ARCHIVES AHDlMA66(J999) 189-224

'"
D'HISTOIRE DOCTRINALE ET LmERAIRE
DU
MOYEN AGE
Tome 66 - ANNEE 1999

SOMMAlRE THEDISTINCTION BETWEEN NATURE ANDWILL

IN DUNSSCOTUS
In memoriam Andre Yernet (1910-1999) .. 7

ETUDES DOCfRlNALES ET LlTI'ERAIRES par Tobias HOFFMANN

Marc GEOFFROY. L'almohadisme theologique d'Averroes (Ibn Ruffd)........... 9-47 Universitat Bonn, Philosophisches Seminar,
Lehr- undForschungsbereichII, Am Hof 1, 0-53113 Bonn
James R. GINTHER. A scholastic idea of the Church: Robert Grosseteste's
Exposition ofPsalm 86 49-72
Jose Ricardo PIERPAULI. Die praktische Yemunft als vis ordinativa. Albert
Resume
und Thomas im Vergleich 73-87
Dans la pensee de Duns Scot, la repartition des puissances actives entre
Guido ALLINEY. «De centro in circumferentia ». Metafore spaziali del
volonte et nature devient un des fondements de son systeme. Elle differencie une
rapporto tempo-etemita in Tomasso d'Aquino , ,......... 89-120
causalite libre et auto-determinante d'une causalite naturelle et necessaire. Get
Jakob H. J. SCHNEIDER. The Eternity of the World. Thomas Aquinas and article essaie de montrer dans quelle mesure cette distinction fonde en grande
Boethius ofDacia 121-141 partie la psychologle, la doctrine morale, la metaphysique et la theologie de Duns
Michael SWEENEY. Soul as Substance and Method in Aquinas' Scot.
Anthropological Writings 143-187
Tobias HOFFMANN. The Distinction between Nature and Will in Duns Abstract
Scotus...................................................................................................... 189-224 In the thought ofDuns Scotus, the distinction ofactive potencies into will and
Giorgio PlNI. Duns Scotus' Commentary on the Topics: New light on his nature takes on a fundamental systematic significance. It distinguishes free and
philosophical teaching............................................................................ 225-243 self-determining causality from natural and necessary causality. The purpose of
this article is to show to what extent this distinction underlies large parts ofDuns
TEXTES Scotus' psychology, ethics, metaphysics and theology.
Ludwig HODL. «Non est malitia in voluntate... », Die magistrate
Zusammenfassung
Entscheidung der PariserTheoiogen von 1285/1286 in der Diskussion Die Unterscheidung der aktiven Wirkvermiigen in Wille und Natur bekommt
des Johannes de Polliaco, Quodl. I, q. /0. Untersuchung und Edition.. 245-297 im Denken von Duns Scotus erstmals eine fundamentale systematische
Chris SCHABEL. Landulphus Caracciolo and a Sequax on Divine Bedeutung. Sie unterscheidetfreie, selbstbestimmende Kausalitdt von naturhaft-
Foreknowledge 299-343 notwendiger Kausaliuit. Dieser Artikel untersucht, inwiefern diese Unterschei-
dung weiten Teilen der scotischen Psychologic, Morallehre, Metaphysik und
Theologie zugrundeliegt.
Ouvrage publie avec le concours
du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique [Mots-des: JeanDunsScot,puissances de l' arne, volonte, natureet necessite]
PARIS
LmRAIR1E PHILOSOPHIQUE J. YRIN
6, PU\CE DE LA SORBONNE, y'
1999
190 TOBIASHOFFMANN
I t is generally accepted that the distinction between nature and will is crucial to
the thought of John Duns Scotus'. Until now, there has been no systematic
analysis of the role of this distinction in the work of the Subtle Doctors. In this
article, my goal is to show that this distinction underlies much of Duns Scotus'
psychology, ethics, metaphysics and theology. Scotus is not the first thinker who
opposes will and nature 3, but the distinction was made more sharply in his work
than in any of his predecessors, and no one before him attributed such a
fundamental role to the distinction - a characteristic that Scotus shares with the
thought ofImmanuel Kanr',
Two brief preliminaries: first, in referring to Scotus' distinction between
'nature' 5 and 'will' , I am referring in shorthand to his distinction between natural
active potencies and free active potencies 6 ; second, if this paper seems to place
(I) A. B. Wolter lists this distinction among several characteristic and innovative features ofthe
thought of Duns Scotus, cf. his dictionary article «John Duns Scotus », in R. AUDl (ed.), The
Cambridge Dictionary ofPhilosophy, Cambridge-New York, Cambridge University Press, 1995,
212b-213a.
(2) The essentials of the will/natnre distinction are clearly exposed by L. D. ROBERTS,
«Indeterminism in Duns Scotus' doctrine of human freedom», Modem Schoolman, 51 (1973),
1-16. Yet, this article does not show the implications of this distinction throughout Scotus' thought,
and its textual basis is limited.
(3) Among others, Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas already use this distinction, but it is less
fundamental in their thought than it is in Scotus. Cf. among other texts BONAVENTURE, In Sent. I d. 2
a. un. q.4 fund. 2, Opera omnia. Quaracchi, 1882ff., I, 56b; THOMAS AQUINAS, S. c. Gent. II c.48
a.I, Leon. (Editio Leonina, Rome, I882ff.) XIIl, 376b-377a; S. theol.lq.19 a.4, Leon. IV, 237a-
238b;lq.63 a.S.Leon. V, 130a-131b;Iq.82a.I,Leon. V,293ab;lq. 83 aLLeon. V, 307a-308b.
Thomas also uses the distinction between ratio and natura, as, for example, inS. theol. I-II q, I a. 2 in
corp., Leon. VI, 9ab. As to Henry of Ghent see below, section one.
(4) The opposition between nature and will or between nature and freedom is considered to be a
basic distinction by KANT, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, Kant's gesammelteSchriften,
Prussian Academy of Sciences, Berlin, 1902-1923, IV, 387.412.428.446.455-456. For this and
other parallels between the thought of Scotus and Kant, A. SCBMlDT, «Scotns und Kant: Rationale
Anti-Rationalisten », Theologieund Glaube, 89 (1999), 180-218.
(5) The term 'nature' stands on the one hand for the essence ofa thing, and in this sense also the
will is a nature; in a more narrow sense it indicates the wayan active potency elicits its acts, namely
in a determinate way, as opposed to the self-determination ofthe will. Cf. Ord. (Ordinatio) prol, p. 1
q. un. n. 73, Vat. (Editio Vaticana, ed. C. BALle et al., Rome, 1950ff.) I, 44-45. Cf. Rep. (Reportatioy
I Ad. 10 q. 3, Oxford, Merton 59, fol. 68v : « ... natura accipitur uno modo communiter pro essentia
rei, et sic unumquodque sicut habet entitatem, ita et naturam.... Alia modo accipitur natura pro
principio naturali ut est vis quaedam productiva ct sirnilis ex simili, et hoc vi productionis suae, et
isto modo producitur Filius in divinis natura vel naturaliter, qua ex vi productionis suae procedit ut
simms ex simili in natura». Cf. Quodl. q.16 n.13, Vivo (Editio Wadding-Vives, Paris 1891-1895)
XXVI,197b.
(6) Scotus distinguishes between potency as a mode of being and as a principle of being,
QQ. Metaph. (Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelisy IX q.I-2 n.14, OPh. (Opera
philosophica, ed, G.l.ETZKORN et al., St.Bonaventure, 1997ff.) IV, 512. Potency as a mode of
being can be understood in different ways: I. as what is opposed to the impossible, 2. in opposition
to necessity, 3. in opposition to the act, QQ. Metaph. IX q. 1-2 n. 21, OPh. IV, 515. As a principle of
being, potency is divided into active potencies and passive potencies, QQ. Metaph. IX q. 3-4 n. 29,
OPh. IV, 548. A passive potency is something that can receive a determining fonn, whereas an
active potency has some sort of efficient causality, QQ. Metaph. IX q. 3-4 n. 29-30, OPh. IV, 548-
549. Cf. G. PIzzO, Intellectus und memoria nach der Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus: Das
THEDISTINCTION BETWEEN NATURE ANDWILLINDUNSSCOTUS 191
more emphasis on 'will' than on 'nature', it is because Duns Scotus usually
analyses this distinction in the contextofbroader discussions about the will.
The distinction between nature and will allows Scotus to characterize what he
considers the essential feature ofthe will : the will, being a free agent 7 , determines
its acts by its own control, while all natural agents are determined in their action to
a specific effect, from extrinsic circumstancess, Scotus takes the will's freedom
(in contrast to natural action) to be the fundamental distinction of active potencies:
«The will is per se never an active principle that acts naturally. To be naturally
active and to be freely active represents a primary division of 'active principle' »9.
By virtue of its capacity for self-determination, the will has the unique
characteristic of being able to determine the intensity of its activity 10, whereas
nature always acts according to the full extent of its power!'. Scotus further
affirms that the will is «an agent that is essentially different from anything else in
the universe» 12.
The article will proceed in five sections: section one takes up the classic
sources for Scotus' will/nature distinction, namely Aristotle and Augustine; it
suggests as well that the work of Henry of Ghent is an important inspiration for
menschliche Erkenntnisvermogen als Vol/zug von Spontaneitat und Rezeptivitat, Kevelaer, Butzon
und Bercker, 1998 (Veroffentlichungen der Johannes-Duns-Scotus-Akademie fur Pranziskanische
Geistlichkeit und Spiritualitat 7), 20-36.
(7) In the texts presented in this article, Scorus takes the freedom of the will for granted. In his
view, the will's freedom is manifestaposteriori, from experience, QQ. Metaph. IX q. 15 n, 30, OPh.
IV,682-683; Ord. IV d.49 suppl. q.9-lOn.lO, Vivo XXI, 333b. He also undertakes a proof of the
freedom of the will with reference to there being contingency; yet, this is only a shift ofthe problem,
since then he has to prove that there is in fact contingency. Cf. n. 139.
(8)Cf. Rep. III d.33 q. un. n.lO, Vivo XXIII, 514b: «nam quia voluntas habet actum et
determinationemactus in potestate sua, ideo potestse libere determinare ad bonum, vel ad malum.
recte vel non recte.... sed non sic est determinaturn agens naturale, quod sic est determinatumex se
ad unum, quod non potest se determinare ad oppositum, et ideo licet determinetur ex se formaliter
per formam naturaliter inclinantem ad unum, tamen aliunde determinamr effective ... Sed voluntas
ex se detenninatur effective». Cf. also QQ. Metaph. IX q.15 n. 22, OPh.IV, 680-681; n.43, OPh.
IV, 587.
(9)« Voluntas, per se loquendo, nunquam est principium activum naturaliter, quia esse
natnraliter activum et esse libere activum sunt primae differentiae principii activi, et voluntas, unde
voluntas est principium activum libere », Quodl. q, 16 n. IS, Vivo XXVI, 199a. For the English text,
see F. ALLUNTI8--A. B. WOLTER, God and Creatures: The Quodlibetal Questions, Princeton,
University Press, 1975,384. Cf. Ord.I d.lOq.un. n.44, Vat.IV, 358; QQ. Metaph. IXq.15 n.23,
OPh. IV, 681.
(10) Lect. (Lectura) I d.I p.2 q.2 n.98, Vat. XVI, 94: « ... quidquid agit necessario, agit
secundum ultimum suae potentiae ; si igitur voluntas necessario ferretur in ultimum finem in
universali, igitur secundum ultimum suae potentiae, et per consequens non aliquando remissius et
aliquando intensius ferretur in illud, sed semper uniformiter, quod falsum est », Cf. Ord. I d. 1 p. 1
q.1 n.22, Vat. II, 16; Ord.1 d.l p.2 q. 2 n, 133 (deleted text), Vat. II, 88-89. Cf. also W.HOERES,
Der Wille als reine Yollkommenheit nach Duns Scotus, Munich, Anton Pustet, 1962 (Salzburger
Studien zur Philosophie 1),240.
(11) Ord. Ld, 8 p. 2q. un. n. 286, Vat. IV, 315: «causa necessario agens agit secundumultimum
potentiae suae, quia sicut non est in potestate eius agerc et non agere, ita nee intense agere et
remisse».Cf.Ord.ld. J p. 2q. 2n. 95. Vat.H, 72; Lect. Hd. 12q. un.n.16, Vat. XIX, 74.
(12)« Voluntas estagens alterins rationis a toto quod est in universo". Leet. II d. 25 q. nn. n. 93,
Vat.XIX,261.
192 TOBIAS HOFFMANN
Scotus' teaching on this issue; section two outlines Scorns' sharp contrast
between will as self-determined and nature as determined, with special emphasis
on psychological implications 13; section three discusses the influence of this
distinction for Scotus' ethics, referring specifically to his distinction between the
will's affection for what is just in itself (affectio iustitiaey as opposed to the
affection for what is of the subject's own interest (affectio commodi) ; section four
analyses Scotus' view of God's activity ad extra, i.e. towards creatures,
emphasizing Scotus' account of contingency; finally, section five discusses how
the will/nature distinction affects Scotus' account of God's activity ad intra, i. e.
the Trinitarian productions, namely the distinction between the way in which the
Son is naturally generated by the Father and the way in which the Holy Spirit
proceeds freely from the Father and the Son.
I.DUNsSCOTUS'SOURCES
It is not my purpose to discuss the thinkers Scotus refers to as authorities as to
their own account of active potencies, nor am I here concerned with the legitimacy
of Scotus' interpretation. What shall be shown is how Scotus himselfconsiders his
position to be prepared by eminent thinkers, namely Aristotle and Augustine, and
moreoverin which way Scotus' thought seems to be preparedby Henry of Ghent.
Aristotle
In Scotus' discussion of the distinction between nature and will, Aristotle
appears in two different ways. In one way, Scotus is rather concerned with the
argument of authority; he wants to prove that this distinction is already present in
Aristotle's teaching. In a second way, Scotus tries to interpret Aristotle as a basis
for his own thought This second use of Aristotle is unseparable from Scotus' own
account of the will as it is opposed to nature; for this reason we shall reserve its
discussion to section two.
Duns Seotus repeatedly argues that the main features of the distinction
between will and nature can be found in Aristotle 14, although this might not be
(13) Scorns' ontological explanation of the possibility of self-motion as a basis for his
conception of the self-determining will (cf. QQ. Metaph. IX q. 14, OPh,IV, 625-673) - a challenge
to Aristotelian and Thomistic principles - will not be discussed in this article. Cf. R. EFFLER, John
Duns Scotus and the principle Omne quod movetur ab alia rnovetur, St. Bonaventure, NY,
Franciscan Institute, 1962 (Franciscan Institute Publications, Philosophy series 15); P. KING.
«Duns Scotus on the Reality of Self-Change », in M. L. GILL-I. G. LENNOX (ed.), Self-motion from
Aristotle to Newton. Princeton, University Press, 1994, 227-290; HOERES, Der Wille als reine
Vollkommenheit.269-274.
(14) Lect. I d.2 p.2 q. 1-4 n.225-226, Vat.XVI. 196-198; Ord. I d.2 p.2 q.l-4 n.345-351,
Vat.II, 332-335; QQ. Metaph. IX q.15 n.23, OPh. IV, 681; n.35-41, OPh. IV, 684-686; Quodl.
q.16n.13. Viv.XXVI, 197b-198a.
THEDISTINCTION BETWEEN NATUREANDW1LLlN DUNSSCOTUS 193
very explicit 15. Scotus bases his argument on his reading of the second book of
Aristotle's Physics and the ninth book of the Metaphysics. The Subtle Doctor
discusses the passage where Aristotle is analyzing the relationship between
chance (to «mOI.la.tOV) and intention (f1 tUXTl) in relation to thefour causes:
Of things that come to be, some come to be for the sake of something [evEKll
'tou], others not. Again, some of the former class are in accordance with
intention, others not... Things that are for the sake of something include
whatever may be done as a result of thought [f:l.1ti:J otavoioo;] or of nature [uno
CPUO'EOl~]l6 .
Here, Scotus interprets Aristotle as claiming that intellect and nature are
essentially different active principles 17. According to Scotus, Aristotle reduces
intentional causality and chance causality, both of which are considered as
accidental causes, to intellect and nature, respectively, as being their per se
causes 18. Thereafter, Aristotle's distinction between intellect and nature is
transformed by Scotns into a distinction between will and nature :
When it is argued, with reference to the Philosopher in the second book of the
Physics that nature and intellect are two distinct productive principles, I say that
the Philosopher has said little about the will, as it is distinct from the intellect, but
usually he unites the intellect and will in the notion of the active principle; that is
why in Book II of the Physics where he distinguished these active principles,
namely intellect and nature, the intellect is not to be understood in so far as it is
distinct from the will, but as it cooperates with the will. When the intellect acts in
this way, the intellect and the will constitute the same principle with respect to
artificial things 19.
