ARSP Beiheft 163 (2020) - Die Reine Rechtslehre Auf Dem Prüfstand

Die Reine Rechtslehre
auf dem Prüfstand

Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law:
Conceptions and Misconceptions
Tagung der Deutschen Sektion der Internationalen Vereinigung
für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie vom 27.–29. September 2018
Lizenziert für Universitätsbibliothek Kiel am 03.04.2020 um 09:54 Uhr
in Freiburg im Breisgau
Herausgegeben von Matthias Jestaedt, Ralf Poscher

und Jörg Kammerhofer
Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie Beiheft 163
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beiheft 163

DIE REINE RECHTSLEHRE
AUF DEM PRÜFSTAND
HANS KELSEN'S PURE THEORY
OF LAW: CONCEPTIONS AND
MISCONCEPTIONS
Tagung der Deutschen Sektion der Internationalen
Vereinigung für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie
vom 27.–29. September 2018 in Freiburg im Breisgau
Herausgegeben von Matthias Jestaedt, Ralf Poscher

und Jörg Kammerhofer

Umschlagbild: Justitia, Landgericht Ulm

Quelle: shutterstock.com / Georg_89
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Inhaltsverzeichnis / Table of Contents
Vorwort. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
I. Die Grundlagen der Reinen Rechtslehre / The Foundations of the Pure

Theory of Law
JOHN GARDNER †
Normativity (in Kelsen and otherwise) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
ROBERT ALEXY
Hans Kelsen’s Legal Theory in the System of Non-Positivism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
ALEXANDER SOMEK
The Demystification Impasse
Legal Positivism Divided Against Itself 45
CHRISTOPH KLETZER
Decentralisation and the Limits of Jurisprudence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
CARSTEN HEIDEMANN
Das „Faktum der Rechtswissenschaft“ bei Hans Kelsen* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
MAXIMILIAN KIENER
Fictionalising Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
II. Rechtstheorie / The Mechanics of Law
MATHIEU CARPENTIER
Kelsen on Derogation and Normative Conflicts
An Essay in Critical Reconstruction 125

6 Inhaltsverzeichnis / Table of Contents
MATHEUS PELEGRINO DA SILVA

Suspension als eine Art von Derogation oder als weitere Funktion
der Rechtsnorm? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
THOMAS HOCHMANN
Welche Rolle für die Rechtswissenschaft?
Zu einer Debatte innerhalb der Wiener rechtstheoretischen Schule 161
RODRIGO GARCIA CADORE

Alternativermächtigung vs. Fehlerkalkül
Wie geht das Recht mit Fehlern um? 177
BENEDIKT PIRKER
Kelsen meets Cognitive Science

The Pure Theory of Law, Interpretation, and Modern Cognitive Pragmatics 203
III. Die Anwendung der Reinen Rechtslehre auf Rechtsordnungen /

Applying the Pure Theory of Law to Legal Orders
LENA FOLJANTY
Hans Kelsen, das Privatrecht und die Demokratie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
FERNANDO MENEZES
Hans Kelsen’s Ideas on Public and Private Law and their Applicability
to a Critical Analysis of the Theory of Administrative Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
D. A. JEREMY TELMAN
Problems of Translation and Interpretation
A Kelsenian Commentary on Positivist Originalism 257
TOMASZ WIDŁAK
Kelsen’s Monism and the Structure of Global Law
On the Relevance of a Kelsenian Account for the Polycentric International Law 275
ANNE KÜHLER
Constitutional Pluralism and the Problem of the Hierarchy of Norms beyond
National Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291

Inhaltsverzeichnis / Table of Contents 7
IV. Ideengeschichtlicher Kontext / Kelsen in Context
FREDERICK SCHAUER
Fuller and Kelsen – Fuller on Kelsen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309
URSZULA KOSIELI Ń SKA-GRABOWSKA

The Impact of Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory on Alf Ross’s Ideas
A Case of Scientific Plagiarism? 319
MARIO G. LOSANO
Bobbios „Bekehrung“ zur Reinen Rechtslehre
Die Turiner Schule und die Rezeption Hans Kelsens in Italien 339
STANLEY L. PAULSON
Did Walter Jellinek Invent Hans Kelsen’s Basic Norm? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351
MARIJAN PAVČNIK
Rechtliche Natur des Staates nach Leonid Pitamic
The Legal Nature of the State according to Leonid Pitamic 361
ULRICH WAGRANDL
Kelsen was no Relativist
Reading Hans Kelsen in the Light of Isaiah Berlin’s Value Pluralism 373
FEDERICO LIJOI
The Democratic Value of Law
Hans Kelsen on the Theory and Praxis of Relativism 393
REUT YAEL PAZ / MAXIMILIAN WAGNER

Salvaging Scientific Socialism?
Hans Kelsen’s Attachments and Detachments to Austro-Marxism 413


Vorwort
MATHIAS JESTAEDT / RALF POSCHER /

JÖRG KAMMERHOFER
Die Reine Rechtslehre Hans Kelsens stellt einen spezifischen Zugang zu Recht und
Normativität dar; sie liefert eine eigene Grammatik und eine besondere Nomenklatur,
mit deren Hilfe man gewisse rechtswissenschaftliche Begriffe, Konzepte und Proble-
me als wesentlich und andere als irreführend für die Hauptaufgaben der (rechts)wis-
senschaftlichen Beschäftigung mit dem Recht ausweisen kann. Grundlegender noch
erhebt sie den Anspruch, eine Rechtswissenschaftstheorie zu sein, d. h. eine Theorie
darüber, was Rechtswissenschaft ist bzw. sein kann oder sein sollte. Dieser Ansatz zu
Bedeutung und Aufgabe einer selbständigen Rechtswissenschaft bleibt freilich oft im-
plizit und wird in der einschlägigen Literatur eher selten adressiert.
Auch nach über einhundert Jahren weckt die Reine Rechtslehre die Aufmerksam-
keit der Rechtswissenschaft – und das in ebenso heftigem Zuspruch wie Widerspruch.
Dabei treten Missverständnisse und Ausblendungen zutage – bei Kelsens Lehren,
bei den Versuchen, sich dessen Lehren anzueignen, und bei den Versuchen, diese zu
widerlegen. Die internationale Community setzt sich nach wie vor mit bestimmten
Schriften und Konzepten Hans Kelsens recht intensiv auseinander. Darüber geraten
andere Wesenszüge und Argumentationslinien der Reinen Rechtslehre gar nicht erst
ins Blickfeld. Und während Kelsens auch auf Englisch verfügbare Werke international
vergleichsweise intensiv diskutiert werden, gilt Gleiches nicht für die Werke anderer
wegbereitender Mitglieder der „Wiener rechtstheoretischen Schule“. Just die Debatte
um die Reine Rechtslehre in und zwischen den unterschiedlichen rechtswissenschaft-
lichen Kulturen und Traditionen ist besonders spannend.
Es war also wert, sich im Rahmen der Deutschen Sektion der IVR mit Kelsen und
der Reinen Rechtslehre zu beschäftigen und den Versuch zu unternehmen, in einem
offenen Diskurs die rechtskulturellen, sprachlichen und disziplinären Disjunktionen
kenntlich zu machen und möglichst zu überbrücken, um eine freimütige internationa-
le und intradisziplinäre Debatte um Hans Kelsen und die Reine Rechtslehre zu eröff-
nen. Mit der Tagung der Deutschen Sektion der IVR am 27.–29. September 2018 an

10 Vorwort
der Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg i. Br. zum Thema „Die Reine Rechtslehre auf
dem Prüfstand / Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law: Conceptions and Misconceptions“
wurde also nichts weniger gewagt, als der heutigen Relevanz der Thesen der Reinen
Rechtslehre in einem international und intradisziplinär reflektierten Rahmen nachzu-
gehen.
Einer der Gründe für diese besondere Spannungslage eröffnet sich bereits bei ein-
er bloß kursorischen Kontrastierung von Leben und Werk von Kelsen mit Herbert
Hart. Harts Geburtsort Harrogate in North Yorkshire und sein Studien-, Arbeits- und
Sterbeort Oxford1 liegen keine 250 km Luftlinie auseinander, das ist in etwa die Entfer-
nung vom Tagungsort Freiburg nach Frankfurt. Seine akademische Karriere hat sich
exklusiv an der Universität Oxford abgespielt; er hat sich und seine Lehren niemals in
anderen Sprachen, gar in anderen Kulturkreisen, verständlich machen müssen. Vita
und Oeuvre sind also britisch, eigentlich rein englisch, und verlassen diesen Orbit
nicht. Auch ist die Rezeptionsgeschichte des Hartschen Werkes ohne den Aufstieg des
Englischen zur wissenschaftlichen lingua franca und der damit einhergehenden Pers-
pektivenverschiebung nicht vollends zu erklären.
Bei Kelsen sieht das völlig anders aus; ihm widerfährt ein Schicksal, welches das
20. Jahrhundert für ideologiekritische Protagonisten der wissenschaftlichen Moderne
in Deutschland und Österreich vielfach bereitgehalten hat – das der „Vertriebene[n]
Vernunft“.2 Kelsen sieht sich im Österreich der 1920er und im Deutschland der frü-
hen 1930er Jahre immer wieder angefochten, angefeindet, unerwünscht und schließ-
lich vertrieben. Von Wien nach Köln, nach Genf, Prag, Harvard und schließlich nach
Berkeley muss Kelsen seinen beruflich-wissenschaftlichen Standort wechseln und er
und seine Familie auch den sozialen Neuanfang wagen. Sein Geburtsort Prag ist vom
Sterbeort Orinda (bei Berkeley) denn auch nicht wie bei Hart 250 km, sondern rund
9.400 km Luftlinie auseinander. Er findet „des Wandermüden letzte Ruhestätte“ am
sprichwörtlich anderen Ende der Welt.3
Kelsen lehrt und publiziert zunächst auf Deutsch, sodann auf Französisch, schließ-
lich auf Englisch. Die fast 18.000 Seiten von Originalarbeiten Kelsens sind zu mehr als
50 % auf Deutsch erschienen, rund 6.000 Seiten liegen auf Englisch vor, einer Sprache,
die Kelsen im Alter von knapp 60 Jahren als seine Alltags- und Berufssprache zu erler-
nen gezwungen war und die er bis zuletzt nicht mit der Leichtigkeit und Selbstverständ-
lichkeit, Virtuosität und Nuanciertheit seiner Muttersprache beherrschte. Mit gewisser
1 Vgl. Nicola Lacey, A Life of H. L. A. Hart. The Nightmare and the Noble Dream, Oxford 2004.
2 Friedrich Stadler (Hrsg.), Vertriebene Vernunft I. Emigration und Exil österreichischer Wissenschaft
1930–1940, Wien 1987; Friedrich Stadler (Hrsg.), Vertriebene Vernunft II. Emigration und Exil österreichi-
scher Wissenschaft 1930–1940, Wien 1988.
3 Die nach wie vor maßgebliche Biographie Kelsens ist: Rudolf Aladár Métall, Hand Kelsen. Leben und
Werk, Wien 1969; siehe auch Hans Kelsen, Selbstdarstellung (1927), in: HKW 1, S. 19–27; Hans Kelsen, Auto-
biographie (1947), in: HKW 1, S. 29–91. Thomas Olechowski, Geschäftsführer des Hans Kelsen-Instituts,
Wien, wird in Kürze eine umfassende Biographie Kelsens im Verlag Mohr Siebeck vorlegen.

Vorwort 11
Zuspitzung könnte man sagen, dass der Nationalsozialismus Kelsen nicht nur seine Hei-
mat, sondern auch seine Sprache geraubt hat, ihn zu nicht unwichtigen Teilen sprach-
los gemacht und im Diskurs-Niemandsland ausgesetzt hat. In den Vereinigten Staaten,
dem Land, das ihm großzügig eine neue Heimat bot, hatte er in des Wortes doppelter
Bedeutung Mühe, sich verständlich zu machen.4 Kelsens Vita und Œuvre bezeugen
eine Odyssee, die sozusagen die Begleitgeschichte und den Resonanzboden abgibt für
die Reine Rechtslehre und die ihre Rezeption und Diskussion bis heute beeinflusst.
Man möchte angesichts dieses Befundes meinen, dass die Rezeptionsgeschichte
der Reinen Rechtslehre in Deutschland, wo im Gegensatz zum US-amerikanischen
Exil doch der sprachlich unmittelbarste und mithin einfachste Zugang zur Reinen
Rechtslehre herrscht,5 besonders günstig verlaufen ist. Doch mitnichten: Hierzulan-
de begreift man jetzt erst in Ansätzen, welcher Schatz seit vielen Jahrzehnten vor den
eigenen Füßen schlummert. Die Reine Rechtslehre wird in Deutschland dramatisch
anders rezipiert als im Gros der übrigen Länder. Kelsen ist auf dem Höhepunkt seines
wissenschaftlichen Schaffens und seiner Anerkennung als public intellectual, als der
sogenannte Weimarer Methoden- und Richtungsstreit ausbricht und er neben Rudolf
Smend, Carl Schmitt und Hermann Heller zum Weimarer Quartett zählt. Doch schon
bald, nämlich bereits im April 1933, wird er hors du discours gesetzt. Seine Wiener
Schule wird, ohne dass sie sich davon je erholen sollte, zerschlagen. Bis 1945 verhängt
die regimehörige Rechtswissenschaft eine damnatio memoriae über den „Juden Kel-
sen“ und dessen Werk.
Die mit der bedingungslosen Kapitulation NS-Deutschlands schlagende Stunde
Null ist aber nicht die Stunde, in der Kelsen rehabilitiert wird und seine Ideen mit
offenen Armen Aufnahme finden. Die Naturrechtsrenaissance, flankiert von der Rad-
bruchschen Positivismuslegende,6 erübrigt, so ist man sich einig, eine Auseinander-
setzung mit Kelsen und seinem Œuvre. Bis weit in die 1960er Jahre bleibt Kelsen hors
du discours. Sowohl die Erstauflage der „Reinen Rechtslehre“, die Kelsen 1934 in Genf
vollendet, als auch die Zweitauflage 1960, gehören streng genommen zur Gattung der
Exil-Literatur, sind also Außenseiter-Schriften im deutschsprachigen Wissenschafts-
diskurs. Ab Mitte der 1980er Jahre scheint sich das Blatt zu wenden, und rund zehn
Jahre später beginnt eine Art Kelsen-Renaissance in Deutschland. Nun fängt die
Staatsrechtslehre langsam an, sich das bislang ausgeschlagene Erbe nach und nach an-
zueignen. Eingeübte vorurteilsgetragene Abwehrreflexe sind zwar immer noch viru-
lent, doch überwiegen heute die wissenschaftliche Neugierde und der Wunsch nach
4 Vgl. Jeremy Telman, The Reception of Hans Kelsen’s Legal Theory in the United States: A Sociological
Model, in: L’Observateur des Nations Unis 24 (2008), S. 299 ff.; Jeremy Telman, A Path Not Taken: Hans
Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law in the Land of the Legal Realists, in: Robert Walter / Clemens Jabloner / Klaus
Zeleny (Hrsg.), Hans Kelsen anderswo – Hans Kelsen abroad, Wien 2010, S. 353–376.
5 Für Österreich gilt Besonderes.
6 Gustav Radbruch, Gesetzliches Unrecht und übergesetzliches Recht, in: Süddeutsche Juristen-Zeitung 1
(1946) 105–108 (107).

12 Vorwort
sachlicher Auseinandersetzung mit den vielfach als frisch und unverbraucht in ihrem
Provokationsgehalt empfundenen Thesen Kelsens.
Im Gegensatz dazu gilt Kelsen im globalen Maßstab als Mastermind der Rechtstheo-
rie; viele Schatzsucher aus Lateinamerika, aus Südostasien, aus Südeuropa, um nur drei
besonders Kelsen-affine Weltregionen zu nennen, sind unterwegs; sie sehen sich mit der
Sprachbarriere konfrontiert, wenn sie den als solchen erkannten Schatz heben wollen,
und sind bereit, diese zu überwinden. Die (zweite Auflage der) Reine(n) Rechtsleh-
re gilt in einer ganzen Reihe von Ländern zumeist des romanischen Sprachkreises als
Pflichtlektüre im ersten Studienjahr, gehört also zu den kanonischen Schriften. Nicht
zuletzt waren es die ausländischen Kelsen-Schüler zu Wiener Zeiten, die sich als eifrige
Exporteure und Verbreiter der Reinen Rechtslehre in ihre Heimatländer und darüber
hinaus betätigten, etwa Leonidas Pitamic, Alf Ross, Charles Eisenmann, Luis Recaséns
Siches oder Luís Legaz y Lacambra. Daran haben sich reiche rechtsphilosophische und
rechtstheoretische Folgediskurse angeschlossen, wie zum Beispiel der argentinische, der

mit den Namen von Carlos Eduardo Alchourrón und Eugenio Bulygin verbunden ist.
Doch sosehr der Status von Kelsen und der Reinen Rechtslehre in einer Vielzahl
von Ländern außer Frage steht, so sehr ergeben sich Rezeptionshindernisse, die mit
dem Faktum zusammenhängen, dass nahezu alle wichtigen Schriften der Reinen
Rechtslehre im Original auf Deutsch verfasst worden sind.7 Das Arbeiten mit Über-
setzungen – mögen sie auch so akkurat und bestechend sein wie jene der Erstauflage
der Reinen Rechtslehre durch Bonnie Litschewski Paulson und Stanley Paulson oder
jene der Zweitauflage durch Mario Losano8 – bringt unvermeidlicher Weise Probleme
mit sich. Diese wachsen um ein Vielfaches, wenn und da eine große Zahl auch sehr
wichtiger Schriften insbesondere nicht ins Englische übersetzt sind.
Und wer des Deutschen nicht mächtig ist, dem wird sich kaum erschließen, welcher
Reichtum und welche Heterogenität sich mit der Reinen Rechtslehre verbindet, die
eben nicht nur das isoliert-exklusive Werk des einsamen Genies ist, sondern Ausdruck
und Folge einer ungemein kraftvollen, unerschrockenen und fruchtbaren kollektiven
Anstrengung von rund 40 jungen Männern und Frauen, die Kelsen als „Jungösterrei-
chische Schule der Rechtstheorie“9 um sich geschart hatte. Um Kelsens Gedankenge-
7 Hans Kelsen, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre entwickelt aus der Lehre vom Rechtssatze, Tübingen
1911 = HKW 2, S. 21–878; Hans Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre, Berlin 1925; Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre.
Einführung in die rechtswissenschaftliche Problematik, Leipzig und Wien 1934; Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechts-
lehre, 2. Aufl., Wien 1960; Hans Kelsen, Allgemeine Theorie der Normen, Wien 1979.
8 Hans Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory (übersetzt von Bonnie Litschewski Paulson
und Stanley L. Paulson), Oxford 1992; Hans Kelsen, La dottrina pura del diritto (übersetzt von Mario Losa-
no), Turin 1966.
9 Die Bezeichnung dürfte auf Alfred Verdroß, Bernhard Stark: Die Analyse des Rechts (1916), in: Schmol-
lers Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reiche 41 (1917), S. 477–
479 (478, 479), und Bernhard Starck, Die jungösterreichische Schule der Rechtswissenschaft und die natur-
wissenschaftliche Methode, in: Juristische Blätter 47 (1918), S. 301–304, zurückgehen.

Vorwort 13
bäude in seinem Reichtum, in seinen Prägungen, aber auch seinen Spannungen wirk-
lich zu ergründen, kommt man nicht nur nicht an den beiden Hauptschülern, Adolf
Julius Merkl und Alfred Verdroß, vorbei, auch die Schriften des Hauptes der Brünner
Schule, František Weyr, oder von jüngeren Schülern wie beispielsweise Fritz Sander,
Felix Kaufmann, Fritz Schreier, Julius Kraft oder Josef L. Kunz, müssen studiert wer-
den – solange und soweit aber belastbare Übersetzungen fehlen, kommt man hier
ohne Deutsch nicht weit. Zugänglichkeit und Zugangswunsch fallen folglich ausein-
ander: In Deutschland die Möglichkeit, aber nicht (oder nur in geringem Maße) das
Interesse – global das Interesse, aber nur eingeschränkt die Zugänglichkeit. Der vorlie-
gende Band will genau hier einsetzen und erblickt in diesem Paradoxon eine Chance
wechselseitiger Hilfe, um einen großen Schritt vorwärts zu machen.
Und das ist mit den 24 Beiträgen dieses Bandes, die allesamt auf Vorträgen bei der
IVR-Tagung basieren, gelungen: Es schreiben Wissenschaftler aus dem In- und Aus-
land, große Namen – an den tragisch während der Drucklegung verstorbenen John
Gardner sei in diesem Zusammenhang besonders erinnert und damit eines Großen des
Faches gedacht – wie Nachwuchstalente, diejenigen, welche (vorranging) auf Deutsch
und im deutschen Rechts- und Kulturkreis arbeiten und publizieren, diejenigen aus
anderen Kulturkreisen sowie diejenigen, deren Vita selbst das Kelsensche Wanderle-
ben zwischen den Kulturen (wenn auch heute weniger brutalen Zwängen geschuldet)
widerspiegelt. Die Beiträge sind denn auch heterogen – kritische, neutral analytische
wie zustimmend die Reine Rechtslehre anwendende Stimmen finden sich gleicher-
maßen; die Zugänge sind philosophischer, (rechts)theoretischer, ideengeschichtlicher
oder rechtsdogmatischer Natur; die Rechtskreise und -gebiete reichen vom deutschen
Privatrecht über das brasilianische Verwaltungsrecht zum Europa- und Völkerrecht.
Gemein ist ihnen der Versuch, vorurteilsfrei und offen die Reine Rechtslehre als Zu-
gang wie als Forschungsformation, Kelsens Leben und Werk, zu durchdringen, zu ana-
lysieren und so zu neuen Ergebnissen zu gelangen.
Wir, die Herausgeber, haben uns zwecks besserer Übersicht erlaubt, eine grobe
Gliederung der Beiträge vorzunehmen, freilich ohne dass damit eine Eingrenzung und
Einschränkung der enthaltenen Ergebnisse verbunden sein soll.
1. Die Aufsätze von Gardner, Alexy, Somek, Kletzer, Heidemann und Kiener
beschäftigen sich vorrangig mit den (rechts)philosophischen bzw. wissen-
schaftstheoretischen Grundlagen der Reinen Rechtslehre.
2. Demgegenüber wird von Carpentier, Pelegrino, Hochmann, Cadore und
Pirker die Dynamik und die Beziehungen der Rechtsnormen zueinander dis-
kutiert, wie auch die den Juristen besonders wichtige hermeneutische Tätig-
keit, welche wir zusammenfassend der „Rechtstheorie“ zugerechnet haben.
3. Eine weitere Gruppe von Beiträgen – nämlich jene von Foljanty, Menezes,
Telman, Widłak und Kühler – beschäftigen sich mit konkreten positiven
Rechtsordnungen und deren Problemen, auf die die Argumente der Reinen
Rechtslehre angewandt werden.

14 Vorwort
4. Schließlich hat die mit Abstand größte Gruppe von Beiträgen verschiedene
Aspekte des (ideen)geschichtlichen Kontextes der Reinen Rechtslehre bzw.
von Kelsen beleuchtet, nämlich Schauer, Kosielińska-Grabowska, Losano,
Paulson, Pavčnik, Wagrandl, Lijoi sowie Paz/Wagner.
Freiburg i. Br., 9. September 2019


I. Die Grundlagen der Reinen Rechtslehre /
The Foundations of the Pure Theory of Law


Normativity (in Kelsen and otherwise)
JOHN GARDNER †*
Abstract: This chapter deconstructs the concept of normativity by engaging with Kelsen’s
postulate of an irreducible duality between Is and Ought. Supererogatory acts are a test
case, because they demonstrate that there must be reasons beyond norms to account for
the value of actions. It critiques Kelsen’s conflation of norms, reasons for action (epistemic,
prudential and moral) and values. If the normativity of the law is escapable, because it is
morally fallible, the special problem of moral normativity arises. Hence, the question of
normativity morphs into a question about the relevance of particular inescapable reasons.
Keywords: legal philosophy, Hume’s law, Hans Kelsen, normativity, reasons for action, Is
and Ought
Schlagworte: Rechtsphilosophie, Humes Gesetz, Hans Kelsen, Normativität, Hand-

lungsgründe, Sein und Sollen
1. Hume’s law
An Ought cannot be reduced to an Is, or an Is to an Ought; and so an Is cannot be

inferred from an Ought, or an Ought from an Is. (GTN 16.I)1
* All Souls College, Oxford. This contribution is based on my talk at the IVR German Section conference in
Freiburg on 21 September 2018. [Editors’ note: John Gardner passed away on 11 July 2019, before the proofs
for his contribution were finalised. The abstract, keywords and all changes (corrections) to the paper as
delivered are the editors’.]
1 My Kelsen quotations throughout are from Michael Hartney’s translation of Kelsen’s Allgemeine Theorie
der Normen (Vienna 1979), published as Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Norms (Oxford 1991). Since most of
the chapters and sections in the book are very short, and readers may well be using different editions, I do
not give page numbers. Instead I provide locations for the quoted passages parenthetically in the text, in the

18 JOHN GARDNER †
By these words in his last book, and no less consistently in earlier books, Kelsen
endorses Hume’s Law.2 In fact he fortifies it: Hume worried only about the inference of
an ought from an is; Kelsen worries no less about the inference of an is from an ought.
That makes his claim stronger than Hume’s. Kelsen’s core argument for this claim is
summarized by him as follows:
Since something can be without being decreed to be obligatory in a norm, and something
can be decreed to be obligatory in a norm without being in reality, therefore when some-
thing is it does not follow that something ought to be, or when something ought to be, that
something is. The relation between Is and Ought is one of irreducible duality. (GTN 17)
We will come back in a moment to the specialized apparatus of norms (and decrees)
that constitute Kelsen’s interpretation of the Ought. For now, we should agree that
the argument is sound as far as it goes. But how far does it go? Suppose we replace the
word ‘something’ with the letter ‘P’, and see how it looks now:
Since P can be without being decreed to be obligatory in a norm, and P can be decreed to
be obligatory in a norm without being in reality, therefore when P is it does not follow that
P ought to be, or when P ought to be, that P is.
Can we really conclude from this that ‘[t]he relation between Is and Ought is one of
irreducible duality’? Surely we can conclude only that the relationship between ‘P is’
and ‘P ought to be’ is one of irreducible duality. ‘You are buying me lunch’ neither
entails nor is entailed by ‘you ought to be buying me lunch.’ True enough. But we do
not know whether the same goes for the relationship between ‘P is’ and ‘Q ought to be’.
For example, we do not know whether the same goes for the relationship between
‘you promised to buy me lunch’ and ‘you ought to be buying me lunch’, to borrow John
Searle’s famous attempt at a counterexample to Hume’s law.3 We know roughly how
Kelsen would reanalyse that claimed counterexample to explain it away. He would say
that there is a hidden ‘Ought’ in the background. He would say that there is a norm
in play sub silentio according to which you ought to do whatever you promised. You
promised to buy me lunch so, according to the sub silentio norm, you ought to buy me
lunch. That is certainly a possible reanalysis of Searle’s claimed counterexample. It is
one of the (Humean) reanalyses that Searle is attempting to resist. But offering the
reanalysis is not making an argument for it. If you think that it is the correct reanalysis,
that is probably because you already endorse Kelsen’s conclusion that ‘[t]he relation
form GTN XX.xx, where XX in Arabic numerals represents the chapter number and xx in roman numerals
represents the section number (if applicable).
2 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (2nd ed, ed L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch, Oxford 1975),
3.1.1.
3 John R. Searle, ‘How to Derive “Ought” from “Is”’, Philosophical Review 73 (1964), 43.

Normativity (in Kelsen and otherwise) 19
between Is and Ought is one of irreducible duality.’ You have done nothing to show
that this conclusion is correct.
Personally, I share Searle’s broadly Aristotelian resistance to Hume’s law. I mention
that mainly by way of a declaration of interest. In the following remarks I will not make
any case against Hume’s law. What I aim to do here is merely to draw attention to some
ways in which the claim that ‘[t]he relation between Is and Ought is one of irreducible
duality’ can easily be made to seem more plausible than it is. What I will suggest is that
there are several different distinctions in the neighbourhood, and that the sense of an
‘irreducible duality’ is mainly owed to their conflation. Since Kelsen is an arch-conflat-
er of these distinctions, and one of the few to conflate them openly, deliberately, and
even proudly, he will be figuring prominently in a lot of what follows. Towards the end
we will, however, turn away from our engagement with Kelsen towards some preoc-
cupations of contemporary moral and legal philosophers. I will suggest that they are
overblown or misdirected preoccupations.
2. Norms and Oughts
What does any of this have to do with my title, ‘Normativity’? ‘Normativity’ is an un-
countable noun confected from the adjective ‘normative’, while ‘normative’ is in turn
an adjective derived from the countable noun ‘norm’. Maybe I am too literal-minded,
but it strikes me as natural to suppose that normativity is the property that all and only
normative things have, and things are normative if and only if they are norms. This
agrees with Kelsen’s usage, although he uses the word ‘normativity’ very rarely (e. g.
GTN 45 n114).4 More interesting and important, for present purposes, is that Kelsen
regards the world of norms as co-extensive with the world of Oughts, and normativity,
accordingly, as a property of all and only Oughts. I have given this contribution the
title ‘Normativity’ partly because it helps us to focus on this Kelsenian doctrine.
Norms, for Kelsen as for most students of the subject, are of various distinct types.
In his terminology, each distinct type has a different ‘normative function’ (GTN 1.V).
The main types of norms recognized and discussed by Kelsen (as by Hart, von Wright,
Raz, and many other students of the subject5) are the obligation-imposing, power-con-
ferring, and permission-granting types.6 Yet this variety of ‘normative functions’ lands
4 He is more promiscuous with the word ‘normative’ which is used in as many as 45 of his 61 chapters.
5 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford 1961), 26–32 (on obligations v powers) and 246n (on permis-
sions); G. H. von Wright, Norm and Action (London 1963), ch V (on obligations v permissions) and ch X
(on powers); Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (London 1975), chs 2 and 3.
6 Kelsen adds the ‘derogating’ type, but this seems to reflect a muddle on his part between the typology of
norms and the sub-typology of normative powers. Derogating is exercising a power that makes an action
permissible (either in the sense of removing an obligation or in the sense of yielding a separate permissive
norm). See GTN 25.IV for evidence of the muddle.

20 JOHN GARDNER †
Kelsen with some unique terminological challenges. If, as Kelsen wants to say, the world
of norms and the world of Oughts are co-extensive, then, as he points out, ‘the word
“ought” is being used in a broader sense than is usual’ (GTN 25.II). More specifically:
According to common usage, ‘ought’ corresponds only to commanding; ‘can’ corresponds
to empowering and ‘may’ to permitting. We say ‘He “ought”’ only of the person to whom
something is commanded; we say ‘He “may”’ of the person to whom something is per-
mitted and ‘He “can”’ of the person empowered to do something. If we say that even an
empowering norm decrees an ‘ought’ and that an ‘ought’ obtains even in the case of a per-
mission – since empowering and permitting are essentially related to an Ought – then
the word ‘ought’ expresses the three normative functions (commanding, empowering, and
permitting). (GTN 25.II)
This is not what I find strange. What I find strange is not how broadly Kelsen uses
the word ‘ought’, but by contrast how narrowly he uses it. Consider this passage:
The norm which decrees a certain behaviour to be obligatory institutes a value. The
judgement that some behaviour is ‘valuable’ or ‘has value’ (and in this sense, is ‘good’)
means that this behaviour is decreed to be obligatory in a norm, is the content of an
Ought. (GTN 16.III)
We will talk more about values below, and particularly about the relationship between
obligation-norms and values that is suggested in the first sentence. But for present pur-
poses, let’s think about the second sentence. It identifies the value or goodness of an
action with the action’s obligatoriness. Thus there are no valuable or good non-ob-
ligatory actions. This seems extremely implausible. To take just one kind of valuable
action thereby annihilated, what about supererogatory actions, also known as ‘actions
beyond the call of duty’? Possibly Kelsen believes that there are no supererogatory
actions. But that hardly seems to warrant his ruling out their existence by definition,
such that anyone who thinks that there are supererogatory actions, and that it can be
valuable to perform them, must be making a mistake about the very concept of value.
Perhaps denying the intelligibility of belief in supererogation is not Kelsen’s only
option. Instead he could conceivably invoke his ‘broader sense of the word “ought”’
and argue that supererogatory actions can be fitted into his normative taxonomy in a
different place. They are actions that one is permitted not to perform. Now to fit them
into his category of valuable actions he only has to make a minor modification:
The judgement that some behaviour is ‘valuable’ or ‘has value’ (and in this sense, is ‘good’)
means that this behaviour is decreed to be obligatory or permitted to be omitted in a norm.
We may agree with the proposal that supererogatory actions are actions that one is
permitted not to perform. They are regulated, in that negative way, by a permissive

norm.7 The difficulty is, however, that this is clearly not the feature of supererogatory
actions that entails their value. Many actions are permitted to be omitted without be-
ing supererogatory and without any implications as to the value of performing them.
Under the conditions of my train fare, I am permitted to break my journey overnight or
not to do so, at my discretion. Nothing is implied about the value of doing either. True,
breaking my journey overnight becomes supererogatory if, for example, I do it at the
cost of some personal inconvenience to assist a stranger who is taken ill on the train.
The value of the action lies in the assistance I thereby provide. Relative to that value,
however, the permission not to perform the action is a surprise and a puzzle. It is even
known among philosophers as ‘the problem of supererogation’.8 Given their value, why
are supererogatory actions not obligatory? Why, in spite of that value, are they permit-
ted to be omitted? The suggested modification to Kelsen’s claim about value turns this
question upside down. It makes it the case that actions that one is permitted to omit
are eo ipso valuable to perform. That is a crazy position to take.

Of course Kelsen might challenge my example: he might say that my assisting the
stranger on the train is an obligation, perhaps a moral obligation of which my legal
permission to break my journey overnight happily facilitates the fulfilment. Then he is
able to accommodate the case in his original formulation. But he has to be able to give
this answer not only for this case but for all alleged cases of supererogation. And if he
does, that brings him back to his original difficulty. He is not only denying that there
are cases of supererogation. He is denying the intelligibility of the category. He is not
solving the problem of supererogation but denying that there could possibly be any
such problem.
3. Reasons beyond norms
The problem of supererogation can be restated as a problem, not about values, but
about reasons. Supererogatory actions are those that one has powerful (possibly de-
cisive) reasons to perform, but that one is permitted not to perform because of the
burden of performing them. There can also be actions that one has powerful (possibly
decisive) reasons to perform but that one has no obligation to perform, never mind
any permission not to perform them.9 Your severe symptoms give you decisive reasons
to see your doctor, but you have no obligation to see her. Your love of Hitchcock gives
7 For an influential analysis in these terms, see Joseph Raz, ‘Permissions and Supererogation’, American
Philosophical Quarterly 12 (1975), 161.
8 Roderick Chisholm and Ernest Sosa, ‘Intrinsic Preferability and the Problem of Supererogation’, Synthese
16 (1966), 321.
9 It follows that not every action that one has no duty to perform is ‘beyond the call of duty’ in the sense
that can (in suitable cases) make its performance supererogatory. Only actions that one has no duty to
perform and that one is permitted not to perform can be supererogatorily performed. Thus the kind of

22 JOHN GARDNER †
you decisive reasons to see the new print of Vertigo, but you have no obligation to see
it. Of these actions one might say: they are actions that one ought to perform even
though it is not the case that one ought to perform them. Putting it that way invites
the charge of contradiction. But there is no contradiction. It is just that there is more
than one sense in which we say of an action that it ought to be performed. Sometimes
we mean that the action is obligatory; on other occasions we mean only that there are
powerful, perhaps decisive, reasons to perform it. Kelsen does not discuss the latter
case any more than he discusses the case of supererogation. That is because these are
cases, if I may put it this way, of an ‘ought’ without any norm that corresponds to it.
The action ought to be performed, and it is a valuable action to perform, but those facts
hold irrespective of any ‘commanding, empowering, or permitting’ norm.
Just as some deny that there can be supererogation, so some deny that there can be
an action that one has decisive reason to perform but that one has no obligation to
perform. Some utilitarians, for example, would subscribe to the view that I have an ob-
ligation to perform whichever action I have decisive reason to perform.10 But that is a
substantive principle. It admits the conceptual distinction between having an obligation
and having a decisive reason. Does Kelsen also admit it? To put it another way, does he
admit the existence of actions that one ought to perform but not by virtue of any norm
under which one ought to perform them? Perhaps he would say that, in the examples
of the severe symptoms and of the new Hitchcock print, the way to go is to differentiate
different normative points of view. One lacks both a moral obligation and a legal obliga-
tion, perhaps, but couldn’t it be that one falls under an analogously commanding norm
from the point of view of prudence or from the point of view of aesthetic appreciation?
Perhaps he would say that.11 But the answer does not solve his problem.
That is because, in order to solve his problem, it is not enough for him to assimi-
late only decisive reasons to the world of norms. We need to know how to think about
reasons more generally, whether decisive or not. Do they or do they not belong to the
domain of Ought? So now we see the strange narrowness of Kelsen’s use of the word
‘ought’. If no norm, he says, then no ought. But what if, in spite of there being no norm,
there are reasons? If I assert that you have a reason, probably not a decisive one, to eat
a hot lunch on a winter’s day, where does my assertion stand in Kelsen’s ‘irreducible
duality of Ought and Is’? Does it stand on the ‘Ought’ side or the ‘Is’ side?
permission involved in supererogation is not just absence of duty, which Kelsen calls ‘negative permission’
(GTN 31). It is the kind of permission that exists under a distinct permissive norm.
10 E. g. Peter Singer, ‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1972), 229; Shelly
Kagan, The Limits of Morality (Oxford 1991).
11 He turns to the metaphysics of ‘points of view’ for some similar purposes, e. g. in GTN 58 note 163.

4. Reasons with and without values
Ontologically, reasons are facts, and that may dispose one to place reasons on the ‘Is’
side. What reason do you have to eat a hot lunch on a winter’s day? The fact that a hot
lunch will stop you shivering is one reason; the fact that a hot lunch will help keep
winter flu at bay is another. But one may think that the ontological classification is a
red herring. As Kelsen says:
By the very nature of things, even a statement about a norm is an is-statement, a statement
about the specific existence (an Is) of a norm (an Ought). But the ‘Is’ of an ‘Ought’, the
existence of a norm, is something different from the existence of a fact; it is an ideel and not
a ‘real’ Is or existence. (GTN 41)
So there is the fact that a norm exists (e. g. the fact of my obligation). That is differ-
ent, thinks Kelsen from the fact of a ‘real’ fact’s existence. We may worry a little about
the scare-quote-marks around ‘real’. But we may yet be tempted by the thought that the
‘“Is” of an “Ought”’ is something special, and we may think that in this respect the fact
of the norm is no different from the fact that constitutes the reason. Both are facts only,
so to speak, within the normative domain.
They are something special, then, but what makes them special? It is tempting to
return here to the relation with values. If I have a reason to φ, and a fortiori if my φing is
obligatory, doesn’t that entail that there is some value in my φing? In Kelsen’s version:
When a norm decrees behaviour to be obligatory, the actual behaviour which agrees with
the norm can be judged (i. e. evaluated) as valuable or good, and the behaviour which does
not agree with the norm as ‘disvaluable’ or bad. As was indicated previously, this norm
institutes a value, if we mean by ‘value’ agreement with a norm and by ‘disvalue’ failure to
agree with a norm. When a certain behaviour is objectively – i. e. purely cognitively – as-
serted to agree or not with a norm presupposed to be valid (and in this sense is evaluated),
the norm serves as a standard of value. (GTN 30)
Notice that Kelsen is a deontologist, i. e. one who believes that the norm institutes the
value, rather than the value instituting the norm. Be that as it may, we may think that
what makes the “‘Is’ of the ‘Ought’” into something special is the place of value in it.
Where there are reasons and norms there are values, and that is what takes reasons and
norms out of ‘ordinary’ facticity. Thus:
The duality of Is and Ought coincides with that of reality and value. … In the case of an
objective value-judgment, the value cannot … be understood as a property of reality, as a
colour is a real property of a real object. That something real is objectively ‘valuable’ means
that an Is agrees with an Ought. (GTN 16.III)
Again, we may worry about the possibly tendentious use of the world ‘real’ here. But
making a value-realist attack on Kelsen is not our immediate priority. Instead, our

24 JOHN GARDNER †
question is whether the domain of Ought is coextensive with the domain of value,
once we are thinking of both norms and reasons as belonging to the domain of Ought.
The answer is that it is not.
Consider epistemic reasons, reasons to believe. That I have reasons to believe P,
even decisive reasons to believe P, does not entail or even suggest that there is any
value in my believing P. My belief that it is a warm day outside may be supported by
evidence (people are walking by without coats), by testimony (I was told by my friend
who visited earlier), and by perception (I can feel the warm air through the window).
I have decisive reasons to believe that the day is warm. But what is the value of my be-
lieving this, while I lie incapacitated in my hospital bed? Perhaps the belief only adds
to the curse of my incapacitation. Likewise, while I am bed-ridden, what is the value of
my believing that the bus to town will be leaving in seven minutes, or that today there
is a strike on the railways? There is no value in my believing either of these things since
I am not going anywhere and I don’t have anyone else who is going anywhere to whom
I could impart the information. And yet I have decisive reasons to believe both of these
things: for both the bus timetable and the local newspaper are right here on my bed-
side table. Epistemic reasons, to put it crudely, are reasons that do not correspond to
any value in the thing that they are reasons for.
Could we not say that the truth of one’s beliefs is a value in its own right, and that
this is the value served by epistemic reasons? Kelsen rightly rejects this option:
‘Good’ is a value, a moral or legal value, according to whether it is a moral or a legal norm
which institutes this value. If we also conceive of truth as a ‘value’, as a logical or theoretical
value (as opposed to a moral or legal value which is a practical value), we might believe
that the desired parallel or analogy between a statement and a norm can be justified by the
claim that both are related in some way to values.
But this is not possible: there is no parallel or analogy between the being-true of a state-
ment and the being-good of behaviour, between the judgment that a statement is true and
the judgment that behaviour is morally or legally good. The latter is a genuine value-judg-
ment, but not the former. (GTN 45.I)
But this leaves Kelsen with a difficulty. What are we to say about epistemic reasons,
reasons to believe? Being reasons that do not correspond to value in what they are
reasons for, do they belong to the domain of Ought or the domain of Is?
Kelsen offers no answer. He says nothing about epistemic reasons or epistemic
norms. In developing his view that truth is not a value, he thinks only of logic, not epis-
temology. He concludes that the so-called norms of logic are not truly norms:
There do not exist any norms of logic prescribing that statements are to be true, and thus
instituting truth as a logical value. Logic is not a ‘normative’ science. … Acts of thought as
such are not subject to any norms at all (GTN 45.III)

We may regard the claim that the norms of logic are not truly norms as a reductio.12 It
shows only that Kelsen’s General Theory of Norms is not an explanation of norms in
general, but only of a certain specialised type of norms. Be that as it may, the omission
of attention to epistemic norms raises independent doubts about Kelsen’s bold con-
clusion. Cannot a belief be unjustified? Cannot a believer be biased, gullible, supersti-
tious, prejudiced in her reasoning towards her beliefs? Are these not faults relative to
her cognition of truth? And if they are faults, should Kelsen not also say that they con-
stitute or entail epistemic norm-violations, notwithstanding that truth is not a value?
5. Normativity deconflated
Allow me to recap. The distinction between the world of norms and what lies outside
it does not correspond to the distinction between the world of reasons and what lies
outside it, for there are reasons beyond norms, for example those that tell in favour
of supererogatory action. The distinction between the world of reasons and what lies
outside it does not correspond to the distinction between the world of value and what
lies outside it, for there are epistemic reasons as well as practical ones. Finally, for com-
pleteness, the distinction between the world of norms and what lies outside it does not
correspond to the distinction between the world of values and what lies outside it, for
there are epistemic norms as well as epistemic reasons, and neither corresponds to any
kind of epistemic value. There are three quite different distinctions here. Kelsen con-
flates them. But now we know they are different: Which, we may wonder, constitutes
the ‘irreducible duality’ of Ought and Is? Now that we know that there are three differ-
ent distinctions in the neighbourhood, should we still agree with Kelsen’s claim that
The difference between Is and Ought cannot be explained any further: We are immediate-
ly aware of the difference (GTN 17)
6. The special problem of legal normativity
Many contemporary philosophers fret about normativity, and in particular about how
normativity is possible.13 But often they are not fretting about normativity in my liter-
al-minded sense, i. e. about the property or properties in virtue of which a norm is a
norm. Often their concerns extend beyond norms to reasons that are not norms. In
framing a question about reasons, irrespective of whether they are norms, one might
12 But cf Gilbert Harman, ‘Logic and Reasoning’, Synthese 60 (1984), 107.

