Module 4:

I. Trial – Rule 30
a. Schedule of Trial
b. Adjournments and postponements
c. Requisites of motion to postpone
trial
d. Agreed statement of facts
e. Order of trial; reversal of order
• Judicial Affidavit Rule
f. Oral Offer of Documentary
Exhibits
g. Suspension of Actions
• Art. 2030 and 2035, Civil Code
h. Consolidation or severance of
hearing or trial – Rule 31
• PNB v. Gotesco, G.R. No.
183211, 6 June 2009

HELD
A court may order several actions pending before it to be tried together
1. where they arise from the same act, event or transaction, involve the same or like
issues, and depend largely or substantially on the same evidence,
2. provided that the court has jurisdiction over the cases to be consolidated and
3. that a joint trial will not give one party an undue advantage or prejudice the substantial
rights of any of the parties.

Rationale
The rule allowing consolidation is designed to avoid multiplicity of suits, to guard against
oppression or abuse, to prevent delays, to clear congested dockets, and to simplify the work of
the trial court; in short, the attainment of justice with the least expense and vexation to the
parties - litigants.13

Case
But in the instant case, the consolidation of PNB's petition for a writ of possession with
GOTESCO's complaint for annulment of foreclosure proceeding serves none of the purposes
cited above. On the contrary, it defeated the very rationale of consolidation.

The record shows that PNB's petition was filed on May 26, 2006, and remains pending after
three (3) years, despite the summary nature of the petition.
1. Obviously, the consolidation only delayed the issuance of the desired writ of possession.
2. Further, it prejudiced PNB's right to take immediate possession of the property and gave
GOTESCO undue advantage, for GOTESCO continues to possess the property during
 the pendency of the consolidated cases, despite the fact that title to the property is no
longer in its name.

i. Delegation of reception of
evidence
j. Trial by commissioners – Rule 32
II. Demurrer to Evidence - Rule 33
a. Ground
b. Effect of denial
c. Effect of grant
d. Waiver of right to present
evidence
e. Demurrer to evidence in a civil
case and demurrer to evidence in
a criminal case
• Republic v. De Borja, G.R. No.
187448, January 9, 2017

FACTS
1. petitioner Republic, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government,
for "Accounting, Reconveyance, Forfeiture, Restitution, and Damages" (Complaint)
before the SB (Civil Case No. 0003) for the recovery of ill-gotten assets allegedly
amassed by the individual respondents therein, singly or collectively, during the
administration of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos
2. One of them was Velasco, the President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the
Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC), It appears from the records that PNOC, in the
exercise of its functions, would regularly enter into charter agreements with vessels and,
pursuant to industry practice, vessel owners would pay "address commissions" to PNOC
as charterer.
3. However during the tenure of Velasco, no address commissions were remitted to
PNOC.Instead, the address commissions were remitted to the account of Decision
Research Management Company (DRMC), the alleged conduit for address
commissions.
4. petitioner Republic claimed that it was De Borja who collected these address
commissions in behalf of Velasco, basing its allegation on the testimony of Epifanio F.
Verano16 (Verano), a witness for petitioner Republic. De Borja was further alleged to
have acted as Velasco's dummy, nominee, and/or agent for corporations he owned
and/or controlled, such as DRMC.
5. respondent De Borja is Velasco' s nephew.
6. The evidence presented against De Borja was that- Verano to deliver to defendant De
Borja envelopes containing money which constituted commissions given by ship brokers.
 7. After the plaintiff submitted its formal offer of evidence, De Borja filed a demurrer to
Evidence
8. SB granted the said motion

ISSUES

1. whether or not the SB committed reversible error in granting respondent De Borja's

Demurrer to Evidence.
2. whether petitioner Republic was able to adduce sufficient evidence to prove the alleged
complicity of respondent De Borja with the required quantum of evidence.

HELD
No.

All told, the Court finds that the evidence adduced is wholly insufficient to support the allegations
of the Complaint before the SB. Thus, for failure of petitioner Republic to show any right to the
relief sought, the Court affirms the SB in granting the Demurrer to Evidence.

In the face of the foregoing testimony, the insinuations of petitioner Republic in the instant
Petition can best be described as speculative, conjectural, and inconclusive at best. Nothing in
the testimony of Verano reasonably points, or even alludes, to the conclusion that De Borja
acted as a dummy or conduit of Velasco in receiving address commissions from vessel owners.

The Court joins and concurs in the SB's observations pertaining to Verano's want of knowledge
with respect to the contents of the envelopes allegedly delivered to respondent De Borja's office,
which remained sealed the entire time it was in Verano' s possession. As admitted by Verano
himself, he did not and could not have known what was inside the envelopes when they were
purportedly entrusted to him for delivery. In the same vein, Verano did not even confirm
respondent De Borja's receipt of the envelopes, despite numerous opportunities to do so.
Relatedly, it was further revealed during the cross-examination of Verano that in the first place,
Velasco did not even deal directly with brokers.

(i) that Verano, on two (2) occasions, testified that he delivered an envelope to Velasco
who, in turn, instructed him to deliver the same to De Borja; (ii) that Verano admitted that
the envelope was sealed; (iii) that Verano did not open the envelope and therefore had
no knowledge of the contents thereof; (iv) that Verano did not deliver the envelope
personally to De Borja; and (v) that Verano did not confirm whether De Borja in fact
received the said envelope.

Demurrer
● A demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
● It is axiomatic that a dismissal on the basis of a demurrer to evidence is similar to a
judgment; it is a final order ruling on the merits of a case.
• Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Spouses
Del Rosario, G.R. No. 138739, July 6,
2000

FACTS
1. Sps. executed a promissory note in favor of the petitioner
2. respondents defaulted on the monthly installments. Despite repeated demands, they
failed to pay their obligations under their Promissory Note.
3. petitioner filed a Complaint7 for the collection of a sum of money before the Regional
Trial Court
4. After the formal offer of evidence, respondents filed a Demurrer to Evidence10 for
alleged lack of cause of action.
5. the trial court dismissed11 the complaint for failure of petitioner to substantiate its claims,
the evidence it had presented being merely hearsay.
6. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the trial court and remanded the case for
further proceedings.

ISSUE

W/N CA erred in ordering the remand of this case to the trial court instead of rendering
judgment on the basis of petitioner’s evidence

HELD

YES.

Consequences of a Reversal, on Appeal, of a Demurrer to Evidence

"SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence.—After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his
evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law
the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present
evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be
deemed to have waived the right to present evidence."

Petitioner contends that if a demurrer to evidence is reversed on appeal, the defendant should
be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence, and the appellate court should render
judgment on the basis of the evidence submitted by the plaintiff. A remand to the trial court "for
further proceedings" would be an outright defiance of Rule 33, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of
Court.

