Probate Cases

Maeda Timothy –Probate and Administration of Estate Cases 2013
CASE ON PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATE
Content
Page:
1. Application for appointment of administrator of deceased's estate … … … … … … … … 2
2. Appointment of administrator… … … … … … … … … …… … … … … … … … … …… … … … … … … … 3
3. Application for revocation of letters of administration and caveats … … … … … … … … …4
4. Conflict of law… … … … … … … … … …… … … … … … … … … …… … … … … … … … … …… … … … … … 11
5. Customary law of inheritance… … … … … … … … … …… … … … … … … … … …… … … … … … … … 13
6. Execution of a will… … … … … … … … … …… … … … … … … … … …… … … … … … … … … …… … … … 19
7. Failure to comply with mandatory legal provisions when filing probate and
Administration of Estates… … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … …33
8. Father dies intestate… … … … … … … … … …… … … … … … … … … …… … … … … … … … … …… … … 34
9. Fraud… … … … … … … … … …… … … … … … … … … …… … … … … … … … … …… … … … … … … … … … 36
10. Grant of probate… … … … … … … … … …… … … … … … … … … …… … … … … … … … … …… … … … 36
11. Intestacy… … … … … … … … … …… … … … … … … … … …… … … … … … … … … …… … … … … … … … 37
12. Islamic law of inheritance… … … … … … … … … …… … … … … … … … … …… … … … … … … … … 38
13. Jurisdiction… … … … … … … … … …… … … … … … … … … …… … … … … … … … … …… … … … … … 44
14. Probate and Administration… … … … … … … … … …… … … … … … … … … …… … … … … … … … 49
15. Revocation of appointed administrator of estate of deceased… … … … … … … … … …… 55
Prepared by
Maeda Timothy
The Law school of Tanzania 13th cohort 2013
NOTE: This is not an exhaustive list of cases you should, take the liberty to add any case to the
list at will
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1. Application for appointment of administrator of

deceased's estate
SEIF MARARE v MWADAWA SALUM 1985 TLR 253 (HC)
Court High Court of Tanzania - Mwanza
Judge Katiti J
June 10, 1979
(PC) CIVIL APPEAL 37 OF 1978
Fly note
Administration of Estates - Application for appointment of administrator of

deceased's estate - Duty of the court in appointing administrators.
Conflict of Laws - Application for appointment of administrator of a deceased's

estate - Conflict between Islamic Law and Customary Law - Primary court has
jurisdiction to decide the law applicable.
Head note
The respondent sought and obtained from the Primary Court her appointment as
an administrator of the Estate of the deceased. She maintained that as the sister
of the deceased she was entitled to administer the Estate under Islamic Law. The
appellant, a nephew of the deceased's husband who had himself died much
earlier, disputed the respondent's appointment as administrator. His objections
failed both in the Primary Court and in the District Court, hence this appeal to the
High Court.
Held:
(i) On application for appointment of an administrator of a deceaced's estate,

the duty of the court is to appoint as administrator a person who has an
interest in the estate, and according to the wishes of the deceased if any
are expressed;
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(ii) as the applicant in this case could only sustain his claim of having an
interest in the Estate through Customary Law and the respondent could
only sustain her similar claim through Islamic Law, either party may be the
interested party depending on what law the court decided to be the law
applicable;
(iii) the Primary Court (having jurisdiction under both Islamic and Customary
Law) applied no wrong principles in appointing the respondent the
administrator.
Appeal dismissed.
2. Appointment of administrator
SAMSON KISHOSHA GABBA v CHARLES KINGONGO GABBA 1990 TLR 133 (HC)
Judge Mwalusanya J
23 November, 1990
Fly note
Administration of Estates - Appointment of Administrator - Whether the court has

power to distribute property.
Civil Practice and Procedure - Appeal out of time - Whether reasons for delay sole
ground for granting leave.
Head note
The appellant filed an application at Kakoro Primary Court, in Ngudu, for him to
be appointed administrator of estate of his deceased father Gabba Mpondamali.
In his application he claimed that the two houses on plots No. 125 and No. 33
Block A, in Ngudu Township belonged to him (applicant) and not the deceased,
though the said plots were in the name of the deceased. The respondent on
behalf of other members of the family filed on objection in court against the
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appointment of the appellant as administrator. The trial court was satisfied and
found candidate unfit for the job and instead the court appointed the Ward
Secretary of the area to be the administrator of the estate. In addition the court
did two things: First, it held that the houses on plots No. 125 and No. 33 block A in
Ngudu township belonged to the deceased and not the appellant. Second the
Court distributed the property of the deceased to his children. The appellant,
after his attempt to file an appeal out of time was rejected, filed on application
for leave to appeal to the District Court out of time. The District Court rejected
the application on the ground that no reasonable ground for the delay was
shown. He appealed to the High Court.
Held:
(i) In determining whether or not to allow an application for leave to appeal

out of time the court has to consider reasons for the delay as well as the
likelihood of success of the intended appeal;
(ii) the appeal has good chances of success because the decision of the trial
court has some conspicuous errors B including the court's erroneous
distribution of the deceased property to his children, deciding the
ownership of the houses on plots No. 125 and No.33 Block A, when the
administrator had yet to distribute them.
Appeal allowed.
3. Application for revocation of letters of administration and

caveats
Mohamed Stambuli v. Mwanaharusi Selemani,[1968] HCD 357
Probate and Administration Cause 11-M-65,
1/7/68,
Seaton J.
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Application for revocation of letters of administration – Where prior proceedings

defective, grant of letters not revoked but qualified by declaration of interests of
applicants.
Jurisdiction – Primary Court has jurisdiction, without pecuniary limits, where

customary or Islamic law is applicable and matter is not governed by marriage,
Divorce and Succession (non-Christian Asia tics) Ordinance.
This was an application for the revocation of letters of Administration of a

deceased’s estate, under the Probate and Administration Ordinance, Cap. 445,
section 49. Proceedings begun in the Primary Court to settle the estate ended in
an equivocal way. The present respondent, acting on legal advice that those
proceedings were outside the jurisdiction of the Primary Court, brought a petition
in the High Court for a grant of Letters of Administration and this was granted.
Meanwhile, present applicants, anxious to protect their interests, had brought an
action in the District Court, which asked the District Administration and this was
granted. Meanwhile, present applicants, anxious to protect their interests, had
brought an action in the District Court, which asked the District Administrative
Officer to take possession of the estate. Applicants now seek revocation on the
grounds that the original petition was false, in that (1) respondent is only half-
sister of deceased; (2) deceased was wife of applicant Stambuli up to her death;
(3) applicant Saudi is a whole blood son of deceased’s brother Husein.
Held:
(1) Primary Courts have no pecuniary limits to their jurisdiction in

administration of deceased’s’ estates, where the applicable law is
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customary or Islamic law and the estate is not governed by the Marriage,
Divorce and Succession (non-Christian Asia tics) Ordinance (G.N. 320 of
1964).
(2) Applicant failed to prove that respondent was not whole blood sister of
deceased, and the onus is on him to prove it.
(3) Deceased was married to applicant Stambuli; the onus is therefore on

respondent to prove a divorce. [Citing Ali Omar Mote v. Ali Siraj (1959) E. A.
883]. Although deceased “married” two other persons after leaving
Stambuli, there was no firm evidence of any valid form of divorce.
(4) Evidence was brought to show that applicant Saudi was illegitimate since
his mother was already pregnant with him when she married Hussein, the
deceased’s brother. Although Islamic law presumes a child born within 6
months of marriage is illegitimate unless acknowledged by the father, the
Evidence Act 1967, s.121 states that birth during marriage is conclusive
proof of legitimacy. Even if the Evidence Act does not supersede Islamic law
on this point, Husein acknowledged Saudi as his son.
(5) As both applicants have interests in the estate, the proceedings to obtain
the Letters of Administration were defective. However, it seems that no
useful purpose would be served by revoking the existing grant; but it should
be qualified by attaching thereto a declaration of the beneficial interests of
the present applicants as found by this Court. So. Ordered; costs to be
borne by the estate.
In the Estate of Sheikh Fazal Ilahi
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[1957] 1 EA 697 (SCK)

Division: HM Supreme Court of Kenya at Nairobi
Date of judgment: 27 March 1957
Case Number: 65/1956
Before: Connell J
Sourced by: LawAfrica
Probate and administration – Practice – Application for grant of Probate –
Application not verified – Whether citation a nullity – Indian Probate and
Administration Act, 1881, s. 67.
Probate and administration – Practice – Application for grant of probate – Caveat
lodged – Whether applicant can proceed by way of motion instead of suit –
Probate and Administration (Contested Suits) Rules, 1940 r. 6 (K.).
Editor’s Summary
An application for probate was filed on March 22, 1956, but the verification on
the reverse side was not filled in although a declaration was completed and
signed on the same day. An appropriate general citation was inserted in the
Official Gazette on March 28, 1956, stating that the court would issue grant unless
cause be shown to the contrary on or before April 17, 1956. A caveat was filed on
May 2, 1956, and the caveator also filed an affidavit which was duly served on the
applicants. On February 27, 1957, a notice of motion was filed by the applicants
moving the court to remove the caveat forthwith and this was supported by an
affidavit dated February 21, 1957. On March 18, the respondent caveator filed an
affidavit stating that it was not competent for the court to grant the application in
the notice of motion; that the application was not in accordance with the Probate
and Administration (contested suits) Rules, 1940, in that it was not by way of a
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suit as required under r. 6; that a grant could not be made as the application for
probate did not comply with s. 67 of the Probate and Administration Act, 1881,
which required the application for probate to be verified; and that the absence of
verification made the citation a nullity. For the applicants it was contended that
matters could be set right other than in the manner required by r. 6.
Held
(i) failure to verify may well be a reason for the court to refuse grant of
probate, but the absence of such verification cannot in any manner affect
the validity of the citation;
(ii) the present proceedings did not lie by way of motion, nor could they be
cured except in the manner laid down in r. 6.
Motion dismissed with costs.
Re the Estate of Petit (deceased)