13 For some recent high-quality fretting, see David Plunkett, Scott Shapiro, and Kevin Toh, Dimensions of
Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence (Oxford 2019).

26 JOHN GARDNER †
expect them to have used the word ‘rationality’ instead of the word ‘normativity’. They
might have asked: How is rationality possible? But that would be a rather misleading
way to express their question. For the word ‘rationality’ is widely used to designate the
capacity or propensity to respond to reasons, to follow reasons, or to use reasons in
one’s reasoning. In this sense it is a property, not of the reason, but of the reason-user.
By contrast, the word ‘normativity’ is not in everyday use so it can be given a technical
meaning for philosophical purposes. And perhaps the technical meaning is something
like this. Normativity designates the property or properties in virtue of which a reason
is a reason. Or, to put it differently, normativity is what differentiates a fact that is a
reason from a fact that is not a reason.
I said that many philosophers writing about normativity fret about how normativity
is possible. They are attempting, we may now think, to address deep doubts about the
very possibility of reasons. The doubts, however, come from two contrasting direc-
tions, reflected in two contrasting literatures. Among philosophers of law, the doubts
are mainly about how so-called ‘legal reasons’ can possibly qualify as reasons. After all,
as Kelsen and others taught us, law is a human creation. It is found in or supervenes
upon legislative acts, judicial decisions, and customary practices. It is therefore mor-
ally fallible. At least sometimes it purports to give us reasons to act which are morally
invalid and which, apart from fidelity to the law, there is no reason to treat as reasons.
In that case fidelity to the law is surely irrational. So why do we classify legal reasons
as reasons? Why not go straight to the moral reasons, relative to which these so-called
legal reasons turn out to be nothing but extremely unreliable intermediaries? Call this
the ‘special problem of legal normativity’.
You will see right away that the special problem of legal normativity is not one that
could be encountered by Kelsen. That is because Kelsen regards morality as just anoth-
er normative order operating with a given social space:
Morality is just as much a social order as law, and an individual is just as subject to the
morality which is valid in the social group to which he belongs as he is subject to the law
which is valid in the social group to which he belongs. (GTN 1 note 4)
Like law, morality is a human creation. Law does not answer to morality any more than
morality answers to law. Nor is there any third thing to which both law and morality
answer:
The Natural Law … is [supposed to be] … a system of norms which is immanent in nature
and which is posited by the will of nature. There is, and there can be, no such law. The name
‘Natural Law’ is given to whatever appears just to a given Natural Law teacher, which he
then projects onto ‘nature’ in order to give it the necessary authority. (GTN 35 note 90)
Those who worry about the special problem of legal normativity think, on the con-
trary, that there is something, a set of reasons beyond the law, to which the law must
answer. Morality is the name generally given to this set of reasons.

One might say that, for Kelsen, both law and morality are relative, whereas for those
who worry about the special problem of legal normativity, law is relative whereas mo-
rality is real. Those who worry about the special problem of legal normativity worry
about how relative reasons are possible, given the existence of real reasons. What space
could there be in rational thought for reasons that lack the status of real reasons? There
is no such problem for Kelsen, since the relative is, so to speak, as real as anything in
the domain of Ought ever gets. Everything there is valid only relative to some system
of norms. There is no normative reality beyond that. Remember Kelsen’s rebuke:
[T]he ‘Is’ of an ‘Ought’, the existence of a norm, is something different from the existence
of a fact; it is an ideel and not a ‘real’ Is or existence. (GTN 41)
These words, however, tend to suggest a problem with talk of the ‘real’ and the ‘relative’.
It is not totally clear what is meant by either term. Even Kelsen must resort to scare-
quotes around the word ‘real’ to convey that fact. Elsewhere, responding to that termi-
nological problem, I have suggested a different way of formulating the special problem
of legal normativity. I have suggested that we think of legal reasons as escapable and
moral reasons as inescapable.14 The idea is that there is an intelligible question of why
I should follow, or even pay attention to, legal reasons. Further reasons, not local to
the law, are needed for caring about what the law says. That is the sense in which legal
reasons are escapable. But there is no intelligible question of why I should follow, and
more generally pay attention to, moral reasons. No further reason is called for. They
are among the reasons that are mine to follow, and more generally to attend to, just in
virtue of my being a rational agent, i. e. an agent with the capacity to follow and attend
to reasons.
Formulated in these terms, the special problem of legal normativity becomes: Why
attend to these so-called escapable reasons, given that not doing so is ex hypothesi not
irrational? Why not just follow the inescapable reasons, such as the moral ones, direct-
ly? I already hinted at the answer. For escapable reasons, the question arises of why I
should follow them or more generally pay attention to them. The answer to that ‘why’
question needs to be given, ultimately, in terms of inescapable reasons. But it does not
follow that one could leap straight to the inescapable reasons and ignore the escapable
ones. Suppose I am advised to follow the law, or I promise to conform to the law, or I
debate whether I have an obligation to obey the law, or I warrant that I am acting with-
in the law, or I take on a role that requires me to support the rule of law. Naturally there
14 John Gardner, ‘Nearly Natural Law’, American Journal of Jurisprudence 52 (2007), 1, reprinted with minor
corrections in my book Law as a Leap of Faith (Oxford 2012). In his ‘Escapable Law: John Gardner on Law
and Morality’, Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies (forthcoming) Leslie Green makes some telling criticisms
of the escapable/inescapable distinction as I originally presented it. I have presented it here in a way that is
supposed to steer clear of most of his criticisms. However a couple of criticisms in section 3 of his paper do
strike me as rather relativistic and I make no attempt to steer clear of these!

28 JOHN GARDNER †
arise questions about the soundness of the advice, the bindingness of the promise, the
basis of the obligation, the truth of my warranty and the legitimacy of the role. These
questions arise at the level of inescapable reasons. But if there are such reasons they
refer to the law, which ex hypothesi a system of escapable reasons. The relevant ques-
tion is whether I have any inescapable reasons to resort to certain escapable reasons.
The escapable reasons do not become redundant just because there is a question of
whether I have inescapable reasons to resort to them. On the contrary: it is only if they
are not redundant – i. e. if resorting to them would make some difference – that I could
possibly have inescapable reasons to resort to them. There can be no reason to resort
to anything if resorting to it makes no rational difference.
Some people seem to be squeamish about calling escapable reasons, such as legal
reasons, ‘reasons’. Much ink was spilt among philosophers of law over the ages in trying
to establish that either legal reasons are inescapable or they are not reasons at all. But
why so? Presumably those who are squeamish about calling escapable reasons ‘rea-
sons’ would also be squeamish about calling escapable norms ‘norms’. Here they could
learn from Kelsen. Since Kelsen thought all norms escapable, his work provides a test
case for the cogency of the view that escapable norms are norms. One may think, as I
think, that he got a lot of things about norms wrong, including quite a few things about
legal norms. But one thing that he clearly did not get wrong is that legal norms are
norms in spite of being escapable (or ‘relative’) norms. Why be more squeamish about
calling escapable reasons ‘reasons’ than one would be about calling escapable norms
‘norms’? Is it is a norm of Monopoly that one must pay rent if one lands on another
player’s property. So there is a reason, so far as playing Monopoly goes, to pay such
rent. Naturally that does not allow one to avoid the further question of whether one
has any reason to play Monopoly. It is just that such a reason, which ultimately needs to
be inescapable, makes essential reference to the escapable reasons given by Monopoly
itself. For it is ex hypothesi a reason to play Monopoly, with all its crazy norms and
bizarre reasons (all fortunately escapable).
7. The special problem of moral normativity
If all this is right, then the special problem of legal normativity is not so much of a
problem. It is a storm in a teacup. So we turn our attention now to doubts that come
from precisely the opposite direction. They are doubts about what I call inescapable
reasons. How can there be such things? How can any reason, or for that matter any
norm, have such a hold over us? This might be called the ‘special problem of moral
normativity’ for it is most often raised in connection with moral reasons and moral
norms. But that already shows where one error is creeping in. For the same question
arises with various other kinds of reasons and norms. It arises with respect to pruden-
tial reasons and norms, for example. How can my own future have such a hold over me

that I ought to keep an eye on my own health and my own pension? An interesting fea-
ture of some writing that treats moral normativity as a special problem is that it treats
prudential normativity as fait accompli, and attempts (often in a contractarian spirit)
to build moral normativity out of it.15 But such a line of argument is hard to maintain
for long. What problem does morality throw up on this front that prudence does not?
Both moral and prudential reasons and norms have an inescapable hold over rational
beings, and inescapability is supposed to be the puzzling feature of reasons that is be-
ing explored under the heading of ‘normativity’.
More importantly, perhaps, the same question arises with respect to epistemic rea-
sons and epistemic norms. For they too are inescapable.16 There is no intelligible ques-
tion of why I should follow them. No further reason is called for. They are among the
reasons that are mine to follow, and more generally to attend to, just in virtue of my
being a rational agent, i. e. an agent with the capacity to follow and to attend to reasons.
Why is the intense worry about the normativity of moral reasons not paralleled, then,
by a no less intense worry about the normativity of epistemic reasons? This is a par-
ticularly important challenge if we think that what we are looking for is some mysteri-
ous ingredient X that differentiates a fact that is a reason from a fact that is not a reason.
For surely all facts are epistemic reasons. Any fact that we become aware of supports
the inference to some further belief beyond belief in that very fact. Everything is evi-
dence of something else. If that is true, and if we accept that normativity in the relevant
sense is a property of facts that are inescapable reasons, then there is no ingredient X
that must be added to a fact to turn it into a reason. Rather, the question turns into this
one: why is this particular fact a reason for this particular response? And that is not a
problem unique to inescapable reasons. Even of legal reasons and Monopoly reasons
we have the problem of why this legal or ludic fact is a reason for that response by a
competent reason-user. This is surely not a problem of normativity but of relevance. It
is not about how reasons can have their inescapable hold over us. It is about what is to
be done with them once (inescapably or otherwise) they have their hold over us. It is
about what rationalises what.
Thinking about epistemic reasons alongside moral reasons has another advantage in
defusing worries about moral normativity. It is part of the nature of a belief, as opposed
15 A no-nonsense example is David Gauthier’s Morals by Agreement (Oxford 1987): ‘Morality, we shall
argue, can be generated as a rational constraint from the non-moral [=prudential] premisses of rational
choice’ (4).
16 Brian Leiter writes: ‘Even in the theoretical domain, there is no real normativity, no norms of belief …
the agent must adhere to.’ Leiter, ‘Normativity for Naturalists’, Philosophical Issues 25 (2016), 64 at 75. This is
perhaps an attempt to deny the inescapability of epistemic reasons and norms. If so it is misleadingly put.
That epistemic reasons and norms are inescapable does not mean that any particular epistemic reason or
norm is inescapable. Probably there is room for diversity in approach or technique in arriving at defensible
beliefs. Defensibly, some rely more heavily on testimony, some on perception, etc. That is compatible with
the inescapability (or what Leiter calls ‘real normativity’) of epistemic reasons and norms taken as a set.

30 JOHN GARDNER †
to delusions, flights of fancy, etc. that it responds to reasons for believing. If one is not
believing for reasons then one is not exactly believing. Of course sometimes one may
get the reasons wrong. But even then there is the question of whether one gets the
reasons wrong for reasons. Did one miss the evidence, or misperceive what was going
on, for a reason? Responsiveness to the world – to the facts – is part of what it takes
to be a believer. Belief, in that sense, entails rationality. Is this not equally true with
action? How can one act without intending? And how can one intend if not by acting
for what one takes to be reasons? And if one mistakes what are not reasons for reasons,
again there is the question of whether one did so for reasons. As lawyers put it, if not
justified was one at least excused? Again these are questions that presuppose that we
are dealing with rational beings, beings with the capacity and the propensity for paying
attention to and making use of reasons. And there we have the answer to the supposed
problem of the normativity of moral reasons. As rational beings we cannot but engage
with reasons, at any rate the inescapable ones. And among inescapable reasons, mor-
al reasons are nothing special in respect of their inescapability. Their hold over us as
rational beings is no different from the hold of prudential reasons, epistemic reasons,
and various other inescapable reasons.
I say that moral reasons and epistemic reasons are alike in respect of their hold over
us. But we already know that they are unalike in another way. Where there are reasons
for action there is value in our doing as they would have us do. Where there are rea-
sons for belief, there need be no value in our believing as they would have us believe.
If there is something to discuss in ethics that does not equally arise in epistemology,
it is that. Could it be that those who believe in the existence of a special problem of
moral normativity are really just worried about the place of value in the world? If so,
their problem does not extend to epistemology, but it does still extend to prudence,
and one wonders why they regard it as a special problem for morality. But one may also
ask whether the problem is as intimately connected with our place in the world as the
talk of ‘normativity’ leads one to expect. For there is value in the world whether or
not there are extant valuers to experience it. The question is not how value comes to
be relevant to us or how we come to be locked into engaging with it. We are rational
beings, to whom (hence) reasons apply, including practical reasons, which by their
nature bring us into constant encounters with the value all around us. The problem,
rather, is in the nature of the world. I am not sure that we are well-served by thinking
of this as a problem of norms and normativity, or even of reasons and rationality. It is
a mistake to think that value is there for the sake of valuers. Valuers, on the contrary,
are there for the sake of value.17 If the special problem of moral normativity is really the
quite different problem of the existence of value, then I think we should be told.
17 Tim Macklem and I explore this theme further (and with more subtlety) in ‘Value, Interest and Well-Be-
ing’, Utilitas 18 (2006), 362.

Hans Kelsen’s Legal Theory in the System
of Non-Positivism
ROBERT ALEXY*
Abstract: Hans Kelsen is a positivist. This, however, does not mean that his ideas are with-
out significance for non-positivism. The opposite is the case. Non-positivism, as a theory
of existing law, is necessarily a theory of the dual nature of law, that is, of its real or factual
dimension as well as its ideal or critical dimension. This implies that non-positivism neces-
sarily includes elements of positivism. At this point the question arises as to which kind of
positivism best fits with non-positivism. The answer to this question is Kelsen’s positivism.
Keywords: Positivism, non-positivism, Hans Kelsen’s non-naturalism, basic norm, norma-

tivity, non-positivistic basic norm
Schlagworte: Positivismus, Nichtpositivismus, Hans Kelsens Nichtnaturalismus, Grund-

norm, Normativität, nichtpositivistische Grundnorm
Some months before his death on January 7, 2018, Ralf Dreier published an article
with the title “Integratives Verstehen – eine Bilanz” (Integrative Understanding – a
Balance). There he takes stock of his intellectual life. We read that he has fluctuated not
only between Habermas and Luhmann but especially between Kant and Hegel, and
also between Kelsen and Radbruch.1 We learn that the Kelsen-Radbruch fluctuation
concerned him not only over a long period of time, but, indeed, right up to the day
he wrote the article.2 These fluctuations can be understood in two ways: first, as an
oscillation between all-or-nothing alternatives, that is, either to accept all the theses
* I should like to thank Stanley L. Paulson for suggestions and advice on matters of English style.
1 Ralf Dreier, Integratives Verstehen – eine Bilanz, in: Rechtsphilosophie und Grundrechtstheorie Robert
Alexys System, ed. Martin Borowski, Stanley L. Paulson, and Jan Sieckmann, Tübingen 2017, 586.
2 Ibid., 583.

32 ROBERT ALEXY
essential for Kelsen or to accept all the theses essential for Radbruch, or, second, as an
attempt to connect elements from both camps. The concept of integrative understand-
ing in the title of Dreier’s article points in the direction of connection. Still, talk about
connections, like talk about middle ways in general, is of little value if the connections
are not constructed in a sufficiently precise way. To contribute to such a construction
is the purpose of my paper.
I. The System of Non-Positivism
Kelsen is a positivist, Radbruch a non-positivist. Positivism and non-positivism are

two theses that contradict each other. Positivism says that there exists no necessary
connection between law and morality. Non-positivism says that there does exist a
necessary connection between law and morality. If one could say nothing more about
positivism and non-positivism than this, there would be little reason to enquire about
connections between positivism and non-positivism. Fortunately, one can, and, in-
deed, must say more. One way to do so is to relate elements of Kelsen’s legal theory to
elements of the system of non-positivism.
All positivistic conceptions of the nature of law refer to two, and only two, elements
of the definition of law: authoritative issuance and social efficacy. These two elements
concern the real or factual dimension of law. All serious non-positivistic conceptions
add to these real or factual elements a third element. It refers to the ideal or critical
dimension of law: moral correctness, first and foremost justice.3 This is the thesis of
the dual nature of law.4 The dual-nature thesis connects a positive side of law with a
non-positive side. With this, the path leading to a construction of the connection of el-
ements of Kelsen’s theory and non-positivism is opened. But to open a path is different
from traveling on it. For this, a look at the system of non-positivism is indispensable.
The system of non-positivism consists of a center, a conceptual framework, and impli-
cations based on both.
1. The Centre: Claim to Correctness
The centre or the Archimedean point of the system of non-positivism is the argument
from correctness.5 This argument says that law necessarily raises a claim to correctness,
and that this claim refers not only to the real dimension of law, but also to its ideal
3 Robert Alexy, The Argument from Injustice A Reply to Legal Positivism (first pub. 1992), trans. Bonnie
Litschewski Paulson and Stanley L. Paulson, Oxford 2002, 3–4.
4 Robert Alexy, The Dual Nature of Law, Ratio Juris 23 (2010), 167.
5 See on this Alexy, The Argument from Injustice (n. 3 above). 35–9.

Hans Kelsen’s Legal Theory in the System of Non-Positivism 33
dimension,6 that is, to moral correctness, first and foremost to justice.7 The argument
from correctness is the source of the necessary connection between law and morality.
Thus, it is not surprising, that many objections have been raised against it.8 These ob-
jections cannot be discussed here. In the present context, only one point is of interest.
Kelsen apparently ascribes a certain thesis to all forms of non-positivism, namely, the
idea “that an immoral social system is not law presupposes an absolute morality, that
is to say, a morality that is valid everywhere and at all times”.9 This idea of Kelsen’s
seems to refer to a morality that is connected with three universal quantifiers, that is,
with three “alls”: all places in space, all points in time, and – although not explicit,
this is implicit in the sentence quoted – all moral questions. I completely agree with
Kelsen that such a morality does not exist and, therefore, cannot be the result of “sci-
entific cognition”.10 But this most radical form of moral cognitivism is by no means a
presupposition of the claim to correctness thesis, and, thereby, of non-positivism. To
be sure, the claim to correctness thesis would lose its sense if everywhere everything
were always morally possible. In this case, nothing but decisions – in Kelsen’s theory,
decisions backed by empowerment – would rule the agenda. Countering this decision
thesis, however, there is the argumentation thesis. It says that rational argumentation
on moral questions is possible, for there exists a system of rules, principles, and forms
of rational practical discourse.11 Discourse theory does not say that there exists just one
right answer in all cases. But it says that some answers are discursively necessary, some
discursively impossible, and some merely discursively possible. Discursively necessary
is what is required by the rules of discourse either directly or indirectly, that is, with ref-
erence to the procedure of discourse. Human rights and democracy belong here.12 Dis-
cursively impossible is what is excluded by the rules of discourse. The racial principle
6 Robert Alexy, Legal Certainty and Correctness, Ratio Juris 28 (2015), 444.
7 Alexy, The Dual Nature of Law (n. 4 above), 168–72.
8 See, for instance, Eugenio Bulygin, Alexy und das Richtigkeitsargument, in: Rechtsnorm und Rechtswirkli-
chkeit Festschrift für Werner Krawietz, ed. Aulis Aarnio, Stanley L. Paulson, Ota Weinberger, Georg Henrik
von Wright, and Dieter Wyduckel, Berlin 1993, 19–24; Robert Alexy, Bulygins Kritik des Richtigkeitsar-
guments in: Normative Systems in Legal and Moral Theory Festschrift for Carlos E Alchourrón and Eugenio
Bulygin, ed. Ernesto Garzón Valdés, Werner Krawietz, Georg Henrik von Wright, and Ruth Zimmerling,
Berlin 1997, 235–50; Eugenio Bulygin, Alexy’s Thesis of the Necessary Connection between Law and Moral-
ity, Ratio Juris 13 (2000), 133–7; Robert Alexy, On the Thesis of a Necessary Connection between Law and
Morality: Bulygin’s Critique, Ratio Juris 13 (2000), 138–47; Eugenio Bulygin, Alexy Between Positivism and
Non-positivism, in: Neutrality and Theory of Law, ed. Jordi Ferrer Beltrán, José Juan Moreso, and Diego M.
Papayannis, Dordrecht 2013, 49–59; Robert Alexy, Between Positivism and Non-positivism? A Third Reply
to Eugenio Bulygin, in: Neutrality and Theory of Law (this note), 225–38.
9 Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, trans. (from the 2nd German Edition, 1960) Max Knight, Berkeley and
Los Angeles 1967, 68.
10 Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (n. 9 above), 63.
11 Robert Alexy, A Theory of Legal Argumentation (first pub. 1978), trans. Ruth Adler and Neil MacCor-
mick, Oxford 1989, 187–206.
12 Robert Alexy, Discourse Theory and Human Rights, Ratio Juris 9 (1996), 220–33.

34 ROBERT ALEXY
(Rassenprinzip) and the leader principle (Führerprinzip), as constitutive for the Third
Reich, belong here. Discursively merely possible is what can be justified without vio-
lation of discourse rules, although the contrary can also be justified without violation
of discourse rules. This applies to the abstract level, which concerns, inter alia, human
rights as such, as well as to the concrete level, which concerns, in the case of human
rights, first and foremost, their application by means of proportionality analysis.13 The
broad area of mere discursive possibility, which comprises what Rawls calls “reasona-
ble disagreement”14, does not deprive the claim to correctness of its sense. To be sure,
when a case cannot be resolved by argument, a decision becomes necessary, in courts
and parliaments normally a majority decision. This is a solution that belongs to the
real dimension of law. But with the claim to correctness, the ideal dimension remains
alive as a regulative idea. Correctness as a regulative idea implies that the institutional
resolution of disagreement remains open for future argumentation.15
2. Conceptual Framework: Two Elements
Conceptual frameworks can be more or less elaborated. Here, only two elements are
of interest: the distinction between the observer’s and the participant’s perspective
and the distinction between classifying and qualifying connections between law and
morality.
a) Observer’s and Participant’s Perspective
The distinction between the observer’s and the participant’s perspective16 is of fun-
damental importance for the construction of the relation between positivism and
non-positivism. In the system of non-positivism, the perspective of the observer is,
with one small exception,17 a positivistic perspective, in contrast to the perspective of
the participant which is essentially a non-positivistic perspective. The observer asks
questions about and adduces arguments on behalf of a position that reflects how legal
questions are actually decided in a legal system, whereas the participant asks questions
about and adduces arguments on behalf of what he deems to be the correct answer to a
13 Robert Alexy, The Absolute and the Relative Dimension of Constitutional Rights, Oxford Journal of
Legal Studies 37 (2017), 46–7.
14 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, New York 1993, 55.
15 Alexy, The Absolute and the Relative Dimension of Constitutional Rights (n. 13 above), 47.
16 Alexy, The Argument from Injustice (n. 3 above), 25.
17 This exception results from the claim to correctness. A system of social rules that does not raise a claim to
correctness is not a legal system; Alexy, The Argument from Injustice (n. 3 above), 34. This conceptual truth con-
cerns, first, the ideal dimension and is, second, inevitable even for one who qualifies himself solely as an observer.

legal question in the legal system in which he finds himself. The observer’s perspective
is defined by the question “How are legal decisions actually made?” the participant’s
by the question “What is the correct legal answer?” These two questions require dif-
ferent kinds of arguments. The observer is confined to fact-based arguments, whereas
the participant, say, a judge, has to adduce, alongside fact-based arguments, normative
arguments that are not fact-based. This applies to all cases that, owing to the “open
texture”18 of law, cannot be resolved solely on the basis of fact-based arguments.19
(1) The Relation between the Two Perspectives
The relation between the two perspectives is asymmetrical, and this for two reasons.
First, all participants must also be observers. Otherwise they could not apply the posi-
tive law. In contrast to this, it is possible to be an observer without being a participant,

that is, to be a pure observer. The second reason for asymmetry is that a legal system
can exist without pure observers, but not without participants. This implies that the
participant’s perspective is more fundamental than that of the pure observer.
(2) Naturalistic and Normativistic Positivism
There exist two kinds of pure observers: naturalistic and

normativistic pure observers, and, therefore, two kinds of NP ¬NP
positivism: naturalistic and normativistic positivism. All
normativistic positivists are non-naturalistic positivists. That
is to say, naturalistic and normativistic positivism stand in
the relation of contradictoriness. If one adds non-positivism
to this, one can formulate a triad in which non-positivism
¬P
stands both to naturalistic positivism and to non-naturalistic
or normativistic positivism in the relation of contrariness:
“P” stands here for “positivism”, “N” for “naturalistic”, and “¬” for negation. One
might call this triad the “naturalism triad”.
18 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 3nd edn., Oxford 2012, 128.

19 The distinction between the observer’s and the participant’s perspective has been criticized from the
positivistic as well as from the non-positivistic side. See, on the one hand, Joseph Raz, The Argument from
Justice, or How Not to Reply to Legal Positivism, in: Law, Rights and Discourse The Legal Philosophy of
Robert Alexy, ed. George Pavlakos, Oxford 2007, 22–5, and, on the other hand, John Finnis, Law as Fact and
as Reason for Action: A Response to Robert Alexy on Law’s “Ideal Dimension”, The American Journal of
Jurisprudence 59 (2014), 86–90. On replies to this, see Alexy, An Answer to Joseph Raz, in: Law, Rights and
Discourse (this note), 45–8, and Robert Alexy, The Ideal Dimension of Law, in: The Cambridge Companion to
Natural Law Jurisprudence, ed. George Duke and Robert P. George, Cambridge 2017, 324–5.

36 ROBERT ALEXY
The question arises: Which of the two positivistic contraries to non-positivism fits
better into the system of non-positivism? The answer is easy: non-naturalistic positiv-
ism. Karl Olivecrona is a paradigmatic representative of naturalism. In his book “Law
as Fact”, published in 1939, Olivecrona maintains, with an eye to Kelsen, that “[t]he
rules of law are a natural cause – among others – of the actions of the judges in cases
of litigation as well as of the behaviour in general of people in relation to each other”.20
One might call this the “natural cause thesis”. In contrast to this, Kelsen, in the first
edition of his “Reine Rechtslehre”, published in 1934, defines “law as norm”,21 and norm
as “meaning”,22 and the “unique sense” of this meaning as “ought”, and “ought” as a
“category”.23 This is the language in which abstract entities are described. Kelsen insists
that norms – and thus, law – can be reduced neither to physical events nor to psychical
processes. They belong not to natural reality but to an “ideal reality”.24 Such an ideal re-
ality, which exists in addition to the physical and the psychical world, would be a “third
realm”25 in the sense of Frege. One might call this the “meaning content thesis”. With its
reference to Frege’s “third realm” or Kelsen’s “ideal reality”, the meaning content thesis
is a rather strong ontological thesis. Its correctness depends on the fourth concept of
Kelsen’s line of concepts used to determine what law is: norm, meaning, ought, and
category. The concept of category leads to the problem of the basic norm. This will be
our theme in the last part of this article. Here, only one point is of interest: the compe-
tition between naturalistic and non-naturalistic positivism.
This competition is decided by the claim to correctness, which stands in the centre
of non-positivism. The claim to correctness is necessarily connected with argumenta-
tion or justification. Correct is what can be justified. Justification is an inferential en-
terprise.26 A correct or rational performance of an inference has to proceed according
to the rules of logic. The rules of logic, however, cannot be directly applied to natural
facts. They can only be applied to propositions, be they propositions about what is, be
they propositions about what ought to be. I would like to call this the “propositionality
thesis”. This implies that naturalistic positivism, as represented by Olivcecrona, is as
such incompatible with non-positivism, whereas non-naturalistic positivism, as repre-
sented by Kelsen, is, in this respect, compatible. In short, the system of non-positivism
includes Kelsen’s non-naturalism.
20 Karl Olivecrona, Law as Fact, Copenhagen and London 1939, 16 (emphasis by R. A.).
21 Hans Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory (first pub. 1934), trans. Bonnie Litschewski
Paulson and Stanley L. Paulson, Oxford 1992, 13.
22 Ibid., 11, 13–4.
23 Ibid., 24.
24 Ibid., 15.
25 Gottlob Frege, The Thought: A Logical Inquiry, in: Philosophical Logic, ed. P. F. Strawson, Oxford 1967,
29.
26 Robert Alexy, The Nature of Legal Philosophy, Ratio Juris 17 (2004), 162.

b) Classifying and Qualifying Connections
The second element of the conceptual framework to be considered here is the distinc-
tion between classifying and qualifying connections between law and morality. This
distinction concerns the effects of moral defects. The effect of a classifying connection
is the loss of legal validity. By contrast, the effect of a qualifying connection is legal
defectiveness or incorrectness that does not, however, undermine legal validity.27 The
decisive point here is that the effect of moral defectiveness or incorrectness is legal
defectiveness or incorrectness. That morally defective laws are morally defective is a
trivial truth. A positivist has no problem agreeing with this. But that these laws are,
over and above this, also legally defective is not only not trivial but, indeed, is of the
greatest significance for the relation between the real and the ideal dimension of law,
and this not only for theoretical reasons, but also for reasons practical in nature. If the
defect were merely a moral one, it would be difficult to explain why a higher court –
independently of what the positive law says – has legal power to set aside the unjust
decision of a lower court in a case in which this unjust decision is every bit as compat-
ible with positive law as a just decision would be.28
3. Implications
The distinction between the classifying and the qualifying connection implies that
three kinds of non-positivism have to be distinguished: exclusive, super-inclusive, and
inclusive non-positivism.29
a) Exclusive Non-Positivism
Exclusive non-positivism is the most radical version of non-positivism. It claims that

every injustice, every moral defect of a norm, precludes its being legally valid, its being
law. A classical version of this view is expressed by Augustine’s statement that “a law

28 Alexy, The Ideal Dimension of Law (n. 19 above), 327.
29 The logical relations between these three forms of non-positivism can be described by means of the
quantifier triad. See on this Robert Alexy, Law, Morality, and the Existence of Human Rights, Ratio Juris
25 (2012), 4–7.

38 ROBERT ALEXY
that is not just would not seem to me to be a law”.30 A recent example is Beyleveld and
Brownsword’s thesis “that immoral rules are not legally valid”.31
Kelsen attributes to non-positivism the thesis “that social norms must have a moral
content, must be just in order to be considered as law”.32 This attribution is correct
with respect to exclusive non-positivism, but incorrect with respect to super-inclusive
and inclusive non-positivism. And the argument, already considered,33 concerning the
limits of moral knowledge, which he connects with this attribution, is correct, too,
but correct only as an argument against exclusive non-positivism, the most vulnerable
form of non-positivism. It is not correct as an argument against super-inclusive and
inclusive non-positivism. Both acknowledge the limits of moral argumentation, that is,
the broad area of mere discursive possibility or reasonable disagreement. That is to say,
non-positivism is not destructed by Kelsen’s destruction of exclusive non-positivism.
b) Super-Inclusive Non-Positivism
Super-inclusive non-positivism is the radical counterpart of exclusive non-positivism.

Super-inclusive non-positivism goes to the other extreme. It maintains that legal va-
lidity is in no way whatever affected by moral defects. At first glance this seems to be a
version of positivism, not of non-positivism. This first impression, however, is wrong
for two reasons. The first results from the distinction between classifying and quali-
fying connections which plays a central role in the system of non-positivism. Even if
legal validity is in no case affected by moral incorrectness, that is, no classifying effect
is assumed in any case of moral defectiveness, a qualifying effect can be assumed in
all cases of moral incorrectness, namely legal defectiveness. Strong tendencies in this
direction are to be found in the work of Aquinas, Kant, and Finnis.34 But this issue
shall not be pursued here. The second reason for the non-identity of super-inclusive
non-positivism with positivism is that super-inclusive non-positivism is compatible
with moral reasons for legal validity, positivism, as related only to the real or factu-
al dimension of law, not. Both reasons will play an important role in answering the
question of whether a basic norm is possible as well as necessary not only in Kelsen’s
non-naturalistic positivism but also in the system of non-positivism. This is the basic
30 Augustinus. De libero arbitrio – Der freie Wille, trans. and ed. Johannes Brachtendorf, Paderborn 2006,
86: “Nam lex mihi esse non videtur, quae iusta non fuerit” (I, 11).
31 Deryck Beylevld and Roger Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw, Oxford 2001, 76.
32 Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (n. 9 above), 64 (trans. alt.). See further Kelsen’s interpretation of non-posi-
tivism as the “thesis that law is moral according to its nature”, ibid., 68 (trans. alt).
33 Above, 31–2.
34 Alexy, The Dual Nature of Law (n. 4 above), 176; Alexy, Law, Morality, and the Existence of Human
Rights (n. 29 above), 6.

norm question. This question cannot be answered without reference to the third form
of non-positivism, inclusive non-positivism.
c) Inclusive Non-Positivism
Inclusive non-positivism claims neither that moral defects always undermine legal va-
lidity nor that they never do. Following the Radbruch formula,35 inclusive non-positiv-
ism maintains that moral defects undermine legal validity if and only if the threshold
of extreme injustice is transgressed. Injustice below this threshold is included in the
concept of law as defective but valid law.
All three forms of non-positivism can be reconstructed as solutions to the compe-
tition between two principles: the principle of legal certainty and the principle of jus-
tice. Exclusive non-positivism gives unconditional precedence to justice, super-inclu-

sive non-positivism to legal certainty. Serious objections can be raised to both claims.36
The situation is different in the case of inclusive non-positivism; it establishes a condi-
tional precedence to justice in cases of extreme injustice.37 With this, the question how
the Radbruch formula is related to Kelsen’s basic norm enters the picture.
II. Basic Norm
With his basic norm, Kelsen tries to overcome two positions to which the pure theory
of law stands in fundamental opposition: naturalism on the one hand and non-posi-
tivism on the other.
1. Basic Norm and “Ought”
The main concern of Kelsen’s confrontation with naturalism is the transformation of

an “is” into an “ought”, the main concern of his confrontation with non-positivism is to
achieve this transformation without having any recourse to morality, that is, his aim is
to establish normativity without morality.
35 Robert Alexy, A Defence of Radbruch’s Formula, in: Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence, 8th edn., ed.
M.D.A. Freeman, London 2008, 426–8; Alexy, The Argument from Injustice (n. 3 above), 40–62.
36 Alexy, The Dual Nature of Law (n. 4 above),176.
37 Alexy, Legal Certainty and Correctness (n. 6 above), 445–7.

40 ROBERT ALEXY
Kelsen speaks, with respect to the formal structure of his solution of the “is” –
“ought” problem, of a “syllogism”38 which he further qualifies as a “normative syllo-
gism”.39 This syllogism can be called “basic norm syllogism”.40 In The Argument from
Injustice, I reconstructed this syllogism as follows.41 The “is” is represented by the first
premise:
(1) Constitution C has in fact been issued and is socially efficacious.
The “ought” is expressed, inter alia, by the conclusion:

(3) It is legally prescribed that one behave in accordance with constitution C.
(3) does not follow logically from (1). For this reason, one has to introduce a further
premise which makes the transition from (1) to (3) possible:
(2) If a constitution has in fact been issued and is socially efficacious, then it is legally pre-
scribed that one behave in accordance with this constitution.
This additional premise counts as one of many possible formulations of Kelsen’s basic
norm.
Stanley Paulson has argued that this reconstruction attributes “justified normativ-
ity”42 to Kelsen. If one understands by justified normativity morally justified norma-
tivity, I do not agree with this. To be sure, Joseph Raz attributes a justified norma-
tivity thesis to Kelsen when he says that Kelsen’s conception of the normativity of a
legal system presupposes that the system be considered as “morally just and good”.43
Nothing of the kind is contained in my reconstruction. Indeed, I use the expression
“legally prescribed” in the formulation of the basic norm. But expressions like “legally
prescribed” and “legally binding” (rechtsverbindlich)44 can be used without any moral
implications. Paulson argues that a basic norm formulation that employs such expres-
sions “appears to lend support to the justified normativity thesis”.45 Perhaps, these
expressions may seduce readers into connecting justified normativity in the sense of
morally justified normativity with these concepts. But this seduction can be coun-
tered by sound interpretative and systematic arguments. It should be added that the

39 Ibid., 212.
41 Alexy, The Argument from Injustice (n. 3 above), 96–8; Robert Alexy. Comments and Responses, in:
Institutionalized Reason The Jurisprudence of Robert Alexy, ed. Matthias Klatt, Oxford 2012, 324–5. The num-
bering has been changed.
42 Stanley L. Paulsen, A “Justified Normativity” Thesis in Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law? Rejoinders
to Robert Alexy and Joseph Raz, in: Institutionalized Reason (n. 41 above), 68.
43 Joseph Raz, Kelsen’s Theory of the Basic Norm, in: Normativity and Norms Critical Perspectives on Kelse-
nian Themes, ed. Stanley L. Paulson and Bonnie Litschewski Paulson, Oxford 1998, 47, 58.
44 Hans Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre, Berlin 1925, 99.
45 Paulson, A “Justified Normativity” Thesis in Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law? (n. 42 above), 87.

term “legally prescribed”, as used in my basic norm formulation, is just one element of
a family of concepts that can be used to express the “ought”. Others are legal validity,
objective sense, and empowerment.46 And I agree with Paulson that there is strong
textual support to the effect that in “Kelsen’s mature position”,47 already announced
in the late 1930s48 and culminating in the second edition of the Pure Theory of Law,49
empowerment is the fundamental normative modality. But in our present context
this is of no special importance. Our question is how the transition from an “is” to an
“ought” can be brought about, and the answer to this question does not depend on
the normative modality representing the “ought”. Furthermore, the textual arguments
speaking for the fundamental character of empowerment can be confronted with sys-
tematic arguments that speak against it.50 But I shall not elaborate this any further
here. For our purposes it is sufficient to state that the basic norm syllogism shows that
a basic norm is, as Kelsen puts it, “logically indispensible”51 (logisch unerläßlich) for
the transformation of an “is” into an “ought”.

According to Paulson all this shows nothing more than that Kelsen’s “appeal to the
normative syllogism” amounts to a “begging the question”, “a petitio principii”.52 I agree
with this on an important point, but not completely. The point on which I do not agree
concerns the analytical power of the basic norm syllogism. The basic norm premise
qua second premise of this syllogism is not merely an “assumption”.53 It is a necessary
presupposition of the transformation of an “is” into an “ought”. Kelsen himself empha-
sizes that there exists an alternative to normativism, namely naturalism, according to
which the law is nothing more than a system of “power relations”.54 This implies that
the necessity of the basic norm premise is not an unconditional necessity but only a
conditional necessity.55 This has far reaching consequences for qualifying the episte-
mological character of Kelsen’s basic norm. It is not simply transcendental, but only
“weakly transcendental”,56 and, with this, only a relative a priori category.57 But this is
more than nothing. It is a transformation from an “is” to an “ought”.
46 Ibid., 86–7.
47 Ibid., 83.
48 Hans Kelsen, Recht und Kompetenz. Kritische Bemerkungen zur Völkerrechtstheorie Georges Scelles,
in: Hans Kelsen Auseinandersetzungen zur Reinen Rechtslehre, ed. Kurt Ringhofer and Robert Walter, Vienna
1987, 75.
49 See, for instance, Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (n. 9 above), 26.
50 Robert Alexy, Hans Kelsen’s Concept of the “Ought”, Jurisprudence 4 (2013), 240–5.
52 Paulson, A ‘Justified Normativity’ Thesis in Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law? (n. 42 above), 70.
53 Ibid.
55 Alexy. Comments and Responses (n. 41 above), 325.
57 Robert Alexy, Hans Kelsens Begriff des relativen Apriori, in: Neukantianismus und Rechtsphilosophie,
ed. Robert Alexy, Lukas H. Meyer, Stanley L. Paulson, and Gerhard Sprenger, Baden-Baden 2002, 193–202.

42 ROBERT ALEXY
2. The Necessity of Kelsen’s Basic Norm
Kelsen’s basic norm qua transformation rule is – with respect to its structure, not with
respect to its systematic consequences – the simplest form of a basic norm. It confines
itself to connecting issuance and efficaciousness on the side of the “is” with validity
or another normative concept on the side of the “ought”. One can call it, with respect
to its structural simplicity, the “minimal basic norm”. Kelsen’s syllogism argument is
successful insofar as it demonstrates that one has at least to presuppose this minimal
basic norm if one wants to transform an “is” into an “ought”. This is an analytical ar-
gument, and one can characterize Kelsen’s basic norm for this reason as an “analyt-
ical basis norm”.58 But to use a certain form of the basic norm in an argument that
successfully demonstrates that a basic norm is necessary for the establishment of the
“ought”, is not to demonstrate that just this form is necessary, too. To demonstrate that
we need a basic norm does not suffice to demonstrate that the basic norm used in this
demonstration is the basic norm. In order to show this, “alternative approaches” have
to be “ruled out”.59 It is exactly this point that Paulson addresses with his reproach of
“begging the question”.60 What is more, Paulson explicitly refers, in the context of the
alternative problem, to natural law theory, that is, to non-positivism: “In particular,
[Kelsen’s] contemptuous dismissal of natural law theory has no force as an argument,
and natural law theory remains, then, as an alternative to his own theory.”61
3. A Non-Positivistic Basic Norm
Kelsen’s thesis that a basic norm is necessary in order to perform a transformation of

an “is” into an “ought” remains, however, true. This transformation can be described
as a category transformation,62 and non-naturalistic positivism needs this transforma-
tion as well as non-positivism. Insofar as this is the case, Kelsen’s basic norm express-
es a universal truth. This universal truth establishes a necessary connection between
non-naturalistic positivism and non-positivism.
With this, however, the alternative question is not yet answered. The answer con-
sists, first, of the construction of a non-positivistic basic norm, and, second, of its jus-
tification. Here, I will focus on the construction. This construction comprises three
steps by means of which Kelsen’s basic norm is transformed into a non-positivistic
basic norm: first, the insertion of a limiting clause, second, the insertion of an opening

59 Paulson, A “Justified Normativity” Thesis in Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law? (n. 42 above), 76.
60 Ibid., 70.
61 Ibid., 76. See also ibid., 76, fn.77.

clause, and, third, the addition of a level of justification. With this, Kelsen’s analytical
basic norm is transformed into a normative basic norm.63
a) Limiting Clause
The Radbruch formula, which says, in its shortest form, that extreme injustice is no
law, is, as already stated, an essential element of inclusive non-positivism, which is en-
dorsed here as the result of balancing legal certainty against justice.64 Super-inclusive
non-positivism knows no limiting clause, exclusive non-positivism advocates the ex-
treme counterpart, a limiting clause that knows no limits. Here, only the basic norm
of inclusive non-positivism shall be considered. It can be formulated in different ways.
Our starting point shall be the following version of Kelsen’s basic norm:
(1) The law includes all norms that have been authoritatively issued and are socially effi-
cacious.
The insertion of the Radbruch formula shall be expressed in the following way:
(2) The law includes all norms that, first, have been authoritatively issued and are socially
efficacious and that, second, are not extremely unjust.
b) Opening Clause
The Radbruch formula concerns the classifying connection between law and morality.
In order to make the non-positivistic basic norm complete, the qualifying connection,
too, must be included. This can be done by an opening clause which refers to the claim
to correctness:
(3) The law includes all norms that, first, have been authoritatively issued and are socially
efficacious and, second, are not extremely unjust, and, third, all principles and arguments
that are required by the claim to correctness.65
63 Ibid., 116.
64 Above, ###.
65 Alexy, The Argument from Injustice (n. 3 above), 102, 127.