In other words, defendants who present a demurrer to the plaintiff’s evidence retain the right to
present their own evidence, if the trial court disagrees with them; if the trial court agrees with
them, but on appeal, the appellate court disagrees with both of them and reverses the dismissal
order, the defendants lose the right to present their own evidence.16 The appellate court shall,
in addition, resolve the case and render judgment on the merits, inasmuch as a demurrer aims
to discourage prolonged litigations.17

CASE
In the case at bar, the trial court, acting on respondents’ demurrer to evidence, dismissed the
Complaint on the ground that the plaintiff had adduced mere hearsay evidence. However, on
appeal, the appellate court reversed the trial court because the genuineness and the due
execution of the disputed pieces of evidence had in fact been admitted by defendants.

the judicial admissions of respondents established their indebtedness to the petitioner, on the
grounds that they admitted the due execution of the Promissory Note,

• GMA Network, Inc. v. Central

CATV, Inc., G.R. No. 176694, July
18, 2014

FACTS

1. the petitioner, together with some of the networks filed with the NTC a complaint against
the respondent to stop it from soliciting and showing advertisements in its cable
television (CATV)system (pursuant to Section 2 of Executive Order (EO) No. 205.5
Under this provision, a grantee’s authority to operate a CATV system shall not infringe
on the television and broadcast markets)
2. After the petitioner presented and offered its evidence, the respondent filed a motion to
dismiss by demurrer toevidence claiming that the evidence presented by the
complainants failed toshow how the respondent’s acts of soliciting and/or showing
advertisements infringed upon the television and broadcast market. (EO No. 436,
expressly allowed CATVproviders to carry advertisements and other similar paid
segments provided there is consent from their program providers)
3. The NTC granted the respondent’s demurrer to evidence and dismissed the complaint.
In the present case, the documents attached to the respondent’s demurrer to evidence
showed that its program providers have given such consent. Although the respondent
did not formally offer these documents as evidence, the NTC could still consider them
since they formed part of the records and the NTC is not bound by the strict application
of technical rules.
4. CA affirmed NTC ruling

ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in affirming the order of the NTC which granted the respondent’s motion
to dismiss by demurrer to evidence.
HELD
Yes.

proscribes the court or the tribunal from considering the defendant’s evidence in the resolution
of a motion to dismiss based on a demurrer to evidence.

In the present case, the NTC proceeded against the very nature of the remedy of demurrer to
evidence when it considered the respondent’s evidence, specifically the certifications attached
to the respondent’s demurrer to evidence. Despite the petitioner’s objections, the NTC
disregarded the rule on demurrer by allowing the submission of the respondent’s evidence while
depriving the petitioner of the opportunity to question, examine or refute the submitted
documents

In granting the demurrer to evidence in the present case, the NTC considered both the
insufficiency of the allegations in the complaint and the insufficiency of the complainants’
evidence in light of its interpretation of the provisions of EO No. 205 and EO No. 436. The NTC
ruled that the complainants, including the petitioner, failed to proveby substantial evidence that
the respondent aired the subject advertisements without the consent of its program providers,
asrequired under EO No. 436. The NTC, therefore, has issued the assailed order upon a
consideration of the applicable laws and the evidence of the petitioner. On this score, the grant
of the demurrer suffers no infirmity.

However, the NTC further extended itsconsideration of the issue to the respondent’s pieces of
evidence thatwere attached to its demurrer to evidence. On this score,we agree with the
petitioner that the NTC erred.

III. Judgment and Final Order – Rule

36
• BA Finance Corp. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 107345, January
27, 1994

FACTS
1. YANKY executed a chattel mortgage over the merchandise and personal properties in
favor of petitioner.
2. petitioner demanded from YANKY the payment of its accumulated obligations but Yanky
did not heed
3. petitioner filed with the then Court of First Instance a complaint against YANKY for
replevin with damages or, in the alternative, payment of the amount of P559,565.00 plus
interest
4. The trial court seized the subjects of the chattel mortgage
5. RCBC and China Bank intervened in the replevin case as creditors of YANKY.
6. A public auction sale was held
 7. Petitioner then filed an Urgent Motion to Cancel Auction Sale stating that it was not given
an opportunity to participate in the sale
8. The trial court then cancelled the auction sale.
9. The highest bidder filed a motion for reconsideration
10. On 20 June 1984, the trial court granted the motion for reconsideration and modified its
1 June 1984 order holding that respondent Siy agreed to put up a surety bond subject to
approval by the court to justify the release to him of the properties purchased at auction.
11. Respondent Siy submitted a surety bond of P140,000.00 after which, on 28 June 1984,
the sheriff was directed to deliver to Siy the chattels thus sold.
12. petitioner filed its notice of appeal and a record on appeal which the trial court
disapproved due to late filing.
13. After denial of its motion for reconsideration, petitioner went to the Court of Appeals on a
Petition for Mandamus and Certiorari. But the appellate court dismissed the petition
because the notice of appeal was filed late. Hence, petitioner filed a petition for review
on certiorari with this Court.

ISSUE:
W/N the June 28, 1984 order is a final judgment

HELD
yes.

Although the order of 20 June 1984 may be considered interlocutory as it required something
more to be done by respondent Siy, i.e., the filing of the bond, the subsequent order of 28 June
1984 can be considered a final one which determined and settled the issue on the validity of the
auction sale and the right of respondent Siy as highest bidder to acquire the properties he
purchased. Petitioner should have appealed the 28 June 1984 order if it wanted to question the
validity of the intervention of respondent Siy as well as of the auction sale. But it did not do so.
Moreover, records show that after the issuance of the order of 28 June 1984 directing the
delivery of the properties to Siy, the remaining proceedings in the trial court pertained only to the
execution and implementation by the sheriff of the order of 28 June 1984.

• RICARDO Silverio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.

178933, 16 September 2009
FACTS
1. The instant controversy stemmed from the settlement of estate of the deceased Beatriz
Silverio.
○ The case was docketed as SP. PROC. NO. M-2629 entitled In Re: Estate of the
Late Beatriz D. Silverio, Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. v. Ricardo S. Silverio Jr., et al
○ Ricardo Sr was the administrator
 2. On January 3, 2005, the RTC issued an Order granting the petition and removing
Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate, while appointing Ricardo Silverio, Jr.
as the new administrator.
3. On January 26, 2005, Nelia S. Silverio-Dee filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Order dated January 3, 2005, as well as all other related orders.
4. On February 4, 2005, Ricardo Silverio Jr. filed an Urgent Motion for an Order Prohibiting
Any Person to Occupy/Stay/Use Real Estate Properties Involved in the Intestate Estate
of the Late Beatriz
5. Then, on May 31, 2005, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order4 affirming its Order dated
January 3, 2005 and denying private respondent’s motion for reconsideration.
○ In the Omnibus Order, the RTC also authorized Ricardo Silverio, Jr. to, upon
receipt of the order, immediately exercise his duties as administrator of the
subject estate
○ The Omnibus Order also directed Nelia S. Silverio-Dee to vacate the property at
No. 3, Intsia, Forbes Park, Makati City within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
order.