[1958] 1 EA 671 (SCK)
Division: HM Supreme Court of Kenya at Nairobi
Date of judgment: 10 October 1958
Before: Miles J
Probate – Practice – Application for grant of probate – Order made by judge
admitting will to probate – Caveat lodged before form of grant of probate signed
by judge – Validity of caveat – When is probate granted – Indian Probate and
Administration Act, 1881, s. 70 and s. 76.
Editor’s Summary
An order that the will of P. be admitted to probate was made by the judge. Before
the form of grant of probate was signed by him, but after the seal of the court
had been affixed thereto a caveat was lodged by the advocates of T. It was
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submitted on behalf of the executor that the “grant” takes place when the judge
makes the order admitting the will to probate.
Held
(i) the grant of probate is the form prescribed by s. 76 of the Indian Probate
and Administration Act, 1881, and not the order of the judge.
(ii) the grant is complete when the seal is affixed and therefore the caveat was
not lodged in time and was of no effect.
Order accordingly.
Maamun Bin Rashid Bin Salim El-Rumhy v Haider Mohamed Bin Rashid
El-Basamy
[1963] 1 EA 438 (SCK)
Division: HM Supreme Court of Kenya at Mombasa
Date of judgment: 17 June 1963
Before: Pelly Murphy J
Probate and administration – Petition for grant of administration – De bonis non –
Executor dead – Administration not completed – Petitioner an heir of an heir –
Issue of notices of citation to interested persons – Issue as matter of course –
Whether practice correct – Caveat lodged by interested person – Whether caveat
should be lodged – Whether claim of superior right can be asserted by lodging
caveat – Indian Probate and Administration Act, 1881, s. 19, s. 20, s. 23, s. 46, s.
69 and s. 70.
Editor’s Summary
On December 15, 1962, the plaintiff petitioned the court for a grant of letters of
administration de bonis non in respect of the estate of one F., deceased, who had
died on May 4, 1927, after having made a will dated November 11, 1926. It was
not until June 10, 1946, that the will was proved and probate granted to one H.,
the executor, who died on November 13, 1961, without having completed the
administration of the estate. On December 18, 1962, on the application of the
plaintiff the court issued notices of citation to eight persons as being persons
interested in the estate. The notices were to the effect that application for a grant
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had been made by the plaintiff and that the court would proceed to issue a grant
to him “unless cause be shown to the contrary” and appearance entered before a
stated date. On January 24, 1963, the defendant, a son of one of the heirs of the
deceased, entered appearance and lodged a caveat under s. 70 of the Indian
Probate and Administration Act, 1881. At the hearing the defendant desired to set
up his paramount title as being in issue, but his advocate, having considered the
decision in Debendra Prasad Sukul v. Surendra Prasad Sukul and Others (1920),
A.I.R. Pat. 343, then sought to establish that the plaintiff was not entitled to the
grant at all.
On behalf of the plaintiff it was submitted that his claim to the grant of
administration was established because he was the heir of a residuary legatee
and was entitled to the grant by virtue of s. 19, s. 20 and s. 23 of the Act. It was
common ground that neither the plaintiff (petitioner) nor the defendant
(caveator) was a direct heir of the deceased but that each had an interest in her
estate as heir of an heir, and that none of the “direct” heirs of the deceased was
alive.
Held
(i) the practice of the court to order, as a matter of course, that citations issue
to all persons shown in the petition as being heirs of the deceased, was
incorrect; therefore, save in cases where the court considers it necessary,
non-contentious citations should not be issued unless the petition discloses
that the person seeking the grant has a lesser right than some other person
who has failed to take the necessary steps to obtain it.
(ii) a caveat should be filed only if a person wishes to argue that the person
who has applied for the grant has no right thereto; if, on the other hand,
the person cited concedes that the person who has applied has a right to
the grant but contends that he has a superior right, then, the proper course
for him to adopt is to enter an appearance to the citation and himself apply
for a grant.
(iii) the effect of the deceased’s will was to make her heirs her residuary
legatees; therefore, any of the heirs had a right to a grant of administration
de bonis non after the death of the executor.
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(iv) as all the residuary legatees were dead, the representative of any one of
them had, by virtue of s. 20 ibid., the same right to a grant of
administration as had the legatee whom he represented; the expression
“representative” in this section meant, not the legal personal
representative, but a person who was entitled to a share in the estate
under the law governing the distribution of the estate.
(v) it did not matter that the plaintiff was not a “direct” heir; he was a person
interested in the estate of the deceased, that interest having accrued to
him under the rules of distribution applicable in this case.
Letters of administration granted to the plaintiff/petitioner.
Caveat ordered to be lifted.
4. Conflict of law
Re Innocent Mbilinyi 1969 [HCD] 283
Deceased. Prob. & Ad. 50-D-68; 31/10/69;
Georges C.J.
Conflict of laws – Rejection of Chagga law by deceased
The Administrator General applied for directions concerning question which have
arisen in the course of the administration of the estate of Innocent Mbilinyi
deceased. The affidavit in support states out that the deceased, a Roman Catholic
by religion and Mngoni by tribe, died in an accident on 29th February 1968.
Surviving him were his widow Elizabeth whom he married by Christian rites, three
infant children of the marriage, his father, his mother, four brothers and five
sisters. The deceased died intestate and accordingly the succession to his prop
could be determined either by the customary law of the Wangoni as set out in the
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Customary Law Declaration G.N. No. 436 of 1963 or according to the law
applicable o Christians who die domiciled in Tanzania, that is to say the Indian
Succession Act. The widow, through her advocate contends that the Indian
Succession Act is applicable while the father and the brothers and sisters state
that customary law is applicable. Leave was given to the widow and to the
brother Hustiene to file affidavits setting out facts from which the mode of living
of the deceased could be inferred. The widow has filed an affidavit. Despite
several adjournments to enable him to do so no affidavit has been filed by
Hustiene or by any of the brothers and sisters. The widow is a Mchagga by tribe
and also a Roman Catholic. She says that she had learned from her husband that
he had left Songea when he was about 7 years old and had been educated
entirely outside the Region. In or about the year 1956 he went to Makerere
College where he graduated as Bachelor of Arts in 1960. In 1961 he took up
employment with Shell E.A. Ltd. as a salesman and after training was stationed in
Moshi. That very year he was transferred to Dar es Salaam where he met her. In
March 1962 they were married and thereafter lived in Mbeya and Moshi. In 1964
the deceased joined Government service and was in 1967 promoted Deputy
Director of the State Lottery. She avers that the fact that the deceased and herself
were of different tribes helped to separate both of them from their tribal
backgrounds. The elders of both of them from their tribal backgrounds. The elders
of both tribes appeared to disapprove of the attachment and the subsequent
marriage. She states that the deceased had very often expressed his happiness at
the fact that they were both Christians and had made it clear that he did not wish
to have any of his affairs regulated by customary law. She had visited her
husband’s family once in 1962 and she describes her reception as cool if not
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actually unfriendly. They visited again in 1964. Apart from these visits she was not
aware that there had been any contacts between the deceased and his relatives.
As far as she was concerned the deceased relatives were strangers. Neither
during the lifetime of the deceased nor after his death had they ever visited her
nor had they ever brought gifts for the children or attempted in any way to win
their affections. She states also that the deceased had told her that he had made
her the beneficiary under two policies of insurance on his life. Those policies are
the principal assets in the estate. Neither policy was in fact ever assigned to the
widow, but in one of the policies the deceased names her in the application form
as his proposed beneficiary.
Held:
“On these facts which are in no way contraverted I am satisfied that it can be said
that the deceased had abandoned the customary way of life in favour of what
may be called a Christian and non-traditional way. There is satisfactory evidence
that he was to a large extent alienated from his family and that his children had
no connection whatever with them. Accordingly I would direct that the law to be
applied in the administration of the estate of the deceased should be Indian
Succession Act.”
5. Customary law of inheritance
John Lwehabura v. Edward Lwehanura, [1968] HCD 358
(PC) Civ. App. 74-M-68,
Seaton J.
Written wills – Requirements – Customary Law Declaration
13
At issue is the validity of a will which purports to disinherit the eldest son of the
testator. It was alleged that the testator disinherited the son, plaintiff, because
the latter beat the former and had not apologized according to Haya customary
law. The testator then disinherited the plaintiff in his will, which he signed and
which was attested by two witnesses. It was not established whether the
testator’s wife or any of the testator’s kin witnessed the will as required by law.
Held:
(1) The alleged will was invalid and insufficiently proved. [Citing ss. 3-5 of the
Law of Wills, G. N. 436/63, which provide that written wills must be
attested by proper witnesses who must include testator’s wife or wives if at
home].
(2) Under section 19, two witnesses are required, on of them being a kinsmen
and the other unrelated to the testator, if the testator is literate.
(3) Property should devolve according to the Law of Inheritance, G. N. 436 of

