western peoples indeed serve the inter-
ests of power - as Canetti claims in his aphoristic critique12 - by justifying the
Western colonization of the world. Power uses death as its weapon, a theme
10
Canetti, Aufzeichnungen 1942-1985 (p. 4, note 13), p. 36.
11
Ibid.
12
»So ist Wissen wirklich Macht, aber rasend gewordene und schamlos angebetete
Macht; ihre Anbeter begnügen sich mit Haaren oder Schuppen von ihr; wenn sie nichts
anderes ergattern können, mit den Abdrücken ihrer schweren künstlichen Füße.«
Ibid., p. 36.
154 Part HI: Style, Law and Danger

which, as has been discussed in chapter 3.4, is central to Crowds and Power.
Scholarship which serves the interests of power, as analyzed by Steiner in his
anthropological writings, thus becomes a religion of killing. Such scholarship
enjoys the worship of all those who have a vital interest in a justification for
oppression. As an end in itself, scholarship is in fact nothing but a secularized
religion, which sacrifices life to death for the sake of knowledge and power.
In an aphorism written in 1943 Canetti touches upon Aristotle's justification
of slavery, precisely at the time at which Steiner was working on a scholarly
critique of the Greek philosopher. Canetti voices his alienation vis ä vis Aristo-
tle, which Steiner shares but expresses in a strictly scholarly style, as follows:13
An anxious feeling of strangeness while reading Aristotle. During the first book of the
Politics, which defends slavery in every way, one feels as though one were reading the
Witches' Hammer. A different air, a different climate, and an entirely different order.
The dependency of science on Aristotle's systems, even now, becomes a nightmare
when getting to know the »antiquated« part of his opinions, which cany those others,
the ones still valid today. It could very well be that the same Aristotle, whose authority
was to blame for the stagnation of the mediaeval knowledge of nature, had an equally
disastrous effect as soon as his authority was broken.14

Here Canetti links Aristotle's justification of slavery to the influence of the

Greek philosopher on the self-understanding of modern science. Steiner, as we
have seen in chapter 5.1, sets out to prove this by scholarly procedures in his
thesis on forms of slavery. Like Canetti, Steiner deduces from Aristotle a spe-
cific modern, Western way of thinking, namely, the superiority of the West over
the non-Western world which is declared to be scientifically proven. Canetti
alludes to Steiner's critique of Aristotle when he chooses the justification of
slavery as the point of departure of his alienation with the Greek philosopher.
Canetti, however, emphasizes another point, which originates in his critique of
Aristotle:15

13
»Beklemmendes Gefühl der Fremdheit beim Lesen des Aristoteles. Während des
ersten Buches der Politik, in dem er die Sklaverei auf alle Weise verteidigt, ist einem
zumute, als lese man im Hexenhammer. Andere Luft, anderes Klima, und eine ganz
andere Ordnung. Die Abhängigkeit der Wissenschaft von den Ordnungen des Ari-
stoteles, bis auf unsere Tage, wird einem zum Alpdruck, wenn man den >veralteten<
Teil seiner Meinungen kennenlernt, die jene anderen, heute noch gültigen, tragen. Es
könnte sehr wohl sein, daß derselbe Aritoteles, dessen Autorität an der Stagnation
des mittelalterlichen Naturwissens Schuld hatte, sobald seine Autorität einmal ge-
brochen war, auf eine neue Weise unheilvoll weiterwirkte.« Ibid., p. 48.
14
Canetti, The Human Province (p. 7, note 21), p. 30-31.
15
»Das Nebeneinander des modernen Wissenschaftsbetriebs, das kalt Technische
daran, die Spezialisiertheit der Wissenschaftszweige, hat auffallend viel Aristoteli-
sches an sich. Die besondere Art seines Ehrgeizes hat die Anlage unserer Universitä-
ten bestimmt; dem einen Aristoteles entspricht eine ganze moderne Universität. Das
Forschen als Selbstzweck, wie er es betreibt, ist nicht wirklich objektiv. Es bedeutet
dem Forscher nur, sich von allem, was er unternimmt, ja nicht hinreißen zu lassen.
6. Canetti 's and Steinet· 's Notion of Literature as Scholarship 155

The coexistence in modern scientific activity, the cold technology, the specialization
of disciplines are quite Aristotelian. The special manner of his ambition has deter-
mined the structure of our universities; a whole modern university corresponds to
that one of Aristotle. Research as an end in itself, ä la Aristotle, is not really objec-
tive. It merely tells the researcher not to let himself be carried away by anything he
undertakes. It excludes human enthusiasm and metamorphosis.16

Steiner unmasks the >objectivity< of Aristotelian science as Western ideology.

Canetti traces the Aristotelian specialization of fields of knowledge back to a
utilitarian hostility to man's capacity for both enthusiasm and for undergoing
metamorphoses. In his Munich speech »The Writer's Profession« (»Der Beruf
des Dichters«), Canetti characterizes specialization as the opposite of meta-
morphosis. >Metamorphosis< is the most important concept with which Canetti
critiques modernity. In »Der Beruf des Dichters« he examines the economic
interests attached to a modern interdiction against metamorphosis: metamor-
phosis is banished from contemporary society, because the former counteracts
the general purpose of production.17 In a similar manner Steiner analyzes the
specialization of fields of knowledge exclusively from the perspective of a
capitalist economic system. Steiner contests the thesis that the autonomy of the
disciplines (»Verselbständigung der Disziplinen«) originates in an urge toward
perfection (»Vervollkommnung«). Schooled in Marxist analysis, which per-
ceives cultural phenomena as grounded in economics, Steiner interprets the
specialization of the sciences as part of a capitalist way of thinking:18
The commercial is one essential aspect of contemporary processes of learning. To
teach means to sell knowledge. And not only, as one believes, the teacher is sub-
jected to economic laws, but also the fields of learning are in a most repulsive man-
ner determined by supply and demand, or have adapted themselves to the general
condition which consists in the determination of supply and demand. [...] Thus we
poor and clever intellectuals sit here, enclose small fields of knowledge in clear
definitions, piously believe to act in the spirit of science and what we achieve is the
marketable selection of the most precious in an all-encompassing warehouse ...

Es schließt Begeisterung und Verwandlung des Menschen aus.« Canetti, Aufzeich-

nungen 1942-1985 (p. 4, note 13), p. 48.
16
Canetti, The Human Province (p. 7, note 21), p. 31.
17
»[...] weil sie dem Allzweck der Produktion entgegenwirkt.« Canetti, Das Gewissen
der Worte (p. 25, note 57), p. 285.
18
»Ein wesentlicher Aspekt der zeitgenössischen Lehrvorgänge ist der kommerzielle.
Lehren heißt, ein Wissen verkaufen und nicht nur der Unterrichtende unterliegt, wie
man glaubt, ökonomischen Gesetzen, sondern auch die Wissensgebiete sind aufs ab-
scheulichste von Angebot und Nachfrage bestimmt, oder haben sich an den allgemeinen
Zustand angepaßt, der in der Bedingtheit alles Käuflichen von Angebot und Nachfrage
besteht. [...] So sitzen wir armen, klugen Intellektuellen da, hegen kleine Wissensge-
biete in deutliche Definitionen ein, glauben fromm, aus dem Geist der Wissenschaft
heraus zu handeln - und was wir erreichen, ist die verkaufsgerechte Assortierung des
Edelsten in dem alles umfassenden Warenhaus ...« Franz Baermann Steiner: Feststel-
lungen und Versuche. Aufzeichnungen über Gesellschaft, Macht, Geschichte und ver-
wandte Themen. In: Akzente 1995, p. 213-227, p. 226. My translation.
156 Part HI: Style, Law and Danger

Deviating from most forms of Marxism, Steiner analyzes the superstructure

(science) as part of the economic basis in which it operates. As a result the
upper part cannot be separated from the lower parts: according to Steiner,
intellectuals who criticize a society formed by processes of commodification,
are themselves parts and also beneficiaries of such a system.
As has been mentioned before, in contrast to Canetti, Steiner belonged to
the academic system throughout his adult life - first as a student and then as a
lecturer. He faced this system without any illusions. How could he justify to
himself his academic undertakings? As has been discussed in part II, Steiner's
purely anthropological works do not violate scientific specialization; on the
contrary, they impress the reader with the meticulousness of the research of
particular areas of investigation. As we have seen in chapter 5.2, Steiner quotes
his opponents and examines their arguments by means of a comparison of the
data available about a specific subject, while Canetti only presents his own
theory as >empirical facts<. Yet while Steiner works with the methods of the
Western academic system, he undermines from within the substance of what
has been put forth by this same system, the very superstructure which justifies
Western forms of military and political colonialism.
Such criticism of Western oppression vis ä vis non-Western peoples cannot
be found in Canetti's Crowds and Power. The representation of the >modern<
as the >primitive< is part of Canetti's strategy of defamiliarization. At this point
Crowds and Power has much in common with Adorno and Horkheimer's
Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944). For Canetti represents the >modern< as an
intensification of the >primitive<, whereas Steiner sets out to demonstrate how
social scientists, clinging to an evolutionist concept which, of course, Canetti,
Adorno and Horkheimer do not share, fail to understand the workings of cer-
tain rituals and taboos. Rituals such as taboos are dismissed in Dialectic of
Enlightenment as the oppression of the individual by the collective (»Unter-
drückung durch ein Kollektiv«).19 As has been shown in chapter 3.4, Canetti
interprets >primitive< customs as bodying forth the will to kill. While it is
wrong to say that Adorno and Horkheimer's as well as Canetti's approaches
eventuate in an »acting-out« of trauma, their refusal to see transformative
elements in premodern forms of life might diminish the potential of transfor-
mation that an analysis of such forms could set free. By contrast, Steiner ap-
preciates rituals and a sociology of danger in premodern communities in both
his literary and his strictly anthropological writings. In chapter 2, I have ana-
lyzed Canetti's treatment of the sociological topics in his novel Auto Da Fe.
Steiner's poetry further develops his anthropological work, as I shall discuss in
the following section.

19
Adorno / Horkheimer, Dialektik der Aufklärung (p. 55, note 162), p. 28.
7. Coincidences Between Steiner 's Anthropology and Poetry 157

7 Coincidences Between Steiner's Anthropology and Poetry

After the previous discussion of correlations between Steiner's and Canetti's

criticism of a positivist notion of scholarship, I shall now proceed to show how
Steiner's poetry thematizes the concerns of the professional anthropologist. I
shall begin with an examination of both a sociology of danger in poems which
were to be published under the heading of »Dangers« (»Gefahren«) in an edition
of Steiner's poetry20 and a concomitant critique of the process of naming as well
as an identification of the poetic voice with the other of the >savage< in the lyrical
cycle Conquest (Eroberungen). We shall see that Steiner's sociology of language
is closely connected to his sociology of danger.21 I shall close with Steiner's
understanding of poetry as a quest for truth in relation to the Nazi genocide.
Comparable to Canetti who, as we have seen in chapter 2, illustrates the phe-
nomena of the crowd and of power in his novel Auto Da Fe, Steiner thematizes
elements of his anthropological research in his poetry. More importantly, in his
poetry Steiner treats Canetti's theory of power as the ability to put people to
death in the context of his own analysis of danger as power. A short aphorism
from 1947 gives evidence that Steiner accepts and reflects upon Canetti's theory
of the dependence of power on crowds (Masse): the ruler wants to be assured of
his power over a multitude of lives who can all be sacrificed for an affirmation of
his survival. Steiner etymologically examines this interpenetration of crowd and
power: »In the Irish dialect one says power for crowd - an immediate insight.«
(»Im irischen Dialekt sagt man Macht »power«, für Menge - eine unmittelbare
Einsicht.«)22 The connotations of the Irish notion »power« embrace the whole
gamut of Canetti's theory of the crowd. In the section which was to be entitled
»Dangers« (»Gefahren«) Steiner added a poem that exactly thematizes Canetti's
theory of power as the ability of putting people to death. In this context he ap-
pears to be working on a sociology of danger, comparable to that developed in
Steiner's aphoristic essay »Über den Prozeß der Zivilisierung« and his anthropo-
logical book Taboo. Indeed, Canetti's concern with death is, according to what
one might describe as Steinerian terminology, a concern with danger as power,
and power as danger. As we have seen throughout part I, Canetti complains

20
Canetti recommended such an edition to the Weismann Verlag, which published the
first German post-war edition of Die Blendung. Steiner called the selection of his po-
etry In Babylons Nischen. When proofs of the book came out, the Weissmann Verlag
went bankrupt. Steiner died shortly afterwards in 1952. Since then a representative col-
lection of Steiner's has been awaiting publication. For a quotation of Canetti's letter in
which he recommends Steiner's poetry to Rudolf Härtung (the >Lektor< of the Weis-
mann Verlag), see: Broch, Canetti, Jahnn. Willi Weissmann und sein Verlag 1946-1954.
Mit einer Bibliographie der Verlagsproduktion. Bearbeitet von Jochen Meyer. Mar-
bach a. N.: Deutsche Schillergesellschaft 1985 (Marbacher Magazin; 33), p. 34.
21
In 1952 Steiner together with Louis Dumont gave a seminar on »The Sociology of
Language«.
22
Franz Baermann Steiner: Aus dem Nachlaß. In: Merkur 8 (1954), p. 34—41, p. 37.
15 8 Part III: Style, Law and Danger

about those who investigate the workings of power without paying attention to
the phenomenon of death.23
Power, Canetti argues, can only be exerted by threatening a crowd of people
with death. The ruler, in turn, feels assured of his power, if he reminds himself
of the number of people who have or will die for his sake. In the poem »Nach
der Wüstenschlacht« (1947) - which would have been placed in the group of
poems dealing with danger - Steiner pursues this power-death thematic:

Das Schicksal ist gesiebt durch die gelegenheiten,

Lose sind ausgeteilt, und überleben
Steckt in der münder trockensten, keiner
Mißgönnt dem tod sein großes reich.

Destiny passes through the sieve of opportunity,

Tickets are distributed and survival
sticks to the driest of mouths, no-one
Grudges death its great empire.24

After battle, the sense of power of those who have survived increases. War cor-
rupts man. The survivor goes on living a perverted life: instead of water and
bread, the sheer pleasure of having survived the death of others offers nutrition
(»überleben / Steckt in der münder trockensten«). The will to kill and the wish to
see lives turned to death is recorded here in the context of perversion. As we saw
in chapter 3.1, Canetti depicts this subject matter in a shocking manner, as if it
were >normal<, or, to put it differently, he describes the history of >health<, and of
>normality< as pathology.25 This making pathological of the >normal< is compa-
rable to Canetti's strategies of defamiliarization (see chapter 3.1). A sense of
outrage at such behavior, at such perversion of human attitudes, vibrates in Stei-
ner's poem. The enjambement of no-one (»keiner«) at the end of the third line
emphasizes this sense of outrage: not a single person can be found who does not
pay homage to the power of death, who does not take pleasure in the workings of
its power.
The poem »Nach der Wüstenschlacht« illustrates that Steiner incorporates
Canetti's theory of death as power into a sociology of danger. As we have seen
in chapter 5.2, Steiner equates danger with power. This does not contradict
Canetti's theory of power: after all, the threat of death is a threat of danger.

23
For an aphorism in which Canetti voices this complaint see Canetti, Aufzeichnungen
1942-1985 (p. 4, note 13), p. 492.
24
Franz Baermann Steiner: Unruhe ohne Uhr. Ausgewählte Gedichte aus dem Nachlaß.
Mit einem Nachwort von H. G. Adler. Heidelberg: Lambert Schneider 1954 (Veröf-
fentlichungen der Deutschen Akademie für Sprache und Dichtung Darmstadt; 3). My
translation.
25
Canetti characterizes everything that leads into the direction of killing as enjoying
the highest esteem in society in general. Canetti, Masse und Macht I (p. 4, note 13),
p. 243.
7. Coincidences Between Steiner 's Anthropology and Poetry 159

Steiner, however, elaborates Canetti's theory and attempts a sociology of danger

in which all situations which endanger life are examined. Rituals of avoidance
such as taboos are ways in which societies can guard themselves against those
threats. In his poems Steiner advocates taboos and the keeping of limits which
banish any form of violence and any attempt at human self-aggrandizement. In
the poem »Kenez im Nebel« (1947) which, like »Nach der Wüstenschlacht« was
to be included in a section entitled »Gefahren«, the inseparability of a >religious<
sphere and a sociology of danger comes to the fore. As we have seen in chapter
5.3, Steiner bases his theory of danger on a recognition of the conditio humana.
After the fall, life on this earth and at this time can never be free from danger.
Limits to what the members of a society may wish to do, need to be embedded in
a social awareness of human liminality, in rituals that are enacted repeatedly. In
»Kenez im Nebel«, a poem which is based on a story narrated by Philo the elder,
Steiner demonstrates the result of an erasure of both religious and social-ethical
limits. The Zebulonians do not believe any more in the validity of status handed
down by tradition; they turn inquisitive, they turn into scientists26 and want to
find out whether holiness is holy (»erkunden / ob das heiligtum heilig sei«):

Mit Unreinheit prüfend, mit sudelnden proben

Versehrten wir das heilige, doch taten wir erheischtes [...]

With impurity examining, with scrawling proofs

we damaged holiness, but we did what was desired [...]27

This poem describes the socio-political results of the abolition of premodem

religious ways of life. After having defiled holiness, the Zebulonians eat their
own offspring:

[...] und wir wollten fleisch unserer kinder verzehren,

Kauend erkunden, ob der herr sie umsorgt.
Denn wir sind von Sebulon,
Einem stamm, der nicht leicht alles glaubt [...]