Instead of filing a Notice of Appeal and Record on Appeal, private respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration of the Order. This motion for reconsideration was denied in an
Order dated December 12, 2005. This Order was received by private respondent on
December 22, 2005.
On January 6, 2006, private respondent filed her Notice of Appeal while she filed her Record on
Appeal on January 23, 2006.
6. Thus, in denying due course to the Notice/Record on Appeal, the RTC, in its Order dated
April 2, 2007, ruled:
7. Verily, the appeal taken by the movant Nelia Silverio-Dee from the Order of this Court
dated December 12, 2005 denying the Motion for Reconsideration is misplaced as no
appeal may be taken from the order denying the motion for reconsideration (see Section
1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in relation to Section 1(f), Rule 109 of the
Rules of Court). Furthermore, assuming that what said movant had appealed is the final
Order dated May 31, 2005, still, the appeal cannot be given due course as the Record
on Appeal had been filed beyond the thirty-day period to appeal (see Section 3 Rule 41
of the Rules of Court)

ISSUE
Thus, the question posed is whether the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 is an interlocutory
order

HELD
Yes

In the instant case, Nelia Silverio-Dee appealed the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC on the
ground that it ordered her to vacate the premises of the property located at No. 3 Intsia Road,
Forbes Park, Makati City. On that aspect the order is not a final determination of the case or of
the issue of distribution of the shares of the heirs in the estate or their rights therein. It must be
borne in mind that until the estate is partitioned, each heir only has an inchoate right to the
properties of the estate, such that no heir may lay claim on a particular property.

Thus, private respondent employed the wrong mode of appeal by filing a Notice of Appeal with
the RTC. Hence, for employing the improper mode of appeal, the case should have been
dismissed.

The implication of such improper appeal is that the notice of appeal did not toll the
reglementary period for the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the proper
remedy in the instant case. This means that private respondent has now lost her remedy
of appeal from the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC.

FINAL ORDER
A final order is one that disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular
proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been
determined by the court, while an interlocutory order is one which does not dispose of the case
completely but leaves something to be decided upon. (Emphasis supplied.)

Additionally, it is only after a judgment has been rendered in the case that the ground for the
appeal of the interlocutory order may be included in the appeal of the judgment itself. The
interlocutory order generally cannot be appealed separately from the judgment. It is only when
such interlocutory order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion that certiorari under
Rule 65 may be resorted to.

• Garrido v. Tortogo, G.R. No. 156358,

17 August 2011

FACTS
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari assailing the order of RTC granting the respondents’
application for writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction to enjoin the execution of the
already final and executory decision of the MTCC

ISSUE
W/N the Nov 12, 2002 is an interlocutory order the

HELD
Yes. The order dated November 12, 2002, which granted the application for the writ of
preliminary injunction, was an interlocutory, not a final, order, and should not be the
subject of an appeal. The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an
appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65,23 provided that the
interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion.

a. Default Judgment – Rule 9

b. Judgment after pre-trial, Judgment
after ex parte presentation of
evidence – Rule 18
c. Judgment without trial
d. Judgment on Compromise
• Gadrinab v. Salamanca, G.R.
No. 194560, 11 June 2014

e. Judgment on the pleadings – Rule

34
• Sunbanun v. Go, G.R. No.
163280, 2 February 2010

FACTS
1. The petitioner and the respondent had a lease contract
2. the petitioner forcibly ejected respondent’s lodgers three months prior to the termination
of the lease contract
3. respondent filed an action for damages against petitioner due to the lost income from her
lodgers
4. During the pre-trial, petitioner moved for the case to be submitted for judgment on the
pleadings considering that the only disagreement between the parties was the correct
interpretation of the lease contract.
5. Respondent did not object to petitioner’s motion.
6. The trial court then directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda, after
which the case would be considered submitted for decision
7. trial court ordered petitioner to pay damages
8. CA affirmed

ISSUE
As to the amount of damages awarded as a consequence of this violation of plaintiff’s rights, the
lower court based its award from the allegations and prayer contained in the complaint. The
defendant, however, questions this award for the reason that, according to the defendant, the
plaintiff, in moving for judgment on the pleadings, did not offer proof as to the truth of his own
allegations with respect to the damages claimed by him, and gave no opportunity for the
appellant to introduce evidence to refute his claims.

HELD
SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. – Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or
otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading, the court may, on
motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. However, in actions for declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved.

● The trial court has the discretion to grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by
a party if there is no controverted matter in the case after the answer is filed.
● A judgment on the pleadings is a judgment on the facts as pleaded, and is based
exclusively upon the allegations appearing in the pleadings of the parties and the
accompanying annexes.

Petitioner, in moving for a judgment on the pleadings without offering proof as to the truth of her
own allegations and without giving respondent the opportunity to introduce evidence, is deemed
to have admitted the material and relevant averments of the complaint, and to rest her motion
for judgment based on the pleadings of the parties.

CASE
We find this objection without merit. It appears that when the plaintiff moved to have the case
decided on the pleadings, the defendant interposed no objection and has practically assented
thereto. The defendant, therefore, is deemed to have admitted the allegations of fact of the
complaint, so that there was no necessity for plaintiff to submit evidence of his claim.

• Diman v. Alumbres, G.R. No.

131466, November 27, 1998

FACTS
1. a complaint for "Quieting of Title and Damages" was filed against the petitioners
2. In their answer with counterclaim
3. After joinder of the issues, the Dimans served on the Heirs a REQUEST FOR
ADMISSION of the truth of the following specified matters of fact
4. no response whatever was made to the request
5. The Dimans then submitted a "MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT because the
heirs had failed to respond to their REQUEST FOR ADMISSION; the Dimans asserted
that no genuine issue existed and prayed that "a summary judgment be entered
dismissing the case for lack of merit.
6. The Trial Court denied the Dimans' motion for summary judgment
7. The case proceeded to trial in due course
8. Shortly after the Heirs rested their case, the Dimans filed a "Motion for Judgment on
Demurrer to Evidence
9. the Trial Court denied their motion to dismiss
10.
HELD

Judgment on Pleadings vs Summary Judgment

In other words, as a noted authority remarks, a judgment on the pleadings is a judgment on the
facts as pleaded while a summary judgment is a judgment on the facts as summarily proven by
affidavits, depositions or admissions.

Another distinction is that while the remedy of a judgment on the pleadings may be sought only
by a claimant (one seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a
declaratory relief, supra), a summary judgment may be applied for by either a claimant or a
defending party.

Summary Judgment
● issues thus arising from the pleadings are sham, fictitious, not genuine, as shown by
admissions, depositions or admissions.
● there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

Judgment on Pleadings
● there is no ostensible issue at all, but the absence of any because of the failure of the
defending party's answer to raise an issue.

"Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the
adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such
pleading

• Iloilo Jar Corp. v. Comglasco

Corp., G.R. No. 219509, January
18, 2017

FACTS
1. The petitioner (lessor) and respondent (lessee) entered into a lease contract
2. The respondent pre-terminated the contract and did not pay the rentals from the day the
contract was pre-terminated until its expiration
3. The petitioner sent several demand letters to the respondents but to no avail
4. The petitioner filed a civil action for breach of contract and damages as there is no
stipulation as to the pre-termination of the contract
5. The respondent filed in its Answer and raised an affirmative defense that it was released
from its obligation from the lease contract since it was pre-terminated by reason the
 consideration thereof had become so difficult to comply in light of the economic crisis
then existing
6. Iloilo Jar filed its Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings arguing that Comglasco admitted
all the material allegations in the complaint. It insisted that Comglasco's answer failed to
tender an issue because its affirmative defense was unavailing.
7. RTC granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings.
8. CA reversed the amended order of the RTC. The appellate court was of the view that
judgment on the pleadings was improper as Comglasco's answer tendered an issue
considering that Iloilo Jar's material allegations were specifically denied therein. It
REMANDED to the RTC for the conduct of further proceedings.

ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT A DEFENSE RAISED IN THE ANSWER THAT IS NOT APPLICABLE TO
THE CASE AT BAR CAN BE CONSIDERED AS APPROPRIATELY TENDERING AN ISSUE
THAT NEED TO BE TRIED BY THE TRIAL COURT; AND

HELD

Yes. The judgment on the pleadings was improper considering that Comglasco's Answer raised
an affirmative defense.

Thus, the proper inquiry in this regard would be whether the affirmative defenses offered by
petitioners constitute genuine issues of fact requiring a full-blown trial.

Comglasco's position fails to impress because Article 1267 applies only to obligations to do and
not to obligations to give. The obligation to pay rentals or deliver the thing in a contract of lease
falls within the prestation "to give

RTC was correct in ordering Comglasco to pay the unpaid rentals because the affirmative
defense raised by it was insufficient to free it from its obligations under the lease contract.

It reversed the CA decision and reinstated RTC decision.

JUDGMENT ON PLEADINGS
Simply stated, what distinguishes a judgment on the pleadings from a summary judgment is the
presence of issues in the Answer to the Complaint. When the Answer fails to tender any issue,
that is, if it does not deny the material allegations in the complaint or admits said material
allegations of the adverse party's pleadings by admitting the truthfulness thereof and/or omitting
to deal with them at all, a judgment on the pleadings is appropriate.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT
On the other hand, when the Answer specifically denies the material averments of the complaint
or asserts affirmative defenses, or in other words raises an issue, a summary judgment is
proper provided that the issue raised is not genuine. "A 'genuine issue' means an issue of fact
which calls for the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or
contrived or which does not constitute a genuine issue for trial."

• Comglasco Corp. v. Santos Car

Check Center Corp., G.R. No.
202989, March 25, 2015

FACTS

1. On August 16, 2000, respondent Santos Car Check Center Corporation (Santos), owner
of a showroom located at 75 Delgado Street, in Iloilo City, leased out the said space to
petitioner Comglasco Corporation (Comglasco), an entity engaged in the sale,
replacement and repair of automobile windshields, for a period of five years at a monthly
rental of P60,000.00 for the first year, P66,000.00 on the second year, and P72,600.00
on the third through fifth years.1
2. On October 4, 2001, Comglasco advised Santos through a letter that it was
pre-terminating their lease contract effective December 1, 2001. Santos refused to
accede to the pre-termination, reminding Comglasco that their contract was for five
years. On January 15, 2002, Comglasco vacated the leased premises and stopped
paying any further rentals. Santos sent several demand letters, which Comglasco
completely ignored. On September 15, 2003, Santos sent its final demand letter,3 which
Comglasco again ignored. On October 20, 2003,
3. Santos filed suit for breach of contract.
4. Comglasco filed its Answer invoking that the termination of the lease was due to financial
difficulties
5. Santos moved for a judgment on the pleadings, which the RTC granted.
6. CA affirmed
7. Comglasco argued that a summary judgment would have been the proper recourse,
after a hearing.

ISSUE
Whether or not judgment on the pleadings was properly invoked by the trial court as basis for
rendering its decision;

HELD
Yes.

As found by the CA, Comglasco’s Answer admitted the material allegations in the complaint, to
wit: a) that Santos holds absolute title to a showroom space; b) that Comglasco leased the said
showroom from Santos; c) that after a little over a year, Comglasco pre-terminated the lease; d)
that, disregarding Santos’ rejection of the pre-termination of their lease, Comglasco vacated the
leased premises on January 15, 2002; e) that Comglasco never denied the existence and
validity of the parties’ lease contract and f) that the lease was for five years

Comglasco cannot be permitted to blame its difficulties on the said regional economic
phenomenon because it entered into the subject lease only on August 16, 2000, more than
three years after it began, and by then Comglasco had known what business risks it assumed
when it opened a new shop in Iloilo City. Moreover, Article 1267 speaks of a prestation involving
service which has been rendered so difficult by unforeseen subsequent events as to be
manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties.

The RTC acted correctly in resorting to Section 1 of Rule 34, on Judgment on the Pleadings, to
cut short a needless trial. This Court agrees with the CA that Comglasco cannot cite Article
1267 of the Civil Code, and that it must be deemed to have admitted the material allegations in
the complaint. Section 1, Rule 34 reads:

Sec. 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise
admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading, the court may, on motion of that
party, direct judgment on such pleading. However, in actions for declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall
always be proved.

A judgment on the pleadings is a judgment on the facts as pleaded,17 and is based exclusively
upon the allegations appearing in the pleadings of the parties and the accompanying
annexes.18 It is settled that the trial court has the discretion to grant a motion for judgment on
the pleadings filed by a party if there is no controverted matter in the case after the answer is
filed.19 A genuine issue of fact is that which requires the presentation of evidence, as
distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false issue.

Come to think of it, under Rule 35, on Summary Judgments, Comglasco had recourse to move
for summary judgment, wherein it could have adduced supporting evidence to justify its action
on the parties’ lease, but it did not do so. Section 2 of Rule 35 provides:

Sec. 2. Summary judgment for defending party. - A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any time, move with supporting
affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part
thereof.

Iloilo
motion for judgment on pleadings is improper
but RTC decision ordering the defendants to pay is reinstated

Comglasco
f. Summary judgments – Rule 35
• Asian Construction v. PCIB,
G.R. No. 153827, 25 April 2006

FACTS

1. petitioner and respondent executed a Memorandum of Agreement wherein respondent

was engaged to supply and erect insulated panel systems at various pavilions at the
Philippine Centennial Exposition Theme Park, specifically for the Phase I Project, for an
agreed amount of US$3,745,287.94.
2. Pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement, petitioner made various payments
amounting to US$3,129,667.32 leaving a balance of US$615,620.33. Respondent
claims that it made several written demands for petitioner to pay the said balance, but
the latter continuously refused to heed its plea.
3. Complaint3 for Sum of Money filed by respondent against petitioner
4. Thereafter, petitioner filed its Answer with Counterclaim and raised the ff. defenses:

19. The complaint should be dismissed on the ground that [respondent’s] certification of
non-forum shopping is defective. Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
… xxx xxx xxx

22. [Respondent] has no legal capacity to sue, as it is a foreign corporation doing business in
the Philippines without a valid license. xxx xxx xxx

27. The unexpected default of FCCC on its obligations to [petitioner] on account of the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee investigation was a fortuitous event which suspended, if not
extinguished [petitioner’s] obligation to FCCC.