44 ROBERT ALEXY
(c) Level of Justification
According to Kelsen, the basic norm is incapable of being established: “Into the basis
of the validity of the basic norm there can be no further enquiry.”66 Non-positivism
contests this.67 An example for a non-positivist who uses the term basic norm (Grund-
norm), even if in part only in quotation marks, is Gustav Radbruch.68 His justification
of the basic norm is exclusively the principle of legal certainty,69 occasionally connect-
ed with “peace, order” (Friede, Ordnung).70 This exclusive orientation on legal certainty
brings Radbruch’s position of 1932 very close to super-inclusive non-positivism, which
also could be considered as a kind of moral positivism. Moral positivism, however, is
much less acceptable than Kelsen’s detached or analytical positivism.71
All of this shows that the alternative problem, as formulated by Paulson, concerns
far more than the problem of the logical reconstruction of the transition from an “is” to
an “ought”. It concerns, perhaps, the deepest question of legal philosophy, the relation
of law and morality.
Robert Alexy
Christian Albrechts University, Faculty of Law, Olshausenstrasse 40, 24118 Kiel,
Germany, alexy@law.uni-kiel.de
66 Hans Kelsen, The Function of the Constitution (first pub. 1964), trans. Iain Stewart, in: Essays on Kelsen,
ed. Richard Tur and William Twining, Oxford 1986, 117 (trans. alt.); see also Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law
(n. 9 above), 195.
67 Alexy, The Argument from Injustice (n. 3 above), 113–6.
68 Gustav Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie, 3rd edn. 1932, in: Gustav Radbruch Gesamtausgabe, ed. Arthur Kauf-
mann, vol. 2, Heidelberg 1993, 313, 324; see also 422. With and without quotation marks the term is used at
324.
69 Ibid., 314, 422.
70 Ibid., 314.

The Demystification Impasse
Legal Positivism Divided Against Itself
ALEXANDER SOMEK
Abstract: Legal positivists emphasize the relevance of law-creating social facts. This em-
phasis bespeaks a healthy skepticism towards the idea that the law lends expression to
something natural or necessary. Hence, legal positivism seeks to demystify the law. With
regard to the task of demystification, at least two strategies can be distinguished. The first
seeks to anchor the purportedly moral foundations of the law in social conventions, while
the other reduces the alleged rational force of appeals to morality in the power to make
them stick. Interestingly, each strategy of demystification can be used to demystify the
other. The upshot is, in the end, a demystification impasse.
Keywords: Legal positivism, Inclusive legal positivism, separability thesis, social facts, de-
mystification, conventionalism
Schlagworte: Rechtspositivismus, Inklusiver Rechtspositivismus, Trennungsthese, so-

ziale Tatsachen, Demystifizierung, Konventionalismus
Introductory
What makes legal positivism special? The trivial answer has it that, as a position in legal
theory, legal positivism insists on separating law and morality. However misleading
or even wrong-headed this answer may be,1 it can be rendered least problematic by
attributing to legal positivists the view that a sharp line needs to be drawn between
propositions concerning what the law is, on the one hand, and postulates with regard
1 John Gardner, Law as a Leap of Faith: Essays on Law in General, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012,
19–53; Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality, (2d. ed.), Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2009, 315–316.

46 ALEXANDER SOMEK
to what it ought to be, on the other.2 Regardless of whether this so-called “separability
thesis” captures adequately, let alone fully, the core of what positivists believe there
is still something that proponents of the approach share, namely a commitment to
recognize, with almost exalted soberness, the relevance of law-creating social facts.3
This commitment implies a healthy scepticism towards the idea that the law lends
expression to something natural and necessary or is a manifestation of the order of
things or possibly even an exhibit of superhuman design. It was thus not by accident
that H. L. A. Hart attributed to one of the arch legal positivists, Jeremy Bentham, the
ambition to “demystify” the law and the legal profession.4
One should not be surprised to see the problem that demystification is supposed to
resolve arise in the legal context in the first place. The run-of-the mill operations of legal
institutions involve the exercise of force. Law supposedly renders the use of such force
legitimate, for example, by motivating the morally intransigent to do the right thing in
response to coercive threats. Those employing force in the name of the law are likely to
rationalize their conduct by putting the best possible face on what authorizes their con-
duct. The chief means thereto is idealization, that is, the representation of facts in light
of appealing ideals, such as justice or the rule of law, or the invocation of awe-inspiring
powers, such as the accumulated wisdom of generations.5 Social facts are then seen as
lending expression to norms or visions of the reasonable. Hence, the demystification of
legal ideas that we encounter in the works of legal positivists is, to a certain extent, also
the consequence of taking the separation of law and morality seriously. It makes an end
to viewing the substance of law as an embodiment of moral ideas.
Unsurprisingly, the world of law is replete with idealizations. Much of the more
mundane work of legal positivists, which is of relevance to doctrinal legal scholarship,
concerns debunking false idealizations and limiting their scope, if at all, to the level
indispensible to render the law as a social fact that is invested with normative signif-
icance. Not by accident, schools of legal positivism differ with regard to whether or
not they regard these idealizations as necessary in the first place;6 they diverge from
each other also inasmuch as they debunk the idealizations embraced by their peers as
superfluous and misleading.
2 H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, Harvard Law Review 71, 1958, 593–621.
3 Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979, 46–47.
4 H. L. A. Hart, Bentham and the Demystification of the Law, Modern Law Review 36, 1973, 2–17. This legacy
of legal positivism has more recently been recognized in Anglo-American circles. Joseph Raz, Ethics in the
Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics, (2d. ed.) Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995,
210; Scott J. Shapiro, Legality, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2011, 388–389; Brian Leiter, The
Radicalism of Legal Positivism (ssrn.com/abstract=1568333), in: Legal Realism and Legal Positivism Recon-
sidered, Ethics, 2001, 111–301.
5 The relevant Burkean pretensions were the target of Bentham’s scorn. Hart, (footnote 4), 2–3.
6 As is well known, Scandinavian legal realists do not. Torben Spaak, A Critical Appraisal of Karl Olivecro-
na’s Legal Philosophy, Heidelberg: Springer, 2014.

The Demystification Impasse 47
This is the topic of central concern here. What serves to demystify from the angle
of one version of legal positivism may appear to be guilty of re-mystification from the
perspective of another. This is, arguably, one of the major problems bedevilling the
overall approach.
Unnecessary or misleading idealizations conceal from the observer what they real-
ly are. This explains why not only legal positivists, but also other critical scholars, have
perceived the law as being surrounded with an ideological halo.7 The law comes to
this world with the aid of ideas obscuring what the law really is. Its self-presentation
is aided and abetted by social practices that endow it with an atmosphere of conse-
cration.
Demystifying the social appearance of law

The quest to rid the law of unnecessary idealizations can be pursued on at least three
different levels.
The first is straightforward and concerns the social aura of the law and of the legal
profession. The Levellers as well as Bentham have to be credited for incisive interven-
tions meant to expose displays of esoteric legal language and uses of the vestiges of
authority as strategies for creating an insuperable distance between those who are in
the know and the lay public that is not. Traditional apparel, the comportment of or-
gans of the courts and the ritual quality of legal procedures are means to instil into the
uninitiated a sense of awe and respect for the wisdom and dignity of those who master
a craft to which are admitted only a few. This type of demystification concerns the
broader social context in which the law operates and how an aesthetics – among which
not least the indirect communication of complexity – serves the material interests of a
privileged profession. The requisite debunking of pomp and circumstance is supposed
to pave the way for a simpler legal system and to a practice of law that is more amenable
to the horizon of notoriously bewildered and easily flabbergasted ordinary people.
Demystifying legal scholarship
The second level of demystification is slightly more difficult to pin down, yet possibly
even more important than the first. It is targeted at the manner in which legal scholars
and adjudicating bodies – courts, notoriously – make sense of (“interpret”) the legal
materials. In this context, we encounter what legal positivists usually understand by
7 D. Kairys (ed.), The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique, New York: Pantheon Books, 1982. Alan Hunt,
The Ideology of Law: Advances and Problems in Recent Applications of the Concept of Ideology to the
Analysis of Law, Law and Society Review 19, 1985, 11–38.

48 ALEXANDER SOMEK
“ideology”, namely, a false representation of legal norms subservient to some partisan

agenda. This function is played by ideology even if those who perpetuate false ideas
may not be aware of their complicity. It is manifest in how scholars routinely reason
about law and in the vocabulary they use.8
While exposing the adverse social consequences of surrounding the law with the
aura of majesty and mystery was one great virtues of Bentham’s critique of the English
common law tradition, exposing the traces of ideology in legal reasoning was perhaps
the greatest achievement of Kelsen’s legal theory, in particular in the field of public law.
Three types of critical intervention were used by Kelsen in the pursuit of this objec-
tive: challenging dualism, identifying hypostatization, and detecting methodological
syncretism.
In a manner that anticipated what many decades later would sail under the flag of
“deconstruction”9 Kelsen attacked various binary oppositions that predominated the
legal thinking of his time. Just as in the case of binaries that would in the late twentieth
century become the intellectual sweethearts of deconstructivists10 one pole of a pair of
opposites was favoured over the other. Kelsen went about his deconstructive business
by showing that the meaning of the disfavoured pole accounted, at least in part, for the
significance of its preferred opposite. Kelsen attacked the duality of private and public
law and concluded that the distinction was spurious. He submitted the “dualistic” po-
sition on the relation between domestic law and public international law to a strident
critique in order to replace it with two versions of monism to which he attributed equal
plausibility. He tore down the line separating natural personhood and the personhood
of legally constituted entities, such as corporations, and upended the traditional rela-
tion between rights and laws. All of this work is neatly summarized in the first edition
of his Pure Theory of Law.11
Hypostatization is for nominalists of a Kantian persuasion12 a cardinal sin, for it mis-
takes what is merely a thought for an existing entity. For example, while the concept of
8 Otto Pfersmann‚ Kelsens Ideologiekritik, in: Hans Kelsen: Die Aktualität eines großen Rechtswissenschaft-
lers und Soziologen des 20 Jahrhunderts (ed. N. Aliprantis & T. Olechowski), Wien: Manz, 2014, 53–66.
9 Jack Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, Yale Law Journal 96, 1987, 743–786.
10 For an introduction, see Jonathan Culler, On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism,
London: Routledge, 1983, 86–87.
11 Hans Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory (trans. Bonnie Litschewski Paulson & Stanley
L. Paulson), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992.
12 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (trans. P. Guyer & G. Wood), Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press A 395, 1998, 439: “Thus every dispute about the nature of our thinking being and its conjunction
with the corporeal world is merely a consequence of the fact that one fills the gaps regarding what one
does not know with paralogisms of reason, making thoughts into things and hypostatizing them; from this
arises an imagined science, both in regard to affirmative and negative assertions, in that everyone either
presumes to know something about objects about which no human being has any concept, or else makes
his own representations into objects, and thus goes round and round in an eternal circle of ambiguities and
contradictions.”

the state, according to Kelsen, signifies merely the unity of the legal system (which is a
rather mystical idea, anyhow) the public scholarship of his time took the state to be a
real entity that precedes the legal order. Hypostatization concerns also the concept of
the “natural person” which is based on the belief in the reality of something that is the
mere point of imputation on which a bundle of norms converges.13 Obviously, there is
an internal link between dualisms and hypostatization, for one of the entities that in
juxtaposition with another comprises a duality is frequently only posited by thought
(such as the natural person or the state). This is part of the deconstruction strategy.
The hypostasized entity is usually the preferred pole of the binary. As it falls by the
wayside, the “dangerous supplement” is all that remains.14
Finally, uncovering methodological syncretism – the mingling of ways of reasoning
or analysis that belong to different disciplines – is the strategy that Kelsen uses early in
his work in order to emancipate the legal analysis of acts of will from its entrapment in
psychology.15 It is also the battle cry used against any interdisciplinary work in the field
of public law scholarship, in particular if it concerns a combination with sociological
theory.16
No fertile ground
It bears emphasis that what is perhaps the most important part of Kelsen’s theory did
not at all fall on fertile ground in the Anglo-American world even in the case where
Kelsen was blessed with the good fortune of having a most gifted student such as Hart.
Kelsen’s ideas were simply not relevant there. In the case of the United Kingdom it
stands to reason that, perhaps not only in public law, the common law tradition has
never had such a strong tradition of legal science as its civil law counterpart. A legal cul-
ture that is comfortable with reasoning from case to case while leaving the business of
legal theory to high-minded social reformers does not feel prompted to revisit its foun-
dations. By contrast, much of the controversies in German public law in the nineteenth
and early twentieth century concerned basic concepts, fundamental ideas such as the
Rechtsstaat and developing the correct understanding of relatively recent phenomena
such as rights against the state. Hence, incomparable paths of political development
and the intellectual shape of legal scholarship may explain why “Germanic” debates
13 Kelsen (footnote 11), 47–51.

14 Culler (footnote 10), 105–106.
15 Hans Kelsen, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre entwickelt aus der Lehre vom Rechtssatz, Werke vol. 2.1
(ed. M. Jestaedt), Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008, 192–300. Stanley L. Paulson, A “Justified Normativity”
Thesis in Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law? Rejoinders to Robert Alexy and Joseph Raz, in: Institutional-
ized Reason (ed. M. Klatt), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, 62–111 at 65.
16 Hans Kelsen, Der soziologische und der juristische Staatsbegriff: Kritische Untersuchung des Verhältnisses
von Staat und Recht, Tübingen: Mohr, 1922.

50 ALEXANDER SOMEK
did not find any resonance in the United Kingdom. In the United States, the situation
was even worse for Kelsen. When Kelsen arrived, the vintage critique of conceptu-
alism, as it is particularly evident in the writings of Felix Cohen,17 had already run its
course. Clearly, the deconstructive part of the program, which consisted of challenging
and overcoming “conceptual jurisprudence” had in large part been already completed
by the American legal realist. The constructive vision did not clearly emerge, but it was
clear that aside from Llewellyn‘s endorsement of “situation sense”, some social science
approach had to matter.18 Understating the point a bit, if anything did not stand out
from Kelsen’s writings then this was the idea that legal scholarship ought to be turned
into a social science. Indeed, the whole business of clearing up conceptual muddle may
have created the false impression that Kelsen was obsessed with topics of legal formal-
ism.19 And, indeed, in many respects Kelsen’s project is deeply steeped in nineteenth
century German constructivism.20
Ironically, only the least interesting parts of Kelsen’s theory have caught the atten-
tion of most Anglo-American legal theorists, notably the Grundnorm.21 The career of
this stillborn brainchild is testament to the lack of interaction between and among the
worlds of legal scholarship of the mid twentieth century.
Demystifying legal norms
There is, finally and lest we forget, a third level of demystification that we can associate
with legal positivism. It concerns the law itself and should not be confused with the
first project of demystification that takes aim at how legal institutions generally adorn
themselves with dignity and purport to pursue high-minded aspirations. Rather, at this
level, demystificiation concerns the substance of laws.
How can this be? The critical analysis of legal institutions can become the task of le-
gal theory where the law itself, either mediated by the authority of courts or by means
of legislation, comes to incorporate an ideologically distorted understanding of itself.
Joseph Raz observes with fine irony that only bad theory can make a practical differ-
17 Felix Cohen‚ Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, Columbia Law Review 35, 1935,
808–849.
18 Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale, 1927–1960, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986.
19 Karl N. Llewellyn, Jurisprudence: Realism in Theory and Practice, Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1962.
20 Stanley L. Paulson, Hans Kelsen’s Earliest Legal Theory: Critical Constructivism, Modern Law Review
59, 1996, 797–812.
21 The final word appears to have been spoken on this topic now. Stanley L. Paulson, The Great Puzzle:
Kelsen’s Basic Norm, in: Kelsen Revisited: New Essays on the Pure Theory of Law (ed. L. Duarte d’Almeida, J.
Gardner & L. Green), Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013, 43–62.

ence.22 For example, the law may require us to sustain differences between private and
public law. While there is, according to Kelsen, no manner in which such difference can
be convincingly sustained, one cannot but muddle through with makeshift conceptu-
al arrangements simply because the law has forced the contrast upon us. Even whole
fields of law may rest upon false understandings of their function and their point. For
example, a careful analysis of the core category of anti-discrimination law, direct dis-
crimination, reveals that this field of law necessarily serves a redistributive function.
Alas, European anti-discrimination law does not recognize this fact.23 Kelsen’s critique
of the law of the United Nations was an attempt to expose the dearth of legal expertise
extant in the drafting process and the influence of phony ideas on the substance of an
international agreement.24
Ironically, thus, misapprehension of the law can be built into a very field of law.
The real normativity of law
The remaining discussion will focus on the avowed goal of the second level of demys-
tification, namely that which by all accounts is supposed to be the enlightened appre-
hension of the law. When it comes to this, we encounter two major approaches that
have been developed by legal positivists in the twentieth century. They coincide, not
by accident, with its most salient strands, one Anglo-American, the other continental.
If one wanted to attach names to these approaches they would read “Hart” and “Kels-
en”, respectively.
Generally, any project of demystification needs to have at least a rough idea of what
the law is supposed to be like once mystifications have been removed and lost their
grip on the legal imagination. This means that such projects invariably need to commit
themselves ontologically to a certain view of what the law really is. At a most general
level, both strands of modern legal positivism agree on two things. First, the law is not
merely “patterns of behaviour” but rather manifest in certain directives that are called
either “rules” or “norms”. Second, whether or not such directives are authoritative is
to be determined with reference to social facts. Hence, both versions of legal positiv-
ism agree that claims to legal validity need to be warranted, to the greatest possible
22 The original lines read as follows: „Theory aims at understanding. By and large, only bad theory can lead
to change. If its wrong conclusions are accepted their acceptance may lead to a change in the self-under-
standing of the culture which will make the bad theory true.” Joseph Raz, Between Authority and Interpreta-
tion: On the Theory of Law and Practical Reason, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, 98–99.
23 I, for one, have made an attempt to analyze Anti-Discrimination Law from such an angle. See Alexander
Somek, Engineering Equality: An Essay on European Anti-Discrimination Law, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2011, 19–20.
24 D. A. Jeremy Telman, Law or Politics? Hans Kelsen and the Post-War International Order, Constellations
18, 2011.

52 ALEXANDER SOMEK
extent, by propositions pointing to some law-creating factor that can be described in

value-neutral terms.25
In addition to the separability thesis, this emphasis on the factual is undoubtedly
the second defining mark of legal positivism.26 Remarkably, however, it also points us
to a type of social normativity that inheres in the law and indicates how it differs from
the persuasive force of reasons for action. Evidently, in the case of Austin, designating
the factual connotes the overpowering force of necessitation. The conception of law
as the command of the sovereign suggests strongly that the commander’s power to
have his or her way is insuperable. In the case of Kelsen, the overall effectiveness of the
coercive legal order, to which reference is made in the conditional part of the Grund-
norm, represents something akin to a force of nature. Hart’s concept of a “social rule”
insinuates that there is no way for a single person or a few forlorn dissenters to stem the
tide of convergent behaviour. The factual that gives rise to law in the guise of sources
originates from an alternative to the normativity of reasons and replaces the “non-co-
ercive force of better arguments” (Habermas) with the stubbornness of social power
or mindless routine. If a source lacked this nexus to might it would never merit the
attention of legal positivists. That’s right. In their eyes, anything claiming to be merely a
better argument could never pass as a source of law.27
The transformation of reasons into the having of reasons
In the eyes of Hartian Anglo-American legal positivists, real law is manifest in legal
enactments – notably rules – the validation of which is derivative of a social rule that is
accepted as the relevant (law-identifying) standard by law-applying officials.28 By con-
trast, from Kelsen’s perspective, real law is to be found in norms that originate from –
and belong to – a dynamic system of law-creation. The key role within such systems is
played by legal powers. They are the real real laws in the universe of the Pure Theory of
Law.29 As we shall see, they are so for good reasons.
In spite of different ontological commitments, it is the case that upon encounters
with idealizations both legal positivisms carry out a transformation that is followed by
a question concerning authority.
25 Raz (footnote 3), 47.

26 Raz (footnote 3), 37, where the “social thesis” is presented as saying that “what is law and what is not is
a matter of social fact”.
27 It may be doubtful whether this is true also of inclusive legal positivists.
28 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (2d. ed.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994, 102–103.
29 For an alternative elaboration of the point of the pure theory that puts the reinterpretation of acts of
violence in term of sanctions at the centre, see Christoph Kletzer, The Idea of a Pure Theory of Law, Oxford:
Bloomsbury Publ., 2018.

The task of transformation consists of presenting an appeal to practical reason as

a social fact. Reason can be translated into something factual30 only if the having of a
reason is treated as a state of belief (which may possibly be caused by some other fact).
Hans: This is wrong.
We: Hans believes this to be wrong.
Legal positivism distinguishes itself from other approaches to law by recasting reasons
for action as beliefs in such reasons and, in addition, attributing these beliefs to some-
one who has them. This is not to say that this transformation already provides us with
the full picture, yet it captures adequately its demystifying ethos.
Hans: You ought to do this.
We (1): Hans believes that we ought to do this.
We (2): Hans wants us to do this.

We (3): Hans wants us to do this because he wants it.
We (4): If Hans has authority over us we have reason to do what Hans wants us to do
because he wants it.
The transition from (1) to (2) is possible because Hans believes we have to do this. If
Hans really believes31 that we ought to do something then he wants us to do something.
Emphasizing the having of reasons for action, that is, a having of reasons regardless of
their content, accounts for the transition form (2) to (3). This is the consequence of
transforming a belief into a social fact. It marks the major step taken by legal positivists
by shifting from a content-dependent to content-independent perspective.32 What Raz
calls the “social thesis”33 turns out to be an implication of the separability thesis. If the
reason for action is not derivative of the full and unrestrained examination of pros and
cons it has to be somehow tied to a fact that is internally indifferent to reasons (for that
is what we mean by “content-independent”, aside from the fact that we have reason to
do something because somebody else has said so). Finally, (4) merely points to the
normative premise that is needed in order to invest the social fact of wanting with
authority. Transforming moral claiming into content-indifferent wanting or endorsing
30 Facts can be reasons, but reasons are not facts.

31 I believe that in an ideal world men should wear at least business attire, if not tuxedos, when they attend
an operatic performance. I believe that in an ideal world this should be so, and I am aware of the fact that it
is never going to be that way in our real world. Actually, I also believe that in the real world people shouldn’t
be forced to wear a suit and a tie if they do not want to. Nevertheless, I believe that in a counterfactual world
it should be the case that people adhere to a dress code. Such a belief does not fall into the category of the
“real” belief that is of relevance here. By contrast, I also believe that people should not kill each other. I do
not want them to kill each other. This is a real belief.
32 It is clearly the step that calls for the justification of authority. See Raz (footnote 3), 214 (on the normal
justification thesis).
33 Raz (footnote 3), 37.

54 ALEXANDER SOMEK
is the essence of the positivist project of demystificiation. Not by accident, it simulta-

neously raises the question of legitimate authority.
Anglo-American demystification
To your claiming that morality enjoins us from doing or omitting something legal pos-
itivists reply that all that we really know, if you are sincere, is that it is you who believes
in this moral demand. A high-minded moral claim is thus brought down to the realm
of social facts.
At the outset, it was mentioned that demystification aims at removing idealizing
sugar coatings from the legal materials. Here is an example of such a sugar coating,
variations of which can be encountered relatively frequently in the literature.34
Mystification: Human dignity is at the heart of all modern constitutional systems. No-
where can a law violating this ideal pass constitutional muster.
The demystification that Anglo-American legal positivists would engage in would

roughly amount to the following:
Anglo-American demystification: The relevance of appeals to human dignity is based upon
a social rule that either accepts appeals to human dignity as appeals to valid law or permits
(or even requires) extra-legal standards to determine judicial decisions.
Insiders will immediately realize that the formulation attempts to cover (“incorporate”)
both inclusive and exclusive legal positivism.35 In both cases, an open set of substantive
34 Shapiro (footnote 4), 270; Raz (footnote 22), 193.

35 Shapiro (footnote 4), 273–274. “Inclusive” legal positivism stands for the view that moral principles can
be binding on legal officials because they are valid law. Such principles are taken to be valid law if they or any
other appeal to moral merit is recognized as a source of law within the rule of recognition. “Exclusive” legal
positivism, by contrast, insists that the morality that is thereby appealed to is not incorporated into the legal
system. A norm can count as law only if it has a social pedigree and can be identified without engaging in,
or recourse to, a moral argument. For extensive discussion of these issues, see Jules L. Coleman, The Prac-
tice of Principle: In Defence of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2001, 106–109, 153. It appears to be Shapiro’s take on exclusive legal positivism that it requires judges to take
moral principles as moral principles into account. See Shapiro, note 4 at 272: “[…][T]he fact that American
judges are simply under a[] [legal, A. S.] obligation to apply nonpedigreed norms does not imply that they
are compelled to apply preexisting law; rather, they are merely under an obligation to reach outside the law
and apply norms of morality instead.” It should be noted that, at least more recently, Raz has conceived of
exclusive legal positivism differently. According to him, judges – as human beings – are always under an ob-
ligation to be guided by moral standards, for this is what it takes for human beings to act appropriately. If the
law has authority it is morality that carves out space for content-independent reasons – that is, rules that are
derivative of the authority of law – and thereby precludes a determination of conduct on the basis of a full
examination of the moral merits of the situation. Morality is that which “incorporates” the law, and not the
other way round. Therefore, it would be rather odd to believe that morality first incorporates law in order
to incorporate itself subsequently into what it has itself incorporated. It is much sounder to assume that the

moral arguments (called, euphemistically, “non-pedigreed norms”) is considered to be

legally relevant on the ground of either its “incorporation” into the rule of recognition36
or an explicit or implicit “validating purport”37 by the law with regard to this set.38
The important point is, at any rate, that Anglo-American legal positivists transform
the claims that moral standards make on us into a de facto shared and practiced belief
that standards of this type – no matter which there are39 – are relevant for the adjudi-
cation of legal disputes. Whether or not the belief in this relevance is accepted as law
depends on whether it guides the practice of legal officials and that they would be criti-
cised for committing mistakes if they failed to take these standards into account. In oth-
er words, the acceptance of moral standards is manifest in a rule-guided social practice.
It follows that the awareness of this social fact is supposed to provide us with a de-
mystified account of moral reasoning in the legal context. The aura of natural law dis-
appears. We grasp that the social fact of acceptance is that which confers relevance to
arguments that appear to invoke “natural law”.

Dworkin has pointed out vis-à-vis Coleman’s variety of inclusive legal positivism
that what is remarkable and puzzling about this form of demystification is that it leaves
everything as it is.40 Practice does not have to alter a bit. Indeed, it is essential for such
law, when referring to reasons of morality, makes various exemptions from the general exclusion of judging
matters on their moral merits. The “inclusion” of morality is rather a partial revocation of its self-limitation.
See Raz (footnote 22), 188–190.
36 Coleman (footnote 35), 107, distinguishes between the grounds of the criteria of legal validity and these
criteria themselves. While according to inclusive legal positivism the relevance of the criteria is grounded
in a social convention (i e , a social fact) “[…] the criteria themselves need not state social facts”. In the case
of human dignity mentioned in the example above this means that the relevance of appeals to “human dig-
nity” is conventionally established, even though there is no social rule or other set of facts that determines
what human dignity means, let alone demands, in singular cases. The meaning is relevant even though it is
up for grabs. One should not be surprised that one encounters in Coleman’s works statements such as the
following (116): “Judges may agree about what the rule is and disagree with one another over what the rule
requires.” It is puzzling to imagine an agreement over what courtesy is and disagreement over what it re-
quires in every single instance. We would call this type of agreement a merely seeming agreement. Coleman
is aware of this, of course, and adds that judges could not disagree in every case or even in most cases. But
this implies that some of the criteria of legality or some applications of these must be conventionally given.
Inclusive legal positivism cannot eliminate the social fact element from the criteria altogether and restrict it
to the formulation of rule as an empty shell.
37 I take this from Hart’s discussion of dualism in international law. See H. L. A. Hart, Kelsen’s Doctrine of
the Unity of Law, in: Normativity and Norms: Critical Perspectives on Kelsenian Themes (ed. S.L. Paulson &
B. Litschewski Paulson), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998, 553–581, at 560–561. The point of such validating
purport is to sustain the difference in the relation of the legal orders involved. Raz goes to some length to
point this out. See Raz (footnote 22), 193.
38 I shall leave aside, for the moment, Raz’s more sophisticated alternative to incorporationism which
treats the relevance of morality as an exclusion of exclusionary reasons.
39 This is a point that is repeatedly emphasized by Coleman. See merely Jules Coleman & Brian Leiter,
Legal Positivism, in: A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (ed. D. Patterson, 2d ed.), Malden:
Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, 228–248 at 238; Coleman (footnote 35), 116.
40 Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press , 2006, 207.

56 ALEXANDER SOMEK
inclusive legal positivism not to assimilate morality to mere conventional standards.41

It is not the case, therefore, that inclusive legal positivists claim that the moral appeals
that we encounter in a legal contexts necessarily invoke conventional morality. Rather,
these appeals are intended to be direct appeals to what is morally right or wrong. What
demystification accomplishes is to highlight that their legal authority has its root in a
conventional social foundation.
They: In hard cases we have to invoke moral standards.
We: They observe a convention that requires them to invoke moral standards in
hard cases.
As Dworkin correctly observed, there is evidently something amiss here.42 The inclu-
sion of moral appeal into the sources of law does in no manner contribute to legal cer-
tainty. The import of moral standards is not at all uncontroversial. Very likely there will
be disagreement concerning their relevance or their proper application.43 The atten-

tion that legal positivists pay to social facts, however, would require identifying those
who are actually calling the shots when it comes to applying the convention that says
that the morally correct outcome counts. The talk of a coordinating convention – or
a shared co-operative activity44 – may in fact conceal relations of power amongst the
law-applying officials. The very idea that the identification of valid law is based on a
social rule to the application of which every official is an equal partner may reflect
a moderate determinacy of application or a “settledness” of law that does not stem
from the solidity of the conventional standard but from effective relations of subordi-
nation.45 In a field where disagreements and controversies are not unlikely to abound,
potential dissenters are hushed into acquiescence with subtle means of co-optation or
by involving them in rituals at the end of which they can hope to pass as initiates.
The predicament
But the problem cuts even deeper. Moral arguments that do not invoke conventions
(“We do not…”) aim at giving an answer that does not only state – report and reas-
sert – a belief from a particular first person plural perspective. They want to be correct
tout court. Hence, they have to base themselves on conceptions of the morally most
attractive understandings of certain terms, such as human dignity, or of moral ideas,
41 Coleman (footnote 35), 127.

42 Dworkin’s objections are usefully summarized in Coleman & Leiter (footnote 39), 237–238.
43 See also Shapiro (footnote 4), 276.
44 Coleman (footnote 35), 96–98; Shapiro (footnote 4), 204–208.
45 See the observations in Alexander Somek, The Legal Relation: Legal Theory after Legal Positivism, Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017, 35.

such as impartiality. Arriving, if necessary, at such a conception involves moving be-

yond that which is merely conventional. While, for example, we may regard the eating
of meat as morally impeccable it may nonetheless be true that upon reflection the prac-
tice turns out to be cruel. A distinction emerges, hence, between what is convention
and what is substantively correct. From the point of view of the latter the truth of a
moral claim does not depend on communis opinio or convergent behaviour among the
members of an in-group.
It follows that everyone who is confident enough to claim to know what is morally
right may legitimately assert what he or she believes to be the moral truth. In relation
to existing conventions this means that either everyone would have to be entitled to
say what the law is or, alternatively, nobody would have to be. If this right had to be
conceded to everyone we would end up with a situation of radical legal pluralism. It
would amount to an equivalent to Hobbes’ right to everything. Legally speaking, who-
ever claims to know the right answer would have to have the power to lay down the
right answer as law, for otherwise the inclusion of morality into the criteria for law
would not make any sense. Alternatively, everyone could be denied this right. In both
cases, however, the result would be radical legal indeterminacy. This result would be in-
consistent with what legal positivism sets out to do, for there would be no more social
fact left determining what accounts for the existence of valid law.
This is, very briefly put, the major problem of inclusive legal positivism. It seeks to
accommodate the non-conventional within the conventional. To the convention that
has the form “This is what we do, and I do what all others do” it adds “What we do is
to have each determine for him – or – herself what we do”. What one gets, then, is a
“rule” saying that what we do is to have each determine for all what we do. If each has
the power to determine for all what the law is there can be no stable social fact. The
convention that allegedly incorporates appeals to morality into a rule of recognition
does not give rise to facts that are capable of generating law. They are “fake facts”. The
convention turns out to be a self-denying ordinance.
Turning to continental demystification
Inclusive legal positivists may want to reply that the above analysis is uncharitable and
transforms their position into something outright absurd. The legal order allocates
powers to say what the law is in a hierarchical manner and confers such a power in the
final instance to the highest courts and not to lay persons.46 In the event that a conflict
arises between their respective judgments the view of the court must prevail.
46 I take it that this reply is similar to Coleman’s attempt to rebut an objection by Dworkin (footnote
35), 157–158. Dworkin pointed out against Coleman’s construction of inclusive legal positivism that if the
content of the criteria of what is valid law are not conventional the law applying officials might never agree

58 ALEXANDER SOMEK
If this is the reply given by “incorporationists” then they have already conceded that
what matters, from a legal point of view, is the allocation of powers to state authorita-
tively what morality demands and not what morality itself requires.47 They have there-
by shifted, tacitly, to another mode of demystification that no longer anchors cloudy
appeals to values or ideas in conventions for making such appeals but rather in con-
crete powers to make them stick. This is the continental way.
Continental demystification: The courts invested with the power of judicial review of leg-
islation have discretion to attribute any meaning to human dignity as they see fit and to
invalidate laws on that ground.
A different picture emerges here, and one is inclined to call it true – as opposed to
existing – exclusive legal positivism. True (or truly) exclusive legal positivism insists
on translating the determination of legally relevant moral claims into the exercise of
the legal power to say and to lay down what the law is.48 This, at any rate, is consistent
with a Kelsenian mindset, which appears to reflect the original critical spirit of legal
positivism. From this perspective, the alleged convention underpinning genuine ap-
peals to moral values always has be to read as a rule authorizing such appeals. Appeals
to “non-pedigreed norms” are made within the confines of powers that provide them
with a legal pedigree.49
on what these are. This is the equivalent of the observation made in the text that the quest for the morally
right answer does not commit anyone to arrive at an answer that elicits the consent of all. To this objection
Coleman replies that the ground of the inclusion of morality, the rule of recognition as a social rule, is best
understood to be a shared cooperative activity. While such an activity may give rise to a number of disa-
greements it commits law-applying officials to settle disagreements and to converge on certain views. This
reply makes it plain that morality is not relevant per se but only subject to the norms governing the shared
cooperative activity (on these norms, see ibid 96–99).
47 Coleman’s idealized account of the rule of recognition as a shared cooperative activity of course must
raise the suspicion of mystifying relations of social power.
48 The difference to Raz’s exclusive legal positivism should be duly noted. From Raz’s point of view judges
are under a moral obligation to arrive at morally defensible resolutions of legal questions. The law merely
modifies the way moral obligations affect judges. It is, however, not easily to parse from Raz’s text how this
is supposed to work. See Raz (footnote 4), 196: „References to moral considerations in constitutions are
typically not cases of the incorporation of morality but blocks to its exclusion or modification by ordinary
legislation. […] Judicial review not only makes the block to the exclusion of modification of constitution-
ally protected moral considerations by legislation enforceable; in addition in [sic] conferring on the courts
powers to enforce that block, it gives them, when adjudicating on the compatibility of legislation with
the constitutionally protected moral considerations, the power to modify the application of those moral
considerations themselves.“ It does not emerge clearly what such a modification is supposed to consist
in. Moreover, while Raz’s idea concerning the partial exclusion of the exclusion of moral consideration is
undoubtedly very elegant, it is doubtful whether it can fully account of the idea that judges are guilty of
committing legal – and not merely moral – mistakes if the do not take morality into account. Why should
the law make morality legally relevant if all that it does is to cede the ground back to morality?
49 I take it that exclusive legal positivists would agree with that view.

In 1926, in the course of a discussion at a meeting of the German public law teachers’
association, Hans Kelsen memorably put this basic demystifying thrust of legal posi-
tivism in the following famous words:50
The question that natural law theory is after is the eternal question of what lies behind pos-
itive law. Whoever tries to find an answer, I am afraid, discovers neither the absolute truth
of a metaphysics nor the absolute justice of a natural law. Whoever lifts the veil and does
not close his eye is going to be stared at by the gorgonian head of power.
Power is the fabric that legal relations are made of. The only idealisation that a non-re-
ductive form of legal positivism cannot dispense with consists of viewing the exercise
of power as authorized by power-conferring norms. These norms can be reconstructed
by interpreting an effective coercive order as composed of social practices that find
their organising core in abiding by legal norms.
Another predicament
But this is not the end of the story. The recurring question within “dynamic” legal sys-
tems that govern their own creation and application is under which conditions a legal
power is indeed successfully exercised. The question is, in other words, whether offi-
cials exercising their power do so truly or merely seemingly. If they do not exercise it
truly, their acts have to be regarded as void.
Interestingly, continental legal positivism encounters at this point a predicament
that is strikingly similar to the impasse of inclusive legal positivism. The question is
whose interpretation concerning the exercise of legal powers counts. Since the days
that Rex v. Hampden was decided,51 this has been the arch-constitutional question:
Quis iudicabit?52
It may appear that the solution to this question has to parallel the way out of the
inclusive legal positivist’s predicament. The legal order allocates powers to settle ques-
tions concerning the scope of powers. Ultimately, such a power to interpret powers
may be vested in a court. Yet, even when the whole legal order becomes construed as
a set of interlocking power-conferring rules the question remains whether those to
whom the system designates the task to serve as the ultimate interpreters of powers
have used their powers of interpretation excessively or not. It follows that, just as in
50 Hans Kelsen, in: Veröffentlichung der Vereinigung deutscher Staatsrechtslehrer 3, 1927, 54–55 (my transla-
tion).
51 Rex v. Hampden, 3 State Trails 862, 1637, partly reprinted in: The Stuart Constitution ,1608–1688, (ed., J. P.
Kenyon, 2d. ed), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986, 98–103.
52 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (ed. I. Shapiro), New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010, 166 (chapter 26);
Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen: Text von 1932 mit einem Vorwort und drei Corollarien, Berlin: Dunck-
er & Humblot, 1963, 122.

60 ALEXANDER SOMEK
the case of claiming moral insight, everyone has equal standing when it comes to adju-
dicating the question whether the ultimate interpreters exceeded their powers (acted
ultra vires) In particular, there is no reason to assume that legal officials are in a bet-
ter position to say what is within an organ’s power than uninvolved and disinterested
scholars adopting the internal perspective of participants in the legal system. There-
fore, the question must arise that has been explored by Adolph Julius Merkl already a
century ago.53 The powers of government can be rendered differently from the perspec-
tive of the real insiders using the system and of outsiders assessing their behaviour by
adopting, apprehensively, the internal, critically reflective attitude. Depending on the
perspective, the legal system can be given different “faces”. The question which of the
two faces shows us the law as it really is?
Leaving aside the fierce debate that this question gave rise to among members of
the early Viennese school,54 the underlying problem can be stated as follows: The legal
power and the act exercising the power need to match somehow. Loosely put, the legal
power has to be comfortable with accepting an exercise as its own; the exercising act,
in turn, must be convinced that the legal power is right for what it wants to achieve. The
determination is never a one-way street. Rather, just as the power, properly interpret-
ed, needs to recognize the act that wishes to be covered by it, the act needs to recognize
the power as appropriate to its end.
Unsurprisingly, the only media available in legal systems that facilitate such mutual
recognition are the social conventions of interpretation. This point is more important
than it may seem. Unless conventions that guide the interpretation of legal rules are
practiced and provide guidance to those operating the system the normativity under-
lying the effective order could not exist. Effective legal orders are effective legal orders
only if they give effect to norms or rules. The normative quality of these norms or rules
has to be manifest in the behaviour of officials who share views as to what these rules
require, at any rate in standard cases. Without the existence of such views – shared
conventions – no legal system could ever exist and legal scholars would have nothing
to describe.
No legal system could ever do without conventions, for their existence logically
precedes and mediates the existence of law. This explains, however, why the views of
the law applying officials have priority over the views by critically reflective scholars.
Their influence accounts for the effectiveness of the overall system. Without their views
there would be nothing for scholars to describe. If a social practice merely consisted
of acts of power that do not observe any rule-like constraints it would not amount to a
legal system. While legal scholars may believe that their understandings of the limits of
53 Adolf Julius Merkl‚ Das doppelte Rechtsantlitz. Eine Betrachtung aus der Erkenntnistheorie des Rechts,
1918, 47 Juristische Blätter 425–427, 444–447, reprinted in: Die Wiener rechtstheoretische Schule (ed. H. Klecat-
sky, R. Marcic & H. Schambeck), Vienna: Europaverlag, 1968, vol. 1, 1167–1201.
54 On this see a forthcoming contribution by Rodrigo Cadore.

legal powers ultimately count these understandings are necessarily derivative of, and
secondary to, the conventions that are practiced. Practice has priority over theory. This
is the demystification that Anglo-American legal positivism has in stock for continen-
tal legal positivists that are often inclined to take for granted that the rules allocating
powers are somehow “objective”, possibly even abstract entities amenable to detached
description from some theoretical point of view. On the contrary, if the practice view
of meaning is correct then the meaning of rules resides somehow in their routine ap-
plication.55
Conclusion
Apparently, we end up, thus, with a relation of mutually assured deconstruction. We

are looking at a demystification impasse.