[...] and we wanted to eat the flesh of our children,

to find out in the process of chewing whether the Lord cares for them.
Because we are from Zebulon,
A tribe who does not easily believe everything [...]28

Steiner perceives an opposition between magic and religion: magical rituals

are not obligatory, they are optional and without social value, whereas reli-
gious rituals acquaint the individual with society's actual values via social ac-
26
Recently, Calasso has argued that liminality contradicts the foundation of experi-
mental research. See Roberto Calasso: The Ruin of Kasch. Transl. by William Wea-
ver and Stephen Sartarelli. Manchester: Carcanet 1994, p. 136.
27
Steiner, Unruhe ohne Uhr (p. 158, note 24), p. 10. My translation.
28
Ibid. My translation.
160 Part III: Style, Law and Danger

tion.29 Thus religion manifests itself in socially obligatory rituals by means of

which power becomes circumscribed and excluded from society. The loss of
trust in socially obligatory laws causes the gradual elimination of inhibitions
which may well be part of instinctive reactions - like the disgust with the shed-
ding of blood.30 The Zebulonians, as they themselves confess, do what their
desire tells them to do: they follow their drives, their libidinal cravings which
transgress all inhibitions. In contrast to Freud, Steiner does not put fear and inhi-
bition down to the neurotic-and-compulsive; inhibitions, after all, control com-
pulsions, and libidinal cravings. In a short aphorism from 1948, he argues that in
contemporary society the most >primitive< human right - namely the right to be
fearful - is constantly threatened; and in an aphorism from 1947 Steiner doubts
whether a modern Odysseus could have convinced his comrades not to eat the
fruits of the Lotus-tree, since such warnings would have been dismissed as >neu-
rotic<.31 In another aphorism from 1950 he interprets the reply the Eskimos of
the northwestern Hudson Bay gave to the anthropologist Rasmussen when asked
after their beliefs. The Eskimos replied that they believe nothing but are only
afraid, and most afraid of their god Inbay. Steiner was astonished that Western
scholars intepreted this reply as a proof of the >primitive< condition of the Eski-
mos rather than realising that a modem erasure of fear and inhibition is rebuked
here in a most subtle manner by a member of a >retarded< community:
When Rasmussen, the Eskimo researcher, asked a native from the area of north-
western Hudson Bay: »Tell me something about your religion. What do you believe
in?« the Eskimo replied: »We don't believe anything, we simply fear, and above all
we fear... (name of god).« This is cited by more or less learned scholars as proof of
primitivism. Nobody notices that the Eskimo dealt the inquirer a splendid rebuke!32
In his theological aphorisms on Judaism, Steiner argues for the inseparability of
the love and the fear of God. The God of the Hebrew Bible does not arbitrarily
exert violence, but measures punishment with mercy.33 This balance between
justice (din) and mercy (rachamim) has to be part of man's relationship to God.
Finally justice becomes a work of God's love, just as fear and love enter an in-
separable union in the human response to the divine. Man is capable of turning
29
For Steiner's diagram of this opposition between magic and religion see Nachlaß
Franz Baermann Steiner, Deutsches Literaturarchiv Marbach a. N.
30
In a similar manner Zygmunt Bauman has recently argued that morality needs to be
grounded in a social code of behaviour. Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust
(p. 128, note 172).
31
Most of Steiner's aphorisms are still unpublished.
32
Steiner, Orientpolitik, Value, and Civilisation (p. 82, note 5), p. 244.
33
For a discussion of God's balance between strict judgement and mercy in the ac-
counts of the Kabbalah see Gershom Scholem: Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism.
New York: Schocken Books 1961, p. 237. See also Jacob Taubes: Die Politische
Theologie des Paulus. Vorträge, gehalten an der Forschungsstätte der Evangelischen
Studiengemeinschaft in Heidelberg, 2S.-27. Februar 1987. Nach Tonbandaufzeich-
nungen redigierte Fassung von Aleida Assmann. München: Fink 1993, p. 45.
7. Coincidences Between Steiner 's Anthropology and Poetry 161

into a demon if he does not obey the divine commandments revealed to Moses at
Sinai. In a fallen world full of dangers there needs to be fear, as a warning signal
which emotionally guards against the contact with threats to life. Another poem
- which was also going to be included in a section entitled »Dangers« - focuses
on this aspect of the necessity of warning signals. »Die Warner« (»Those who
warn«) describes the approach of caravans towards a spot of danger. We read of
a body covered by scourges. This alludes to the law against contact with lepers
in Leviticus and Numbers. The poetic voice of the poem consists in utterances of
those who try to warn the caravan of an approaching encounter with danger. We
are not told whether these warnings are thrown into the wind or whether they are
met by fearful reaction which results in avoidance-behavior. The poem closes in
a characterization of danger as being both known and unknown:

Denn das schwarze gesicht, das sich ruckweise hebt aus den binsen,
Ist bekannt und unbekannt, bekannt und unbekannt [...]

For the dark face, that rises in jerks from the rushes
Is both known and unknown, known and unknown [...]34

The characterization of danger as hovering between the state of being both

familiar and indefinite emphasizes its uncanny nature, which is meant to in-
spire fear as well as ensuing behavior of avoidance, rather than hybristic confi-
dence which might eventuate in a desire for an encounter with something
which poses a threat to life.
The centrality of the theme of danger in Steiner's poetry is not only exem-
plified by the fact that the poet wants to dedicate a whole section of an edition
of his poetry to this theme; danger also features in other poems and most con-
spicuously in »Leda«. In contrast to his predecessors (Spencer, Yeats and
Rilke), Steiner embeds the Leda myth into the social setting of a village envi-
ronment. Having been raped by Zeus, Leda returns to her village, where her
parents ask her whether she has seen the glory of the gods (»der götter weiße
pracht«). With Leda the white (»weiß«) that her parents attribute to the divine
transforms itself into darkness (»dunkel«):

Da rief sie aus: »ich war im dunkel, ja!

Ich wund vor dunkel! nehmt den schleim von mir,
Was ich nicht sah, soll nimmer mehr geschehen.
Ihr einzigen, o wascht mich wieder rein!«

There she called out: »I was in the dark, yes!

I am wounded by the dark! take the slime from me,
What I did not see, shall never happen anymore.
You only ones, oh purify me!«35

34
Steiner, Unruhe ohne Uhr (p. 158, note 24), p. 11. My translation.
35
Ibid., p. 47. My translation.
162 Part III: Style, Law and Danger

Instead of purifying her, Leda's contact with the god has vilified her (»schleim«).
The powerful touch of the god is dark (»dunkel«). As in »Die Warner« danger is
characterized as being undefmable, imperceptible: Leda says that she could not
see what was done to her (»Was ich nicht sah«). The divine has the attributes of
power (»wilden flügeln«, »peitschte den schäum hoch, riesensäulen stäubend«)
and the neologism »riesensäulen« that Steiner created to describe the effect of
Zeus' forceful movements underlines the ineffable, non-describable nature of
danger. Ironically, Leda's parents are pagans and have no acquaintance with the
law in the Hebrew Bible that guards against the pronunciation of the name of
God or any form of physical contact with the divine (Moses has to hide his face,
when he receives the commandments.)36 In their ignorance, Leda's parents do
not know that the divine should be tabooed, that it should be avoided on account
of its danger and power. In a witty move, Steiner turns Leda into a kind of Greek
Moses who lays down the inhibition against an approximation to the dangerous
and powerful: Leda thus establishes a taboo when she says that her action should
never be repeated (»soll nimmer mehr geschehen«). She wants her personal ex-
perience to be perceived as a warning to the whole of the community. As we saw
in chapter 5.2, Steiner unfolds his theory of danger, power and avoidance in
Taboo and in »Über den Prozeß der Zivilisierung«, but a connection between
power and danger is also established in his poem on Leda.
This raises the question of the function of anthropological thought in Steiner's
poetry. As we saw in chapter 3.1, in Crowds and Power Canetti thinks in terms
of images. Steiner's purely anthropological work, on the other hand, consists
more in abstract arguments. Poetry offers Steiner the opportunity to develop his
thought with concrete examples. As has been alluded to in chapter 4.4, Steiner
also develops the central binary opposition which governs evolutionist anthropo-
logical thought in his poem »Elefantenfang«. The poem is itself the result of
detailed sociological studies of elephants. Steiner took notes from Otto Stein's
Elefantenjagd im alten Indien, and from E. Hart's Picturesque Burma. These
notes report how human captors manage first to allure male elephants through
the enticement of females, how the wild elephants are in this way led to a place
from which escape is impossible and how finally the captors crawl beneath the
elephant cows and entice them to attack their wild male companions.37 In this
way the malicious enticement by the human hunters makes the female elephants
into murderers of their own species where their usual behavior is characterized
as benign and supportive.38 In Steiner's poem, however, the elephants kill their
36
For discussion of the »danger inherent in God's power« as far as the laws of Leviti-
cus are concerned, see David Damrosh: Leviticus. In: Robert Alter / Frank Kermode
(Ed.): The Literary Guide to the Bible. London: Fontana 1987, p. 66-77, p. 70.
37
Steiner's notes from this book are kept in the Deutsche Literaturarchiv in Marbach.
38
Alverdes refers to these characterizations in Social Life in the Animal World - a
book that was in Steiner's library - when he writes: »According to Burger (p. 225),
the instinct to help a sick companion is stronger in elephants than in any other spe-
cies of animal [...].« See Friedrich Alverdes: Social Life in the Animal World. Lon-
don: Kegan, Trench, Trubner 1927, p. 134.
7. Coincidences Between Steiner's Anthropology and Poetry 163

companions with enjoyment (»Strafte mit Lust«), Following Hart and Stein,
Steiner divides elephants into two categories. However, whereas Hart and Stein
contrast »females« with »males«, Steiner establishes a binary opposition be-
tween the tame ones (»zahme tiere«), and the wild (»Wildlinge«). Ironically, the
wild ones fall victim to the violence of the tame. The expression »Wildlinge« is
closely associated with the term »die Wilden«, the German equivalent for the
>savages<. Grimm's Deutsches Wörterbuch defines »Wildling« as a >»savage< in
the true sense« (»Ein wilder Mensch [...] ein >wilder< im eigentlichen Sinn.«),
giving as an example North American savages (»Indianische Wildlinge«). If
»Wildlinge«, as Grimm confirms, refers to the »wilden«, to the »savages«, then
»the tamed animals« resemble the >civilized<, that is to say, people living in the
modern >civilized< world who have allegedly >tamed< their sexual and aggressive
drives. But in Steiner's poem, the >civilized< irrationally slaughter the >savages<,
who are hungry. The tame and well-fed elephants are incensed to fury by the
otherness of the wild ones:

Erbarmungslos der wohlgenährten hass

Dem waldgeruch galt, dem fernherkommen:
Strafte mit Lust.

Fat bodies' hatred, without pity aimed

Against the jungle smell and foreign kind,
Wreaked glad revenge.39

Strikingly, Steiner leaves out the captors who entice the female elephants to
attack their male companions as narrated in the anthropological sources. The
absence of a third party focuses the attention on the binary opposition between
>tame< and >wild<. One might note that Steiner anticipates here a deconstructive
methodology; he illustrates the way in which language perpetrates violence. Der-
rida has drawn attention to how, in the hands of the Nazis, language itself turns
into a murderous instrument.40 In Steiner's poem, the >wild< animals are killed
exclusively on account of the signification of which they are the carriers. The
denotation of »otherness« (»fernherkommen«) provokes murder: the »Wildlinge«
are seen as coming from afar, they smell of the forest (»Waldgeruch«), of the
uncivilized and it is exactly this air of strangeness that causes the hatred of the
»zahmen tiere«. In calling the »zahmen« »wohlgenährt« (»well-fed«) Steiner
emphasizes the irrationality of such a killing. The tame animals do not murder
their companions out of hunger; rather it is hatred and anger at the denotation of

39
Modern German Poetry 1919-1960. An Anthology with Verse Translations. Ed. and
with an Introduction by Michael Hamburger and Christopher Middleton. London:
MacGibbon & Kee 1962, p. 275. This translation is by Middleton.
40
For his discussion of the Nazi attempt to erase the name of otherness, see Jacques
Derrida: Force of Law. The Mystical Foundation of Authority. Trans, by Mary Quaint-
ance. In: Drucilla Cornell / Michel Rosenfeld / David Gray Carlson (Ed.): Deconstruc-
tion and the Possibility of Justice. London: Routledge 1992, p. 3-67, p. 59-60.
164 Part III: Style, Law and Danger

»otherness« which paves the way to brutality. Steiner's poem »Elefanten-

fang« offers a comment on the anthropological discussion about >savages<.
Steiner originally wanted to write his Oxford D. Phil about the sociology of
elephants, but Radcliffe-Brown dissuaded him. Since Steiner regarded the
thesis on slavery as a »sacrifice« for surviving in England while European
Jewry were murdered on the continent, one could read »Elefantenfang« as a
sociology of persecution, and as such it is closely linked to Steiner's »Com-
parative Study of Forms of Slavery«. It seems likely that Steiner developed
or at least reinforced a »deconstructive« methodology as a response to the
anti-Semitic scapegoating of Nazi Germany. Critical theorists like Geoffrey
Hartman and Robert Young indeed perceive both a deconstructive question-
ing of binary oppositions and a critique of Eurocentric assumptions as a
response to the Nazi genocide.41 In the following chapter and in the conclu-
sion to this essay, I shall develop my argument opened in chapter 5.3, ac-
cording to which Steiner affirms the necessity of limits. This affirmation and
a belief in the differences between premodern and modern forms of life offer
a sharp contrast to some postmodernist assumptions of non-difference and
indifference. One can also note Gillian Rose's argument that a postmodernist
refusal of law results in a failure to act mercifully, despite merciful inten-
tions.42 The centrality of law in Steiner's thought provides a contrast to a-
social postmodernist tendencies. Here, however, I shall focus on Steiner's
deconstructive methodology which features in his poetry, most of all in a
theoretical manner in his lyrical cycle Eroberungen. Steiner's deconstructive
critique of binary oppositions dramatizes his concern not to confuse limits to
the self-empowering or self-aggrandizement of man, that is to say, with the
establishment of geographical, nationalist boundaries.
Steiner's critique of nationalist boundaries unfolds within an examination of
language. He questions the process of >naming< as well as the construction of
nationhood in Eroberungen, which is a metaphysical autobiography.43 As an
autobiographical poem, Eroberungen harks back to Wordsworth's Prelude and
shares with the latter a deep interest in an investigation of the nature and the

41
Hartman writes: »With respect to guilt there are many that question not only the
treatment of immigrants but our entire history of behavior toward the other - the
stranger in our gates or the conquered and colonized. Our confidence in the West, in
its claim to be civilized, is shaken.« Geoffrey Hartman: Introduction. In: Holocaust
Remembrance (p. 18, note 33), p. 1-22, p. 17. In a similar manner Young writes:
»What has been new in the years since the second World War during which for the
most part, the decolonisation of the European empires has taken place, has been the
accompanying attempt to decolonize European thought and the forms of its history
as well. It thus marks that fundamental shift and cultural crisis currently character-
ized as postmodernism.« Young, White Mythologies (p. 107, note 97), p. 119.
42
Rose, Judaism & Modernity (p. 50, note 146), p. 6.
43
In an unpublished letter of 5 April 1948 to the critic Rudolf Härtung, Steiner charac-
terizes Eroberungen as a metaphysical, autobiographical poem.
7. Coincidences Between Steiner 's A nthropology and Poetry 165

workings of memory. As we saw in chapter 4.2, Steiner pleads for a sacrifice of

the memories of the poet. In an unpublished letter of 14 March 1952 addressed
to the critic Rudolf Härtung, Steiner describes the intention of Eroberungen as a
generalizing investigation into selfhood, and characterizes as its central themes
an approval of the principle of repetition and the demand of a sacrifice of mem-
ory. This sacrifice consists in handing the poet's memory over to the reader, so
that the experience saved in the act of memorizing can be repeated in a non-
identical manner. The title of the poem is therefore ironic: the whole poem un-
dermines the concept of »conquests«, arguing for an enactment of the idea of gift
and of sacrifice instead. The very narrative of the poetic cycle illustrates the
practice of giving and sacrificing. As has been seen in chapter 4.2, the poet's
sacrifice resides in the destruction of his memories as far as >memory< as a per-
sonal possession is concerned. At the same time, memory, though lost to the
poet, survives in the life of all those readers to whom it has been given. In their
lives, some of the experiences might live on that have been the possession of the
poet. Steiner defines both gift and sacrifice as the destruction of usefulness to the
owner.44 Here one could, for example, bring in Derrida who has recently drawn
attention to the affinity between sacrifice and gift.45 As we shall see in the con-
clusion to this essay, in contrast to Steiner, Derrida rejects a notion of the gift as
involving reciprocity. The narrative of Eroberungen demonstrates that the de-
struction of the usefulness of the object to the one who passes it on might not
lead to non-existence. Indeed, repetition saves the objects that have become lost
to their owner from annihilation. Through repetition, sacrifice becomes a gift.
Sacrifice as gift, and gift as sacrifice prevents what John Milbank has recently
described as a »unilateral expenditure of the self without return«.46
The poet of Eroberungen who sacrifices his memories so that they may sur-
vive as a gift in the experiences of his readers, questions the very process by
which a fluidity of selfhoods, which only allows for such mutual giving and
taking, becomes rigidified. Steiner blames language for such processes of rigidi-
fication. In contrast to Derrida, who makes the spoken word responsible for
authoritarianism only to celebrate >writing< as a sphere of pure play, one might
note that Steiner indicts the process of naming as such for human guilt. Names
establish national boundaries, concepts of friend and enemy and as such they are
responsible for the violence exerted in wars and genocides. According to Steiner,
children are free from guilt on account of their ignorance of >names<:

44
In the unpublished collection of many aphoristic essays »Anmerkungen über Gebet
& Opfer« (1946) Steiner discusses, amongst other things, this point.
45
Derrida discusses sacrifice and gift in the The Gift of Death. Trans, by David Wills.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1995 (Religion and Postmodernism). In Given
Time (I.: Counterfeit Money. Trans, by Peggy Kamuf. Chicago: University of Chica-
go Press 1992) Derrida argues that gift-giving is only possible through the forgetting
that the gift is a gift.
46
Milbank, Stories of Sacrifice (p. 37, note 98), p. 15-^16, p. 42.
166 Part HI: Style, Law and Danger

Heimat, heimat des herzens ...

Die verwobene schuld
Ist im Leben die heimat auf der wir wachsen.
Die kinder sind heimatlos.
[...]
Sie die sich noch nicht gehören, die staunenden:
[...]
In ihrer weit ist nicht fremde von heimat geschieden [...]

