The 3 Pillars of EW -

Electronic Support

▪ Brian Moore
▪ President, RAS
▪ bmoore@ras.com

▪ November 14, 2019

▪ 14:00 – 15:00 EST
 Brock Sheets
AOC Director of Marketing,
Communications, & Education

2
Gold Sponsor

“Rohde & Schwarz is a close, long-standing partner of government

authorities, armed forces and leading companies in the aerospace and
defense industry.”

Interested in Sponsoring the AOC Virtual Series? Click here

5
Presenter:

Brian Moore
President, Research Associated of Syracuse
bmoore@ras.com
6
The 3 Pillars of EW -
Electronic Support

▪ Brian Moore
▪ President, RAS
▪ bmoore@ras.com

▪ November 14, 2019

▪ 14:00 – 15:00 EST
Second in a series
▪ The Three Pillars of EW
▪ Part 1 – Electronic Attack (EA)
▪ 11/07/2019
▪ Brian “Hinks” Hinkley
▪ Part 2 – Electronic Support (ES)
▪ 11/14/2019
▪ Brian Moore
▪ Part 3 – Electronic Protection (EP)
▪ 11/21/2019
▪ Clayton Stewart
8
Some ES History
▪ 1981 – ICAP II, Soviet era Mediterranean Sea threat situational awareness. Ship type (emitters),
location
▪ 1986 - Libya Strike, Soviet era SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, ZSU and long range SA-5. Situational awareness,
threat location, threat warning, EA support
▪ 1986 -1990 ES missions Pacific Region, Radar Type and location
▪ 1990 – Desert Shield situational awareness, threat location, threat warning
▪ 1991 – Desert Storm EA support, threat location and warning, suppression of enemy air defense
(SEAD)
▪ 1995 – 1998 Bosnia – Threat type, location, and warning. Threat employed mobility, blinking, ambush
▪ 2001 AEA AOA – EA-6B replacement study showed ES was critical impact of long stand-off
▪ 2003 DARPA WolfPack program – Distributed networked ES. Multiple DF tech.
▪ 2005 - 2012 JIEDDO IED threat, ES to support communications and Counter IED.
▪ Commercial systems, rapidly changing threat, yards vs miles, terrain impact, spectrum saturation

9
Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (JEMSO)
Joint Publication 3-13.1
▪ JEMSO are the coordinated efforts of EW and joint electromagnetic
spectrum management operations (JEMSMO) to exploit, attack, protect,
and manage the electromagnetic operational environment (EMOE).

▪ Electro-Magnetic Spectrum Operations (EMSO):Actions taken to

maneuver, operate, control (dominate?) portions of the spectrum to ensure
friendly operations while degrading / denying such access to threats

▪ EW refers to military action involving the use of EM energy and directed

energy (DE) to control the EMS or to attack the enemy.

▪ EW consists of three elements: Electronic Attack (EA), Electronic Protect

(EP), and Electronic Support (ES). JP 3-13.1
10
Electronic Warfare Support (ES)
Joint Publication 3-13.1
▪ ES refers to the element of EW involving actions tasked by, or under direct control of, an
operational commander to:
▪ Search for, Intercept, Identify, and Locate or Localize sources of intentional and unintentional
radiated EM energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition, targeting, planning, and
conduct of future operations.
▪ The distinction between whether a given asset is performing an ES mission or an
intelligence mission is determined by who tasks or controls the collection assets, what
they are tasked to provide, and for what purpose they are tasked.

▪ ES, ELINT(Electronic Intelligence) and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) operations

may share the same or similar assets and resources, and may be tasked to
simultaneously collect information that meets both requirements.

▪ ES – Provides “unprocessed information” (not yet validated by national authority) used

by operational forces to develop and maintain situational awareness for an operationally
defined period of time

See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3210.03C, Joint Electronic
JP 3-13.1
Warfare Policy, for a classified in-depth discussion of the relationship and distinctions
between ES and SIGINT 11
ES – IO and Cyber
▪ Expanding reliance on the EMS for a wide range of purposes increases both the potential and the
challenges of EW in IO.
▪ Increased prevalence of wireless telephone and computer extends the utility and threat of EW
▪ Offers opportunities to exploit an adversary’s EM vulnerabilities and
▪ Adds a need to identify and protect friendly communications from similar exploitation.