1963. Appeal allowed.
Peter John v. Richard Barongo, [1969] HCD 19
(PC) Civ. App. 202-M-68, 8/1/69
Bramble J.
Disinheritance of beneficiary – Beneficiary cannot challenge.
Disinheritance of customary heir – Heir may challenge.
Distribution of “the big house”, the Nyaruju – Haya law.
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Promise to make person heir in return for gifts – Contract
Herman, by his will in 1953, made the respondent a beneficiary provided that the
latter looked after his needs. The respondent spent Shs. 6,280/50 up to 1967,
when Herman changed his will in favour of the appellant because he claimed the
respondent did not build a new house for him. The lower courts thought that a
will is “property” for they held “according to customary law nobody can be
deprived of a property for which he has offered ‘appropriation gifts’ even if he has
done something to his father,” and since the respondent had paid ‘appropriation
gifts’, he was entitled to the will.
Held:
(1) A customary heir may challenge a will if he is disinherited by a testator who

is alive. But this cannot be done by an ordinary beneficiary and neither the
respondent nor the appellant was a customary heir. Herman then was free
to revoke his will.
(2) “The true position between the respondent and Herman is that on the basis
of a promise to make the former heir to a shamba he has spent monies in
the interest of Herman …. The true nature of the claim was a claim for
damages for breach of contract”.
Constantine Bulagile v. Bi. Genereza Mashakala [1969] HCD 20
(PC) Civ. App. 103-D-67, 21/11/68,
Georges C. J.
Women – May not inherit immovable – Haya law
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The dispute in this case concerned the ownership of a shamba which belonged to
one Mashakala, now deceased. The respondent alleged that she was an
illegitimate daughter of the deceased, acknowledged by him, accepted in the
family and declared by him in a written will as his heir to the property. However,
the document purporting to be a will was not produced in court and no
explanation was given as to what had happened to it. The appellant on the other
hand denied that the respondent was the daughter of the deceased and contends
that he was the deceased’s nephew and was appointed by him as his heir before
his death. It was not disputed that the respondent’s mother was married to one
Rubeshelwa when the respondent was conceived and born. Her witnesses
however testified that she was daughter of the deceased, Mashakala, who was
first cousin of the respondent’s mother – within the prohibited degree of
consanguinity according to Haya customary law. The respondent’s mother died
when she was very young and her aunt looked after her and later took her to her
father, Mashakala, who paid Shs. 50/- for her clothes and kept her till her
marriage. On the question of the legitimacy of the respondent, the Primary Court
quoted s. 181, (a) and (b), Declaration of Customary Law of Persons, and held that
none of the methods of legitimating a child there set out had been followed. The
District Court, however, reversed this and held that the respondent had been
legitimated under Haya custom by the payment of Shs. 50/- by her father to hr
aunt. Both lower courts applied the law of Inheritance under G.N.436/63.
Held
(1) Section 181, Declaration of Customary law of Persons, could not be

applicable to a legitimation which must have taken place in 1944 or
16
thereabouts. Hay Customary law was applicable and therefore the

respondent as legitimated by the payment of Shs. 50/- by her father to her
aunt, which was according to Haya customary law.
(2) Questions of succession to the estate of the deceased and the validity of his
will can only be decided by the law as it was at the time of his death, i.e.
Haya customary law before the Declaration. According to section 28 of Cory
and Hartnoll, “should a man name in his last will a female as heiress of his
immoveable property, even with the consent of the witnesses, such a
testament would be considered void”.
(3) Even if (2) above is ignored, the will was not sufficiently proved. It was not
produce in court and the witnesses to its execution are interested parties.
Moreover the only partly independent witness did not sign as a witness.
(4) The choice of the appellants’ heir was supported by two independent
witnesses who had nothing to gain by supporting it. Appeal allowed.
Jackson Lesirango v. Pantaleo KirboI [1969] HCD 277
(PC) Civ. App. 108-D-67, 26/8/69,
Georges, C. J.
Intestacy – Women’s rights to inherit land – Chagga law
The plaintiff, a schoolboy of 14 years, sued the defendant in respect to a piece of

land in Kilimanjaro district, which defendant planned to sell, but which plaintiff
claimed as his own.
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Both parties claimed to have inherited the land from a certain deceased person,
who was the full brother of the defendant, and also the father of the defendant,
and also the father of the plaintiff’s mother.
Held:
(1) “I am not aware what the present practice is but would rule that in cases
where it is necessary for a young child of that age to sue in order to protect
a legal right, or where it may be necessary to sue him in order to do so, his
legal guardian should sue or e sued as the representative of the child.”
(2) The defendant was successful before the District Magistrate who held that
it was clear law that if there were males in the clan, widows could not
inherit or give away land belonging to the clan …….. The burden of the
plaintiff’s complaint in the memorandum of appeal was that the defendant
had not behaved properly towards the deceased …… This does not, in m
view, affect the validity of the argument advanced by the District
Magistrate that a widow cannot inherit clan land when there are male
relatives of the clan eligible to inherit.”
(3) Appeal dismissed.
Deusdedit Kashaga v. Bi. Baite Rwabigene, [1968] HCD 165
(PC) Civ. App. 90-M-67,
19/2/68,
Mustafa J.
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Oral wills – Requirements – Customary Law Declaration.
The parties both claim a shamba. Plaintiff, a full sister of deceased, claims by way
of intestate succession. Defendant, a distant relative of deceased, based his claim
on an oral will. Defendant called two witnesses who heard deceased say at a
pombe party that she wanted defendant to succeed to her property and another
witness who had heard deceased make a similar statement at another time.
Held:
G. N. No. 436/63, Schedule 1, section 11, reads; “An oral will must be witnessed
by at least 4 person, at least 2 of whom must be kinsmen and at least 2 unrelated
to the testator. The wife or wives of the testator are additional to the minimum of
4 recognized witnesses.” Since this requirement was not complied with, the allege
oral will has not been proven. Plaintiff is entitled to the shamba by intestate
succession.
6. Execution of a will
JOHN NGOMOI v MOHAMED ALLY BOFU 1988 TLR 63 (HC)
Court High Court of Tanzania - Dar Es Salaam
Judge Msumi J
4th June, 1988
Fly note
Administration of Estates - Execution of a will - Whether proper to choose any

person to witness the execution under customary law- Essence of witnesses
especially when the testator is old and illiterate.
Administration of Estates - Fraud - Whether fraud vitiates the validity of the will.
19
Head note
Respondent petitioned the Primary Court for letters of administration in respect

of the estate of the deceased Hadija Manzi. The deceased left a house situated
along Uhuru Street, Dar es Salaam. While the respondent's petition was pending,
appellant filed objection claiming that the said house was given to him by the
deceased in her will executed before her death in the presence of witnesses who
testified before the court in his favour. The genuineness of the will was disputed,
hence dismissed in both lower courts, Hence this appeal.
Held:
(i) The requirement that at least half of the number of witnesses to a will
executed under customary law must be related to the testator is intended
to act as a safeguard against fraud;
(ii) Where a will is surrounded by fraud, it is void.
Appeal dismissed.
GEORGE A MMARI AND ANANDE A MMARI 1995 TLR 146 (HC)
Judge Mwaikasu J
(PC) Civil Appeal No 116 of 1994
May 14, 1995
Fly note
Probate and Administration - Wills - Attestation of wills - Will drawn by a literate

person - When valid - Local Customary Law (Declaration) (No 4) Order 1963, GN
436 of 1963 Rules 5 and 19.
Head note
20
The appellants challenged the validity of a will drawn by their deceased father
while hospitalized bequeathing a house to their stepmother. The will was attested
by the said stepmother, i.e. wife of testator, and the doctor who was attending
the deceased.
Held:
(i) For a will drawn up by a literate person to be valid it must be attested,

besides the wife (wives), by at least two persons of whom one must be a
relative of the deceased;
(ii) The deceased's will was not attested by a relative of the deceased, and it
was defective for want of proper attestation.
Appeal allowed.
In the matter of Antonio Natalicchio, [1969] HCD 142
Prob. And Admin. Cause 64-D-65, 9/4/69
Hamlyn J.
Wills – References to money held in specific bank accounts cannot be construed