Home, home of the heart...

the intricated guilt
is in life the home in which we grow up.
Children are homeless.
[...]
They do not own themselves, the amazed ones:
[...]
foreign parts are not separated from the home in their world [...]47

Here we see how the concept of permanent ownership, which the act of both
sacrifice and gift implicitly discards, plays a central role in scapegoating mecha-
nisms that are inseparable from the perpetration of violence. Only on account of
>naming< are friend-enemy oppositions possible. Thus, Steiner's critical reflec-
tions on linguistic procedures in Eroberungen shows that the language involved
in the location of danger within the context of avoidance behavior should not be
confused with the establishment of nationalistic spheres of power. Steiner con-
trasts the home of the heart with the notion of »home« as a geographical and
national place of birth. In Steiner, »heart« symbolizes all that man experiences,
be it bodily or spiritually.48 The individual in a premodern community collects in
his or her heart taboos and other rituals which delineate the avoidance of specific
dangers and powers. »The home of the heart« therefore describes the way of life
that the child acquires in following the directions concerning limits to certain
forms of action performed in community rituals.
Thus, Steiner, although addressing political concerns, argues against a certain
type of politics. If, in The Concept of the Political (1932), Carl Schmitt defines
the political as the struggle between two camps, or the confrontation between
friend and enemy, then Steiner's thought opposes politics - the Schmittian and
sometimes Nietzschean glorification of power as such - with a theology that tries
to limit the range of danger which man can unleash in his bid for omnipotence.49
Whereas Schmitt theologizes politics, Steiner politicizes theology. In the former,

47
Steiner, Eroberungen (p. 42, note 118), p. 24. My translation.
48
In an unpublished aphorism (1947) Steiner describes the heart in the Jewish tradition
as a bodily at-oneness with human existence. Steiner denies that the heart symbol-
ises the physical; rather it stands as a symbol for all the experience through which
man becomes aware of the condition of his or her being.
49
For a discussion of Schmitt's definition of politics see Julien Freund: Schmitt's Po-
litical Thought. In: Telos 102 (1995), p. 11-42, p. 14.
7. Coincidences Between Steiner's Anthropology and Poetry 167

theology provides the struggles of political life with a metaphysical justification:

after the fall, man must of necessity perpetrate violence, otherwise peace would
create a paradisal condition which would be blasphemous. If one argues, follow-
ing Jacob Taubes, that Schmitt conceives of secularization as »satanic«, this begs
the question of what this kind of »saeculum« stands for.50 Is it not a word strate-
gically used in order to bedevil a state of peace which would make redemption
possible? The brutality of political life, the ongoing struggle between friend and
enemy would be absurd, if theology did not invest violence and war with mean-
ing.51 In this way, theology serves politics. In contrast to Schmitt, Steiner's the-
ology stands in a Jewish tradition which prescribes the saving of life as one of
the highest, if not the highest value. Jacob Milgrom's analysis of Jewish Law has
in fact affirmed Steiner's theory of taboo as a way of saving life:
Thus it [P's blood prohibition in Genesis] declares its fundamental premise that hu-
man beings can curb their violent nature through ritual means, specifically, a dietary
discipline that will necessarily drive home the point that all life (nepes), shared also
by animals, is inviolable.52

Steiner's thought is too religious - too aware of the imperfection of life on this
earth as not to be in need of a relation to a transcendence - to perceive, as
Schmitt does, the possibility of an everlasting peace achieved by an immanent,
human decision to abolish binary oppositions. Steiner's critique of a home-
foreign antagonism within >naming< has to do with a sociology of danger deep-
ly rooted in Steiner's Judaism: man is bound by divine commandments to save
life endangered in a postlapsarian world. Schmitt, who was attracted to Na-
zism, on the other hand, fails to link his theology to Biblical thought.53
In Warum Auschwitz? (Why Auschwitz?) the historian Gunnar Heinsohn ar-
gues that the Nazi genocide against the Jews was an attempt to destroy Jewish
ethics which has at its centre the rejection of the shedding of blood.54 The
killing of seventy thousand two hundred and seventythree physically and men-

50
For Taubes' discussion of Schmitt's critique of secularization see Taubes, Die Poli-
tische Theologie des Paulus (p. 160, note 33), p. 86-97.
51
Heinrich Meier has described the relation of theology to politics in Schmitt's
thought as follows: »In the end, politics needs theology not to realize a goal but to
provide a foundation for its own necessity«. See H. Meier (Ed.): Carl Schmitt & Leo
Strauss. The Hidden Dialogue. Including Strauss's notes on Schmitt's concept of the
political and three letters from Strauss to Schmitt. Trans, by J. Harvey Lomax. Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press 1995, p. 55.
52
Jacob Milgrom: Studies in the Cultic Theology and Terminology. Leiden: Brill 1983
(Studies in Judaism in Late Antiquity; 36), p. 47-48.
53
For a discussion of Schmitt's failure to link his theology to Biblical writings see
Wolfgang Palaver: Schmitt's Critique of Liberalism. In: Telos 102 (1995), p. 43-71,
p. 66-67.
54
For a discussion of the attempt by the Nazi to root out Jewish ethics see Gunnar
Heinsohn: Warum Auschwitz? Hitlers Plan und die Ratlosigkeit der Nachwelt. Rein-
bek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt 1995 (rororo; 13626. rororo aktuell), p. 18.
168 Part III: Style, Law and Danger

tally handicapped people - which preceded the Nazi genocide - as well as the
murder of both three million and three hundred thousand Soviet and the mur-
der of seven million and five hundred thousand Polish, Ukrainian and White-
Russian prisoners of war, gives evidence of the Nazis' will to root out »unwor-
thy life«.55 Steiner's sociology of danger constitutes a strong affirmation of the
rituals laid down in the Hebrew Bible. He shows how non-Jewish premodern
societies enacted rituals which helped to save life precisely through the avoid-
ance of danger and unrestricted power. From a theological perspective Stei-
ner's unscholarly conflation of the Jewish with the >primitive< - in the sense of
premodern - and the >Oriental< is justified: after all, the Biblical scholar Jacob
Milgrom has shown that the P strand in Genesis obliges the whole of humanity
- not only the Jews - to the strict keeping of taboos against endangering life on
earth.56 Steiner's critique of language, which turns the qualitative into the quan-
titative, like his sociology of danger, needs to be seen against the background
of a Jewish prohibition against murder. In Eroberungen, Steiner contrasts the
holistic and >nameless< perception of the child with an adult world in which
binary opposition emerges as a result of a split between signifier and signified:

Damals durchpulste das herz die einheit der bilder,

Leben vom leben waren hände wie tor,
Gesichter der menschen wie züge der berge,
[...]
Hatten alle das einzige Schicksal der weit,
Einmal geschaut, waren alle bilder
Schon verbunden und vom selben herzen gespeist.
Dann doch aus bildern entschälte sich jäh das Sondergeschick,
Bilder von dingen fielen,
Dinge beharrlich wurden,
Meßbar und fremd, auf vergleiche und ablaufbezogen.
Mit geduldigen blicken rührte das kind an die heile weit,
Aber sie warfen ihm einen namen zu
Und ein kleineres deckt er von jähr zu jähr.

At that time the unity of images pulsed through the heart

Life from life were hands like a door,
Human faces like traces of mountains,
[...]
They all had the single destiny of the world,
Once seen, all images
55
Ibid., p. 161.
56
»The P strand in Genesis also indicts the human race for its hamas (Gen. 6:11).
Because the Noachide law of Gen. 9 is the legal remedy for hamas, it probably de-
notes murder (as in Ezek. 7:23), though in subsequent usage, especially under pro-
phetic influence, it takes on a wider range of ethical violations. Thus, the blood pro-
hibition proves that P is of the opinion that a universal God imposed a basic ritual
code upon humanity in general.« Milgrom, Studies in the Cultic Theology and Ter-
minology (p. 167, note 52), p. 48.
7. Coincidences Between Steiner 's Anthropology and Poetry 169

Were already connected and fed from the same heart.

Then, however, out of images abruptly peeled itself separated fate
Images fell from things
Images turned static
Measurable and alien, related to comparisons and procedures.
The child touched with patient looks the undamaged world,
But they threw a name at him
And from year to year he covered a smaller piece.57

Steiner contrasts a world, marked by fluidity, metamorphosis, and the absence

of binary oppositions with reification and alienation as the outcome of >nam-
ing<. The process of signification divests the image of a thing from the thing
itself, and shows thing and image to be arbitrary. Thus >naming< alienates the
subject from the surrounding world.58 Things have become dead, measurable
objects without any personal connection to the subject. This state of selfhood is
achieved precisely through a matching between >subjective< image and >objec-
tive< thing. The splitting between the »I« and the world goes hand in hand with
the gap between signified and signifier. Through this rupture between image
and thing, language can be used for violent, dangerous ends.
In terms of Steiner's theology, the transition from childhood to adulthood
reflects the fall. As we have seen in chapter 5.2, Steiner depicts the fallen
world of our conditio humana as marked by danger; the separation performed
in the process of naming, and the manipulation which the arbitrary matching of
image and thing invites, are part of this realm of danger. In a letter of 30 May
1948 to Rudolf Härtung, who criticized the combination of »Zweiung« (»split-
ting«) and »Verzeihung« (forgiveness) in the poem »Taucht ein« (»Delve
Into«), Steiner refers to accounts of separations (hiv' dil) in Genesis 1, which
are not affirmed by a »saw that it was good«. Steiner explains that »Zweiung«
in his poem refers to the principle of separation and to the rift between man
and creator in and through original sin. In a long unpublished essay, Steiner
argues that the love of God can only liberate man from the dangers of splitting
and separation which accentuate the differentiation between good and evil. In
his letter, he argues that the happiness and unhappiness of physical love is only
an echo of a future which is otherwise to be called redemption. These theo-
logical reflections about difference and separation must have been reinforced
by Steiner's reading of Gershom Scholem's Major Trends in Jewish Mysti-
cism. Here Scholem shows how according to Kabbalistic writings, eating from
the tree of knowledge brought about both separation and isolation.59 Salvation
(Tikkun) means the restitution of the world before the fall which is character-
ized by an absence of separation. Language enacts these separations and in a

57
Steiner, Eroberungen (p. 42, note 118), p. 25. My translation.
58
Steiner's critique of alienation was certainly influenced by Georg Simmel's analysis
of a modern split between subject and object.
59
Scholem, Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism (p. 160, note 33), p. 224 and p. 232.
170 Part III: Style, Law and Danger-

long unpublished letter of 25 July 1948 about his poem on the Nazi genocide
»Gebet im Garten« (»Prayer in the Garden«), Steiner speaks of the examina-
tion of words as a religious exercise. Thus, the principle of separation as well
as Steiner's sociology of danger has its roots in theological reflections about
original sin. For it is only in a fallen world, governed by the principle of binary
opposition, that danger exists. According to the Kabbalah, the postlapsarian
condition necessitates prohibitions as a result of the rule of separation, which
gives evidence of the predominance of judgment over the qualities of mercy.60
Before the fall, evil partakes of good, whereas after the fall, however, the
power of evil creates a separate identity.61 Obedience to the law means keep-
ing a distance to these defined entities of danger. Through the law, fallen man
can gradually free him or herself from a postlapsarian condition, reaching out
for a potential union with the creator. As Aharon Agus has put it,
The Law, then is not merely a salvation from the smallness of sinning. It is the Jew's
way of embracing the knowledge of suffering and imperfection, and the intense con-
viction that through him the world can and must be redeemed; and redemption (in-
volving the social-historical axis), not merely salvation (which is personal and ahis-
torical), is possible and necessary.62
The construction of binary oppositions in language, however, generates danger
by enabling a clash between two objects that are set up for violent encounters.
The sign, as a result of its splitting from the thing it denotes, can be used to
perpetrate lies about the world in which we live. Thus language plays a vital
part in the construction of abstract, though reality-targeted, biological and
geographical constructions such as >race< and >nation<. The split between signi-
fier and signified partakes of the themes which a sociology of danger has to
address. As we have seen, in his poetry Steiner illustrates the murderous con-
sequences of >naming<, that is to say, of the arbitrary use of signification so as
to empower the shedding of blood. It is by means of >naming< that the interests
of power and danger are upheld violating the Jewish commandment not to
endanger life.
As an anthropologist, Steiner works for the recognition of the inseparability
of different ways of life and the need not to discriminate against people whom
language denotes as separated or >other<. Indeed, Steiner inserts into Eroberun-
gen a variation on the Robinson Crusoe myth in which he dramatizes his own
experience as an anthropologist. The episode describes the encounter between
a captain who has been bound to the mast of his ship and a foundling from an
island. The foundling narrates from his experiences on this >alien< place:

60
Ibid., p. 178.
61
Ibid., p. 267.
62
Aharon Angus: The Binding of Isaac and Messiah. Law, Martyrdom, and Deliverance
in Early Rabbinic Religiosity. Albany: State University of New York 1988 (SUNY.
Series in Judaica), p. 51.
7. Coincidences Between Steiner 's Anthropology and Poetry 171

Wie er vor langen jähren von schwarzen stürmen

Geschleudert worden auf ein gefurchtetes land
Das dann sein eigen wurde.
Wie er verwuchs mit der wildnis!
»jener gefiederte bäum zum beispiel
Ist ein bewährter freund.
Die tosenden äffen im astwerk lieben wir beide.«

How, a long time ago, he was tossed by black storms

Unto a feared country
Which then became his own.
How he grew one with the wilderness!
»This plummaged tree, for example
Is a worthy friend.
We both love the roaring apes in the branches.«63

Strikingly, Steiner undermines the projection of danger onto a foreign country,

yet again refusing to accept the geographically constructed boundaries of na-
tionhood, or the biologically erected boundaries of >race<. These boundaries
create danger in that they erect further oppositions between man and man.
Steiner has only contempt for philosophies such as Social Darwinism (sub-
scribed to by the Nazis) which made use of biological or geographical >facts<
for the the shaping of a value system. In a short aphorism, Steiner marks off
truth (»Wahrheit«) from the biological.64 It is important to emphasize that
Steiner's writing on limits must not be confused with racial or geographical
limits. Similar to Canetti, Steiner tries to work against death and suffering by
recommending avoidance behavior not for the sake of separating nations or
races, which itself constitutes danger, but in order to set limits upon the de-
structive potential of mankind. In Steiner's anthropological encounter with the
>other<, such separations dissolve: the foundling grows at one with the wilder-
ness. This account of an identification with what seemed to be split apart and
unbridgeable, has a religious impact on the captain, who sighs the words:

[...] ich fuhr nicht vergebens.

Du also machst mich fromm.

[...] I did not sail in vain.

You therefore make me pious.65

An anthropological encounter in which two separated ways of life unite is

driven by a theological concern: the attempt to find a way back to a prelapsar-
63
Steiner, Eroberungen (p. 42, note 118), p. 14. My translation.
64
»In der Erfindung des Begriffes >Wahrheit< steckt viel mehr menschliche Bemühung
als in der aller andren Abstrakta. Es ist der erste völlig un-biologische Begriff, Vor-
aussetzung vieler andrer.« Franz Baermann Steiner: Sprachliche Feststellungen und
Versuche. In: Merkur 10 (1956), p. 966-973, p. 973.
65
Steiner, Eroberungen (p. 42, note 118), p. 14. My translation.
172 Part HI: Style, Law and Danger

ian creaturely existence, in which man is created according to His image. We

have seen in chapter 5.3 that Steiner's »working-through« the Holocaust consists
in a plea for a society in which limits to danger and power are strictly kept as
well as in a reminder of man's creation in the divine image. Every war, every act
of violence removes us further from a creaturely existence. The anthropological
attempt to close violent rifts within humankind affirms the possibility of man
living up to the potential that the creation in His image always leaves open. In
Eroberungen, Steiner appreciates the life of a non-individualist who has aban-
doned hope, the essence of desires that are born out of the separation of the indi-
vidual.66 Here it is important to draw attention to Steiner's regard for the concept
of the Doppelgänger. Indeed, Steiner plays off the concept of a double identity
against the notion of the individual. In its Latin root individual means the small-
est part which is not further divisible. The I of the Doppelgänger, however, al-
lows for the coexistence of two entities in peaceful unity.67 Steiner's »solitary«
(»der einsame«) inhabits a borderland and is double-faced:

O anfang der heimat:

Wie innig sind die keime der schuld
Und jene ersten und breiten unsichem grenzen der fremde,
Wohnliche grenzen, in welche der frühe einsame
Doppelgesichtig sich einbaut.
Er duldet nicht trennung,
Hält hüben und drüben im liebenden äug, solang ers vermag.

O beginning of home:
How inward are the seeds of guilt
And those early unstable borders of strangeness,
Inhabitable borders, in which the early solitary one
Builds himself into, double-faced.
He does not tolerate separation,
Bends his loving eyes on hither and yon as long as he can.68

Steiner's early »solitary« (who moves into adulthood) does not accept the se-
parations which the symbolic system imposes on the created world and, though
he cannot remove the borders which a postlapsarian humanity has established,
he succeeds in dwelling amongst them rather than conniving at the existence of
such geographical separations.
The second World War and the Nazi genocide made Steiner all too aware of
the violence which biological >racial< and geographical >national< boundaries
can exert. In his tripartite poem »Prayer in the Garden«, Steiner reflects upon
66
Steiner's criticism of individualism has interesting relations to Louis Dumont's an-
thropology, but cannot be discussed here.
67
For a discussion of the Doppelgänger as »a key constituent of literary constructions of
selfhood throughout« modem German literature see Andrew Webber: The Doppelgän-
ger. Double Visions in German Literature. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1996, p. 55.
68
Steiner, Eroberungen (p. 42, note 118), p. 25-26. My translation.
7. Coincidences Between Steiner 's Anthropology and Poetry 173

the sinking of the »Struma« on 24 February 1942. The British government

pressed Turkey to force the »Struma«, a ship filled with Jewish refugees, into
the Black Sea where it was sunk. In the presence of the British Navy all pas-
sengers drowned, except for one. The British government spokesman in Jeru-
salem explained later on that the Jewish refugees had no legal right to enter
»Palestine«.69 According to Steiner, the sinking of the Struma embodies the
involvement of the whole of modern Europe in the Holocaust. In a long unpub-
lished letter of 14 March 1952 to Härtung, however, Steiner makes it clear that
the poem should not be read as a political piece of scapegoating that turns the
English into the enemies of the Jews. »Prayer in the Garden« oscillates be-
tween a historical plane and a religious link to past Jewish history (most con-
spicuously featuring Babel as the prototype of an imperial power) by means of
which the poetic voice tries to find comfort. Like Eroberungen, »Prayer in the
Garden« is a complex poem and deserves a detailed study and analysis of the
diverse influences on it, most prominent of which are the Jewish liturgy, G. M.
Hopkins's »The Wreck of the Deutschland«, and Jorge Manrique's »Coplas«.
Here, however, I will focus on one of the central, if not the central theme of
»Prayer in the Garden«, namely the quest for truth.
In chapter 5.3, we saw how Steiner perceives his scholarly anthropological
work as an ethical undertaking. The same holds true for the epistemological
work performed in his poetry and that perhaps most strikingly in »Prayer in the
Garden«. In Taboo, Steiner attaches importance to the examination of actions
that might be dangerous. In this poem, the emergence of truth and the knowledge
of which actions lead to danger are presented as closely connected processes:

O daß die Hoffnung nimmer aufersteh!

O daß sie die Wahrheit erleide!
O daß die Wahrheit trete aus dieser gefahr,
Trete aus jener heimlichkeit
Zu gepriesener stunde.