Anglo-American demystification re-mystifies. It conceals the indeterminacy that in-
heres in conventionalism. The demystification can be overcome by shifting the focus
from conventions to legal powers.
But continental demystification is also guilty of re-mystification, for it fails to recog-
nize that the limits of legal powers become originally drawn in convention-based prac-
tice. Law as a system of interlocking power-conferring rules presupposes the efficacy
of conventions.
The source of all this bewilderment may well be that legal positivism has never ex-
plained the “factness” of the social facts that are supposed to function as legal sources.
But that is a different story the answer to which leads us already beyond legal positiv-
ism.
It will be remembered what the decisive step is (see above p. 52–54). It consists of
transforming belief into the fact of belief or, alternatively put, of transforming judg-
ment into the fact of judgment. This is something that we ordinarily do in the case of
moral disagreement. We allow others to go forward with what they happen to believe.
It is from such mutual recognition of judgments that legal relations arise. That the law
is based upon sources is a reflection of this way of relating to one another.
This indicates that the perplexity surrounding legal positivism can be overcome by
altering our view of the sources. Legal relations allow someone to have a say. That’s
the whole secret of authority. Sources of law are not primarily social facts but embodi-
ments of subjectivity. They provide us with knowledge of the law. Social facts are rele-
vant to how the law is known in the forms of sources.
55 Dennis Patterson, Law and Truth, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. For a general restatement of
this view, see Christoph Menke, Die Souveränität der Kunst Ästhetische Erfahrung nach Adorno und Derrida,
Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1988, 223.

62 ALEXANDER SOMEK
Legislation, for example, in virtue of resting on a decision, recognizes what the law
is with an eye to what has been decided. Knowing the law from the perspective of leg-
islation, therefore, requires adhering faithfully to the text of a statute or to its original
meaning. The pertinent maxims of interpretation mark what it takes to know the law
“legislatively”. By contrast, the law is known in a manner congenial to customary law
if claims are made that “this” or “that” is not what we are ready to condone here. If the
law is known “customarily” this knowledge is replete with appeals to common under-
standings. Finally, law that is known “scholarly” comes about in appeals to a different
form of fact, actually to argumentatively established differences in situations that are
supposed to warrant the application of the appropriate legal rule. The law emerges,
ideally, from a better argument. It is indeed only at this point that the law transcends
the domain of the factual, however, only in order to become reabsorbed by it in the
case of decisions.
The forms of legal knowledge that are inherent in sources epitomize varieties of sub-
jectivity. They, in turn, make a legal consequence conditional upon something factual.
The sources say “you ought to” because “we see it that way”, “we have decided it that
way” or “the stronger argument requires that you follow this rule”. The law flows from
common understandings or decisions or, finally, from better views concerning what is
to be considered the applicable rule.
I can only posit here that by carrying this view of sources forward the predicaments
of legal positivism can be finally overcome.
Alexander Somek
Institute of Legal Philosophy, University of Vienna, Schenkenstraße 8–10, 1010 Vienna,
Austria, alexander.somek@univie.ac.at

Decentralisation and the Limits of Jurisprudence
CHRISTOPH KLETZER
Abstract: One important, yet still under-theorised aspect of the Pure Theory of Law is its
treatment of what Kelsen called the ‘legal technique’, ie an analysis of how exactly the law
does what it does. In this paper I try to outline both the specific intermediary theoretical
location of the legal technique and its decentralised nature by comparing the technique of
the law with another one: the technique that allows us to transfer data on the internet, the
so-called internet protocol suite. This will help us, I believe, in getting a clearer understand-
ing of the different levels or layers of analysis and keep separate what is done from how it is
done. After having determined the exact yet often misallocated level of some of the most
relevant insights of the Pure Theory I will then analyse the specific architecture of what I
call the legal stack. This is followed by a discussion of the operation of the legal protocol
and an analysis of the nature of its decentralisation. I argue that this stack analysis helps us
see more clearly that (i) the law is ultimately always a matter of the use of force; that (ii) the
law operates not by simply telling people what to do, but that it tells people what to do by
conditioning the use of force; and (iii) that whilst the use of force might be fundamental
to the legal system, it is not its most significant part: what is more significant than the use
of force is all the things the law does by means of this use of force.
Keywords: Hans Kelsen, decentralisation, networks, protocol, primitive law, Pure Theory
of Law
Schlagworte: Hans Kelsen, Dezentralisation, Netzwerke, Protokoll, primitives Recht,

Reine Rechtslehre
When thinking about the relation of the world of facts and the world of the law most
of us, jurisprudes, legal experts and laymen alike, work from a model of detached de-
pendence: we take both worlds to be inextricably entangled, yet conceptually (or at
least provisionally) separable from one another. Most contemporary jurisprudential
theories can be plotted somewhere on the spectrum marked out by the extremes of

64 CHRISTOPH KLETZER
pure detachment and pure dependence: on the extremes we have a natural law theory
based on divine revelation, stressing the complete detachedness of the law from this
world and its determination by another, transcendent world, on the one hand, and a
reductive, sociologist realism, highlighting the complete dependence of law on actual
facts and the merely illusionary or ideological character of any detachedness or inde-
pendence of the law, on the other. Legal Positivism of a Hartian tint, for instance, sits
somewhere between those extremes in that it takes the law to be both a social fact and
a normative phenomenon.
Now, whilst this dualist ontology is certainly plausible and to an extent helpful it has
the disadvantage of hiding what I believe to be a key element of a full understanding of
the law, namely, the peculiar mechanics of the relationship of the two worlds.
This mechanism is what in the context of the Pure Theory of Law has been called
the legal technique.1 The analysis of this legal technique has been one of the main, yet, I
believe, under-appreciated, contributions of the Pure Theory of Law: the Pure Theory
aims to enlighten us about the law not primarily by investigating what its essence or
nature is but by analysing how exactly it works.
In what follows I want to highlight the attractiveness of this approach.2 I try to do
this by discussing a feature of the legal technique which has so far been, I believe, large-
ly overlooked: the decentralised nature of the legal technique. In order to get a better
grip of both the specific intermediary theoretical location of the legal technique and
its decentralised nature, I want to start off by comparing the technique of the law with
another one: the technique that allows us to transfer data on the internet, the so-called
internet protocol suite. This will help us, I believe, in getting used to manoeuvring be-
tween different levels or layers of understanding and keep separate what a certain phe-
nomenon does from how it does it.
After that I will apply the insights to the law and analyse the architecture of what I
call the legal stack. This is followed by a discussion of the specific working of the law
and an analysis of the nature of its decentralisation.
A. Decentralisation
It is a curious fact about the internet that one cannot easily switch it off. A government
might be able to block its domestic users from accessing certain online content, but no
single actor could feasibly switch off the internet altogether. Why is that? The answer
1 See, for instance, Hans Kelsen, ‘The Law as a Specific Social Technique’ 9 University of Chicago Law Re-
view 1941: 75–97.
2 Many of the jurisprudential arguments presented in this paper have already been defended, more formal-
ly and extensively, in previous publications. See Christoph Kletzer, ‘Primitive Law’ in 4 Jurisprudence 2013:
263–72 and The Idea of a Pure Theory of Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing) 2018.

Decentralisation and the Limits of Jurisprudence 65
Figure 1
is not as obvious as one might think. After all, if one considers the architecture of a
typical communication network, it would be rather easy to shut it down: when, say,
my grandfather staying in the Bristol wanted to call his friend at the Sacher Hotel, his
call had to be relayed via a couple of switchboards: the hotel-switchboard gave him an
outside line and connected him with the city-switchboard, which was connected to all
the hotels in the city. This city-switchboard then connected him to the switchboard of
the Sacher, which in turn was connected with all the rooms in the Sacher and which
connected him with his friend.
Take network A from Figure 13 to illustrate the city telephone network of Vienna in
the Thirties where each station represents a hotel or a private telephone station. The
central node is the city switch-board that connects these stations. It is clear that in
such a set-up one would only have to take out the central node to make any telephone
communication between hotels or private stations impossible and to thus shut down
the entire city network.
Now whilst the problem is easily identifiable the solution is less so. After all, this
star-shaped, hub-and-spokes network architecture is not entirely accidental: we do
need some method to keep an authoritative record of which stations are connected to
the network and how to reach them. This essential function is provided by the central
switchboard. Without it, it seems, there would be no operative network to start with. It
is thus the central switchboard that represents the unity of the network.
3 Diagram from Paul Baran, ‘On Distributed Communications Networks’ P-2626, 1962, RAND Corpora-
tion.

66 Christoph KLetzer
Yet, at the same time the centralised architecture presents an unacceptable vulnera-
bility: telephone network downtime might have been an inconvenience for my grand-
father, for military communication it would have been a disaster, especially so in a
post-nuclear-attack scenario. The fact that a star-shaped US command and control net-
work would quite certainly be rendered inoperative by a Soviet first strike also meant
that the US would likely be incapacitated to issue a timely counter-strike. Within the
logic of the cold war, which was stabilised only by the assurance of mutual complete
destruction, this presented a potentially deadly game-theoretical itch: since there was
a high possibility that the US would be rendered incapable of retaliating in time the
only option left open to the US would be not to wait for a situation where it would
need to retaliate but rather anticipate any attack by striking first. This led to a danger-
ous finger on the trigger mentality. And all of this was caused mainly by unreliable
network design. A survivable second strike capability was needed to move down from
a guns loaded, hair-triggered command and control doctrine.

It was within this context that Paul Baran in 1960 presented a series of papers show-
ing that with sufficient network redundancy, ie with sufficiently many extra connec-
tions between the stations, a network can become surprisingly resilient to the taking
out of individual stations.4 Reliable networks can be built out of unreliable elements by
using redundancy. Baran called such a mesh-network ‘distributed’.5
Such a network architecture was, of course, a wonderful idea. However, in the
1960ies it was but an idea. After all, what was missing was the crucial bit: finding out
how to allow the stations to communicate with each other on such a network, ie with-
out there being a central node that relays the messages from the sender to the right
recipient. As mentioned before, the hub-and-spoke design of a centralised network
did not emerge by accident. Rather, the star-shaped setup seemed necessary to make
sure a message could find its way from one node to the other. Conversely, if there were
no central node controlling communications, opening and closing lines, connecting
servers, confirming transmissions and keeping records of all nodes, it seemed impossi-
ble to make sure a message from one part of the network finds its way to another part
of the network.
What solved this problem was the development of a so-called network protocol. A
protocol is a computer programme that uniformly runs on each station and tells each
station how to package, address, relay and confirm messages sent on the mesh net-
work. It is the uniformity of this protocol that allows a decentralised or distributed
network to operate. In a sense the protocol takes over the role of the central hub and
thus represents the unity of the network. There is thus a shift in the paradigm of what
4 Paul Baran, ‘On Distributed Communications Networks’ P-2626, 1962, RAND Corporation and ‘On Dis-
tributed Communications: Introduction to Distributed Communication Networks’, Memorandum RM-
3420-PR, 1964, United States Air Force Project RAND.
5 In this paper we will not follow Baran’s nomenclature but rather call them ‘decentralised’.

represents the unity of the network. We move from a master-unity paradigm to a proto-
col-unity paradigm. In the case of the internet this network protocol is called the inter-
net protocol suite or TCP/IP.
Let us have a closer look at where exactly in the logic of the network this protocol
operates and thus also where the important paradigm shift occurred. In computer sci-
ence it is common to think of computer systems to be a stack of so-called abstraction
layers operating on top of each other. In the case of the internet this stack would look
something like this:
Figure 2
At the bottom we have the physical link layer. It represents the hardware of a variety of
different servers at different physical locations linked to each other by cables or wire-
less radio connections. This hardware alone might form a physical net but it is not yet a
network. After all, data has to be able to travel from one server to the other.
On the very top we have the application layer. In this layer we find the internet ap-
plications we use every day, like the applications that allow us to read newspapers, ac-
cess our bank account, order books, stream movies, go through the publications of
colleagues and so on.
When we think of the internet, most of us think only about these two layers: we
know there must be some kind of physical connection and we know what we want to
do with this connection. However, as we have seen in the brief historical digression,
the truly crucial bit that is missing in this picture is neither of the two but rather what
lies in between: the so called data link, transport, and network layers, which is taken care
of by the TCP/IP. This protocol makes or establishes the actual communication net-
work. It represents the unity of the internet. In a sense it is the internet. Without it, you
would only have hardware laying around. Without it, you could not watch any movies,
order any books or read any newspapers, as no station would know how to communi-
cate with any other station. The top layer tells you what you do with the internet, the

bottom layer is where you do what you do on the top layer. The intermediary layer,
however tells you how to do all of that.
B. The Legal Stack
 regulating Law Application Layer What?
 Legal protocol
transport/Network
Layer
how?
 Legal Facts Link Layer Who?
Figure 3
Now, in the law, too, we tend to only think about two layers in a stack. On the one hand
we see all the things that the law does: it tells people what to do, it makes demands, it
regulates affairs, sets down taxes and so on. This can be called the application layer of
regulatory law. It is what most jurisprudes in the Anglo-American tradition of jurispru-
dence focus on exclusively.
On the other hand, there are the social underpinnings of these legal affairs: people
speaking to each other, judges pronouncing things, voters voting, and so on. This is the
world of the social and psychological forces into which the law is embedded, or on top
of which the law is built. Sociologists of law and legal realists focus exclusively on this
realm. Legal reductionists claim that it is the only realm that really exists.
But in the law there is, too, the intermediary layer, a layer corresponding to the trans-
port/network layers of the internet stack. It is, I believe, this layer that Hans Kelsen was
addressing when he was writing about the legal technique and it is this layer on which
the most significant discoveries and insights of the Pure Theory of Law have to be
located. Whilst the rule of recognition, for instance, is a device of the top application
layer of regulating law, the basic norm of the Pure Theory can only be understood as
operating in this intermediary layer.
The exact manner in which I understand the Pure Theory to model the operation
of the legal protocol will be discussed in the next chapter. I want to use the remaining
paragraphs of this chapter to say a couple of words about the architecture of the legal
stack as a whole.

This architecture can be understood under a loosely emergentist paradigm.6 Under

this paradigm the world is structured in higher and lower layers of existence where the
properties of the higher layers are grounded or anchored in the realities of the lower
level and in this sense do not exist independently of them. However, at the same time
and crucially they are not reducible to them.7
The relation between the layers can be described as follows: whilst a bottom layer
is more fundamental than the others, the top layer is more significant. Whilst the cable
network is more fundamental it is certainly not the significant part of the internet,
which can be found in the applications we are using every day. The applications of the
higher abstraction layer, however, are dependent in their running on the more funda-
mental physical network. We could never understand how the application layer oper-
ates if we were completely ignorant of the other layers building its foundations. If we
knew nothing about the physical network and the internet protocol, the applications
of the internet would have to seem rather miraculous.

Now, importantly, the internet protocol suite inhabits a wold between what is sig-
nificant but non-fundamental, on the one hand, and what is fundamental but in itself
in-significant, on the other. This middle layer is at the same time significant and fun-
damental.
The legal stack has a similar design. On the bottom there are fundamental facts
which are fundamental but taken by themselves legally in-significant. On the top we
have significant yet non-fundamental legal phenomena of regulative law.
As mentioned, most jurisprudes in their analysis of the law focus exclusively on the
top layer and relegate everything which does not inhabit this layer to legal sociology.8
By doing so, I believe, they miss out on a good chunk of significant and fundamental
insights of the intermediary level. By neglecting the more fundamental layers many
jurisprudes face the impossible task of explaining the operation of an application layer
which without reference to the intermediary protocol layer must seem rather miracu-
lous.
In trying to provide answers on this level of legal technique, the Pure Theory is nei-
ther trying to uncover the essence of the regulating law, nor its nature. Its object might
be more fundamental than the legal applications but that does not make it more sig-
nificant. Rather the opposite. The stack analysis tells us how exactly the law does what
it does. This, however, does not mean that what the law does can be reduced to this
operation.
6 Klaus Brunner and Bert Klauninger, ‘An Integrative Image of Causality and Emergence’ in Causality,
Emergence, Self-Organisation, ed Vladimir Arshinov and Christian Fuchs, (Moscow: NIA-Parioda, 2003),
23–35, 26.
7 David Blitz, Emergent Evolution: Qualitative Novelty and the Levels of Reality (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1992),
179.
8 See, for instance, Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1979), 104–105.

C. The Legal Protocol
Now that we have made some progress in determining the level on which many of the
explanations offered by the Pure Theory operate, let us go ahead and try to find out
what exactly this legal protocol according to the Pure Theory of Law is. On the top lev-
el the law issues demands, regulates conduct, creates norms and so on. But how exactly
does it do all of that?
If we want to answer how the law does what it does, we
cannot in our answer, by threat of circularity, make ref-
erence to the concepts and ideas that operate on the top
level. Questions of legal normativity, of the legal ought
in general and of the demands the law creates in particu-
lar operate on the top level. When answering how the
law can be normative and create legal demands this lan-

guage of legal normativity is as unavailable to us as the
Figure 4 techniques of the application layer of the internet are
unavailable at the protocol layer.
Rather conversely, we have to build our stack from the bottom up. Just as the internet
protocol can be understood only insofar as it makes a specific use of the underlying
physical link so our legal protocol can only be understood insofar as it makes specific
use of the facts underlying it. So to understand how the legal protocol operates, we
have to accurately model the medium in which this protocol does what it does. What
we find in this bottom layer is agents doing things, where doing things includes saying
things. At this stage of modelling it is not yet relevant what exactly these agents do.
What we are facing, rather, at any given moment is a set of agents with a certain ca-
pability to do things. We could call these capabilities the agents’ forces and represent
them as arrows pointing in different directions.
So, seen independently from the layers above, the bottom layer can be represented
as a set of agents and their forces pushing in different directions. Again, what the exact
content of these forces is is as of yet irrelevant. The forces are not necessarily aligned.
As mentioned, the agents communicate with each other and insofar as these commu-
nications affect other agents, they are part of the forces that operate between them.
Now, whatever the law does on the top layer, it certainly has to affect those forces: it
regulates behaviour, co-ordinates action and ultimately monopolises the use of force.
So in order to do anything at all, the law has to be able to influence these social forces
and to bring some kind of order to them. How exactly this order which the law brings
to the social forces looks like is not yet relevant and will vary depending on the state
of legal development and specific historic and cultural features of a given legal system.
What matters here is the more basic problem of how the law can bring any order to
these forces at all.

So how is this to be done? There are three classic answers to this problem: (i) com-
munication, (ii) self-interest, and (iii) force. I will go through each of the answers in
turn.
A first (i) answer to the question of how the law brings order to the world would
look something like this: the law influences its subjects’ actions mainly by communi-
cating standards to them. The subjects then voluntarily take an internal perspective
towards these standards and comply with them. It is roughly along these lines that
Hart wrote:
The principal functions of the law as a means of social control are not to be seen in private
litigation or prosecutions, which represent vital but still ancillary provisions for the fail-
ures of the system. It is to be seen in the diverse ways in which the law is used to control, to
guide, and to plan life out of court.9
Under this model the law basically functions as a naked demand made on us. Such a
system of pure or un-fortified demands will likely bring about at least some level of
co-ordination of behaviour. However, there are a couple of well known difficulties with
this model: first of all, this view models the law to function in the same way as morality
does, ie by simply telling people what to do. Now whilst it might seem attractive to
have such a functional alignment of normative practices, this approach produces a host
of so far unresolved difficulties. After all, we do ascribe a different mode of origin, oper-
ation, content and effect to legal and moral rules. All these differences may be covered
up in the demand-paradigm but they re-surface at various intersections of contempo-
rary jurisprudential debates about the law, where they are pressed down only to surface
at another point. Since there is no consensus that such a Whack-A-Mole approach will
ultimately be unsuccessful (or that there can be anything else than such an approach
in philosophy in general) I do not take this to be a debunking argument. What comes
closer to such a debunking argument is the second well known criticism: it argues that
in relying entirely on the voluntary co-operation of the subjects such a pure demand
model is incapable of explaining the level of co-ordination and ultimately the monop-
olisation of the use of force you find in legal systems. Note that the claim presented in
this paper does not maintain that the law does not demand anything nor that these de-
mands do not have any effect whatsoever. The claim is only that taken in isolation the
demand model is incapable of enlightening us about how the law actually moves about
the forces in the bottom layer and how it ultimately monopolises the use of force.
A second (ii) approach do deal with the problem would be to embellish the the-
ory of pure standards or demands with a theory of self-interest. After all, it seems to
be mostly in the self-interest of the individual agents to align their acts with the legal
order. However, there is, of course, a missing link between self-interest and the actual
9 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994) 33.

alignment of action. After all, whilst it is certainly in one’s self-interest to benefit from
social order (be it in the form of peace, prosperity or security), it is not necessarily in
one’s self-interest to bear one’s share of the costs of this social order, especially given
one’s knowledge that everybody else will make similar calculations: self-interest taken
by itself advises us to appear to be aligning our actions with the legal order and we can
appear to be aligning our action in two ways, either by actually aligning our actions
or by pretending to align our action.10 The fact that in some instances it may be easier
and less costly to actually align our actions to the legal order rather than to only make
it appear that we are doing so does not weigh very heavily, since in cases where the
stakes are high, the differential payoffs of a good show will more and more outweigh
the benefits of honest play. After all, the costs of putting up a show remain relatively
constant whereas the costs of actual honest commitment vary heavily depending on
the task involved.
The claim that there might be a strong incentive to free-ride does not, of course, by
itself refute the argument that it might nevertheless be in the self-interest of individual
agents to co-operate or to align their actions and this claim thus does not establish
that the spontaneous emergence of co-operation would be impossible. Rather, con-
versely, some kind of emergence of a propensity towards co-operation or alignment
of behaviour is likely to emerge even from evolutionarily aligned forces of self-interest
taken in isolation. Strategies which are maximally prone to free-ride or diverge from
common behaviour might actually not constitute what has been called an evolutionary
stable strategy:11 in the context of everyone free-riding or diverging it will be beneficial
to develop some kind of tendency towards co-operative or convergent behaviour since
such a tendency, if met with other such tendencies, would out-compete the lone diver-
gent free riders.
Such a spontaneous emergence of co-operation and behavioural convergence will,
however, only occur in pockets of rather limited co-operation and by the same evolu-
tionary reasons cannot grow beyond a certain limit: just as the evolution of a ‘hawk-
ish’12 strategy that never co-operates will be out-competed by gangs of co-operating
‘doves’, so a society composed of purely dovish players is easy prey for hawkish ex-
10 Some forms of social coordination do seem to require actual alignment. The traffic rule to drive on the
left hand side of the road benefits only drivers who actually drive on the left hand side. This, however, is a
special case as it is unclear how one could appear to drive on the left hand side without actually driving on
the left hand side. From most other traffic rules, however, like the rules not to park on certain spots, not to
exceed a certain speed limit, not to jaywalk, not to kill pedestrians by running them over and so on, one
can benefit without actually being in compliance with them, but rather by successfully appearing to be in
compliance.
11 John Maynard Smith defines an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) as “an uninvadable strategy” and
defines this quality of univadability mathematically in terms of the payoffs of certain strategies. John May-
nard Smith, Evolution and the Theory of Games (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 10.
12 Maynard Smith uses the terms ‘dove’ and ‘hawk’ to represent the two strategies modelled in his Hawk-
Dove game, where the hawk escalates and continues until injured or until opponent retreats, whereas the

ploitative behaviour. In a world of doves, a single hawk can make a lot of easy prey and
at a certain saturation point the benefits of turning hawkish will simply be too great to
forgo. The question thus is not whether human nature is such that it does or does not
favour behavioural alignment and co-operation but rather which behavioural strate-
gies would become too costly to resist even for the best natured being.
Whatever the level of such an emergent co-operation resulting from an equilibrium
of the hawkish and dovish forces pulling in opposite directions, I think it is safe to say
that it represents but the minimal fall-back level of locally limited pockets of co-opera-
tion and social ordering on the scale of families and tribes. Going beyond this minimal
level of spontaneous co-ordination and social ordering and moving towards some kind
of monopolisation of the use of force will demand much more of agents and will put
their willingness to forgo the benefits of free-riding under ever more strain. I think it is
safe to say that any regime that claims to have law has a level of social order that goes
far beyond that minimum of what people want to do ‘naturally’, ie merely out of self-in-
terests co-ordinated by evolutionary strategies. How would such level of the alignment
and ordering of social forces be achieved? How could people be made to do things that
go beyond and against what they are willing to do naturally?
The only remaining answer (iii), it seems, is force: if people do not align their be-
haviour naturally or willingly, it seems they need to be forced to do so. On the face of
it, this might appear a promising route. However, there is a principled problem with
such an approach that relates to the possible holder of such a force, to the agent that
is supposed to force the others. Let us say the amount of cumulative resistive force to
be overcome in order to bring people into alignment is Z. Now, no single individual of
the group will be strong enough so that his individual force X > Z. Thus any individual
aiming to dominate a group by force will have to make use of the forces of other mem-
bers, say a group of henchmen or myrmidons. Say, the combined force of the myrmi-
dons is quantified as Y. In order for this suggested alignment by naked force to work, Y
has to be greater than Z. At the same time, for the leader to control his helpers by force
alone it has to be the case that X > Y. But if both X > Y and Y > Z, then it follows by
necessity that X > Z: if the purported leader were strong enough to dominate by sheer
force the myrmidons which in turn were strong enough to dominate by sheer force the
wider public then the purported leader would by necessity be strong enough to domi-
nate the wider public by sheer force directly. Since this is certainly not the case – after
all we needed to go through the myrmidons only because we established that X ≯ Z – it
cannot be the case that the supposed ruler truly dominates the myrmidons by force
alone. And this makes perfect sense. It is likely that they are not truly forced by him
but follow him voluntarily, ie either by following his naked demands (see above (i))
Dove retreats at once if the opponent escalates. John Maynard Smith, Evolution and the Theory of Games
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 12.

or by concluding it is in their self-interest (see above (ii)) to follow him independently

of the use of force.
But there is a last option we missed: could it not be the case that no individual agent,
but the group as a whole exercised force to keep individual agents in line? Could there
not be some some Durkheimian social forces13 at play that are in a sense external to
and coercive of individual actors? Could not ‘the community’ make sure that people
come and stay in line? This is an attractive option, however, without going into details
of Durkheim’s theory, it can be ruled out at this stage as it posits and takes as given ex-
actly what we want to explain, namely, the social force that aligns the individual forces.
The explanation of how the individual forces are aligned, how the legal force is con-
stituted, thus has to go down a different route than the ones taken by the above theo-
ries and might well involve some kind of interplay of them. It requires a shift from the
master-paradigm to the protocol paradigm.
The legal technique as presented by the Pure Theory does just that. I think that nei-
ther communication nor self-interest nor force taken in isolation is capable of creating
the alignment of forces which would constitute the monopolisation of the use of force
we see in modern societies. So how can it work?
In discussing primitive legal systems Kelsen gives a curious answer:
In primitive law, the individual whose legally protected interests have been violated is
himself authorised by the legal order to proceed against the wrongdoer with…coercive
means. This is called self-help. Every individual takes the law into his own hands. Blood
revenge is the most characteristic form of this primitive legal technique. Neither the es-
tablishment of the delict nor the execution of the sanction is conferred upon an authority
distinct from the parties involved or interested. In both these aspects the legal order is
entirely decentralised…Nevertheless, in a primitive community the man avenging the
murder of his father upon one whom he considers to be the murderer is himself regarded
not as a murderer but as an organ of the community…The distinction between murder, as
a delict, and homicide, as a fulfilment of a duty to avenge, is of the greatest importance for
primitive society. It means that killing is only permitted if the killer acts as an organ of his
community, if his action is undertaken in execution of the legal order. The coercive act is
reserved to the community, and is, in consequence, a monopoly of this community. The
decentralisation of the application of the law does not prevent the coercive act as such
from being strictly monopolised.14
To illustrate this idea, take the following situation: say X kills A. In revenge A’s brother
B kills X. In revenge Y kills B, then C kills Y and Z kills C.
13 See, for instance, Emile Durkheim, Suicide (London: Routledge, 2002) and The Elementary Forms of
Religious Life (New York: The Free Press, 1995).
14 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1949) 338–9.

Figure 5
Figure 6 Figure 7
In terms of the pure facts at the basic level, this is but a series of mutual killings. It is
a war-like and un-ordered chaotic state of affairs. If we apply Kelsen’s logic of prim-
itive law, however, whilst the situation in terms of pure facts remains the same, the
legal assessment has fundamentally changed: now the end-of-alphabet group (X, Y, Z)
are marked as culprits or criminals and the beginning-alphabet-group (B and C) are
marked as legal organs.
In a global context we can thus see how the law picks out certain agents by reference
to their specific direction of force and marks this force as the force of the law.
Note that this force of the law is not created by the law but only co-opted by it.
The force has existed as force before the existence of law and independently of it. It
is a force which operates on the basic, ‘physical’ layer. It is not created by the law, but
it is identified by the law amongst the existing forces of society. This force is thus by
definition always already directed in the legally right direction. The law thus solves
the problem of how to create order neither by demanding that the direction of forces
be changed or by relying on the self-interest of agents to change the direction of their
force or by forcing the use of force. It does not immediately change the direction of
forces at all. Rather it confirms the direction of certain forces in contrast to others.
This may, of course, have the mediated effect of gradually changing the direction of
forces of the agents by the feeling of that being demanded, by calculation of self-inter-
est or by the actual fact that in an instance the use of force marked out as lawful might
happen to be stronger than the one marked out as unlawful. This mediated effect,
however, is but a secondary effect. The primary method, conversely, is the identifica-
tion of a social order.
The problem discussed above of how to direct social force in a certain way is here
already resolved: the law does not need to move about forces in the right direction but

it identifies the correctly directed forces as its own force. The strongest, historically
prevailing force will be considered the legal force. It is only after this establishment of
the legal force that the legal force will consolidate itself by means of centralisation and
thus by means of a successive weeding out of unlawful force.
What needs to be seen, though, is that even at this primitive stage the law, whilst
not yet being able to centralise the use of force, it is already capable of monopolising the
use of force: the law allows us to distinguish between lawful use of force (sanctions by
state organs) and unlawful use of force (crimes by criminals). Every use of force is thus
marked out as either allowed or forbidden. This is all that is needed for monopolisa-
tion, since the monopolisation can neither mean the total absence of the use of force
altogether or even the total absence of the unlawful use of force. Even in modern states,
where the use of force is uncontroversially monopolised, there is still a lot of unlawful
use of force. What monopolisation means is that all lawful force is wielded by the state
as identified by the law.

This analysis of the legal stack helps us to see rather clearly the importance as well
as the practical limitations of this legal protocol. Let us, again, compare the legal stack
to the internet protocol suite. TCP/IP might establish the foundation of the modern
internet, but taken in isolation, ie without a further developed application layer run-
ning on top of it, is rather useless. Similarly, the legal protocol does establish the foun-
dations of the legal system, it does create peace and order but it does so only in a very
formal sense: using the protocol we can interpret the raging war between two families
not as war but as peace-keeping. One family acts as the organs of the state, the other
as band of criminals. This is war understood as peace-keeping but, of course, not yet
peace or security in a substantive sense. But it is more than nothing. It is the germ of a
legal order around which this legal order can grow.
So when Hart argues that this primitive law is not yet law, he is both right and wrong:
he is right in pointing out that the protocol layer is not the application layer, that the
legal protocol is not yet regulatory law. He is, however, wrong, in overlooking the fact
that the protocol layer is a fundamental ingredient of all law, including our modern law.
This protocol layer describes the legal technique, it describes how the law does what it
does, it describes how the law orders and regulates society.
D. Decentralised Centralisation
Whilst the protocol layer of the internet is irreducibly decentralised, the abstraction
layer on top of it, ie the application layer, is not: whilst, say, Google is linked to millions
of different computers, the webpage of the Londonderry Bridge Club is connected
only to a couple and whilst there are millions of webpages like the Londonderry Bridge
Club, there are but a couple like Google. The internet is thus actually quite centralised.

However centralised the application layer may be, this centralisation is still created on
top of and thus by means of the irreducibly decentralised internet protocol suite.
Something similar holds true for the legal stack. Modern law is certainly radically
more centralised than the primitive law system sketched above. Still, even in modern
law the centralisation is effected by means of the fundamentally decentralised method
of the legal protocol.
How, then, does the centralisation of the law work exactly? Again, since we are work-
ing within a layered stack we cannot simply assume the availability of any techniques
or concepts of a higher stack. Rather, we have work our way from the bottom to the
top and have to explain the functioning of these higher-order techniques and concepts
by means of the lower ones. We thus have to start with the primitive legal protocol and
see how centralisation can be achieved by using only this protocol.
The protocol above can be formalised as follows:
[1] If X, then the use of force is lawful.
According to the Pure Theory of Law, this is the fundamental form of the law in gen-
eral. It is also the so-called basic norm. What distinguishes modern law from primitive
law is not the legal form as such or the way of its operation as a legal protocol layer, but
only the specific content of X, the content of the condition of the lawfulness of the use
of force.
What we aim to show, then, is how centralisation can be implemented by changing
only the content of the condition X.
In primitive law the content of the condition X is rather straightforward: the law-
fulness of the use of force is conditioned by simple facts, eg the fact that someone has
killed someone else who himself has not killed someone else.
[2] If A has killed B who himself has not killed someone then killing A is lawful.
Now, the first step towards centralisation would be to require not only that A has killed
someone but also that a third person (call him a ‘judge’) has authorised the killing of
A. It is important to note that this requirement would not feed into the law as a bare
demand but that it would be introduced into the condition X.
[3] If A has killed B who himself has killed C but A has not been authorised to kill B by
D then killing A is lawful.
The recursive nature of this rule has the effect that now any killing has to be authorised
by a judge in order not to have the effect of rendering a killing of the last killer lawful.
Note that this centralising move is effected neither by telling A what he can do or
cannot do, nor by telling D (the “judge”) what he can do or cannot do, but by telling
everyone what they can do to A.
Take again our case illustrated in Figure 6. X kills innocent A and then B kills X.
Under rule [2], this last killing would have been lawful which means nothing else than

that a killing of B by, say, Y, would be unlawful which, in turn means nothing else than
that a killing of Y would be lawful and so on.
If we apply rule [3], however, the situation looks entirely different: in this case, if B
had not been authorised by J (the “judge”), then his killing of X remains unlawful, even
if X might have in fact previously killed A. This in turn would render a killing of B law-
ful. However, if now Y comes along and kills B without himself having been authorised
by J, his killing of B is unlawful which in turn means that killing him would be lawful,
as long as authorised by J, and so on.
Note, that rule [3] operates not by rendering more killings unlawful but by render-
ing them lawful Or, put differently: it renders certain killings unlawful by rendering
others lawful. Under rule [2] alone, killing B would not be lawful. Under rule [3] kill-
ing B is lawful. The recursive applicability of rule [3], however, makes sure that no kill-
ing unauthorised by J is lawful. The recursive nature of this rule has the effect that now
any killing has to be authorised by a judge in order not to have the effect of rendering
the killing of the last killer lawful.
Now, apart from the requirement that a judge authorises the killing, other require-
ments can be introduced into the condition X. These can include the rules about how
exactly the judge has to go about to authorise the killing, how the killing has to be
conducted, who can do the killing, who counts as a judge and so on. Furthermore in
referring to certain valid rules and procedures these conditions refer to the valid cre-
ation and abrogation of new rules feeding into X. Thus, for instance, the condition X
may include requirements like: ‘as has been decided by a person appointed as a judge
in accordance to the requirements as set out in the laws regulating the appointment of
judges as created by parliament in accordance with the constitution which has been
created in accordance with international law.’
It is via this route, ie as specific content of the condition X, that the entire content
of the modern, centralised legal system enters the primitive legal rule. It is thus in this
content X that the entire application layer of the regulatory law has to be located.
E. Conclusion
Understanding the law not as a flat, one-dimensional phenomenon but adding some
depth to it by understanding it as a stack of various layers helps us, I believe, get a much
clearer understanding of how it works and also what it is. It helps us, I think, see more
clearly three facts.
First, the law is ultimately always a matter of the use of force. What distinguishes
modern from primitive law is but complexity and sheer number of the conditions that
condition the lawfulness of the use of force. It is thus no wonder that we as lawyers and
jurisprudes can sometimes get lost in the legal material and start to overlook that logi-
cally it all plays the same role, namely that of conditioning the lawfulness of the use of

force. Of course, modern law regulates many trivial things which do not in themselves
seem to be matters of the use of force. The stack analysis presented here, however,
shows that as soon as we try to analyse how the law regulates even those trivial things
we find out that it regulates them by ultimately holding out the use of force. This use of
force, is of course, heavily conditioned, but it is always there.
Secondly, and relatedly, the law operates not by simply telling people what to do,
but it tells people what to do by conditioning the use of force. It involves a shift from
a master-paradigm of social unity in which there has to be some real or projected uni-
fied agent behind the law to a protocol-paradigm where the social unity is explained
by means of the uniform operation of a protocol or code. The ease with which the law
makes people do things might sometimes seem miraculous. It has to remain miracu-
lous as long as we do not inquire into how exactly the law can make people do things.
In its technique the law has recurse to a decentralised and in this sense ‘social’ reservoir
of pure force. It establishes this social force by identifying it.

Thirdly, whilst the use of force might be fundamental to the legal system, it is not its
most significant part. What is more significant than the use of force is all the things we
do by means of this use of force.
Christoph Kletzer
King’s College London, The Dickson Poon School of Law, Strand, London, WC2R 2LS,
United Kingdom, christoph.kletzer@kcl.ac.uk


Das „Faktum der Rechtswissenschaft“
bei Hans Kelsen*1
CARSTEN HEIDEMANN
The ‘Fact of Legal Science’ in Hans Kelsen’s Theory of Law

Abstract: The ‘fact of science’ is, in two different senses, at the core of Kelsen’s neo-Kantian
theory of law during the twenties. On the one hand, Kelsen defines his theory, following
Kant, Trendelenburg, and Cohen, as a critical theory of legal science, that is, of legal dog-
matics. Legal science is a fact insofar as it is established as a social practice; and it is the task
of the Pure Theory to analyse the presuppositions of the claim to objectivity, normativity
and positivity, which is raised by dogmatic statements, and to reconstruct legal science in
accordance with these presuppositions. On the other hand, Kelsen identifies the fact which
is established by legal science, the legal norm, with the hypothetical judgment of legal sci-
ence wherein antecedent and consequent are connected by the category of imputation. This
judgment is not a psychic entity or procedure, but an objective structure; its validity might
plausibly be taken to consist in the normative demand to think according to this judgment.
Keywords: Hans Kelsen, Hermann Cohen, Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg, fact of legal
science, transcendental method, validity
Schlagworte: Hans Kelsen, Hermann Cohen, Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg, Faktum der
Rechtswissenschaft, transzendentale Methode, Geltung
1. Einleitung
Der Bezug auf das „Faktum der Rechtswissenschaft“ ist für Kelsens neukantische
Rechtstheorie der zwanziger Jahre von zentraler Bedeutung, und der entsprechende
Ausdruck erscheint in der ersten Auflage der Reinen Rechtslehre an prominenter Stelle.
Kelsen schreibt dort, die Möglichkeit und Erforderlichkeit einer normativen Theorie
* Ich danke Monika Zalewska für hilfreiche Kommentare zum Text.

82 CARSTEN HEIDEMANN
des Rechts sei schon durch das „jahrtausendalte Faktum der Rechtswissenschaft“ er-
wiesen.1 Und in seiner einzigen ausführlicheren Auseinandersetzung mit neukanti-
schen Theorien, Rechtswissenschaft und Recht von 1922, heißt es, dass die Beziehung auf
das Faktum einer Wissenschaft das „Um und Auf der Transzendentalphilosophie“ sei.2
Im Folgenden werde ich kurz die Genese der Wendung vom Faktum der Wissen-
schaft, ihre doppelte Bedeutung und ihre Funktion innerhalb der Reinen Rechtslehre
darstellen.
2. Das Faktum der Wissenschaft bei Cohen, Kant und Trendelenburg
Das Faktum der Wissenschaft zählt, als Ansatzpunkt der „transzendentalen Methode“,
durch die in der Nachfolge Kants notwendige Bedingungen der Möglichkeit objekti-
ver Erkenntnis begründet werden sollen, zum Grundbestand neukantischer Theorien.

Dort wird das entsprechende Theorem vor allem von Hermann Cohen vertreten. 1877
schreibt Cohen:
„Nicht die Sterne am Himmel sind die Objekte, die jene Methode betrachten lehrt, son-
dern die astronomischen Rechnungen, jene Fakten wissenschaftlicher Realität sind gleich-
sam das Wirkliche, das zu erklären steht, auf welches der transzendentale Blick eingestellt
wird. […] Jene Fakten von Gesetzen sind die Objekte; nicht die Sternendinge“.3
Und in der 2. Auflage seiner Schrift Kants Theorie der Erfahrung heißt es dann 1885:
[„Den Ausweis der apriorischen Elemente] bringt die transzendentale Methode, deren
Prinzip und Norm der schlichte Gedanke ist: solche Elemente des Bewusstseins seien
Elemente des erkennenden Bewusstseins, welche hinreichend und notwendig sind, das
Faktum der Wissenschaft zu begründen und zu festigen.“4
Cohen gibt dies als Rekonstruktion des Kerns der theoretischen Philosophie Kants
aus. In der Tat lässt die Konzeption sich auf den ersten Blick auf Kants Prolegomena
zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik5 stützen. In dieser didaktisch vereinfachenden Zu-
sammenfassung von Teilen der Kritik der reinen Vernunft unterscheidet Kant die in der
Kritik angewandte anspruchsvolle synthetische oder progressive Begründungsweise,
die ausgehend von der skepsisresistenten transzendentalen Einheit des Selbstbewusst-
seins die apriorischen Geltungsbedingungen objektiver Erkenntnis begründet, von
1 Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (1. Aufl.), Wien und Leipzig 1934, 37.
2 Hans Kelsen, Rechtswissenschaft und Recht. Erledigung eines Versuchs zur Überwindung der „Rechts-
dogmatik“, in: ZöR 3 (1922), 128.
3 Hermann Cohen, Kants Begründung der Ethik, Berlin 1877, 20 f.
4 Hermann Cohen, Kants Theorie der Erfahrung (2. Aufl.), Berlin 1885, 77.
5 Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten kön-
nen, Werke (hrsg. von Wilhelm Weischedel), Bd. 5, Frankfurt/M. 1977, 134 f. (A 38 f.), 139 f. (A 46 f.).