According to Scotus, a more obvious example of Aristotle's distinction
between these two essentially different active principles is his distinction between
(15) The context of most of the following references to Aristotle is Scotus' doctrine of the
Trinity. where he argues that there are only two essentially different Trinitarian productions: a
natural one and a free one. For more details see section five. Here, Scotus responds to objections that
Aristotle does not distinguish between nature and will, but rather between nature and intellect
(Physics II) and between rational and irrational active potencies (Metaphysics IX). Cf. Ord. I d.2
p. 2q. 1-4n,216-217. Vat. II,257-258 ;Lect.ld. 2 p. 2q. 1-4n. 160-161, Vat. XVI. 165-166.
(l6)ARIST .• Physics II. 5, 196b17-22. The English text is taken from The Complete Works of
Aristotle, ed. by I. BARNES, Princeton, NI. University Press, 1984, vol. 1,335.
(17) Ord. I d. 2 p. 2 q, 1-4 n. 216, Vat. Il, 257; see also Quodl. q. 16 n. 13, Vivo XXVI, 19Th-
198a.
(18) Quodl., ibid... cf. also QQ. Metaph. IX q. 15 n. 23, OPh. IV, 681. This interpretation seems
to bejustified, ARlST.• Physics, II, 6, 19ThI -22.
(19) «Cum arguitur de natura et intellectu quod sunt duo principia productiva distincta per
Philosophum Il Physicorum, respondeo quod Philosophus parum locutus est de voluntate ut
distinguitur contra intellectum, sed communiter in ratione principii activi coniunxit intellectum ad
voluntatem: et ideo in II Physicorum, ubi distinguit isla principia activa, naturam scilicet et
intellectum, intellectus non debet intelligi ut distinguitur contra voluntatem sed ut concurrit cum
voluntate, constituendo idem principium respectu artificialium», Ord.I d.2 p.2 q.I-4 n.345,
Vat. II, 332. When no other source is mentioned. the translations are my own.
194 TOBIASHOFFMANN
irrational and rational potencies in the ninth book of the Metaphysics 20. There, the
key difference between irrational and rational potencies is that the latter can
produce contrary effects, whereas irrational potencies are determined to only one
effect-", Thus, for example, heat can only heat, whereas medicine can produce
either a cure or sickness 22.
... whenthe agentand thepatientmeetin the wayappropriate to the potentiality
in question, the one must act and the other be acted on, but with the former
kindthisis notnecessary. Forthenon-rational potentialities areall productive of
one effect each, but the rational produce contrary effects, so that they would
producecontrary effects at the same time; but this is impossible. That which
decides, then, mustbe something else; I meanby this,desire [ope~t<;] or choice
[ltpoatpeGt<;] 23.
Duns Scotus appropriates these Aristotelian distinctions, inserting them into
his own doctrine of the distinction of the active potencies 24. Scorns accomplishes
this - as mentioned earlier - by acknowledging that the intellect can be considered
in two different ways: first, with respect to its own activity and nature; second,
with respect to the activity and nature of other potencies which influence the
intellect. Whereas in the first sense, the intellect is a natural active potency 25, in the
second sense (i. e. in connection with the will) it is not a natural, but a free active
potency-e. In fact, as a nature, the intellect is not able to determine itself in an
opposite way, this means that, by itself, it is not able to accomplish the choice
Aristotle demands ofit in the above quotation 27; inasmuch as the intellect acts in a
natural way, it acts under the same circumstances in like manner 28. Even if we
admit that the intellect has the possibility of opposite effects, this does not yet
imply the self-possession of the intellect. For the sun (an irrational potency), too,
produces opposite effects: it can either liquefy a solid material (e. g. it can melt
ice) or solidify a liquid material (e. g. harden mud) 29. Yet, even though the SUfI can
(20)« ... oij)"ov on Kat 'tCiiv O'Uvaltll(i)V ui l1£v e<:lovw:t &",010t ai oe l111ti':r. M10'U »,
ARIST., Metaph. IX, 2, I 046b1-2. Cf. P. SCAPIN, «Necessite et liberte d' apres Aristote erJean Duns
Scot », Diotima, 8 (1980), 120-127. - Scorns discusses this text extensively in his QQ. Metaph. IX
q.15, OPh. IV,675-699. Atthis point ofmy article I intend toshow how Scotus transforms what he
canfind inAristotle tohisown purposes. Insection two, when dealing with Scotus' account ofthe
will as self-determining potency, his interpretation of Aristotle's distinction of rational and
irrational potencies inQQ. Metaph. IXq. 15will bediscussed more closely.
(21)ARIST., Metaph. IX,2, 1046b4-5.
(22) Ibid., I046b6-7.
(23)ARrST., Metaph. IX, 5, 1048a6-11. For the English text, see The Complete Works of
Aristotle. vol. II, 1654-1655. Cf. DUNSSCOTUS, Quodl. q. 16n. 13, Viv. XXVI, 198a.
(24) Cf. H. MaHLE, Ethik als scientia practica nach Johannes Duns Scotus : Eine philosophi-
sche Grundlegung, MUnster, Aschendorff, 1995 (Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie und
Theologie desMittelalters, NeueFolge 44), 158-161.
(25) Oro. I d. 2p.2q.1-4n. 346, Vat. II, 333.
(26) Ord. Id. 2 p. 2q.1-4n. 351, Val. II, 335.
(27)Ord. Id.2p.2q. 1-4n. 350, Vat. II, 334.
(28)Ord. Id.2p.2q.I-4n.348, Val. II, 334.
(29) Ord. I d.2 p.2 q.l-4 n.349, Vat. II, 334; QQ. Metaph. IXq.15 n.5, OPh. IV, 676: «Sol
potest inopposites effectus inistis inferioribus: dissolvit enim glaciem et constringit lutum; tamen
THEDISTINCTION BETWEEN NATUREANDWILLIN DUNSSCOTUS 195
cause opposite things, it cannot determine itself to opposite effects. The sun acts
always by natural necessity, and which one of the opposite effects is produced
depends on the matter on which it acts 30. As a consequence, self-determination is,
according to Scotus, reserved to the will>',
Augustine
More profoundly than Aristotle, Augustine perceived the philosophical (and
theological) problems associated with the will. Augustine develops a more
explicit notion of the will and its free activity than Aristotle. Thus, it is no surprise
that Scotus repeatedly quotes Augustine when discussing the freedom of the will :
« Nothing is in our power as much as the will itself» 32. The originality with which
Augustine treats the peculiar nature of the will can be attributed to Augustine's
novel concern with the degree to which humans are culpable for their sins, and
why God, while first cause of all being, cannot be held responsible for human sin.
Scotus draws upon Augustine's On Free Will as an authority for his distinction
between free active principles and natural active principles:
I thinkyouremember wewerefairly satisfied in thefirstdiscussion that the mind
becomes the slave of passion only through its own will. ... The movement,
therefore, must be due to itself, by which it turns its will to enjoyment of the
creaturefromenjoyment of the Creator, If thismovement is calledculpableand
todoubtthisis, in youropinion, absurd- it is certainly notnatural,but voluntary
[non estutiquenaturalis, seduoluntariusv>.
potentia eius est irrationalis ». Cf. Add. magn. (Additiones magnaet, ed. C. BALle in Les
commentaires de Jean Duns Scot sur les quatre livres des Sentences, Leuven 1927 (Bibliotheque de
la Revue d'histoire ecclesiastique 1), 264-301, especially 267. The Additlones magnae contain
fragments of Scotus' teachings; they arereported byWilliam of Alnwick, a student of Scotus, The
degree ofauthenticity isofcourse less than for texts redacted byScotus himself; nevertheless they
areofacertain value, since they are asource which testifies Scotus' late teaching.
(30)Scotus expresses this idea particularly clearly in Ord. IVd.12q. 3n.19, Vivo XVII, 594b-
595a: « ... agens ex electione potest diversirnode agere, non tanturn diversitate quadam
disparationis, sed contradictionis, sicut potest non tantum hoc agere et illud, sedhoc agere et ilIud
non agere. Agens autem naturale, quod est illimitaturn simpliciter, vel aliqualiter secundum
perfectionem activam potest ad disparata agere, sednon ad contradictoria, quia quodlibet iIlorum
agit inmateria disposita, ethocnecessaria. Non ergo sequitur, non agit secundum electionem, ergo
nondiversas forrnas in diversis passis. Sed sequitur, ergo non indifferenter agn, velnonagit ex se
formam illam, quam potest agere in tali passo. Exemplum de sole ... qui licet habeat
indeterminationem quamdam addisparata causanda indiversis passis, nonesttamen indeterminatus
contradictorie ad agendum, immo necessario agit in quodlibet passivum quidquid potest in iIlud
agere ».
(31) Ord. I d.2 p. 2 q. 1-4n. 350, Vat. 11,334. This point will bedeepened in section two ofthis
article.
(32)"Quapropter nihil tam in nostra potesrate quam ipsa voluntas est», Retractationes I, 9,3,
CCSL57, 25. cr. Lect. I d. 1 p.2 q. 2 n.96,Vat. XVI, 93; Leet. n d.25 q. un. n.15,Vat. XIX, 232;
Quodl. q.16n.4,Vivo XXVI, 184b.
(33) De libero arbitrio Ill, 1,8-9, CCSL 29,275, The English textistaken from St.AUGUSTINE,
The Problem of Free Choice, translated by D. M. PONTtFEX, Westminster, MD, Newman Press-
196 TOBIASHOFFNIANN
Like Scotus, Augustine thinks that the natural activity of active principles
entails necessity, and where there is necessity there can be no sin 34.
It is to Augustine's City ofGod which Scotus turns to support his view that the
will is free, that is, it is not determined to particular activity by causes outside of
itself. In Book XII, Augustine asks how it is that two different persons, in
apparently the same situation, make different choices :
Let us suppose that two persons in the same mental and physical state see the
beauty of a single body, and that the sight of it drives one of them to seek illicit
enjoyment while the other maintains steadfastly the chastity of his will. Now
what do we think is the reason that the will to do evil is produced in one but not in
the other? ... Accordingly, even if they study the matter ever so carefully, those
who are curious to know what thing created the individual will of one ofthem evil
are at a loss for an idea.... Now if anyone says that the one who yielded was
himself responsible for making his will evil, although he was certainly good
before the evil will, let him put the question why he did this ... It will then be
discovered that the evil will derives not from the fact that he is a natural creature,
but from the fact that he is a natural being created out of nothing 35.
Though major intention in this text is not to argue for the self-
determination of the will, the Subtle Doctor finds here a confirmation of his
conviction that the will is not a natural active principle, because the will does not
always actin the same way, even under the same circumstances 36.
Henry ofGhent
It is easy to be misled with regard to Scotus' intellectual debt to Henry of
Ghent. For Scotus rarely explicitly cites Henry as an authority, but rather criticizes
Henry's views. However, with respect to the distinction between will and nature
as the two fundamental active principles, it is very likely that Henry's work has a
direct influence on Scotus. For not only is this distinction important for Henry's
work generally, it is also a fundamental distinction in those specific areas of
Henry's teaching which are foundational for Duns Scotus' treatment, namely, the
self-motion of the will and the procession of the Holy Spirit by the will ofGod 37.
For example, Henry asks if the active potency of God is infinite. Henry's
response to the objections against the affirmative answer to this question 38 is that
they only have force if one assumes that God's activity ad extra (i. e. towards
London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1955, 140-141. Cf. DUNS SCOTUS, Quodl. q.16 n.L Vivo
XXVI,180ab.
(34) De libero arbitriolil; 1,4, CCSL29, 274; IIIA8, 167, CCSL29, 304.
(35) De civitate Dei XII, 6, CCSL 48, 361. The English text is taken from St. AUGUSTINE. The
City of God Against the Pagans, translated by Ph, LEVINE, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University
Press-London, William Heinemann Ltd, 1966 (Loeb Classical Library 414), IV, 29.
(36)Leet. Il d. 25 q, un. n. 12, Vat. XIX, 231-232.
(37) Cf. Quodl. IX q. 5 (self-motion of the will) and Summa a. 60 (procession of the Holy Spirit).
(38)Summa a.35 q.6 arg.2 and arg.3, Opera omnia XXVIlI, ed. G.A.WILSON, Leuven,
University Press, 1994,43.
THE DISTINCTIONBETWEENNATUREANDWILL INDliNS SCOTUS 197
creatures) is natural, that that God acts always with utmost intensityw. In
Henry's Summa, this discussion of God's activity follows shortly after Henry
distinguishes natural and rational potencies, where he defines rational potencies as
those commanded by the will 40 • In the light of that distinction, Henry argues that
God's aetivity is determined not naturally, but according to the requirements of
reason and the disposition of the will 41.
Whereas in this text Henry discusses the will in conjunction with the intellect,
and distinguishes both will and intellect from nature, elsewhere, namely in his
discussion of the doctrine of the Trinity, Henry appeals only to the will as the
opposite of nature 42 • There, Henry asks ifthe active spiration ofthe Father and the
Son proceeds solely by will, or also by nature.
Henry responds that «nature and will are the two principle categories of
production... to which all the other categories of production have to be
referred» 43. On this occasion, Henry distinguishes four senses of the term 'nature'
in God: first, nature as the divine essence; second, nature as a naturally active
principle; in a third sense as any power in God, even if free (this sense applies to
the will); and finally nature as the necessity of an act 44. If 'nature' refers to a
natural active principle, then the act ofthe generation of the Son is natural, but not
the act of the spiration of the Holy Spirit. The latter is produced by the will, that is
to say, the Holy Spirit proceeds freely ". As we shall see, Henry's distinction
between those productions in God which are produced by nature and those
produeed by will shall be incorporated into Duns Scotus' treatment of the Trinity.
For Henry, the basis for distinguishing the will from nature as two distinct
active potencies is the will's capacity for self-motion 46. Henry's emphasis that the
(39) «Et est vera ct necessaria consequentia, quia omnis virtus naturalis naturaliter motiva, in
corpore iam existens, movet de necessitate mobile suum secundum totum suum vigorem », Summa
a. 35 q. 6 ad 2, Opera omnia XXVIII, 67.
(40)« ... potentia agens duplex est. quaedam scilicet naturalis, er per impetum naturae,
quaedam rarionalis, et perimperium voluntatis ", Summa a. 35 q, 6 ad 1, Opera omnia XXVIII, 63.
(41) Summa a. 35q. 6 ad 3, OperaomniaXXVIll, 68-69.
(42) Summa a. 60q.1.
(43)« ... natura et voluntas sunt duae rationes principales emanandi sive producendi tam in
divinis quam in creaturis, ad quas omnes aliae quae sunt habent reduci », Summa a. 60 q. I in corp.,
ed, BADtuS, Paris, 1520 (reprint: St. Bonaventure, NY, The Franciscan Institute, 1953) II, I 53vN.
(44) Summa a. 60q.l in corp., II, 154vT: «Sciendurn est quod natura in divinis quadrupliciter
dicitur. Uno modo appellatur natura ipsa divina essentia, in qua tres personae consisrunt, et dicitur
pure essentialiter. Secundo modo dicitur natura principiumactivum naturale, et sic natura est vis
productiva similis ex sirnill ... Tertio modo dicitur natura quaelibet vis naturaliter exsistens in
natura primo modo, etiam etsi sit libera illa vis; et sic voluntas in Deo dicitur natura, quia scilicet est
naturalis potentia, exsistens naturaliterin divinanatura. Quarto modo dicitur natura incommurabilis
necessitas circa aliquern actum »,
(45)Suntmil a. 60 q.l in corp., II, l54vT: «Secundo modo dicitur natura principium activum
naturale».154vV: «Loquendo vero de secundo modo naturae: dico simpliciter quod natura
solummodo est principium eliciendi actus generationis filii, et nullo modo communis spirationis
cum voluntate.... Ad acturn autem spirandi, ordinem habet non ut est natura naturaliter agens, sed ut
est libera liberaliter agens ».
(46) The self motion of the will is the subject of a detailed discussion in Quodl. IX q. 5, Opera
omnia XIII, ed, R. MACKEN. Leuven, University Press, 1983,99-139.
198 TOBIASHOFFMANN
will is not in any way like a nature can be seen in his concluding notes to the
discussion offreedom of the will and self-motion:
... if the will were naturally moved by something else, it would be determined to
its act without any freedom, and it could not pull back from it .... One must say,
then, without qualification that the will is moved to its act of willing by nothing
else, but by itselfalone 47.