O would that hope might never rise again!

would that hope might suffer truth!
would that hope [sic! Steiner has truth] from this danger might escape,
Out of this secrecy
At the lauded hour.70

Truth should appear out of danger, so that danger can be seen and located.
Steiner prays for the recognition of the horrors of the Nazi genocide, and his
prayer underlines his belief in the ethical role of cognition. »Gefahr« (»danger«)

69
For a descpription of the events leading up to the sinking of the Struma see Martin Gil-
bert: Endlösung. Die Vertreibung und Vernichtung der Juden. Ein Atlas. Deutsche Erst-
ausgabe Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt 1982 (rororo; 5031. rororo aktuell), p. 88-89.
70
Franz Baermann Steiner: Franz Baermann Steiner. Modem Poetry in Translation. Trans,
by Michael Hamburger. In: Special Issue 2 (1992), p. 81.
174 Part HI: Style, Law and Danger

harks back to the notion of danger in Steiner's anthropological writings on

taboo behavior. Research sheds light on the truth of danger and only through a
recognition of »Wahrheit« can the workings of danger be opposed. Poetry needs
to participate in this research. In this way, it abandons its status as a >fiction<
and moves into the sphere of truth grounded in scholarly investigations. Steiner
generally conceives of poetry as a search for truth. In an unpublished letter of
13 January 1949 to Härtung, Steiner writes that in poetry, recognition of reality
is subordinated to concerns of communicability and associated with this, to
considerations of the expansion of the applicability of specific scholarly find-
ings. Similarly, in an unpublished aphorism of 1949 he marks off science from
art by this principle of communicability and a concomitant expansion of appli-
cability of specific scholarly findings. In chapter 5.2, we have seen that in
Taboo Steiner uses literary devices, like ironic masks, so as to be able to com-
municate his findings to his audience. However, as has been shown in chapter
3.1, Canetti combines the literary and the scholarly to a much greater extent
than Steiner in his purely anthropological works. Instead, Steiner expands the
applicability of his sociology of danger to the subject matter dealt with in his
poetry, thus making his sociological theories more understandable for a greater
non-specialist readership.
Steiner's concern with the epistemology of poetry is most striking in his poem
on the Holocaust. Steiner sets out to abolish all his individual concerns, repeat-
edly mentioning that he is only a part of a greater whole. In the extract quoted
above, hope (»Hoffnung«) has the same negative individualistic connotations as
in Eroberungen. One should note that Hamburger translates »Wahrheit« as
»hope«, thus distorting the sense of the poem.71 The hopes of the poet have to
disappear or be effaced, so that the whole truth can appear. The quotation of
Meister Eckhart at the beginning of the poem is crucial in this context:

[...] Ich spreche aber, daz vernünftekeit edeler ist dan wille. Wille nimt got under
dem kleide der güete. Vernünftekeit nimt got blöz, als er entkleidet ist von güete un-
de von wesen. Güete ist ein kleit, da got under verborgen ist, unde wille nimmt got
under dem kleide der güete [...].

[...] But I say again that intellect is higher than the will. Will takes God under the
garment of good. Intellect seizes him naked, divested of good and being. Goodness
is a garment under which God is concealed and will takes God in this garment of
goodness [...]72

Meister Eckhart discards will as being blind-folded by individualist hopes and

worries, whereas reason recognizes the truth objectively. According to Meister
Eckhart, the human will sees God veiled in the garment of goodness, whereas
the intellect perceives him naked (blöz), accepting him without attributes of
71
One can only hope that this is a printing mistake: »Wahrheit« does not mean »hope«
in German. It means truth.
72
Steiner, Modern Poetry in Translation (p. 173, note 70), p. 75.
7. Coincidences Between Steiner· 's Anthropology and Poetry 175

goodness. Goodness and being are understood as the specific intentionality of

a specific individual.73 Hope and worry are expressions of such intentionality.
Steiner needs to abolish his selfhood in order to become a mouthpiece of truth.
Thus his suspicion of fiction as being the work of individual intentions which
distort truth here comes to the fore, bearing a strong resemblance to Canetti's
evaluation of knowledge over hope, as discussed above in part I. This issue has
been noted by James E. Young who has argued that faced with the Holocaust,
the writer turns into an a neutral »instrument of events«: »the scribe is in this
view a neutral medium through which events would write themselves«.74
»Prayer in the Garden« thematizes the possibility of »writing the Holocaust«.
Abolishing his individuality, the poetic voice of »Prayer in the Garden« turns
into the mouthpiece of those who were killed:

Die sich in mir gefunden,

Sind überm Meer verbunden.

Who themselves in me have found

Across the sea are conjoined.75

The poet wants to become an organ for the suffering of his people. In an at-
tempt to record all events, Steiner moves from the sinking of the Struma to the
gas chambers on the continent, insisting meticulously on the exact counting of
every wound:

Keine wunde ungezählt

An stirne oder brüst,
Nicht bruch, nicht beule ungewusst,
Nichts, was an frauenhals und wangen
Die starre hand begangen,
Der kleinsten wimpern ungeschmählt.
[...]
Kein tropfen, die äugen zu netzen,
Der Säuglinge äugen, die gase ätzen,
Augen der mütter, hart im entsetzen.
Kein wundes äuge ungezählt,
Der kleinsten wimmern ungeschmält.
Denn alles leiden auf dem meer
Ein schmerz sei um die Herrlichkeit,

73
For a discussion of will as intentionality and intellect as the abolition of selfhood
in the context of the reception of God's truth see the commentary in Meister Eck-
hart: Werke in zwei Bänden. Texte und Übersetzungen von Ernst Benz et al. Hg.
und kommentiert von Nikiaus Largier. Frankfurt a. M.: Deutscher Klassiker Ver-
lag 1993 (Bibliothek des Mittelalters; 21 - Bibliothek deutscher Klassiker; 92),
p. 847-853.
74
Young, Writing and Rewriting the Holocaust (p. 151, note 6), p. 21.
75
Steiner, Modern Poetry in Translation (p. 173, note 70), p. 83.
176 Part III: Style, Law and Danger

In Herrlichkeit sich wandelnd,

Alles all verwandelnd.
No wound uncounted now,
Wound in the breast or the brow,
No bruise, no fracture omitted,
Nothing which on woman's cheek or throat
The unfeeling hand committed,
No smallest infant's whimper left unheard.
[...]
Not a drop with which to cool the eyes,
The eyes of children which gases cauterize,
Eyes of mothers, hard in the midst of horror.
No wounded eye uncounted now,
No smallest infant's whimper left unheard.
For all the suffering out at sea
Is pain for glory's sake,
Itself into glory turning,
Transforming everything.76

Steiner moves from the enumeration of wounds to an acceptance of this suf-

fering, which is, in the final part of the poem, interpreted as a basis for hu-
man existence. Does this not >normalize< the horrors which the poet wants to
depict in detail? Does acceptance of the suffering of Nazi persecution con-
tradict the non-acceptance of social structures such as national and geo-
graphical boundaries as advocated in Eroberungen? Asking these questions
might represent a failure to understand the poem. But, as we have seen in
chapter 5.3, Steiner is fully aware of the historical break which the Holocaust
constitutes. In Eroberungen, Steiner voices his shock at the Nazis, who have
made murder the law: »he [the murderer] is the law.«77 Steiner's switching
from a realistic to a metaphysical plane does not harmonize the violence
described. Despite Steiner's attempt to efface his individual concerns, »Prayer
in the Garden« is a highly personal poem: after all, it is also a prayer for his
father who was killed presumably in Treblinka. Despite this highly personal
aspect of the »Prayer«, Steiner's reference to divine manifestation, or Schechi-
na - of which majesty (»Herrlichkeit«) is a translation - not only bespeaks a
wish for comfort; Schechina is a verbal noun meaning »dwelling« and a
»post biblical term particularly used for God's indwelling on earth«.78 By
referring to God's presence in creation, Steiner does not idealize suffering.
The quotation from Meister Eckhart illustrates that God perceived without
garments, might mean the absence of attributes of goodness. Steiner, indeed,
can only mention the Schechina in the second part, in the middle of the

76
Ibid., p. 85.
77
»ist er das gesetz«, Steiner, Eroberungen (p. 42, note 118), p. 48.
78
Leo Strauss: Liberalism Ancient and Modern. New York: Basic Books 1968, p. 160.
Similarly, Scholem, Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism (p. 160, note 33), p. 216.
7. Coincidences Between Steiner 's Anthropology and Poetry 177

poem, at which point he has already abolished his intentionality. At the very
end of the poem, which describes the situation after the prayer, Steiner con-
ceives of God's presence as pain:
Über mein herz ist ein grosses frieren gekommen.
Im dunkel steh ich allein, seh nichts mehr.
Weh ist der friede, o weh,
Weh ist der friede deiner herrlichkeit. Amen.

A great, a mighty frost has entered my heart.

In the dark I stand alone, see nothing anymore.
Woe is thy peace, alas;
Woe is the peace of thy glory. Amen79

God's presence does not cover up or aestheticize the horrors of the Nazi
genocide; on the contrary, it intensifies them. Meister Eckhart defines intel-
lect as the non-intentional and therefore non-individualistic reception of
truth, which means to face creator and creation without the garments of
goodness. The Schechina of Steiner's poem does not offer comfort. On the
contrary, the recognition of horror coincides with the vision of divine mani-
festation. Love of the creator compels the poet to turn into the mouthpiece of
horror so that the corruption of creation as literally hell on earth can be wit-
nessed. The experience of hell destroys trust in the world, as Jean Amery so
accurately describes, and the many suicides of Holocaust survivors so over-
whelmingly illustrate. Steiner's attempt at giving a voice to the witnesses
(»Witnesses, witnesses, / Join me in what I speak, be near me now. / Let me
speak truthfully«) 80 of this hell on earth is enabled by the abolition of self-
hood that issues in a depersonalized vision of the creator and creation. Only
the recognition of the utter corruption of creation makes it possible to work
at the change of a damaged way of life. As we have seen, Steiner's writing
on danger needs to be interpreted in the context of a fallen world. The Holo-
caust has pushed this world beyond the limits of the fall, into what was only
imaginable as an otherworldly hell. Steiner's way out of this hell consists in
thought about the law. The Schechina offers a view on what happened in this
hell on earth, thus compelling man to prevent it from happening again. As I
will show in the following chapter, Canetti testifies to the centrality of law in
Steiner's thought. His philosophy of law originates in his shock at the Nazi
genocide. For law not only helps man to overcome humanity's fallen condi-
tion, but in order to do so it directly responds to the darkest aspects of a
postlapsarian world.

79
Steiner, Modern Poetry in Translation (p. 173, note 70), p. 87.
80
Ibid., p. 83.
178 Part III: Style, Law and Danger

8 Law, Myth and Danger

As we have seen in the previous chapter, Steiner's concern with limits, taboos,
and law has to be seen against the background of the transgression of all limi-
nality in the Nazi genocide.81 And as has been discussed in chapter 5.3, focus-
ing on Himmler's Posen speech, Holocaust scholars like Dominick LaCapra
and Berel Lang have recently argued that the Nazis consciously transgressed
limits. The following abstract from Himmler's speech to the SS officers is
often cited in this context:
Most of you know what it means when 100 corpses are lying side by side, when 500
lie there or 1,000. Having borne that nevertheless - some exceptional human weak-
ness aside - having remained decent [anständig geblieben zu sein] has hardened us
[...]. All in all, we may say that we have accomplished the most difficult task out of
love for our people. And we have not sustained any damage to our inner self, our
soul and our character [und wir haben keinen Schaden in unserem Inneren, in un-
serer Seele, in unserem Charakter daran genommen].82
Commenting on this passage Saul Friedlander speaks of
a fundamental dissonance between explicit commitment to breaking the most fun-
damental of human taboos, i. e, wiping from the face of the earth each and every
member of a specific human group [...] and the declaration that this difficult task
was being accomplished satisfactorily, without any moral damage.83
Similarly, Berel Lang defines »the will to do evil through the medium of geno-
cide« as »the will to transcend all limits and restrictions«.84 The historian of
the Holocaust, Raul Hilberg, describes the decision to make the >Final Solu-
tion< as the crossing of a »threshold«.85 In the previous chapter we saw that
Steiner's defence of ethical boundaries which help man to avoid the dangerous
and the powerful stands in stark contrast to the modernist construction of racial
and nationalist boundaries. Zygmunt Bauman has recently argued that the
creation of racial boundaries, such as those erected by the Nazis, is the direct
outcome of the abolition of normative ethical laws:

81
The Auschwitz survivor Jean Amery (alias Hans Mayer) depicts the horror of a
world without ethical limits, in which everything is possible. Jan Philipp Reemstma
discusses this point in his article »172364. Gedanken über den Gebrauch der ersten
Person Singular bei Jean Amery«. In: Stephan Steiner (Ed.): Jean Amory (Hans May-
er). Mit einem biographischen Bildessay und einer Bibliographie. Frankfurt a. M.:
Stroemfeld 1996, p. 63-86.
82
Quoted from Saul Friedlander: Memory, History, and the Extermination of the Jews
of Europe. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1993, p. 105.
83
Ibid.
84
Lang, Writing and the Holocaust (p. 137, note 199), p. 102.
85
Raoul Hilberg: Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders. The Jewish Catastrophe 1933-1945.
London: Lime Tree 1993, p. 16.
8. Law, Myth and Danger 179

In a world notable for the continuous rolling back of the limits to scientific, techno-
logical and cultural manipulation, racism proclaims that certain blemishes of a cer-
tain category of people cannot be removed or rectified - that they remain beyond the
boundaries of reforming practices, and will do so for ever.86
The inauguration of racial laws means the invalidation of ethical laws that have
the preservation of life as their aim. As we have seen in the previous chapter,
Steiner realizes that there is law in Nazism: the law of killing. Canetti gives an
account of this kind of Nazi-law in Crowds and Power, as has been examined in
chapter 3.4. Here he concentrates on the diagnosis of Nazism, while Steiner tries
to delineate ways out of a modernity characterized by the law of ethical lawless-
ness.87 In this final section I shall argue that Canetti's reflections on metamor-
phosis and myth contribute to Steiner's theory of law. I shall do this through
detailed analysis of Canetti's description of Steiner's concern with law.
In his portrait of his dead friend, Canetti singles out Steiner's work on the
concept of law as the most important aspect of his intellectual project:
One can question the laws with impunity. Their wording is fixed and in the end
some have no choice but to ask for the exact wording of the law. This was really
Franz Steiner's way. Gradually he decided upon his faith's obedience to the law.88
Why, however, does one need to ask for the exact wording of the law, if it is
fixed? We have seen in chapter 5.2 that Steiner undermined any fixity of the
concept taboo: though following the same way of thought, being faithful to the
principle of avoidance, taboos differ from context to context. There is no such
thing as a fixed way of acting according to a rigid generalized taboo. For ta-
boos are as fluid in meaning as the infinite play of signs in language. Conse-
quently the study of law and taboo is a linguistic investigation, though one
which does not lose itself in an abstract current of play, but applies this very
fluidity of denotation to the applicability of different social contexts. Once
again we see how scholarly investigations are closely connected to literary wir-
ting: Canetti describes Steiner's poetry as an examination of words (»For him
the writing of poetry was an examination of words«).89 The study of law needs
to be carried out with the more delicate tools of the poet; it requires a highly
developed sensitivity to language. Otherwise law would turn into idolatry.
Though the wording of law is fixed, the words which lay down or commit the

86
Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (p. 128, note 172), p. 65.
87
Heinsohn accurately discribes Hitler's fascination with the law of lawlessness: »Die
Gesetzlosigkeit als Norm interessiert Hitler«. Heinsohn, Warum Auschwitz? (p. 167,
note 54), p. 133.
88
»Ungestraft fragen kann man nach den Gesetzen. Ihr Wortlaut steht fest, und zum
Schluß bleibt für manche gar nichts übrig, als nach dem genauen Wortlaut der Ge-
setze zu fragen. Das war auch wirklich Franz Steiners Weg. Mehr und mehr entschied
er sich für die Gesetzestreue seines Glaubens. Canetti, Aufzeichnungen 1992-1993
(p. 4, note 13), p. 18. My translation.
89
»Dichten war für ihn ein Prüfen von Worten«, ibid., p. 21.
180 Part HI: Style, Law and Danger

law must yield to the fluidity of different contexts. This fluidity prevents the
ossification of a graven image like the golden calf that provokes Moses into
smashing the tables of the law out of fear that they themselves could fall prey
to idolatrous worship. In an important essay Arthur Jacobson has argued that
Moses' writing of the law depends on erasure; only erasure prevents the law
from assuming the status of a »completed creation«.90 Erasure is itself within
the written: denotation changes meaning from context to context. Law and lan-
guage become idols, if one does not question them. In the previous chapter we
have seen how Steiner rebels against the symbolic system which distorts the
object by the imposition of a name. The split between signifier and signified
can be used for the construction of idols such as nationhood and race. Lan-
guage disfigures creation in generalizing upon the infinite fluidity and variety
of created things. In these constructions man does not only cover up the fluid-
ity of the signifying system, but, as a consequence of this, he ossifies creation
as completed by saying, for example, »this race can only behave in this and
this manner«. The poet is aware of the infinite generation of meaning in lan-
guage that has its equivalent in an incomplete, or one might say unredeemed,
fallen social and natural world. Although Jacobson does not draw attention to
the erasure within the written word, his discussion of oral rules that prevent the
ossification of writing helps to define the role of different social contexts in
their relation to language. The written tends to become categorical, tends to be
a generalization which enables the exertion of power over all such individuals
who do not confirm the category. This, as we have seen in chapter 5.2, is pre-
cisely what Steiner attacks in anthropological accounts of the »general concept
of taboo«. The oral is linked to the specific context in which it is spoken:
Without oral doctrine the written rules could not be put into play [...]. Rules such as
an »eye for an eye«, which the oral doctrine construes to mean »money compensa-
tion for an eye«, could not be read: they could only be slavishly obeyed.91
As an anthropologist and poet, Steiner works against the fixity of the written in
the sense of generalizing law. The fixed wording of the written law needs to be
questioned through what Jacobson calls the »oral rule«, which precisely de-
scribes Steiner's contextualistion of avoidance behavior.
I shall now argue that law understood not as categorical imperative but as
>way< (halachah) distinguishes the Jewish from the Gentile approach, precisely
on account of a deep aversion to the idolatrous. Here I will further examine the
relation that Canetti establishes between freedom and the law. Canetti argues
that Steiner was >free<, despite or rather on account of his orthodox faith in one
particular religion:

90
Arthur Jacobson: The Idolatry of Rules. Writing Law According to Moses, with Re-
ference to other Jurisprudence. In: Cornell et al., Deconstruction and the Possibility
of Justice (p. 163, note 40), p. 95-151, p. 97.
91
Ibid., p. 119.
8. Law, Myth and Danger 181

Steiner was and remained always free in a way that he would not have admitted in the
latest years of our friendship. He was free in myths. He was the only person known to
me with whom I could talk about myths. Not only did he know many and could surprise
me with some of them as I could him: he did not interfere with them, he did not inter-
pret them, he did not attempt to organize them according to scientific principles, he left
them untouched. They were never a mere instrument for him. We could talk to each other
about myths for days. [...] and they were always the essential part in the life of a specific
human community; they always mattered and they always had a decisive impact.92

Where lies the connection between myth, freedom and law? What kind of con-
cept of myth does Canetti develop? Steiner does not always praise myth; as we
have seen, in »Über den Prozess der Zivilisierung« he employs a Marxist defini-
tion of religion and myth in order to undermine the idea of a battle between man
and nature. This idea is nothing else but the trite myth of capitalism (»Der banale
Mythos des Kapitalismus«). Steiner develops, however, another meaning of
myth in close connection to Kafka's style of writing, and treatment of the theme
of law, and Thomas Mann's novel Joseph and his Brothers.9* The individual of
mythical culture is connected to the community thanks to a shared interpretation
of the surrounding world. According to Steiner, Kafka constantly switches from
the physical to the metaphysical and this exactly describes the movements within
a mythical perception of the world: the things of everyday life narrate specific
stories to the members of a specific community.
What correlation does this have to the concept of law? In the following I shall
show how Steiner unites the concept of myth and law. This can best be illustra-
ted through an analysis of Steiner's interpretation of Kafka. In his poem »Kafka
in England«, Steiner mocks both the response of the English Gentiles and those
of assimilated Jews. The assimilated Jew George Piltzmann as well as Mrs Brittle,
Mr. Tooslick, and Miss Diggs take Kafka's writing to be cut off from any form
of reality. This response contrasts sharply with that of Steiner who sees Kafka as
a Jewish mythical thinker who constantly switches from a mystical to an historical
plane (»er wechselte immer wieder die mystische mit der historischen Ebene«).94
92
»Auf eine Weise, die er in den spätesten Jahren unserer Freundschaft nie zugegeben
hätte, war und blieb er immer frei. Er war frei in Mythen. Er war der einzige Mensch,
den ich gekannt habe, mit dem ich über Mythen sprechen konnte. Nicht nur kannte
er viele und konnte mich so gut mit welchen überraschen wie ich ihn: er tastete sie
nicht an, er deutete sie nicht, er machte keinen Versuch, sie nach wissenschaftlichen
Prinzipien zu ordnen, er ließ sie in Ruhe. Sie wurden nie für ihn zu einem blossen
Mittel. [...] immer waren sie im Leben einer bestimmten Menschengruppe das We-
sentlichste gewesen, immer hatten sie gezählt und bestimmend gewirkt.« Canetti,
Aufzeichnungen 1992-1993 (p. 4, note 13), p. 18. My translation.
93
In a letter of 11 August 1936 to his friend Paul Brüll, Steiner voices his enthusiasm
about Mann's »Vorrede« to the Joseph novel. In his foreword Mann lays down his
conception of myth.
94
»[...] er [Kafka] wechselte immer wieder die mystische mit der historischen Ebene, da
er schließlich, trotz allen mystischen Elementen und trotz allem, das über ihn gesagt
wird, kein Mystiker war (also auch kein werkappter Kabbalist<, sondern ein jüdischer
mythischer Denker.« Steiner, Fluchtvergnüglichkeit (p. I l l , note 111), p. 58-59.
182 Part III: Style, Law and Danger

The last line of the poem gives an indication of how society could be transformed,
quoting Kafka's »Before the Law« (»Vor dem Gesetz«). The talk of the assimi-
latory Piltzmann fades away and makes room for the radiance of the »Gesetz«:

Nur der kleine Geoffrey Piltzmann

Träumt: »wer?
Ich meine, wer daran verdient,
Sie müssen doch tot sein,
Ich mein die leute in Prag - nun, wer auch immer ...«
Doch aus dem tor bricht trotzdem der Schimmer ...
Only little Geoffrey Piltzmann
Dreams: »who?
I mean, who does well out of this,
They must be dead, after all,
I mean those people in Prague - well, no matter what name ...«
Yet the brightness shines through the gateway all the same ...95

The glimmer which breaks through the door refers to the radiance (Glanz)
which the dying countryman (»Mann vom Lande«) sees before he dies: »Wohl
aber erkennt er jetzt im Dunkel einen Glanz, der unverlöschlich aus der Türe
des Gesetzes bricht.«96 (»Yet in his darkness he is now aware of a radiance
that streams inextinguishably from the gateway of the Law.«)97 Steiner quotes
Kafka's »bricht«, thus underlining the force of Jewish law. As Thomas Mann
argues in his novel on Joseph, in myth there is a pervasive presence of past ex-
perience in present day life.98 The rhyming of »immer« (»always«) with »schim-
mer« (»radiance«) demonstrates that even in contemporary society which is
blind to the indwelling of mythical signification in real objects, this very in-
dwelling will never fade away.
In his poem »Schweigsam in der sonne«, Steiner takes up the idea of a
community that lives according to the Torah. As in »Kafka in England«,
Steiner switches from the description of the present state of society to what it
could be like, if the community realized the potential of Mosaic law. He
wrote the first draft of the poem in 1930, but continued revising it until 1941.
First it describes the exclusively material concerns of life in the cattle-
market, until - comparable to Kafka's own style of writing - it switches to
another plane:

95
Steiner, Modern Poetry in Translation (p. 173, note 70), p. 61.
96
Franz Kafka: Drucke zu Lebzeiten. Hg. v. Wolf Kittler, Hans-Gerd Koch und Ger-
hard Neumann. Frankfurt a. M.: S. Fischer 1994, p. 269.
97
Franz Kafka: Before the Law. In: Wedding Preparations in the Country, and other
Stories. Trans, by Willa and Edwin Muir. Harmondsworth: Penguin 1978 (Penguin
Modern Classics), p. 128-129.
98
For a discussion of this point see Wolf-Daniel Hartwich: Die Sendung Moses. Von
der Aufklärung bis Thomas Mann. München: Fink 1997, p. 215-226.
8. Law, Myth and Danger 183

Männer mit messern liefen feilschend umher.

Neben mir zählte einer sein geld.
[...]
Rief nicht die stimme: der abend! der abend!
Rief nicht die stimme: wo weilst du? wo weilst du?
Viele tore hat die heilige Stadt.
In der nacht liegt sie einsam
Aufweiten, schweigenden bergen.

Bargaining, men with knives ran about.

Near me someone counted his money.
[...]
Did not the voice call: evening! evening!
Did not the voice call: where are you? where are you?
Many gates has the holy city.
In the night it lies lonely
On silent, far-spreading mountains."

The doors of the holy city refer to the door of Jewish law in Kafka's »Before the
Law«. As in »Before the Law«, they are open for those who have not only the
longing, but also the courage - which the countryman has not - to pass through
them into a life according to the Torah. The three last lines of the poem are apo-
strophic: they are marked by a »turning away«.100 This kind of apostrophic turn
at the end of the poem recalls the closing of »Kafka in England« with its unex-
pected pointing away from the present society to its possible transformation in a
life according to the Torah. Steiner does not characterize the holy city as absent;
rather - comparable to the glimmer emanating from the door in »Kafka in Eng-
land« - the people do not realize its significance. Thus the holy city lies silent and
lonely, indicating that so far only the poet has heard the voice calling from afar.
Kafka's writings problematize the link between law and community. Derrida
has rightly argued that in »Before the Law«, law itself is the prohibited: »The
story of prohibition is a prohibited story.«101 Yet this begs the question of
whether it is exactly the point of Kafka's parable to undermine the exclusionary
use of law. Kafka after all published »Before the Law« in the leading cultural
Zionist journal Selbstwehr the main aim of which was the rejuvenation of a Jew-
ish way of life according to Mosaic law. Contrary to Derrida, Elizabeth Boa has
argued that »The law should be a space to inhabit, a way of life rather than a
code; judgemental prohibitions and prescriptions are obstacles to the good.«102

99
Steiner, Modern Poetry in Translation (p. 173, note 70), p. 25.
100
Catherine Pickstock defines apostrophe as follows: »Apostrophe, which in Greek
means >turning away<, is a historical figure used to signify vocative address to an ab-
sent, dead or wholly other person, idea, or object.« Pickstock, After Writing (p. 8,
note 23), p. 193.
101
Jacques Derrida: Acts of Literature. Ed. by Derek Attridge. New York: Routledge
1992, p. 200.
102
Boa, Kafka (p. 110, note 110), p. 238.
184 Part III: Style, Law and Danger

Indeed, the countryman refers to the law as opening up a social space that
should be accessible to every one (»the Law, he thinks, should surely be acces-
sible at all times and to everyone«).103 The doorkeeper prevents accessibility
by insisting on his power (»I am powerful«).104 It is precisely by means of this
power that law becomes perverted into a quantitative, arbitrary mechanism
which excludes, rather than includes all members of the community. Law can
only operate in a social space; it needs to embrace the whole of society, and in
fact the Hebrew Bible (Leviticus and Numbers) emphasizes this integrative
element; it repeatedly admonishes that even strangers living in Israel must
under no circumstances be excluded from law.105 So the doorkeeper's power-
driven exclusionary discourse offends against Jewish Law, instead of reinforc-
ing it. The doorkeeper has recently been compared to the figure of the Zaddik,
and Kafka's critical attitude to one leading Zaddik (the Rabbi of Belz) as a
corrupter of tradition as dogma has recently been pointed out.106 Furthermore,
as has been shown by Scholem, Zaddiks even celebrated »lust for power«107 in
their theoretical works. Steiner's writing on taboo and law as a way of circum-
scribing power clearly harks back to Kafka's critique of the instrumentaliza-
tion of Jewish law by the doorkeeper as Zaddik.
In »Vor dem Gesetz« Kafka emphasizes the doorkeeper's insistence on his
social superiority, or his class: he poses questions in a manner similar to peo-
ple who belong to the upper classes of society (»wie sie [questions] große
Herren stellen«).108 Kafka undermines this Zaddikistic insistence on law as an
exertion of power in »Concerning the Question of Laws« (»Zur Frage der
Gesetze«). Here the nobility (»der Adel«) forbids the whole of the population
access to the Law. The bleak character of the present state of society infuses
hope for the future where the power of the nobility makes way for an all-
inclusive usage of law which transcends the exertion of power (»Das fur die
Gegenwart Trübe [...] erhellt nur der Glaube, daß einmal eine Zeit kommen
wird, wo die Tradition und ihre Forschung gewissermaßen aufatmend den
Schlußpunkt macht, alles klar geworden ist, das Gesetz nur dem Volk gehört
und der Adel verschwindet.«).109 Those who claim to be the keepers of tradi-
tion actually distort it: law needs to operate within the whole of the commu-
nity; it has to be community based, rather than being allocated to a ruling class
that employs a perverted version of it in order to maintain their grip on power.
103
Kafka, Before the Law (p. 182, note 97), p. 128.
104
Ibid.
105
For a discussion of law in the Hebrew Bible as inclusive, see Mary Douglas: In the
Wilderness. The Doctrine of Defilement in the Book of Numbers. Sheffield: JSOT
Press 1993 (Journal for the Study of the Old Testament. Supplement Series; 158),
p. 140-155.
106
Baioni, Kafka (p. 110, note 110), p. 147-162.
107
Scholem, Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism (p. 160, note 33), p. 337.
108
Kafka, Drucke zu Lebzeiten (p. 182, note 96), p. 268.
109
Franz Kafka: Sämtliche Erzählungen. Hg. von Paul Raabe. Frankfurt a. M.: S. Fi-
scher 1981, p. 315.
8. Law, Myth and Danger 185

Kafka's questioning of the category of law as being removed from or categori-

cally imposed upon the situational contexts of everyday life stands within a
Jewish tradition, in which the notion of Halachah and Torah transcends an
abstract kind of legalism. Thus the Jewish philosopher Gillian Rose has re-
cently opposed the translation of Torah as law, giving »teaching« and »instruc-
tion« as a more accurate rendering in that it emphasizes the all-inclusive and
situation-targeted character of this central Jewish concept. By being always
grounded in the particularities of communal life, Jewish law - in contrast to
modern or Roman law - avoids »the diremption and discrepancy between its
formal promises and the social actualities they presuppose and reproduce«.110
In fact, law produces injustice if it is hidden behind a gate, utterly removed
from the changing realities of various situations in everyday life. Myths depict
the application of the law to situationality; as stories, they are closely tied to
specific objects and to specific people. The stories in the Hebrew Bible body
forth life as law; but not, however, as some abstract entity. The category of*ue
story implicitly questions any abstract, context-removed character of the writ-
ten law. The wording of the law is fixed, but must itself be questioned in the
constant interchange between law and life, between word and its applicability
to action or avoidance of action. The letter of the law cannot be applied with
disregard to its spirit. The Mosaic commandments lay down the letters. They
are, however, framed by stories and myths. The written rule without its exem-
plification in ever-changing contexts would be anti-law, or rather law as an
anti-social device. David Damrosh has argued that in Leviticus »the story exists
for the sake of the laws which it completes«.111 Is it not necessary to say »and
vice versa«: the law would be incomplete without the story which it exempli-
fies in different contexts? Or rather, are myths not laws, do they not body force
laws, even when they describe the failed application or misapplication of law?
Another point speaks for the inseparability of story and law, of Aggadah
and Halachah. So far I have discussed myths as exemplification of the applica-
bility of law. Myths, however, not only illustrate, but also lay down laws; not
of universal validity, but of localized application. On account of the knowledge
which myths communicate about localities, they establish rules of behavior to
the members of a specific community in terms of its social structure. Accord-
ing to Steiner, this precisely defines law or >taboo<. As we have seen in chap-
ter 5, taboo gives notice of where exactly the danger lies, thus localizing dan-
ger. This means, however, that it cannot be a general, systematic rule; rather it
needs to be developed in the ever-changing encounter with new localities.
Instead of being a rigid category, it needs to be unfurled in a variety of narra-
tives, and these precisely are myths. As we have seen, Canetti emphasizes that
Steiner does not interfere with myths, does not organize them according to
systematic principles. This would turn them into generalising categories that
are imposed upon specific situations, rather than originating in an encounter
110
Rose, Judaism & Modernity (p. 50, note 146), p. 12.
1
'' Damrosh, Leviticus (p. 162, note 36), p. 66.
186 Part HI: Style, Law and Danger

with them. Myths are as socially decisive as laws.112 They are the lawbooks of
>primitive< peoples. Canetti gives an account of the sociological interest he and
Steiner had in their study of myths of non-modern communities: »It was a
matter of myths which were precisely handed down, according to which people
have arranged their life, it was not a matter of his or my playful inventions.«113
The myths of >primitive< people are »playful«, as playful as any narrative, but
they are not fictive inventions. Canetti is careful to clarify that here the literary
contradicts our modem understanding of literature as fiction, as »invention«
that has no informative impact on the way society organizes itself. In chapter
3.3, I showed how Canetti treats myths not as fictions, but as a social reality.
Indeed, myths understood as socially decisive laws are >real< in that they give
guidelines for behavior in everyday life. This is the element of law in myth. As
I have shown in this chapter, Canetti and Steiner reject a >modern< (Kantian)"4
notion of law which discards all the specificities and therefore both metamor-
phosis and myth.
The concept of metamorphosis underlines the dynamic character of law. In-
deed, Jacobson has defined Jewish law as dynamic jurisprudence, according to
which every action is immersed in law: »Law drenches life and fills the uni-
verse.«115 As a consequence, the content of the law has to be able to undergo
metamorphoses: it has to be capable of being told in different stories, that is to
say, in relation to ever changing contexts. Canetti's and Steiner's definition of
literature offers a striking contrast to the >modem< notion of the poet as the soli-
tary individual who cultivates the fruits of his genius outside the >depravity< of
society. As we have seen in chapter 2, social responsibility marks Canetti's no-
tion of the poet off from both positivism and art pour art. Against the back-
ground of his reflections about Steiner's philosophy of law and myth, Canetti's
description of the poet as the guardian of metamorphosis (»Hüter der Verwand-
lung«) needs a new interpretation; not least because it stands in close correlation
to Steiner's definition of the poet as »the only guardian of the myths of all peo-
ples« (»der einzige Hüter der Mythen aller Völker«)116 Canetti's »guardian of
metamorphosis« also saves myths (»Einmal wird er [der Dichter] sich das liter-
arische Erbe der Menschheit zu eigen machen, das an Verwandlungen reich
ist.«117 - »For one thing, he will make mankind's literary heritage, so rich in

112
Recently, John Milbank has discussed the importance of myths, of narratives in the
construction of social norms. See Milbank, Theology and Social Theory Beyond
Secular Reason (p. 16, note 26).
113
»Es ging um Mythen, die präzis überliefert waren, nach denen Menschen ihr Leben
eingerichtet hatten, nicht um seine oder meine spielerische Erfindung.« Canetti,
Aufzeichnungen 1992-1993 (p. 4, note 13), p 19. My translation.
114
For a discussion of Kant's notion of law see my article »Between Kant and Kafka.
Walter Benjamin's Notion of Law«. Forthcoming in Neophilologus.
115
Jacobson, The Idolatry of Rules (p. 180, note 90), p. 132.
116
Steiner, Eroberungen (p. 42, note 118), p, 125.
117
Canetti, Das Gewissen der Worte (p. 25, note 57), p. 283.
8. Law, Myth and Danger 187

metamorphoses, his own.«)"8 Myths are narrations and therefore mean the liter-
ary testament of mankind. Heritage (»Erbe«) refers to a time other than moder-
nity. Canetti particularly draws attention to the myths of >primitive< peoples who
were exterminated by >civilized< empires, and whose myths, however, survived
thanks to anthropological research: »One cannot thank scholarship enough for
rescuing it [the mythical heritage of >primitive< peoples]; its true preservation, its
resurrection to our life is up to the poet, the Dichter.«,119 The scholar functions
here as the servant of the poet. The anthropologist preserves the material, but
only the poet can call it back to life.
Steiner understood both his scholarly and literary work as a resuscitation of
premodern myths - the myths of Odysseus, of Joseph and of Robinson Crusoe
permeate his poetry - and this calling back to life is a religious activity. The
religious here means the laws which help to bring man closer to the creation in
His image. Following Mosaic Law, Steiner denies that man has rights; he or
she has only duties, duties to collaborate with Yahweh in the reconstitution of
the condition of a non-violent, non-dangerous way of life, freed from the al-
lurements of a will to power. Those who follow the law look back to the past,
remembering stories of bygone times (myths-laws). In the words of Jacobson
the »past supplies the judgment of perfection. The future is a prospect that the
present will attain past perfection«.120 Like Steiner, Canetti works for such a
restitution of a prelapsarian humanity, when he shocks the reader of Crowds
and Power into a change of social behavior. The gruesome myth that he nar-
rates about eating habits are particularly aimed to reinforce the Jewish prohibi-
tion against the shedding of blood. As Jacob Milgrom has pointed out,
[...] according to the priestly account of creation, man was meant to be a vegetarian.
He was charged with the responsibility to domesticate the animal world (Gen. 1:28),
but not to use it as provender.121