▪ EW operations (EA and ES) and attributes (EP) can

▪ Assist in setting the conditions in cyberspace to ensure availability of the area requiring access,
▪ Provide the ability to engage adversaries decisively
▪ Conduct cyberspace operations to enable the creation of the desired effects in the physical domains (i.e., air, land,
maritime, and space) JP 3-13.1

▪ "Tactical EW systems and sensors provide for significant points of presence on the battlefield, and can
be used for cyber situational awareness…” Col. Joseph Dupont, program manager for EW under
Program Executive Office Intelligence, Electronic Warfare and Sensors
12
Passive EW Tasks

Real Time Threat

RWR Radar Warning and What is engaging TACTICAL
Warning Response own-ship right now
& how to respond
Rcvr (RWR) Generation

What is out there

today and what is
Collect Information
Electronic important.
on the Electronic
Support Detect and
Order of Battle characterize
(ES) interference as hostile
jamming or
-Some denoted as Operational ELINT (e.g. RIVET JOINT platform) unintentional EMI
-Historically ELINT was not as real time as ES……
Provide Detailed
Electronic What is potentially
Technical Data on
Intelligence Potential Threat out there and its
(ELINT) System capabilities
STRATEGIC
Sometimes denoted Technical ELINT (e.g. Combat SENT platform)

13
ES / RWR / ELINT -
Distinguished by timeliness and quality / extent of signal measurements
▪ RWR: Tactical platform real-time threat detection and warning
▪ Supports real-time response, maneuver, and/or EA for combat platforms
▪ Historically the least complex….
▪ Historically limited to threat detection (just prior to threat maximum firing range)
▪ Primarily single platform with minimal EWO (operator) interaction

▪ ES: Detection and Situation Assessment of all signals in the battlespace

▪ Employ multi-function receivers for accurate ID, location and assessment of “intent” of all radars and for real-time threat detection and
response (maneuver, EA, etc.)
▪ Used on tactical platforms operating in stealth environments (minimal external data)
▪ Also functions as RWR in many cases
▪ May provide information to or control EA and weapon assets (EA may have a real-time ES/RWR as well)
▪ Detects threat prior to the threat detecting the own-ship platform

▪ ELINT: High value strategic platforms; historically non real-time but being pushed to smaller platforms (UAV)
▪ Accurate signal measurement and location; signal recording
▪ High value assets often using complex, custom equipment and operator involvement
▪ Emerging functionality: Non-Traditional ISR/ELINT on tactical platforms (may be tied to ES)
14
ES / RWR / ELINT -
Distinction between RWR and ELINT is blurring as modern systems are
merging to an ES functionality
▪ OPELINT systems required to support real-time operations
▪ Operate in rapidly changing battlefield
▪ Support net-centric operations
▪ Targeting of Short Up-Time Emitters (SUTE)
▪ Provide RWR functions to address threats with increasingly longer engagement ranges

▪ RWRs required to have higher accuracy and real-time precision targeting to address
▪ Agile, complex and often ambiguous emitters
▪ Highly mobile threat environment
▪ And have the ability to operate autonomously

15
ES Objectives
▪ Provide Situation Awareness of the EMS
▪ Provide cues to
▪ Direct electronic attack operations
▪ Task weapon systems
▪ Initiate self-protection measures
▪ Corroborate other sources of information or intelligence
▪ Support electronic protection efforts
▪ Create or update (mission / theater) EW databases

16
ES System Functions
▪ INTERCEPT and DETECT Emitters
▪ MEASURE Pulses and Signals
▪ Single and multiple pulse parameters
▪ LOCATE or DF(direction find)
▪ Determine Line of Bearing and then Range(over time) or determine LOCATION
▪ Requires multiple receivers or multiple intercepts over time to obtain location information
▪ IDENTIFY
▪ Compare measured parameters with a priori stored data
▪ Correlate with other sensor data
▪ Perform Tactical Situation Assessment (SA) - Threat, Friendly, Unknown
▪ Estimate Threat Priority, Intent and/or Lethality : Modes /Waveforms, i.e., Search, Acquisition, Track, Illuminate, Launch
▪ TRACK:
▪ Correlate intercepts and update Track File / Emitter History
▪ REPORT
▪ To Display and/or Operator
▪ May provide Reports to Off-board Sensors / Platforms -- increasingly common in networked EW
▪ MAY provide RWR capability for self protection
▪ MAY control EA and weapon assets in some applications