5. Respondent then moved for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the Answer
admitted all material allegations of the Complaint and, therefore, failed to tender an
issue. Thus, respondent deems that petitioner’s Answer, in effect, admitted the
existence of the Memorandum of Agreement and its failure to pay the balance despite
repeated demands.
6. In a Judgment5 dated October 6, 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City
rendered judgment in favor of respondent.

ISSUE
whether or not judgment on the pleadings is proper.

HELD
Yes.
Here, it is irrefutable that petitioner acknowledged having entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement with respondent and that it still has an unpaid balance of US$615,620.33.

While petitioner allegedly raised affirmative defenses, i.e., defect in the certification of non-forum
shopping, no legal capacity to sue and fortuitous event, the same cannot still bar respondent
from seeking the collection of the unpaid balance. Other than these affirmative defenses,
petitioner’s denial neither made a specific denial that a Memorandum of Agreement was
perfected nor did it contest the genuineness and due execution of said agreement.

• Republic v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 152154, July 15, 2003

FACTS

1. petitioner Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government

(PCGG), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition
for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan, against Marcoses for ill-gotten wealth
2. Marcoses filed their answer
3. petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings
4. SB denied petitioner's motion for summary judgment

ISSUE
whether or not respondents raised any genuine issue of fact which would either justify
or negate summary judgment

HELD
No.

We hold that respondent Marcoses failed to raise any genuine issue of fact in their
pleadings. Thus, on motion of petitioner Republic, summary judgment should take place
as a matter of right.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT
summary judgment was described as a judgment which a court may render before trial
but after both parties have pleaded. It is ordered by the court upon application by one
party, supported by affidavits, depositions or other documents, with notice upon the
adverse party who may in turn file an opposition supported also by affidavits,
depositions or other documents. This is after the court summarily hears both parties with
their respective proofs and finds that there is no genuine issue between them.

CASE

SPECIFIC DENIAL
Upon careful perusal of the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent Mrs. Marcos and
the Marcos children indubitably failed to tender genuine issues in their answer to the
petition for forfeiture. A genuine issue is an issue of fact which calls for the presentation
of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious and contrived, set up in
bad faith or patently lacking in substance so as not to constitute a genuine issue for
trial.

In their answer, respondents failed to specifically deny each and every allegation
contained in the petition for forfeiture because the answer is based on their alleged lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations of
the petition. The purpose of requiring respondents to make a specific denial is to make
them disclose facts which will disprove the allegations of petitioner at the trial, together
with the matters they rely upon in support of such denial

All they gave were stock answers like "they have no sufficient knowledge" or "they could
not recall because it happened a long time ago," and, as to Mrs. Marcos, "the funds
were lawfully acquired," without stating the basis of such assertions
● On the part of Mrs. Marcos, she claimed that the funds were lawfully acquired.
However, she failed to particularly state the ultimate facts surrounding the lawful
manner or mode of acquisition of the subject funds. Simply put, she merely
stated in her answer with the other respondents that the funds were "lawfully
acquired" without detailing how exactly these funds were supposedly acquired
legally by them. Even in this case before us, her assertion that the funds were
lawfully acquired remains bare and unaccompanied by any factual support which
can prove, by the presentation of evidence at a hearing, that indeed the funds
were acquired legitimately by the Marcos family.

NEGATIVE PREGNANT
negative pregnant, that is, a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts
in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied.
It was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at.34 Stated otherwise, a
negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it an affirmation or
at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial
pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a
fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as
so qualified or modified are literally denied, has been held that the qualifying
circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted

• Province of Pangasinan v. Court

of Appeals, G.R. No. 104266,
March 31, 1993

FACTS
 1. private respondent Rogelio R. Coquial and petitioners entered into a contract for the
improvement of Urdaneta-Mapandan Road, Phase I and Phase II
2. Upon completion of the Phase I, petitioners had paid only P1,320,000.00 leaving a
balance of P1,854,083.20, which petitioners refused to pay
3. he has also completed 60% of Phase II which costs P1,000,000.00 but petitioners, who
have decided not to pursue the project, refused to pay
4. respondent filed a complaint for a sum of money against petitioners Province of
Pangasinan and Provincial Governor Rafael M. Colet
5. respondent filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the balance of
P1,854,083.20.
6. the trial court granted the motion filed by private respondent
7. respondent filed a motion for execution of the partial summary judgment
8. the trial court issued the writ of execution. It ordered the garnishment of petitioners’ bank
account

ISSUE
W/N the partial summary judgment can be executed

HELD

Petitioners are correct.

● A partial summary judgment is merely interlocutory and not a final judgment.

● It does not finally dispose of the action, execution thereof shall not issue, conformably
with Section 1 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
● What Rule 34 contemplates is that the appeal from the partial summary judgment shall
be taken together with the judgment that may be rendered in the entire case after a trial
is conducted on the material facts on which a substantial controversy exists. The trial
court and the respondent court erroneously relied on Section 5 of Rule 36 of the Rules of
Court, which pertains to judgments in general.

"SEC. 4. Case not fully adjudicated on motion. — If on motion under this rule, judgment is not
rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the
hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by
interrogating counsel shall ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy
and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an
order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to
which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further
proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly."cralaw virtua1aw library
g. Contents of a judgment
h. Rendition of judgments and final
orders
i. Amendment of Judgment vs.
Supplemental Judgment

• Esquivel v. Alegre, G.R. No.

79425, April 17, 1989

FACTS
1. Respondents filed an ejectment case against the petitioners
2. Respondents secured a judgment ordering respondents to vacate a parcel of land
3. The supplemental complaint was admitted in pleading the spouses Encinas, the two
other private respondents herein as the subject property was transferred to the said
spouses
4. the court n quo rendered a decision on the supplemental complaint declaring the
supplemental defendants as successors-in-interest of herein private respondents
Teotimo Alaurin and Visitacion Magno, such that whatever is the result of the appealed
case shall be legally binding them

SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION
“In the light of the foregoing testimony of the witnesses presented by supplemental plaintiffs
together with the documentary exhibits supporting the allegations of the supplemental
complaint, the Court finds that the evidence presented by the supplemental plaintiffs are
preponderantly sufficient to justify and warrant a judgment in their favor."

ISSUE
The sole issue is whether or not the decision rendered by a trial court in supplemental complaint
modified the decision of the same branch of the court in the original complaint and amounts to a
amendment of the original decision

HELD
No.