Only after the fall, man, no longer Adam the ideal, but Noah the real, is allowed
to eat meat; however, not its blood as this embodies life. Eating blood means
killing life. Canetti gives detailed description of particular bodily behavior and in
doing so he tries to have a transforming impact on the laws of violence which the
reader daily follows. In his phenomenology of power, Canetti is as specific as
Steiner in his contextualization of behavior to danger. It is such particularity
which transforms their argument into a narrative, a myth. The social focus of this
myth characterizes it as Law. As Hans Blumenberg has argued, myths respond to
those violent disruptions of life marked by destruction of any meaning. Law
works out a mythical, that is to say, a meaningful structure for the individual in

118
Canetti, The Conscience of Words (p. 25, note 58), p. 240.
119
Ibid., p. 241. Cf. »Für seine Rettung kann man der Wissenschaft nicht genug dank-
bar sein; seine eigentliche Bewahrung, seine Auferstehung zu unserem Leben, ist
Sache der Dichter«. Canetti, Das Gewissen der Worte (p. 25, note 57), p. 285.
120
Jacobson, The Idolatry of Rules (p. 180, note 90), p. 133.
121
Milgrom, Studies in the Cultic Theology and Terminology (p. 167, note 52), p. 102.
188 Part HI: Style, Law and Danger

relation to society. Blumenberg maintains that the opposition between logos and
mythos is paradoxical, as myth collaborates with the logos. This also holds true
for the relation of myth to law. Law partakes of logos, with the difference that
the raison d'etre of the former consists in its applicability to the social, whereas
the latter has a strong individual orientated bias. Blumenberg describes myth as
»eine >Form überhaupt der Bestimmung des Unbestimmten« (»a form in gene-
ral of the definition of the indefinite«).122 As we have seen, Steiner defines taboo
as a mechanism of the localization of the dangerous and, as the poem »Die War-
ner« illustrates, the indefinite characterizes danger. Myths establish laws which
enable a meaningful life: against the empty appearance of fact, against >naked
reality< myth places meaning, which points to the value in objects and thus saves
them from destruction.
Canetti describes a quantitative world in which there is no value, no mean-
ing, apart from an unrestrained will to power, to survival, to mass-murder. As I
have argued, in Crowds and Power Canetti establishes the law of killing,
which he intends the reader to erase. He depicts the law of modernity, a law
that needs to be realized as life-threatening, similar to the myths of modernity
which play out this law in different forms. Steiner, however, affirms the valid-
ity of Jewish law as a preservation of life, focusing on its positive potential if
contextualized in the particularities of narrative that shape the life of premod-
ern peoples. He embeds myth always into law, that is to say, into a societal
sphere: »Eine Kultur die völlig >mythisch< ist, d.h. in der jeder die Bedeutung
jedes Dinges, jeder Einrichtung erzählen kann.« (»A culture which is com-
pletely >mythical<, that is to say, in which everyone can narrate the meaning of
each thing, of each institution.«)123 Only if every member of a society knows
about the signification of things, can laws be followed: the law, after all, varies
from context to context. One can only avoid the dangerous, if one knows what
exactly signifies the danger. The meaning of things gives notice of their danger
or absence of danger. Consequently, Steiner attacks >private myths<, which he
considers to be the product of a fragmented society. The modern poet of a
fragmented society needs to keep a distance from >private myths<. Steiner per-
ceives the responsibility of the poet in a selection of myths which help to build
a society in which man does not fall prey to fantasies of omnipotence and in
doing so corrupts into an instrument of the dangerous:
He [the poet] must not be uncritical and be a companion to ersatz-mythologies. And
the judgement, which he the only guardian of the myths of all people must com-
mand, the moral judgement, the responsibility for the selection and the impact of his
vision, comes from a religious commitment. Leaving common humanity out of ac-
count, the »atheist« poet [...] is an absurdity.124

122
Hans Blumenberg: Arbeit am Mythos. Sonderausgabe. Frankfurt a. M: Suhrkamp
1996, p. 186. My translation.
123
Steiner, Feststellungen und Versuche (p. 171, note 54), p. 227. My translation.
124
»Er [der Dichter] darf aber nie unkritisch sein, sich den Ersatzmythologien zu-
gesellen, und das Maß, das er, der einzige Hüter der Mythen aller Völker, besitzen
8. Law, Myth and Danger 189

Steiner strongly dislikes the usage of the term »God« in poetry. Steiner's reli-
gious poetry does not try to drive home a specific creed; rather he hopes to
express the liminality of human existence. An awareness of liminality and a
commitment to collaborate with the creator in the moral perfection of human-
ity constitutes Steiner's understanding of religion. Rudolf Härtung accurately
characterizes Steiner's poetry when he speaks of its religious nature (»religiö-
sen Natur«), and even where the religious vocabulary is absent (»und dies auch
dort wo die religiöse Vokabel fehlt«).125 The myths which the poet selects give
an account of both the dangers which condition life on this earth and the laws
which man must keep in order to avoid an encounter with specific places of
danger. Steiner's myths admonish to moderate behavior, and to recognize inhi-
bitions as regards the transgression of ethical limits.126
Although Canetti does not offer a new contribution to the debate about law
and ritual, his theory of power participates in Steiner's sociology of danger,
and as such it also has inhibition and liminality as an underlying theme. In
continuity with Canetti who argues that power depends on death, Steiner
equates danger with power, and their overcoming by means of an awareness of
liminality. Canetti depicts modernity as a slaughter-house in which moderation
has completely disappeared. His novel Auto Da Fe offers a frightening depic-
tion of a world ruled by hubris, in which everything assumes immoderate pro-
portions, be it Therese's lust for money or Kien's sinological obsession.127
Masse und Macht has the theme of the »Maßlose« (the immoderate) in its title:
neither crowds nor power know moderation, the moment of the transgression of
limits characterizes both. The mutual usage of the word »guardian« (»Hüter«)
brings to the fore the common ground of Canetti's and Steiner's self under-
standing as poets and scholars. For the poet both protects creation from dam-
age, and prevents the destructive actions of man, who either damages himself
or his environment.

muß, das moralische Maß, die Verantwortung fur die Auswahl und Wirkung seiner
Vision, kommt aus einer religiösen Bindung. Vom allgemein Menschlichen abge-
sehen, ist der >atheistische< Dichter [...] ein Unding.« Steiner, Eroberungen (p. 42,
note 118), p. 125. My translation.
125
Rudolf Härtung: Gesang des Heimatlosen. In: Eckart 21 (1952), p. 232.
126
For a detailed discussion of the revulsion toward what is morally wrong see
Colin McGinn: Ethics, Evil, and Fiction. Oxford: Clarendon 1997.
127
Elena Nährlich-Slatewa charakterizes the novel as follows: »[...] das Thema der
Blendung ist Schuld, Vergeltung und Sühne der bürgerlichen Zivilisation, die in ihrer
Wertsetzung die Grenzen des Kreatürlichen und damit des Menschlichen sprengt.«
See E. Nährlich-Slatewa: Das Meer und seine Tropfen im Zeitalter der Vereinze-
lung. Das erste Buch: >Die Blendung<. Elias Canetti zum neunzigsten Geburtstag.
In: Germanisch-romanische Monatsschrift 46 (1996), p. 198-215, p. 205.
Conclusion: Steiner's and Canetti's Contribution to
Debates About Postmodernity

In part III, I have summarized the arguments developed in part I and part II,
while further expanding my analysis of Steiner's and Canetti's responses to the
Holocaust as an evaluation of liminality. In the conclusion to this essay I will
discuss the social and philosophical implications of Steiner's identification as a
Jew with the >primitive< or >Oriental<. As has been argued in chapter 5.2, through
an elaboration of this identification Steiner attempts to influence Western social
and philosophical tendencies as regards behavioral responses to danger and
conceptualizations of differences. Indeed, Steiner's writings respond critically to
some Kantian transcendentalist dispositions within >modernity<. These tenden-
cies have been somewhat radicalized in >postmodern< wilting, mainly in the
work of Jacques Derrida. I will argue that Steiner's »sociology of danger« might
offer a valid alternative to an espousal of the »ghostly«, or, the virtual, as pro-
pounded by Derrida. While the contrast between Steiner and Derrida is certainly
ahistorical, it nevertheless emphasizes the Simmelian heritage of Steiner's thought
by means of which he is responding to traces of Kantian transcendentalism
within sociological and philosophical traditions. Derrida's affirmation of the
ghostly, or, the non-empirical, needs to be seen in this transcendental lineage,
which Steiner's Simmelian »sociology of danger« sets out to undermine. From
this perspective, a brief concluding discussion of Steiner's relevance to contem-
porary critical theory is not as arbitrary as it might first appear.
Nietzsche often figures as the >godfather< of deconstruction (and as Simmel
has argued, stands in a transcendentalist tradition).1 Against this background it
is important to emphasize Canetti's and Steiner's anti-Nietzschean reading of
power. Nietzsche argues that man can overcome his natural frailty through the
exertion of power: he can liberate himself from the human condition through
radical disregard of his own suffering and that of others. This liberation is
achieved mainly through a powerful reading of pain as joy that results in a
world of heroism where suffering has no place. Thus, for Nietzsche power is
self-sufficient; it is so self-sufficient that it can even deify man. Contrary to
Nietzsche, and, as we have seen, originating in a response to the Holocaust,
1
As Simmel has argued, in Kant, man transcends nature and in Nietzsche, the indi-
vidual transcends society. See Georg Simmel: Kant. Die Probleme der Geschichts-
philosophie (Zweite Fassung 1905/1907). In: G. Simmel: Gesamtausgabe. Bd 9. Hg.
von Guy Oakes und Kurt Rottgers. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp 1997, p. 225.
192 Conclusion

Steiner and Canetti point to the fundamental lack of power within power's own
exertion. Canetti examines how power depends on death, and Steiner explores
the interrelationship between power and danger. Against a Nietzschean deifi-
cation of man through power, Canetti and Steiner both variously show how
power estranges humanity from the promise of the imago dei.
The crucial theme of power can, however, lead to uncritical postmodernist
readings of Canetti which completely ignore Canetti's work as a response to
the Holocaust. Recently Harriet Murphy has attempted to turn Canetti into a
Nietzschean. Despite Canetti's attacks on Nietzsche, Murphy conceives of the
work of the former as a glorification of power and violence: »It would be ap-
propriate to see Canetti less as an opponent of power and violence and more as
wily, masterful, cunning ally, of both power and violence as sources of magical
life.«2 As has been argued in this essay, this is precisely what Canetti is work-
ing against. In her eagerness to depict Canetti's writings as a self-referential
aesthetic universe, »devoid of concrete references«,3 Murphy celebrates a Nietz-
scheanism that leaves out the deep shock at the Nazi genocide which a work
like Crowds and Power overwhelmingly registers.
There are some links between a Nietzschean attempt at overcoming the hu-
man condition through a disregard of suffering and the crimes perpetrated by the
Nazis. It is against this uncanny historical connection (about which Nietzsche
himself would likely have been disturbed) that Steiner and Canetti argue against
the transgression of liminality by deflating a Nietzschean notion of power as, in-
stead of transcending it, being dependent on death and suffering. Nietzsche's
non-acceptance of human liminality issues in a plea for the abolition of values
that respond to such liminality. It is against this background that cultural histori-
an Steven E. Aschheim associated Nietzsche's philosophy with the »moral and
historical significance of Nazism« which »lies precisely in its unprecedented trans-
valuations and boundary-breaking extremities, its transgressive acts and shattering
of previously intact taboos«.4 Steiner's and Canetti's responses to the Holocaust
meet in their rejection of transgressive acts and the Nietzschean glorification of a
self-sufficient notion of power that makes possible such transgressions. As we
have seen in chapter 3.1, Canetti himself exerts power, but this exertion needs to
be interpreted as the violence implicit in the act of persuasion. Thus his deploy-
ment of power is not self-sufficient; rather, it serves an ethical end.
In the same manner, Steiner does not depict the >primitive< as a non-violent
entity. As we have seen in chapter 5.2, Steiner makes it clear that >primitives< are
not removed from writing and the violence that goes with it. Here one could, for
example, bring in Derrida who criticizes both Rousseau and Levi-Strauss for
2
Harriet Murphy: Canetti and Nietzsche. Theories of Humor in >Die Blendung<. Alba-
ny: State University of New York Press 1997 (SUNY Series. The Margins of Litera-
ture), p. 349.
3
Ibid., p. 47.
4
Steven E. Aschheim: Nietzsche, Anti-Semitism, and the Holocaust. In: Jacob Golomb
(Ed.): Nietzsche and Jewish Culture. London: Routledge 1997, p. 3-20, p. 16.
Steiner 's and Canetti 's Contribution to Debates About Postmodernity 193

idealizing the >primitive< as the absence of the written. Derrida also establishes a
link between this revolt against writing and the rejection of law: »it [ the
idealization of »the immediate range of the voice«] relates [...] to the Anarchistic
and Libertarian protestations against Law, the Powers, and the State in general«.5
He accuses Levi-Strauss of failing to differentiate between power and coercion:
Levi Strauss does not distinguish between hierarchization and domination, between
political authority and exploitation. The tone that pervades these reflections is of an
anarchism that deliberately confounds law and oppression.6

As we have seen in chapter 5.2, Steiner avoids such conflation in his anthro-
pology. This means that his evaluation of the >primitive< over the >modern<
does not lead to an idealization of the former. Rather, Steiner delineates alter-
native ways cognitively of relating to danger, and one is >safer< than the other.
Thus, Steiner does not interpret avoidance behavior to danger as being intrin-
sically linked to a specific geographical place or a specific ethnic group. As we
have seen in chapter 5.2, Steiner links the Jewish and the >primitive< or >Oriental<
in order to deconstruct the binary opposition between the Jews and the victims of
modernization in anti-Semitic discourse. As a consequence of this conflation,
Steiner discusses the >primitive< in terms of Judaism: we have seen how in his
thesis on slavery Steiner discusses >slavery< in the Hebrew Bible as exemplary
for >Oriental< and >primitive< ways of integrating foreigners. In chapter 8 I have
examined how Canetti interprets his friend's concentration on the theme of law
and taboo as an intense concern with one of the main elements in Judaism. Stei-
ner perceives taboos and laws as fluid limits that are always open to reinterpreta-
tion. The tension between the fixed and the fluid characterizes the oscillation
between Mischna (the codified law) and Gemara (the dialogue about the Mischna).
What justifies, however, Steiner's conflation of Jewish law with >primitive< ta-
boo other than a response to modern anti-Semitism? To answer this question we
have to take into account Steiner's image of Egypt in its relation to Israel.7 As
Sander Oilman and Jack Zipes have argued, Egypt marks the Galut as a Diaspora:
But Egypt was both a voluntary outgoing from the the Holy Land, an experience of
mutual benefit (cultural symbiosis) for Jews and Egyptians, and a cruel incarceration
(a true Diaspora). The only answer for this series of false human steps that draw the
Jews away from the Holy Land into the land of Egypt was divine redemption and
the punishment of the »hosts of Egypt« [...].8

5
Jacques Derrida: Of Grammatology. Trans, by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press 1976, p. 138.
6
Ibid., p. 131.
7
For a detailed discussion of this point see my article: Ägypten und Israel im Werk
Franz Baermann Steiners. Ein Beitrag zur Ägyptenrezeption in deutscher Dichtung der
Neuzeit. In: Dialog. Zeitschrift Deutsch-Ägyptischer Gesellschaften 7 (1999), p. 15-23.
8
Sander L. Oilman and Jack Zipes: Introduction. In: S. Oilman and J. Zipes (Ed.): Yale
Companion to Jewish Writing and Thought in German Culture, 1096-1996. New Ha-
ven/Conn.: Yale University Press 1997, p. XVII-XXXIV, XIX-XX.
194 Conclusion

In a poem on slavery in Egypt, Steiner makes the Biblical narration fluid by turn-
ing the punishment of the Egyptians into a blessing for Egypt. Steiner portrays
the Egyptian oppressors as the guardians of a death cult, which not only enslaves
Israel but also Egypt. In »Der Aufseher« (»The Taskmaster«) the biblical task-
masters are Uschaptis; as oppressors they are already that on which the Hebrew
slaves have to work: clayfigures that accompany the pharaoh into the realm of
death. Steiner interprets Moses, the liberator neither as an Egyptian nor as a He-
brew but as a Midian. Moses as Midian prince destroys the clayfigures which the
Hebrew slaves have to form under the supervision of their Egyptian taskmasters:

O Herr und knecht, o herr und knecht.

Harter lehm zerbirst unterm stab des prinzen;
Der Herrschaft Sorgfalt ist zerstückt, in die gruft des heim
Blut rinnt des lebens, o Midjan!

O master and slave. O master and slave.