Das „Faktum der Rechtswissenschaft“ bei Hans Kelsen 83
der leichter fassbaren analytischen oder regressiven der Prolegomena, die ausgehend
von den in Mathematik und reiner Naturwissenschaft „gegebenen“ synthetischen Ur-
teilen a priori deren Ermöglichungsbedingungen nachweist.
Die synthetische Methode ist die eigentliche philosophische Methode. Sie macht
den Kern von Kants theoretischer Philosophie aus. Dieser geht es angesichts der Un-
möglichkeit, eine Erkenntnis eines Gegenstandes mit einem erkenntnisunabhängig
gedachten Gegenstand zu vergleichen, darum darzulegen, ob und auf welche Weise
Gegenstandsbezug und Objektivität innerhalb der Erkenntnis zustande kommen kön-
nen. Sie setzt nicht voraus, dass es synthetische Urteile a priori gibt (denn dies könnte
durch den Skeptiker bezweifelt werden), durch die sich die Gültigkeit der Katego-
rien sonst leicht belegen ließe; vielmehr müssen die Kategorien als notwendige Be-
dingungen der Möglichkeit von Gegenstandserkenntnis von einer unbezweifelbaren
Prämisse aus bewiesen werden. Dieser unbezweifelbare Ausgangspunkt ist für Kant
die transzendentale Einheit der Apperzeption, das „ich denke“, das alle unsere Vorstel-
lungen und Urteile begleiten können muss. Sie lässt sich wohl am ehesten als „Gleich-
ursprünglichkeit“ von Erkenntnissubjekt und einem kohärenten System referierender,
also sich auf einen Gegenstand beziehender, Urteile oder Propositionen begreifen.6
Ob und wie es Kant gelungen ist, von diesem formalen Ausgangspunkt aus inhaltlich
bestimmte Kategorien nachzuweisen, ist fraglich; jedenfalls dürfte es sich bei der Be-
weisführung nicht um eine einfache „Deduktion“ handeln. Möglicherweise kommt für
die Rechtfertigung der transzendentalen Einheit der Apperzeption selbst ein „elenkti-
sches“ Argument in Frage,7 während die Gültigkeit der Kategorien im Rahmen einer
„Sequenz analytischer Implikationsschritte“8 nachgewiesen werden könnte. Denkbar
ist auch, dass die synthetische Begründung stets einer Ergänzung durch einen Beweis
nach analytischer Methode bedarf.9
Die analytische Methode ist deutlich anspruchsloser. Sie ist für Kant kein philo-
sophisches Begründungsverfahren, sondern eine ausschließlich für Prolegomena zu-
lässige Darstellungsweise. Sie müsse sich auf etwas stützen,
6 Aschenberg meint, dass das Prinzip der transzendentalen Einheit der Apperzeption grundlegender
als die Kontrastrelation zwischen Subjektivem und Objektivem sein müsse (vgl. Reinhold Aschenberg,
Sprachanalyse und Transzendentalphilosophie, Stuttgart 1982, 185 f.). Das scheint mir aber nur dann der Fall
zu sein, wenn die Einheit des Urteilszusammenhangs bei Kant sich wirklich kategorial trennen lässt von der
Einheit des empirischen Gegenständlichen, was m. E. zweifelhaft ist; vgl. unten 3.3. Zur Gleichursprüng-
lichkeit der beiden Elemente vgl. auch Hansgeorg Hoppe, Die Bedeutung der Empirie für transzendentale
Deduktionen, in: Kants transzendentale Deduktion und die Möglichkeit von Transzendentalphilosophie, Frank-
furt/M. 1988, 131.
7 Reinhold Aschenberg, Sprachanalyse und Transzendentalphilosophie (Fn. 6), 383 ff.
8 Reinhold Aschenberg, Einiges über Selbstbewusstsein als Prinzip der Transzendentalphilosophie, in:
Kants transzendentale Deduktion und die Möglichkeit von Transzendentalphilosophie, Frankfurt/M. 1988, 55.
9 Vgl. etwa Christian Krijnen, Nachmetaphysischer Sinn, Würzburg 2001, 56 f. m. w. N., der von einer not-
wendigen Komplementarität der beiden Begründungsmethoden ausgeht.

„was man schon als zuverlässig kennt, von da man mit Zutrauen ausgehen und zu den
Quellen aufsteigen kann, die man noch nicht kennt, und deren Entdeckung uns nicht al-
lein das, was man wusste, erklären, sondern zugleich einen Umfang vieler Erkenntnisse,
die insgesamt aus den nämlichen Quellen entspringen, darstellen wird.“10
Die Möglichkeit der analytischen Methode ergebe sich daraus, dass „gewisse reine
synthetische Erkenntnis a priori“ zwar nicht unbezweifelbar, aber doch „wirklich und
gegeben“ sei, nämlich die Urteile der Mathematik und der reinen Naturwissenschaft.11
Ihr Vorteil ist, dass sie nicht aus einem unbezweifelbaren, aber formalen Prinzip zu
inhaltlichen Ergebnissen gelangen muss, sondern bestimmte nichtempirische, aber
dennoch synthetische Urteile voraussetzen darf. Entsprechend heißt es bei Kant zu
den Vorzügen der analytischen Methode:
„[Sie] erleichtert das Geschäfte sehr, in welchem die allgemeinen Betrachtungen nicht al-
lein auf Facta angewandt werden, sondern sogar von ihnen ausgehen, anstatt dass sie in
synthetischem Verfahren gänzlich in abstracto aus Begriffen abgeleitet werden müssen“.12
Doch wird für Kant die eigentliche Begründungslast von der synthetischen Methode
getragen; denn mittels der analytischen Methode kann lediglich die relative Geltung
apriorischer Elemente bezogen auf die Sätze der Mathematik und reinen Naturwissen-
schaft nachgewiesen werden.13 Wenn Cohen die „transzendentale“ Methode mit der
analytischen Methode Kants identifiziert, relativiert er den Kantschen Ansatz also er-
heblich.
Darüber hinaus findet sich bei Cohen eine zweite Relativierung des Begründungs-
ansatzes Kants, die vermutlich auf den Einfluss Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburgs zu-
rückzuführen ist. Trendelenburg fordert Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts angesichts des
desolaten Zustands der Philosophie nach dem Niedergang des deutschen Idealismus,
dass sie sich an die seinerzeit blühenden Naturwissenschaften anschließen möge, zum
wechselseitigen Nutzen, denn diesen würde eine kritische Methodologie fehlen. Be-
reits 1840 schreibt Trendelenburg:
„Die Tatsachen, die [die Logik, d. h. die erkenntnistheoretische Philosophie] beobachten
sollte, um sie abzuleiten, sind die Methoden der einzelnen Wissenschaften; denn diesen
10 Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena (Fn. 5), A 40.

11 A. a. O.
12 Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena (Fn. 5), A 47.
13 Vgl. zur analytischen/synthetischen Methode auch Immanuel Kant, Logik, Werke (hrsg. von Wilhelm
Weischedel), Bd. 6, Frankfurt/M. 1977, 581 (§ 117): „Die analytische Methode ist der synthetischen ent-
gegengesetzt. Jene fängt von dem Bedingten und Begründeten an und geht zu den Prinzipien fort […],
dieses hingegen geht von den Prinzipen zu den Folgen oder vom Einfachen zum Zusammengesetzten. Die
erstere könnte man auch die regressive, so wie die letztere die progressive nennen. […] Für den Zweck der
Popularität ist die analytische, für den Zweck der wissenschaftlichen und systematischen Bearbeitung des
Erkenntnisses aber ist die synthetische Methode angemessen.“

hat der erkennende Geist in den größten Abmessungen sein eigenes Wesen eingedrückt.
Die Wissenschaften versuchen glücklich ihre eigentümlichen Wege, aber zum Teil ohne
nähere Rechenschaft der Methode, da sie auf ihren Gegenstand und nicht auf das Ver-
fahren gerichtet sind. Die Logik hätte hier die Aufgabe zu beobachten und zu vergleichen,
das Unbewusste zum Bewusstsein zu erheben und das Verschiedene im gemeinsamen
Ursprunge zu begreifen. […] Ohne sorgfältigen Hinblick auf die Methode der einzelnen
Wissenschaften muss sie ihr Ziel verfehlen, weil sie dann kein bestimmtes Objekt hat, an
dem sie sich in ihren Theorien zurechtfinde.“14
Und 1870 heißt es dann in der dritten Auflage von Trendelenburgs Logischen Unter-
suchungen, die Wissenschaften stellten der Skepsis ein „Factum“ entgegen, und die Tat-
sache der Wissenschaft sei die Basis des logischen Problems.15
Damit wird Trendelenburg zu einem Begründer der Wissenschaftstheorie.16 Zwar
kann sein Einfluss auf Cohens Konzeption des „Faktums der Wissenschaft“ nicht
direkt nachgewiesen werden, denn Cohen hat für seine Auffassung nie explizit auf
Trendelenburg Bezug genommen. Doch hatte er als Student in Berlin in der ersten
Hälfte der 1860er Jahre nicht nur unmittelbaren Kontakt zu Trendelenburg;17 er be-
teiligte sich auch maßgeblich (und zwar im Wesentlichen auf Trendelenburgs Seite)
an dem Streit um die „Trendelenburgsche Lücke“, in dem es um die Frage ging, ob
Kant seine Einordnung von Raum und Zeit als subjektive Anschauungsformen über-
zeugend begründet habe.18 Ferner entspricht Cohens Begrifflichkeit weitgehend der-
jenigen Trendelenburgs. Darüber hinaus lässt sich seine Deutung der analytischen
oder regressiven Methode kaum ohne Trendelenburgs Einfluss erklären. Denn diesem
geht es nicht, wie Kant, um die konstituierenden Elemente apriorischer synthetischer
Urteile, sondern um den Aufweis der Methoden und Voraussetzungen der aposteri-
orischen Naturwissenschaften schlechthin. Das findet sich entsprechend bei Cohen,
der das wissenschaftliche Faktum als Ansatzpunkt der transzendentalen Methode, wie
die oben zitierte Passage belegt, nicht (nur) in den apriorischen synthetischen Sätzen
der reinen Naturwissenschaft und Mathematik, sondern generell in den Tatsachen der
wissenschaftlichen „Gesetze“ sieht.19
14 Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg, Logische Untersuchungen (1. Aufl.), Berlin 1840, Vorrede IV.
15 Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg, Logische Untersuchungen (3. Aufl.), Leipzig 1870, 130 f., 312.
16 Vgl. Klaus Christian Köhnke, Entstehung und Aufstieg des Neukantianismus, Frankfurt/M. 1993, 35 ff.
17 Vgl. Deutsche Biographie, Artikel „Cohen, Hermann“ (abrufbar unter https://www.deutsche-biographie.
de/sfz8558.html).
18 Vgl. dazu insbesondere Klaus Christian Köhnke, Entstehung und Aufstieg des Neukantianismus (Fn. 16),
257 ff.
19 Vgl. dazu auch Klaus Christian Köhnke, Entstehung und Aufstieg des Neukantianismus (Fn. 16), 272: „Dass
schon 1840 von Trendelenburg gesagt worden war, die Logik müsse sich auf die Wissenschaften richten,
weil sie sonst kein bestimmtes Ziel und Objekt habe, und damit erstmals eine ‚Theorie der Wissenschaft‘
ihrem Anliegen nach gefordert war, sollte den Gedanken erleichtern, der Vater des neukantianischen Scien-
tismus, Cohen, habe tatsächlich weit mehr, als bislang gesehen worden ist, von jenem gelernt.“

Diese Kontingenz des Ausgangspunktes wirkt sich im Übrigen bereits bei Cohen,
mehr noch bei seinem Schüler Paul Natorp, in einer eigentümlichen Dynamik der Er-
kenntnisbedingungen aus: Zwar verkörpert das Faktum der Wissenschaft das erreich-
bare Höchstmaß objektiver Erkenntnis; es ist aber nichts Feststehendes, sondern ein
„Fieri“,20 und mit ihm können sich auch die notwendigen Bedingungen seiner Mög-
lichkeit verändern.
Wenn Cohen für seine Theorie dennoch den Anspruch erhebt, die theoretische
Philosophie Kants zu rekonstruieren, dann reduziert er die Transzendentalphiloso-
phie letztlich auf eine „methodenkritische Wissenschaftstheorie mit erweiterten poli-
zeilichen Vollmachten“.21 Das bedeutet allerdings nicht unbedingt eine Trivialisierung.
So wie Kant die traditionelle Ontologie nicht wirklich „zermalmt“, sondern sie in einer
Verstandesanalytik aufgehen lässt,22 so verwirft Cohen seinerseits Kants Verstandes-
kritik nicht, sondern deutet sie in eine kritische Wissenschaftstheorie um. Die klassi-
sche Ontologie wird quasi in der neukantischen Wissenschaftstheorie „aufgehoben“.
3. Das Faktum der Rechtswissenschaft bei Cohen und Kelsen
Nach Kelsens eigener Auskunft wird er durch eine Besprechung seiner Hauptprobleme
der Staatsrechtslehre auf Parallelen zwischen seiner Theorie und der von Cohen 1904 in
der Ethik des reinen Willens entwickelten aufmerksam.23 Diese betreffen zwar vor allem
den Personen- und Willensbegriff; in Cohens Schrift heißt es jedoch auch ausdrück-
lich, dass jede Philosophie auf das „Faktum von Wissenschaften“ angewiesen sei,24 das
sei „das Ewige in Kants System“. Und die Wissenschaft, an die Cohen seine Ethik in
sehr eigenwilliger Weise andockt, ist die Rechtswissenschaft.
3.1 Die faktische Rechtswissenschaft
Dabei modifiziert er sein eben geschildertes Konzept allerdings erheblich. Cohen er-
klärt nie genauer, was er unter dem „Faktum der Rechtswissenschaft“ versteht. Einer-
seits scheint die ausgeübte Rechtswissenschaft für ihn nicht (wie für Kelsen) mit der
Rechtsdogmatik identisch zu sein. Vielmehr lokalisiert er sie auf einer abstrakteren
20 Paul Natorp, Die logischen Grundlagen der exakten Wissenschaften, Leipzig und Berlin 1910, 14.
21 So treffend Andreas Hoeschen, Das „Dostojewsky“ – Projekt Lukács‘ neukantianisches Frühwerk in seinem
ideengeschichtlichen Kontext, Tübingen 1999, 113.
22 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Werke (hrsg. von Wilhelm Weischedel), Bd. 3, Frankfurt/M.
1974, 275 (A 246/B 303).
23 Hans Kelsen, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre (2. Aufl.), Tübingen 1923, Vorrede XVII; ders., Reine
Rechtslehre (Fn. 1), Vorwort IX.
24 Hermann Cohen, Ethik des reinen Willens, Berlin 1904, 62.

Ebene als die Naturwissenschaft; sie ist für ihn als Allgemeine Rechtslehre eine „Ma-
thematik“, also gewissermaßen eine Methodik, der Geisteswissenschaften schlecht-
hin.25 Diese Allgemeine Rechtslehre scheint er jedoch andererseits vor allem der insti-
tutionalisierten Rechtsdogmatik entnehmen zu wollen. Ferner eignen sich die Gesetze
der Naturwissenschaften als Ausgangspunkt der transzendentalen Methode, weil sie
das Ideal objektiver Erkenntnis weitestgehend annähern. Sie sind als allgemeingültige
Regeln experimentell belegbar und erlauben zuverlässig Vorhersagen. Rechtswissen-
schaftliche Sätze dagegen sind für Cohen nicht deswegen tauglicher Ansatzpunkt, weil
sie einem vergleichbaren Erkenntnisideal genügen, sondern weil sie Bestandteile einer
soziokulturell etablierten, systematisch vorgehenden und Objektivität beanspruchen-
den begrifflichen Praxis sind.26 Ihm scheint es ausschließlich darum zu gehen, die Be-
deutung ethischer Begriffe, die für alle Geisteswissenschaften von Interesse sind, wie
„Handlung“, „Person“, „Wille“ etc., nicht abstrakt entwickeln zu müssen, sondern sie
aus einer gegebenen Praxis herauspräparieren zu können.27 Unmerklich wird so das

„wissenschaftliche Faktum“ als das der transzendentalen Analyse Gegebene durch den
„faktischen Wissenschaftsbetrieb“ ersetzt; dessen Urteile erhalten ihre Dignität nicht
aufgrund ihrer Objektivität oder Allgemeingültigkeit, sondern schlicht dadurch, dass
sie in der Wirklichkeit institutionalisiert ist. Dies bedeutet eine Annäherung an den
Neukantianismus der südwestdeutschen Schule, für den die theoretische Philosophie
von vornherein deswegen an das Faktum der Wissenschaft anknüpft, weil und soweit
diese Kulturbestandteil ist.28
In seiner später erschienenen Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls radikalisiert Cohen diesen
Ansatz im Übrigen; er verzichtet dort völlig auf das Bezugsfaktum einer Wissenschaft
und lässt die transzendentale Methode direkt am „Faktum der Kunst“ ansetzen.29 Rück-
blickend bezeichnet er dort als Aufgabe der theoretischen Philosophie, zu zeigen, „wie
sich das Kulturbewusstsein, von der Mathematik geleitet, in den Gebieten der Natur-
wissenschaft darlegt“;30 soweit es um die Ethik geht, benennt er als Bezugsfaktum nicht
mehr die Rechtswissenschaft, sondern die „sittliche Kultur in Recht und Staat“.31
25 Hermann Cohen, Ethik des reinen Willens (Fn. 24), Vorrede I, 60 ff.

26 Hermann Cohen, Ethik des reinen Willens (Fn. 24), Vorrede I.
27 Vgl. Hermann Cohen, Ethik des reinen Willens (Fn. 24), Vorrede I: „[Es] wird hier der Versuch gemacht,
die Ethik auf die Rechtswissenschaft zu orientieren. Diese ist die Mathematik der Geisteswissenschaften.
Die Methodik ihrer exakten Begriffe hat die Ethik für ihre Probleme der Persönlichkeit und der Handlung
zu belauschen.“
28 Vgl. Heinrich Rickert, Vom Begriff der Philosophie, in: Logos, Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie
der Kultur (1910), 18. Zur Problematik vgl. auch Hans-Ludwig Ollig, Die Frage nach dem Proprium des
Neukantianismus, in: Neukantianismus und Rechtsphilosophie (hrsg. v. Robert Alexy, Lukas H. Meyer, Stan-
ley L. Paulson und Gerhard Sprenger), Baden-Baden 2002, 81.
29 Etwa Hermann Cohen, Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls, Berlin 1912, Vorrede X.
30 Hermann Cohen, Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls (Fn. 29), 4.
31 Hermann Cohen, Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls (Fn. 29), 5.

Das ursprüngliche Anliegen des transzendentalen Beweises im Sinne Kants, aus

einem unbezweifelbaren Punkt universale Ermöglichungsbedingungen objektiver Er-
kenntnis zu deduzieren, wird damit ein drittes Mal relativiert. Trotzdem geht es auch
dieser extrem abgeschwächten Version der kritischen Methode um die Bedingungen
der Möglichkeit von (normativer) Erkenntnis, und ihr Ergebnis bietet letztlich eine
Ontologie des jeweiligen Gegenstandsbereichs; insofern ist der Bezug auf Kant gerade
noch berechtigt.
Kelsen übernimmt Cohens Ansicht, dass die transzendentale Methode nur an das
„Faktum der Wissenschaft“ anknüpfen könne, und er geht auch grundsätzlich davon
aus, dass dieses im Bereich des Rechts mit der als soziokulturelle Praxis existierenden
Rechtswissenschaft zu identifizieren sei. In zwei Punkten distanziert er sich jedoch
vom Cohenschen Ansatz: Zum einen fasst er das Faktum der Rechtswissenschaft en-
ger; er versteht darunter ausschließlich die Rechtserkenntnis der Rechtsdogmatik.
Zum anderen und vor allem teilt er – trotz seiner fundamentalen These eines Dualis-
mus zwischen Sein und Sollen – nicht Cohens Auffassung, dass ein fundamentaler
Unterschied zwischen theoretischer und praktischer Erkenntnis besteht. Im Bereich
der theoretischen Philosophie ist die Durchführung der transzendentalen Methode
für Cohen, wie gezeigt, Aufgabe der Logik, d. h. der Erkenntnistheorie, die an die ma-
thematischen Naturwissenschaften anknüpft. Im praktischen Bereich tritt an die Stelle
der Logik die Ethik, die zwar an die Rechtswissenschaft anknüpft, aber weniger die
Bedingungen der objektiven Geltung rechtswissenschaftlicher Urteile, als vielmehr
ein System der rechtlichen Grundbegriffe herausarbeitet, um mit deren Hilfe eine
Analyse der Geisteswissenschaften schlechthin vornehmen zu können. Die Rechts-
wissenschaft spielt für Cohen eine Rolle, die der der Mathematik für die Naturwis-
senschaften analog ist. Kelsen dagegen siedelt die Rechtswissenschaft auf einer den
Naturwissenschaften analogen Ebene an; es geht ihm um die Voraussetzungen der
objektiven Geltung der Urteile einer szientistisch verstandenen Rechtsdogmatik.32
Er kombiniert gewissermaßen das Anliegen der theoretischen Philosophie Cohens,
die Voraussetzungen der Objektivität wissenschaftlicher Urteile festzustellen, das sich
daraus rechtfertigt, dass naturwissenschaftliche Urteile das höchstmögliche Maß an
Erkenntnis enthalten, mit der Relativierung der Urteile der Rechtswissenschaft auf
eine bestimmte „historische“, in der Wirklichkeit etablierte Praxis in der praktischen
Philosophie Cohens.
Für Kelsen ist diese Variante aus zwei Gründen attraktiv. Zum einen kann er die
an die „gegebene“ Rechtswissenschaft anknüpfende transzendentale Methode ohne
weiteres in sein in den Hauptproblemen entwickeltes System integrieren. Schon dort
hat er seine Theorie in erster Linie als „Methodologie“ der etablierten Rechtsdogmatik
32 Vgl. insbesondere Hans Kelsen, Rechtswissenschaft und Recht (Fn. 2), 128.

aufgefasst;33 nun gelingt ihm ohne Aufwand die Einordnung in einen philosophischen
Zusammenhang. Zum anderen kommt sie der spezifischen Zielsetzung seiner Theorie
entgegen: Während Trendelenburg und der „frühe“ Cohen den Status der zweifelhaft
gewordenen Philosophie durch die Anbindung an die erfolgreichen Naturwissen-
schaften wiederherstellen wollen, möchte Kelsen umgekehrt die durch methodische
Verirrungen zweifelhaft gewordene dogmatische Rechtswissenschaft mittels des An-
schlusses an die neukantische Wissenschaftstheorie sanieren. Die Objektivität rechts-
dogmatischer Sätze ist für diesen Ansatz kein relativ skepsisresistenter Ausgangspunkt,
sondern bleibt, als bloßer Anspruch, problematisch, und die Reine Rechtslehre stellt
nur die Bedingungen fest, unter denen diesem Anspruch stattgegeben werden könnte.
3.2 Die transzendentale Methode

Was Kelsen genau unter der transzendentalen Methode versteht, und wie diese auf
das Recht bzw. die Rechtswissenschaft angewendet werden kann, wird von ihm nie
näher erläutert. Dadurch, dass er einerseits den wissenschaftstheoretischen Ansatz der
frühen Lehre Cohens übernimmt, dessen Ansatzpunkt die Gesetze und Methoden der
exakten Naturwissenschaften sind, weil sie das Höchstmaß an Objektivität und All-
gemeingültigkeit verkörpern, andererseits seine eigene Theorie in der Folge der späten
Lehre Cohens als „transzendentale“ Analyse der soziokulturellen Praxis der Rechts-
dogmatik versteht, ergeben sich letztlich zwei verschiedene Deutungen der transzen-
dentalen Methode:
Nach der ersten setzt die transzendentale Analyse direkt am wissenschaftlichen
Urteil an, denn dieses ist
„der Grund- und Eckstein der Transzendentalphilosophie, die eben darum nur Kritik der
Wissenschaft, Erkenntniskritik, weil Analyse des synthetischen Urteils sein kann“.34
Aufgabe der transzendentalen Methode ist es nach dieser Deutung, die nichtfaktischen
Ermöglichungsbedingungen der hypothetischen Urteile der Rechtswissenschaft her-
auszuarbeiten; deren Existenz und Geltung wird vorausgesetzt. Ergebnis einer solchen
Präsuppositionsanalyse sind u. a. die Kategorie des Sollens als urteilskonstituierende
Kategorie35 und die Grundnorm als oberstes Geltungskriterium36.
Nach der zweiten Deutung setzt die Analyse an der rechtsdogmatischen Praxis
(und ihren alltagssprachlichen Derivaten) an, in der normative Sätze wie „X sei dazu
berechtigt, Y dazu verpflichtet, usw.“ verwendet werden; Ausgangspunkt sind also „all
33 Hans Kelsen, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre (1. Aufl.), Tübingen 1911, Vorrede III.
34 Hans Kelsen, Rechtswissenschaft und Recht (Fn. 2), 128.
35 Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (Fn. 1), 21 ff.
36 Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (Fn. 1), 66 f.

die Tausende von Aussagen, in denen das Rechtsleben sich täglich äußert“.37 Nach die-
ser Deutung ginge es allgemeiner um die Voraussetzungen der mit der Äußerung sol-
cher Sätze beanspruchten Normativität und Objektivität; der Rechtssatz als Urteil der
Rechtswissenschaft wäre weniger Ausgangspunkt der Analyse als vielmehr Ergebnis
einer kritischen Rekonstruktion faktisch geäußerter rechtswissenschaftlicher Sätze.
Für diese Deutung spricht, dass Kelsen die Rechtswissenschaft nicht nur analysieren,
sondern auch einer Methodenkritik unterziehen will.
Will man beide Deutungen miteinander vereinbaren, könnte Kelsens Konzeption
der transzendentalen Methode in drei teilweise ineinander übergehende Schritte ein-
geteilt werden:
Der erste Schritt besteht in einer interpretierenden Bestandsaufnahme. Zunächst
wird festgestellt, welche universalen formalen Eigenschaften die Sätze der Rechtsdog-
matik nach dem Anspruch der sie Äußernden in der Regel aufweisen, nämlich Ob-
jektivität,38 Normativität39 und Positivität.40 Zusätzlich argumentiert Kelsen auf der

Grundlage seiner neukantisch-szientistischen Wissenschaftsauffassung dafür, dass
diese Eigenschaften auch notwendig beansprucht werden: Dass mit wissenschaft-
lichen Sätzen Objektivität beansprucht werden muss, ergibt sich unmittelbar aus
dem Wissenschaftsbegriff.41 Normativität muss beansprucht werden, damit eine Ab-
grenzung des Gegenstandsbereichs der Rechtswissenschaft möglich und somit ihre
Eigenständigkeit gewährleistet ist.42 Positivität muss beansprucht werden, weil wissen-
schaftliche Urteile auf empirisches „Material“ als Bedingung ihrer Geltung angewiesen
sind.43
In einem zweiten Schritt werden die notwendigen nichtfaktischen Voraussetzun-
gen der Möglichkeit solcher Urteile festgestellt. Allgemeine Voraussetzungen jeder
Wissenschaft sind zunächst die Einheit und Einheitlichkeit ihrer Urteile und die Aus-
schließlichkeit des wissenschaftlichen Urteilssystems für seinen Gegenstandsbereich.
Objektivität setzt Gesetzlichkeit voraus; diese wiederum setzt die Form des Rechts-
satzes als dem Kausalgesetz analoges hypothetisches Urteil (in einem logischen Sinn)
voraus.44 Positivität setzt die Existenz von Regeln voraus, die bestimmte empirische
Tatbestände – insbesondere Setzungsakte – als Normgeltungsbedingungen festle-
37 Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (Fn. 1), 35.

38 Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (Fn. 1), Vorwort III.
39 Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (Fn. 1), 33 f.
40 Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (Fn. 1), 14; ders., Eugen Hubers Lehre vom Wesen des Rechts, in: Schwei-
zerische Zeitschrift für Strafrecht (1921), 223, 233.
41 Hans Kelsen, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre (Fn. 23), Vorrede VII.
43 Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (Fn. 1), 14, 64 f.
44 Hans Kelsen, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre (Fn. 23), Vorrede VII.

gen;45 die Annahme rechtlicher Normativität schließlich setzt die Kategorie der peri-
pheren Zurechnung voraus, durch die Bedingung und Zwangsausübung innerhalb des
Rechtssatzes miteinander verbunden werden.46
Zuletzt werden in einem dritten Schritt, dem der Kritik, jene Sätze oder Konzeptio-
nen aus der Rechtswissenschaft ausgeschieden, die nicht mit diesen Präsuppositionen
zu vereinbaren sind oder sich nicht in der Gestalt des Rechtssatzes oder seiner Be-
standteile rekonstruieren lassen.47 Dadurch werden insbesondere soziologische oder
moralische Normbegründungen aus dem Recht ausgeschlossen; und die Begriffe des
subjektiven Rechts, der Pflicht und der Person werden als Implikate des Rechtssatzes,
seiner Bestandteile oder des Zusammenhangs von Rechtssätzen nachgewiesen bzw.
auf diese reduziert.48
Eine exakte Abgrenzung der drei Schritte dürfte allerdings kaum möglich sein.
Ohne eine generalisierende Interpretation rechtsdogmatischer Sätze wird man am
Anfang der Analyse nicht auskommen können. Dass mit ihrer Äußerung ein An-
spruch auf Objektivität, Normativität und Positivität verbunden ist, ist aber nicht un-
bezweifelbar, und Kelsens Zusatzargument, dass dieser Anspruch erhoben werden
muss, wenn die Wissenschaftlichkeit der Rechtsdogmatik gewahrt bleiben soll, geht
eigentlich über die Aufgabe einer transzendentalen Analyse im Sinne Cohens hinaus
und beruht auf einer bestimmten Auffassung von Wissenschaftlichkeit. Ferner schei-
nen einige Rechtselemente, wie das subjektive Recht und die Pflicht, eine „Doppel-
rolle“ zu spielen. Zum einen gehören Aussagen über Rechte und Pflichten, wie aus
den oben zitierten Beispielen Kelsens für „naive“ Aussagen innerhalb der Rechtspraxis
hervorgeht, zum „Input“ für die transzendentale Methode. Zum anderen sind sie, in
geläuterter Form als „reflektierte“ sekundäre Rechtsbegriffe, Ergebnis einer kritischen
Rekonstruktion der dogmatischen Rechtswissenschaft.49
3.3 Das rechtswissenschaftliche Faktum
Die „faktische Rechtswissenschaft“ als Ansatzpunkt der transzendentalen Methode ist

also identisch mit der soziokulturellen Praxis der Rechtsdogmatik. Es bleibt die Frage,
was Kelsen unter der innerhalb der faktisch gegebenen dogmatischen Rechtswissen-
schaft festgestellten Tatsache versteht, dem „rechtswissenschaftlichem Faktum“ als
Äquivalent zum Naturgesetz, an das jedenfalls der „frühe“ Cohen die transzendentale
45 Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (Fn. 1), 64 f.; ders., Der soziologische und der juristische Staatsbegriff, Tü-
bingen 1922, 94 f.
47 Hans Kelsen, Zur Theorie der juristischen Fiktionen, in: Annalen der Philosophie (1919), 47 ff.; ders.,
Reine Rechtslehre (Fn. 1), 1.
48 Etwa Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (Fn. 1), 47 ff.
49 Etwa Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (Fn. 1), 47 ff.

Methode im naturwissenschaftlichen Bereich anknüpft. Die Antwort liegt nach dem

oben Ausgeführten nahe: Das rechtswissenschaftliche Faktum ist die Rechtsnorm,
und diese ist identisch mit dem Urteil der Rechtswissenschaft selbst.
Dies erläutert Kelsen vor allem im Rahmen seiner Debatte mit Fritz Sander. Dort
heißt es zunächst zu der auch seiner Reinen Rechtslehre zugrundeliegenden neukanti-
schen Erkenntnistheorie, Erfahrung als Wissenschaft sei ein Verfahren der Erkenntnis,
in dem der reine Verstandesbegriff (die Kategorie) auf sinnliche Anschauungen bezo-
gen werde. Diese Einheitsbeziehung realisiere sich in den synthetischen Urteilen der
Naturwissenschaft, deren Zusammenhang die „Erfahrung als Wissenschaft im Sinne
Kants“, also letztlich die Natur, darstelle.50 Das Recht der Rechtswissenschaft sei ana-
log der Natur der Naturwissenschaft zu begreifen, wobei an die Stelle des Anschau-
ungsmaterials das Willensaktmaterial des Gesetzgebers trete:
„Im erkennenden Bewusstsein, d. h. in den als Rechtssätzen auftretenden Urteilen der

Rechtswissenschaft, drückt sich das – in der Urteilssphäre objektivierte – Wollen als Sol-
len aus. Nur in dieser Sphäre kommt aber das Recht als Gegenstand der Rechtswissen-
schaft in Betracht. Als Gegenstand der Rechtswissenschaft ist dann das Recht ebenso ein
System von Urteilen über das Recht, wie die Natur als Gegenstand der Naturwissenschaft
ein System von Urteilen über die Natur.“51
Das aus Normen bestehende Recht ist daher identisch mit dem System der hypotheti-
schen normativen Urteile der Rechtswissenschaft, den Rechtssätzen. Die Rechtsnorm
selbst ist also ein hypothetisches Erkenntnisurteil, in dem die Kategorie der normati-
ven (peripheren) Zurechnung zur Anwendung kommt.52
Innerhalb der Theorie Kelsens ist diese Konzeption – die er um 1940 herum wie-
der aufgibt53 – im Rahmen seiner nichtrealistischen neukantischen Erkenntnistheorie
konsequent; sie hat auch hohes Erklärungspotential. Sie ermöglicht ihm, den Norm-
begriff ohne Rekurs auf eine Theorie erkenntnisunabhängiger abstrakter Entitäten
zu explizieren. Ferner wird die in der Reinen Rechtslehre insgesamt nicht klare und
dementsprechend in der Sekundärliteratur umstrittene Definition der Geltung als
Existenz oder Sollen der Norm54 unproblematisch; es handelt sich einfach um die Gel-

51 Hans Kelsen, Rechtswissenschaft und Recht (Fn. 2), 181. Angesichts der eindeutigen Formulierung ist
die Auffassung Christoph Kletzers, Kelsen wolle in dieser Passage eine abbildtheoretische Erkenntnistheo-
rie vortragen, unhaltbar; sie wird von ihm auch nicht weiter begründet (vgl. Christoph Kletzer, Fritz San-
der, in: Der Kreis um Hans Kelsen, Wien 2008, 459).
52 Hans Kelsen, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre (Fn. 23), Vorrede VI; ders., Allgemeine Staatslehre, Ber-
lin 1925, 48 ff.
53 Kenntlich insbesondere an der Unterscheidung zwischen der Rechtsnorm und dem Rechtssatz (ver-
standen als Urteil über die Rechtsnorm), die erstmals in Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law and Analy-
tical Jurisprudence, in: Harvard Law Review, Vol. 55 (1941), 44–70, durchgeführt wird.
54 Vgl. beispielhaft Joseph Raz, Legal Validity, in: ders., The Authority of Law, Oxford 1979, 146 ff.; Eugenio
Bulygin, An Antinomy in Kelsen‘s Pure Theory of Law, in; Normativity and Norms Critical Perspectives on

tung eines Urteils im logischen Sinne; diese ist dann gegeben, wenn der Urteilsakt
bzw. der das Urteil formulierende Satz wahr ist. Auch logische Beziehungen zwischen
Normen sind unkompliziert möglich, wenn diese als Erkenntnisurteile aufgefasst wer-
den.55 Zuletzt vermeidet die Konzeption die sich aus der späteren Trennung zwischen
der Rechtsnorm, als einer der Erkenntnis vorgegebenen Entität, und dem Rechtssatz,
als einer isomorphen Reproduktion der Norm auf der Erkenntnisebene, ergebenden
Probleme.56
Kelsen gibt zu, dass es einen „Schein der Paradoxie“ habe, wenn das Recht mit
den Urteilen „über“ das Recht identifiziert werde,57 doch hält er seine Auffassung für
unvermeidlich, wenn man mit Kant davon ausgeht, dass die Erkenntnis selbst ihren
Gegenstand konstituiert und Erkenntnis sich stets in logischen Urteilen äußert. Und
tatsächlich beruft Kelsen sich durchaus zu Recht auf Kant. Wenn Referenz nach Kant
als eine Angelegenheit innerhalb der Erkenntnis gedacht werden muss, dann kann sie
letztlich allein durch die Konstitution des Erkenntnisgegenstandes in gültigen Urtei-

len herbeigeführt werden. Denn Kant führt alle Handlungen des Verstandes auf Urtei-
le zurück;58 und um im Rahmen der metaphysischen Deduktion die Herleitung der
Kategorien aus der Tafel der Urteilsfunktionen zu rechtfertigen, schreibt er:
„Dieselbe Funktion, welche den verschiedenen Vorstellungen in einem Urteile Einheit
gibt, die gibt auch der bloßen Synthesis verschiedener Vorstellungen in einer Anschauung
Einheit, welche, allgemein ausgedrückt, der reine Verstandesbegriff heißt.“59
Begriffe werden also im Urteil durch dieselbe Funktion und dieselbe Verstandeshand-
lung zur Einheit gebracht wie Vorstellungen in einer Anschauung zur Einheit des kate-
gorial bestimmten Erkenntnisgegenstandes; Kant unterscheidet nicht klar zwischen
„propositional-logischer“ und „kategorial-erkenntnistheoretischer“ Synthesis:60 In-
dem die Kategorien Urteile konstituieren, konstituieren sie zugleich den objektiven
Gegenstand der Erkenntnis. Zwar mag es so scheinen, dass dies nur auf einer begriff-
lichen Äquivokation beruhe, weil Kant in seiner vorstellungstheoretischen Diktion
nicht den Fall der Gegenstandssynthese (Subsumtion einer Anschauung unter einen
Begriff) von dem der Urteilssynthese (Subsumtion eines Begriffs unter einen anderen
Kelsenian Themes, Oxford 1998, 297 ff.

55 Vgl. zur urteilstheoretischen Normkonzeption, ihren Vorteilen und den Gründen für ihre Aufgabe
Carsten Heidemann, Noch einmal: Stanley L. Paulson und Kelsens urteilstheoretischer Normbegriff, in:
ARSP 93, 2007, 345–362.
56 Zu diesen Problemen vgl. etwa Carlos Santiago Nino, Some Confusions surrounding Kelsen‘s Concept
of Validity, in: Normativity and Norms Critical Perspectives on Kelsenian Themes (hrsg. v. S. L. Paulson und B.
Litschewski Paulson), Oxford 1998, 253 ff.; Roberto J. Vernengo, Kelsen‘s „Rechtssätze“ as Detached State-
ments, in: Essays on Hans Kelsen (hrsg. v. R. Tur und W. Twining), Oxford 1986, 99 ff.
58 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Fn. 22), 110 (A 69/B 94).
59 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Fn. 22), 117 f. (A 79/B 104 f.).
60 Vgl. dazu Reinhold Aschenberg, Sprachanalyse und Transzendentalphilosophie (Fn. 6), 106.

Begriff) unterscheide.61 Ferner werden wichtige Teile der Kritik der Vernunft, etwas das
Schematismuskapitel, überflüssig, wenn Urteils- und Gegenstandssynthese identisch
sind. Aber wenn alle Verstandeshandlungen auf Urteilen beruhen, dann ist es kaum
denkbar, wie die Kategorien außerhalb eines Urteils angewendet werden sollten und
wie die Gegenstandssynthese anders als im Urteil erfolgen sollte. Man kann Kelsen
daher auch keine Fehlinterpretation Kants vorwerfen.
Zwar ist Kelsens Gleichsetzung von Urteil und Erkenntnisgegenstand, soweit der
letztere als „Objekt“ verstanden wird, kontraintuitiv; plausibler ist es, zwischen dem
gegenstandskonstitutiven, aber selbst nicht gegenständlichen Urteil, das durch einen
Aussagesatz ausgedrückt werden kann, und dem innerhalb eines Urteils der Meta-
ebene zum Gegenstand „gemachten“ objektiven Urteil, der Tatsache, die durch einen
dass-Satz bezeichnet werden kann, zu unterscheiden.62 Doch entspricht die urteils-
theoretische Konzeption des wissenschaftlichen Faktums durchaus dem damaligen
Stand der akademischen Philosophie. Wenn Cohen wissenschaftliche Fakten in den

als hypothetische Urteile verstandenen „Gesetzen“ lokalisiert63 und Frege Tatsachen
als „wahre Gedanken“ definiert,64 bewegen sie sich grundsätzlich in demselben Theo-
rieraum wie Kelsen.
Charakteristisch für Kelsens Konzeption des wissenschaftlichen Urteils sind zwei
weitere Merkmale:
Zum einen ist das Urteil eine objektive Struktur;65 es darf nicht mit dem psychi-
schen Urteilsakt oder einem mentalen Gehalt identifiziert werden. Die psychologi-
schen Tatsachen seien im Verhältnis zu den logischen Geltungen nur die conditio sine
qua non, aber nicht die conditio per quam des Rechts in seinem Geltungsaspekt,66
Dieser „Logizismus“ lässt sich bereits auf Kant zurückführen, der in den Prolegomena
schreibt, dass
„hier nicht vom Entstehen der Erfahrung die Rede sei, sondern von dem, was in ihr liegt.
Das erstere gehört zur empirischen Psychologie, und würde selbst auch da ohne das zwei-
te, welches zur Kritik der Erkenntnis und insbesondere des Verstandes gehört, niemals
gehörig entwickelt werden können.“67
61 So Reinhold Aschenberg, Sprachanalyse und Transzendentalphilosophie (Fn. 6), 105 f.

62 Vgl. dazu Carsten Heidemann, Die Norm als Tatsache, Baden-Baden 1997, 297 ff.
63 Etwa Hermann Cohen, Kants Begründung der Ethik (Fn. 3), 20 f. Vgl. auch Hermann Cohen, Logik der
reinen Erkenntniss, Berlin 1902, 299: „Die Kategorie des Gesetzes erweist sich als solche auch in den Geistes-
wissenschaften: in der Ethik, als ihrer Logik; sowie in der Jurisprudenz, als ihrer Mathematik […]. Alle
haben in dem hypothetischen Urteil und in der Bedingung ihren Typus.“
64 Gottlob Frege, Der Gedanke, in: ders., Logische Untersuchungen (hrsg. v. G. Patzig, 3. Aufl.), Göttingen
1986, 74.
65 Hans Kelsen, Rechtswissenschaft und Recht (Fn. 2), 205 ff.
66 Etwa Hans Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrechts, Tübingen 1920, Vorrede
VI.
67 Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena (Fn. 5), 304 (A 87).

Die Abgrenzung logischer bzw. erkenntnistheoretischer Argumente von psycho-

logischen Argumenten wurde später von Frege und Husserl aufgenommen und ge-
hört seither zum Grundbestand des Neukantianismus Marburger68 und südwestdeut-
scher69 Prägung.
Zum anderen ist das objektive, mit dem Erkenntnisgegenstand identische Urteil
stets ein „geltendes“ Urteil;70 Geltung ist gewissermaßen die logische Daseinsweise
des Urteils. Dabei tendiert Kelsen, ohne dass dies eindeutig wird, zu einem normati-
ven Geltungsbegriff. Das entspricht einem zentralen Theorem der südwestdeutschen
Schule; und so nimmt Kelsen nur zweimal kurz und etwas unklar Bezug auf Windel-
bands Gleichsetzung von Geltung und Sollen der logischen Gesetze71 und geht sonst
ohne weitere Erläuterung davon aus, dass die Geltung eines objektiven Urteils, sein
„Tatsachesein“, nicht der Existenz eines Dinges zu vergleichen ist und sich auch nicht
seiner Übereinstimmung mit einer von ihm unabhängigen Wirklichkeit verdankt.
Vielmehr sei darunter zu verstehen, dass es den Erkenntnisregeln genügt72 – „Tatsa-

che ist, was ich denken soll“, wie Rickert dies formuliert.73 Diese normative Geltungs-
konzeption geht auf Hermann Lotze zurück, für den Geltung die nichtgegenständ-
liche normative Daseinsform von „Wahrheiten“ ist.74 Sie macht Kelsens Sollensbegriff
ambivalent:75 Denn das Sollen der geltenden Norm liegt zum einen darin, dass eine
bestimmte Handlung „gesollt“ ist, zum anderen in der normativen Anforderung, ent-
sprechend zu urteilen. Folglich gilt die Norm „man soll x tun“, als normatives Urteil,
genau dann, wenn man denken oder urteilen soll, dass man x tun soll.76
Auf diese Weise können der Norm- und der übergeordnete Tatsachenbegriff ohne
eine „starke“ Ontologie abstrakter Entitäten erklärt werden; zugleich liefert diese
Konzeption ein Argument gegen jede Form eines Psychologismus. Allerdings darf
das „Denkensollen“ des Urteils nicht dem robusten inhaltlichen Sollen der Norm-als-
Faktum verglichen werden – es ähnelt eher dem impliziten praxisimmanenten Sollen
einer Wittgensteinschen Regel, die keine gegenständliche Existenz hat. Eine vergleich-
bare zeitgenössische Version dieser Konzeption findet sich etwa in Hilary Putnams
internem Realismus; dort heißt es – wenn auch tentativ – :
68 Etwa Hermann Cohen, Logik der reinen Erkenntniss (Fn. 63), 52 ff.