In the instant case no restudy was made by respondent court of the original decision but only on
the issues raised in the supplemental complaint. The supplemental decision cannot stand alone
as a judgment on the merits as there was no declaration of the respective rights and duties of
the parties. It only declared the supplemental defendants as successors-in-interest of the
defendants in the original complaint, "such that whatever is the result of the appealed case shall
be legally binding upon them

AMENDED JUDGMENT
There is a difference between an amended judgment and a supplemental judgment. In an
amended and clarified judgment, the lower court makes a thorough study of the original
judgment and renders the amended and clarified judgment only after considering all the factual
and legal issues. The amended and clarified decision is an entirely new decision which
supersedes the original decision.

SUPPLEMENTAL JUDGMENT
Following the Court’s differentiation of a supplemental pleading from an amending pleading, it
can be said that a supplemental decision does not take the place or extinguish the existence of
the original. As its very name denotes, it only serves to bolster or adds something to the primary
decision. A supplement exists side by side with the original. It does not replace that which it
supplements

• Flight Attendants and Stewards

Association of the Philippines v.
Philippine Airlines, Inc., G.R.
Nos. 178083

FASAP vs PAL
FACTS
1. On September 7, 2011, the Second Division denied with finality PAL’s Second
Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of July 22, 2008.
2. On October 4, 2011, the Court En Banc issued a resolution docketed as A.M. No.
11- 10-1-SC recalling the September 7, 2011 resolution of the Second Division
3. Petitioner contended that the resolution should be declared void for failing to comply with
the requirement for the Court to state the legal and factual basis for its decisions
○ Section 14, Art VIII of Consti: No decision shall be rendered by any court
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based.
ISSUE
W/N the Oct 4, 2011 resolution is a valid judgment?

HELD
No. October 4, 2011 resolution did not adjudicate on the merits of G.R. No. 178083 and
did not constitute the reversal of the substantive issues already decided upon by the
Court in the FASAP case in its previously issued Decision (of July 22, 2008). What we
thereby did was instead to exercise the Court's inherent power to recall orders and
resolutions before they attain finality.

In so doing, the Court only exercised prudence in order to ensure that the Second
Division was vested with the appropriate legal competence in accordance with and under
the Court's prevailing internal rules to review and resolve the pending motion for
reconsideration.
A.M. No. 11-
10-1-SC (Resolution), March
13, 2018

Section 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders. A judgment or final order determining the
merits of the case shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him, and filed with the
clerk of court.

j. Judgment nunc pro tunc

• Cardoza v. Singson, G.R. No.
59284, January 12, 1990

FACTS

1. On 1979, respondents filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment of CA wayback 1939,

which was 40 years ago.
2. RTC directed the petitioners to submit their memorandum within fifteen days from receipt
of the memorandum. Defendants did not submit their memorandum nor submitted their
reply to written interrogatories
3. On 1980, they deferred the motion upon discovery that no entry of judgment had been
made and that nobody could tell whether parties or their counsel received a copy of the
decision of the CA
4. they prayed for the recording of the decision of the Court of Appeals in the book of
entries of Judgment
5. the trial court issued an order that "a nunc pro tunc judgment be entered pursuant to the
decision of the Court of Appeals in Civil Case No. C.A. G.R. No. 3545."
6. For the satisfaction of the judgment it likewise ordered the issuance of a writ of execution
7. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
injunction seeking to annul and set aside the writ of execution and; argued that the
respondent judge usurped the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals when it issued the
Order directing that ‘a non pro tunc judgment be entered pursuant to the decision of the
Court of Appeals in Civil Case C.A. G.R. No. 3545’
● because under Section 10 of Rule 5 of the Revised Rules of Court, its issuance is
the ministerial duty of the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals;
● that the trial court erred in granting the application for issuance of a nunc pro tunc
judgment because plaintiffs’ inaction to move for the execution of the Judgment
40 years after its promulgation is a ground for its denial;
● that private respondents have not adduced evidence to overcome the regularity
in the performance of official function so that it can be presumed that the Clerk of
Court of the Court of Appeals made the entry of judgment;
● that respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he deprived petitioner
of his property without due process of law
ISSUE
1. whether or not the decision of the trial court as modified by the Court of Appeals can still
be enforced
2. whether or not the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion when it made the
entry of judgment nunc pro tunc and issued the writ of execution.

HELD

1. Yes. the prevailing party in a civil action is entitled to a writ of execution of the final
judgment obtained by him within five years from the date of its entry. The counting of the
five-year period starts from the entry of judgment and not from its promulgation.

2. No. Acting not only as a court of law but also as a court of equity, the trial court correctly
made the entry of a judgment nunc pro tunc pursuant to the decision of the Court of
Appeals in Civil Case No. C.A. G.R. No. 3545. In so doing, the lower court merely
ordered the judgment of the Court of Appeals to be executed.
a. No presumption of regularity in the performance of the duties of the Clerk of
Court of the Court of Appeals can apply to the instant case. There is no record
whatsoever whether in the appellate court or in the court below of any entry of
judgment in Civil Case No. 1853. Presumptions cannot substitute for the records,
much less prejudice vested rights.
b. Contrary to what the petitioner claims, the lower court’s action — decreeing the
entry of a judgment nunc pro tunc — was not done arbitrarily nor capriciously.
The petitioner was already allowed to oppose the motions in open court and was
even required to submit a memorandum to support his position. The petitioner,
however, failed to submit a memorandum. Neither did he adduce sufficient
evidence to support his claims over the properties in question.

• Nuñal v. Court of Appeals, G.R.

No. 94005, April 6, 1993

FACTS
1. Petitioners and respondents were parties to a civil case in which an order of partition
among them was ordered by RTC
2. an order for the issuance of the writ of execution was issued
3. RTC issued the assailed order directing the inclusion of Mary Lyon Martin as co-owner
with a share in the partition of the property

ISSUE
W/N the trial court may order the inclusion of Mary L. Martin as co-heir entitled to participate in
the partition of the property considering that she was neither a party plaintiff nor a party
defendant in Civil Case No. 872 for partition and accounting of the aforesaid property and that
the decision rendered in said case has long become final and executory

HELD
No.

In the case at bar, the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 872 has become final and
executory. Thus, upon its finality, the trial judge lost his jurisdiction over the case. Consequently,
any modification that he would make, as in this case, the inclusion of Mary Lyon Martin would be
in excess of his authority.

The remedy of Mary Lyon Martin is to file an independent suit against the parties in Civil Case
No. 872 and all other heirs for her share in the subject property, in order that all the parties in
interest can prove their respective claims.

DOCTRINE OF IMMUTABILITY
nothing is more settled in the law than that when a final judgment becomes executory, it thereby
becomes immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modified in any respect,
even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of
fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the Court
rendering it or by the highest Court of land.

The only recognized exceptions are the correction of clerical errors or the making of so-called
nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and, of course, where the judgment
is void.