17
ES – High Level Block Diagram
, and/or EA Cues

Signal Interception / Detection Pulse Processing Signal / Intercept Processing

Parameter Measurement - Clustering Parameter Analysis/Characterization
RF - Deinterleaving - Scan
Pulsewidth (PW) - Pre-Filtering / Data Limiting - PRI
TOA - Parameter Smoothing - RF Agile
Bearing (AOA) - FM, AM, PM
Amplitude Emitter Classification / Typing
Modulation-on-Pulse Correlation / Track File Update
These 2 functions sometimes
Multi-Chn. / Rcvr AOA C2 Interface
implemented in common processor but
(, A) System Control
processes remain essentially the same.
18
The Electro-Magnetic Environment (Scenario)
▪ Land, Ship, and Airborne Platforms

▪ Variety of Waveform Types

▪ Search; Acquisition; Target Track; Missile Guidance; Target Illuminator; Airborne Interceptor; Fire Control

▪ Threats distributed over a wide frequency range (KHz to tens of GHz)

▪ High Pulse Densities – several million pulses per second (MPPS)

▪ Many non-military electro-magnetic signals may be present

▪ Civil Radars and Communication
▪ Blue Force, Coalition, Enemy Jammers congest Spectrum

▪ Variety of Signal Characteristics (details next slide)

19
Wide Variety of Waveforms to be Addressed
▪ Pulse Systems
▪ Narrow to wide pulse-widths
▪ Large range and variety of PRI types (complex, staggers, jitters, modulated, etc.)
▪ Gated or Interrupted CW, FMCW
▪ Intentional Modulation on Pulse (IMOP) - Pulse Compression / Beam Steering
▪ Can be Phase and/or Frequency or generated at I/Q such as Taylor Codes
▪ Ex. Include LFM, NLFM, Stepped LFM, PSK, m-ary PSK, Barker, SFM/FSK
▪ Pulse Doppler (Medium to High PRF); often burst-to-burst agile with Pulse Compression
▪ RF Agile: Pulse-to-pulse, burst-to-burst
▪ Spread Spectrum* / LPI
▪ FMOP: Linear, Non-linear, Discrete modulations
▪ Polytime, Polyphase, Frank Codes, other
▪ Frequency Hoppers
▪ Noise / Pseudo-random Noise modulations

* System where the transmitted signal is much wider than the minimum bandwidth
required for modulation operation; Time-Bandwidth product satisfies BT>1 20
Radar Evolution Continuously Drives
EW System Design
▪ Power – Higher, Lower and Adaptive
▪ Wider Pulse / Narrower Pulse
▪ Frequency Agile, PRF Agile, PW Agile, Modulation Agile and Multi-Agile [Burst or Pulse-to-
Pulse]
▪ Increasing complexity and variety of Intentional Modulations (IMOP)
▪ Low Probability of Intercept (LPI) / Low Probability of Intercept Detect (LPD) waveforms
▪ Electronic Scanned Arrays – Track While Scan beam steering
▪ Lower Sidelobe Antennas
▪ Monopulse Processing
▪ Adaptive Nulling
▪ Multiple Frequency / Multiple Beam
▪ Netted Systems / Bi-static Radars
▪ Polarization Diversity
▪ Higher Degree of Radar Signal Processing – may impact ES, EA and/or EP
21
ES System – Key Characteristics
▪ Broad Spatial Coverage – often 360 deg. AZ, 30-60 deg. EL, and Dual Pol?
▪ Wide Frequency Coverage – MHz to 10s of GHz
▪ Sensitivity – Detect Long Range, Side-Lobe intercept, LPI signals
▪ High Probability of Intercept (POI)
▪ Low Time-to-Intercept (TOI) - critical in EA and Self-Protect
▪ Dynamic Range – Total and Instantaneous
▪ Capability to handle high pulse densities without degradation
▪ Accurate Emitter Parameter Measurement
▪ Good accuracy required to reduce potential ambiguities
▪ Increasingly agile emitters with wide variations in parameters
▪ High Probability of Correct Classification and Identification
▪ Passive Location / Ranging Capability
▪ Emitter Signature (Known and Unknown) Recording in some cases
▪ RAW IQ or DIF Data and/or PDW Data and Track File)