69 Etwa Heinrich Rickert, Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis (2. Aufl.), Tübingen 1904, Vorrede VI.
71 Hans Kelsen, Rechtswissenschaft und Recht (Fn. 2), 207 ff.; ders., Der soziologische und der juristische
Staatsbegriff, Tübingen 1922, 81 f.
72 Hans Kelsen, Die Grundlagen der Naturrechtslehre und des Rechtspositivismus, Charlottenburg 1928, 62.
73 Heinrich Rickert, Zwei Wege der Erkenntnistheorie, in: Kant-Studien 14, 1909, 185. Diese These macht
Rickert sich in Auseinandersetzung mit der Theorie Theodor Lipps zu eigen.
74 Hermann Lotze, Logik, Leipzig 1874, 501 ff.
76 Vgl. dazu näher Carsten Heidemann, Geltung und Sollen: Einige (neu-)kantische Elemente der Reinen
Rechtslehre Hans Kelsens, in: Neukantianismus und Rechtsphilosophie (hrsg. v. Robert Alexy, Lukas H. Mey-
er, Stanley L. Paulson und Gerhard Sprenger), Baden-Baden 2002, 203–222.

„Würde ich es wagen, ein Metaphysiker zu sein, dann würde ich wohl ein System schaffen,
in dem es nichts als Verpflichtungen gibt. […] In meinem Phantasiegebilde von mir als
dem metaphysischen Superhelden würden sich alle Tatsachen zu Werten auflösen. Dass
in meinem Zimmer ein Stuhl steht, würde als eine Menge von Verpflichtungen analysiert
[…]: etwa die Verpflichtung, zu denken, dass in diesem Zimmer ein Stuhl steht, falls die
epistemischen Bedingungen ‚gut‘ genug sind.“77
Putnams Theorie des internen Realismus lässt sich durchaus der neukantischen Ideen-
welt zuordnen. Im Übrigen lassen sich auch bei Kant selbst die Grundzüge einer nor-
mativistischen Erkenntnis- und Geltungstheorie nachweisen – so werden Begriffe von
ihm (auch) als Regeln aufgefasst, und die nach der Kritik der reinen Vernunft grund-
legende Eigenschaft des Verstandes, Spontaneität, hängt letztlich von seiner Fähigkeit
zum Regelfolgen ab.78
4. Resümee und Ausblick
Ich fasse zusammen: Das „Faktum der Wissenschaft“ macht in doppelter Bedeutung
den Kern des Kelsenschen Neukantianismus in den zwanziger Jahren aus.
Zum einen versteht Kelsen seine Lehre in der Folge von Kant, Trendelenburg und
Cohen als methodenkritische Theorie der als soziale Praxis etablierten und insofern
als Faktum gegebenen dogmatischen Rechtswissenschaft; ihre wesentliche Aufga-
be ist es, die Präsuppositionen der mit der Äußerung rechtswissenschaftlicher Sätze
beanspruchten Objektivität, Normativität und Positivität herauszuarbeiten und die
Rechtsdogmatik so zu rekonstruieren, dass sie mit den dabei gewonnenen Resultaten
im Einklang steht. Für diesen Theoriestatus beruft Kelsen sich zwar zu Recht auf die
Kantsche Philosophie; er ist aber das Resultat einer dreifachen Depotenzierung der
transzendentalen Analyse Kants: Kants Ausgangspunkt ist die unbezweifelbare trans-
zendentale Einheit der Apperzeption, aus der „progressiv“ die Kategorien als notwen-
dige Ermöglichungsbedingungen jeglicher Gegenstandserkenntnis gewonnen werden
können. Schon bei Kant wird dieser Ansatz ein erstes Mal relativiert, indem er die
transzendentale Analyse für den Zweck einer leichter erfassbaren Darstellung an den
synthetischen apriorischen Urteilen, die in Mathematik und reiner Naturwissenschaft
„gegeben“ sind, ansetzen lässt. Eine zweite Relativierung findet sich in der Theorie
77 Hilary Putnam, Wozu die Philosophen?, in: ders., Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Reinbek 1993,
203–220, 215.
78 Vgl. dazu Markus Willaschek, Die „Spontaneität des Erkenntnisses“. Über die Abhängigkeit der „Trans-
zendentalen Analytik“ von der Auflösung der dritten Antinomie, in: Metaphysik und Kritik Interpretationen
zur „Transzendentalen Dialektik“ (hrsg. v. Jiří Chotaš, Jindřich Karásek und Jürgen Stolzenberg),Würzburg
2010, 165–184.

Trendelenburgs und den frühen Schriften Cohens, deren Ansatzpunkt die (aposte-
riorischen) Methoden und Ergebnisse der systematisch vorgehenden und „erfolgrei-
chen“ Naturwissenschaften sind. Zu einer dritten Relativierung kommt es in der Ethik
Cohens, die an der Rechtswissenschaft als einer „gegebenen“ soziokulturellen Praxis
ansetzt. Kelsens neukantische Erkenntnistheorie verbindet den szientistischen Ansatz
der Relativierung der transzendentalen Methode auf die objektiven, exakten Natur-
wissenschaften mit dem Ansatz der Relativierung dieser Objektivität auf die Praxis
der Rechtsdogmatik.
Zum anderen setzt Kelsen das rechtswissenschaftliche Faktum, die Rechtsnorm,
mit dem hypothetischen Zurechnungsurteil der Rechtswissenschaft gleich, das nicht-
psychologistisch als objektive Denkstruktur zu verstehen ist und dessen Daseinsweise
oder Geltung in der Folge Lotzes und Windelbands nicht analog der Existenz eines
Dinges aufgefasst werden darf, sondern am ehesten als normative Anforderung zu ver-
stehen ist, dieses Urteil so zu denken.

Beide Konzeptionen sind von zentraler Bedeutung innerhalb der Reinen Rechts-
lehre. Legt man Kelsens Deutung der transzendentalen Methode zugrunde, so ist es
zwar einerseits Aufgabe seiner Theorie des Rechts eine „Rechtsontologie“ auszuarbei-
ten; insofern liefert sie durchaus eine Metaphysik des Rechts. Andererseits ergibt sich
diese Rechtsontologie aber (nur) als Ergebnis einer Präsuppositionsanalyse der in der
existierenden soziokulturellen Praxis der Rechtsdogmatik erhobenen Ansprüche. Das
ist eine metaphysisch bescheidene Konzeption, die auch unabhängig vom Theorie-
rahmen der Reinen Rechtslehre plausibel ist. Innerhalb der Reinen Rechtslehre hat
sie hohen Erklärungswert – beispielsweise dürfte der Status der Grundnorm ohne
sie kaum verständlich sein79 – und bedingt zugleich ihre kritische Funktion: Die zur
Rechtsontologie gehörenden notwendigen Elemente des Rechts umfassen (nur) das
rechtswissenschaftliche Zurechnungsurteil, seine Bestandteile, seine Implikate und
seine Voraussetzungen.80 Das bedeutet, dass alle Rechtsbegriffe entweder auf diese
Elemente zurückgeführt oder aus der Rechtserkenntnis ausgeschieden werden müs-
sen bzw. als Norminhalt nur kontingenter Bestandteil des Rechts sein können. Dies
79 Eine Präsupposition eines Urteils ist eine notwendige Voraussetzung dafür, dass es überhaupt geltungs-
bzw. wahrheitsdifferent ist. Die Grundnorm ist unter Zugrundelegung der Darstellung Kelsens z. B. inso-
fern eine Präsupposition jeder Rechtsnorm / jedes rechtswissenschaftlichen Urteils, als sie überhaupt erst
die Möglichkeit schafft, geltende von nichtgeltenden rechtswissenschaftlichen Urteilen zu unterscheiden.
80 Dabei kommt es in den zwanziger Jahren zu einer merkwürdigen „Ungleichzeitigkeit“ der Konzeptio-
nen Kelsens. Die Auffassung der Rechtsnorm als dem Kausalgesetz analog strukturiertes Zurechnungs-
urteil passt zu der eindimensionalen statischen Normauffassung, die Kelsen in den Hauptproblemen der
Staatsrechtslehre entwickelt hat. Mit der Übernahme der Merklschen Stufenbautheorie sind Formen der
Rechtsnorm erforderlich geworden (Ermächtigungsnorm, individuelle Norm), die nicht auf das hypothe-
tische Zurechnungsurteil reduziert werden können; dies macht letztlich Kelsens Unterscheidung zwischen
einer eindimensionalen „statischen“ Rechtsbetrachtung (die mit der Form des hypothetischen Urteils aus-
kommt) und einer „dynamischen“ Rechtsbetrachtung erforderlich, die nur bedingt ineinander übersetzbar
sind.

betrifft u. a. die Begriffe des Staates und der Person, die jeweils als Mengen von Rechts-
sätzen aufgefasst werden, sowie der Pflicht und des subjektiven Rechts, die als Impli-
kate des Rechtssatzes bzw. als auf diesen reduzierbar aufgefasst werden.81
Noch positiver muss die Bewertung des urteilstheoretischen Normbegriffs ausfal-
len. Mit ihm werden die Aporien von Kelsens späterer korrespondenztheoretischen
Erklärung der Normerkenntnis ebenso wie die Probleme einer Willenstheorie der
Norm vermieden,82 und die schwierige Aufgabe, Objektivität, Normativität und Posi-
tivität des Rechts miteinander zu vereinbaren, lässt sich ohne großen Aufwand bewerk-
stelligen: Normativität ist eine Frage der spezifischen Urteilsmodalität; Objektivität
wird gewährleistet durch die Urteilsform; Positivität ist eine Frage der empirischen
Kriterien für die Geltung der normativen Urteile.83 Insgesamt handelt es sich damit
um eine Konzeption, mit deren Hilfe der komplexe Status der Rechtsnorm zwischen
Sein und Sollen auch außerhalb des Kontextes der Reinen Rechtslehre ohne großen
metaphysischen Aufwand plausibel erklärt werden kann.
Carsten Heidemann
Bordesholm, heidemann.carsten@gmail.com
81 Vgl. Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (Fn. 1), 46 (zur Pflicht), 40 (zum subjektiven Recht), 52 ff. (zur
Person), 115 ff. (zum Staat).
82 Vgl. dazu Carsten Heidemann, Noch einmal: Stanley L. Paulson und Kelsens urteilstheoretischer
Normbegriff (Fn. 55), 352, 354.
83 Zu einem Versuch einer Rekonstruktion des urteilstheoretischen Normbegriffs mittels der Methodik
der sprachanalytischen Philosophie vgl. Carsten Heidemann, Die Norm als Tatsache (Fn. 62), 324 ff.

Fictionalising Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law
MAXIMILIAN KIENER
Abstract: This essay raises a new challenge for Hans Kelsen’s The Pure Theory of Law, i. e.
what I call the Cognitivist Challenge This challenge concerns the question as to how to
retain Kelsen’s view about relative legal norms, i. e. that one can objectively cognise these
norms, while not rejecting his view about absolute moral norms, i. e. that one cannot objec-
tively cognise those norms. After explaining the Cognitivist Challenge in detail, I will pres-
ent Positive Legal Fictionalism as a solution to it. I will claim that Positive Legal Fictionalism
is rooted in Kelsen’s own statements and provides the specific epistemic advantages that
Kelsen’s project of cognising the law requires. Positive Legal Fictionalism thereby deepens
the understanding of Kelsen’s project as a ‘theory’ and as ‘pure.’
Keywords: Hans Kelsen, Legal Positivism, Fictionalism, Cognition, Validity, Basic Norm
Schlagworte: Hans Kelsen, Rechtspositivismus, Fiktionalismus, Erkenntnis, Geltung,

Grundnorm
Introduction
Hans Kelsen (1881–1973) was one of the leading so-called ‘legal positivists’ in the 20th
century. He was a legal positivist because he exclusively focused on “questions of what
the law is and how the law is made [i. e. the law as it is posited], not [on] (…) questions
of what the law ought to be.”1 Kelsen separated his position from natural law theory by
denying that law, in order to be law, “must have some concern for justice, be it a matter
1 Kelsen, Hans. Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory A Translation of the First Edition of the Reine
Rechtslehre or Pure Theory of Law (Henceforth abbreviated as PTL1). Translated by B. L. Paulson and S.
Paulson. 2004, Oxford Clarendon, 7. Emphasis added. In addition to referring to the English translation, I
will also provide references to the German original. See Kelsen, Hans. Reine Rechtslehre Studienausgabe der
1 Auflage 1934 Edited by M. Jestaedt. (Henceforth abbreviated as RR1). 2008, Tübingen Mohr Siebeck, 15.

100 MAXIMILIAN KIENER
of assuring an ethical minimum, be it a matter of attempting, however inadequately, to

be ‘right’ law, that is, simply, to be just.”2
However, unlike many other positivists, Kelsen denies that the validity of legal
norms (or in other words their normative bindingness) can ever be derived from the
fact that people by and large comply with them. Kelsen adheres to a strict distinction
of ‘is’ versus ‘ought’ and claims that a norm (i. e. an ‘ought’) can never receive its valid-
ity from a fact (i. e. an ‘is’) but only from another norm. Accordingly, a norm is valid if
and only if it can be traced back to a higher norm which confers validity upon it. As the
chain of validity-conferring norms cannot go back infinitely, Kelsen claims that the va-
lidity of legal norms ultimately depends on a first norm, the validity of which no longer
depends on another norm. Kelsen calls such a norm the basic norm and presents it as
a non-positive norm (i. e. a norm that is not posited and therefore not part of a given
legal system) and as a norm that is merely presupposed in thought. The basic norm
authorises the highest positive norm, e. g. the constitution, and can be schematically
formulated as follows:
“Coercive acts ought to be performed under the conditions and in the manner in which
the historically first constitution, and the norms created according to it, prescribe. (In
short: one ought to behave as the constitution prescribes.)”3
As the basic norm is necessary for the validity of norms, it will also be crucial for the
cognition of the law as objectively valid, which Kelsen describes as his main objective:
“my aim from the very beginning was to raise it [i. e. jurisprudence] to the level of a genu-
ine science, a human science. The idea was to develop those tendencies of jurisprudence
that focus solely on cognition of the law rather than on the shaping of it, and to bring the
results of this cognition as close as possible to the highest values of all science: objectivity
and exactitude.”4
In this essay, I aim to make two contributions to the debate on Kelsen. Firstly (1), I
want to draw attention to a serious challenge to Kelsen’s project of the cognition of the
law, pertinent to both editions of The Pure Theory of Law, which I call the Cognitivist
Challenge and which has not received attention in the literature. Secondly (2), I want
to show how trying to solve the Cognitivist Challenge leads to a deeper understanding
of Kelsen’s project as a ‘theory’, i. e. a project concerned with cognition, and how it is
‘pure’, i. e. separated from morality as well as separated from sciences concerned with
2 Kelsen, PTL1, 22. (RR1, 32.)

3 Kelsen, Hans. Pure Theory of Law Translated from the Second (Revised and Enlarged) German Edition by
Max Knight. (Henceforth abbreviated as PTL2). 2009, Clark The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., 201. Also with
regards to the second edition, I will provide references to the German original: Kelsen, Hans. Reine Re-
chtslehre Studienausgabe der 2 Auflage 1960 Edited by M. Jestaedt. (Henceforth abbreviated as RR2). 2017,
Tübingen Mohr Siebeck, 359. See also Kelsen, RR1, 76.
4 Kelsen, PTL1, 1. (Footnote 1).

Fictionalising Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law 101
matters of fact as opposed to norms. In particular, I will aim to solve the Cognitivist
Challenge by presenting an account I call Positive Legal Fictionalism. From an exeget-
ical perspective (2.1), I will claim that Positive Legal Fictionalism can be firmly rooted
in Kelsen’s own statements, albeit it sometimes needs to develop Kelsen’s statements
further rather than taking them for granted. Therefore, Positive Legal Fictionalism will
be a Kelsenian but not quite Kelsen’s own account. From a systematic perspective
(2.2), I will then explain the specific epistemic advantages that Positive Legal Fictional-
ism provides for Kelsen’s project of cognising the law, thereby solving the Cognitivist
Dilemma, and emphasise the value of fictionalism for legal positivism. Finally (3), I
summarise my results and draw conclusions.
This essay is very ambitious. To address and solve the Cognitivist Challenge, I will
need to take into account a very wide scope of Kelsen’s primary texts: Kelsen’s early
writings, the two editions (from 1934 and 1960) of Kelsen’s The Pure Theory of Law,
work from Kelsen’s late period, as well as Kelsen’s correspondence with other scholars.
In addition, I will need to link the debate on Kelsen to claims from the philosophical
and metaethical debate on so-called fictionalism, i. e. a link which has not been ex-
plored in the debate on Kelsen so far. And finally, I will also always need to balance
exegetical and systematic aspects in the course of developing my arguments.
The combination of such ambition and the usual space constraints will prevent me
from discussing the wide body of secondary literature on Kelsen’s work in detail. On
the one hand, I will thereby have to leave the reader with room for further inquiry, i. e.
an inquiry into how my approach exactly aligns or conflicts with the majority view on
some of Kelsen’s claims. On the other hand, it is precisely such an approach that will
enable me to focus on very important exegetical and systematic aspects in sufficient
depth, thereby providing a fresh take on many of Kelsen’s claims. Hence, I hope that
the way in which I will proceed in this essay, including my scare treatment of secondary
literature, is not only excused with reference to space constraints but also appreciated
as intrinsically linked to the object to my inquiry and the ambition I pursue.
1. The Cognitivist Challenge
Hans Kelsen presents The Pure Theory of Law explicitly as a “theory.” By “theory”, he
means that The Pure Theory of Law “aims solely at cognition of its subject-matter”5 and
is therefore a genuinely scientific project. Kelsen then identifies as the subject-matter
the legal norm, which he claims can be stated in the form of a conditional: it (legally)
ought to be the case that if some natural event X occurs then the legal consequence Y
is imposed. Kelsen continuously emphasizes that one can reach objective cognition

of the legal norm, and at its core the ‘legal ought’, thereby grounding a genuine “Re-
chtswissenschaft”6 (legal science). Objective cognition consists in the cognition of a
legal norm’s objective validity. A legal norm is objectively valid if and only if it is genu-
inely normatively binding, which means that the legal norm’s normative force cannot
be reduced to either subjective wishes or preferences or to any other psychological or
sociological facts.
On the other hand, Kelsen endorsed a diametrically opposed view about moral
norms. Most notably in the first edition of The Pure Theory of Law, Kelsen contends
that a moral norm is a “logosfremdes Objekt”7 (alien to objective inquiry8) and “can-
not be accounted for by way of rational cognition.”9 That something morally ought
to be the case does not qualify as a suitable object of a “Wissenschaft.” Moral norms
cannot be objectively valid because, if they exist at all, they always depend on psycho-
logical or sociological facts. And if they cannot be objectively valid, there cannot be
objective cognition of them in the sense outlined.

Hence, taken at face value, Kelsen draws a stark contrast between legal and moral
norms in the first edition of The Pure Theory of Law. However, a closer look reveals that
there is another hidden distinction. When Kelsen talks about moral norms in the first
edition, he always talks about absolute moral norms;10 and when he talks about legal
norms, he always talks about relative legal norms. A norm is absolute if its validity does
not depend on any other norm, and relative if its validity depends on another norm.
Therefore, Kelsen does not contrast moral norms with legal norms after all. He con-
trasts absolute moral norms with relative legal norms.
Unfortunately, employing these two different distinctions at once (i. e. moral ver-
sus legal, relative versus absolute) obfuscates what Kelsen aims to say. This is because
the distinction between moral and legal norms does not map on to the distinction
between absolute and relative norms: there may be relative moral norms (as ethical
relativism claims) and absolute legal norms (as natural law theory claims). And Kelsen
explicitly recognises this in the second edition of The Pure Theory of Law. But if there
can be relative moral norms and absolute legal norms, this leaves us with the following
question: do absolute moral norms fail as objects of cognition because they are moral
norms or because they are absolute norms? What exactly is Kelsen’s position? Unfortu-
nately, both alternatives lead to problems.
Let us first assume that norms cannot be an object of cognition if they are mor-
al norms and thereby follow what Kelsen seems to claim in the first edition. On this
6 Kelsen, RR1, 15. See also the foreword. “Rechtswissenschaft”, unlike “legal science”, does not suggest af-
finity to natural sciences. (Footnote 1).
7 Kelsen, RR1, 27. (Footnote 1).
8 The translation in Kelsen PTL1 as “alien to logic” seems too narrow. See Kelsen, PTL1, 17. (Footnote 1).
10 In PTL1, Kelsen always implies that moral norms are absolute. See Kelsen, PTL1, 16–18, 22–23, 28, 34.
(RR1, 26–29, 33, 40, 47). (Footnote 1).

reading, the combination of Kelsen’s view about legal and moral norms becomes very
puzzling. This is because Kelsen himself stressed that the ‘legal ought’ and the ‘moral
ought’ converge on the category of ‘ought’ as their genus proximum.11 Therefore, one
might think if the ‘legal ought’, unlike the ‘moral ought’, can be an object of cognition,
this must be because of what is distinct about the ‘legal ought.’ However, Kelsen’s an-
swer is that the “distinction between law and morality consists in the fact that the law is
a coercive order”12 whereas morality is not such a coercive order, viz. morality does not
impose a “coercive act of the state.”13 But this does not explain why one ‘ought’ (legal)
is an object of cognition while the other ‘ought’ (moral) is not. Hence, this first inter-
pretation of Kelsen’s contrast of different norms seems to lead to a dead end.
But how about the interpretation, according to which Kelsen claims that norms
cannot be an object of cognition if they are absolute? This seems to be the position
that Kelsen later endorsed in the second edition of The Pure Theory of Law. Kelsen
claims that “an absolute value in general and an absolute moral value in particular is
rejected from the point of view of scientific cognition.”14 On this basis, both moral and
legal norms can be objectively valid and an object of cognition, as long as they are
relative. Consequently, Kelsen concedes in the second edition, opposing his claims in
the first edition, that ethics is the “discipline directed toward their [i. e. moral norms’]
cognition”15 and refers to ethics as “the science of morals.”16 However, even on this read-
ing, it remains puzzling why only relative but not absolute norms can be an object of
cognition? How can relativity facilitate objective validity and objective cognition? And
moreover, after giving up the distinction between the moral and the legal, how can
Kelsen preserve the distinction between morality and the law, which he is so keen to
stress as part of legal positivism? Hence, the second interpretation of Kelsen’s contrast
of different norms also leads to difficult questions.
In the following, I will use the term Cognitivist Challenge to describe the challenge of
how to retain Kelsen’s view about the relative legal norms, i. e. that one can objectively
cognise these norms, while not rejecting his view about the absolute moral norms, i. e.
that one cannot objectively cognise these norms A solution to the Cognitivist Chal-
lenge will be of vital importance for understanding Kelsen’s project as a ‘theory’, viz. a
11 See Kelsen, PTL1, 26. (RR1, 37.) (Footnote 1).

12 Kelsen, Hans. The Function of a Constitution, in: Essays on Kelsen. Edited. by R. Tur and W. Twining.
1986, Oxford Clarendon, 112. See also Kelsen, RR1, 37. (Footnote 1).
14 See PTL2, 63. (RR2, 128). See also Kelsen, PTL2, 18, 67, 68–69. (RR2, 50, 134, 137). Kelsen, Problem der
Gerechtigkeit, in Kelsen, RR2, 689 In my translation: Kelsen rejects “from the point of view of scientific
knowledge (…) the existence of an absolute in general and absolute values in particular (…) and only
[recognises] the validity of relative values.” (Footnote 3).
15 Kelsen, PTL 2, 59. (RR2, 119). (Footnote 3).
16 Kelsen, PTL2, 86. (RR2, 169). See also Kelsen, PTL2, 8, 19, 22, 64. (RR2, 33, 51–52, 56, 126). (Footnote 3).

project of objective cognition and as a project that is ‘pure’, viz. a project separated not
only from empirical sciences but also from morality.
2. Positive Legal Fictionalism as a Solution to the Cognitivist Challenge
In this section, I will develop what I call Positive Legal Fictionalism as a solution to the
Cognitvist Challenge. Support for Positive Legal Fictionalism comes from an exegetical
perspective, showing that it can be firmly rooted in Kelsen’s own statements, and from
a systematic perspective, demonstrating how it effectively assists Kelsen’s project of
cognising the law and thereby solves the Cognitivst Challenge. However, before I elab-
orate on these two perspectives, I want to outline my proposal. Positive Legal Fictional-
ism consists of the following two claims:
Error Theory: There are no objectively valid norms. Hence, there is no objective cog-
nition of norms17 and any statement asserting the existence of objectively valid norms
is false.
Legal Fiction: Employing a fiction facilitates objective cognition of relative legal
norms, which would otherwise not be possible, and provides further epistemic advan-
tages for the cognition of the law.
In a nutshell, the solution that Positive Legal Fictionalism proposes to the Cognitivist
Challenge is the following: it is correct that no norm, legal or moral, relative or absolute,
can be an object of cognition – actually speaking. However, resorting to a fiction allows
us nevertheless to separate the class of relative legal norms from all other norms and
promote legal norms in a way that facilitates objective cognition of them. One caveat
is required here: there can be objective cognition of these norms qua norms insofar
these norms’ validity does no longer depend on any facts or psychological preferences
but only on another norm, i. e. the fiction, which I will shortly explain with reference
to the basic norm; and therefore the legal norms’ validity as well as their cognition
can be objective, notwithstanding the fact that such validity will be fictional just like
the fiction itself. Positive Legal Fictionalism understands ‘fiction’ as a false assumption
and identifies as the fiction the assumption of an existing basic norm. The basic norm
qua fiction is supposed to ensure that Kelsen’s project is a theory, i. e. concerned with
objective cognition, as well as that Kelsen’s project is pure, i. e. separated from morality
and empirical sciences. The fiction can do this by providing the basis for objective va-
17 Note, it is about objective cognition of norms qua norms This is still consistent with saying that there
can be objective cognitions of norms understood as sociological or psychological facts.

lidity, i. e. validity which cannot be reduced to either subjective wishes or preferences

or to any other psychological or sociological facts, but which depends on norms only.
This solution to the Cognitivist Challenge sidesteps the dead end from the first inter-
pretation of Kelsen’s contrast mentioned earlier: Positive Legal Fictionalism does not
consider the law as a coercive order as being the reason why legal norms, but not moral
norms, can be an object of cognition. Moreover, Positive Legal Fictionalism also side-
steps the difficult questions for the second interpretation: it does not imply that it is
just the relativity of norms that makes them suitable objects of cognition. It is the fic-
tion applied to the positive law that renders relative legal norms suitable for objective
cognition.
As the fiction is applied to legal norms only, Positive Legal Fictionalism is consistent
with Kelsen’s claim in the first edition of The Pure Theory of Law that only legal norms,
but not moral norms, can be objects of cognition. Moreover, Positive Legal Fictionalism
is also in accordance with Kelsen’s claim in the second edition of The Pure Theory of
Law that only relative norms can be objects of cognition: the fiction is an absolute
norm (i. e. the basic norm) which is not itself an object of cognition but only facilitates
the cognition of other relative norms, the validity of which depend on the fiction in
the relevant way.
One caveat is required at this point: Error Theory must not be confused with Adolf
Julius Merkl’s “Fehlerkalkül”, which is an entirely different idea. The term Error Theory,
as I use it, is not concerned with the question as to whether or to what extent those
legal norms which contradict other higher legal norms are still legally valid, but rather
focuses on the systematic falsity of certain statements. So understood, Error Theory is
common terminology in philosophical metaethics and, in particular, stems from John
Mackie’s seminal work in his book Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.
To further explain and vindicate Positive Legal Fictionalism as a solution to the Cog-
nitivist Challenge, I will firstly highlight the exegetical basis of Positive Legal Fictionalism
in Kelsen’s work (2.1) and then, on this basis, elaborate on how, from a systematic per-
spective (2.2), Positive Legal Fictionalism solves the Cognivist Challenge.
2.1 The Exegetical Perspective: The Basis of Positive Legal Fictionalism

in Kelsen’s Work
Error Theory generalises Kelsen’s claims about absolute moral norms to all norms. Not
only moral and absolute norms but also legal and relative norms are barred from being
an object of cognition.
Error Theory is supported by Kelsen’s own statements. Emphasizing a clear dis-
tinction between ‘is’ and ‘ought’, Kelsen held that any norm (legal or moral), i. e. any
‘ought’, could derive its validity (i. e. objective validity) only from another norm, i. e.

an ‘ought’, but never from facts, i. e. an ‘is’.18 However, the chain of norms conferring
validity on other norms cannot extend infinitely. Therefore, if a particular norm is to be
objectively valid, there has to be one first norm the validity of which no longer depends
on another norm, i. e. there has to be one absolute norm. However, Kelsen rejects the
existence of absolute norms, and in the absence of absolute norms no norm can be ob-
jectively valid. Hence, Error Theory Note that this is consistent with anything Kelsen
says about the basic norm. Kelsen does not claim that the basic norm actually exists but
only presents it as a condition necessary for the validity of norms.
While Error Theory corroborates Kelsen’s statements about norms not being suita-
ble objects of cognition, Legal Fiction aims to explain how Kelsen can still claim that
there is objective cognition of relative legal norms. Legal Fiction claims that a fiction
can separate the class of relative legal norms from all other norms and promote these
relative legal norms in such a way as to make them objects of cognition. Legal Fiction
proposes to recast Kelsen’s account of ‘presupposing the basic norm’ as ‘employing a

fiction’ and thereby explain the role of the fiction.
As already mentioned, Kelsen introduced the basic norm to explain the validity of
relative legal norms. The basic norm is the first and absolute norm that stops an infinite
regress of the chain of validity conferring norms. Kelsen explains the basic norm as
merely ‘presupposed’ (“voraus-gesetzt”) and as a purely non-positive norm. Kelsen
calls the basic norm a ‘hypothesis’ and a transcendental condition of the very possi-
bility for positive law to be objectively valid.19 Kelsen claimed that all norms in a legal
system have to converge on one single fundamental norm, the ‘basic norm’, if they are
to be considered objectively valid. Converging on the basic norm makes these norms
objectively valid because their validity cannot be reduced to either subjective wishes
or preferences or to any other psychological or sociological facts. Their validity ulti-
mately depends on a norm, i. e. the basic norm.
Recasting Kelsen’s account of ‘presupposing the basic norm’ as ‘employing a fic-
tion’ then leads to the following explanation of Legal Fiction: the fiction is the basic
norm and the fiction is employed by presupposing the basic norm in thought. The
basic norm qua fiction is only applied to positive legal norms within a legal system
and thereby separates the class of legal norms from other norms, e. g. moral norms.
The basic norm qua fiction makes such legal norms objects of cognition by providing
the necessary basis for their objective validity: a first and absolute norm, i. e. the basic
norm which invests all the positive legal norm with objective validity. The basic norm
18 See Kelsen, PTL 1, 193. (RR 2, 346). (Footnote 1 and 3).

19 See Kelsen, PTL1, 58, 64, 70. (RR1, 77, 85, 93) Kelsen, PTL2, 101–107. (RR2, 197–207). (Footnote 1 and
3). Kelsen, Hans. General Theory of Law and State. Translated by A. Wedberg. 1945, Cambridge, Harvard
University Press, 110, 134, 401, 406, 437. Kelsen abandons the notion of “hypothesis” in favour of a fiction in:
Kelsen, Hans. General Theory of Norms. Translated by Michael Hartney. 1991, Oxford Clarendon, 256. I will
later take up this point once more.

renders all these legal norms into relative legal norms, which ultimately depend on the
basic norm. So understood, Legal Fiction is an interpretation as well as a further devel-
opment of Kelsen’s doctrine of the basic norm. To see where it is interpretation and
where it is further development, I need show in greater detail how Legal Fiction accords
with Kelsen’s own statement on fictions (2.1.1) and his alleged method for cognising
the law: Kantian transcendentalism (2.2.2).
2.1.1 Kelsen on Fictions
Kelsen thought about fictions at several points in his career. Two such points deserve
special attention. Firstly, as early as in 1919, Kelsen writes on Vaihinger’s account of
legal fictions. Agreeing with Vaihinger, Kelsen claims that there are “true, i. e. episte-
mological fictions in legal science (…) of the attempt to know the law, dictions of the
intellectual mastery of the legal order.”20 It is indeed most noteworthy that, from a very
early stage, Kelsen claims that there are epistemological fictions, i. e. fictions that are
supposed to assist the “intellectual mastery of the legal order.”21 However, Kelsen does
not elaborate much on this point. He only mentions the ‘person’ as a legal fiction and
argues that using such a fiction may provide the “advantages of illustration and simpli-
fication ”22 The ‘person’ provides these advantages by offering a vivid picture instead of
the mere juridical and technical description of a bundle of obligations and rights.
Secondly, from 1960 onwards, Kelsen draws his attention again to legal fictions. Two
significant differences occurred at this point, however. Firstly, Kelsen now considers
his own account from a fictionalist standpoint and not only other accounts like Vai-
hinger’s. He thinks of his basic norm as a fiction.23 Secondly (and related to the first
point), whereas Kelsen’s 1919 essay was only concerned with fictions within the law
(the ‘person’) Kelsen’s consideration of the basic norm as a fiction now focuses on
fiction about the law as a whole.
Unfortunately, Kelsen’s position from 1960 onwards is inconsistent with his posi-
tion in 1919. This inconsistency is most obvious when Kelsen, after 1960, claimed that
the basic norm is a fiction insofar as it “contradict[s] reality”24 and explicitly revokes
earlier statements about norms (‘Ought’) not being able to contradict reality (‘Is’),
20 Kelsen, Hans. On the Theory of Juridic Fictions. With Special Consideration of Vaihinger’s Philosophy
of the As-If, in: Legal Fictions in Theory and Practice. Edited by M. Del Mar and W. Twining. 2015, Switzer-
land Springer, 5.
21 Ibid., 5.
22 Ibid, 7. Emphasis in original.
23 See for instance Kelsen, Hans. On The Pure Theory of Law. Israel Law Review, 1966, 1–7.
24 Kelsen, Hans. The Function of a Constitution, in: Essays on Kelsen. Edited. by R. Tur and W. Twining.
1986, Oxford OUP, 117.

which formed the basis of his view in 1919. As a result, any fictionalist interpretation of
Kelsen needs to take sides.
Following Kelsen completely in his view in 1960 and later would partly sidestep
the Cognitivist Challenge This is because his 1960 view less emphatically stresses the
distinctness of the realm of ‘ought’ and norms, i. e. what Kelsen aims to reach objective
cognition of. My aim in this essay is therefore to retain Kelsen’s view that norms cannot
contradict reality. I will consider the basic norm as a fiction, not in the sense of fictions
contradicting reality (i. e. in the realm of ‘Is’), but in the sense of stating something that
does not exist in the realm of ‘Ought’.
Hence, Positive Legal Fictionalism embraces Kelsen’s claims concerning fictions
about the law (i. e. the fiction is the basic norm), the claim about fictions providing
genuinely epistemic advantages, and claims about the distinctness of ‘is’ and ‘ought’.
Positive Legal Fictionalism is thereby maximally close to Kelsen’s own statements. It
only departs from Kelsen where Kelsen’s contradicting statements made a departure
inescapable and the choice between contradicting statements was made with an eye to
upholding rather than sidestepping the Cognitivist Challenge.
However, it must also be stressed that Positive Legal Fictionalism goes beyond Kels-
en’s owns statements. It goes beyond Kelsen’s claims by recommending that the view
on fictions, developed from Kelsen’s own claims, be applied to all phases of Kelsen’s
work, including the first and second edition of The Pure Theory of Law, and not only to
the later sceptical phase in Kelsen’s life that is usually associated with Kelsen being a
fictionalist if he is considered a fictionalist at all. This is a first reason why Positive Legal
Fictionalism is a Kelsenian but not quite Kelsen’s own account.
2.1.2 Kelsen on Kantian Transcendentalism
By expanding the fictionalist reading to all phases of Kelsen’s work, Positive Legal Fic-
tionalism competes with the most widely accepted interpretation of Kelsen’s method
in cognising the law: Kantian transcendentalism. In this subsection, I will claim that
fictionalism is a better exegetical basis for Kelsen’s method in cognising the law than a
qualified version of Kantian transcendentalism.
In The Pure Theory of Law, Kelsen focuses on the conditions under which the cog-
nition of positive law as objectively valid becomes possible. Kelsen claims that this ap-
proach resembles Kant in his inquiry into the conditions of the possibility of cognition
in the natural sciences.25 Therefore, the basic norm, i. e. what Kelsen identifies as the
25 See Kelsen, PTL2, 202. (RR2, 361). (Footnote 3).

condition for cognising the positive law as objectively valid, is to be considered “cogni-
tively and theoretically transcendental in terms of the Kantian philosophy.”26
Despite such alleged common ground, many commentators correctly pointed out
that Kelsen’s link to Kantian transcendentalism is rather loose.27 To begin with, where-
as Kant’s inquiry (and also the inquiry of Neo-Kantians like Cohen whom Kelsen re-
fers to) was about the very conditions of cognition as such, Kelsen’s inquiry is only
about one way of looking at one particular area of the world, i. e. the positive law. Kelsen
indeed claims that:
“The Pure Theory of Law is well aware that the specifically normative meaning of certain
material facts, the meaning characterized as ‘law’, is the result not of a necessary interpreta-
tion but of a possible interpretation, possible only given a certain basic presupposition.”28
As a result, Kelsen admits that one could simply refuse to accept his conditions of
cognising the law as objectively valid and instead consider legal norms as mere acts of
power and domination. However, in Kant’s account, in contrast, it was not possible
simply to reject the transcendental conditions of cognitions and choose a different way
of looking at things.
Secondly (and as a result of the first difference), Kant’s and Kelsen’s uses of the term
‘hypothesis’ diverge considerably. When Kant identifies the conditions of cognition as
such, he states these conditions as ‘hypotheses’. By ‘hypotheses’, he means claims that
he cannot directly prove but only postulate through the transcendental method. Nev-
ertheless, for Kant, a hypothesis is something that can be true and is indeed assumed
to be a good candidate for a true claim. This is different in Kelsen. Although the basic
norm is also called a ‘hypothesis’, Kelsen does not mean something that can be true.
The basic norm, being a norm, cannot be true, according to Kelsen. And Kelsen explic-
itly states that the basic norm does not exist.
Referring to these differences, commentators suggested that Kelsen lacked suf-
ficient acquaintance with Kantian transcendentalism.29 However, this is a rather un-
26 Kelsen, PTL1, 25. (RR1, 36). (Footnote 1) Kelsen expresses his allegiance to Kant in other places too. See
Letter to Treves in Kelsen papers, 171. Similar statements also appear in earlier and later work. For earlier
work, see Kelsen, Hans. Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre Entwickelt aus der Lehre vom Rechtssatze (from
1923). 1960, Aalen Scientia, Vorrede, XVII.
27 See Wilson, Alida. Joseph Raz on Kelsen’s Basic Norm. The American Journal of Jurisprudence 27 (1982),
49. Dreier, Horst. Rechtslehre, Staatssoziologie und Demokratietheorie bei Hans Kelsen, 1986 Nomos Baden-
Baden, 44, 81–89. Winkler, Günther. Rechtstheorie und Erkenntnislehre Kritische Anmerkungen zum Dilemma
von Sein und Sollen in der Reinen Rechtslehre aus geistesgeschichtlicher und erkenntnistheoretischer Sicht 1990,
Wien New York Springer, 107–108.
28 Kelsen, PTL1, 34. Emphasis added. (RR1, 47). He repeats this point in Kelsen, PTL2, 218 (RR2, 393).
(Footnote 1 and 3) See also Kelsen, Hans. Value Judgments in the Science of Law, in: What is Justice? Justice,
Law, and Politics in the Mirror of Science Collected Essays by Hans Kelsen 2013. Clark The Lawbook Exchange,
Ltd., 226–227.
29 See for instance Wilson, 1982, 48. (Footnote 27).

charitable interpretation and in this subsection I want to claim that Kelsen’s departure
from Kant was to a great extent deliberate and should therefore be appreciated rather
than criticised. Framing Kelsen’s method in fictionalist terms rather than transcenden-
tal terms can charitably capture Kelsen’s departure from Kant and should therefore be
the preferred interpretation of Kelsen’s method in cognising the law.
Support for a fictionalist interpretation comes from what commentators sometimes
overlook, namely that Kelsen himself stressed that he employs the Kantian philoso-
phy only “by analogy”30: it is just the focus on conditions of the possibility of cognition
that links Kelsen to Kantian Philosophy in some loose sense. There are other aspects
of (Neo)-Kantian transcendentalism that Kelsen explicitly rejects. In a little-known
letter to Renato Treves from 1933, Kelsen contrasts the conditions of the possibility of
cognition developed by Kant and Cohen with his own conditions of the possibility
of cognizing the positive law. Kelsen claims that Kant and Cohen adhered to a “con-
tentually constituted, materially determined a priori”31, by which he meant that Kant

and Cohen adhered to substantial value judgements and potentially a form of value
realism, i. e. the assumption of absolute values. Kelsen, in contrast, rejects such values
and is looking only for “purely formal categories of a priori validity.”32 The basic norm
is supposed to be completely formal in the sense of not including any substantial or
absolute values, or any restriction on what legal norms may proscribe. The basic norm
merely supports whatever the highest positive legal norm, i. e. the constitution, states.
Moreover, in the same letter, Kelsen claims that moral relativism is “something that
Cohen – exactly like Kant on this point – was not prepared to accept, if only because of
his religious convictions.”33 However, moral relativism is key to Kelsen’s own account.
Kelsen fiercely rejects absolute norms and denies they could be accounted for by way
of rational cognition.
In order to keep the basic norm purely formal as well as defend ethical relativism,
Kelsen had to claim that the basic norm is indeed just one contingent way of looking
at the positive law as well as deny that the basic norm can be true in the sense Kan-
tian hypotheses can be true. If the basic norm were a materially-determined, true, and
absolute norm, Kelsen would undermine his relativism about norms and the purely
formal nature of the conditions of cognising the positive law.
Therefore, Kelsen’s letter to Treves shows that his departure from presenting the
very conditions of cognition as such and the adherence to ‘hypotheses’ as truth-apt
was not simply due to a lack of acquaintance with Kant. It can be seen as deliberate and
30 Kelsen, PTL2, 202. (RR2, 361). (Footnote 3).