as applying to money in other bank accounts.
“The testator, Antonio Natalicchio of Morogoro, died in that town on 26th July,
1965 having some five years before his death executed two wills. He adopted this
mode of disposing of his estate as he had, at the time that the wills were drawn,
two separate bank accounts, one being in the Standard Bank, Dar es Salaam and
the other in Barclay’s Bank, Dar es Salaam. Each will dealt with a separate account
and save for this and for a divergence which appears later, the two wills were
identical; both were executed on the same date and disposed of his property in
such accounts in the same manner. Subsequent to the execution of he wills and at
21
some time during the five years thereafter which preceded his death, the testator
opened a further account, a savings-account in the Standard Bank, Morogoro,
which now has a credit balance of Shs. 593/75. On 17th July, 1964, he also made a
payment to the same bank as a fixed deposit account, which presently has a sum
of Shs. 9,000/- as a credit to the estate. Neither of these two latter accounts is
mentioned in the two wills. The dare s Salaam account in the standard Bank was
subsequently closed by the testator, who deposited the proceeds in a current
account in the same bank; this he drew upon during his life-time until the credit
was exhausted and the account was finally closed. The Barclay’s Bank account
was also closed by the testator, who transferred all the monies there in to the
Standard Bank current account, but thereafter placed the money so transferred
on fixed deposit in the same bank. At the date of his death therefore, the testator
had in his name the two Morogoro accounts and also the Standard Bank, Dar es
Salaam fixed –deposit account. The learned Administrator General, who seeks the
directions of his court in this matter, has drawn my attention to one matter which
raises a difficulty in respect of the deposit account in the Standard bank, Dar es
Salaam. The two wills of the deceased, as I have noted earlier, are not completely
identical …. The Barclay’s Bank will (if I may thus speak of it) deals with “all
money, interest and property now held by me on Barclay’s Bank, Dar es Salaam
and all money, interest and property that shall be my due in the future in the
aforesaid bank”. …. The Standard Bank will (to use a similar convenient phrase)
specified “all money, interest and property now held by me in the standard Bank,
Dar es Salaam and all interest that shall be my due in the future in the aforesaid
bank. That is, the testator has seen fit to deal with all future “money, interest and
property” in Barclay’s Bank, Dar es Salaam, while in the case of the Standard
22
Bank, Dar es Salaam he has referred only to future interest. As a result of the
testator’s financial transactions prior to his death, the dare s Salaam Barclay’s
Bank account has ceased to exist and the Administrator General now seeks
directions as to the monies lying in the two Standard Bank Morogoro accounts
and also the principal money on fixed deposit in the Standard Bank, Dar es
Salaam; interest in respect of the letter account is already the subject of the
Standard Bank will”.
Held:
(1) “Now in so far as the Morogoro monies are concerned, both wills are entirely
silent, for these accounts were brought into existence after the two wills were
executed. Section 24 of the English Wills Act, 1837 reads: “Every will shall be
construed, with reference to the real estate and personal estate comprised in it,
to speak and take effect as if it had been executed immediately before the death
of the testator, unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will”. I do not think
that any doubt can exist but that the English Act applies in matters of this sort and
Section 2(2) of the Judicature and application of Laws Ordinance, 1961 appears to
govern the matter. It is clear that when the wills speak of money, interest and
property in the two Dar es Salaam Banks, those expressions cannot have
reference to the Morogoro accounts. It is immaterial that, at the date of the
execution of the wills, there was money deposited to which the expressions
would have reference. It is also immaterial that the testator before his death may
have transferred monies from one of the Dar es Salaam accounts to Morogoro.
Re. Gillins: Inglis v. Gilins (1909) 1 Ch. 345 makes it clear that interpretation of the
wills must be as at the date of the death of the testator and not otherwise. And as
23
Wood V.C., in Goodlad v. Burnett 6 (I.K. & K. 341) observed, “Testator must be
taken to know the wills Act.” The wills are not sufficient to pass the new thin
which the testator acquired and there is ad emption – Lane: Loard v. Lane (1880)
14 Ch. D. 856. The test is as to whether the property at the date of the death is
“substantially the some thing “ as that spoken of in the will. I do not think that by
any stretch of imagination could monies lying in the Dar es Salaam Bank be
retrograded as substantially the some as other monies lying in the Morogoro
Bank. While a bequest of money is ordinarily a general legacy, it may be specific
and the fact that in the instant case the particular accounts were referred as
being liable for the payments would appear to render the legacies specific ones.
There are, it is true, conflicting decisions on this class of gift, but he circumstances
and wording of the two wills do not enable me to hold that the testator, having
made clear general gifts, merely pointed out particular funds which would be
primarily liable, on failure of which the general personal estate would remain
liable. I consequently find that the Morogoro account cannot be utilized as a
source of payment of the Dar es Salaam bequests”.
(2) “In so far as the Standard Bank deposit account is concerned, the will
concerned bequeaths future interest only and not future principal. The testator in
that document spoke of “all money, interest and property now held by me in the
Standard Bank, Dar es Salaam and all interest that shall be my due in the future in
the aforesaid Bank”. While the introduction of the word “now” into a
testamentary document has never been construed so as to produce an intestacy,
the circumstances of the present case are somewhat different from the run of
English decisions, for the testator here uses the word in respect of property which
has wholly ceased to exist and was subsequently replaced by other property from
24
a different source, while the future property concerns interest only. The bequest
as to the principal amount fails under the will and any interest that may have
accrued in the Dar es Salaam Standard Bank savings account will pass under the
legacy in the Standard Bank will.”
Re Robert William Stafford Bird, deceased. [1969] HCD 297
Prob. & Ad. Cause 12-A-69; 13/10/69;
Platt J.
Probate – Verification by witness of petition for probate dispensed with under s.

57 of Probate and Administration Ordinance Cap. 445.
Wills Construction – Reference to “my wife” sufficient to indicate wife

subsequently divorced and remarried
An application was made for grant of probate to Margaret Fox formerly Margaret
Bird, of the will of Robert William Stafford Bird. The will was dated 26th June 1951
and was properly signed and attested under clause 3 of the will, the testator
provided as follows: - “If my wide Margaret Bird shall be living at the expiration of
seven clear days (excluding the day of my death after my death I gibe her
absolutely all my property of whatsoever kind and whosesoever situated and
appoint her my sole executrix” [sic]. Clause 4 continued: - “If my said wife shall
not be living at the expiration of the period aforesaid then the following
provisions shall take effect”. In the next paragraph, the testator appointed his
sister and the brother of Margaret Bird to be executors and trustees of his will
25
and guardian of his infant children and each executor, who should act, was given
a legacy. The testator then bequeathed all his real and personal property, to the
trustees upon trust for sale, to divide his residuary estate amongst his children
living at the time of his death and his grand-children on certain terms. In
September 1962, the testator and Margaret Bird were divorced. Margaret Bird
later remarried.
Held:
(1) “The application involves two questions. The first is whether Margaret Fox
having divorced the testator, is still entitled under the will to all the
testator’s property and to be appointed his sole executrix. Secondly, there
is an application for dispensation with the verification of the petition for
probate by one attesting witness of the will of the deceased Therefore, so
long as Margaret Bird was living after the period specified in Clause 3, she
was entitled to all the testator’s property and to be appointed his sole
executrix.
(2) “The question then is whether the reference to “my wife Margaret Bird” is
a sufficient and suitable reference to Margaret Fox so as to entitle her to
the property of the testator and to be appointed executrix. The will did not
envisage the situation which might arise if the testator should divorce his
wife Margaret Bird. The only condition to her receiving all the property and
being appointed executrix was that she should be living at the time of the
testator’s death. Bur it might be thought that she must be his wife and that
as she was not his wife at the time of his death, she must be excluded from
the will as the testator’s wife at the time that the will was made, and the
26
testator having possession of the will and having made one alteration due
to the death of his mother, must be taken to have intended that Margaret
Bird was still to be entitled under Clause 3 of the will. No East African
authority could be discovered, but he referred the court to Jarmans on
Wills 8th Ed. Vol. 2, p. 1239, from which it would appear that a divorce does
not ipso facto revoke the will. He also referred to Halsbury Vol. 34, where in
dealing with the voluntary revocation of wills, the learned author sets out
the only events in which such revocation would be effected (See paragraph
107 of 2nd Ed. Or Vol. 39, 3rd Ed. Para 1354) Nothing is stated as to divorce.
The most useful authority quoted would appear to be In re Boddington,

Boddington v. Clariat (1883) 22 Ch. D. p. 597, in which the testator by his
will gave the proceeds of the sale of his residuary estate to trustees on trust
to pay his wife Emily Caroline within one month after his decease, a legacy
of ₤300, commencing from the date of his deceased, “or otherwise in lieu
and in substitution of the said annuity, at the option of my said wife, if she
shall prefer it, a legacy of ₤2000.” After the date of the will, the marriage
was declared null on the ground of the impotency of the testator. The latter
died without altering his will. It was held that the former wife was entitled
to the legacy of ₤200, but that she could not claim the annuity, inasmuch as
she never had been in law the wife of the testator and never could be or
continue his widow. The annuity was therefore given for a period which
could never come into existence. Fry, J….. explanted that there was no
doubt about the identity of the person named in the will, since the
misdescription could not be of importance, and that although she was
described in the will as the testator’s wife, which she was not at the time of
27
his death and in law never had been, nevertheless, she was prima facie
entitled to the legacy of ₤200. The learned Judge went on to consider the
authorities, but held that here being no false assumption by the lady of the
character of a wife, she was entitled to that legacy. At he same time, he
refused to grant her the annuity because she could not properly be
described as having been his widow. As far as the legacy of ₤200 is
concerned, there is no material difference between the facts in
Boddingtons’s case and the instant case. It is true that Margaret Bird has
remarried, but I cannot see that that can make any difference. Accordingly I
am satisfied that Margaret Fox is the identical person to Margaret Bird,
who was described by the testator as his wife, as indeed she ten was. As
the testator did not alter his will, and as the divorce did not operate as a
voluntary revocation, Margaret Fox is entitled. Under Clause 3, to the
testator’s property and to be appointed his sole executrix. By way of
strengthen the position; learned Counsel adduced the consents of the two
children of the marriage to Margaret Fox being granted probate. I am also
told that the two other executors have both deceased.
(3) As to the second question, there is provision in section 57 of the Probate