Hard loam bursts under the prince's rod;
Dominion's painstaking drudgery falls apart, into the master's vault
The blood of life trickles. O Midian!9

The bursting of the clay causes the blood of life to run into the tomb of the pha-
raoh (»in die gruft des heim / Blut rinnt des Lebens. o Midjan!«).10 Rather than
resulting in death, punishment of the Egyptian oppressor means the liberation of
Egypt from death and it enables the creation of Israel as community that follows
Mosaic laws. Strikingly, Steiner's Moses liberates Egypt as well as Israel. In doing
so Steiner undermines the binary opposition between Moses as the figure of the
Jews and the Pharaoh as the representative of the Egyptians. It is this binary op-
position between Egypt as the old and Israel as the new which Jan Assmann sees
at the root of European anti-Semitism.11 It is this contrast between the old and
the new which also figures in the conflict between Christianity and Judaism. In
Steiner's poem this antagonism ceases to matter, since his Moses is coming from
a place removed from both the imperial power (Egypt) and its victims (the He-
brews). In the same way Steiner changes geographical points of desire. In Stei-
ner's poem the promised land is Midian rather than Canaan. It is the >primitive<
community of the Midians which promises an end of slavery to the Hebrews and it
is Moses' arrival from Midian which liberates the Egyptians and the Hebrews
from their oppressors.12 In this way the >Oriental< (Egypt) can also be the op-
pressive. However, oppression can always be transformed. It is this transforma-
tive potential, which Steiner sees embodied in the >primitive< (Midian) and it is
9
Steiner, Modern Poetry in Translation (p. 173, note 70), p. 36.
10
Steiner, Unruhe ohne Uhr (p. 158, note 24), p. 28.
1
' For a discussion of this point see Jan Assmann: Moses the Egyptian. The Memory of
Egypt in Western Monotheism. Cambridge/Mass.: Harvard University Press 1997.
12
The copula between »o herr und knecht« emphasizes the connection between op-
pressed and oppressor.
Steiner 's and Canetti 's Contribution to Debates About Postmodernity 195

thanks to this transformation that Moses' coming and returning to Midian

creates Israel. This transformation of dead clay into the blood of life does not
issue in a paradisial state but it enables a life freed from oppression. It is thus
the >primitive< that frees the Egyptian from an oppressive imperial reign and in
doing so makes possible the creation of a Jewish way of life, which tries to
overcome slavery and violence through the following of Mosaic laws. As we
have seen at the end of chapter 5.3, Steiner interprets the Jewish as opposing
modern Christian Europe. Indeed, Steiner sees the Jews as those who can in-
augurate an »Asian renaissance.« In this way Steiner's identification as a Jew
with the >primitive< and >Oriental< needs also to be seen as the universalizing
element within Steiner's particular Jewish identity.13 As a Jewish anthropolo-
gist, Steiner wants to reverse dangerous tendencies within modern Europe, but
as »The Taskmaster« exemplifies he also sees the >primitive< and >Oriental< as
liable to follow a similarly dangerous path.
Thus neither Canetti's nor Steiner's response to the Holocaust results in an
idealization of the non-modern. However, their characterization of the >primi-
tive< anticipates recent critical theory. Canetti's defence of metamorphosis can
be seen in the light of an affirmation of Derridean linguistic fluidity. Yet Canetti
does not stop short at the level of language. As we have seen throughout part I,
for Canetti the concept of metamorphosis functions as a means of taking the
sting out of the exertion of power by outdoing the threat of death. Similarly,
Steiner's deconstructive deconceptualization of notionalities reaches out into
social concerns. Steiner combines a philosophy of the limit with a sociology of
danger. Drucilla Cornell has recently renamed deconstruction as the philoso-
phy of the limit in order to dissociate the latter from postmodernist con-
notations. Cornell traces the beginning of such a philosophy back to Adorno
who undermined Hegel's »absolute identification of object and concept«.14 As
we have seen in chapter 5.2, Steiner anticipates such deconceptualizations in
his anthropology. Indeed, Adorno felt a deep affinity with Steiner's theoretical
approach and encouraged an edition of his writings; unfortunately Adorno's
encouragements fell on deaf ears.15
A direct influence of Steiner's deconstruction of Western anthropology can
be found in Louis Dumont. As has been mentioned in chapter 4.4, Dumont
gave together with Steiner a seminar on the »Sociology of Language« in Ox-
ford (1952). Dumont differentiates himself from Marcel Mauss and his other
teachers by emphasising the analysis of modern texts rather than the study of
contemporary >primitive< peoples (»we are studying texts and not living peo-

13
For a discussion of »the passionate commitment to Jewish difference and the equally
passionate commitment to universal humanity« see Daniel Boyarin: A Radical Jew.
Paul and the Politics of Identity. Berkeley: University of California Press 1997, p. 12.
14
Drucilla Cornell: The Philosophy of the Limit. London: Routledge 1992, p. 25.
15
In a letter of January 1954 to H. G. Adler Adorno expresses his deep affinity to Stei-
ner's philosophy.
196 Conclusion

pie«).16 As we have seen, this is precisely what Steiner had done before Dumont.
In this way Steiner's deconstructive investigations into the limits of conceptua-
lity have been further developed not only by Dumont and Adorno, but also, as
we have seen in chapter 5.1, by Said. Steiner's sociology of danger also had some
impact on Mary Douglas and Julia Kristeva. In Purity and Danger Douglas de-
lineates her methodological focus on the particular by direct reference to Steiner:
Each primitive culture is a universe to itself. Following Franz Steiner's advice in
Taboo, I start interpreting rules of uncleanness by placing them in the full context of
the range of dangers possible in any given universe.17
As we have seen in chapter 5.2, Steiner argues for a comparative method that
analyzes each society in its full social context, and Douglas' »each primitive
culture is a universe to itself« clearly takes up Steiner's critique of Radcliffe-
Brown's approach. Similarly, Douglas' appreciation of >primitive< rituals as
opposed to modem atomization harks back to Steiner's critique of individual-
ism. Douglas characterizes >modern< societies as lacking rituals that unite the
whole of a given community: in >primitive< worlds the individual is controlled
by society, whereas in >modernity< the individual tries to control the commu-
nity. Rituals can only have a strong social effect if they are taken to be >true<
throughout the whole of society; if society fragments, the social impact of ri-
tuals fade.18 Indeed in Implicit Meanings Douglas refers to Steiner's article on
the Chagga concepts of truth when she discusses the importance of rituals for
the sociological grounding of ethics.19 However, Talal Asad has argued that
there are differences between Douglas' and Steiner's approach:
His [Steiner's] argument was that tabu did not constitute a single institution nor pose
a single kind of problem. But out of this critical effort emerged a positive conclu-
sion: Steiner's proposal for developing what he called the sociology of danger,
which would inquire into the way all situations of danger (not only those created by
tabu-breaking) were culturally defined and dealt with. In principle, this allowed for
the possibility of transformation. Douglas took over the idea of a sociology of dan-
ger from Steiner but rehabilitated the notion of tabu, which the latter tried to dis-
credit. [...] Ritual danger was now essentially the danger of pollution (»matter out of
place«), and the ritual treatment of danger invariably reinforced existing social, psy-
chological, and cosmological boundaries.20

16
Louis Dumont: Essays on Individualism. Modern Ideology in Anthropological Per-
spective. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1986, p. 13.
17
Mary Douglas: Purity and Danger (p. 104, note 82), p. 4.
18
Douglas speaks of »the poverty of our rituals.« Significantly, she relates this poverty
to »the current concern with the unreality of experience« (what is otherwise called
»virtuality«) »and to our emancipation from what Kant called the shackles of the
subjective conditions of knowledge.« See M. Douglas: In the Active Voice. London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul 1982, p. 37-38.
19
For Douglas's discussion of this point see Implicit Meanings. Essays in Anthropol-
ogy. London: Routledge 1991, p. 128.
20
Asad, Genealogies of Religion (p. 106, note 90), p. 146.
Steiner 's and Canetti 's Contribution to Debates About Postmodernity 197

Space does not permit a discussion of Asad's interpretation of Douglas' ap-

proach.21 But it should be noted that Steiner's »sociology of danger« has im-
plications for cultural practices. Indeed, as the discussion of his deconceptuali-
sing methodology in chapter 5.2 has shown, he also develops a philosophy of
the limit.
Another critique should also be mentioned; although Kristeva refers to both
Steiner and Douglas,22 appreciating taboo as what »curtails sacrifice«,23 she only
focuses on taxonomy. By curtailing the desire to kill, law prevents sin and in
doing so it helps to enact charity in a postlapsarian world. As taxonomy law
signifies the abject or the sinful which must be avoided. However, Kristeva fails
to point out the fluidity in both taxonomy and in the reality which such taxon-
omy denotes. Asad has drawn attention to the ever-changing situationality of
danger in Steiner's sociological thought, and, as we have seen in chapter 5.1, for
Steiner the danger of one situation is not absolute; it can pass away with the flow
of time. Thus criminals are taken out of their community until they are free from
violent impulses, so that they can be reintegrated into new societal units. In the
same manner, taboo does not incapacitate action in a dangerous situation, for it lo-
calizes where exactly the danger lies at a specific point of time. Such localization
needs continually to be made so as to trace the movement of specific dangers.
In chapter 8 we have seen how Steiner insists on the interpretation of the
written law. As Cornell has pointed out, »interpretation is transformation«.24
Transformation implies action. Cornell, however, opts for undecidability. Here
lies the difference between Steiner's philosophy of the limit that cannot be
separated from his sociology of danger and Cornell's limiting of conceptuali-
zation that paradoxically neglects liminality by issuing into what Gillian Rose
has called »passivity beyond passivity«.25 Why does Cornell's philosophy of
the limit do away with liminality? While limiting the applicability of concepts,
Cornell does not develop a sociology that tries to come to terms with the vul-
nerability of both bodies and the body politic. In other words, a philosophy of
the limit without a sociology of danger falls pray to abstractions that decon-
structive deconceptualizations set out to overcome.
This can be illustrated by a comparison between Derrida's Of' Grammatology
and his more recent work. As we have seen above, in Of Grammatology, Derrida
criticizes an anarchistic rejection of the law. In his recent work,26 however, Der-
21
Douglas' evaluation of »negative rites« (Purity and Danger [p. 104, note 82], p. 73)
indicates that Asad is wrong, when he argues that she rehabilitates the notion of taboo.
22
»Anthropologists, since Sir James Frazer [...] or Rudolf [!] Steiner, have noted that
>filth<, which has become sacred >defilement<, is the excluded on the basis of which re-
ligious prohibition is made up.« See Julia Kristeva: Powers of Horror. An Essay on
Abjection. New York: Columbia University Press 1982 (European Perspectives), p. 65.
23
Ibid., p. 112.
24
Cornell, The Philosophy of the Limit (p. 195, note 14), p. 115.
25
Gillian Rose: Mourning Becomes the Law. Philosophy and Representation. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 1996, p. 37.
26
Most notably in his »The Force of Law« (p. 163, note 40).
198 Conclusion

rida has become influenced by a Benjaminian perception of law as necessarily

falling prey to the violence that goes with every form of human action in a
postlapsarian world. As we have seen in chapter 5.3 and chapter 8, Steiner
develops a sociology of danger in order to come to terms with the limitless
violence perpetrated in the Nazi genocide. The traumatic shock of the Holo-
caust leads Steiner to think about how life can become less violent in a fallen
world. Taboo and law does not condemn the totality of profane existence to a
fallen state, instead it points to localities that are free from such a condition. In
his »Zur Kritik der Gewalt«, on the other hand, Benjamin not only rejects law,
he also does away with any form of legality and social normativity, as they are
inevitably implicated in violence:
We are above all obligated to note that a totally non-violent resolution of conflicts
can never lead to a legal contract. For the latter, however peacefully it may have
been entered into by the parties, leads finally to violence.27
Benjamin only allows for a non-violent solution in the sphere of private but not
in the political dimension of public intersubjectivity.28 In this way he contrasts
the heart (love) of subjectivity with the law of objectivity. Benjamin does not
conceive of a mediation between law and charity,29 so that finally only the
loving violence of the Divine can abolish the violence of law. Behind this
rejection of all kinds of legal contract lies the total dismissal of all forms of
public behavior within the context of a postlapsarian condition:
[...] every conceivable solution to human problems, not to speak of deliverance from
the confines of all world-historical conditions of existence obtained hitherto, remains
impossible if violence is totally excluded in principle [...].«3°
As we have seen, Steiner develops a sociological philosophy in order to reduce
the violence within the human condition to that of social coercion which en-
forces the avoidance of the violence of blood-shedding power.
The differences between Steiner and Benjamin's approach to the question of
danger and violence needs to be seen within the context of their respective phi-
losophical traditions. Whereas Benjamin's opposition between profane imper-
27
Walter Benjamin: One Way Street and Other Writings. Trans, by Edmund Jephcott /
Kingsley Shorter. London: NLB 1979, p. 142.
28
»Ist überhaupt gewaltlose Beilegung von Konflikten möglich? Ohne Zweifel. Die
Verhältnisse zwischen Privatpersonen sind voll von Beispielen dafür. Gewaltlose Eini-
gung findet sich überall, wo die Kultur des Herzens den Menschen reine Mittel der
Übereinkunft an die Hand gegeben hat.« See W. Benjamin: »Metaphysisch-geschichts-
philosophische Studien: Zur Kritik der Gewalt«. In: W. B.: Gesammelte Schriften.
Vierter Band. Unter Mitwirkung von Theodor W. Adorno und Gerschom Scholem hg.
von Rolf Tiedemann und Hermann Schweppenhäuser. Bd II/l: Aufsätze, Essays, Vor-
träge. Hg. von R. Tiedemann und H. Schweppenhäuser. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp
1980 (Werkausgabe Edition Suhrkamp), p. 179-203, p. 191.
29
For a discussion of this point see my article: Law and Charity. Walter Benjamin, Leo
Strauss, Georg Simmel, Franz Baermann Steiner. Forthcoming in Law Text Culture.
30
Ibid., p. 147.
Steiner 's and Canetti 's Contribution ίο Debates About Postmodernity 199

fection and messianic purity harks back to his Kantian studies,31 Steiner's search
for ways within an imperfect world to diminish contact with the dangerous has
its philosophical grounds in a Simmelian critique of Kantian transcendental-
ism. Space does not permit a discussion of the complex relationship between
Kant and Benjamin.32 However, it should be noted here that the latter under-
mines the anti-bodily philosophy of the former by advocating the fulfilment of
profane »happiness«,33 and yet this very intensification of anarchical activities
should result in the destruction of the profane capitalist world which inaugu-
rates the coming of the Messiah.
Like Benjamin, Derrida seems gradually to have become impatient with the
imperfection of a postlapsarian world.34 Nevertheless Derrida acknowledges
the danger of a Benjaminian messianism. In his essay »The Force of Law«,
Derrida has drawn attention to a somewhat worrying similarity between a Ben-
jaminian messianic »destruction« and a Heideggerian »Destruktion«.35 What
causes Derrida's worries? What urges him to reflect on Benjamin's proximity
to Heidegger and to a possible involvement in thought that bears some respon-
sibility for the >Final Solutiom? Derrida's anxiety has to do with the will to
radical annihilation of profane life that marks Benjamin's messianic nihilism.
As we have seen, it is against this background that Benjamin rejects any form
of social contract in an unredeemed world.
However, Derrida has himself developed Benjamin's antinomian stance in his
most recent works. While he differentiates his position from any attachment to a
political cause that might justify physical destruction, it could be argued that
Derrida clings to a transcendentalism which rejects empirical foundations. Thus
he emphasizes that his notion of the non-referential messianic radically opposes
any kind of messianism36 as delineated by Benjamin. In Given Time he does
away with »any kind of relation«,37 be it law or economy. Similarly, in The Gift
of Death, following a Kantian dichotomy between transcendence and imma-
nence,38 Derrida discards the laws of this world as violating the ethics of a
3
' As witness see Walter Benjamin's » ber das Programm der Kommenden Philosophie«.
32
See my article »Between Kant and Kafka« (p. 186, note 114).
33
Most notably in Benjamin's »Theologisch-Politisches Fragment«.
34
Like Benjamin he opposes the public with the private in his Politics of Friendship.
Trans, by George Collins. London: Verso 1997.
35
»It is the thought of difference between these destructions [Heidegger's and Benja-
min's] on the one hand and a deconstructive affirmation on the other that has guided
me tonight in this reading. It is this thought that the memory of the final solution seems
to me to dictate.« Derrida, The Force of Law (p. 163, note 40), p. 63.
36
See Jacques Derrida: Archive Fever. A Freudian Impression. Trans, by Eric Pre-
nowitz. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1996 (Religion and Postmodernism),
p. 72 and his Specters of Marx. The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and
the New International. Trans, by Peggy Kamuf. London: Routledge 1994.
37
Derrida, Given Time (p. 165, note 45), p. 35.
38
For a discussion of the influence of Kant's transcendentalism on Derrida see Rodol-
phe Gasche": The Tain of the Mirror. Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection. Cam-
200 Conclusion

wholly transcendent God. Recently, Catherine Pickstock has drawn attention to a

rejection of sociological intersubjectivity within Derrida's anti-empirical tran-
scendentalism, pointing out that »it does not embody itself in peoples' everyday
rituals and practices«.39 The absolutism of such an approach plays off sacrifice
against ethics: »[...] ethics must be sacrificed in the name of duty.«40 What pre-
conditions such binary oppositions between ethics and duty? The justification of
such antagonism lies in an antinomy between theology and materialism that
characterizes the structural movement of Benjamin's messianic thought (which
Derrida adopts, though abstaining from giving it political and sociological con-
tent).41 It is this antinomy which necessitates Benjamin's rejection of law and
with it any form of social contract. As a result Benjamin's and Derrida's decon-
ceptualizations result in the despair at a world riddled with imperfection, where-
as Steiner's deconstruction mediates between the fluidity of a constantly chang-
ing material world and the fluidity within various taxonomies by means of which
a relation between ethical thought and responsible social action can be made
possible. In this way action and reflection constantly act upon each other and
point to their respective failings or achievements.
By contrast Cornell argues that the philosophy of the limit imposes upon us
»the infinite responsibility« of »undecidibility«.42 Responsibility here remains
merely philosophical in the sense of the noumenal; the insights into the limits
of conceptualization do not affirm a mediation between the material and the
intellectual. To refrain from making a decision may leave the philosopher
untouched by violence, but it also leaves him or her detached from a carefully
thought-out form of social behavior. Cornell's infinite responsibility that even-
tuates in undecidability contrasts with Steiner' s finite responsibility in an infi-

bridge/Mass.: Harvard University Press 1986, p. 276 and John D. Caputo: The Prayers
and Tears of Jacques Derrida. Religion without Religion. Bloomington: Indiana Uni-
versity Press 1997 (The Indiana Series in the Philosophy of Religion), p. 170.
39
Catherine Pickstock: Postmodern Theology? In: Telos 110 (1998), p. 167-179.
40
Derrida, The Gift of Death (p. 165, note 45), p. 67.
41
For a discussion of this antinomy see Richard Wolin: Walter Benjamin. An Aesthetic
of Redemption. New York: Columbia University Press 1982, p. 7. Wolin describes
Benjamin's politics as the wish to »act >ruthlessly< and >radically<, and never >con-
sistently< - for to act consistently would be tantamount to an avowal of belief in the
meaningfulness of profane ends, a compromise that is fatal from a Messianic point
of view.« (p. 117) More recently Berth Sharon Ash has criticized Benjamin's rejec-
tion of the laws of the profane world as a libidinal rebellion against his father in the
name of an omnipotent divine father: »For his [Benjamin's] part, the son uncon-
sciously blames the father for conditions the son is helpless to change, or which can
only be altered in wish fantasy. According to Benjamin's extreme version of Messi-
anic history, nothing short of an impossible and inexpressible perfection (the lost
paradise of humankind's childhood), inexpressibly returned to us by divine justice,
will suffice.« See B. S. Ash: Ethnic Fears, Oedipal Anxieties, Political Consequen-
ces. In: New German Critique 48 (1989), p. 2-42, p. 17.
42
Cornell, The Philosophy of the Limit (p. 195, note 14), p. 169.
Steiner 's and Canetti 's Contribution to Debates About Postmodernity 201

nite variety of decidibilities that change from context to context. As we have

seen Cornell's split between responsibility and decidibility originates in a di-
chotomy of the profane and the holy as expounded by the Kantian form of
Benjamin's messianism. If Cornell's and Derrida's thought develop within a
Kantian transcendental structure, what is Steiner's theoretical background that
promotes a combination of empirical and intellectual concerns?
In chapter 4.1 Steiner's debt to Simmel was discussed within a sociological
context. Yet Steiner himself did not see the latter as a sociologist but primarily
as a philosopher. Finally, in these concluding pages, I will argue that Simmel's
mediation between the real and the ideal helped Steiner to advance a combina-
tion of a philosophy of the limit and a sociology of danger. Steiner's attraction
to Simmel's thought needs to be seen in the context of the latter's critique of
the dualism that establishes a basis for Kantian transcendentalism. If Benjamin
clings to a Kantian dichotomy between the >profane< and the intellectual, while
at the same time undermining it,43 Simmel attempts to reconcile the empirical
with the spiritual. Significantly, Simmel discusses danger in the context of a
Kantian positing of the non-empirical as the >real<. He perceives a »tremen-
dous danger« (»die ungeheure Gefahr«)44 in a construction of a social world on
the basis of the non-recognisability of the Kantian thing-in-itself (»die Gefahr,
das schlechthin Unerkennbare der Dinge-an-sich doch zu einer Welt auszub-
auen«),45 just äs Steiner interprets >danger< as blindness to danger in empirical
reality. Indeed, this continuity in Steiner's and Simmel's thinking is not acci-
dental. As has been mentioned in chapter 4.1, Steiner gave lectures on Simmel
at the department of Social Anthropology, University of Oxford, in Michael-
mas Term 1952. He praised Simmel for having undermined a body-soul dicho-
tomy, thus alluding to Simmel's critique of Kant's transcendentalism.