Henry also seems to influence Scotus with regard to the relationship between
the will and the intellect Specifically, Henry asks whether the will and intellect
have the same degree of freedonr", To answer this question, Henry appeals to
Aristotle's distinction between rational active potencies and natural active
potencies-". Henry claims that freedom is an attribute of active potencies, but not
of passive potencies so. Now in a most proper sense it is the will that is an active
potency: « ... it is very strange to say that the will is a passive power and still is
free, just as it would be strange to say that something is an active natural power and
still is free» 51. Henry argues again that the distinction between the will and nature
is that the will, and not nature, can determine itself to different possibilities 52 . For
Henry, the intellect can, in a sense, even be considered a passive potency, because
it cannot control freely its own activity 53.
In this section, we have already anticipated some of Scotus' ideas on the will
and its opposition to nature in as much as they appear in the use he makes of the
authorities. In the next section we will analyze the distinction between will and
nature directly in Scotus' own thought.
(47)« ... Si voluntas rnoveretur ab alio natural iter, determinaretur ad actum absque omni
Iibertate, nee posset resilire ab ipso ... simpliciter ergo dicendurn quod voluntas in acturn volendi a
nullo alio, sed a se ipsa sola movetur», Quodl. IX q. 5 in corp .. Opera omnia Xlll, 130. The English
translation is taken from HENRY OF GHENT, Quodlibetal Questions on Free Will, translated by
R. J. TESKE, Milwaukee, WI, Marquette University Press 1993,58. Cf. Quodl. IX q. 5 in corp., Opera
omniaXllI, 131-132 : « Quam propter libertatem voluntatis, qua debet esse domina suorum actuurn,
impossibile estponi quod ab aliquo naturali activo, ut est natura ut est receptibilis volitionis, alio a se
procedat de potentia in actum : hoc enirn omnino repugnat liberrati, sicut dictum est, et non minus
ageretur appetitus voluntatis, quam ille qui est sensibilis, Unde et Spiritus sanctus, si a Patre et Filio
procederet ut a naturali activo, ut natura est, et modo naturae, non diceretur procedere modo
voluntatis et libertatis sive liberalitaris, sed quia procedit ab agente ut est liberum voluntate ...
diciturprocedere opere voluntatis ».
(48)Quod. XIV q.5, ed. BADIUS. Paris, 1518 (reprint Leuven, Bibliotheque S.J., 1961) Il,
563vT: "utrum ... intellectus et voluntas ambo sint aeque liberi, supponendo quod ambo sint
liberi ».
(49) Quodl. XIV q. 5 argo2, rr, 564rX.
(50) Quodl. XIV q. 5 in corp., II, 574rY; cr. ibid., ad 2, Il, 566rD.
(51) « Unde multum mirabile est dicere quod voluntas est virtus passiva, libere ramen, sicut
mirabile esset dicere quod aliquid esset vis activa naruralis, libere tamen », Quodl. XIV q. 5 ad 2, II,
566rD. For the English text see HENRY OF GHENT, Quodlibetal Questions on Free Wili, 86.
(52) Ibid. : "Ex quo provenit quod contingens aequaliter potest inveniri a voluntate fieri pro
altera parte, non sic auternab agente naturali ».
(53) Ibid. : «Licet ergo intellectus aeque rationalis sit quam voluntas aut etiam magis, cum
tarnen non sit activa potentia, nisi prius passiva, nec etiam activa quoad exercitium actus etiam in
iudicando quod est opus quod magis libere agit, nisi secundum complacentiam voluntatis secundum
praedicta, ideo non tam libere valet ad opposita ut voluntas »,
THE DISTINCTIONBETWEENNATUREANDWILLIN DUNSSCOTUS 199
II.THE SELF-DE1ERMINAnON OF THE WILL
TheSelfDeterminationoftheWill versusthe DeterminationofNature 54
When examining Scotus' treatment of notions like necessity, contingency and
freedom of will, it is important to note that he analyses them with regard to
different modes ofcausation. The consideration ofthe effects of different types of
agents is secondary. Thus, with respect to will, Scotus says that « ... the primary
distinction of active potencies stems from the radically different way in which
they elicit their respective operations» 55.
Negatively, the will is characterized by its non-natural activity:
... there is only a twofold generic wayan operation proper to a potency can be
elicited. For either the potency of itself is determined to act, so that so far as itself
is concerned, it cannot fail to act when not impeded from without; or it is not of
itself so determined, but can perform either this act or its opposite, or can either
act or not act at alL A potency of the first sort is commonly called 'nature',
whereas one of the second sort is called 'will'. Hence, the primary division of
active potencies is into nature and will 56 •
Thus, the will is characterized by indetermination. This indetermination
applies not only with respect to contrary effects (in the same way irrational beings
as e. g. the sun have been shown to be indeterminate), but also with respect to
contrary acts and to contrary objects 57. Nature, on the other hand, is determined to
one effect 58. Thus, there are two questions which arise: first, if the will is
undetermined, how can it choose anything at all? second, why does the will
choose one possibility rather than the other?
Duns Scotus answers the first question with a distinction between two sorts of
indetermination. On the one hand, indetermination can be seen as a deficiency, as
is the case with a passive potency which lacks its determining form. Scotus refers
(54) F.INCIARTE. « Natura ad unum - ratio ad opposita, Zur Transformation des Arisrotelismus
bei Duns Scotus », in J. P. BECKMANN et al. (ed.), Philosophic im Mittelalter : Entwicklungslinien
und Paradigmen, Hamburg, Meiner, 1987 (Festschrift W. Kluxen), 259-273, especially 262-266;
H. MaHLE, Ethikals scientia practica, 161-166.
(55)« ... prima distinctio potentiae activae est secundum diversum modum eliciendi operatic-
nem», QQ. Metaph. IX q.15 n.21, OPh.IV, 680. The English text is taken from A.B.WOLTER.
Scotus on Will and Morality, Washington D. C., The Catholic University of America Press, 1986,
151.Fromnowon Ireferto this bookasABW. Cf. n. 9.
(56) «Iste autem modus eliciendi operationem propriam non potest esse in genere nisi duplex.
Aut enim potentia ex se est detenninata ad agendum, ita quod, quantum est ex se, non potest non
agere quando non impeditur ab cxtrinseco. Aut non est ex se determinata, sed potest agere hunc
actum vel oppositum actum: agere etiam vel non agere. Prima potentia communiter dicitur 'natura' ,
secunda dicitur 'voluntas'. Unde prima divisio principiorum activorum est in naturam et
voluntatem»,EnglishtextABW,151.
(57) Leet. I d.39 q.I-5 n.45, Vat-XVII, 493. Cf. QQ.Metaph. IX q. 15 n.22-23, OPh. IV,
680-681.
(58) QQ. Metaph. IX q.15 n.24, OPh. IV, 681: «natura est tantum unius (hoc est, ...
determinate ex se est istius vel illorum), voluntas autem est oppositorum (id est, ex se indeterminate
huius actionis vel non actionis) »,
200 TOBIASHOFFMANN
to such a case as indeterminatio insufficientiae and indeterminatio contradictio-
nis'", On the other hand, indetermination can express a perfection, such as when a
potency produces contrary effects on its own (indeterminatio superabundantis
sufficientiae, indeterminatio illimuationisy», In the former case the activity of a
potency depends on external circumstances, and as soon as the deficiency is
remedied, the potency is determined to one specific effect. On that account, these
are natural agentsv'. The latter case, that is, indetermination as a perfection,
applies only to the will which does not act according to nature as described above,
but freely. The will determines itself with respect to contrary (velle and nolle) or
contradictory (velie and non velle) possibilities to act 62•
According to Scotus, there is no answer to the second question: «There is no
other cause to be found except that the will is will» 63. The proposition "the will
wills" is a contingent and at the same time immediate proposition. With regard to
contingent propositions in general, some are first and immediate, and it is to these
which all other contingent propositions have to be traced back 64 • This shows the
fundamental difference between free active potencies and natural active
potencies: whereas the activity of natural active potencies can always be
explained by reference to prior causes, the one offree active potencies cannot 65.
(59) QQ. Metaph. IXq.15 n.31. OPh. IV, 683; Add. magn., ed. BALlC, 275. Cf. also Ord. Id. 7
q.1 n. 20, Vat. IV, 1l4-1l5;Leet. Id. 7 q.un, n. 26, Vat.XVI,481·482.
(60)Add. magn.,ed. BALlC,275 ; Lect. lId. 25 q. un.n. 92, Vat. XIX, 260·261.
(61) Ibid.
(62) Cf. Add. magn., ed. BALlC,276; Leel. lId. 25 q. un.n, 93, Vat. XIX, 261.
(63)« Quare voluntas illud volet ? Nulla erit alia causa nisi quia est voluntas », QQ. Metaph. IX
q. 15n.29, OPh. IV,682. EnglishtextABW, 153. Cf. also Ord. Id. 8 p. 2q. un n. 299, Vat. IV, 325;
Leel.ld.S p.2q. un. n.279, Vat. XVII, 105; Ord. II d. 1 q, 2 n.91, Vat. VII, 47-48; Lect. lId. 1 q.2
n. 89, Vat. XVIII, 29; Rep. I A d. IOq. 3, Oxford, Merton 59, fol. 68r-68v : « Sicut quamlibet formam
activam consequitur immediate quod sit principiurn agendi, ita immediate consequitur earn modus
agendi, et ideo sicut non est aliqua causa quaerenda quare talis forma agit vel potest agere vel quare
calor est calefactivus et quare calidum calefacit, nisi quia sunt tales formae, ita non est aliqua causa
quaerenda quare habent talem modum agendi, ur calefacere per modum naturae er huiusmodi, nisi
quia sunt tales formae. Unde sicut non est medium inter formam et principiumactivum, ita non est
medium inter modum agendi et principium agendi, et ideo sicut quamlibet entitatem sequitur
immediate modus essendi eius proprius, ita quamlibet formam activam sequitur immediate modus
eius agendi proprius. Non est ergo aliqua causa quare voluntas vult, nisi quia voluntas est voluntas,
nee quare hoc vel hoc vult necessario et contingenter, necessario et libere, nisi quia est talis et talis
voluntas ».
(64)Cf. QQ. Metaph. q. 15n.28,OPh. IV,682;Ord. prol. p.3q.1·3n.I69, ve.r, 113; Rep. IA
d. 10 q. 3, Oxford, Merton 59, fol. 68v: «Sicut in propositionibus necessariis standum est tandem ad
aliquam immediate, ita et in contingentibus propositicnibus oportet stare ad immediatam
contingentem et non necessariam, quia ex necessario non sequitur contingens, sicut ex veto non
sequitur falsum ».
(65)Cf. Leel.II d. 25 q. un. n.31, Vat. XIX, 238. Regarding this viewpoint, Duns Scotus seems
to be in accordance with Augustine: «Sed quae tandem esse potent ante voluntatem causa
voluntatis ? Aut enim et ipsa voluntas est et a radice ista voluntatis non recedetur, aut non est
voluntas et peccatum nullum habet. Aut igitur voluntas est prima causa peccandi aut nullum
peccatum est prima causa peccandi. Nee est cui recte inputetur peccanrm nisi peccanti », De libero
arbitrio III, 49, 168, CCSL 29, 304. This point comes out more clearly in De civitate Dei XII, 7:
«Nemo igitur quaerat efficientem causam malae voluntatis ; non enim est efficiens sed deficiens,
THEDISTINCTION BETWEEN NATUREANDWILLINDUNSSCOTUS 201
The Intellect as Natural Agent
Its capacity to self-determination also distinguishes the will from the
intellect. In principle, both the will and the intellect are open to opposite effects 66.
However, while the will always acts freelys", the intellect by itself acts in a
determinate way. The intellect is unable to choose between opposite possibilities
on its own, but rather is determined by things exterior to itself. Its primary
determinant is the object of knowledge, though it may also be the will 68• Thus, on
its own, the intellect acts as a nature 69.
The example of the intellect being determined from the outside shows again -
we mentioned before the case of the sun - that the possibility of something
producing opposite effects is not mutually exclusive with its being determined 70.
Unlike the will, a natural agent does not have its activity in its own power;
«inasmuch as it is not hindered, it cannot produce opposite effects in the same
matter which is disposed in the same way» 71. Observing that irrational potencies
have the capacity to produce opposites, we must thus note that for Scotus the term
'rational' cannot merely mean the capacity to produce opposites, but the capacity
to self-determination,
Having shown that the intellect is to be considered a natural agent, Scotus can
now relate his distinction between will and nature with the Aristotelian distinction
between rational and irrational agents 72. If, according to Aristotle, to be 'rational'
quia nee iIla effectio sed defectio », CCSL48, 362. - Aristotle holds the opposite view, i. e. that the
will is moved by earlier causes, namely by the object of desire (opentlCov), De anima III, 10.
433blO·18.
(66)As to the intellect, cf. ARIST.,Metaph.IX, 2, 1046h4·6; DUNS Scows, QQ. Metaph. IX
q.15n.41,OPh.IV,686.
(67) Scotus explicitly claims thai the will always acts freely: «Voluntas autem semper habet
suum modumcausandi proprium, scilicet libere », Quodl. q. 16 n. 14, VivoXXVI, 198b. Therefore, a
will cannot be forced from the outside to a specific act: «eontradictio enim est voluntatem
simpliciter cogi ad actum volendi»,Ord. IV d.29q. un.n. 6, Viv.XIX,218a(ABW, 174).
(68) QQ. Metaph. IX q.15 n.39, Ol'h, IV, 686; also Ord. II d.42 q.I·4, Vivo XlII, 45Ia-462a;
H. MOHLE, Ethik als scientia practica. 198-202.
(69) QQ. Metaph. IX q. 15 n. 36, OPh. IV, 684; «Et sic intellectuscadit sub natura. Est enirn ex
se deterrninatus ad intelligendum, et non habet in potestate sua intelligerc et non intelligere, sive
circa complexa, ubi potest habere contraries aetas, non habet etiam ilIos in potestate sua: assentire
et dissentire ».
(70)« ... Determinatio non tollit 'posse in opposita' », QQ. Metaph. IX q.15 n.62, OPh.
IV,694.
(71) « ... Agens naturale - idem et non impeditum - in eadem passe aequaliter disposito non
potest causare opposita (hoc enim est de ratione agentis naturalis; unde II De generatione : "Idem in
quantum idem natum est semper facere idem"; et hoc specialiter intelligitur de agente naturali) »,
Lect. II d. 25 q. un. n.36, Vat. XIX, 239. Cf. ARiST., De generatione et corruptione II, 10, 336a27-
28. Therefore, if a natural agent acts by itself, it acts uninterruptedly. Cf. Lect. II d. 25 q. un. n. 73,
Vat, XIX, 254.
(72) A. B. WOLTER, « Duns Scotus on the Will as a Rational Potency», in M. McCORD ADAMS
(ed.), The Philosophical Theology ofJohn Duns Scotus, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1990,
163-180; M.McCoRD·ADAMS, «Duns Scotus on Will as Rational Power», in L. SILEO (ed.), Via
scoti. Methodologia ad mentem Joannis Duns Scoti. Atti del Congresso Scotistico Internazionale
202 TOBIAS HOFFMANN
THE DISTINCTION BETWEENNATUREAND WILLIN DUNSSCOTUS 203

is to have the power to produce opposite effects, then, Scotus argues, it is the will
rather than the intellect that is properly deemed rational 73:
If 'rational' is understood to mean 'with reason', then the will is properly
rational, and it has to do with opposites, both as regards its own act and as regards
,the acts it controls. And it has to do with opposites not in the way that a nature,
like the intellect, acts, which has no power to determine itself in any other way.
But the will acts freely, for it has the power of self-determination. Properly
speaking, however, the intellect is not a potency with regard to external things,
because if it does have to do with opposites, it cannot determine itself, and unless
it is determined, it is unable to do anything extra 74.
Scours' argument that the intellect is a natural agent should not be understood
as derogatory. Rather, it can be seen that therein lies the intellect's true strength:
for since the intellect as nature acts according to its utmost power, it is not subject
to error in so far as simple concepts of thought are concerned 75. Furthermore, the
intellect as a natural agent cannot fail to perceive the truth of self-evident
principles (propasiiianes per se notae) and the truth of conclusions from these
principles 76.
We could say that in this feature of the intellect lies the basis for objective
ethical judgments: one is free to elicit a morally good act, but the criteria of its
judgment is objective and accessible to the intellect 77.
The Cause of the Will's Act: The Will is not determined by the Object of
Apprehension 78
If the will self-determines its activity, it follows that it is in some respects
independent of exterior influences. This includes a certain independence with
regard to its object as it is presented by apprehension. Since the object of
apprehension can only exercise a natural influence, the relationship between the
free will and the object has to be accounted for in a way that freedom will not be
compromised.