Furthermore," (a)ny amendment. or alteration which substantially affects a final and executory
judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that
purpose."

k. Entry of judgment and final order

l. Law of the Case

m. Bar by former judgment and

conclusiveness of judgment

• Del Rosario v. Far East Bank.

G.R No. 150134, 31 October
2007

FACTS
BACKGROUND
1. Petitioner (debtor) and PDCP (creditor) entered into a loan agreement
2. The loans were secured by real estate and chattel mortgages
3. PDCP assigned its receivables to FEBTC under a Deed of Assignment
4. Petitioner allegedly paid in full its loan to PDCP and in fact overpaid

FIRST CASE
5. Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money against PDCP and FEBTC to recover an
alleged overpayment of P5.3 million P965,000 from FEBTC and P4.335 million from
PDCP.(Civil Case No. 94-1610)
a. CA ordered PDCP to execute a release or cancellation of the mortgages over the
properties of the petitioners
b. CA also ordered FEBTC to pay petitioners only the amount of P965,000 (as it
was the only the amount prayed for) with legal interest from the date of the
promulgation of its judgment
6. FEBTC filed a motion for reconsideration
7. CA denied said motion; thus making CA decision final and executory
8. Notice of Satisfaction of Judgment between petitioners and FEBTC was in fact submitted

SECOND CASE
9. Petitioners filed a complaint against FEBTC to recover the balance of the excess
payment of P4.335 million (Civil Case No. 00-540)
10. FEBTC filed a Third Party Complaint against PDCP praying that the latter be made to
pay the P965,000 and the interests adjudged by the CA in favor of petitioners, as well as
the P4.335 million and interests that petitioners were claiming from it.
11. RTC dismissed the petitioners' complaint on the ground of res judicata and splitting of
cause of action
12. CA affirmed RTC decision

ISSUE
W/N the res judicata is applicable in this case

HELD

RES JUDICATA
As to the requisite of identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action, it cannot be
gainsaid that the first case, Civil Case No. 94-1610, was brought by petitioners to recover an
alleged overpayment of P5.3 million P965,000 from FEBTC and P4.335 million from PDCP.

On the other hand, Civil Case No. 00-540, filed by the same petitioners, was for the recovery of
P4.335 million which is admittedly part of the P5.3 million earlier sought to be recovered in Civil
Case No. 94-1610. This time, the action was brought solely against FEBTC which in turn
impleaded PDCP as a third party defendant.
Notably, the same facts were also pleaded by the parties in support of their allegations for, and
defenses against, the recovery of the P4.335 million

In determining whether causes of action are identical to warrant the application of the
rule of res judicata, the test is to ascertain whether the same evidence which is
necessary to sustain the second action

SPLITTING OF COA
This Court finds well-taken then the pronouncement of the court a quo that to allow the
re-litigation of an issue that was finally settled as between petitioners and FEBTC in the prior
case is to allow the splitting of a cause of action, a ground for dismissal under Section 4 of Rule
2 of the Rules of Court reading:

SEC. 4. Splitting of a single cause of action; effect of. If two or more suits are instituted on the
basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is
available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.

• Islamic Directorate of the

Philippines v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 117897, May 14, 1997

FACTS
1. IDP filed a petition before the SEC, docketed as SEC Case No. 4012, seeking to declare
null and void the Deed of Absolute Sale signed by the Carpizo Group and the INC since
the group of Engineer Carpizo was not the legitimate Board of Trustees of the IDP.
2. INC, pursuant to the Deed of Absolute Sale executed in its favor, filed an action for
Specific Performance with Damages against the vendor, Carpizo Group, before Branch
81 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-90-6937, to
compel said group to clear the property of squatters and deliver complete and full
physical possession thereof to INC.
3. During the pendency of SEC 4012, RTC rendered in favor of INC as the rightful owner of
the real properties
4. Mrs. Ligon was alleged to be the mortgagee of the two parcels of land executed in her
favor by certain Abdulrahman R.T. Linzag and Rowaida Busran-Sampaco claimed to be
in behalf of the Carpizo Group.

ISSUE
W/N the res judicata is applicable in rhia case

HELD
No.
Neither of these concepts of res judicata find relevant application in the case at bench. While
there may be identity of subject matter (IDP property) in both cases, there is no identity of
parties. The principal parties in G.R. No. 107751 were mortgagee Leticia P. Ligon, as petitioner,
and the Iglesia Ni Cristo, as private respondent. The IDP, as represented by the 1971 Board of
Trustees or the Tamano Group, was only made an ancillary party in G.R. No. 107751 as
intervenor.[28] It was never originally a principal party thereto. It must be noted that intervention
is not an independent action, but is merely collateral, accessory, or ancillary to the principal
action. It is just an interlocutory proceeding dependent on or subsidiary to the case between the
original parties.[29] Indeed, the IDP-Tamano Group cannot be considered a principal party in
G.R. No. 107751 for purposes of applying the principle of res judicata since the contrary goes
against the true import of the action of intervention as a mere subsidiary proceeding without an
independent life apart from the principal action as well as the intrinsic character of the intervenor
as a mere subordinate party in the main case whose right may be said to be only in aid of the
right of the original party.[30] It is only in the present case, actually, where the IDP-Tamano
Group became a principal party, as petitioner, with the Iglesia Ni Cristo, as private respondent.
Clearly, there is no identity of parties in both cases.

• Allied Banking Corp. v. Court of Appeals and Alano

G.R. No. 108089, January 10, 1994

FACTS
1. Alano was one of the defendants in the complaint filed by the petitioner. The complaint is
based on promissory notes, letters of credit, and trust receipts executed by the principal
obligor, Dearfield.
2. The complaint was dismissed against the defendant Alano due to failure to state a COA
based on the allegations of the complaint
3. petitioner filed a new complaint against the private respondent and Feliciana Camara, a
surety who was also a defendant in the first complaint. The complaint practically restates
the causes of action in and involves the promissory notes, letters of credit, and trust
receipts covered in the First Case.
4. The private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the Second Case on the ground of res
judicata
5. Petitioner contended
a. that the judgment dismissing the First Case for failure to state a cause of action is
not a judgment on the merits and
b. that there is no identity of causes of action between the First Case and the
Second Case.

ISSUE
W/N the second case is barred by res judicata

HELD
Yes.
 1. The dismissal of the First Case was a dismissal on the merits.

DISMISSAL IS JUDGMENT ON MERITS

Although
● there was no trial on the merits because the case was decided on a motion to dismiss,
● there was no formal presentation or reception of evidence and
● an order, not a decision, was issued by the trial court, still, the ruling was a judgment on
the merits.

A judgment is upon the merits when it amounts to a declaration of the law to the respective
rights and duties of the parties, based upon the ultimate fact or state of facts disclosed by the
pleadings and evidence, and upon which the right of recovery depends, irrespective of formal,
technical or dilatory objectives or contentions.