In his criticism of Kant, Simmel develops his conception of the »immanent

ideal« (»immanentes Ideal«) of the sensuous (»Sinnliches«).46 In particular, he
accuses Kant of sacrificing ethical concerns to the abstract requirements of
systematic science.47 Abstract law is static and has therefore no relation to the
ongoing change in social life. Paradoxically, on account of its categorality, the
Kantian imperative furthers >private law< by making the law proclaimed inap-
plicable. For Kant, the individual is the guardian of law, which is general in
application. Law and the totality of individuals in a given society diverge from
each other with the result that law paradoxically outlaws law. Kant's categori-
43
An example of such subversion is Benjamin's notion of »profane illumination«. For
a discussion of this point see my article forthcoming in Neophilologus.
44
Simmel, Kant (p. 191, note 1), p. 180.
45
Ibid.
46
Georg Simmel: Das individuelle Gesetz. Philosophische Exkurse. Hg. und eingelei-
tet von Michael Landmann. Neuausgabe, l. Aufl. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp 1987
(Suhrkamp-Taschenbuch Wissenschaft; 660), p. 194.
47
Ibid., p. 182.
202 Conclusion

cal imperative may be logical, but its logic has no connection to the life it is
supposed to guide.48 As we have seen, in a similar manner Cornell's and Der-
rida's responsibility may be purer than a Hegelian imposition of law or spirit
on to the particularity of the material, but at the same time it does not engage
in a valid or active manner with material existence on account of its wholly
spiritual insistence on undecidibility.
Indeed, one can argue that Kant's idealism as well as a Derridian espousal of
the >ghostly< issues in a transgression of empirical limits. Kant's idealism means
a belief in the overcoming of natural inclinations by virtue of a transcendental
law of pure goodness. In this way, his categorical imperative transgresses the
limits of the human condition. Indeed, Rüdiger Safranski has recently pointed
out the similarities between Sade's and Kant's transcendentalism: Sade replaces
Kant's transcendental goodness with evil; however, the movement towards hu-
man omnipotence as the transgression of empirical liminality characterizes the
way both philosophers think.49 Similarly, we have seen how Derrida's absolut-
ism in The Gift of Death contradicts his deconceptualising deconstructive ap-
proach and therefore encourages the transgression of liminality in the name of an
otherworldly duty. Simmel thus deconstructs in advance just such dichotomies
between spirit and body, between duty and ethics.
However, as Steiner pointed out in his Oxford lectures, Simmel paradoxically
reintroduces thinking in dichotomies by separating form (the intelligible) from
content (the sensuous). Steiner owes a great debt to Simmel for having shown
that the idealism of the transcendental results in the corruption of the >profane<
and for having advocated the establishment of an immanent ideal of the sensu-
ous. Nevertheless, as we have seen in chapter 5.3, Steiner developed his sociol-
ogy of danger independently of Simmel, in response to the limitless destruction
of life in the Nazi genocide. Steiner's philosophical and sociological preoccupa-
tion with liminality and danger can be located in the year 1944, when he finished
his essay »Über den Prozess der Zivilisierung«. As we have seen, here Steiner
advances his philosophy of the limit and his sociology of danger with direct
reference to the overwhelming horrors of Nazi concentration camps.
Steiner's sociology of danger and his philosophy of the limit underline the
necessity for a »working-through« of the Holocaust, if one seeks to engage
thoughtfully with transgressive forms of theory and practice in contemporary
society. As I have shown in chapter 8, the contribution of Canetti's »working-
through« the Holocaust participates in Steiner's sociology of danger and in his
philosophy of the limit: what Steiner calls danger, Canetti attacks as death. Ca-
netti, however, lacks a detailed sociological theory as has been developed by
Steiner. This is not surprising, if one keeps in mind that the latter was a profes-

48
This is a summary of Simmel's critique of Kant (ibid., p. 192).
49
For Safranski's critique of Sade's and Kant's transcendentalism as a radical excess
that does not know any limits see Rüdiger Safranski: Das Böse oder das Drama der
Freiheit. München: Hanser 1997, p. 209.
Steiner 's and Canetti 's Contribution to Debates About Postmodernity 203

sional anthropologist. Having shown the extent of the collaboration between

Canetti and Steiner in their respective responses to the Holocaust, I have fo-
cused on Steiner's detailed philosophical and sociological argument in this
concluding section. As has been shown throughout this essay, Steiner's and
Canetti's respective responses to the Holocaust consist in a critique of static
ways of thought, affirming >metamorphosis<, and a deconceptualized under-
standing of the world which connects linguistic fluidity to the ever-changing
contextualities of social and embodied life.
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Index
Adler, H. G. 2,7, 15,42, 195
Adler, Jeremy 2,82, 104, 123
Adorno, Theodor W. 5, 16-17, 55,
142, 156, 195-196
Agus, Aharon 170
AhadHa-Am 110
Alverdes, Friedrich 162
Amery, Jean 177-178
Angus, Aharon 170
Arie-Gaifman, Hana 2-3
Aristotle 115-116,154-155
Asad,Talal 98, 196-197
Aschheim, Steven E. 110,192
Ash, Berth Sharon 200
Assmann, Jan 194
Atze, Marcel 2
Baioni, Guiliano 110
Bakhtin, Mikhail 8
Barnett, W. 126
Barnouw, Dagmar 9-10, 12, 23-24,
31
Barth, Martina 32
Barthes, Roland 143
Bartsch, Kurt 24
Baudelaire, Charles 73
Bauman, Zygmunt 128, 135, 137,
160, 178-179
Baur, Ruprecht Salvko 15
Bayley, John 31
Beer, Gillian 2, 128
Beidelman, Thomas O. 123-125
Beller, Steven 46
Bellow, Saul I
Benedict, Ruth 20,51,79-80
Benjamin, Walter 198-201
Bennett, Tony 59
Bergmann, Hugo 3
Berman, Rüssel R. 37
Bhabha, Homi 98, 107
Biagioli, Mario 14, 137
Bienek, Horst 17-18
Binder, Hartmut 110
Bleek, Wilhelm I. 68-70, 77
Bloom, Harold 23
Blumenberg, Hans 187-188
Boa, Elizabeth 110,183
Boas, Franz 85, 140
Bohannan, Paul 106,117
Bohrer, Karl Heinz 48
Bollacher, Martin 40
Booth, Wayne C. 53
Borch-Jacobsen, Mikkel 61
Botstein, Leon 5
Boyarin, Daniel 195
Broch, Hermann 10-13, 15, 18, 23-
24,44, 149
Brüll, Paul 86, 181
Buber, Martin 110
Burckhardt, Jacob 41^2, 44
Burke, Kenneth 151
Cabral, Amilcar 110
Calasso, Roberto 159
Callaway, Henry 78
Caputo, John D. 200
Chaucer, Geoffrey 150
Chen, Viktoria 126
Clifford, James 126
Collini, Stefan 89
Conrad,Joseph 51
Cook, James 120-121
Cornell, Drucilla 5, 195, 197, 200-202
Damrosh, David 162,185
Darby, David 37
Darwin, Charles 92
Derrida, Jacques 5,143,163,165,
183, 191-193, 197-202
Descartes, Rene 43
Dietsch, Steifen 31
Dissinger, Dieter 34-35
228 Index

Doppler, Alfred 34 Gilbert, Martin 173

Dostoevsky, Fyodor M. 51 Gillen,F. J. 70,72-73
Douglas, Mary 2, 85, 104, 144, 184, Oilman, Sander 7, 14, 109, 193
196-197 Goffman, Erving 20
Dschingis Khan 54 Goldhagen, Daniel Jonah 6, 111-112
Dumont, Louis 104, 157, 172, 195- Goltschnigg, Dietmar 11
196 Grimm, Jakob and Wilhelm 35, 163
Durkheim, Emile 131-132 Grünbein, Durs 66,152
Durzak, Manfred 9, 18
Habermas, Jürgen 111
Eigler, Friederike 23, 28 Hädecke, Wolfgang 15,31
Elbaz, Robert 33 Hadomi, Leah 33
Elias, Norbert 135-140,142,145- Hambly, Wilfrid D. 63-64
146 Hamburger, Michael 174
Eliot, T. S. 39,73 Hart, E. 162-163
Elkin, Adolphus Peter 70, 72-73 Hartman, Geoffrey 1, 6, 17-18, 164
Ellmann, Maud 39 Härtung, Rudolf 2, 18-19, 33, 157,
Erdheim, Mario 60 164-165, 169, 173-174, 189
Evans-Pritchard, Edward E. 3-4, 76, Hatvani, Paul 48
82-83, 102-106, 123, 128-129, 131 Hartwich, Wolf-Daniel 182
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 29,
Fanon, Frantz 110 91-92,146, 195,202
Pardon, Richard 123 Heidegger, Martin 43, 199
Felman, Soshana 18 Heine-Geldern, Robert 84
Felstiner, John 17 Heinsohn, Gunnar 167, 179
Fetscher, Iring 17 Herder, Johann Gottfried 127
Firth, Raymond 24,97 Herodot 31-32,41
Fischer, Ernst 24,29 Herzl, Theodor 110-111
Fleischli, Alfons 2, 84, 86, 92, 108 Herzog, Dagmar 6
Foucault, Michel 112, 116, 121, 128, Hilberg, Raul 178
143 Himmler, Heinrich 141,178
Frazer, Alfred R. 103 Hitler, Adolf 17, 54, 61, 112, 179
Frazer, James 81, 82, 89, 91-92, 94, Hobbes, Thomas 26
96-97, 113, 123-124, 125-126, Hobsbawm, Eric 127-128
128-130, 133, 197 Holz, Hans Heinz 16
Freud, Sigmund 11,29, 60-61, 63, Honneth, Axel 20,29
73-74, 99, 130, 138, 140, 142, 146, Hopkins, G. M. 173
160 Horkheimer, Max 55, 142, 156
Freund, Julien 166 Horst, Karl August 12
Friedlander, Saul 178 Huyssen, Andreas 1
Frye, Northrop 150, 152
Jacobson, Arthur 180,186-187
Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand 82, Jerischna, Jan 91
110,112-113, 137 Joachim of Fiore 146
Gasche, Rodolphe 199 Joyce, James 39
Geertz, Clifford 20, 48, 51, 54, 126
Gellner, Ernest 88, 91-92, 107-108, Kafka, Franz 3, 10, 23, 181-185
123 Kant, Immanuel 191, 196, 199, 201-
Georgiev, Palmen 19 202
Ghandi, Mahatma 87 Kaplan, Harold 14,21,137
Index
Kaszynski, Stefan 17
Keats, John 39
Kenk, Fran9oise 11
Kien, Peter 34,37-38
Kluge, Friedrich 35
Kopytoff, Igor 106, 117
Kracauer, Siegfried 6-7
Kraus, Karl 5,10,25-28,38,59
Kraut, Richard 116
Kristeva, Julia 196-197
Krumme, Detlef 38
Kuhnau, Petra 16
Kuper, Adam 85-86, 102
LaCapra, Dominick 5, 18, 21-22, 36,
109, 120, 131, 141, 150-152, 178
Lang, Berel 112,141,151,178
Lanzmann, Claude 18,22, 151
Lawson, Richard H. 9, 29
Le Bon, Gustave 47, 61-63
Leask, Nigel 113
Levi-Strauss, Claude 192-193
Levy-Bruhl, Lucien 85, 94-95
Lichtblau, Klaus 83
Lichtenberg, Georg Christoph 81,
104
Lienhardt, Godfrey 101
Lloyd, L. C. 68-70,77
Mack, Peter 150
Malinowski, Bronislaw 3,51,77,81-
85, 89-104, 122
Mann, Thomas 181-182
Manrique, Jörge 173
Maquet, Jacques J. 98
Marti, Urs 16
Marx, Karl 29, 47, 83-84, 106, 146
Mauss, Marcel 83, 85-88, 195
MC Dougall, William 61
McClelland, John 4,61
McGinn, Colin 189
McMillan, Terry 150
Mead, Margaret 121-122
Meier, Heinrich 167
Meili,Barbara 36
Meillassoux, Claude 106, 117
Melzer, Gerhard 28
Meister Eckhart 174-177
Menke, Christoph 19
Michaels, Anne 9, 149
229
Miers, Suzanne 106, 117
Milbank, John 14-16, 37, 165, 186
Milgrom, Jacob 167-168, 187
Miller, Fred D. 115
Milton, John 125
Montesquieu, Charles Louis de
Secondatde 20, 115
Moore, R. J.B. 119
Moscovici, Serge 4, 61
Moser, Manfred 34
Moses, Stephane 3
Murdock, J. P. 84
Murphy, Harriet 192
Musil, Robert 10
Nährlich-Slatewa, Elena 189
Nairn, Tom 29
Nash, June 97
Nietzsche, Friedrich 43, 56, 104, 112,
120, 143, 166, 191-192
Ölender, Maurice 127
Ortega y Gasset, Jose 47
Ovid 77
Paal, Jutta 34
Palaver, Wolfgang 167
Patterson, Orlando 114
Payne, Harry J. 122
Pecora Vincent P. 111
Pedersen, Johannes 140,146-147
Pessoa, Fernando 39
Pickstock, Catherine 8, 183, 200
Piel, Edgar 15,22
Pirandello, Luigi 39
Pocock, David 120,123
Pollak, Oskar 23
Pope, Alexander 19
Porter, Dennis 107
Preuss, Konrad Theodor 85
Pythagoras 77
Quack, Josef 27
Radcliffe-Brown, Alfred R. 3, 83-84,
89-90,98, 102-104, 118-119,
129-130, 133-134, 164, 196
Radin, Paul 69
Reiss, Hans 32
Renan, Ernest 127
230 Index

Richards, Audrey I. 94 Strauss, Leo 176

Richards, David 96 Strehlow, C. 70-73
Riedner, Nicola 40 Strelka, Joseph P. 11-13
Rilke, Rainer Maria 161 Strolz, Walter 15
Roberts, David 17,34 Swift, Jonathan 19,20-21,51,59
Robertson, Ritchie 48, 56, 59-60, 68,
110 Tamerlan 54
Rose, Gillian 50, 164, 185, 197 Tarde, Gabriel 61
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 192 Taubes, Jacob 146,160,167
Ruppel, Ursula 24 Thornton, R. J. 100
Rüssel, Peter 34 Thurnwald, Richard 84-85
Rycaut, Paul 114 Timms, Edward 27, 34, 37-38, 56
Tolstoy, Leo N. 62-63
Sade, Donatien Alphonse Franfois Tregear, Edward 120
de 202 Tylor, Edward B. 42-43, 88-90, 97,
Safranski, Rüdiger 202 140
Sagan, Eli 117-118
Said, Edward 82,105-108,112-113, Warner, William Lloyd 78-79
115-116, 196 Weber, Max 84, 112, 119-120
Schickel, Joachim 30-33, 75-77 Webber, Andrew 172
Schlant, Ernestine 11 Weigel, Robert 13
Schmid, Georg 46 Werlen, Hansjakob 10
Schmid-Bortenschlager, Sigrid 11 White, Hayden 36, 137, 151
Schmitt, Carl 166-167 Wiesenhöfer, Stephan 40
Schöne, Albrecht 3 Wiggershaus, Rolf 142
Scholem, Gershom 160,169,176,184 Witte, Bernd 23
Schreber, Daniel 60 Wittgenstein, Ludwig 5
Schuh, Franz 17,24 Wolin, Richard 200
Sebald, Winfried Georg 31 Wordsworth, William 164
Serke, Jürgen 2
Shusky, A.N. 116 Yeats, William Butler 73, 161
Simmel, Georg 4, 67, 83-84, 169, Yerushalmi, Yosef Hayim 1
191, 199,201-202 Young, James E. 151,175
Smith, William Robertson 123-130, Young, Robert 107-108, 164
132-135
Sontag, Susan 19 Zipes, Jack 193
Sorin, Raphael 33
Spencer, Baldwin 70, 72-73, 161
Spinoza, Baruch de l
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty 105, 112
Srinivas, Mysore N. 85
Starobinski, Jean 127
Stein, Otto 162,163
Steiner, George 137
Steiner, Stephan 69
Stendhal 46,47,50
Steussloff, Axel G. 10
Stieg, Gerald 11,16,34,60
Stocking, George W. 82, 88-89, 93,
96-100, 102