31 Kelsen, Hans. The Pure Theory of Law, ‘Labandism’, and Neo-Kantianism. A Letter to Renato Treves,
in: Normativity and Norms: Critical Perspectives on Kelsenian Themes, ed. by Stanley L. Paulson and Bonnie
Litschewski. 1998, Oxford Clarendon, 173. Original emphasis.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.

necessary to uphold central features of his account, even if Kelsen did not explicitly say
so in the Pure Theory of Law. Therefore, it is no surprise that Kelsen, even though he
still declares allegiance to Kant and Cohen in focusing on an inquiry into the conditions
of the possibility of cognition, rejects Kant’s and Cohen’s overall framework as versions
of “natural law theory.”34
These exegetical data require a choice: one could either continue interpreting Kels-
en as employing Kantian transcendentalism but with all these necessary qualifications
that (as commentators correctly claim) take away what is genuine about Kantian tran-
scendentalism; or one could develop a different interpretation that aligns more closely
with all of Kelsen’s claims. In the rest of this subsection, I will opt for the second route
and claim that a fictionalist framework, as given by Legal Fiction, can account for all of
Kelsen’s claims and should therefore be adopted.
To begin with, Legal Fiction recognises Kelsen’s attempt to identify the conditions
under which cognising the law as objectively valid is possible. Legal Fiction recognises
the basic norm qua fiction as the necessary condition for the possibility of objection
cognition of relative legal norms. As such, Legal Fiction can be understood per analo-
giam to Kantian transcendentalism in the restricted sense Kelsen refers to. But operat-
ing with a fiction leaves no doubt that employing the fiction is only one way of looking
at the positive law. My fictionalist proposal does not imply that the basic norm is the
only way, or even an especially privileged way, of looking at the positive law. And it is
precisely the contrast between a fiction and a Kantian hypothesis that maps on to the
contrast between Kelsen’s basic norm and a Kantian hypothesis. A fiction is something
we do not assume to be true but actually know is false or non-existing. This is exactly
what Kelsen says about the basic norm but what would be misleading to say about a
‘hypothesis’. And in fact, Kelsen later abandoned the notion of ‘hypothesis’ in favour
of the notion of a “fiction”.35 As a result, the fiction is purely formal and not, as Kelsen
thought about Cohen’s and Kant’s approach, contentually-constituted and material-
ly-determined. The fiction is the basic norm and as such comprises only what Kelsen
attributes to the basic norm. Finally, since the basic norm is a fiction, applied to the law,
it does not imply any claims about morality. Therefore, it is compatible with ethical
relativism as Kelsen defends it.
Hence, Legal Fiction can account for all of Kelsen’s claims. On this basis, I propose
reconstructing Kelsen’s method of cognising within a fictionalist framework rather
than within a framework of Kantian transcendentalism. However, it must be noted
that preferring fictionalism over Kantian transcendentalism does not imply abandon-
ing the characterisation of Kelsen’s account as Kantian or Neo-Kantian altogether.
Other aspects of Kelsen’s account that are usually considered (Neo)-Kantian can still
34 Ibid.
35 Kelsen, Hans. General Theory of Norms, 1991, Oxford Clarendon, 256. (See Footnote 18).

remain in place. These aspects are: (i) the assumption of ‘is’ and ‘ought’ as separate and
irreducible categories; (ii) the assumption of the validity of norms in terms of binding
force; (iii) the emphasis of genuine normativity of legal science, where legal science is
sharply contrasted with more empirical approaches like legal sociology.36
2.1.3 Summary
This section (2.1) outlined the exegetical basis of Positive Legal Fictionalism in Kelsen’s
own claims. However, Positive Legal Fictionalism did not merely adapt Kelsen’s claims
but went beyond them in two ways: firstly, as there was no consistent account of a legal
fiction in Kelsen, Positive Legal Fictionalism had to reconstruct such an account from
Kelsen’s contradictory claims. Positive Legal Fictionalism then applied this account to
all of the different phases in Kelsen’s work and not only to the latter sceptical phase.
Secondly, Positive-Legal-Fictionalism suggested reinterpreting Kelsen’s method in cog-
nising the law as a fictionalist approach rather than as a Kantian transcendental ap-
proach. In the next section (2.2), I will elaborate on how Positive Legal Fictionalism
contributes to a project of cognition required to solve the Cognivist Challenge.
2.2 The Systematic Perspective: The Contribution of Positive Legal Fictionalism to

a Project of Cognition
It may seem paradoxical that a fictionalist account, i. e. an account relying on false

claims, could ever contribute to a project of cognition. However, if Positive Legal Fic-
tionalism is to be a solution to the Cognitivist Challenge, I need to explain how it con-
tributes to objective cognition. To do this, I will firstly elaborate on fictionalism as a
scientific method more generally (2.2.1), then specify the particular epistemic advan-
tages that come with the assumption of the basic norm qua fiction (as made by Positive
Legal Fictionalism) (2.2.2), and finally explain how Positive Legal Fictionalism not only
provides epistemic advantages but also remains loyal to legal positivism (2.2.3).
36 See Bulygin, Eugenio. An Antinomy in Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law, in: Normativity and Norms: Critical
Perspectives on Kelsenian Themes, ed. by Stanley L. Paulson and Bonnie Litschewski. 1998, Oxford Claren-
don, 297–315.

2.2.1 Fictionalism as a Scientific Method
Recall that Kelsen claimed that there are “epistemological fictions in legal science (…)
of the attempt to know the law, dictions of the intellectual mastery of the legal order.”37
In order to illustrate how a fiction could assist such intellectual mastery, Kelsen gives
the following example:
“And we have to speak of a fiction as soon as cognition (and especially juridic cognition)
takes a detour in knowing its object (and in juridic knowledge this object is the law, the
legal order, the legal ought), a detour in which it consciously sets itself in contradiction to
this object; and be it only in order to better grasp it: just like a rock-climber, in order to
avoid an obstacle and reach his goal more easily, is sometimes forced to temporarily climb
downwards, i. e. in a direction directly opposed to his goal, the peak.”38
So, according to Kelsen, a fiction can be a device that helps to overcome an obstacle
to cognition. Such an obstacle can be overcome, Kelsen argues, if we allow the fiction
to take us on a “detour” and thereby identify an alternative path to cognition. Unfor-
tunately, Kelsen does not elaborate on how such a “detour” can be mapped out in de-
tail. However, the metaphor of rock-climbing is instructive. And most interestingly, it
resembles a method that Vaihinger, whom Kelsen knew, once attributed to Fermat’s
solution of a mathematical problem. Therefore, Vaihinger’s interpretation of Fermat
may help to specify Kelsen’s take on how fictions assist cognition, even if Kelsen does
not explicitly refer to it.
Vaihinger presented his reader with the following mathematical task: suppose you
would like to divide a line into two parts, x and a-x, so that the term x2(a-x) is maxi-
mally large. Vaihinger claims that it was impossible to provide a solution until Fermat
employed a particular trick.
Fermat substituted the x in the term x2(a-x) with (x+e), leading to the new term:
(x+e)2(a-x-e). He then equated the original term with the new one, reaching the fol-
lowing equation: x2(a-x) = (x+e)2(a-x-e)
By equating both terms, Fermat consciously made a false assumption, Vaihinger
claims. Fermat knowingly equated two unequal terms. After multiplying all the terms,
Fermat then reached the following equation: 2ax + ae = 3x2 + 3xe + e2
In order to reverse his initial false assumption (i. e. arbitrarily adding e to the equa-
tion), Fermat cancelled all the terms containing an e. However, arbitrarily cancelling
all the terms containing an e is in itself another false assumption, Vaihinger claims: one
must not simply leave terms out of an equation.
37 Kelsen, Footnote 19, 5.

38 Ibid.

After cancelling all terms containing an e and shifting everything but x to the left
side, Fermat reaches 2a/3 = x and this is indeed the solution to the problem: if the line
x is divided into parts, x and a-x, so that 2a/3 = x, the term x2(a-x) is maximally large.
On Vaihinger’s interpretation, Fermat used two false assumptions as tools in his
arithmetic operation. He made a first false assumption (i. e. arbitrarily adding e to the
equation) to facilitate an easier arithmetic calculation and made a second false as-
sumption (i. e. dropping all terms containing an e) in order to reverse the initial false
assumption. Vaihinger calls this the “method of opposite errors”, i. e. errors that neu-
tralise each other.
Fermat’s solution, at least in Vaihinger’s description, seems to illustrate what Kels-
en says about the metaphor of the rock-climber: “just like a rock-climber, in order to
avoid an obstacle and reach his goal more easily, is sometimes forced to temporarily
climb downwards, i. e. in a direction directly opposed to his goal, the peak”39, so is
Fermat, in order to avoid a mathematical obstacle, forced to temporarily depart from

the truth, i. e. think in a direction directly opposed to his goal, the truth. Fermat does
this by means of his first false assumption. And just as the rock climber’s adjustment of
his position allows him to “reach his goal more easily” 40 later, so can Fermat reach the
true solution to the problem more easily after relying on a false equation that he later
neutralised by means of a second well-chosen false assumption.41
Vaihinger’s interpretation of Fermat’s solution illustrates how false assumptions, i. e.
fictions, may help to achieve cognition. Moreover, Vaihinger’s interpretation is strik-
ingly close to how Kelsen himself describes how fictions can help legal science, and
Kelsen in fact knew Vaihinger’s book containing this interpretation.42 Therefore, ap-
plying Vaihinger’s interpretation to Kelsen’s Pure Theory of the Basic Law may be a
plausible way of explaining the epistemic significance of the fiction in Kelsenian terms.
So, let us transfer this take on fictions to Kelse’s Pure Theory of Law:
Just as Fermat faced an arithmetic predicament, Kelsen can be seen to face a pre-
dicament concerning the validity of norms. According to Error Theory, there are no
objectively valid norms. However, legal science in Kelsen’s sense, if it is to be possible
at all, is only possible if there are objectively valid norms.
Just as Fermat employed a false assumption to overcome an arithmetic predicament
and facilitate an easier arithmetic calculation, Kelsen can be seen as employing the
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Vaihinger, Hans. Die Philosophie des Als Ob System der theoretischen, praktischen und religiösen Fiktionen
der Menschheit auf Grund eines idealistischen Positivismus Mit einem Anhang über Kant und Nietzsche 1918,
Leipzig Meiner, 200 ff.
42 Admittedly, it is not certain that Kelsen knew this passage when writing about fictions, but it is nev-
ertheless likely. Vaihinger’s book was published in 1918 and Kelsen published a review of it in 1919, the
same year in which his other paper appeared from which the rock-climbing metaphor is taken. See Kelsen,
Footnote 20.

basic norm qua fiction to overcome the legal predicament of there being no objective
validity. Once the basic norm, understood as a fiction, is presupposed, all relative legal
norms within a particular legal system are invested with objective validity.
However, just as Fermat reversed the initial false assumption in order to reach the
correct result, Kelsen also has to prevent the fiction from distorting the results reached.
After the basic norm qua fiction is presupposed, Kelsen’s can be interpreted as adding
something like a tag to any legal norm saying that legal norms are valid only on the ba-
sis of the fiction, i. e. on the basis of this mere product of thought, but not valid in any
more robust sense. Kelsen may have done this by introducing the Rechtssatz (rule of
law) as opposed to the Rechtsnorm (legal norm). Kelsen explains both terms as follows:
“Rules of law [i. e. Rechtssätze] (…) are hypothetical judgments stating that according
to a national or international legal order, under the conditions determined by this order,
certain consequences determined by the order ought to take place. Legal norms [i. e. Re-
chtsnormen] are not judgments, that is, they are not statements about an object of cogni-
tion. According to their meaning they are commands, they may also be permissions and
authorizations.”43
Hence, Rechtsnormen are the legal norms that I presented as the subject-matter of The
Pure Theory of Law. Rechtssätze are statements about those norms and usually take the
following form: according to the legal system X, such and such ought to be the case.
The prefix ‘according to the legal system X’ can be read as the required tag. On a fiction-
alist interpretation, this prefix can be read as “according to the fiction in legal system
X”. This tag makes clear that objective validity still depends on the fiction and prevents
the results from being distorted, that is from stating objective validity independent of
a mere product of thought. Hence, similarly to how Fermat’s dropping all terms con-
taining an e neutralised his initial false assumption, Kelsen’s prefix in his Rechtssätzen
prevents the potential false assumption of objective validity that exists independently
of the fiction and makes clear that objective validity is still dependent on arbitrary
presupposition.
However, there seems to be a difference between Fermat and Kelsen. Whereas Fer-
mat’s second false assumption neutralised his first false assumption, Kelsen – on this
interpretation – only highlights but does not neutralise the use of a fiction. The falsity
of stating norms of objective validity does not disappear. Error Theory is still in place
and, as I will show in section 2.2.3, still plays an important role. At this point, I only
want to highlight this difference from Fermat. Kelsen prevents distorted results by a
different strategy from that which Vaihinger attributes to Fermat.

2.2.2 The Epistemic Advantages of the Legal Fiction
In the last subsection (2.2.1) I tried to explain the seemingly paradoxical claim that fic-
tions, i. e. deliberate departures from truth, can sometimes be used to reach the truth.
I claimed that both Fermat and Kelsen can use an initial fiction to overcome a pre-
dicament and later prevent the fiction from leading to distorted results. This method
strikingly resembles Kelsen’s own description of the use of fictions in his metaphor of
the rock-climber, and it is a plausible assumption that Kelsen knew about Vaihinger’s
interpretation of Fermat and was inspired by it.
In this subsection (2.2.2), I want to be more specific and describe the particular
epistemic advantages that come with the basic norm interpreted as a fiction. These
epistemic advantages fall into two groups: firstly, there are all the epistemic advantages
that Kelsen attributes to the basic norm independent of considering it a fiction. Since I
proposed to recast Kelsen’s account of presupposing the basic norm as employing the
fiction, the epistemic advantages of the basic norm can be re-interpreted as the epis-
temic advantages of the fiction. Secondly, however, there are also epistemic advantages
that specifically stem from the basic norm being a fiction. Such epistemic advantages
are not already among those which Kelsen highlights but still contribute to his overall
project of cognising the law.
Let me start with the first set of advantages, those already associated with the basic
norm independent of considering it a fiction. Consider the following passage from
Kelsen:
“That an assembly of people is a parliament, and that the result of their activity is a statute
(in other words, that these events have this ‘meaning’), says simply that the material facts
as a whole correspond to certain provisions of the constitution. That is, the content of an
actual event corresponds to the content of a given norm.”44
Kelsen here claims that a legal norm renders “actual events” into something with le-
gal significance: there is a parliamentary law (i. e. legal event) and not only a group of
people writing down some rules they wish to be complied with (i. e. natural event);
there is an instance of murder (i. e. legal event) and not just an instance of killing (i. e.
natural event), etc. Without a legal norm, or more precisely without objectively valid
legal norms, there would only be natural but not legal events. Kelsen seems to think
of something like a parallel or augmented reality. 45 However, all this is only possible

45 See Kelsen, Hans. Value Judgments in the Science of Law, in: Kelsen, H. What is Justice? Justice, Law, and
Politics in the Mirror of Science Collected Essays by Hans Kelsen 2013. Clark, The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd.,
227: “If the system of legal norms is an ideology, it is an ideology parallel to a definite reality.” See also 2008,
49, where Kelsen qualifies the pure theory as an ideology behind a reality which is supposed to conform
to this ideology. See also “Welt des Sollens” and “Welt des Seins” in Kelsen, 1960, e. g. 5 ff. (Footnote 26).

after presupposing the basic norm because only the presupposition of the basic norm
ensures objective validity. Therefore, legal practice arises and is intelligible as a legal
practice only by presupposing the basic norm.
Hence, Kelsen’s own statements allow the extracting of a specific reason for em-
ploying the basic norm as a fiction: presupposing the basic norm makes the legal prac-
tice – insofar as it is concerned with legal cognition – intelligible. More particularly,
these passages allow us to extract two ways in which presupposition of the basic norm
contributes to “cognizing positive law.”46 Firstly, it facilitates legal propositional knowl-
edge, viz. knowing that there are certain legal things (parliamentary law, murder, etc.),
which would not legally exist without the presupposition of the basic norm. Secondly,
it facilitates legal understanding, viz. understanding why actual events bring with them
certain legal characteristics. It is because they correspond to norms which are invested
with validity by the presupposition of the basic norm. On this basis, the legal scientist
can know that there are certain norms, certain legal events, also that a group of norms
leading back to the same basic norm belong to the same legal system, and understand
why all this is true: namely because of the link to the basic norm.
However, over and above those epistemic advantages associated with the basic
norm independent of its interpretation as a fiction, there are also epistemic advantages
specifically connected with the basic norm qua fiction
Firstly, fictionalist accounts can avoid the disadvantages of realist accounts or natural
law theories but still have the same advantages as these views. A disadvantage of realist
accounts of norms or natural law theory is often seen in their commitment to compli-
cated ontology. However, the advantage of these theories is their simple semantics.
Realist accounts and natural law theory make genuine propositional assertions about
norms. As a result, such statements can be robustly true or false and they are subject to
principles of logic and inference. Such simple propositional semantics, truth-aptness,
and the applicability of logical principles seem to be conducive to a scientific project,
other things being equal.
Fictionalism can avoid the disadvantage of complicated ontology but still provide
the advantages of realist accounts. Fictionalism can avoid complicated ontology by ad-
hering to an error theory, e. g. rejecting any absolute norms, which natural law theory
claims exist and which Kelsen continuously highlighted as ontologically incompre-
hensible. At the same time, however, fictionalism can still claim that there are genuine
assertions about the subject matter. It may be true that there are no norms. However,
one can still state that ‘according to the legal fiction, such and such a norm exists’ (i. e.
Kelsen’s Rechtssätze). Such statements are genuine assertions with propositional con-
tent. As such, these statements fall under simple realist semantics and can therefore be
robustly true or false as well as subject to principles of logic and inference. Hence, a first
46 Kelsen, PTL1, 58. Emphasis added. (RR1, 77). (Footnote 1).

epistemic advantage of fictionalist accounts like Positive Legal Fictionalism is that it can
avoid complicated ontology while providing the same advantages as natural law theory.
Secondly, another advantage of Positive Legal Fictionalism comes from a distinction
available to all fictionalist accounts, namely the distinction between accepting and be-
lieving claims. Accepting a claim means endorsing it for the time being without believing
it to be true. Believing a claim in contrast means taking the claim to be true. Fictionalist
accounts can make this distinction by interpreting certain claims as systematically false
(e. g. due to a Error Theory) and thereby oppose believing in those claims. However,
fictionalist accounts can still argue that one should accept these claims for reasons oth-
er than their literal truth (e. g. the specific advantages connected to the fiction, which
may be epistemic, pragmatic, political, or aesthetic.)
L. J. Cohen used this distinction in a discussion of methods in science more gener-
ally. He argued that a scientist who only accepts his hypotheses, claims, and theories is
superior to a scientist who believes them. Concerning the later, he says:

“possession of a belief that p might make him less ready to change his mind about accept-
ing that p if new evidence crops up or a better theory becomes available. It might even
make him less ready to look for new evidence or a better theory, when otherwise he would
have done so.”47
Hence, ‘accepting’ instead of ‘believing’ claims leads to a greater open-mindedness and

willingness to revise one’s theories, which may be conducive to a project aiming at
cognition.
Positive Legal Fictionalism, being a fictionalist account, can resort to the distinction
between acceptance versus belief and thereby provide an epistemic advantage for a
Kelsenian project of cognising the law. Due to Error Theory, a legal scientist embracing
Positive Legal Fictionalism would never believe in legal norms, that is take them to be
objectively valid, full stop, or even take them to be true. A legal scientist would only
accept the legal norms provisionally, that is accept them as part of a contingent legal
system and on the contingent fictionalist assumption of a presupposed basic norm. As
a result, a legal scientist embracing Positive Legal Fictionalism does not cling on to legal
norms in any way but is indifferent to changes in them. As a result, the statements about
those norms, the Rechtssätze, are also subject to radical contingency. They are radical-
ly contingent because they would need to change whenever Rechtsnormen change.
And this is the case even though Rechtssätze – unlike Rechtsnormen – can be robustly
true or false. So, the fictionalist legal scientist only accepts Rechtsnormen and, since
Rechtsnormen are the basis for Rechtssätze, he is also maximally open-minded for
changing Rechtssätze whenever “new evidence crops up or a better theory becomes
available”, to use Cohen’s phrase again.
47 Cohen, Laurence Jonathan. An Essay on Belief and Acceptance, 1992, Oxford OUP, 88.

Hence, insofar as open-mindedness can be considered an epistemic virtue in line

with Cohen’s description, Positive Legal Fictionalism – being a fictionalist account – can
claim to provide this virtue for a project of cognising the law.
2.2.3 Fictionalism and Legal Positivism
In the last two subsections (2.2.1 and 2.2.2), I tried to explain the use of a fiction as a
scientific method more generally as well as specify the particular epistemic advantages
of the basic norm qua fiction. In this subsection (2.2.3), I wish to highlight how my
fictionalist proposal, amidst all cognitivist aspirations, still remains loyal to legal posi-
tivism, thereby also returning to a claim I made at the end of section 2.2.1.
It is indeed the specifically fictional take that aligns with legal positivism: the take
on there being no objectively valid norms (Error Theory) but only a fiction that ensures
fictional objective validity (Legal Fiction). In order to see how these claims provide
advantages, let us consider the opposite account of a richer cognitivist project that
abandons Error Theory and the assumption of a fiction. Such a project does not seem
to be terribly attractive vis-à-vis Kelsen’s legal positivism. The last thing that Kelsen
should arrive at is a cognitivist account that tends towards recommending certain
norms are really true and ought to be complied with.’ Kelsen indeed stresses that the
Pure Theory is not supposed to legitimise the law in any way but remain agnostic on the
moral worth of the positive law.48 And Dreier is correct when he says that it was never
Kelsen’s aim to hedge the arbitrariness of positive law.49 Error Theory is in accordance
with these claims and emphasizes that full normative necessity in law is still compati-
ble with the utmost moral depravity of the legal system. As such, keeping Error Theory
in place facilitates an interpretation that is carefully nuanced between cognitivist and
positivist aspirations. This justifies labelling my proposal Positive Legal Fictionalism.
2.2.4 Summary
This section (2.2) aimed to explain how Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law can be a cogni-
tive project after the adoption of Error Theory. Referring to Positive Legal Fictionalism,
I made three claims: firstly (2.2.1), the epistemic function of a fiction can be explained
according to Kelsen’s metaphor of the rock-climber. Just as Fermat employed a false
assumption to solve a mathematical challenge, Kelsen can use a fiction to solve a legal
challenge, i. e. how to explain objective validity. Secondly (2.2.2), presupposing the ba-
48 Most notably Kelsen, PTL1, 7, 18. (RR1, 15, 29). Kelsen, PTL2, 1, 68–69. (RR2, 21, 136–138). (Footnote
1 and 3).
49 See Dreier, 1986, 59 (Footnote 27).

sic norm qua fiction then specifically facilitates the following epistemic advantages: it
provides legal propositional knowledge and it provides legal understanding. Further-
more, it avoids complicated ontology while facilitating simple propositional semantics
and leads to a particular open-mindedness in legal theorizing. Finally (2.2.3), over and
above these epistemic advantages, a fictionalist account is also particularly suited to
legal positivism, thereby balancing cognitive and positivist aspirations.
3. Conclusion
At the beginning of this essay, I identified two objectives: drawing attention to the
Cognitivist Challenge as a serious challenge to Kelsen’s account and proposing Positive
Legal Fictionalism as a solution to the Cognitivist Challenge.
The Cognitivist Challenge was a challenge of how to retain Kelsen’s view about the
relative legal norms, i. e. that one can objectively cognise these norms, while not reject-
ing his view about the absolute moral norms, i. e. that one cannot objectively cognise
these norms I claimed that a solution to the Cognitivist Challenge is of vital importance
for understanding Kelsen’s project as a ‘theory’, viz. a project of objective cognition,
and as a project that is ‘pure’, i. e. separated not only from empirical sciences but also
from morality.
The solution that I proposed, Positive Legal Fictionalism, proceeded in two steps:
firstly, relying on Error Theory, Positive Legal Fictionalism claimed that no norms are
objectively valid – actually speaking. It thereby accounted for all of Kelsen’s statements
about certain norms, e. g. absolute moral norms, not being objects of cognition. Sec-
ondly, relying on Legal Fiction, Positive Legal Fictionalism presented the use of a fiction
as the tool to facilitate objective cognition of relative legal norms. Presupposing the
basic norm qua fiction invests all relative legal norms with objective validity and facil-
itates several epistemic advantages: legal propositional knowledge, legal understand-
ing, realist semantics without complicated ontology, open-mindedness. These advan-
tages form the basis of Kelsen’s project of cognising the law.
Hence, Kelsen’s project should be understood as a ‘theory’ along these fictionalist
lines and considered ‘pure’ to the extent that the legal fiction applies only to positive
legal norms and not moral norms, as well as to the extent that the fiction facilitates the
genuine normative validity, which cannot be reduced to facts.
I hope to have shown that Positive Legal Fictionalism is also firmly rooted in Kelsen’s
account from an exegetical basis. However, Positive Legal Fictionalism is only a Kelseni-
an but not quite Kelsen’s own account. This is because Positive Legal Fictionalism went
beyond Kelsen’s own claims by (i) applying a unified account of fictions about the law
to all the different phases in his work, (ii) explaining Kelsen’s claims about the method
of cognising the law in terms of a fictionalist rather than a qualified Kantian frame-
work, (iii) explicitly linking Kelsen’s take on the epistemic use of fictions to Vaihinger,

and (iv) developing from the previous points specific epistemic advantages which
Kelsen himself did not highlight: i. e. simple semantics without complicated ontolo-
gy, open-mindedness on the basis of the distinction between acceptance and belief.
Therefore, Positive Legal Fictionalism may be seen as a proposal for how to develop
Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law further, rather than as account that merely summarises
its present status.
Acknowledgment
I want to thank Leslie Green, John Hyman, Jörg Kammerhofer, and Matthias Jestaedt
for their detailed and very helpful comments on an earlier draft of this essay. I also ben-
efitted considerably from presenting an earlier version of this essay at the 2018 Confer-
ence of the International Association for the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy
(IVR): Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law: Conceptions and Misconceptions, at the Univer-
sity of Freiburg (Germany).
Maximilian Kiener
University of Oxford, St. Peter’s College, OX1 2DL Oxford, UK,
maximilian.kiener@philosophy.ox.ac.uk


II.

Rechtstheorie / The Mechanics of Law

Kelsen on Derogation and Normative Conflicts
An Essay in Critical Reconstruction
MATHIEU CARPENTIER
Abstract: This article focuses on Hans Kelsen’s late period, in which, breaking from views
that he had previously held dear, Kelsen espoused a novel theory of normative conflicts.
He claimed that since the principle of non-contradiction does not apply to norms, norma-
tive conflicts are not logical impossibilities. Two equally valid norms may conflict; wheth-
er the law provides the tools to solve such a conflict is not a logical matter, but is dependent
on contingent positive legal norms, also known as “metarules” such as Lex posterior. How-
ever, Kelsen did not want to cut the link between normative conflicts and invalidity (or
non-validity). He claimed that conflicts are solved through derogation. This is the claim
the present paper intends to analyse and ultimately refute. I then go on to introduce a new
conception of metarules conceived as norms of applicability, with no special bearing on
the conflicting norm’s validity.
Keywords: Hans Kelsen, derogation, normative conflicts, normative systems, legal valid-
ity, applicability
Schlagworte: Hans Kelsen, Derogation, normative Konflikte, normative Systeme, rechtli-

che Geltung, Anwendbarkeit
In1 1962, Hans Kelsen published an article called “Derogation”2, in which he shook up
some of his own well-entrenched beliefs. Even if the shortcomings and inconsistencies
of his earlier views did not totally disappear, that article made a crucial step in (what
1 Previous versions of this paper were presented at the Legal Philosophy Seminar of the University Pom-
peu Fabra in Barcelona and at the Conference of the German Section of the IVR in Freiburg. I would like to
thank Jose Juan Moreso, Chiara Valentini, Stanley L. Paulson, Jörg Kammerhofer and Thomas Hochmann
for invaluable comments.
2 Hans Kelsen, Derogation in: Essays in Jurisprudence in Honour of Roscoe Pound, ed. Ralph Newman, 1962.
This essay was reprinted in Hans Kelsen, Essays in Legal and Moral Philosophy, 1973. I cite and quote it here
from the 1973 edition.

126 MATHIEU CARPENTIER
I believe is) a good direction. It opened the way to Kelsen’s so-called late, sceptical3
period and was re-used – sometimes verbatim – in his last opus magnum, the General
Theory of Norms.
In this paper I shall try to re-elaborate and defend some of the basic tenets devel-
oped by Kelsen in the “Derogation” article, while trying to solve some of its main in-
consistencies. Here are some of the things which, controversial as they may be, I think
Kelsen basically got right:
(1) Repeal – or abrogation, or derogation4 – is a specific, self-standing normative
function. It does not prescribe, nor prohibits nor authorizes any behaviour. It
suppresses the validity of another norm from the normative system they both
belong to.
(2) Normative conflicts are not a matter of logical contradiction. Two conflicting
norms may be equally valid in a legal system; therefore, two conflicting nor-
mative propositions (Sollsätze, descriptive propositions about norms) may be

true in the same time5. This is a major move by Kelsen away from what he
3 “Sceptical” should not be understood here as referring to so-called “rule-scepticism”, i. e. the thesis ac-
cording to which rules can never guide behaviour. Although Kelsen has sometimes been understood as
somehow paving the way for an interpretation-centred rule-scepticism, it is not what is at stake here – see,
on such an understanding, Michel Troper, La Théorie du droit, le droit, l’Etat, 2001, 67 ff.; Riccardo Guastini,
Rule-Scepticism Restated, in: Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law Volume 1, ed. Leslie Green / Brian Leiter,
2011, 138 ff.; for a critique, see Christoph Kletzer, Kelsen’s Development of the Fehlerkalkül-Theory, Ratio
Juris 18 (2005), 53. The later Kelsen is sometimes dubbed sceptical because of his newfound stance that
there are no logical relations between norms (Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Norms (trans. M. Hartney),
1991, 189–193), or at least that norms are subject neither to the principle of non-contradiction nor to rules
of inference; but as Bruno Celano notes, Kelsen has to grant that at least some logical relations between
norms may exist (see Bruno Celano, Norm-Conflicts: Kelsen’s View in the Late Period and a Rejoinder, in:
Normativity and Norms, ed. Stanley Paulson / Bonnie Litschewski-Paulson, 1998, 345 ff.).
4 In what follows, I will use all those terms as broadly synonymous. Kelsen himself argues that the classical
distinction between abrogation (as total repeal) and derogation (a partial repeal) is mistaken, due to a
failure to appreciate the importance of (1). See Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Norms, 111–112. Therefore, I
will use the three words interchangeably. I must warn at the outset that in my own native language, French,
“derogation” does not mean the suppression of a norm, or of the validity thereof, from a normative system;
rather it means the creation of an exception in an individual case (as in “accorder une dérogation”, which
means roughly “to grant an exception”). When one uses the word “dérogation” in French, it is obvious to any
speaker that what is at stake is not a validity problem, but rather a momentary non-application of a norm.
Since I will argue that what is at stake in most normative conflicts is a matter of applicability and not of
validity, I shall make it clear that I will only use “derogation” in the technical meaning defined above, lest I
am accused of begging the question by using a French-infested notion of “derogation”.
5 Indeed, the downside of this conception is that two conflicting normative propositions (i. e. descriptive
propositions about norms) may be true in the same time. Depending on whether normative propositions
describe the norm-content or the norm’s validity, such a claim may entail very unfortunate consequences.
Kelsen himself does not seem to choose between the two functions of normative propositions, although
he only mentions propositions about validity (See Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Norms, 164). As Kelsen
shows (Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Norms, 223) statements about the validity / existence of the conflict-
ing norms are not contradictories: if p = there is a valid norm to the effect that that it is obligatory that P and
q = there is a valid norm to the effect that it is forbidden that P, since q ≠ ~ p, p and q are not contradictories.
Whether such statements of validity amount to statements of fact will not be discussed here (see generally

Kelsen on Derogation and Normative Conflicts 127
wrote just two years before in the second edition of the Pure Theory of Law: “A
conflict of norms is just as meaningless as a logical contradiction”6. In “Dero-
gation”, Kelsen claims that when two descriptive propositions contradict each
other, one of them is false from the outset, whereas in the case of a conflict of
norms, both norms are valid until one is repealed – or both are.
(3) Metarules (such as, per Kelsen, Lex Posterior7) are not logical principles but
positive legal norms8.
And here are the main flaws and shortcomings of Kelsen’s new theory:
(4) Kelsen’s classification of normative conflicts is clumsy at best. It confuses two
distinct problems: the conflict’s scope (regarding the classes of cases covered
by the norm’s antecedent) and the conflict’s nature (regarding the deontic fea-
tures of the norm’s consequent).
(5) More importantly, due to a confused notion of legal validity, Kelsen could not
take himself to apply (2) above to conflicts arising between norms of different
ranks within the normative hierarchy. Just a few paragraphs after writing that a
conflict between two norms does not entail anything about either norm’s va-
lidity, Kelsen writes that in the case of “unconstitutional statutes” “no conflict
exists”. This is due to a confusion made by Kelsen (and many others) between
validity as membership (of a norm within a legal system) and validity as con-
formity with higher ranking norms, including those prescribing the procedure
by which lower-ranking norms are to be created. More on this later.
(6) Although Kelsen’s formulation on this matter is quite ambiguous9, he seems
to believe that the only solution to a normative conflict is through repeal and
Carlos E. Alchourrón / Eugenio Bulygin, The Expressive Conception of Norms, in: Normativity and Norms,
ed. Stanley Paulson / Bonnie Litschewski-Paulson, 1998, 383 ff.). On the other hand, if normative proposi-
tions describe the norm-content, the description of a normative conflict necessarily yields two contradicto-
ry descriptive statements: if p = “it is forbidden to phi” and q = “it is not forbidden to phi”, then p and q are
contradictory. The same goes for r = “it is obligatory to phi” since r → q according to the axiom D of standard
deontic logic. Kelsen’s new tenet that the principle of non-contradiction does not hold for norms entails that
it does not hold any more for descriptive propositions about the content of norms.
6 Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (2nd ed., trans. Max Knight), 1967, 206; Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre,
1960, 210.
7 For reasons soon to be obvious, Kelsen refers only to Lex Posterior, and sets aside Lex Superior and Lex
Specialis.
8 For an overview of Kelsen’s shifting positions throughout his lifetime, see Stanley L. Paulson, On the
status of the Lex Posterior Derogating Rule, Liverpool Law Review 5 (1983), 5–18.
9 Kelsen writes: “The conflict can, but need not be, solved by derogation” (Hans Kelsen, Derogation, 271).
There are two ways to understand this sentence: on the first reading, Kelsen means that conflicts can be left
unsolved, but that when they are solved, the solution is always derogation; on the second reading, Kelsen
means that conflicts can be solved by derogation, but may also be solved through other means. Context in-
dicates that the first interpretation is correct as an exegetical matter – although I will argue that, as a matter
of fact, Kelsen should have meant the second one.

that metarules are “norms which regulate derogation” (in the sense of repeal).
But this is clearly not the case as a matter of empirical fact. Judges often solve
normative conflicts without altering the validity of either norm.
(7) Even if we grant that metarules are “norms which are about derogation” –
which I am going to argue is not the case – there still remains an ambiguity
regarding what they actually do. On one interpretation, they are (pro futuro)
derogating norms. For instance, Lex Posterior means: “whenever a conflict oc-
curs, the prior norm ceases to be valid whenever the posterior norm becomes
valid”. On another interpretation, they are norms regulating derogation, that is,
power-conferring norms giving some officials (e. g. judges) the power to repeal
one of the two conflicting norms (or both).
In this paper, I will try to vindicate propositions (1)–(3) while showing that most of
the shortcomings of (4)–(7) can be avoided. Throughout, my claims will not be exe-
getical in nature; my aim is to offer a conceptual and critical reconstruction of Kelsen’s
later views, by trying to build a coherent picture of normative conflicts on what I be-
lieve are correct intuitions on Kelsen’s part.
My main claim is that normative conflicts are a matter of applicability, not validity,
and that metarules are not norms of derogation but norms of (in)applicability, even
if some legal systems also empower certain law-applying organs to repeal one of the
conflicting norms (or both). The paper is comprised of four parts. In the first part, I
will propose a tentative and incomplete classification of normative conflicts; in the
second part I will try to adumbrate the distinction between validity and applicability;
in the third part, I will show that metarules are norms of applicability, beginning with
Lex posterior. This claim vindicates Kelsen’s intuition that Lex Posterior is a positive
law norm and not a logical principal and in the same time rebuts his tenet that the only
way to deal with normative conflicts is through derogation. In the last part I will try to
show that the same holds for Lex Superior, against Kelsen’s clear and trenchant claims
to the contrary.
I. Types of Normative Conflicts
Let us assume that legal norms (and perhaps other norms as well) are conditional
norms. A conditional norm has the following structure: a factual antecedent specify-
ing the norm’s scope, that is, the properties of the generic or individual case regulated
by the norm; a normative consequent (or as Alchourrón and Bulygin would put it,
a normative solution), prescribing the behaviour to be adopted when the antecedent
is instantiated; and between the two a logical link (a conditional) which I will leave

non-specified10. In that perspective, categorical norms are conditional norms whose

antecedent is T, i. e. whatever tautology. This presentation of legal norms as condition-
al norms11 leaves unanswered the question of the individuation of norms. I shall not try
to defend any theory of norm-individuation here.
A crucial distinction has to be made between, on the one hand, the nature of a nor-
mative conflict, i. e. the ways two norms may conflict with each other, and, on the oth-
er hand, the scope of the normative conflict, i. e., the classes or subclasses or cases in
which the conflict actually occurs.
A. Contradiction, contrariety, incompatibility
The conflict occurs when the normative consequents of both conflicting norms cannot
be applied in the same time. Contrary to a persistent misconception, the criterion of

a normative conflict is not that both norms cannot be obeyed at the same time12. As a
matter of fact, what I will call normative contradiction is about two conflicting norms
which can both be obeyed. However, they cannot both be applied in the same timeby
law-applying organs: a law-applying organ cannot use both norms to justify its deci-
sion. If we were to say that norms conflict only when they fail to motivate behaviour,
we would reduce norms to motivational reasons. Here I will primarily take norms as
providing justificatory reasons for action. If you disagree with that, it does not matter
terribly, since it is rather a side issue for the present purposes.
There are three kinds of normative conflicts13.
The first kind of normative conflict can be called normative contrariety. In such a
case, the conflict involves two normative solutions with the same deontic operator and
opposite internal negations: for instance, OA (it is obligatory to do A) and O~A (it is
10 Here I will not elaborate on the problems that representing that link as the material implication (wheth-
er internal or external) creates (see on this Mathieu Carpentier, Norme et exception Essai sur la défaisabilité
en droit, 2014, 92–106). Neither will I ask here whether normative conflicts – and, more specifically, the kind
of normative conflict which is called in the literature “defeasibility” – call for a specific, defeasible condi-
tional. On this, see for instance, Mathieu Carpentier, Norme et exception, 268–281. For the present purposes,
I shall assume that all these problems have already been settled, one way or another.
11 Which is endorsed by Kelsen himself, see Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, 100.
12 A pathbreaking analysis in this respect is H. Hamner Hill, A functional taxonomy of normative conflict,
Law and Philosophy 6 (1987), 227 ff.
13 This typology borrows a lot from H. Hamner Hill (footnote 12), and also Stephen Munzer, Validity and
Legal Conflicts, Yale Law Journal 82 (1973), 1041–1043 and Risto Hilpinen, Normative conflicts and Legal
Reasoning, in: Man, Law and Modern Forms of Life, ed. Eugenio Bulygin / Jean-Louis Gardies / Ikka Niinu-
luoto, 1985, 195). However, neither Munzer nor Hilpinen consider what I call normative incompatibility,
and they both write about normative subcontrariety (PA and P~A) which does not strike me as involving
a genuine normative conflict (which Hilpinen candidly acknowledges). The very distinction between nor-
mative contrariety and contradiction, which I share with Hilpinen and Munzer, can already be found in
Jeremy Bentham, Of Laws in General, 1970, 110–111.

obligatory not to do A), which is the same as ~PA. Those solutions are deontic contra-
ries. In such a case, both norms cannot be obeyed in the same time14.
The second kind of normative conflict can be called normative contradiction: here
again we have two normative solutions with the same deontic operator but opposite
external negations: for instance, OA (it is obligatory to do A) and ~OA (it is not oblig-
atory to do A), which is the same as P~A. Obviously such a conflict does not involve
a motivational conflict. One can obey both norms, simply by doing A. You cannot be
said to have disobeyed a norm which permits you not to help your neighbour if you
do in fact help your neighbour, unless, of course there is also a norm forbidding you to
help your neighbour, which ex hypothesi is not the case here (if it were we would have
a case of normative contrariety, not contradiction). So, both norms can be obeyed.
However, both norms cannot simultaneously justify one’s behaviour. If a norm forbids
you to steal and another one authorizes you to steal, a judge who has to apply both is
faced with a genuine dilemma.

The third kind of normative conflict can be called normative incompatibility15 It in-
volves two actions A and B which can only be described by two incompatible propo-
sitions. Two propositions p and q are incompatible if and only if they cannot both be
true, but they can both be false: p and q are incompatible iff p ^ q is always false and it is
false that ~(~p^~q). It means that although p →~q and q →~p, it isn’t the case the p↔~q
nor that q↔~p, because it is not the case that ~p→q nor that ~q→p. Two actions can be
called incompatible if they can be described by two incompatible propositions. For
instance: it is obligatory that all houses are entirely paint in white and it is obligatory that
all houses are entirely paint in blue. Such norms are incompatible. Normative incompat-
ibilities break into two distinct subclasses, according to the kind of deontic operator at
stake. For any two incompatible actions A and B, there is a normative contradiction-in-
compatibility when OA and PB (or ~O~B) and there is a normative contrariety-in-
compatibility when OA and OB.
What is the point of distinguishing normative incompatibility (and its two sub-
classes) from normative contradiction and contrariety? When two actions A and B
are incompatible, it is not the case that ~A→B (and vice versa). Therefore, even though
14 According to Lars Lindahl, Conflicts in Systems of Legal Norms: A logical point of View, in: Coherence
and Conflict in Law, ed. Bob W. Brouwer / Ton Hol / Arend Soeteman / Willem van der Velden / Arie de
Wild, 1992, 39, only normative contrarieties are genuine normative conflicts since only them cannot be
simultaneously obeyed. But as I have hinted, I will consider normative conflicts as involving not only con-
flicting motivations, but also, and mainly, conflicting normative justifications. I would add that what some
normative incompatibilities (see infra) also involve conflicting motivations.
15 Such cases are not to be confused with what Uta Bindreiter calls “normative incompatibility”, which
is what happens when obeying simultaneously both norms is materially possible but is morally – or oth-
erwise normatively – subject to blame. (See Uta Bindreiter, Why Grundnorm?, 2000, 139–141). Bindreiter
also refers to what he calls empirical incompatibility, when there is an empirical impossibility to perform
both actions: for instance: you ought to work from noon to midnight; you ought to work from midnight to noon.
Neither cases are normative conflicts for the purpose of this paper.