and Administration Ordinance Cap. 445 giving the court power to dispense
“with verification by a witness where it is satisfied that it cannot be
obtained, in that it cannot be obtained without undue delay or
expense”…… Accordingly I grant the application for the dispensation with
the verification as generally required by section 57 of the Ordinance.” (4)
“In the result, probate is granted to Margaret Fox of the will of the testator
Robert William Stafford Bird.”
28
Jaffari Msafiri v. John Mashenge [1970] HCD 111
(PC) 284-M-69;
30/1/70;
Bramble J.
Disinheritance of natural heir – will must mention it specifically
The appellant, who admitted that he was not of the same clan as deceased,
claimed that the deceased was his grandfather who had made a will bequeathing
the shamba under dispute to him. The respondent, who was the decease’s
brother claimed as a natural heir. The primary court upheld the will but the
District court reversed judgment on the ground that there was no evidence from
the clan member’s showing that the respondent had been disinherited.
Held:
(1) “There is, however, the evidence of P.W. 1, a clan member that the
deceased had disinherited the respondent because he had refused to assist
him and the finding of fact was wrong. In addition ……. A testator must
declare specifically in writing his intentions and reasons for disinheriting his
heir-at-law in keeping with Clause 34 of Government Notice 436 of 1963.
The learned district magistrate could not have read the will, which was put
in evidence, since it gave in detail the reasons for disinherited the
respondent ……”
(2) Appeal allowed.
29
Mbarwohi v. Mbarwohi [1970] HCD 183
(PC) Civ. App. 15-M-70;
28/4/70;
Seaton J.
Oral will to be valid must be witnessed by four witnesses at least two of whom are
non-clan members – Customary Law Declaration.
The appellant/plaintiff was claiming a piece of clan land left to him by his
deceased father. His story was that the shamba in dispute had been given to him
by his late father; that before his father dies he had chased away the respondent,
the appellant’s full brother, and had disinherited other brother Paul. However,
after the father’s death, the appellant brought back the respondent and gave him
some land. But the respondent sold this land to Paul. Finally, the appellant had to
redeem this land with his own money. The respondent on the other hand,
claimed that he had never been chased away from the shamba. The appellant in
support of his claim produced five witnesses, all of them clan members. The
Primary Court, on the strength of this evidence, decided for the appellant, but the
district court reversed this decision on the ground that the written will which was
produced in court and on which the appellant based his claim was void as failing
to satisfy the requirements of paragraphs 1-5, 17, 19 and 20 of the Third Schedule
to the Local Customary Law (Declaration) (No. 4), Government Notice No. 436 of
1963.
Held:
30
(1) “The written will was not in conformity with the Declaration of Customary
Law and ought not to have been admitted in evidence.” “It appears
however that the primary court never based its decision on the purported
written will. From a careful reading of the judgment of the primary court, it
would appear that the will in issue was not a written one but an oral will;
the primary court never dealt with the authenticity of the written will.
Accordingly, the district magistrate erred in holding that the written will
was void while no such written will was in issue.”
(2) …. I am convinced that even the oral will did not satisfy the requirements of
paragraphs 1-5, and 11 to the 3rd schedule of G. N. 436/1963. For although
the appellant contends that the oral will was witnessed by five clan
members, it did not meet the requirements of paragraph 11 of Government
Notice No. 436 of 1963. Paragraph 11 requires no less that four witnesses,
two of whom should be clan members and the other two should be non-
clan members. As it is only five clan members are said to have witnessed
the will but apparently no non-clan member was present. In Deusdedit
Kashanga v. Bir. Baite Rwabigene (1968) H.C.D., Case No. 165, Justice
Mustafa noted that according to G. N. No. 363/63, schedule 111, section 11
reads: “An oral will must be witnessed by at least 4 persons, at least 2 of
whom must be kinsmen and at least 2 unrelated to the testator. The wife or
wives of the testator are additional to the minimum of 4 recognised
witnesses. Since this requirement was not complied with, the learned Judge
found the alleged oral will not proved. Similarly, in the present case the
primary court was wrong in finding the oral will proven.”
31
(3) “No doubt where a testator has died intestate by leaving behind no will, the
property of the deceased has to be distributed in accordance with the Law
of Inheritance G. N. 436/63 which applied to the jurisdiction of the Buhaya
District Council by G. N. 605/63. But the situation in this case does not
seem to be governed by the law of Inheritance as set out in the Declaration
of Customary Law. The appellant claims that he had been given the shamba
while the father still lived. The respondent avers to the same effect,
although the appellant brought the will into issue, it does not seem to this
Court that the allocation of the shamba derives its validity from that will. If
the shamba was allotted to either party before their father died, it could
not be the subject of a will unless to confirm the same or disinherit the
allottee. In the circumstances, it is for this Court to decide which of the
parties was allotted this shamba, and in doing so must look to the evidence
of the parties. As found above, the appellant’s claim was supported by the
clan members. The respondent could gather no evidence in support of his
claim. The appellant must therefore be telling a true story of the
transaction with regard to this shamba entered into between him and their
father at the time the latter was still living.” This Court is satisfied that the
appellant has proved his claim and that the shamba with all the property on
it lawfully belongs to him.
(4) Appeal allowed.
Re Bird Deceased
[1970] 1 EA 289 (HCT)
Division: High Court of Tanzania at Arusha
Date of judgment: 13 October 1969
32
Case Number: 12/1969 (33/70)

Before: Platt J
Probate and Administration – Will – Revocation – Whether divorce revokes will –
Whether divorced wife entitled to the property.
Editor’s Summary
The testator left all this property to his “wife Margaret Bird”. The will also
provided for the devolution of the estate if the wife did not survive the testator.
The testator divorced his wife. Later she remarried and became known as
Margaret Fox. The testator had made one alteration in the will due to the death
of his mother but the clause bequeathing all his property to “my wife Margaret
Bird” was not altered. Margaret Fox applied for the probate of the will and for
dispensation with verification.
Held
(i) divorce does not ipso facto revoke a will;
(ii) as the applicant was the person referred to in the will as Margaret Bird she
was entitled to the testator’s property. (In re Boddington, Boddington v.
Clariat (1) followed.)
Application allowed.
7. Failure to comply with mandatory legal provisions when

filing probate and Administration of Estates
RASHIDI HASSANI v MRISHO JUMA 1988 TLR 134 (HC)
Judge Mtenga J
27 July, 1988
Fly note
Administration of estates - Failure to comply with mandatory legal provisions

when filing probate and administration cause.
33
Head note
This was an application to the High Court for revision of proceedings of a lower
court in respect of probate and administration, with a request to quash the
proceedings in the lower court and to declare them null and void. The applicant
argued that, when filing the cause in the lower court, mandatory legal
requirements were not complied with.
Held:
(i) Since the Respondent did not comply with the provisions of section 22 of
the Civil Procedure Code and rules 39, 73 and 75 of the Probate rules, there
was no petition of probate and administration lodged with the District
Court;
(ii) the proceedings in the District court and the resultant appointment of the
Respondent as administrator of the deceased's estate were null and void.
8. Father dies intestate
VIOLET ISHENGOMA KAHANGWA AND JOVIN MUTABUZI v THE

ADMINISTRATOR GENERAL AND MRS. EUDOKIA KAHANGWA 1990 TLR 72 (CA)
Court Court of Appeal of Tanzania - Dar es Salaam
Judge Kisanga JJA, Makame JJA, Mfalila JJA
16 July 1990
Fly note
Administration of Estates - Intestacy - Customary law applicable - Whether

Administrator-General can administer the estate under customary law - Whether
Administrator-General needs to appear before a Primary Court by reason of
administering the deceased's estate under customary law.
Administration of Estates - Father dies intestate - Whether illegitimate children

qualify for distribution of the deceased's estate.
34
Family Law - Children - Meaning of.
Family Law - Putative father's duty to maintain children - Nature of the duty -
Duration of the duty.
Head note
In an application for directions the High Court directed that the life style of the
deceased at the time of his death was governed by the traditions, customs and
practices of the Bahaya tribe to which he (the deceased) belonged, therefore, the
law applicable in administering the distribution of the estate was the customary
law of the Bahaya. The High Court further directed that since the first appellant
was not lawfully married to the deceased because the previous monogamous
marriage to the second respondent was still subsisting, the 2 issues of the
deceased's cohabitation with the first appellant were illegitimate children who
under the applicable Bahaya customary law did not legally qualify for distribution,
because an illegitimate child cannot inherit from the father's side upon his dying
intestate. On appeal to the Court of Appeal against the directions.
Held:
(i) In administering the estate the Administrator-General does not have to

appear in the Primary Court for any purpose because he is not acting as an
advocate representing a particular party. All that is required of him is to
distribute the estate to all those who qualify for distribution. In case he
runs into a difficulty he may turn to the High Court f or direction.
(ii) under paragraph 43 of the Local Customary Law (Declaration) (No.4) Order,
1963, G.N. No.436 as applied to the Bahaya tribe vide G.N.No.605 of 1963,
an illegitimate child cannot inherit from the father's side upon his dying
intestate;
(iii) a child as defined under the Law of Marriage Act, 1967 does not include an
illegitimate child, thus the word "children" in section 129 (1) of the Law of
Marriage Act does not include illegitimate children;
35
(iv) a putative father's obligation to his illegitimate children is personal and

ends with his death. It does not survive him and cannot attach to his estate
upon his dying intestate.
Appeal dismissed.
9. Fraud
Refer to the case of: John Ngomoi v Mohamed Ally Bofu 1988 TLR 63 (HC)
10. Grant of probate
HAMSON D. GHIKAS v LUDWINA G. GHIKAS 1992 TLR 288 (CA)
Court Court of Appeal of Tanzania - Arusha
Judge Mfalila JJA, Kisanga JJA, Mapigano Ag. JA
21 September 1992
Fly note
Administration of Estates - Grant of probate - Conditions for grant - Necessity of a

will.
Head note
The respondent petitioned for, and was granted, probate by the High Court in
respect of the estate of her late father. The appellant, also the child of the same
deceased father applied for a revocation of the grant of the probate to the
respondent but the High Court refused the application. The appellant appealed to
the Court of Appeal. In the course of hearing and upon perusal of the High Court
proceedings, the Court noted a number of irregularities whose details are found
in the order of the Court.
Held:
The petition for probate by the respondent was misconceived as the deceased
died intestate and the purported grant of the same was null and void.
36
Order accordingly.
Inheritance
ABDUL SADIKI v WILFRED RUTAKUNIKWA 1988 TLR 167 (HC)
Judge Moshi J
19 September, 1988
Fly note
Administration of Estates - Inheritance - A will by an illiterate person - Conditions

for validity thereof.
Head note
Upon death of one Miria Nsheke, the respondent presented to the administrator
of her estate a will purportedly executed by the deceased, who was illiterate,
witnessed by two clan members and two non-clan members.
Later, the appellant too came up with yet another will purportedly executed by
the deceased and witnessed by two clan members and one non-clan member.
Held:
Rules 19 and 21 of the Local Customary Law (Declaration) (No. 4) Order of 1963
clearly provide that if a testator is illiterate, a will executed by him must be
attested by a minimum of two clan members and two non-clan members. As the
testator in this instance was illiterate, the will presented by the appellant was not
properly attested.
Appeal dismissed.
11. Intestacy
Refer to the case of: Violet Ishengoma Kahangwa and Jovin Mutabuzi v The
Administrator General and Mrs. Eudokia Kahangwa 1990 TLR 72 (CA)
37
12. Islamic law of inheritance
HASSAN MATOLLA v KADHI WA MSIKITI, MWINYI MKUU STREET 1985 TLR 53