Scotus compares his views regarding the effective cause of the act of will with
his scholastic contemporaries. He attributes to Thomas Aquinas and Godfrey of
Fontaines the view that the act of will is determined by the object of apprehension
alone 79. To Henry of Ghent, on the other hand, he attributes the view that the will
alone is the effective cause of its act 80. Scotus grants some truth to both positions
and integrates them into his own view:

... I hold a middle way, claiming that not only the will, but also the object
cooperate to the act of will, so that the act of the will sterns from the will and from
the apprehended object as its effective cause 81.
Roma 9-11 marzo 1993, vol.2, Rome,Edizioni Antonianurn, 1995, 839-854; H.MOHLB, Ethik als In Lectura II d. 25, Scotus' pivotal text on this question, he interprets the will
scientiapractica, 166-173.
and the intellect (i. e. that which presents the object to the will) as both being partial
(73)In this assumption,Scotus seems to be directlydependenton Henry of Ghent, cf. Summa
a.36q.5,OperaomniaXXVllI,122-130.
(74)« Si autem intelligiturrationalis,id est cum ratione, tunc voluntasest proprierationalis.Et
ipsa est oppositorum, tamquoadactum proprium quamquoad actus inferiorum; et non oppositorum
modo naturae, sicut intellectus non patens se deterrninare ad alterum, sed modo Iibero potens se
determinate. Et ideo est potentia, quia ipsa aliquid potest, nam potest se determinate. Intellectus
(77)H.MOHLE, Ethik als scientia practica, 205. Cf. Ord. I d.l p.2 q.2 n.147, va.n, 98:
autem proprie non est potentia respectuextrinsecorum, quia ipse, si est oppositorum, non potest se
« necessitasest in intellectupropterevidentiamobiecti necessariocausantisassensumin intellectu:
determinare ; et nisi determinetur, nihil extra poterit », QQ. Metaph. IX q. 15 n. 41, OPh. IV, 686.
non autem bonitas aliqua obiecti causatnecessario assensum voluntatis, sed voluntas libere assentit
EnglishtextABW,157.
cuilibet bono,et ita libere assentitmaioribono sicut minori ». Cf. Ord. I d. 1 p. 1 q, 1 n. 22,Vat. II, 16.
(75)Cf. Ord. I d.3 p.l q.I-2 n.76, Vat.ID, 52: «causa naturalis agit ad effectum suum
(78) Seethe extensive study of thisquestionin H.MOHLE, Ethik als scientiapractica, 178-198.
secundum ultimum suae porentiae, quando non est irnpedita; igitur ad effectum perfectissimum
quem potest primo producere, primo agit, Omnia concurrentia ad istum actum primum intellectus Cf. also J, SPRUVT,« Duns Scotus's CriticismofHenryof Ghent'sNotion of FreeWill", in E. P. Bas
(ed.), John Duns Scotus: Renewal of Philosophy. Acts of the third Symposiumorganized by the
sunt causae mere naturales,quia praecedunt omnem actum voluntatis, - et non impeditae, ut patet;
Dutch Society for Medieval Philosophy Medium Aevum (May23 and 24, 1996), Amsterdam-
ergo prime producunt perfectissimum conceptum in quam possunt: ille autem non est nisi
Atlanta, Rodopi, 1998 (Elernenta. Schriften zur Philosophie und ihrer Problemgeschichte 72),
conceptus speciei specialissimaeproductae ». Cf. Leer. I d. 3 p, 1q, 1-2n. 71,Vat. XVI, 251.
139-154.
(76) Ord. II d.6 q.2 n.ll, Vivo XII, 355b (ABW, 474): « ... non est in potestate intellectus
(79)Cf. THOMAS AQUINAS, s.c. Gem. III c.26 ad5, Leon. XlV, 73a: «Voluntas enim, in
moderari assensum suum veris, quae apprehendit, nam quantum ostenditur veritas principiorum
quantum huiusmodi, movetur a suo obiecto, quod est bonum apprehensum»: S. theol. I q. 82 a. 4 in
ex terminis vel conclusionurn ex principiis,tantum oportet assentire, propter carentiam libertatis »,
corp., Leon. V, 303a; GODFREY OF FONTAlNES, Quodl. VI q.7 in corp., ed. M.DE WULF-
The necessityofthe assentto the firstprinciples(I. e. the self-evidentprinciples)lieson the one hand
J. HOFFMANS, Philosophes belges III, Leuven, t914, 163: «Voluntas non mover se, sed movetur a
in thenatureof the intellectas a natural agentthat acts to its utmostpower (Ord. I d. 3 p. 1 qA n. 269,
bono apprehenso secundum modum et formam apprehensionis », Aquinas and Godfrey are
Vat.III, 164-165); on the other hand it lies in the nature of these principles themselves: «termini
mentionedexplicitly inAdd. magn., ed. BALle, 267.
principiorumper se notorumtalemhabentidentitatemutalterevidenternecessarioalterumincludat,
(80) HENRY OFGHENT, Quodl. IX q.5 in corp.: « Simpliciterergo dicendum quod voluntas in
et ideo intellectus, componensillos terminos, ex quo apprehenditeos - habet apud se necessariam
actum volendi anulloalio, sed a se ipsa solamovetur », Opera omnia Xlll, 131.Cf.n.47.
causarn conformitatis illius actus componendi ad ipsos terminos quorum est compositio, et etiam
(81) «Ideo renee viam mediarn, quod tam voluntasquam obiectum concurrunt ad causandurn
causam evidentem talis conformitatis, et ideo necessario pater sibi ilia confonnitas cuius causam
actum volendi, ita quod actus volendi est a voluntare et ab obiecto cognito ut a causa effectiva »,
evidentemapprehenditin tenninis»,Ord. Id. 3 p. 1 q. 4n. 230,Vat.III,138-139.
Lect. lId. 25 q. un.n.69, Vat.XIX,253.
204 TOBIAS HOFFMANN
causes 82. In causing the act of will, both express their causality according to their
characterization: the will as a free active potency and the intellect as a natural
active potency. Of these two partial causes, Duns Scotus considers the will to be
the principal cause 83. The will's freedom is not compromised by the cooperation
of the intellect as a natural cause, since the will freely chooses regarding the use it
makes ofthis natural cause 84.
The will's freedom with respect to its object holds true even with regard to its
most perfect object: the ultimate end for humans 85, i. e. the beatific vision of God
(as its most perfect object) and happiness (beatitudo, as its ultimate end). The will
remains free to will beatitude and the beatific vision or not to will it. While the will
cannot will against (nolle) happiness, it can fail to elicit an act ofwill for happiness
(non velle) 86. Furthermore, since the human will is not infinite, it can tum away
from the infinite and highest beatifying good, even while experiencing the beatific
vision. Since the stability of the beatific vision, i. e. that the will can not tum away
from God, is not entailed by the interaction of the object and the will, Scotus
(82) The Scotistic Commission holds that the discussions of the act of the will found in the text
of Lectura II d.25, Vat. XIX, 229-263 and in the Reportatio II A d.25 are authentic teaching of
Scotus. Cf. the introduction to Vat. XIX, 38*-41 *.The text of the Opus OxonienseII d. 25 contained
in the edition of Wadding-Vives does not belong to Scotus' Ordinatio, Vat. XIX, 37*. In the latter
text the object of the will is merely considered as causa sinequa non for the will's act, and the author
avoids interpreting it as efficient cause, Op. Ox. II d. 25 q. un. n. 19. Vivo XlTI,21Za. According to
this text, the will alone is considered the total cause of the will's act (n. 22, VivoXlll, 221b). Thus,
the Scotistic Commission refutes the view of C. Balic : basing his view on a note of the Additiones
magnae, where Scotus' student William of Alnwick reports that «aliter dixit Oxonie », ed. BALlC,
272, 282, Balle concluded that Scotus changed his mind about the cause of volition several times.
Balic thought that, at an early stage (represented by the Lectura-texii, Scotus believed that object
and will are partial causes: by the time Scotus taught in Oxford Balic thought he had changed his
mind to the view described by the Op.Ox., and at the end of his career Scotus was assumed to have
returned to his original position. Balic believed that Scotus' final view was presented in the
Additiones magnae and the Secundae additiones (Add. magn., ed. C. BALlC, 282-284; Sec. add., ed.
C. BALlC,«Une question inedite de J. Duns Scot sur la volonte », Recherchesde theologie anclenne
et medievale, 3 (1931], 191-208, especially 202-203). The Scotistic Commission interprets the
words of William of Alnwick(aliterdixit Oxonie) as implying not that Scorns presented a different
view in Oxford than he did before (i, e. in Paris), but rather that he should be understood as defending
a view at variance with that of Henry of Ghent, who appears as Scotus' opponent, Vat. XIX, 39*. In
his article" Did Duns Scotus Change his Mind on the Will?» (forthcoming in vol. 28 of Miscellanea
Mediaevalia), S. Dumont challenges this view. He argues against the editors of Vat. XIX that Balic
was correct in thinking that Scotuschanged his mind on the will, but that this change, contrary to the
opinion of Balle .took place at Paris. not at Oxford. Dumont considers Rep. II A d. 25 to be the latest
statement on this issue and he interprets this text as favoring the viewthatthe will is the total cause of
volition.
(83) Lect. IId.25 q. un.n, 73, Vat. XIX,254.
(84) Lect. lId. 25 q. un, n, 74, Vat. XIX, 255.
(85) MOHLE, Ethikals scientiapractica,389-398.
(86)" Licet non potest nolle beatitudinem, potest tamen non velie illud », Lect. I d. 1 p.2 q. 2
n.Ll S, Vat. XVI, 100: more extensively Ord. IV d.49 suppl. q, 9-10 n.S, VivoXXI, 332b. For the
motivation of Scotus' viewon this point, see MOHLE, Ethik als scientia practica, 186-187.
THEDISTINCTION BETWEENNATURE ANDWlUIN DUNSSCOTUS 205
assumes that to avoid sin during the beatific vision the will is preserved by a
permanent influence of God 87.
The Will as a Pure Perfection : Freedom and Necessity
An important element of Scotus' conception of the will follows from his
consideration of the divine will, becausein God the will is found as an infinite will.
Reflections on the infinite will in God presuppose that the will can not only exist as
a finite will (in creatures), but also as an infinite will (in God), in other words, that
the nature of the will as such transcends the modes of finite being and of infinity.
This leads us to the consideration of Scotus' account ofpure perfections 88.
Literally, the expression 'pure perfection' (perfectio simpliciter) stands for a
perfection in the unqualified sense of the term. With Anselm of Canrerburyw,
Scornsdefines the pure perfection in the following terms:
That is said to be a pure perfection, which is better in everything than that which
is not-it90.
Following Scotus' own thought, this description can be exposed in the
following way:
Whenever two positive perfections are incompatible with one another, if one is a
pure perfection, it mustbe better than the other 91.
For instance, for someone to have intelligence or wisdom is better than to lack
them. The only condition is that these perfections be compatible with the nature of
that which possesses them: for a dog it is not a perfection to be wise, since wisdom
is incompatible with a dog' s nature'".
What is important for our purpose is to consider that, according to Scotus, pure
perfections are compatible with the mode ofinfinity 93• In fact, pure perfections are
(87) Ord.lV d. 49 q. 6 n. 15, Vivo XXI, 234a: « ... Simpliciter contingens est. quod non peccet,
tamen nunquam eveniet, quia causa superior semper praeservat »,
(88) For an acconnt of the pure perfections in Duns Scotus, A B. WOLTER, The Transcendentals
and their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus, St. Bonaventure, NY, The Franciscan
Institute, 1946, 162-175.
(89) ANSELM OFCA1"TERBURY, Monologlon C. 15, Opera omnia 1, ed. F. S. SCHMm, Seckau
(Austriaj.Styria, 1938,28-29.
(90) " Perfecrio simpliciter dicitur, quae in quolibet est melius ipsum quam non ipsum », Pro
princ. (Tractatus de primo principia) c. 4 concl. 3, ed. E. ROCHE, St. Bonaventure, NY, Franciscan
Institute-Leaven, Nauwelaerts 1949,76. English texiibid.•77.
(91) WOL'fER. The Transcendental". 164.Cf. DUNS SCOTUS, Pro princ. C. 4 concl. 3, ed, ROCHE,
78; « Perfectio simpliciter est, quae est simpliciter et absolute melius quocumque incomposslbili: et
ita exponatur illud 'in quolibet quam non ipsurn' , hoc est, quodlibet quod non est ipsum ».
(92) Pro princ. c.4 concl. 3, ed. ROCHE, 78: «Non melior est in cane sapientia, quia nihil est
bonitas in ilIocui contradicit »,
(93)Cf. Quodl. q.5 n. 9, Vivo XXV, 212a. Compatibility with the mode of infinity is just one of
four features Scotus ascribes to the pure perfections. For a complete account of the features of the
pure perfections, see WOLIT:.R, The Transcendentals, 166-169.
206 TOBIASHOFFMANN
transcendentals 94, which means that they are not restricted to any genus and that
they are indifferent to finite and infinite being'", Consequently, they can all be
predicated of God, some exclusively ofhim (such as omnipotence), others of God
and of creatures 96. According to Seems, the will is a pure perfection 97; in fact, the
wiJ1 is one that applies to God and to creatures.
We will now turn our attention to Scorns' account of the will in the mode of
infinity (which is the divine will). God's will can be active not only contingently
(when it respects a finite object), but also necessarily (when it respects the infinite
object, i. e. his own goodness), because both modes of the will's activity are
perfect 98 • As a general rule, it can be said that each of God's productions ad intra
(within the Trinity) is necessary while each causation ad extra (with respect to
creatures) is contingent 99. The latter productions of God shall be discussed in the
fourth section, while the former ones will be treated in the fifth and final section of
the paper. However, before we turn to these subjects, it is necessary to present
Scotus' argument as to how an activity of the will which is necessary does not
compromise its freedom.
According to Scotus, God necessarily wills his own goodness. Yet, at the same
time, this act of willing is free lOO• The question why the necessity of this act does
not contradict its freedom cannot be explained by further reasons; this
compatibility of freedom and necessity simply derives from the nature of the will
and from the nature of God's goodness mi. Scotus is concerned to maintain a clear
distinction between two pairs of contraries: the opposition between necessity and
contingency is distinct from the opposition between nature and freedom. As
(94)« ... Omnes sunt transcendentes qui important perfectionem simpliciter», Ord. I d. 8 p.l
q. 3n.156, VatlV,229.
(95)Ord. I d.8 p.1 q.3 n.114. Vat. IV, 206:« ... Transcendens quodcurnque nullum habet
genus sub quo contineatur ». Cf. Ord. I d.S p.1 q.3 n.113. Vat. IV. 206: «Quaecurnque sunt
cornmunia Deo et creaturae, sunt talia quae conveniunt enti ut est indifferens ad finiturn et
infinitum ».
(96) Ord. I d. 8 p. 1 q. 3 n, 115, Vat. IV, 207: «Ita enim potest sapientia esse transcend ens, et
quodcumque aliud, quod est commune Deo er creaturae, licet aliquod tale dicatur de solo Deo,
aliquod autem de Deo et aliqua creatura». It is in fact a condition for a pure perfection to be
predicable of God, Ord. I d.26 q. un. n.83, interpolated text, Vat. VI, 41 : « ... Solum ilIud est
perfectio simpliciter quod potest esse in aliquo infinitum ».
(97) All attributes of God are pure perfections, Pro princ. c. 4 concl. 10, ed. ROCHE, 140: «Nihil
est in Primo nisi perfectio simpliciter». InOrd. I d. 2 p. 2 q.1-4n.235. Vat. II. 268, Scotus explicitly
characterizes the will (and the intellect) as pure perfections. Cf. also Pro princ. c.4 concl, 4,
ed, ROCHE, 86 : «Intelligere, velle, sapientia, arnor sunt perfectiones simpliciter ».
(98)« ... Voluntas infinita necessario habet actum circa obiectum infinitum, quia hoc est
perfectionis ; et pari ratione non necessaria habet actum circa obiectum <finitum> (Viv. : infinitum),
quia hoc esset irnperfectionis », Quodl. q. l6n. 9, VivoXXVI, 194b.
(99) Lect, I d.2 p.2 q.I-4 n.177, Vat. XVI, 172; Ord. I d.2 p.2 q. 1-4 n.239, Vat. II, 272;
cf. Ord. proI. p. I q. un. n.4l, Vat. I, 24.
(100) Quodl. q. 16n. 8, Viv.XXVI, 194a.