22
Implementation Challenges
▪ Diverse quantity of threat systems
▪ Detection and measurement of complex radar waveforms
▪ Without a priori knowledge which limits matched filter detection
▪ Presence of jamming in the environment
▪ Friendly radars in ES system vicinity
▪ Netted radar systems
▪ High pulse density environments
▪ Real-Time reporting requirements
▪ Demand for ever-increasing location and ID accuracy
23
ES Receiver Architecture - Functions
Multiple Antenna Types
- Omni Reception Detection Multiple Analysis
- Spinning Spatial, A/D, Digital Detect & De-interleaving,
- Directional Spectral Down-
Demod Sorting
and Conversion, Characterization
- Phased Array Detection Methods
Temporal &
- Spirals Intercept
Digital
Identification
Channelizer
-- Broadband, Broad Beam & DF
- Multi-Antenna Arrays for DF Freq
A TOA
-- Diff. Amp, Diff. Phase D Quad
PW
-- Diff. Time, Diff. Freq. Demod. plus…..
LO
-- Varying DF accuracies Pulse
Amplification Display
-- 10 deg to <1 deg, location to meters Freq.
Characteristics:
Generation
Freq and
Conversion Time Domain.
Filtering Parameter
Multiple Receiver Types Format
Distribution
into PDWs
- Superheterodyne RF Raw DF
- Channelized Conversion Measurement Indication
- IFM
- Compressive (Rapid Scan)
- Acousto-Optic
- Optical
- Many digital implementations Increasing demand to push A/D near to or “at” antenna 24
Analog to Digital Conversion Essential in Modern ES
Analog (IF) signal is quantized to time discrete
amplitude samples
- Referred to as Digitized IF (DIF)
Digital Quadrature downconversion
produces In-Phase/Quadrature data
- Referred to as Digitized IQ (IQ or DIQ)
Time
Frequency
Transform from time domain to frequency domain
- (FFT is not necessarily required, but often used)
- Can process IQ data directly to obtain instantaneous
phase, frequency and amplitude
(Maintains coherency)
25
Pulse Measurements and Accuracy Factors
All Measurements all driven by Signal to Noise
▪ Amplitude / SNR Ratio (SNR) and measurement / averaging time
▪ Time of Arrival (ToA) and Pulse Width
▪ Sample Rate
▪ Clock Stability
▪ Signal Rise-time / Receiver BW
▪ Detection and Measurement Method

▪ Frequency
▪ Signal Duration, LO/Clock stability, Measurement Technique, Signal Processing fidelity

▪ Differential Measurements for DF – Amp, Phase, Time or Frequency

▪ Antenna Baselines, Antenna Type and Configuration, Measurement Technique and duration

▪ IMOP / UMOP
▪ Real time IMOP measurement (Barker Code, Chirp) – Type and Characteristics
▪ UMOP – Most everything in the link between emitter and ES processor
26
EW Data Bases
▪ Electronic Warfare Integrated Reprogramming Data Base (EWIRDB or EWIR)
▪ Primary DoD approved source for technical parametric and performance data on non-communications electronic emitters
and associated systems; inputs from several agencies, intelligence centers including KILTING and EPL, and US Non-
communications Systems Database (USNCSDB)

▪ NGES – Next Generation EWIR System

▪ KILTING – NSA National Technical ELINT parametric data base; data input to EWIR

▪ Common Emitter DB (CED) – Extends KILTING to address modern waveforms & provide IQ snippets

▪ ELINT Parameter Limits (EPL) – Parameter limits as measured by ELINT systems

▪ WRANGLER – Library of collected, recorded waveforms

▪ Others
▪ Combat Support Database (CSDB)
▪ Blue Airborne Target Signatures (BATS) Database
▪ US Electromagnetic Systems Database (USELMS)

27
ES Factors / Limitations - Airborne
▪ Multiple Beams
▪ Multiple Functions (Search/Acq/Track)
▪ Wide variety of challenging signals
▪ LPI, wideband, RF Agility, FMCW, Low Power, Pulse Compression, Narrow beams
▪ Short Up-Time Emitters
▪ Ambush – Optical Acquisition/launch, radar terminal control
▪ Spoofing with higher power decoys
▪ Blinking
▪ Dense EM Spectrum – commercial, enemy, Blue Force, Coalition
▪ Look-through requirements when ES supports EA (PD/Duty Cycle Trade-Off)
▪ Look Window Synchronization