(HC)
Judge Ruhumbika J
21 October, 1982
Fly note
Islamic Law - Inheritance - "Wakf" dedicating deceased's house to the Mosques

for religious reasons - "Wakf" conditional upon failure of deceased's daughter
coming forward to inherit -Deceased's daughter did not show up - Deceased's
brother's son claimed to be a rightful heir -Whether the mosque is entitled to any
share in the property of the deceased.
Head note
The deceased, a father of only one child who was living outside the country,
dedicated by "Wakf" his house to a mosque for religious reasons. The "wakf" was
given conditional upon failure of the deceased's daughter coming forward to
claim inheritance. After his death the daughter did not show up. However, a son
of the deceased's brother applied in a Primary Court for and was granted letters
of administration of the estate of the deceased. He also claimed the right to
inherit the house of the deceased. The Primary Court decided that he was
entitled to inherit the estate of the deceased as heir under Islamic Law. The
Court, however, required him to cash down 23,330/= to the mosque in terms of
the "Wakf", being 1/3 of the value of the house. The appellant appealed against
the court's order that the appellant should pay Shs.23,330/= to the mosque
before he could inherit the house.
Held:
38
(i) The appellant has the right to inherit the house and the dedication of the
house to the mosque in the "Wakf" is rendered non-effective thenceforth
by the reason of the act of the appellant inheriting the house;
(ii) the requirement to pay 1/3 of the value of the house to the mosque would
arise only if the deceased had set up an unconditional "Wakf" dedicating
the house to the mosque permanently after his death without the clause
that the house should pass to the heir when that heir was available.
Appeal allowed.
SOFIA SAID AND YUSUF MOHAMED MUSA v AWADH AHMED ABEID & THREE
OTHERS 1992 TLR 29 (CA)
Court Court of appeal of Tanzania - Dar Es Salaam
Judge Ramadhani JJA, Mnzavas, JJA, Mapigano Ag. JA
28 February, 1992
Fly note
Islamic law - Inheritance - Principles of inheritance where a person dies intestate;
Islamic law - Inheritance - Importance of proximity to the deceased person in

intestate succession.
Head note
Fatuma d/o Sefu who was a Sunni - Shaffii Moslem died intestate in 1983. After
an application in the Kariakoo Primary Court by the could be heirs the Court
appointed the fourth respondent as the administrator of the deceased estate. On
the same day the court made an order that the assets of the deceased be sold by
auction. There was no dispute that under Islamic law Mgeni Hemedi, the surviving
husband of the deceased was entitled to take half of whatever fell to be decided.
The issue was the method to be adopted for the distribution of the remaining part
of the estate. Several relatives from the uterine and agnate sides competed for a
share. The matter was taken to the District Court. The District Court held that
39
since there were no Koranic heirs other than Mgeni Hemedi, heirs on the uterine
side are entitled to inherit along with those on the agnate side. The appellants are
aggrieved by this decision and they appealed to the High Court. The High Court
upheld the decision of the District Court. They appealed further to the Court of
appeal.
Held:
(i) In the Islamic law of succession the principle of proximity is of great

importance in that within the limits of each class the nearer of blood
excludes the remote;
(ii) under the Islamic law of inheritance there are three principal classes of
heirs - the "sharers" or "koranic heirs"; "Residuaries" and the "Distant
Kindred". The rule regarding their right of inheritance prescribes that
residuaries inherit only where there are no koranic heirs or where the
inheritable estate is not exhausted by the Koranic heirs and the distant
kindred inherit only where there are no sharers of residuaries;
(iii) as the Koranic heir, Mgeni Hemedi, did not exhaust the estate the only
person who has the right of inheritance in the circumstances is a residuary
i.e. the second appellant. The rest of the claimants have no right under
Islamic law.
Appeal allowed.
Mrisho s/o Pazi v. Tatu d/o Juma, [1968] HCD 119
(PC) Civ. App. 69-D-67,
23/2/68,
Saudi J.
Property of deceased wife which is presumed to be purchased with money of

husband should go to husband – Islamic law.
40
This case concerned the inheritance of property as between appellant, the

husband of deceased, and respondent, deceased’s daughter by a previous
marriage. The property in question included a shamba at Kibaha and gold
ornaments and Khangas. There was some doubt as to whether the gold
ornaments and Khangas. There was some doubt as to whether the gold
ornaments and Khangas existed. Although both parties live in Magomeni where
there is a Primary Court, the case was brought in the Primary Court of Ilala.
Held:
(1) Under section 4 of the Magistrate’s Court of Ilala. Cap. 537, each Primary
Court within a district has jurisdiction within the whole district. As a result,
a party may file an action in any Primary Court within the district even
though his choice causes inconvenience and expense to his opponent. The
Court characterized this result as “unfortunate”.
(2) The Primary Court had no jurisdiction to deal with the shamba at Kibaha
which lies outside the district in which the court is located
(3) Even if the ornaments and Khangas exist, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary it must be presumed that they were purchased by the deceased
with money given her by husband, appellant. Therefore, they should not
have been awarded to respondent. (4) The remainder of the inheritance
should be divided between appellant and respondent according to Muslim
law.
Abdallah Shant v. Mussa [1972] HCD 9
(PC) Civ. App. 123-D-70; 20/1/72

41
Onyiuke, J.
The appellant and respondent, African Moslems, were married according to

Islamic Law. The marriage ended by divorce by talk 18 years after solemnization.
After the divorce the respondent filed a suit in the Primary Court claiming Shs.
3,300/= as representing her contribution to the costs of erecting two houses and
a but during the subsistence of the marriage. The respondent’s case was that
shortly after their marriage the appellant who was then working as a house-boy
for a certain expatriate found her a job as a yaya with the same employer. It was
agreed between them that the appellant was to take her wages as her
contribution to the building of some houses. It was part of the agreement that
one of the houses would eventually be given to her. On the basis of the
agreement the appellant received her wages for the whole period of her
employment and built two houses. When the expatriate left they went to live in
Bagamoyo where the respondent’s relatives gave them a piece of land on which
they cultivated rice. They used the proceeds of the sale of the rice to build yet a
third house. When the marriage broke up the appellant refused to give her any of
the houses. The appellant disputed the claim. He admitted that the respondent
was employed as she alleged but denied receiving her wages and that there was
any partnership or arrangement between them. The primary court magistrate
concurred with the assessors that there was not sufficient evidence for a finding
of partnership and held that the respondent could not simply allege partnership
by virtue of being the appellant’s wife. On appeal to the district court the
magistrate set aside the decision and awarded the respondent the amount
claimed. He disagreed with the findings of the assessors and held that the
respondent’s story was consistent and held that the respondent’s story was
42
consistent and was sufficient to support her claim. In making his order he relied
on the English case of Balfour v. Balfour [1919] K. B. 521. He stated that that case
established the principle that contracts between husband and wife were
enforceable if they were intended to have legal consequences. In the High Court
counsel for The appellant conceded that the respondent did contribute but
argued that since this was an appeal from a primary court the law to be applied
was either Moslem law or customary law. He submitted that the district
magistrate was wrong to apply English law.
Held:
(1) “I agree … that the proper law applicable to the case was customary law or
Islamic law and that it was wrong for the District Magistrate to import the
principle of English law.”
(2) “I am of the view however that the District Magistrate’s conclusions were
fully justified on the basis of customary law and/or Islamic law. That Islamic
laws as well as Customary Law are equally applicable to Africans converted
to Islam is fully established by the decisions in Hussein Mbwana v. Amiri
Chongwe (Tanzania High court Civil Appeal No. 1 of 1969) and Re. Kusudwa
[1965] E. A. 248. In the latter case Sir Ralph Windham C. J. stated as
follows:- “The fact that a tribe may have been converted to Islam does not
necessarily mean that its customs, particularly those relating to land tenure
are thereby changed.” In the former case Spry J. (as he then was) made the
following observations: - “It has sometimes been argued that Islamic law is
to be regarded as applying to Africans as part of their customary law. In my
view this is not a sound proposition. Customary law is the body of customs
43
which b usage has acquired the force of law. As such it is constantly