(101)« Non est quaerenda ratio eorum quorum non est ratio ... Ita dico hie, quod sicut ista est
immediata et necessaria, voluntas divina vult bonitatem divinam, nee est alia ratio, nisi quia haec est
talis voluntas, et ilia talis boniras », Quodl. q.16 n. 8, Vivo XXVl. 194b; ibid. n.16, Vivo XXVl,
199b. cr. also above, n. 63.
THE DISTINCTIONBETWEENNATUREANDWILLIN DUNSSCOTUS 207
Scotus puts it. this is because contingency can spring from natural agents, and a
free agent can act necessarily 102.
Scotus himself seems to be somewhat puzzled with his own account of the
compatibility between necessity and freedom. In an Addition to Quodlibet
q.16 103 , the question is raised as to in precisely what the essence of freedom
consists if the will can act necessarily.In necessary actions it seems neither to have
a determination to act nor a mastery over its acts 104. Moreover, since both an
action of a natural agent and a necessary action of the will entail some
determination to act, Scotus asks why the will does not act like a nature when it
acts necessarily 105.
The answer to the first question is that the freedom of a necessary act of God
«consists in the fact that he elicits this act and perseveres in it as something
delightful which he has elected, as it were, to do» 106. This reply is of course
somewhat deceiving, since it does not respond to the intriguing question of
whether the mastery over the action is preserved in necessary acts. The answer to
the second question is more persuasive: Scotus remarks that even though
necessity implies determination. there are different degrees ofnecessity. Whereas
(102)« Non est eadem divisio in principium naturale. et liberum, et in principium necessario
activurn, et contingenter, aliquod enim naturale potest contingenter agere, quia potest impediri:
igitur pari ratione possibile est aliquod liberum, stante libertate, necessario agere », Quodl. q, 16 n. 9.
Vivo XXVI. 195a. Cf. Rep. IA d.1O q.S, Oxford. Merton 59. foI.68v: «Sicut ergo natura ex se
determinata ad unum. ita et voluntas ad producendum aliquid necessario vel contingenter, nee israe
differentiae actionis necessitas et contingentia sunt differentiae essentiales principii activi vel
productivi, sed sunt differentiae accidentales non convertibiles cum principio activo naturali, nee
cum principio libero, quia utroque modo potest utrumque principium agere ». Cf. Ord. I d. 1 p. 2 q. 2
n. 131, Vat. II, 88. - The explanation ofcontingency in this quote as a hindrance of natural effects is
in apparent contradiction to Scotus' usual account of contingency (which is the object of section
four). In his major texts on contingency, Scotus traces contingency back to a free will, not to some
sort of interaction between natural causes. This apparent contradiction is resolved if we consider
that in this text Scotus is not discussing contingent causation, which is in fact reserved to free will.
nor does he seem here to intend the contingency of being, but he rather seems to have in mind the
contingency ofa certain effect to take place or not (e. g. a stone is prevented from falling down if it is
held in a hand). This type of contingency may be explained as referring to the effects of natural
causes, even though, when tracing it back to the first cause of being, we arrive at the disjunction
between necessary or contingent causing. This means that. in the final analysis, the hindrance of
natural effects as the cause for this type of contingency has to be itself either necessary (as an effect
of natural causation of the first cause) - or contingent (as an effect of free, contingent causation of
the first cause). Cf. section four.
(103) F. Alluntis and A. B. Wolter believe that the additions to Scorns' Quodlibet « were added
by hands other than Scotus.... Some of these seem to be simply earlier versions of parallel passages
and probably would have been eventually eliminated had Scotus lived to see the revision of the
Quodlibet completed », God and Creatures, XXXIII.
(104)« Sed semper est dubium, in quo stat per se ratio libertatis, sive enim dicatur quod libertas
stat in determinatione ad agendum, sive in dominatione respectu sui actus. per neutrum hie videtur
possesalvari»,Quodl. q. 16n. 9 (additio), Viv.XXVI.195a.
(105) «Sed quaeritur unde est, quod voluntas, licet necessario agat, non tamen naturaliter agit,
cum non possit natura magis esse determinata ad agendum, quam quod sit necessitata ad agere ? »,
Quodl. q.16 n. 15, VivoXXVI, 199a.
(106)« Respondeo, quia delectabiliter et eligibiliter elicit actum, et permanet in actum », Quodl.
q. 16 n. 10 (additio), Viv, XXVI, 195b. English text ALLUNTIS-WOLTER. God and Creatures, 380.
208 TOBIASHOFFMANN
a natural agent is determined by exterior circumstances to produce its effect, the
will- even when it necessarily wills something - has the capacity to determine
itself to its volition 107. Scotus seems to claim that God's will, when it wills
necessarily, determines itself, yet in a determinate way. Though determining
itself, the infinite and most righteous will cannot fail to will the most perfect
good lOB.
Yet, even though necessity is not contradictory to the freedom of will, the will
never elicits its act by natural necessity 109, The only case in which natural
necessity is compatible with the will's freedom is given when the will freely
accepts a natural necessity. Duns Scotus provides the following example:
For instance, if one voluntarily dives off a cliff and, while falling, continues to
will this, hefalls necessarily with the necessity ofnatural gravity and yethe freely
wills that fall. Thus God, though he lives necessarily by a natural life and with a
necessity that excludes all freedom, nevertheless freely wants to live such a
life llO.
Having thus exposed the principal implications of the will/nature distinction
for the notion ofthe will itself and of the intellect, we can now tum to see how this
distinction affects Scotus' ethics.
{I07)Cf. Quodl. q.16n.16, Viv.XXVI, 199b:« ... Grave est determinaturn ad descensum, non
habito necessario actu descendendi ab ipso generanre, sed tantum habito ab ipso principio
naturaliter determinative ad descendendum. Voluntas autem causata, si necessario vult aliquid, non
sic est determinata a causante ad illud velle, sicut grave ad descensum, sed tantum a causante habet
principium deterrninativum sui ad hoc velle ».
(l08)Cf. Ord. Id.lOq. un. n.47-48, Vat.IV, 359; Quodl. q.16n.2, Viv.XXVl, 181ab;Rep. IA
d.10 q. 2, OXford, Merton 59, foJ.67v: «Sequitur a primo ad ultimum, quod si voluntas infimta
posset esse non recta vel in actu non recto, quod necessario sit in actu volendo recto et circa primum
obieetum volibile. Primum autem obiectum volibile quod est summum bonum est sunune et
necessario volendurn ex ratione finis ».
(109) Ord. I d. 1 p. 2 q. 2 n, 80, Vat.Il, 60: «Necessitas naturalis non stat cum libertate. Quod
probo : quia natura et voluntas sunt principia activa habentia oppositum modum principiandi; ergo
cum modo principiandi voluntatis non stat modus principiandi naturae ». Here again it is apparent
how the difference between nature and freedom is founded in the different modus principiandi, i. e.
the way a principle elicits its act, and not how some effects are related to another. Cf. also Leer, I d. 10
q. un, n. 17, Vat. XVII, 121 : « ubi est necessitas naturae ibi non est libertas ».
(110)« Exemplum, si quis voluntarie se praecipitat, et semper in cadendo illud velie continuat,
necessario quidem cadit necessitate gravitatis naturalis, et tamen libere vult ilium casum, ita Deus,
licet necessario vivat vita naturali, et hoc tali necessitate, quae excludit omnem libertatem, tamen
vult libere se vivere tali vita », Quodl. q. t6 n. 18, Vivo XXVI, 20lab. English text ALLuNTls-
WOLTER, God and Creatures. 387.
THEDISTINCTIONBETWEENNATUREANDWILL IN DUNS SCOTUS 209
III. THE AFFECTION FOR THE ADVANTAGEOUS VERSUS
THE AFFECTION FOR JUSTICE
Besides the specific notion of the will as a free potency, Scotus also refers to
the will in a general sense as an appetite Ill. As an appetite, the will has a natural
inclination towards its own perfection, although it is entirely free in eliciting its
act 112.
In addition to this natural tendency of the will by which a person pursues his or
her own perfection (happiness), the will, being free, also has the capacity to want
something independently of the person's own profit and simply because it is a
good in itself. In Scotus' thought, each of the two types of the will's acts is based
on a different affection of the will.
Following Anselm of Canterbury 113, Scotus refers to one of these tendencies
or biases of the will as «the affection for the advantageous» taffectio commodii,
i. e. that which promotes one's own perfection, and to the other as «the affection
for justice» (affectio iustitiaet, i, e. the tendency toward something good for its
own sake 114. As Scotus puts it :
According to Anselm, two affections may be assigned to the will, namely, the
affection for justice and the affection for the advantageous. He treats of these
extensively in The Fall of the Devil, ch.14, and The Harmony of God's
(Ill) «Dico quod voluntas potest accipi sup propria ratione vel sub generali ratione et notitia,
scilicet pro appetitu », Ord. IIld. 17 q. un. n. 2, Viv.XIV, 653b(ABW, 180).
(112) «Dico quod voluntas naturalis sic. et ut naturalis non est voluntas ut potentia, sed tantum
importat inclinationem potentiae ad tendendum in propriam perfectionern suam», Ord. III d.17
q. un.n.5, Viv.XlV,655a(ABW, 182).
(I 13) ANSELM OFCANTERBURY, De casu diaboli C. t4, Opera omnia I, ed. SCHMITT, Seckau,
1938,258: «Quoniam ergo nec solummodo volendo beatitudinem, nee solummodo volendo quod
convenit cum ex necessitate sic velit, iustus vel iniustus potest appellari, nee potest nee debet esse
beams nisi velit et nisi iuste velit : necesse est ut sic faciat deus utramque voluntatem in iIlo
convenire, ut et beatus et iuste velit, Quatenus addita iustitia sic temperet voluntatem beatitudinis, ut
et resecet voluntatis excessum et excedendi non amputet potestatem. Ut cum per hoc quia volet
beatus esse modum possit excedere, per hoc quia iuste volet non velit excedere, et sic iustam habens
beatitudinis voluntatem possit et debeat esse beatus », Cf, De concordia praescientiae et
praedestinationis et gratiae Dei cum libero arbitrio q, 3 c. II, Opera omnia II, ed, SCHMITT, Rome,
1940,281 : « ... Instrumentum volendi duas habet aptitudines, quas voeo 'affectiones'. Quarum una
est ad volendum commoditatem, altera advolendum rectitudinem.... Per affectionem quidem quae
est ad volendum cornmoditatem, semper vult homo beatitudinem et beatus esse. Per illam vero quae
est ad volendumrectitudinem, vult rectitudinem etrectus, id est iustus esse »,
(114) Ord. II d. 6 q. 2 n.Ll , Vivo XII, 356b. This distinction has received attention in several
studies: W. HOERES, Der Wille als reine Yollkommenheit, 149-162; A.B. WOLTER. «Native
Freedom of the Will as a Key to the Ethics of Scotus », in Deus et homo ad men/em l. Duns Scali,
Rome, Societas internationalis Scotistica 1972 (Studia scholastico-scotistica 5), 359-370;
N. HARTMANN,« Die Preundschaftsliebe nach Johannes Duns Skotus », wissenschaft una Weisheit,
52 (1989),194-218; 53 (1990), 50-65; I.F. BOLER, «Transcending the Natural: Duns Scotus on the
Two Affections of the Will», American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 67 (1993), 109-126;
Th. WILLIAMS, «How Scotus Separates Morality from Happiness », American Catholic
Philosophical Quarterly, 69 (1995), 425-445; L. SUKJAE, « Scotus on the Will : The Rational Power
and the Dual Affections », Vivarium, 36 (1998), 40-54.
210 TOBIASHOFFMANN
Foreknowledge, Grace, and Predestination, ch.19. The affection for justice is
nobler than the affection for the advantageous, understanding by 'justice' not
only acquired or infused justice, but also innate justice, which is the will's
congenital liberty by reason of which it is able to will some good not oriented to
self. According to the affection for what is advantageous, however, nothing can
be willed save with reference to self. And this we would possess if only an
intellectual appetite with no liberty followed upon intellectual knowledge, as
sense appetite follows sense cognition 1J5.
With his twofold account of the affections of the will, Scotus disassociates
himself from a strict eudaemonism in the Aristotelian sense!", For Scotus, not
every good is pursued for the sake of happiness 1l7; acts not motivated by the
pursuit of one's happiness but rather intended for their own good are based on the
affection for justice. For Scotus, the affection for justice is of utmost importance,
for it alone makes unselfish love possible J J8.
According to Scotus, the affection for justice would be inconceivable if the
will were a natural active principle rather than a free active principle. For as a
nature, i. e. by the natural inclination alone, a person necessarily pursues the
highest degree of his or her happiness 119. The will can desire all that is good in
itself independently of the pursuit of its own happiness, precisely since it is not
naturally ordered solely to its own self-perfection. Thus, while the affection for the
advantageous is conceivable also in creatures lacking a free will, the affection for
justice can only be present in those with a free will 120. In fact, Scotus literally
(1l5) «In voluntate secundum Anselmum assignantur duae affectiones, scilicet affectio
iustitiae et affectio commodi, de quibus tractat De casu diaboli, capitulo 14 er De concordia, 19
diffuse. Nobilior est affectio iustitiae quam commodi, non solum intelligendo de acquisita et infusa,
sed de innata, quae est ingenita libertas secundum quam potest velle aliquod bonum non ordinatum
ad se. Secundum autem affectionern commodi nihil potest velle nisi in ordine ad se, et hanc haberet
si praecise esset appetitus intellectivus sine libertate sequens cognitionem intellectivam, sicut
appetitus sensitivus sequitur cognitionem sensitivam », Ord. ill suppl, d. 26 q. un. n. 17, Vivo XV,
340b-34Ia{ABW, 178). EnglishtextABW, 179.
(116) BOLER, «Transcending the Natural », 116·122.
{I 17) Ord. IV d,49 suppl, q. 9-10 n. IS, Viv. XXI. 382a.
(118) Cf. Ord. IV d. 49 q. 5 n, 2-3, VivoXXI, Ina-l73a: « ... Velie etiam est duplex in genere,
aut propter volitum, sive propter bonum voliti, aut propter volentem vel bonum volentis. Primum
velle dicitur esse amoris amicitiae; secundum amoris concupiscentiae ... actus amicitiae inest
voluntati, secundum quod habet affectionem iustitiae, quia si solam affectionem commodi haberet,
non posset nisi sibi summe commoda velie... Actus autem concupiscentiae inest voluntati
secundum quod habet affectionem commodi », For more details, see HARTMANN, «Die
Freundschaftsliebe », 53 (1990),54.
(1l9) Ord. IV d,49 suppl.q, 9-IOn. 2, VivoXXI, 319a:« ... Natura non potest remanere natura,
quin inclinetur ad suam perfectionem, quia si tollas ilIam inclinationem, tollis naturam; sed
appetitus naturalis non est nisi inclinatio talis: ergo ut sic necessario appetit beatitudinem, quia illa
est maxima perfectio.... Praeterea, in cuius potestate non est tendere, vel non tendere, in eius
potestate non est remisse tendere; ergo si voluntas ut natura determinatur necessario ad appetendum
beatitudinem, ergo summe »,
(120) Rep. IV d,49 q. 4 n. 5, Vivo XXIV, 637b: « Affectio iustitiae, sive illud quod convenit
alicui secundum affectionern iusti tantum, convenit voluntati inquantum liberae, affectio autem
commodi est communis ornni appetitui cognoscitivo, non inquantum liber, quia sic non conveniret
non habenti libertatem ». Cf. Ord. lId. 39q. 2n. 5, VivoXIII,415ab{ABW, 202).
THEDISTINCTION BETWEENNAWREAND WILLINDUNSSCOWS 211
identifies the affection for justice with «the innate freedom of the will» 121.
Conversely, if a will were to lack the affection for justice, it would have lowered
itself to the level of a natural agent (i. e. one without free will), as Scotus remarks
with reference to the free will ofangels J22:
For if one were to think, according to that fictitious situation Anselm postulates
in The Fall of the Devil, that there was an angel with an affection for the
beneficial, but without an affection for justice (I. e., one that had a purely
intellectual appetite as such and not one that was free), such an angel would be
unable not to will what is beneficial, and unable not to covet such above all. But
this would not be imputed to it as sin, because this appetite would be related to
intellect as the visual appetite is now related to sight, necessarily following what
is shown to it by that cognitive power, and being inclined to seek the very best
revealed by such a power, for it would have nothing to restrain it 123.