28
ES Factors / Limitations – Ground Based

▪ Dense Environment, Commercial Systems Weaponized

▪ Networked Threats
▪ Receiver sensitivity required for reactive systems
▪ EA response often limited to direct threat
▪ Battlefield SA
▪ Look-through requirements when ES supports EA (PD/Duty Cycle Trade-Off)
▪ Look Window Synchronization
▪ Library Updates with commercial system migration
▪ Some legacy ES impacted by lack of coordination – time, geography
▪ Systems targeting same emitters – ES/EA trade-off?
29
ES Factors / Limitations - Maritime
Many similar to airborne plus….

▪ Littoral environments

▪ Extremely large number of similar emitters

▪ Increasing use of commercial navigation radars for military applications

▪ Solid-state and LPI emitter proliferation

▪ Surface based platforms unable to maneuver rapidly

▪ Requires very low TOI and high POI on fast mover threats to enable effective EA

▪ Sub-surface platforms must provide timely ES vs maritime aircraft to avoid detection

30
Some EW/ES Systems

31
 Ongoing ES Issues
▪ Sensors must be capable of detection at greater ranges and with increased dynamic range

▪ Jamming of sensors is highly likely as environments move from permissive to

contested/congested

▪ Cognitive Radars - Parameters will change and new waveforms likely not in EW libraries

▪ Sensor-shooter timeline compressed - Must minimize time from detection, decision to lethal act

▪ Metadata is of increased value – Enables smoother faster integration of disparate sensor data

▪ Must be able to update Electronic Order of Battle real time - Rapid Reprogramming critical.

▪ Tighter Coordination with Coalition Partners to react to modern threat and joint operations

32
Emerging ES Trends
▪ Machine Learning / Artificial Intelligence / Cognitive methods offer significant promise
▪ Area of much research
▪ Highly Data Driven - need large quantities of ground truth data to train and test networks

▪ Cross cueing of sensors is advantageous – networked EW key

▪ Permits 6-8dB signal to noise increase,
▪ Lowers convergence times by 10X and increases geolocation by 100X

▪ Video exploitation with SIGINT enables Activity Based Intelligence vs Static intelligence
▪ Video enables assessment of intent

▪ Space SIGINT capabilities - provides capability for coverage in denied areas

▪ Quantum sensing / nano-technology offers the opportunity for paradigm shift

▪ High performance at potential low cost
▪ Single technology base for clocks, magnetometers, inertial sensors

33
The Future of ES / ELINT
▪ Multi-Function / Multi-Role Receivers and Shared Apertures
▪ High Gain Search
▪ Directed Search / Characterization for SOI and “Unknowns”
▪ Scan-based Acquisition with increased measurement capability
▪ High POI dedicated acquisition for very fast response time for key threats
▪ Precision Cued Narrowband Measurement - multiple set-on receivers
▪ Wideband / LPI Measurement - multiple channels and frame processing
▪ Increased usage of digital receivers at higher RFs and wider BWs
▪ Increased acceptance of processing load to process wideband, agile, LPI signals
▪ Increased use of complex algorithms for highly accurate DF
▪ Interoperable data and formats across services and coalition partners
▪ Multiple sensor correlation and tracking (all source fusion)
▪ Multi-platform operations – Drive to net-centric / networked environments
▪ Emerging requirement for ELINT functionality on tactical platforms for NT-ISR applications
▪ Machine Learning / Artificial Intelligence
▪ Increased usage of UAVs with on-board ESM/ELINT systems
34
Summary
▪ ES plays a critical role in air and ground operations.
▪ Essential first step in any follow-on EW activity.
▪ ES provides situational awareness(SA) of the spectrum
▪ Search, intercept, identify, and localize or geo-locate sources of intentional (possibly
unintentional) radiated EM energy
▪ Used for immediate threat recognition, targeting, planning, and conduct of future
operations
▪ ES supports IO and Cyber by providing situational awareness and targeting

Version 2019 builds on the 2014 ES webinar and B. Moore 3 and 5 day class material.
Thank you to the many prior contributors to the 2014 version, particularly photographs.

35
Questions?

36