changing with changing ways of life. It cannot therefore, in my view include
a complete and fully developed system of Religious law. Some elements of
Religious law may, of course, be absorbed into the customary law but they
are then to be judged and are subject to change as part of the customary
law and they lose the attributes of the Religious law from which they were
derived. I hold therefore that there are two systems or law which may
apply in an African Muslim Community, Religious law in matters personal,
such as marriage, and customary law which may apply in all spheres of life.”
(3) “The District Magistrate was therefore not strictly correct when he held, in
effect, that Islamic law was exclusively to be applied to the case before him.
There can be no doubt that a contract such as the on under consideration is
enforceable under Customary law. Even under Islamic law a Muslim wife is
not obliged to provide anything for household expenses, a Muslim wife’s
wages are her personal property and there is nothing, in principle, to
invalidate or to prevent the enforcement of an arrangement such as the
present one under Islamic law.”
(4) “The District Magistrate was fully justified in his finding on the fact. The
reasons given by the Primary Court for dismissing the respondent’s claim
were unsound.”
(5) Appeal dismissed.
13. Jurisdiction
IBRAHIM KUSAGA v EMANUEL MWETA 1986 TLR 26 (HC)
44
Court High Court of Tanzania - Tanga
Judge Kapoor Ag J
6 April, 1984:
Fly note
Administration of Estates - Jurisdiction - Powers of Primary Courts in

administration of estates matters - S.15(1)(c) of the Magistrates Courts Act, 1963.
Head note
A primary court heard matters relating to grant of administration of estates and

proceeded to distribute the property of the deceased. Among the properties
concerned was a partnership property. On appeal the High Court stated the law
concerning administration matters before Primary Courts.
Held:
(i) A Primary Court may hear matters relating to grant of administration of

estates where it has jurisdiction, i.e., where the law applicable is customary
law or Islamic law;
(ii) A Primary Court ought not to distribute the estate of the deceased; that is
the job of an administrator appointed by court;
(iii) Partnership property is not covered under customary law or Islamic law.
Order accordingly.
SALMIN MOHAMED v ABDU MOHAMED 1986 TLR 251 (HC)
Judge Mnzavas JK
8th November, 1988.
45
Fly note
Administration of Estates - Jurisdiction - House built on registered land - Whether

Primary Court has jurisdiction - Magistrate's Courts Act, 1984, s. 18(1)
Head note
A Primary Court heard a case involving, and granted letters of, administration of
estate. The subject matter of the dispute between the parties was a house built
on registered land. When the case reached the High Court the learned Judge
considered whether the Primary Court had jurisdiction over the case.
Held:
(i) In view of the provisions of s. 18 (1) of the Magistrate's Courts Act, 1984 no
Primary Court shall have jurisdiction in any proceedings affecting the title
to or any interest in land registered under the Land Registration Ordinance;
(ii) the Ilala Primary Court had no jurisdiction to hear the case.
Order accordingly.
SHOMARY ABDALLAH v ABDALLAH HUSSEIN AND HASSAN RAMADHANI 1991

TLR 135 (HC)
Judge Kyando J
20 September, 1991
Fly note
Administration of Estates - Jurisdiction - Probate and administration matter -

Resident Magistrate not specifically appointed as district delegate hears probate
cause - Effect.
Head note
46
This probate cause was heard by a Resident Magistrate in the District Court of
Ilala at Kisutu in Dar es Salaam. The appellant having been dissatisfied by the
decision of the District Court appealed to the High Court of Tanzania. After
making the necessary enquiries the High Court judge noted that the learned
Resident Magistrate was not a District Delegate according to the provisions of
section 5 of the Probate and Administration Ordinance of 1961. For this reason
the court found that he lacked the jurisdiction to entertain the matter.
Held:
As the learned magistrate lacked jurisdiction the proceedings are nullity.
Order accordingly.
SCOLASTICA BENEDICT v MARTIN BENEDICT 1993 TLR 1 (CA)
Court Court of Appeal of Tanzania - Mwanza
Judge Nyalali CJ, Makame JJA and Omar JJA
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 26 OF 1988
9 March, 1989
(From the Judgment and Decree of the High Court of Tanzania at Mwanza, Moshi,
J.)
Fly note
Civil Practice and Procedure - Functus officio - When a court becomes functus
officio.
Probate and Administration - Administration of estates - Administration of

registered land - Whether primary courts have jurisdiction.
Magistrates' Courts Act - Jurisdiction - Administration of estates - Subject matter

of administration is registered land - Whether primary court has jurisdiction -
Sections 14 and 15 of the Magistrates' Courts Act, 1984 and Government Notice
No. 320 of 1964.
47
Head note
The appellant's husband died intestate in 1971. He was survived by two wives and
a number of sons and daughters. The deceased left to his heirs substantial
property including motor vehicles, farmland, cattle and houses. The
administrators of the deceased's property distributed the property and the
interests therein to the heirs in accordance with the guidance of the clan council
acting under Haya customary law. None of the widows of the deceased inherited
any property of the deceased; instead they were required to reside with and be
maintained by their respective children according to Haya customary law. The
respondent, one of the sons of the deceased by his first wife, was given, among
other things, a house on plot Nos. 17 and 19 Block `D' in Bukoba township, in
which the appellant, the second wife of the deceased had been living with her
deceased husband. The only daughter whom the appellant had sided with the
deceased was given, among other things, a farmland including a house in need of
some repair at Kanoni Shamba.
The appellant filed a civil suit in the Urban Primary Court of Bukoba challenging
the administration of the estate of her deceased husband, particularly in respect
of the house on plot Nos. 17 and 19 Block `D' in Bukoba township. The defendants
resisted the suit on the ground, inter alia, that the primary court had no
jurisdiction on the subject-matter. The primary court overruled the defendants
who successfully appealed to the District Court whose decision was confirmed by
the High Court.
The High Court, however, granted the appellant `liberty to pursue her claim'
either in the District Court or the High Court. This liberty was not exercised.
The respondent, who was given the house on plot Nos. 17 and 19 instituted a suit
in the Court of Resident Magistrate at Bukoba seeking, inter alia, to evict the
appellant and her daughter from the suit premises. The trial court granted vacant
possession to the respondent. The appellant's appeal to the High Court failed. On
a further appeal to the Court of Appeal of Tanzania the Court upheld the decision
of the High Court. In addition the Court considered when a court becomes functus
48
officio and the question of jurisdiction of primary courts in administration of

registered land.
Held:
(i) As a general rule, a primary court, like all other courts, has no jurisdiction to
overturn or set aside its own decisions as it becomes functus officio after
making its decisions;
(ii) The only exception to this general rule includes the setting aside of ex parte
decisions and reviews of decisions induced by fraud or misinformation;
(iii) While section 15(1)(c) of the Magistrates Courts Act 1963 (now s. 19 of the
Magistrates' Courts Act 1984) did not specify the particulars relating to the
administration of estates, the order of the Chief Justice published as
Government Notice No. 320 of 1964 conferred jurisdiction on primary
courts in matters of administration of estates regardless of whether the
subject-matter is land registered under the Land Registration Ordinance,
provided the applicable law is customary or Islamic law, other than matters
falling under the Marriage, Divorce and Succession (Non-Christian Asiatics)
Ordinance.
Appeal dismissed in its entirety.
14. Probate and Administration
LUIHAM MARTIN v JUMA SAIDI 1992 TLR 74 (CA)
Judge Omar JJA, Ramadhani JJA, Mnzavas, JJA
13 May 1992
Fly note
Administration of Estates - Probate and Administration - Subordinate court

discovers after hearing application that it has no jurisdiction - Moves High Court
49
to exercise revisional powers - High Court sets aside decision of subordinate

court- Proceeds to hear the application though no fresh application was filed -
Whether irregular.
Civil Practice and Procedure - Court of Appeal Rules - High Court has exercised
original jurisdiction - Whether leave must be sought and obtained in order to
appeal to the Court of Appeal.
Head note
Letters of administration were initially granted to the respondent by the Moshi

R.M.'s Court. Then the R.M.'s court realised that it lacked jurisdiction. So it invited
the High Court to revise the proceedings.
The High Court ruled that the R.M.'s court had no jurisdiction and set aside the
grant in that cause. Then the High Court (D'Souza, Ag.J.) proceeded to hear and
determine the cause although no fresh application was before it. The appellant,
aggrieved by the decision of the High Court applied for leave to appeal to the
Court of Appeal. That application was heard by Mroso, J. who decided that no
leave was required because D'Souza, Ag. J. was exercising original jurisdiction. In
the Court of Appeal arguments were heard on whether the decision of Mroso, J.
was right.
Held:
(i) The procedure adopted by D'Souza, Ag.J. amply showed that the court
decided to hear the case in its original jurisdiction. The framing of issues
and the hearing of witnesses from both parties did not, by any stretch of
imagination, amount to revising the R.M.'s Court;
(ii) Since the High Court (D'Souza Ag. J.) heard the application in its original
jurisdiction, in view of the provisions of section 52 of the Probate and
Administration Ordinance, Cap. 445 and section 5(1)(a) of the Appellate
Jurisdiction Act, the High Court (Mroso, J.) was right in ruling that no leave
was required for the appellant to appeal to the Court of Appeal.
50
Order accordingly.
MWANAHAWA MUYA v MWANAIDI MARO 1992 TLR 78 (CA)
Judge Omar JJA, Ramadhani JJA, Mnzavas, JJA
13 May 1992
Fly note
Administration of Estates - Probate and Administration - Annulment of grant of