In accordance with Anselm, Scotus identifies the two affections as two
constitutive features ofthe will :
Nevertheless, by distinguishing from the nature of the thing the two primary
characteristics of this twofold affection ... he [i. e. Anselm] makes these aspects
out to be nothing other than the will itself insofar as it is an intellective appetite
and insofar as it is free. For, as has been said, qua pure intellective appetite, the
will would be actually inclined to the optimum intelligible (as sight is to what is
best visible), whereas qua free, it could restrain itself in eliciting its act from
following this natural inclination, as to either the substance of the act or its
intensity 124.
Here we see that Scotus does not - contrary to Thomas Aquinas 125 - conceive
ofthe will simply as an intellectual appetite. If the will were merely an intellectual
(121) Cf. n.129.
(122) An example about the angelic will also allows conclusions about the way the human will
acts, since the will as a pure perfection is not restricted to a specific mode of existence. The essence
of the will is univoque in different modes of existence, namely in God, in human beings and in
angels. cr. Lect. I d.3 p. I q. 1-2 n.33, VaI.XVI, 237: «Anselmus De libero arbitrio cap. I :
"Potestas peccandi non est potestas libertatis, alioquin Deus non haberet libertatem" ; sed hoc non
sequeretur nisi libertas secundum se univoce conveniret nobis et Deo ».
(123)« ... Angelus tantum habens affectionem cornmodi et non iustitiae (hoc est, habens
appetitum intellectivurn mere ut appetitum talem, et non ut liberum), talis angelus non posset non
velie commoda, nee etiam non-summe velle talia; nee imputaretur sibi ad peccatum, quia ilIe
appetitus se haberet ad suam cognitivam sicut modo appetitus visivus ad visum, in necessario
consequendo ostensionem illius cognitivae et inclinationem ad optimum ostensum a tali potentia,
quia non haberet unde se refraenaret », Ord. II d. 6q. 2 n. 8, VivoXII, 353b (ABW, 468), English text
ABW,469.
(124) « ... Distinguendo ex natura rei duas rationes prirnas istarum rationum. ... nihil aliud sunt
ista quam eadem voluntas, in quantum est appetitus intellectivus et in quantum libera, quia, sicut
dictum est, voluntas inquantum est mere appetitus intellectivus summe inclinaretur actualiter ad
optimum intelligibile ;.. tamen inquantum libera est, potest refraenare in eliciendo actum ne
sequatur istam inclinationem, nee quantum ad substantiarn actus, nee quantum ad intensionem, ad
quam potentia naturalitcr inclinatur », Ord. II d. 6 q. 2 n. 8, VivoXll, 354a (ABW, 470), English text
ABW,471.
(125)Cf. S. theol. Iq. 82a. 2arg. 3 and ad 3,Leon. V, 296aand 297ab.
212 TOBIASHOFFMANN
appetite, it would not be a freely active potency, but a natural active potency, since
the intellect is a natural agent l 26 . Scotus often identifies the intellectual appetite
with the affection for the advantageous 127.
This confirms our assumption that for Scotus freedom of the will would be
inconceivable if the will only disposed of the affectio commodi128. Instead, the
Subtle Doctor explicitly establishes the relationship between the affectio iustitiae
and the freedom of will :
... this affection for what is just, I say, is the liberty innate to the will, since it
represents the first checkrein on this affection ofthe advantageous 129.
The possibility of the affection for justice to overcome the affection for the
advantageous is based upon the will's capacity to determine the intensity of its
acts, in other words, the will's ability to not always act according to what promotes
the person's own good. Actually, in being free not to pursue one's own interest, by
virtue of the affectioiustitiae, a person is destined to follow a higher will 130• This
dependence upon a higher will must be interpreted as a subordination ofthe will to
the will ofGod 131.
W. Haeres sees the connection between freedom and the affection for justice
in Scotus as so important that he defmes freedom in terms ofit:
Since the capacity to self-determination owes its criterion and its direction to the
inner rationality of the will, by which alone freedom becomes possible ... ,
freedom can be characterized as the capacity to dojustice to each thing 132.
(126)Scotus therefore does not use in this context the expression appetitus rationalis, but he
talks of the appetitus intellectualis. The reason for this seems to be that Scotus considered the will,
rather than the intellect, as the rational active potency (cf. n. 74). Cf. WILLIAMS, «How Scotus
separates Morality from Happiness », 428, n. 6.
(127)Cf. the text just quoted: Ord.IId. 6q.2n. 8, VivoXlI, 353b (ABW, 468); Ord. II d. 39 q.2
n. 5, Viv.XIII,415ab(ABW.202);Ord.IIId.26suppl.q. un.n.17, Viv.XV,340b(ABW,178).
(128) This is also manifest in a similar reflection as the one just quoted: «Si esset angelus
creatus habens instrumentum volendi solum affectione commodi, talis non posset non velle
commoda ... Ex quo pater, quod voluntas non est libera, quia est imaterialis nee etiam eius libertas
principaliter est ex parte intellectus, quia si tantum esser appetitus intellectivus, qui tantum
afficeretur ad commoda esset imaterialis et haberet intellectum precedentem, non ramen esset
liber», Add. magn., ed. BAlle, 301. Cf. Rep. IIAd. 25 q. un. n, 20. VivoXXIII, 128b; Ord. II d. 39
q.2n.5, Viv.XIII, 415b; Ord. IV d.49 q.Sn.S, Viv.XXI,173a.
(129) «Ilia igitur affectio iustitiae, quae est prima moderatrix affectionis commodi, ... est
libertas innata voluntatis », Ord. II d. 6 q. 2n. 8, VivoXlI, 353b (ABW, 470), English lexlABW, 471.
(130) Ord. II d. 6 q. 2 n. 10, VivoXlI. 355b: «Quia [voluntas] habet aliam regulam in agendo,
quam ilia haberet si ex se sola ageret; tenetur enirn sequi voluntatem superiorem, ex quo in
moderando iIIam inclinationem naturalem in potestate eius est moderari vel non rnoderari, quia in
potestateeius est non summeagere in quod potest ». Cf. HOERES, Der Wille als reine Vollkommen-
heit,154.
(l31)Rep. II A d.6 q.2 n.IO, Vivo XXII, 622a; WILLIAMS, «How Scotus separates Morality
from Happiness», 436-437. See also HOERES, Der Wille als reine Yollkommenheu. 154.
(132)« Da die Fahigkeit zur Selbstbestimmung ihren MaBstab und ihre Richtung in der inneren
Rationalitat des Willens hat, wodurch allererst Freiheit rnoglich wird ..., kann man die Freiheit auch
als die Fahigkeit bezeichnen, den Dingenjeweils gerecht zu werden », HOERES, Der Wille als reine
Yollkommenheit. 152.
THEDISTINCTIONBETWEENNATL'REAND WILLINDUNSSCOWS 213
IV. GoD'SPRODUcnONSADEJITRA: CONTINGENCY
Our topic now leads us to the consideration of the notion of contingency.
According to Scotus, contingency can only arise from causality that is not
naturally necessitated. As we shall see, Scotus argues that contingency is founded
in the free will of God 133.
The notion of contingency is critical in Duns Scotus' work, because he
understands it to show in a particularly clear way how the Graeco-Arabic
necessitarian cosmology of those whom Scotus simply calls the 'philosophers'
(i. e. Aristotle, Avicenna and Averroes) is fundamentally incompatible with
central Christian theological convictions.
One's conception of contingency has a profound influence on one's
understanding of the relationship between God and creatures. The theological
issues at stake are the Christian doctrines that God's creation of the world and
God's gift of grace are purely gratuitous. According to Scotus, God's activity ad
extrais never necessitated 134, but always arises out of God's free love.
Without belaboring the significance of the notion of contingency in the work
of Scotus, I will briefly recount the central issues at stake in Scotus' rejection of
necessitarianism 135.
Duns Scotus engages in his most detailed debate with the 'philosophers' in his
treatment of God's immutability (Ord. I d. 8 p. 2)136. In arguing that God alone is
immutable, Scotus is confronted with the view which he attributes to Aristotle
and Avicenna 137 that the immutability of God requires the immutability and
therefore necessity ofall being that is caused by God 138.
(133)Yel, God's will is not the only source of contingency. Besides the divine will, also the
human will is a source of contingency, even though the latter contingency has its ontological
foundation in God's contingent operalion ad extra. Cf. Rep. I A d. 39-40q. 1-3 n. 36, ed. J. R. SODER,
in m., Kontlngenz; und Wissen: Die Lehre von den futura contingentia bei Johannes Duns Sea IUS,
Munster, Aschendorff, 1999 (Beitrage zur Geschiehte der Philosophie und Theologie des
Mittelalters, Neue Folge 49),249. Cf. also SOder's comments, ibid., 86-87.
(134) Cf. n.99.
(135) A thorough analysis of Scotus' account of contingency is given by SODER, Kontingem
und Wissen. Cf. also M. SYloWANOwrCZ, Contingent Causality and the Foundations ofDuns Scotus'
Metaphysics, Leiden-New York-Cologne, Brill 1996 (Studienund Texte zurGeistesgeschichtedes
Miuelalters 51); L. HONNEFELDER, Scientia transcendens : Die formaie Bestimmung del' Seiendheit
und Realitat in del' Metaphysik des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit (Duns Scotus-Suarez-Wolff-Kant-
Peirce), Hamburg, Meiner, 1990 (paradeigmata 9),56-108. For a description of how Scotus' notion
of contingency influences his conception of metaphysics, ethics and the supernatural order,
P. SCAPrN, Contingenza e liberta divina ill Giovanni Duns Scoto, Rome, Editrice Miscellanea
Francescana, 1964,79-86.
(136) For a more extensive discussion of Scotus' arguments, L. HONNEPELDER, « Die Kritik des
Johannes Duns Scotus am kosmologischen Nezessitarismus der Araber. Ansatze zu einem neuen
Preihcitsbcgriff », in J.FRIED (ed.), Die abendlandische Freiheit vom 10. zum 14. Jahrhundert,
Sigmaringen 1991,249-263, especially 250-254. Cf. also 10., Scientia transcendens, 74-82.
(137) Ord. I d. 8 p.2q. un. n.251-255, Vat. IV, 294-297.
(138) Further places for the discussion ofnecessitarianism are the proofofthe existence of God
tLect. I d. 2 p. I; Ord. I d. 2 p. 1; Rep. I A d. 2 q. 1-2; PI'. princ.) and the question concerning God's
knowledge ofcontingents (Lect. I d. 39).
214 TOBIAS HOFFMAN'N
The 'philosophers' agree with Scotus on the assumption that there is indeed
contingency 139. But Scotus' point of departure from the philosophers is that he
believes contingency of being can only be adequately accounted for in relation to
the contingent causation of the First Cause l 40 • In fact, Scotus is generally
considered to be the first to make a sharp distinction between contingent being 141
and contingent causation, i, e. between entitative and operative contingency t42. In
contrast, the 'philosophers' appeal to a necessarily operating First Cause to
account for contingency, and they explain contingency by the fact that some
effects might be hindered by interfering causes, due to the complex movements
and interferences in the sublunary world 143. The difficulty with this explanation,
Scotus notes, is that these movements are founded upon the necessary movements
of the constellations of the celestial bodies, which means that Scotus' opponents
are actually claiming that contingency can arise from necessity-w. Scorns'
response is that this account does not allow for true contingency of being :
(139) Cf. Ord. Id. 8 p. 2q. un. n. 281-282, Vat. IV, 313. Wbile contingency cannot be proved by
a demonstration by the cause (propter quid), Scotus argues for it with reference to the moral and
political order, which would be senseless if there were no contingency. Furthermore, he proposes an
argument for contingency based on a thought-experiment: someone who denies contingency shall
be tortured until he admits that it is non-necessary that he be tortured, Rep. I A d. 39-40 q. 1-3 n. 30,
ed. cit.. 268-269: «Potest igitur probari [sc. contingentia] a posteriori, quia aliter non essent
necessariae virtutes nee praecepta nee merita nee mercedes nee poenae nee honores, et breviter
destrueretur omnis politia, et omnis conversatio humana. Et contra hoc negantes esset procedendum
cum tormentis et cum igne et huiusmodi, et tamdiu deberent fustigari, quousque fateantur, quod
possunt non tormentari, et ita dicere quod contingenter tormentantur et non necessario, sicut fecit
Avicenna contra negantes primum principium. Tales enim secundum eum debent vapulari donee
sciant quod nan est idem torqueri et non torqueri, cornburi et non cornburi ». Cf. AVtCENNA, Liber de
philosophia prima I c. 8, AvicennaLatinus, ed. S. VAN RIET, Leuven-Leiden, Peeters-Brill 1977.62.
Even though contingency has its ontological foundation in the free will (so that, a priori,
contingency could only be proved by insight into the action of the will), the a posteriori proof of
contingency is also used by Scotus to hint at the self-determination of the will; Rep. n A d. 25 q. un.
n.20, Viv.XXm.127b-128a.
(140) Scotus proposes five arguments against the conception of contingency proper to the
'philosophers', HONNEFELDER, Scientia transcendens, 78-80. We will present only one of them; in
this argument the foundation of contingency in the will as a non-natural agent is especially clear.
(141) According to Scams, contingency is a "disjunctive attribute" of being; every being is
either contingent or necessary. Cf. Ord. I d. 8 p. 1 q. 3 n. 115, Vat. IV, 207: « Sicut autem passiones
convertibiles sunt transcendentes quia consequuntur ens in quantum non determinatur ad aliquod
genus. ita passiones disiunctae sunt transcendentes, et utrumque membrum illius disiuncti est
transcendens quia neutrum determinat suum determinabile ad certum genus: et tamen unum
membrum illius disiuncti formaliter est speciale, non conveniens nisi uni enti, - sieut necesse-esse
in ista divisione 'necesse-esse' vel 'possibile-esse', et infinitum in ista divisione 'finitum vel
infinitum' , et sic de aliis »; WOLTER, The Transcendentals, 150-152.
(142)Cf. Pro princ. c.4 concL4, ed, ROCHE, 84; Ord. I d.2 p.l q.I-2 n.86, Vat. II, 178-179.
Cf. SODER, Kontingenz und Wissen, 50-56.
(143)ARIST., Physics vm, 6, 259b32-260aI9; Metaph. XII, 6-7, 1072a9-23. The idea that
contingency is rooted in the sublunary movements is most clearly exposed by THOMAS AQUINAS, In
Sent. I d. 39 q. 2 a. 2 in corp., ed. P. MANDONNET. voLI, Paris, Lethielleux, 1929, 932. Elsewhere,
Aquinas ascribes to matter the cause of contingency, S. theol. I q. 86 a 3 in corp., Leon. V, 351.
(l44)Cf.n.142.
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN NATURE AND WILL IN DUNS SCOTUS 215
If the first cause necessarily causes and moves its proximate cause and has a
necessary relation to it, then that second cause necessarily moves this which it
moves and causes, for a second cause only moves insofar as it is moved by the
first cause. Therefore, if it is necessarily moved and caused by the first cause, it
necessarily moves something else and so all the way down to the effect to be
produced. Thus the whole order of causes is necessary in moving, and
consequently these causes can produce no effect contingently. Therefore it is
necessary that, if there is contingency in things, the first cause move either the
second cause contingently or the effect contingently, so that contingency
proceeds from the action ofthe first cause. If all things, therefore, were necessary
in relation to the first cause, nothing would happen contingently t45.
The assumption of a contingently operating First Cause is closely linked to
Scotus' notion of contingent being as something «the opposite of which could
come to be when in fact it comes to be» 146. Scotus gives an account of how divine
causality is contingent and thus able to produce contingent being in the above
sense. He argues that the First Cause as contingent cause must arise either from the
divine intellect or the divine will, because they are the basis for God's activity ad
extra 147. The intellect cannot be considered the source of contingency, since its
activity is natural, and hence it cannot freely cause opposite effects 148.
Instead, as we have discussed, Scotus attributes to the will the capacity to
choose contraries 149, and therefore «when it is the cause which elicits an act of
(145)« Si prima causa necessario causat et movet causam sibi proximam, et necessariam habet
habitudinem ad illarn, igitur illa secunda causa necessario movet hoc quod movet et causat, quia
causa secunda non movet nisi in quantum movetur a prima; si igitur necessario movetur et causatur a
prima, necessario movet aliud, et sic semper descendendo ad effectum producendum, - et ita torus
ordo causarum in movendo erit necessarius, et per consequens nullum effectum contingenter
possunt producere; igitur oportet quod si sit contingentia in rebus, quod prima causa vel
contingenter moveat causam secundam, vel quod contingenter movet effectum, ita quod
contingentia proveniat ex actione primae causae. Si igitur omnia essent necessaria in comparatione
ad primam causam, nihil contingenter proveniret », Lect. I d. 39 q. 1-5 n. 35, Vat. XVII. 489. The
English text is taken from JOHN DUNS SCOTUS, Contingency and Freedom. Lectura I 39, ed. by
A. Vos JACZN.. H. VELDHUIS et al., Dordrecht-Boston-London, Kluwer academic publishers, 1994
(Synthese Historical Library 42), 90. In a shorter form this argument also appears in Pro princ. c.4
concl.4, ed.ROCHE, 84; Ord. I d.2 q.I-2 n.80-81. Vat. II, [76-177; QQ. Metaph. IX q. 15 n.28,
OPh. IV. 682.