2. There is identity of COA

That identity relates to the causes of action in the prior and latter cases. No elaboration is
needed to show that the causes of action in both the First Case and the Second Case are the
same — enforcement of the rights of the petitioner under the promissory notes, letters of credit,
and trust receipts. Although the trial court declared that "on the basis of the allegations of the
complaint, there is really no cause of action against defendant Alano," it does not follow that the
complaint states no cause of action at all.

Other Requisites:
1. The parties do not dispute the fact that Branch 149 of the RTC of Makati had jurisdiction
over the First Case.
2. It is likewise undisputed that there is an identity of parties (insofar as the petitioner and
the private respondent are concerned) and
3. an identity of subject matter between the First and Second Case.

DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA

Res judicata means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing
or matter settled by judgment.

The essential requisites of res judicata are:

(1) the former judgment must be final;
(2) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties;
(3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and
(4) there must be between the first and second action identity of parties, identity of subject
matter, and identity of causes of action.
• Spouses Noceda v. Arbizo-
Directo, G.R. No. 178495, July
26, 2010

FACTS

1. respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for "Recovery of Possession and

Ownership and Rescission/Annulment of Donation"with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Iba, Zambales, Branch 71, docketed as Civil Case No. RTC-354-I.
2. Judgment was rendered against the petitioners
3. spouses Rodolfo Dahipon and Cecilia Obispo- Dahipon filed a complaint for recovery of
ownership and possession, and annulment of sale and damages against spouses
Antonio and Dominga Arbizo, spouses Rodolfo and Erna Noceda, and Aurora
Arbizo-Directo with the RTC, Iba, Zambales, Branch 70. This was docketed as Civil
Case No. RTC-1106-I.
4. Judgment was rendered against the petitioners
5. The decision became final and executory, and a writ of execution was duly issued by the
RTC on March 6, 2001 in Civil Case No. RTC-354-I.
6. petitioners instituted an action for quieting of title against respondent, docketed as Civil
Case No. 2108-I
7. Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary Injunction to enjoin the
implementation of the Writ of Execution dated March 6, 2001 in Civil Case No.
RTC-354-I
8. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of res judicata. Respondent averred
that petitioners, aware of their defeat in Civil Case No. RTC-354-I, surreptitiously
negotiated with Cecilia Obispo-Dahipon for the sale of the land and filed the present suit
in order to subvert the execution thereof.
9. RTC denied the motion
10. respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence
11. RTC granted the motion
12. CA affirmed the decision

ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA OR DOCTRINE OF
CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT IS APPLICABLE UNDER THE FACTS OBTAINING IN
THE PRESENT CASE

HELD

The foregoing disquisition finds application in the case at bar. Undeniably, the present case is
closely related to the previous case (Civil Case No. RTC-354-I), where petitioners raised the
issue of ownership and possession of Lot No. 1121 and the annulment of the donation of said lot
to them. The RTC found for respondent, declaring the deed of donation she executed in favor of
petitioners revoked; and ordered petitioners to vacate and reconvey the donated portion to
respondent. The decision of the RTC was affirmed by the CA, and became final with the denial
of the petition for review by this Court in G.R. No. 119730. In that case, the Court noted the
established fact "that petitioner Noceda occupied not only the portion donated to him by
respondent Aurora Arbizo-Directo, but he also fenced the whole area of Lot C which belongs to
private respondent Directo, thus, petitioner's act of occupying the portion pertaining to private
respondent Directo without the latter's knowledge and consent is an act of usurpation which is
an offense against the property of the donor and considered as an act of ingratitude of a donee
against the donor."[12] Clearly, therefore, petitioners have no right of ownership or possession
over the land in question.

DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA

The doctrine of res judicata is set forth in Section 47 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, as follows:

Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. - The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by
a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be
as follows:
xxxx

(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or
as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the
parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action
or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same
capacity; and

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is
deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face
to have been so adjudged, or which actually and necessarily included therein or necessary
thereto.

bar by former judgment

- bars the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand, or cause of
action
The principle of res judicata lays down two main rules, namely: (1) the judgment or decree of a
court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the parties and
their privies and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action
either before the same or any other tribunal; and

conclusiveness of judgment
- bars the relitigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation between the same
parties on a different claim or cause of action.
(2) any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the
determination of an action before a competent court in which a judgment or decree is rendered
on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated
between the parties and their privies whether or not the claims or demands, purposes, or
subject matters of the two suits are the same.

It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular
matter in another action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issue
be identical. Identity of cause of action is not required but merely identity of issue.

These principles are commonly applied to all matters essentially connected with the subject
matter of the litigation. Thus, it extends to questions necessarily implied in the final judgment,
although no specific finding may have been made in reference thereto and although such
matters were directly referred to in the pleadings and were not actually or formally presented.
Under this rule, if the record of the former trial shows that the judgment could not have been
rendered without deciding the particular matter, it will be considered as having settled that
matter as to all future actions between the parties and if a judgment necessarily presupposes
certain premises, they are as conclusive as the judgment itself.

n. Immutability of final judgment

• Griffith v. Estur, G.R. No.

161777, 7 May 2008

FACTS
1. respondents filed a complaint for for illegal dismissal, nonpayment of legal holiday pay,
13th month pay, and service incentive leave against the respondents
2. LA decided the case in favor of respondents
3. the decision of LA became final and executory, and the first writ of execution was issued
4. petitioner filed a motion to quash the first alias writ of execution. Petitioner contended
that the addition of the execution fee in the writ in effect modified Labor Arbiter
Layawen's decision, and thus nullified the writ.
5. LA denied the motion
6. NLRC also denied the motion
7. Labor Arbiter Reyno issued a second alias writ of execution against petitioner
8. petitioner filed with CA a petition for certiorari with application for temporary restraining
order or preliminary Injunction
9. CA dismissed the petition
ISSUE

1. W/N the labor’s arbiter’s decision is modified by reason of the addition of the execution
fee
 2. W/N the writ of execution is valid

HELD

1. No

The inclusion of the execution fee is not a modification of the Labor Arbiter's decision. Section 6,
Rule IX of the Sheriff Manual provides that the execution fee shall be charged against the losing
party, thus:

SECTION 6. Sheriffs/Execution Fees. - Sheriffs and deputy sheriffs shall be provided at the
beginning of the month with a cash advance of five hundred pesos only (P500.00) for
transportation expenses which shall be liquidated at the end of the month with a statement of
expenses and itinerary of travel duly approved by the Commission or Labor Arbiter issuing the
writ.

doctrine of finality of judgment

Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it thereby becomes
immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification
is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and
regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by
the highest court of the land. Just as the losing party has the right to file an appeal within the
prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the
resolution of his case. The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental
considerations of public policy and sound practice, and that, at the risk of occasional errors, the
judgments or orders of courts must become final at some definite time fixed by law; otherwise,
there would be no end to litigations, thus setting to naught the main role of courts of justice
which is to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order
by settling justiciable controversies with finality.

2. Yes

Thus, the inclusion of the execution fee does not make the writ of execution defective.