letters of administration - Concealment of letter of administration granted by
lower court - Effect of such concealment.
Civil Practice and Procedure - Revisional powers - Suo moto - When exercisable.
Head note
The appellant applied for and was granted letters of administration by the
Resident Magistrates' Court. In that court the respondent was the objector.
Despite this grant the respondent filed a petition for letters of administration in
the High Court in respect of the same estate. The respondent deposed in her
petition that there had not been any proceedings for grant of probate or letters of
administration regarding the estate. The High Court granted letters of
administration to the respondent. Dissatisfied with the grant of letters of
administration to the respondent by the High Court, the appellant filed a civil
application in the High Court challenging the grant of letters of administration to
the present respondent and prayed that the grant of letters of administration to
the respondent by the High Court be revoked. This civil application was heard by a
different High Court judge who instead of addressing the issue invoked revisional
power suo moto and declared the proceedings in the Resident Magistrates' Court
null and void.
51
The Court of Appeal considered whether the grant of letters of administration by

the High Court was valid. It also looked into the propriety of invoking revisional
jurisdiction suo moto by the High Court over the proceedings of the lower court.
Held:
(i) Respondent's blatant lies that there had not been previous proceedings H
regarding grant of probate or letters of administration while she was in fact
the objector in the R.M.'s court when letters of administration were
granted to the appellant, amply demonstrated that she was bent to
defraud other interested parties in the estate. Had the High Court (Nchalla,
J.) dealt with this issue he would no doubt have found that this was a good
reason to annual the grant of letters of administration to the respondent by
the High Court (Chua, J.);
(ii) in a proper case the High Court can invoke its powers of revision in a grant
of letters of administration by the District Court. Powers of revision are
however usually exercised by the High Court suo moto when exercising its
supervisory powers over subordinate courts;
(iii) it is wrong, indeed improper, for the High Court to resort to its revisional
powers where (as it was in this case) there are specific issues calling for
determination by the court.
MOHAMED HASSANI v MAYASA MZEE AND MWANAHAWA MZEE 1994 TLR 225
(CA)
Court Court of Appeal of Tanzania - Dar es Salaam
Judge Kisanga JJA, Mnzavas JJA and Mfalila JJA
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 20 OF 1994
23 December, 1994
(From the decision of the High Court of Tanzania at Tanga, Msumi, J)
Fly note
52
Probate and Administration - Administration of Estate - Powers of the Primary

Court to appoint and replace an administrator - Rules 2(a) and (b) of the First
Schedule of the Magistrates' Courts Act, 1984.
Probate and Administration - Challenging validity of appointment of an

administrator - Onus of proof.
Probate and Administration - Disposition of property - Whether consent from all

heirs is necessary before sale of property.
Head note
This was an appeal against the decision of the High Court that the appointment of
one Mfundo Omari as an administrator of the estate of the late Mzee Risasi was
void because it was done under Rule 2(b) and not under Rule 2(a) of the Fifth
Schedule to the Magistrates' Courts Act, 1984, and thus he had no power to
dispose the property of the deceased's estate and, therefore, his sale of the
house to the appellant was null and void. It was argued by the appellant that the
appointment was valid under Rule 2(b) because it was a replacement and not a
first appointment.
Held:
(i) Primary courts are empowered under Rule 2(a) of the Fifth Schedule to the
Magistrates' Courts Act, 1984, to make first appointment of administrators
of estate and Rule 2(b) of the same schedule for appointment of a
replacement. Therefore the Judge was wrong to restrict the powers of
Primary Courts to appoint administrators to Rule 2(a).
(ii) It is up to the person challenging the validity of appointment of an

administrator by the court to show that the person so appointed does not
have the required qualifications to administer the estate.
(iii) The administrator is not legally required to obtain consent of all the heirs
before disposing of property or sale of a house.
Appeal allowed.
53
CELESTINA PAULO v MOHAMED HUSSEIN 1983 TLR 291 (HC)
Court High Court of Tanzania - Bukoba
Judge Mushi .J
September 5, 1985
CIVIL APPEAL 223 OF 1982
Fly note
Probate and Administration - Religion - Whether the difference of religion can

affect an ascertained will in appointing an administrator of an estate.
Probate and Administration - Clan linkage - Whether the difference in clan linkage
can prevent a person from administering the property of a deceased person of
another clan.
Head note
The appellant appealed against the decision of the District Court of Bukoba which
reversed the decision of the Primary Court which appointed the appellant the
administrator of the estate of Sawia d/o Balegu on the basis of oral evidence and
a written will. The District Court had reversed the Primary Court's decision
purportedly because the appellant was of different religion and clan from that of
the deceased.
Held:
(i) Where there is an ascertained will the same must be respected in letter and
spirit notwithstanding the difference of religion between the deceased and
the appointed administrator;
(ii) where personal property is bequeathed the person bequeathing the

property has an absolute right to choose an administrator of her own
choice and the clan has no right to interfere with the same.
Appeal allowed.
54
15. Revocation of appointed administrator of estate of

deceased
SAFINIEL CLEOPA v JOHN KADEGHE 1984 TLR 198 (HC)
Court High Court of Tanzania - Arusha
Judge Chua J
November 29, 1986
Fly note
Probate and administration - Revocation of appointment of administrator of

estate of deceased - Reasons that may justify such revocation.
Head note
The appellant sought to revoke the appointment of the respondent as

administrator of the estate of the deceased on the ground that he had misapplied
or subjected the estate to loss or damage. It was established on the evidence
available that the administrator had underpriced some property sold and failed to
account for the whereabouts of various other properties.
Held:
(i) The sale of property at below the market value and failure to account for
the whereabouts of other properties in the custody of the administrator
amounts to misapplication of the estate;
(ii) an administrator who misapplies the estate of the deceased or subjects it

to a loss or damage is liable to make good such loss or damage.
Appeal allowed.
55

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Maeda Timothy –Probate and Administration of Estate Cases 2013

CASE ON PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATE

1. Application for appointment of administrator of deceased's estate … … … … … … … … 2

3. Application for revocation of letters of administration and caveats … … … … … … … … …4

5. Customary law of inheritance… … … … … … … … … …… … … … … … … … … …… … … … … … … … 13

8. Father dies intestate… … … … … … … … … …… … … … … … … … … …… … … … … … … … … …… … … 34

10. Grant of probate… … … … … … … … … …… … … … … … … … … …… … … … … … … … … …… … … … 36

12. Islamic law of inheritance… … … … … … … … … …… … … … … … … … … …… … … … … … … … … 38

14. Probate and Administration… … … … … … … … … …… … … … … … … … … …… … … … … … … … 49

15. Revocation of appointed administrator of estate of deceased… … … … … … … … … …… 55

The Law school of Tanzania 13th cohort 2013

1. Application for appointment of administrator of

SEIF MARARE v MWADAWA SALUM 1985 TLR 253 (HC)

Court High Court of Tanzania - Mwanza

June 10, 1979

(PC) CIVIL APPEAL 37 OF 1978

Administration of Estates - Application for appointment of administrator of

Conflict of Laws - Application for appointment of administrator of a deceased's

(i) On application for appointment of an administrator of a deceaced's estate,

Court High Court of Tanzania - Mwanza

Administration of Estates - Appointment of Administrator - Whether the court has

(i) In determining whether or not to allow an application for leave to appeal

3. Application for revocation of letters of administration and

Mohamed Stambuli v. Mwanaharusi Selemani,[1968] HCD 357

Probate and Administration Cause 11-M-65,

Application for revocation of letters of administration – Where prior proceedings

Jurisdiction – Primary Court has jurisdiction, without pecuniary limits, where

This was an application for the revocation of letters of Administration of a

(1) Primary Courts have no pecuniary limits to their jurisdiction in

(3) Deceased was married to applicant Stambuli; the onus is therefore on

In the Estate of Sheikh Fazal Ilahi

[1957] 1 EA 697 (SCK)

Re the Estate of Petit (deceased)

Re Innocent Mbilinyi 1969 [HCD] 283

Deceased. Prob. & Ad. 50-D-68; 31/10/69;

Conflict of laws – Rejection of Chagga law by deceased

5. Customary law of inheritance

John Lwehabura v. Edward Lwehanura, [1968] HCD 358

(PC) Civ. App. 74-M-68,

Written wills – Requirements – Customary Law Declaration

(3) Property should devolve according to the Law of Inheritance, G. N. 436 of

Peter John v. Richard Barongo, [1969] HCD 19

(PC) Civ. App. 202-M-68, 8/1/69

Disinheritance of beneficiary – Beneficiary cannot challenge.

Disinheritance of customary heir – Heir may challenge.

Distribution of “the big house”, the Nyaruju – Haya law.

Promise to make person heir in return for gifts – Contract

(1) A customary heir may challenge a will if he is disinherited by a testator who

Constantine Bulagile v. Bi. Genereza Mashakala [1969] HCD 20

(PC) Civ. App. 103-D-67, 21/11/68,

Women – May not inherit immovable – Haya law

(1) Section 181, Declaration of Customary law of Persons, could not be

thereabouts. Hay Customary law was applicable and therefore the

Jackson Lesirango v. Pantaleo KirboI [1969] HCD 277

(PC) Civ. App. 108-D-67, 26/8/69,

Intestacy – Women’s rights to inherit land – Chagga law

The plaintiff, a schoolboy of 14 years, sued the defendant in respect to a piece of

(3) Appeal dismissed.

Deusdedit Kashaga v. Bi. Baite Rwabigene, [1968] HCD 165

(PC) Civ. App. 90-M-67,

Oral wills – Requirements – Customary Law Declaration.

JOHN NGOMOI v MOHAMED ALLY BOFU 1988 TLR 63 (HC)

Court High Court of Tanzania - Dar Es Salaam