(146) « Non dieo hie contingens quodcumque non est necessarium nee sempiternurn, sed cuius
oppositum posset fieri quando istud fit », Pro princ. c.4 concl. 4, ed. ROCHE, 84, English text ibid.,
85. Cf. Ord. Id. 2 p.l q. 1-2 n. 86, Vat. II, 178. Accordingly, the definition of necessity is as follows;
«Illud dicitur necessarium, cuius oppositum includit contradictionem », Quodl. q.16 n.3, Vivo
XXVI, 184a;cf. Ord. IV d.12q.l n. 9, Viv.XVIl,545a.
(147) Lect. Id. 39q.I-5n.42. Vat. xvn, 492.
(148) Lect. I d.39 q.I-5 n.43, Vat.XVII, 492: «Sed ista contingentia non est ex parte
intellectus divini in quantum ostendit aliquid voluntati, quia quidquid cognoscit ante actum
voluntatis, necessario cognoscit et naturaliter, ita quod non sit ibi contingentia ad opposita »,
(149) Lect. Id. 39 q. 1-5 n. 43-45, Vat. XVII, 492-493; d. n. 57. The activity of the human will is
the basis for the insight into the divine will. As a pure perfection, the will has an indifferent essence
which Scorus considers to apply univocally to God's will and the will of creatures, d. n. 95. This
allows SCOluS to transfer that which is perfect in the human will to the divine will, cf. Rep. I A d. 39-
40 q.I-3 n.40, ed. SODER, 250: «Hie dico quod assumendo quae sunt perfectionis in voluntate
216 TOBIASHOFFMANN
willing, the will has a contingent relation to the act, so that willing at a [volens in a]
it can not-will at a [potest nolle in a]» 150. Thus, the contingency of a being (e. g.
that of a stone) arises from the so-called synchronic contingency of the causation
of the divine will. This means that «the divine will", can will and not-will
something [velle et nolle aliquid] , and likewise can produce or not-produce
something in the same moment of eternity and for the same moment of
eternity» 151. Consequently, the actual existence of a contingent being (i, e. of a
creature) cannot be explained by any further reasons, other than by referring to the
fact that God wills it; and, as we noted earlier, Scotus maintains that no reason can
be given for why the divine will decides as it does apart from the fact that the divine
will is a will 152.
Seotus' conception of contingency thus rests on the view that the First Cause is
not a natural agent ad extra, but is a free agent 153, If there is contingency, there
must be a free agent; the primary source of contingency must then be rooted in the
divine will 154 •
However, since necessity is generally a more perfect attribute of being than
contingency, it may seem that to cause contingently is an imperfect type of
nostra respectu actus et dimittendo quod est imperfectionis in ea, transferendo ea quae sunt
perfectionis in ea ad divina, statim apparet propositum ». Indifference with respect to the object,
which is at stake in the following arguments of Scotus, is considered to be a perfection, and therefore
it can be ascribed to the will of God, cf. Rep. I A, ibid.: «Voluntas enim nostra indifferens est
contingenter ad actus diversos, quibus mediantibus est ad diversa obiecta et ad plures effectus.
Prima indifferentia est imperfectlonis ; secunda est perfectionis er ideo ponenda in divinis »,
(150)Leet.ld. 39q. 1-5 n.51, Vat. XVII, 495 :« ... Voluntas ... quando est causa eliciens aetum
volendi contingentem habet habitudinem ad actum, ita quod 'volens in a, potest nolle in a' .»,
English text in JOHN DUNSSCOTUS, Contingency and Freedom. 118. In this statement a stands for a
specific moment in time.
(l51) Lect. I d. 39 q.I-5 n.54, Vat. XVII, 497: «Voluntas divina ... potest in eodem instanti
aeternitatis et pro eodem instanti aeternitatis velle et nolle aliquid, et sic producere aliquid et non
producere », English text in JOHN DUNS SCOTUS, Contingency and Freedom. 126. For a more
detailed account ofScot us ' concept of synchronic contingency, SODER, Kontingenzund Wissen, 92-
107; S.DUMONT, «The Origin of Scotus's Theory of Synchronic Contingency», The Modem
Schoolman, 72(1995) 149-167.
(152) Ord. I d. 8 p. 2 q. un. n. 299, Vat. IV, 324-325: «Et si quaeras quare ergo voluntas divina
magis detenninabitur ad unum contradictoriorum quam ad alterum, respondeo : "indisciplinati est
quaerere omnium causas et demonstrationern" (secundum Philosophum IV Metaphysicaei,
"principii enim demonstrationis non est determinatio". Immediatum autem est voluntatem velIe
hoc, ita quod non est aliqua causa media inter ista, sicut est immediatum calorem esse calefactivum
(sed hie naturalitas. ibi Iibertas), et ideo huius "quare voluntas voluit" nulla est causa nisi quia
voluntas est voluntas, sicut huius "quare calor est calefactivus" nulla est causa nisi quia calor est
calor, quia nulla est prior causa ». To be not explainable by further reasons is, as mentioned before, a
typical feature ofthe will. Cf. n. 63.
(153) The fact that God is not naturally active ad extra is shown by Scotus with the following
consideration: A natural activity of God ad extra would imply that God has a natural inclination ad
extra, and therefore he would be naturally related to something other than himself; this is
impossible. Cf. Pro princ. c. 4 concl. 4, ed. ROCHE, 80; Ord. I d. 8 p. 2 q. un. n. 268, Vat. IV, 304-305.
(l54)Lect.I d.39 q.I-5 n.54, Vat.XVIl, 497. cr. SODER, Kontingenz und Wissen;
HONNEFBLDER, Scientia transcendens, 82-94; E. GtLSON, Jean Duns Scot .. Introduction a ses
positions fondamentales, Paris, Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 1952 (Etudes de philosophie
medievale42),153.
THE DISTINCTIONBETWEENNATUREAND WILLIN DUNS SCOTUS 217
causation, whereas to cause necessarily seems to be perfect-". Because any
imperfection is incompatible with the essence of God, Duns Scotus has to show
why it does not entail an imperfection for God to cause contingently, i. e. to create
contingent beings. Scotus' response is that the claim that necessary being is more
perfect than contingent being must be qualified. Only if it is non-contradictory for
something to be necessary, its necessity is a more perfect condition than its
contingency 156. However, as Scotus argues, it is logically impossible for
'causable being' (ens causabile) to be necessary; consequently it cannot be a
perfect condition of it, nor can it be a more perfect mode of production to produce
something into necessary being if this is itself impossible 157. Thus, Scotus has
shown that it is not incompatible with the perfection of God to cause contingently,
viz. to cause contingent being.
Duns Scotus' account of contingency - its explanation with reference to the
contingent causation of the First Cause of being rather than to some random
combination of secondary effects, and consequently the ontological notion of
contingency - is highly significant for the metaphysics of the Subtle Doctor.
L. Honnefelder articulates the implication of Scotus' notion of contingency for his
metaphysics:
Contingency is ... no more as it is for the 'philosophers' ... a consequence of
materiality, but it is a mode of being in its actual existence, it is no longer a
category ofPhysics, but a transcategorical attribute of being 158.
The Necessity ofthe Intelligibility ofCreatures 159
If the world as we can understand it is a contingent world and radically
dependent for its creation and continued existence upon God's will, then one
might conclude that metaphysics - which, as a science, must be based upon
(155) « In omni differentia entis necessitas est perfectior condicio quam contingentia ; probatio,
quia necessitas est perfectior in ente in se, ergo et in omni differentia entis ; ergo et in ista differentia
entis quae est 'causa', necessitas est perfectior contingentia perfectissirna ; ergo causa necessario
causat », Ord. I d. 8 p. 2 q. un. n. 259, Vat. IV, 300. This objection is not a quote from anyone of the
philosophers; it is rather an objection Scotus makes to himself, in the spirit of Aristotle and Avicenna.
(156) Ord. I d. 8 p. 2 q. un. n. 302, Vat. IV, 326 : « ... Dico quod 'necessarium' est perfectior
condicio in omni entitate (quam 'possibile') cui condicio necessitatis est possibilis ; non est autem
perfectior in ilia entitate cui non est cornpossibilis, quia contradictio non ponit aliquam perfectionern
ethoc non est ex ratione sui sed ex ratione illius entis cui repugnat, Et ita dico quod necessitas repugnat
omni respectui ad posterius, quia ex quo omne posterius est non-necessarium, primum non potest
habere necessariam habitudinem ad aliquod eorum».
(l57)Ord. I d.8 p.2 q.un. n.305, Vat. IV, 327-328: «Dico quod ens causabile non potest
habere istas plures differentias, necessarium et possibile, sed omne ens causabile est tan tum
possibile ; et ideo non est perfectionis in causa posse causare istas plures differentias, quia ad
impossibile nulla est potentia »,
(158)« Kontingenz ist ;.. nicht mehr wie bei den 'philosophi' ... Folge der Materialitat,
sondern Modus des Seienden in seiner aktuellen Existenz, nicht mehr Kategorie des Physischen,
sondern transkategoriale Bestimmtheit des Seiendseins », HONNEFBLDER, « Die Kritik des Johannes
Duns Scotus am kosmologischen Nezessitarisrnus der Araber », 260.
(159) HONNEFBLDER, Scientia transcendens, 45-56; 94-108.
218 TOBIASHOFFMANN
necessary knowledge 160 - is an impossible enterprise. However, even though
created being is contingent as to its real existence, Scotus maintains that it is
necessary for non-contradictory finite being to be possible 161 and to be
intelligible 162.
While the cause of the actual existence of created beings is the contingent will
of God 163, the very possibility of their being derives not from God's will, but from
God's intellect 164. Besides his own essence, God knows all finite beings that are
non-contradictory. Prior to God's knowledge of the non-contradictory finite
beings 165, they do not have any entity whatsoever. By virtue of the act of the
divine intellect they come to be in a 'known being' (esse cognitum) or 'intelligible
being' (esse intelligibile) 166. This is what Scotus refers to as the divine idea of a
thing. All non-contradictory and non-necessary beings which are thus ideally
present to the divine intellect can come to real existence if God's will sovereignly
decides to cause their real being 167. Thus, before something comes to contingent
existence through creation, it necessarily already possesses an intelligible notion
in God's intellect - Scotus refers to it as 'objective being' (esse obiectivumi 168.
(160) AR1ST., Analytica Posteriora I, 2, 71b9-12; I, 4, 72b21-74a3.
(161) This does not mean that possible being is necessary being, The condition for possibility is
to be non-contradictory and to be non-necessary, Ord. I d. 43 q. un. n. 7, Vat. VI, 354 (cf. n.166). The
qualification 'non-necessary' excludes God's own infinite essence from the definition of possible
beings.
(l62)Cf. Lect.I d.2 p.1 q.I-2 n.57, Vat. XVI, 131: e ... Dico quod licet alia entia a Deo
actualiter sinl conringentia respectu esse actualis, non ramen respectu esse potentialis. Unde illa
quae dicuntur contingentia respectu actualis exsistentiae, respectu potentialis sunt necessaria, ut
licet hominem esse sit contingens, tamen ipsum esse 'possibile esse' est necessarium, quia non
includit contradictionem ad esse ». For the necessity of finite non-contradictory being to be
intelligible, see the following remarks.
(163) Cf. Leet. I d. 39 q. 1-5 n. 62-63, Vat XVII, 500; SODER, Kontingen: und Wissen, 173-176.
(164) Cf. Ord. I d.43 q. un. n. 7, Vat. VI, 354; ibid., n. 14, Vat VI, 358-359; Rep. IA d.43 q. I,
Oxford, Merton 59, fol. 183r: « ... Res anle suam existentiam extra prius sint possibiles: ergo
secundum suum esse possibile prius oportet principiari esse ab aliquo, non ab omnipotentia vel
potentia activa, ergo ab intellectu ». Cf, also A. B. WOLTI:.R, «Scorns on the Divine Origin of
Possibility», American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 67 (1993), 95-107. For a more detailed
analysis of what follows, HONNEFELDER, Scientia transcendens, 22-31.
(165) The priority is ontological, not chronological. Scotus talks of different 'instants of nature'
to distinguish what is ontolcgically prior or posterior.
(l66)Ord. I d.35 q. un. n.32, Vat. VI, 258; Lect.I d.35 q.un. n.22, Vat XVII, 452. Scotus
argues that a finite being, produced into intelligiblebeing by the divine intellect, is possible formally
by itself and principally by the intellect of God, Ord. I d. 43 q. un. n. 7, Vat. VI, 354: «Possibile ...
est illud cui non repugnat esse et quod non potest ex se esse necessario ; lapis, productus in esse
intelligibili per intellectum divinum, habet ista [sc. the two conditions: to be non-contradictory and
non-necessary] ex se formaliter et per intellectum principiative ; ergo est ex se formaliter possibilis
et quasi principiative per intellectum divinum ». For more details, L. HONNEFELDER, «Die Lehre
von der doppelten ratitudo entis und ihre Bedeutung fur die Metaphysik des Johannes Duns
Scotus », in Deus et homo ad mentem I. Duns Scoti, Rome, Societas intemationalis Scotistica, 1972
(Studia scholastico-scotistica 5), 661-671; WOLTER, «Scotus on the Divine Origin of Possibility»,
American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 67 (1993), 95-107; S. KNULTTILA, Modalities in
Medieval Philosophy, London-New York, Routledge, 1993, 139-149.
(167)Cf. n.163.
(168) Ord.] d. 36q. un.n.47, Vat. VI, 289.
THEDISTINCTION BETWEEN NATUREANDWILLIN DUNSSCOTUS 219
Scotus emphasizes that the divine idea of a thing (i. e. the intelligible being of the
creature) does not proceed freely from the divine will, but necessarily from the
divine intellect:
... iris to say thatthe instantofeternity in which God knows his own essence can be
divided into two signs or instances of nature. In the first one, God knows his
essence as the first object, and in the second one he knows ail that is distinct from
himself as being naturally constituted by the act of God' s knowledge in a certain
intelligible being. Thus God is, with respectto the things that are distinct from him,
the natural cause oftheir intelligible being, by the act ofhis knowledge. The proof
ofthis; since the will does not want anything that is not known, the divine intellect
knows something according to its intelligible being before the will wills it, because
the will can only have an act which refers to something known by the intellect But
every cause that precedes the will and that is previous to the will is a natural cause,
and all that precedes the act of will is merely natural; so it follows that God is a
natural causeof all that is distinctfrom him as to its intelligiblebeing 169.
Scotus continues by arguing that human knowledge has its ontological foun-
dation in God's knowledge of possible creatures, namely in the divine ideas 170.
Once it receives real existence and thus becomes accessible to human knowledge,
the notion of a thing as it is necessarily in God's intellect, and as it has a necessary
ideal being (esse intelligibile, esse obiectivumi, is also the basis for human
knowledge 171. Thus, whereas its existence is contingent, its inner 'intelligible
structure' is necessary. Since human knowledge is founded in the natural and
necessary knowledge of God (though mediated by knowledge of existing crea-
tures), metaphysics has an objective and necessary ground in the First Being 172.
V. GOD'sPRODUCTIONSADINTRA: SOMENOIESONTHETRINITY
The distinction between will and nature is also fundamental for Duns Scotus'
doctrine of the Trinity 173. This distinction is the basis for his explanation for why
(169) « ... Dicendum quod iIlud instans aeternitatis in quo Deus intelligit essentiam suam,
dividi potest in duo signa vel instantia naturae, in quorum primo intelligit essentiam suam ut primum
obiectum, in secundo autem intelligit omnia alia a se ut constituta naturaliter in quodam esse
intelligibili per actum intelligendi divinum: et respectu rerum aliarum a se, ut habent esse
intelligibile, est Deus causa naturalis per actum suum intelligendi. - Cuius probatio est: quia cum
voluntas nihil velit nisi cognitum, igitur intellectus divinus prius intelligit aliquid secundum esse
intelligibile quam velit illud, cum voluntas non possit habere actum nisi respectu cogniti ab
intellectu; sed omnis causa praecedens voluntatem et praevia voluntati est causa naturalis, et affine
quod praecedit actum voluntatis est mere naturale; igitur Deus est causa naturalis aliorum a se
secundum esse intelligibile », Lect. I d. 3 p. I q.3 n. 191, Vat. XVI, 302. Cf. Ord. I d. 38 q, un. n. 6,
Vat. VI, 305 ; Quodl. q. 14n. 13, Viv.XXVI,47a
(170) Lect. Id. 3 p.l q. 3 n. 191-192, Vat. XVI, 302-303;Ord. Id. 3 p. 1q.4n. 262, Vat. III, 160.
(171)Cf. n. 168.
(172) HONNEFEWER,Scientiatranscendens, 104.
(173) For a more extensive discussion of the role of the distinction between will and nature in
the doctrine of the Trinity, F. WETTER, Die Trinitiuslehre des Johannes Duns Scotus, Munster,
220 TOBIASHOFFMANN
there must be precisely three persons in the Trinity, that is - assuming that there is
only one ungenerated person 174 - why there are precisely two Trinitarian
productions. Furthermore, the distinction between will and nature allows him to
distinguish the Son and the Holy Spirit by virtue of their emanations, and therefore
without needing to refer exclusively to their relations of origin 175.
Christian doctrine traditionally claims that there are two Trinitarian
productions, namely, the generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy
Spirit 176. Scotus attributes the necessity of there being two and only two
Trinitarian processions to the fact that there are two and only two formal active
principles 177. According to Pseudo-Dionysius, each great number is best
accounted for by only one thing or by the smallest possible number of things 178. In
Scotus' view, this Dionysian ptinciple applies also to active principles 179. What
Scotus wishes to show is that there are only two essentially different active
principles. His argument runs as follows: an active principle produces in either a
determinate way or not. If it produces in a determinate way, it is a natural
production; if it does not produce in a determinate way, it is a free production 180.
Following the Augustinian tradition, Scotus argues that the Son is generated
by the memory of the Father. Scotus understands the memory of the Father as «the
intellect to whom the intelligible object [i. e. God's essence] is present» 181. Since
the intellect is a natural agent l 82 , the Son is produced naturally (per modum
naturae) 183. Conversely, the Holy Spirit is produced by the will of the Father (and
Aschendorff, 1967 (Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 41/5),
31-32; 198-200, For the role of the divine will in the Trinitarian productions, H,R.KoSLA,
« Voluntas est prlncipium producendi amorem infinitum»: La productio e fa complacentia nel-
i'autocomunicarione divina secondo il B, Giovanni Duns Scoto, Rome, PAA-Edizioni Antonianum,
1995,111-163.
(174) Ord. I d. 2 p. 2q.I-4n. 359-370, Vat. II, 338-341.
(11S)The dominating assumption among theologians in the 13'" century was that the only
reason for the distinction of the divine persons is that they are constituted by different relations of
origin, cf. THOMAS AQUINAS, S. theol. I q. 29 a.4 in corp., Leon, IV, 321b (for references to other
medieval theologians who held this view see the footnote of the Vatican Edition to Ord. I d. 26 q. un.
n. IS, Vat. VI, 4). Thus the Father is assumed to be constituted as a divine person by his relation of
e.
paternity, i. because he generates the Son. The relation of origin for the Son is the relation to the
Father who generates him (filiatio) ; for the Holy Spirit it is the relation to the Father and the Son who
spirate him ispiratio passiva).
(176)Cf. the Symbol of Constantinople (381), ed.H.DENZIOER-A.SCHONMETZER, Enchiri-
dion Symbolorum, Barcelona-Freiburg i. Br-Rome, Herder, 1976",66-61, Nr. ISO.
(117) c-« Id, 2 p. 2q, 1-4n. 300, Vat. II, 305.
(178) Ps. DIONYSIUS, De divinis nominibus, c. 13,2, ed. B. R. SUCHLA, Berlin-New York, W, de
Gruyter, 1990 (Patristische Texte und Studien 33), 221-228.
(119) Ord.Id.2p. 2q, 1-4 n. 301, Vat. II, 305.
(180) Ord. I d.2 p. 2 q. 1-4 n. 30 1, Vat. Il, 306. A similar explanation is given in Ord. I d. 10
q. un. n. 8, Vat. IV, 341. In this text, Scotus adds thai both productive principles (per modumnaturae
and permodum voluntatisy are pure perfections,
(181)« ... Memoria perfecta, sive, quod idem est, istud IOtum 'inrellectus habens obiectum
intelligibile sibipraesens' »,Ord. Id.z p.z q. 1-4n,221, Vat. II, 259.
(182) As to the generation ofthe Son, d. Ord. I d. 2 p. 2 q, 1-4 n. 30 I (deleted text), Vat. 1I,308,
(183) Lect. I d. 2 p. 2 q.I-4 n. 202, Vat. XVI, 184; Ord. I d. 2 p. 2 q. 1-4 n. 301 (deleted text),
Vat. 1I,308.
THEDISTINCTION BETWEEN NATURE ANDWILLINDUNSSCOTUS 221
the Son) that has its lovable object present 184, namely God's essence as what is
loved 185. Although both productions are necessary (because it would be
impossible for God not to know and love his infmite essence), the productions of
the Son and the Holy Spirit remain essentially different, since one is produced by
natural generation while the otheris produced by free spiration 186.
So far, Scotus has argued that there must be only two essentially different
Trinitarian productions in God. Scotus' attempt to demonstrate the necessity of
precisely three divine persons requires him to show that these two productive
principles do not produce more than one person each.
To show that each of the productive principles (i. e. the will and intellect) only
act to produce one person, Scotus appeals to two features of the Trinitarian
productions. First of all, each production fully taxes God's entire (infinite)
productive potency in the intellect and in the will. Second, each production is
eternal. If the first condition were not the case, the productive principle could
produce more than one person at a time, just as heat can warm up more than one
thing. The eternity of production guarantees that there is no production of several
persons successively, in the way that one person would be annihilated and a
further person would be produced 187,
Scotus' insights regarding the mode of Trinitarian productions now allow him
to account for the distinction between the Son and the Holy Spirit. This in tum
sheds light on the problem of the constitution of the divine persons. For that which
constitutes the divine person also provides its distinctiveness from the other divine
persons 188. Contrary to the common opinion 189, Scotus argues that the divine
persons are not distinguished solely by their relations oforigin, but also in terms of
their properties (which he calls therefore 'constitutive properties' : paternitas,
filiatio, spiratio passiva) 190. An additional reason for the distinctiveness applies
between the Son and the Holy Spirit, namely between their emanations: for
Scotus, generation is essentially different from spiration 191. For whereas
generation is natural (per modum naturae), spiration is «in the way a will acts»
(permodum voluntatisi 192.
Scotus' derivation of the distinction of the two Trinitarian productions from
his distinction between will and nature has an even further significance for his
(l84) Leet.Id. 2 p, 2q.I-4n. 175, Vat. XVI, 171; Ord.ld. 2 p, 2q, 1-4n. 226, Vat. II, 263,
(185)Ord. Id.lOq.un.n. 9, Vat.IV,342.
(l 86) Lect. Id, 13 q. un. n. 29, Vat. XVII, 175; Ord.Id.l3q.un. n. 82, Vat. V. 109. Cf. this brief
expression «Spiritus Sanctus procedit per modum libertatis et Filius per modum naturae", Lect. I
d. 1 q. un. n. 44, Vat. XVI, 488.
(187) Lect. l d. 2p, 2q.l-4n. 205, Vat. XVI, 186;Ord, Id. 2p. 2q. 1-4n, 303, Val. II, 308-309.
(I88)Cf.Ord. I d.26 q.un. n,I4, Vat, VI, 4: « ... Quoeumque Pater constituitur in esse
personali, eo distinguereturpersonaliter aFilio et Spiritu Sancto »,
(I89)Cf.n.175.
(190) Duns Scotus is very reserved about the constitution and the distinction of the divine
persons by reason of the relations of origin solely, Ord. I d. 26q. un. n. 32-56, Vat. VI, 10-22.
(191)Ord. Id.ll q.2n,46, Vat. V,I9-20,
(l92) Lect: Id.11 q. 2n. 39, Vat. XVII, 143.
222 TOBIAS HOFFMANN
doctrine of the production ofthe Holy Spirit 193. The Holy Spirit is produced by the
love with which the Father and the Son love the divine essence 194. This love
necessarily originates in God. The necessity of this origin is by virtue of the
infinity of God's will and by virtue of the infinity of the goodness of the will's
object (God's essence) 195. Since the production of the Holy Spirit occurs in the
way of the will iper modum voluntatisi, it is free. If it is true that the Holy Spirit is
produced both necessarily and by free will, we have a further case that shows that
there is no contradiction between a free will and its necessity 196. Even though the
production of the Holy Spirit is necessary, he is not produced by natural necessity,
but by free love l97 • In showing this, Scotus is in accordance with Augustine's
claim that the Holy Spirit proceeds "like a gift" - quomodo datum - and therefore
freely 198. For Scorns, there is no contradiction between the gift offree love and the
necessity ofthis love.
As we have seen, Scotus' arguments about the nature and function of the will
and nature reappear in his discussion of the doctrine of the Trinity. For example,
since the will is most intimately endowed with freedom, this must be most
profoundly so in God. The intellect is considered as a natural agent, and the Son,
who is generated by the memory of the Father - his intellect with the presence of
its object -, is said to be produced permodum naturae. In the spiration of the Holy
Spirit per modum voluntatis it is manifest that freedom and necessity are not
contradictory.
CONCLUSION
The most important outcome of the study about the distinction of nature and
will is a better understanding of Scotus' account of the will's central features.
Following Scotus' teaching, several misconceptions can be discarded. It is
inadequate to characterize the will by its opposition to necessity, since « the will as
pure perfection is intended to act in the simply perfect mode of necessity» 199.
Moreover, it is false to maintain that the will alone is the domain of contingent
activity, insofar as, to some extent, contingency can be accounted for as a
(193) Cf. more extensively P. SCAPIN, Contingenza e libertadivina in GiovanniDunsScoto, 52-
61 ; L. IAMMARROl'm, «La liberta in S.Tommasoe in G.DunsScoto », Miscellaneafrancescana, 95
(1995),25-71, especially 53-56; MOHLE, Ethik als scientia practica, 368-375.
(194)Ord. Id.lOq. un.n.P, Vat. IV, 342.
(195) Ord. Id.IOq. un. n.47, Vat. IV, 359 ;cf. n.108.
(196) Ord. Id.lOq. un. n. 56-57, Vat.IV, 363 .cf, n.lOO.
(197) This is in contrast to, among others, Thomas Aquinas: «Spiritus autem Sanctus procedit
ut arnor, mquantum Deus amat seipsum. Unde naturaliter procedit, quarnvis per modum voluntatis
procedat », S. theol. Iq. 41 a. 2 ad 3, Leon. IV, 423b.
(198) Lect. I d. 18 q. un. n. 17, Vat. XVII, 264 : « Sed tamen aliquid possir dari alicui, praesup-
ponit aliquid communicatum libere ».
(199) HOERES, Der Wille als reine Yollkommenheit, 81.
THEDlSTlNCTION BEfWEEN NATURE AND WILL IN DUNS seOTUS 223
hindrance to natural cause/effect relations 200. To characterize the will primarily as
'indifferent' is misleading, since the will as a pure perfection is always ordered to
the good. Furthermore, the view that what is specifically characteristic ofthe will
is its capacity to produce opposite effects is erroneous, because the intellect can
have opposite contents ofthought201, and even natural things like the sun can have
opposite effects 202. Contrary to modern understanding, the will's freedom is not
restricted to the capacity of decision, since in the mode of necessity there is no
decision.
What must be characterized as essential to the will is its capacity to self-
determination. Even when the will acts necessarily, it is never necessitated from
the outside, but it still determines itself. The self-determination of the will has an
important consequence for the personal character of the will's activity. Both the
responsibility for one's action and the possibility for disinterested love reside in
the will's capacity to determine the person's activity; natural agents cannot be
blamed for their actions, nor can they be attributed merit 203. Self-determination is
the basis for the self-possession of the human person, because it is in the power of
the will to control human action 204.
When comparing Scotus' account of the will with that of e. g. Thomas
Aquinas, both medieval authors seem to emphasize different features of the will.
Thomas sees the will first of all as an appetite. In his account of morality as the
pursuit of happiness, the issue of whether the will is free or not (in fact it is not free
with regard to the ultimate end, but by "natural necessity" it wills this end)205 is
secondary; what is important is that the will is the potency that pursues happiness.
However, Scotus focuses primarily upon the way the will elicits its acts. For him,
the specific feature of the will is to elicit its act freely, even in the mode of
necessity. For Scotus, love being the final perfection of man, the major concern
seems to be how the will is not determined to its act in the way of a natural active
principle, for true love as a natural process is inconceivable206.
(200) Quodl. q. 16n.9, Viv.XXVr, 195a.Cf. n. 102.
(201) AR!ST.,Metaph. IX, 2, 1046b4-5.
(202) Cf. n. 29. '
(203)Ord. II d.42 q.1-4 n.l, Vivo XIII, 448b: « ... Omnis causa activa in universe praeter
volumatem est naturaliter activa: ergo nulla praeter voluntatem est vituperabilis propter suam
actionem ». Cf. Lect. II d. 25 q. un. n. 14, Vat. XIX, 232, where Scotus quotes Augustine (De libero
arbitrio ill, 1, 13, CCSL 29,276): « Motus voluntarius quo voluntas hue atque illuc volutatur, nisi
in nostra esset potestate.neque laudandi neque vituperandi essemus », Cf. also Ord. r d. 8 p, 2 q. un.
n. 285, Vat IV,314;Ord. Id.17n.26, Vat. V, 149.
(204) For the inference from the will's free act to the self-control of a human being, Rep. II A
d.25 q. un. n. 7, Vivo XXIII, 120b: « Voluntas enim non potest aliis potentiis imperate, nisi per
actum voluntatis, vel nisi veliteis imperate, vel nisi velit ipsasexequi imperium, aquo est iIlud velle
effective. Aut igitur istum actum causat in se immediate, tunc pari ratione standum est in principio ;
vel hoc habet aliunde. et tunc imperium suurn non est in sua potestate ».
(205) Cf. THOMA.S AQUiNAS, S. theol. I q. 82 a. 1 in corp., Leon. V, 293b.
(206)Ord. I d.l7 p.1 q.1-2 n.26, Vat. V, 149: « ... Actus ille non est meus qui non est in
potestate mea; sed actio ipsius habitus non est in potestate mea, quia habitus ipse - si est activus -
non est liber, sed principium naturale; ergo illud 'diligere' non erit meum, sic quod in potestate mea
sit, et ita non merebor illo actu ».
224 TOBIASHOFFMANN

The distinction between the affection for the advantageous and the affection
for justice helps to account for the fact that something can be loved without being
desired. This applies to the will of God for his creatures: God loves human beings
without desiring them 207.
In the final analysis, the capacity of the will to transcend its own subjective
interest is the reason for the existence of contingent being: God's will freely
decides to create or not to create finite being. The gratuitous character of creation
and grace are in accordance with this notion of contingency. Yet while the actual
existence of creatures is contingent, their intelligibility is necessary. Nature and
will are thus at the base of two different productions ad extra: the possibility of
creatures is produced by the intellect in a natural way, whereas the real existence
of creatures derives from the free activity of God's will.
This distinction of two different types of production ad extra corresponds to
two distinct Trinitarian productions: the Son is generated by a natural act of the
intellect, whereas the Holy Spirit proceeds from an act of the will. Freedom of will
moreover is not contradictory to the necessity of Trinitarian productions: the Holy
Spirit proceeds as an expression of free love, in a necessary production 208.

Ne en 1967, Tobias Hoffmann a fait des etudes de theologie a Fribourg-en-

Brisgau eUI Fribourg (Suisse), entre 1987 et 1993. A termine en 1999 une these
de doctorat de philosophic aFribourg (Suisse), intitulee Creatura intellecta. Die
Ideen und Possibilien bei Duns Scotus mit Ausblick auf Franz von Mayronis,
PonciusundMastrius.
«Individuation bei Duns Scotus und bei dem jungen Leibniz », Medioevo, 24
(1998), 31-87 ; «Ideen der Individuen und intentio naturae: Duns Scotus im
Dialog mit Thomas von Aquin und Heinrich von Gent», Freiburger Zeitschrift
fiir Philosophie undTheologie, 46 (1999),138-152.

(207) Cf.Rep. III d. 26q. un. n.18, Vivo XXIII, 475a.

(208) I am grateful to 1. Berkman, 0, Boulnois and S. Hipp for helpful comments on this article.
I am especially indebted to J. Berkman for reviewing my English.