A→~B, O~A^O~B is not a normative conflict, whereas O~A^O~~A is a normative

conflict: it is a normative contrariety. If it is forbidden to paint one’s house in white
and not to paint one’s house in white, we have a normative contrariety; if it is forbidden
to paint one’s house in white and to paint one’s house in blue, there is no normative
conflict whatsoever. Just paint your house in pink or in purple.
This triple (or even quadruple) distinction between contrariety, contradiction and
incompatibility is indeed schematic. It does not account for a certain type of norma-
tive conflicts which are not predicated on the classical deontic modalities (permission,
prohibition, obligation). For instance, it does not prove useful in case of a conflict be-
tween two power-conferring norms16.
B. The Scope of Normative Conflicts

Normative conflicts do not always occur in all cases. They occur modulo the facts spec-
ified in the norm antecedent. Therefore, conflicts differ in their scope.
Here I will use (and marginally modify) Alf Ross’ famous classification of norma-
tive conflicts in On Law and Justice17. He distinguishes between three kinds of conflicts
in what concerns their scope.
The first kind is what Ross calls total (or, more precisely, total-total) conflicts, when
the sets of cases X and Y regulated by both norms are identical. For instance: for every
x, if x is a vehicle, it is forbidden for x to enter the park; for every x, if x is a vehicle, it is per-
mitted for x to enter the park.
The second kind is what Ross calls total-partial conflicts, when the set of cases X reg-
ulated by one norm is a subset of the set of cases regulated Y by the other. The conflict
occurs only when an instantiation of X obtains, and not when other cases belonging to
Y but not to X obtain. For instance, for every x, if x is a vehicle, it is forbidden for x to enter
the park; for every x, if x is an on-duty ambulance, it is permitted for x to enter the park.
The third kind is what Ross calls partial (or, more precisely, partial-partial) conflicts
when the set of cases X regulated by one norm intersects with the set of cases Y reg-
ulated by the other norm (a non-normative example of such a conflict is the famous
Nixon Diamond used in most systems of non-monotonic logic). The conflict occurs
only when an instantiation of X∩Y occurs; it does not in other instantiations or X nor
16 See for instance what Lindahl and Reidhav call “capacitative conflicts” (Lars Lindahl and David Reidhav,
Conflict of Legal Norms: Definition and Varieties, in: Logic in the Theory and Practice of Lawmaking, ed.
Michał Araszkiewicz / Krzysztof Płeszka, 2015, 49 ff.).
17 Alf Ross, On Law and Justice, 1958, 129. For a recent formalisation of Ross’s taxonomy, see Abdullatif
Elhag / Joost Breuker / Bob Brouwer, On the Formal Analysis of Normative Conflicts, in: Legal Knowledge
Based Systems (JURIX ’99), ed. Jaap van den Herik, 1999, 37–38.

Y. To borrow an example from Jorge Luis Rodriguez18: if the light is red, one should stop
one’s vehicle; if one is driving through a military zone, one should not stop one’s vehicle.
This classification seems correct. I will add a caveat however. In cases of partial-par-
tial conflicts, no specificity-based criterion of conflict-resolution (such as Lex Specialis)
can be used, because none of the conflicting norms is “more special” than the other.
Or so Ross claimed19. It is however a bit more complicated than that. In most legal sys-
tems, what seems to be a prima facie partial-partial conflict will often be transformed in
total-partial conflict due to certain (conscious or unconscious) interpretative assump-
tions. Consider the two following norms. N1: For every x, if x wilfully causes the death of
another human being, x shall be punished with thirty years in prison N2: For every x, if x is
suffering from a psychological disorder and commits a crime, x shall not be punished Now
it seems that what we have here is a partial-partial conflict, which cannot be solved
using Lex Specialis. However, most lawyers share an interpretative assumption of spec-
ificity which operates in favour of N2. Either they presuppose an additional norm N3:
whoever commits a crime shall be punished, in which case there is a total-partial conflict
between N2 and N3; or they conceive N2 as being not a single norm, but the sum of a
great number of specific norms, such as N2’: For every x, if x is suffering from a psycho-
logical disorder and commits murder, N2’’: For every x, if x is suffering from a psychological
disorder and commits theft, etc , in which case there is a total-partial conflict between
N2’ and N1.
This is why Lex Specialis applies even in cases where the conflict at hand looks like a
partial-partial one, due to some specificity assumption.
C. What About Kelsen’s Own Classification?
In “Derogation”20 and in General Theory of Norms21, Kelsen worked out a theory of nor-
mative conflicts which rests on a specific typology. Conflicts are distinguished accord-
ing to whether they are “necessary” or “possible”, “bilateral” or “unilateral”, and “total”
or “partial”. I have criticized this classification elsewhere, and I will not rehearse my
arguments here22. Suffice it to say that it is riddled with confusions, insofar as it fails to
distinguish between the nature of a conflict and the scope thereof.
For instance, the notion of a necessary conflict rests on considerations about the
conflict’s scope: a conflict is necessary when it occurs in every case, whereas it is
18 Jorge Luis Rodríguez, Contradicciones Normativas. Jaque a la concepción deductivista de los sistemas
jurídicos, Doxa 17/18 (1995) 372.
19 Alf Ross, On Law and Justice, 131.
20 Hans Kelsen, Derogation, 269
21 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Norms, 123 ff.
22 See Mathieu Carpentier, Norme et exception, 228–230.

merely possible when it occurs only on some cases. The notion of a bilateral conflicts
deals with the presence of a conflict “on the side” of the norm: in what Ross calls a
total-partial conflict, the conflict is necessary on the side of the special norm, and
merely possible on the side of the general norm. The problem with such a classifica-
tion is that what Kelsen calls an “unilateral” conflict is not a conflict at all. His exam-
ple of such a “conflict” is the following: “Norm 1: Murder is to be punished by death,
if the murderer is over 20 years of age. Norm 2: Murder is to be punished by death, if
the murderer is over 18 years of age”. There is no conflict on the side of Norm 1, but
according to Kelsen there is a possible conflict on the side of Norm 2 (since Norm 2
may entail the punishment of a 19-year-old murderer for instance). Whatever prob-
lems are raised by the formalization of conditional norms, it is common ground that
the antecedent of a norm is a sufficient condition of the realization of the consequent.
But Kelsen’s notion of a unilateral conflict rests on a more robust conception of con-
ditional norms, which is predicated on the antecedent being a necessary condition as

well. There is a conflict between Norm 1 and Norm 2 only if Norm 1 is reinterpreted
as “Norm 1a: Murder is to be punished by death, if and only if the murderer is over 20
years of age”. Norm 1a implies Norm 1b: “If it is not the case that the murderer is over
20 years of age, then murder is not to be punished by death” which then (and only
then) conflicts with Norm 2. It is what Ross calls a partial-partial conflict, since the
class of cases about murderers over 18 intersects with the class of cases about murder-
ers under 20. But if Norm 1 expresses only a sufficient condition, there is no conflict
since the same normative solutions is applied to two classes of cases one of which is
included in the other. There is no conflict between Norm 1 and Norm 2, not any more
than between Norm 3: “If one owns farm animals, one ought to pay a tax” and Norm
4: “If one owns a cow, one ought to pay a tax”.
To sum up: Kelsen’s classification of conflicts is flawed; hence I will use the classifi-
cation elaborated above instead of Kelsen’s, however partial and incomplete it may be.
II. A Few Words on the Validity / Applicability Distinction
It is well known that Kelsen defines validity as the specific mode of existence of norms23.
This definition rests on an assimilation of the norm’s existence with its bindingness.
There exists a norm to the effect that one ought to φ if and only if it is the case that one
23 On this, see (among an extensive literature), Dick W. P. Ruiter, Legal validity qua specific mode of ex-
istence, Law and Philosophy 16 (1997), 479–505; Carlos S. Nino, Confusions surrounding Kelsen’s concept
of validity, in: Normativity and Norms, ed. Stanley Paulson / Bonnie Litschewski-Paulson, 1998, 255 ff.; An-
dras Jakab, Problems of the Stufenbaulehre. Kelsen’s Failure to Derive the Validity of a Norm from Another
Norm, Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 10 (2007), 35–68. A very clear introduction can be found
in Clemens Jabloner, Der Rechtsbegriff bei Hans Kelsen, in: Rechtstheorie: Rechtsbegriff – Dynamik – Ausle-
gung, ed. Stefan Griller / Heinz Peter Rill, 2011, 24 ff.

ought to φ. A norm’s existence coincides with the duty to obey it. Such a conception
of validity may be labelled a strong conception of validity. It can be contrasted with a
weak notion of validity which treats validity as a matter of membership of a norm within
a normative system. According to the weak conception, a norm exists only if it belongs
to a normative system. A legal norm exists if and only if it belongs to a legal system. The
notion of membership is useful insofar as it has no stakes in the ontological question
of what makes a norm exist qua norm. In that sense, legal validity, understood as mem-
bership within a legal system, is what endows a norm with its legal character – i. e. what
makes it exist qua law –, regardless of what makes it exist qua norm in the absolute. It
answers the question: why is it the law that one ought to φ? And it sets aside the quite
trickier question: what makes it the case that one ought to φ? On the weak conception,
a legal system uses a set of criteria of membership which will be picked out by a specific
rule or set of rules. This is roughly the Hartian notion of a rule of recognition, and it is
quite remote from the Kelsenian conception of validity as bindingness (although Kels-
en occasionally comes close to using “validity” in the weak sense24).
On the weak conception, derogation is merely about the suppression of a norm’s
membership, and it does not bear on other dimensions of what is usually called “va-
lidity”. Indeed, a weak notion of validity allows us to distinguish membership from
applicability.
The notion of applicability in contemporary jurisprudential literature (flowing
mainly from Eugenio Bulygin’s seminal work25) is a reinterpretation of the notion of
bindingness, severed from the membership dimension of normative validity. The ap-
plicability of a legal norm is to be understood as the duty (or power) that a law-apply-
ing organ has to apply it. As Bulygin has shown, a norm’s applicability is contingent on
the legal system containing norms of applicability, i. e. norms which regulate the way
other norms ought to be applied. Such norms of applicability regulate not only norms
of the legal system but norms belonging to other normative (not necessarily legal) sys-
tems as well. Norms of applicability come in various types. They may be general norms
meant to be applied to a vast range of norms: for instance, the nullum crimen principle
and the principle of retroactivity in mitius are such general norms of applicability. They
also may be particular norms regulating the applicability of a specific norm or set of
24 For instance, Kelsen writes: “Why does a certain norm belong to a certain order? And this question
is closely tied to the question: Why is a norm valid, what is the reason for its validity” (Hans Kelsen, Pure
Theory of Law, 193). In the German original text: “warum gehört eine bestimmte Norm zu einer bestimmten
Ordnung? Und diese Frage steht in einem engen Zusammenhang mit der Frage: Warum gilt eine Norm,
was ist ihr Geltungsgrund?” (Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 196). However, Kelsen is clear that “closely
tied” is not the same as “equivalent”. And in the following paragraph, Kelsen does equate validity with
bindingness (Verbindlichkeit).
25 See mainly Eugenio Bulygin, Time and Validity, in: Essays in Legal Philosophy, ed. Carlos Bernal et al.,
2015, 171–187.

norms: for instance, the section of a statute which deals with the statute’s own “entry
into force”.
Applicability thus understood is a kind of bindingness. In order to grasp the dif-
ference between applicability and membership, we can go back to the Ross/Kelsen
debate on validity. As Alf Ross showed in a famous article26, a distinction must be made
between a legal norm’s bindingness and a legal obligation. For instance, legally you
may not kill or steal. Legally a judge may not refuse to adjudicate a matter brought
before her. Those are legal statements, referring to legal obligations (or rather prohibi-
tions). Bindingness, on the other hand, must be understood as a duty to obey. As Ross
astutely noticed, there is no legal obligation to obey the law. There only is a legal obli-
gation or permission to φ. This is why Ross dismissed Kelsen’s conception of validity
as bindingness as hopelessly infected with some natural law disease. An obligation to
obey the law cannot be legal; it must be a moral obligation.
As Bulygin observed27, the nexus of Ross’s objection to Kelsen’s notion of validity

is that it ultimately rests on an absolute conception of bindingness: absolute binding-
ness means that a norm is binding on its own (moral) merits. However, the notion
of applicability reveals a thoroughly relative conception of bindingness, which allows
for a specifically legal kind of bindingness: courts are vested with a duty (or at least a
power) to apply legal norms, which is grounded in other legal norms, which Bulygin
calls norms of applicability. When we say that laws are binding on judges we do not
mean that they have a duty to obey, but rather a duty to apply. Legal norms are legally
binding when a certain set of officials is under the duty to apply them. This kind of
bindingness is strictly legal, since it is predicated on the existence of a specific set of
legal norms.
The distinction between membership and bindingness understood as applicability28
is not necessarily incompatible with Kelsen’s general outlook since it does not say an-
ything about the question of absolute bindingness. And it is able to account for legal
complexities that the mere identification of validity with bindingness cannot allow.
For instance, it allows us to account for situations where applicability and member-
ship are somehow disjoined. In cases of vacatio legis, the norm belongs to the legal
system (which is proven by the fact that normative operations such as amendment
or derogation are possible in the interim) but it is not yet applicable: though it is not
26 Alf Ross, Validity and the Conflict between Positivism and Natural Law, in: Normativity and Norms, ed.
Stanley Paulson / Bonnie Litschewski-Paulson, 1998, 153.
27 Eugenio Bulygin, The Problem of Legal Validity in Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law, in: Essays in Legal Phi-
losophy, ed. Carlos Bernal et al., 321.
28 I have raised doubts about this distinction in Mathieu Carpentier, Validity versus Applicability: a
(Small) Dose of Scepticism, Diritto & Questioni Pubbliche, 18 (2018), 107–132. However, my doubts do not
as much bear on the correctness of the conceptual distinction itself as they are concerned with the poor
heuristic value of the notion of “mere membership”.

quite normatively inert29 in the meantime, judges and other officials have no duty to
apply them. This shows that membership is not a sufficient condition of applicability.
Conversely, it is not a necessary condition either: a judge is sometime bound to apply
a foreign legal norm when a choice-of-law rule directs her to do so. And in cases of
normative post-activity, a judge is sometimes bound to apply a norm to a set of cases
which occurred after the removal of the norm from the legal system.
III. Metarules as Norms of Applicability
My claim in the present paper is that metarules are norms of applicability. I will first
show it using the very metarule Kelsen focuses on: Lex posterior. Following the dis-
tinction sketched out in (7) above, I will try to show that Lex posterior is neither a pro
futuro derogating norm, nor a power-conferring norm regulating derogation.
A. Meta-rules are not pro futuro derogating norms
Derogation is a central feature of legal systems. A legal authority could not properly
discharge her job or fulfil her function if she were not able to cancel past pronounce-
ments made by her predecessors or by herself. It would be difficult to conceive a legal
system close to the ones we know, and work with, that would not have such a feature.
Derogation is a specific normative function, as Kelsen pointed out. A derogating norm
has the sole effect of removing the norm from the legal system; that is, because the leg-
islature enacted the relevant norm, a previous norm disappears from the legal system.
Derogation is what allows a legal system to change; it is a function of what Hart called
the “rules of change” of a given legal system30, which empower lawmakers to repeal
earlier las and to make new ones.
It is tempting to think that this is the kind of process which is captured by the max-
im Lex posterior derogate a priori31. However, I will argue that Lex Posterior captures
another kind of situation. Indeed, it should be stressed out that there is no conflict be-
tween a derogating norm and the norm it derogates. If Lex Posterior is to play the role
of a metarule allowing officials to solve a normative conflict that, it makes no sense to
argue that it should be used when a norm derogates another. On the contrary, Lex Pos-
terior, qua metarule, deals with situations where a norm is neither a derogating norm,
29 Mathieu Carpentier, Validity versus Applicability: a (Small) Dose of Scepticism, 122.

30 On which see infra.
31 See e. g. Jörg Kammerhofer, Uncertainty in International Law, 2011, 157–158: “it seems obvious how the
problem of change is a problem of norm-conflict, what is being argued is the reverse, namely that change in
law presupposes the lex posterior maxim”.

nor a compound of norms one of which being a derogating norm, yet it conflicts with
a previous norm of the legal system32.
From here, one of the easiest moves is to claim that Lex posterior itself is a derogat-
ing norm: whenever two norms conflicts, Lex posterior derogates the prior norm. This
is the view Kelsen seems to espouse, both in “Derogation” and in the General Theory of
Norms: derogation is “the function of (…) a positive legal norm; this norm [Lex Poste-
rior] is not one of the two conflicting norms but a third norm which specifies that one
of the two conflicting norms loses its validity, or that both norms lose their validity”33.
This view leads to a theory of implied repeal. Due to norm A (Lex posterior), whenever
norm B conflicts with posterior norm C, then B is not valid, and is thereby repealed
whenever C becomes valid34. When we say that C impliedly repealed B, what we mean
is that B is repealed by Lex posterior itself.
Kelsen maintains that this a matter of positive law, not logical truth. He is right in
that respect. However, this picture is not without problems in other respects.
First, it happens that metarules conflict one with another. Whenever the posterior
norm is more general than the earlier norm, there is a conflict between Lex posterior
and Lex specialis35. For instance, let us suppose that, due to norm N1, vehicles have
permission to enter the park between 6PM and 6AM, and they are forbidden to do so
between 6AM and 6 PM. Then, let us say that a norm N2 is enacted to the effect that
ambulances on duty are allowed in the park at all times and that a few months later a
norm N3 is enacted to the effect that N1 is derogated and vehicles are banned from
the park at all times. Does Lex posterior or Lex specialis apply? Which of these two
metarules ought to prevail? It is plain that N3 derogates N1 insofar as N1 permits cars
32 This I take to be Kelsenian orthodoxy. See Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Norms, 108. See also on the
same idea Giovanni Battista Ratti, Negation in Legislation, in: Logic in the Theory and Practice of Lawmaking,
ed. Michał Araszkiewicz / Krzysztof Płeszka, 2015, 147, who accepts this picture but admits that “it is inter-
esting to observe that, strictly speaking, no act of derogation is carried out here”.
33 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Norms, 125 (see also Hans Kelsen, Derogation, 273).
34 Kelsen would accept, I think, that this picture is oversimplified. Norm B may remain applicable however
repealed by C if C is due for entry into force at a later date. But it does not affect the basic point made by
Kelsen here.
35 In cases of total-partial conflicts Lex specialis seems particularly well suited to resolve the conflict, for
instance by creating an exception. It may seem strange to claim that creating an exception derogates, that is
repeals, the rule from which it is excepted; in other words, it seems strange to conceive Lex specialis as a
derogating norm. However, it is plain that if Lex Specialis is a derogating norm, it is only insofar as it der-
ogates the general norm pro tanto. What is derogated from the legal system is not the defeated norm, but
som” logical consequence of that norm (on the idea of legal systems are deductively closed, insofar as they
comprise not only valid norms but also the logical consequences thereof, see Carlos E. Alchourrón / Euge-
nio Bulygin, Normative Systems, 1971, 185; Carlos E. Alchourrón / Eugenio Bulygin, Análisis lógico y Derecho,
1991, 129, 163, 219…). In the context of a discussion of defeasibility and implicit exceptions, J. Ferrer Beltran
and G. B. Ratti have recently made a case for this notion of exception as pro tanto derogation (see Jordi
Ferrer Beltran, Giovanni Battista Ratti, Validity and Defeasibility in the Legal Domain, Law and Philosophy
29 (2010), 601–626). I will not have the time to study this theory in detail; suffice it to say that I intend to
defend a contrarian view in the present paper.

to enter the park between 6AM and 6PM. But does N3 “implicitly” (or “impliedly”)
derogates N2 as well? (to reformulate: does Lex Posterior derogates N2 as well?) Or is
it the case that N2 is still valid, and that N3 is “impliedly” derogated by Lex specialis
insofar as it prohibits ambulances on duty? If both metarules are derogating norms36,
this conflict of metarules entails that N2 and N3-insofar-as-it-covers-ambulances are
both valid and invalid. This seems rather unfortunate. On the other side, the idea of a
conflict of norms of applicability is much more appealing since it is common-sensical
that a judge can be subject to two conflicting duties.
Another defect with the view of metarules as derogating norms is that in such a con-
ception metarules (that is, per Kelsen, mainly Lex Posterior) play the same role in the
positive law conception of normative conflicts than in the logical conception, which
Kelsen once espoused before rejecting it at a later stage, as proposition (2) above has
shown. Under the logical conception, when two norms conflict, it is impossible that
both be valid in the same time, so it must be the case that one of them ceases to be
valid. So if Kelsen’s new stance is that although it is not a logical necessity, it is always
the case that a normative conflict produces derogation as all legal system have a Lex
posterior metarules as part of their positive law, one cannot see clearly what is gained
in Kelsen’s new view and why it should be deemed ground-breaking. Once we dis-
tinguish between membership and applicability, we can understand how a norm may
cease to operate due to some normative conflicts without being forced to draw the
conclusion that it stops belonging to the normative system.
A third defect is that such a conception of metarules in general, and Lex Posterior
in particular, does not fit with some of our basic intuitions about what is commonly
called – in UK law for instance – “implied repeal”, which, it turns out, is not about re-
peal at all. The very fact that judges use Lex Posterior shows that there is a conflict in
the first place, and that the conflict has not been pre-emptively solved by an implicit re-
peal. If there is a conflict to be solved, then there is a conflict in the first place. Moreover,
if there is a conflict between N1 and N2 (N2 having been enacted at a later time than
N1) and if N2 is itself repealed by a subsequent repealing norm N3, then the earlier law
N1 becomes applicable again, without any further act from the lawmaker37 (whereas in
cases of derogation, it is commonly admitted that the derogation of a derogating norm
does not reinstate the norm that was derogated in the first place). Interpreting that
repealing norm, to wit N3, as not only abrogating N2, but also as somewhat implicitly
“re-enacting” N1 seems quite a heavy price to pay. Therefore, Lex Posterior is best un-
36 I set aside the hypothesis that Lex specialis and Lex posterior do not discharge the same function. I will
say more about this at the end of this paper.
37 As Jeffrey Goldsworthy (who writes about the UK doctrine of implied repeal) puts it : “The inconsistent
provisions of the earlier statute are not, as it were, expunged from the statute book: if the later statute were
to be formally repealed, the earlier one should be fully revived” ( Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Parliamentary Sover-
eignty: Contemporary Debates, 2010, 289).

derstood as a norm of applicability directed at legal officials, and mainly law-applying

organs. It directs officials not to apply the earlier of two conflicting norms.
One last point. As Kelsen observed38, in some legal systems Lex Posterior coexists
with Lex Prior, according to which the earlier of the two conflicting norms is repealed
in case of a conflict. For instance, in the UK, the doctrine of “constitutional statutes”
asserts that when a statute is of constitutional significance, the doctrine of implied re-
peal cannot be used to solve conflicts with later statutory norms. Instead, the courts
ought to disapply posterior statutory norms which conflict with constitutional statutes
insofar as they clash with them39. But it would make little sense to claim that the later
norm is repealed in the process, unless we are ready to be committed to the idea of a
norm’s nullity (rather than its annullability): the later norm would then never exist in
the legal system, even though it was duly passed and enacted. This is not a conceptual
impossibility, but it does sound counter-intuitive. Indeed, if the idea of Lex posterior
as a derogating rule is attractive, it is because of the intuition I mentioned in the begin-

ning of the present section: a future legislator must be able to change past legislation.
As there is “explicit repeal”, there should be “implied” repeal when none of the con-
flicting norms are derogating norms. But as soon as we notice that Lex prior cannot be
reasonably described as operating this way, we can have doubts about the derogating
function of Lex posterior itself.
B. Meta-rules are not power-conferring norms regulating derogation
As we saw in (6) there is another option on the table: we can analyse metarules as rules
regulating derogation. On such a conception, meta-rules are norms empowering a cer-
tain subset of officials to repeal whichever of the two conflicting norms is defeated. Let
us examine this view in further detail.
First, a basic distinction between law-creating and law-applying organs should be
assumed40. Such an assumption will not be disputed here, however debatable it may be.
There is no doubt that law-creating organs are empowered to derogate earlier norms.
That’s part of the very notion of normative empowerment. But again, Lex Posterior,
and metarules in general, do not apply to derogating norms enacted by the lawmaker
38 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Norms, 126.

39 See the opinion by Lord Justice Laws in Thoburn v Sunderland City Council, [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin).
This doctrine has recently been espoused by the Supreme Court: see H v The Lord Advocate, [2012] UKSC
24; R (HS2 Action Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport, [2014] UKSC 3. See also, for an audacious
use of the notion of “constitutional statutes” (although it does not concern the implied repeal doctrine) R
(on the application of Miller and another) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, [2017] UKSC 5.
40 See on this distinction Paolo Sandro’s important new book, The Creation and Application of Law: A
Neglected Distinction, 2020 (forthcoming).

itself: it is agreed that law-creating organs are empowered to repeal norms from the
legal system, because it is what lawmakers do.
In the view discussed here, law-applying organs, which have to deal with normative
conflicts, are empowered to repeal the norm which is defeated due to the application of
a meta-rule, sometimes with retroactive effect. Thus understood, meta-rules empower
judges and other officials to derogate, that is suppress the norm from the legal system.
I am not sure such an interpretation is consistent with what Kelsen has to say about
Lex posterior. However, as we shall see in the next section, the idea that one of the
conflicting norms is resolved through derogation by a certain organ other than the law-
maker is essential in the way Kelsen deals with conflicts (or, according to Kelsen, the
absence thereof) arising between lower- and higher-ranking norms.
For now, suffice it to say that the claim that normative conflicts are necessarily
solved through derogation of either conflicting norms by the law-applying organ does
not square well with the common conception of law-application. Removing a norm
from a legal system is not normally part of the job a law-applying organ. Such is rather
the lawgiver’s task. The distinction between membership and applicability allows us to
understand what happens when a judge resolves a normative conflict: meta-rules do
not as much direct her to remove the norm from the legal system (which is a matter of
membership) as they empower her to disapply the defeated norm.
Of course, further power-conferring norms, which are not identical to metarules
themselves, may empower the law-applying organ to resolve the conflict through der-
ogation. But it is by no means a conceptual necessity. It is contingent on the exist-
ence of further norms within particular legal systems. The default option available
to judges and other law-appliers is the use of metarules which are merely norms of
applicability. Of course, as Kelsen claimed throughout his later writings, the existence
of meta-rules themselves is a contingent matter, since it is thoroughly dependent on
positive law. However, from a conceptual point of view, it makes much more sense
to claim that metarules are norms of applicability rather than norms regulating dero-
gation, given that they are to be used by law-appliers rather than by law-creators. Be-
sides, although it is true that no metarule expresses a logical law, it is necessarily41 the
case that a legal system should at least comprise one metarule, whatever it is. Judges
and other officials are always bound to be faced with normative conflicts, and neces-
sarily at least one metarule will emerge, if only by way of custom. Sometimes they will
also be empowered to derogate norms, but that is quite distinct from applying Lex
posterior or Lex specialis.
41 This may not be a logical or conceptual kind of necessity. A weaker conception of necessity (e. g. mate-
rial, or natural, necessity) will suffice for the present purposes.

IV. And the Same Goes for Lex Superior
Until now, I have talked of metarules in the abstract, although my main example was
Lex posterior. A special case seems to be Lex superior. On Kelsen’s view, Lex superior
is not a meta-rule proper, it is rather a structural feature of every legal system. In other
words, the reason why Kelsen never pays attention to Lex Superior is that he is still
committed to the logical conception of it: Lex superior as a logical principle is pre-
cisely what Kelsen means by legal dynamics. In any legal system a norm is valid if and
only if it has been created according to the procedure set out in a higher-ranking norm.
In this fourth and last section I intend to claim that Kelsen should have bitten the
positive-law bullet; he should have acknowledged that Lex superior is no more a log-
ical principle of legal systems than Lex posterior ever was. In other terms, he should
have realized that Lex superior is a meta-rule like any other, and that it has no bearing
on the conflicting norms’ membership, but only on their applicability.
A. The Problem of Unlawful Law
The problem of unlawful law is as old as legal philosophy itself42. Hobbes famously
pronounced that no law may be deemed unlawful since all law derives from the sover-
eign. Modern constitutionalism grappled with this problem, never to completely solve
it. If law is to be the expression of the sovereign (even more so in case of a popular
sovereign), it cannot be circumscribed by legal limits: the sovereign cannot bind itself.
However, modern legal doctrine during after the French and American Revolutions
evolved a series of conceptual tools43 which allowed to solve this paradox – or so it was
claimed.
The notion of unconstitutional statutes, and, more generally, of unlawful law, creat-
ed a different kind of problem for Kelsen, and for other members of the Vienna School
as well44. The paradox is well known: if a norm is valid, then its creator must ex hypoth-
42 See generally Paulo Sandro, Unlocking Legal Validity: Some Remarks on the Artificial Ontology of Law,
in: Legal Validity and Soft Law, ed. Pauline Westerman / Jaap Hage / Stephan Kirste / Anne-Ruth Mackor,
2018, 112 ff.
43 Such as the pouvoir constituant vs constitué distinction by Sieyès (on which the best analysis remains Carl
Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 1928, 98 ff.).
44 See Christoph Kletzer, Kelsen’s Development of the Fehlerkalkül-Theory, 46 ff.; Jörg Kammerhofer, Un-
certainty in International Law, 189 ff.; Johannes Buchheim, Fehlerkalkül als Ermächtigung? Kelsens Theo-
rie des Rechts letztverbindlicher Entscheidungen vor dem Hintergrund von H. L. A. Harts Rechtstheorie,
Rechtstheorie 14 (2014), 59–78; Thomas Hochmann, Les théories de la “prise en compte des défauts” et de
l’“habilitation alternative”, in: Un classique méconnu: Hans Kelsen, ed. Thomas Hochmann / Xavier Mag-
non / Regis Ponsard, 2019.

esi have been empowered to take such a norm45. Therefore, if a norm is valid it cannot –
as a matter of logical principle – conflict with higher-ranking norms, since its very con-
formity with higher-ranking norms grounds its legal validity. The logical conclusion
is that whenever a conflict occurs between two norms whose rank in the normative
hierarchy is different, the conflict is only apparent. This conclusion is paradoxical in-
sofar as unconstitutional statutes do not look like they are logical incompatibilities. If
they were, one could hardly understand why Kelsen would (rightly) be celebrated as
the creator of European-style constitutional courts46. If unconstitutional norms were a
logical impossibility, that is if unconstitutional norms were null ab initio, there would
be no need for a special organ empowered to remove them from the legal system. Only
if unconstitutional statutes are valid in the first place is such an organ necessary. And,
of course, Kelsen rightly endorsed the idea that legal norms are not null, insofar as they
are only annullable47.
It is well known that Kelsen solved this paradox by developing a theory of alter-
native authorisations. The basic idea is that a Constitution does not only comprises
norms empowering the legislature to legislate in such-and-such manner. The Consti-
tution also contains an “alternative” clause which empowers the legislature to act as it
sees fit. Whenever the legislature (for instance) passes a statute that conflicts with a
constitutional norm, this statute must be deemed consistent with the alternative au-
thorization, which is why it is valid. It is valid insofar as, though conflicting with a con-
stitutional norm, it conforms with an alternative constitutional norm which empowers
the legislature to pass this statute. This is a strange idea, after all: a constitution is meant
to be a frugal menu, not an all-you-can-eat buffet. If the Constitution creates a special
procedure for legislation, then it should implicitly preclude any other procedure from
being lawfully followed by the legislature48. Expressio unius, exclusio alterius.
The crucial point is that, according to Kelsen, when a constitutional court finds a
statute to be unconstitutional and thereby repeals it, it does not entail that the statute
45 I gloss over some serious problems which I will not be able to address at length: for instance, there may
be an asymmetry between on the one hand procedural constitutional norms which regulate the procedure
the legislature must follow if it is to legislate and on the other hand substantive constitutional norms which
regulate the content of legislation. For brevity’s sake, I will lump those (arguably) very different dimensions
together and focus only on the scope of the constitutional empowerment.
46 A very interesting contribution on Kelsen’s role in the creation and early life of the Austrian Consti-
tutional Court is Christian Neschwara, Kelsen als Verfassungsrichter, Hans Kelsen: Staatsrechtslehrer und
Rechtstheoretiker des 20 Jahrhunderts, ed. Stanley L. Paulson / Michael Stolleis, 2005, 353 ff.
47 Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, 276 ff. It bears noticing that in his seminal 1929 article on constitution-
al adjudication, Kelsen was not very clear on that problem, since he claimed that nullity and annulability
were equivalent, and equally plausible, ways of organizing a normative system (see Hans Kelsen, Wesen
und Entwicklung der Staatsgerichtsbarkeit. 2. Mitbericht von Professor Dr. Hans Kelsen in Wien, Veröffen-
tlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer 5 (1929), 44–49). He later repudiated this view.
48 Kelsen sometimes seems to think that the only thing a statute must have to be valid is to be published in
the Official Gazette (see Hans Kelsen, Wesen und Entwicklung der Staatsgerichtsbarkeit, 46).

was void ab initio, even though the court’s decision may be retroactive. What the court
does is repealing a perfectly valid statute, just as a legislature would do, hence the fa-
mous theory of the “negative legislator”49. However, the court can only do so on the
grounds of the statute’s incompatibility with the explicit constitutional norm, whereas
the legislature may repeal an earlier statute for whatever reason it likes. But when no
organ (other than the lawgiver) is empowered to “annul” the defective norm, then the
norm remains fully valid (it fully belongs to the legal system).
However, Kelsen, adhered until the end of his life to the notion of alternative author-
ization, and he did so well after his “sceptical turn”50. In the General Theory of Norms, he
wrote: “[In the case] of an unconstitutional statute, it should be noted that according
to positive law a so-called ‘unconstitutional’ statute can be valid, but its validity can be
repealed by a special procedure provided for in the constitution, e. g. by the decision of
a special court. In such a case, there is no conflict of norms. For if the norm in question
is valid, it is also constitutional, that is, the constitution empowers the legislator to en-
act the statute in question but provides that it can be repealed by a special procedure”51.
B. The Possibility of Genuine Normative Conflicts Between Lower-

and Higher-Ranking Norms
There are many problems with Kelsen’s view. The main one is that Kelsen refuses to
allow that there are genuine normative conflicts between lower- and higher-ranking
norms. I aim to show that such genuine conflict is possible, although the conflicting
norms are equally valid. Such a hierarchical normative conflict is to be solved by me-
tarules. Lex superior is one such metarule, and like any other, it is a norm of applica-
bility. On such a view there is no need to have recourse to the baroque notion of an
alternative authorization. The downside is that the very notion of legal dynamics is put
into question; law is then seen as a system of non-hierarchical sources of validity.
How can such a bizarre (but sound) theory be achieved? There are actually many
ways to that, and although I have advocated for one specific theory somewhere else52, I
49 Hans Kelsen, Wesen und Entwicklung der Staatsgerichtsbarkeit, 54.

50 For a very interesting reconstruction of Kelsen’s later views on the unlawful law problem, see Jörg Kam-
merhofer, Uncertainty in International Law, 192–193. Kamerhofer argues that in his sceptical phase, Kelsen
would have distinguished between a norm’s existence (which results from any kind of act of will) and its
membership (which is a specific property of certain norms). However, such a distinction does not explain
how un unlawful law may still belong to the legal system, which is the very problem addressed here.
51 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Norms, 125 (taken verbatim from Hans Kelsen, Derogation, 272).
52 Mathieu Carpentier, Sources and validity, in: Legal Validity and Soft Law, ed. Pauline Westerman / Jaap
Hage / Stephan Kirste / Anne-Ruth Mackor, 2018, 84 ff. In the same vein, see Michael Giudice, Understand-
ing the Nature of Law, 2015, 113 ff., where Giudice argues for what he calls a “contingent relation between
invalidity and unconstitutionality”.

will not rehearse my arguments here. Suffice it to say that such a theory must somehow
assume that a norm’s membership within a legal system is to be divorced from its con-
formity with higher-ranking norms53. Under such an assumption, a norm may belong
to a legal system although it conflicts with higher-ranking norms. In this outlook, high-
er-ranking norms are power-conferring norms – what Hart calls “rules of change”54.
They regulate the way legal norms ought to be posited – or derogated – and to some
extent their content. Whenever a norm conflicts with a higher-ranking norm, it does
not mean that it does not belong to the legal system; it just means that the law-maker
acted ultra vires. So, we do not need to abandon the idea of a hierarchical structure of
the legal system; what we need to do is to divorce this legal structure from the notion
of a dynamic production of legal validity – insofar as validity is understood as mere
membership within a given legal system55.
One way to achieve such a theory is to use the notion of a rule of recognition, con-
ceived as a social fact. The rule of recognition picks out the legal system’s criteria of va-
lidity. In a positivist outlook, sources are such criteria. A norm is valid, i. e. it belongs to
the legal system, if and only if it can be traced to a source of law, that is to a complex set
of social facts. Whether it conflicts with higher-ranking norms is prima facie irrelevant
as long as the basic facts for there to be a legal norm are present. Of course, such facts
overlap to some extent with the “facts” that make up the procedure through which the
norm ought to be produced according to higher ranking norms. When the facts in the
overlap are missing, not only is the norm contrary to a higher-ranking norm, but there
may be doubts whether the “norm” is a legal norm at all. For instance, if the French
President enacts a “statute” which has not been passed in either House of Parliament,
I am not sure such a statute would be at all treated as a legal norm. However, this ex-
ample shows that two different questions are at stake. First, there is a demarcation
problem: is this “thing” a law, i. e. a legal norm, or is it a non-law? If I sign a piece of
paper where I “enact” a “law”, no one will dispute that this is not a law: the reason why
it is not a law is not that I have violated some constitutional requirement or any other
power-conferring norm; it is because the basic facts for there to be a law in the first
place are missing. We could argue that the same goes in our example, even though the
President is a legal authority. The second question is whether the president has acted
ultra vires, i. e. whether he has been violating a higher-ranking norm56. These are two
distinct questions.
53 A careful (albeit different from mine) analysis of the distinction between conformity and validity can
be found in: Régis Ponsard, Validité et conformité juridiques, in: Un classique méconnu: Hans Kelsen, ed.
Thomas Hochmann / Xavier Magnon / Regis Ponsard, 2019.
54 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (3rd ed.), 2012, 95 ff.
55 Of course this is debatable, and it is clear that Kelsen’s is a much more robust notion of validity. But as I
made clear in Section II above, I am working with a weak notion of validity.
56 One objection could be that in our example, there is not a conflict in the sense elaborated in Section I
above, since the conflict is not about the content of the norms at stake. This is correct; however I have hint-

There are many other ways through which such a result may be achieved without
divorcing membership from conformity. You can claim that validity is a compound of
membership and conformity – that is you can save to some extent Kelsen’s dynamic
theory of law – and, in the same time, accept that norms may be valid even though
they conflict with higher-ranking norms. In other words, you do not have to agree with
the previous paragraph in order to accept that genuine conflicts between equally valid,
different ranking norms exist. For instance, some authors distinguish existence from
validity57, in which existence is understood as some kind of presumptive or prima facie
validity.
The upshot is that any theory that allows for genuine normative conflicts between
lower-and higher-ranking norms serves better the Kelsenian motto that “laws are not
null but only annullable” than Kelsen’s own theory of alternative authorizations. Kels-
en is right to argue that before it is repealed by a constitutional court, an unconstitu-
tional statute is perfectly valid within the legal system. As we framed it in section III,
Kelsen is right to claim that Lex superior is not a pro futuro derogating norm (even if he
erroneously thought such was the case with Lex posterior) However, as we shall now
see, he is wrong to argue that the conflict must be solved through derogation.
C. Lex Superior as A Norm of Applicability
We saw in Section III that metarules are not power-conferring norms regulating dero-
gation. The same goes for Lex superior. Indeed, the reason why Kelsen was so reluctant
to mention at all Lex superior as a metarule is not only that Kelsen refused to treat con-
flicts across the normative hierarchy as genuine conflicts; it is also that Kelsen thought
that metarules (such as Lex posterior) function as derogating norms. And since there
is no nullity, but only annullability, Lex superior cannot be such a derogating norm.
However, Kelsen’s theory of alternative authorizations and of the role of constitutional
courts may be reframed as a specific theory of Lex superior, understood as a pow-
er-conferring norm directing law-applying organs (or a subset thereof) to derogate
an inferior norm whenever it conflicts with a higher-ranking norm. Kelsen seems to
presuppose that the only way to solve the “conflict” (which according to him is only
ed that the classification sketched out in Section I was incomplete (it excludes what Lindahl and Reidhav
call capacitative conflicts). However, I needed such an example because the overlapping facts I focused on
are generally facts about procedure and not facts about content. The fact that a norm has such-and-such
content has nothing to do with the source of that norm’s legal character (i. e. with its membership). How-
ever, the fact that a norm was passed in Parliament and enacted by the head of state is generally part of the
reason why it is a legal, rather than a non-legal, norm.
57 In the recent literature, see Paolo Sandro, Unlocking Legal Validity: Some Remarks on the Artificial
Ontology of Law, 114 ff.; see also Matthew Grellette, Legal Positivism and the Separation of Existence and
Validity, Ratio Juris 23 (2010), 22 ff.

apparent) is through derogation, i. e. repeal. But, as Kelsen was well aware58, it need not
be so. Kelsen was right to insist that before the court rules, the statute is still valid. But
there are many cases in which the statute remains valid after the court’s decision. Many
courts (be they constitutional courts or supreme courts) are not empowered to repeal
unconstitutional statutes. They are only empowered to disapply them or to enjoin low-
er courts from applying them59. This mundane observation points to another solution,
which is predicated on the general tenets outlined in Section IV.B above. Once we
understand that Lex superior is not about membership at all and that the reason why
norms belong to a legal system is not because they are created within the scope of the
powers conferred upon their creators, it makes it easier to treat Lex superior as a mere
norm of applicability. In that respect, Lex superior is a metarule like any other.
Such is actually the crux of Chief Justice John Marshall’s reasoning in Marbury v
Madison (and Alexander Hamilton’s reasoning in the Federalist 78)60 Interestingly,
when discussing unconstitutional statutes, Marshall does not use the common phrase
“null and void”; he only says that such statutes are “void”. Moreover, Marshall insists
that judicial review is part of the ordinary province of the judiciary, because an un-
constitutional statute does not differ from ordinary normative conflicts. “If two laws
conflict with each other, the Courts must decide on the operation of each. So, if a law
be in opposition to the Constitution, if both the law and the Constitution apply to a
particular case, so that the Court must either decide that case conformably to the law,
disregarding the Constitution, or conformably to the Constitution, disregarding the
law, the Court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This
is of the very essence of judicial duty”61. Judges have always been faced with normative
conflicts and they solve them by disapplying the defeating norm. The same goes for
unconstitutional statutes, and for unlawful laws in general.
Of course, in many legal systems, judges are specifically barred from applying Lex
superior, at least in what regards unconstitutional statutes. Some legal systems have
not adopted judicial review, be it American- or European-style. This shows that Lex
superior as a norm of applicability is not part of their positive law, or that, in what
regards legislation, Lex posterior defeats Lex superior. In other legal systems, further
norms empower law-applying organs to repeal (i. e. derogate) the inferior norm, but,
as we saw at the end of Section III, it is a purely contingent matter. Sometimes law-ap-
plying organs (or a subset of them, e. g. Constitutional courts) are further empowered
to repeal unconstitutional statutes: such is the case in France, where the Constitutional
58 See Hans Kelsen, Judicial Review of Legislation: A Comparative Study of the Austrian and the Ameri-
can Constitution, The Journal of Politics 4 (1942), 184 ff.
59 Mathieu Carpentier, Validity versus Applicability: a (Small) Dose of Scepticism, 115 ff.
60 Marbury v Madison, 5 U. S. 137 (1803). I am aware of the political overtones of Marshall’s opinion, which
must be taken with a grain of salt. I should be clear that I do not use Marbury to prove my point, but rather
to illustrate it by way of a very famous example.
61 Marbury v Madison, 5 U. S. 137, 177–178.

council is empowered to repeal an unconstitutional statute. But remember that Euro-

pean-style constitutional courts are specialised organs. They are law-applying organs
insofar as they apply the Constitution, but they are not part (not even at the top) of the
ordinary judiciary, and they are never called upon to apply statutes62. Hence, they are
never really faced with genuine normative conflicts, insofar as they are not bound to
apply one of the two conflicting norms in the first place. Only when a court must apply
both the constitution and the unconstitutional statute is there a genuine normative
conflict. When it is the case, the court will apply Lex superior and disapply the statute.
Whether the court can also repeal the statute is a different question entirely.
Conclusion
In this paper I have tried to vindicate some intuitions which are central to Kelsen’s
last, sceptical move. In the same time, I have aimed to identify and solve some flaws
in Kelsen’s account of normative conflicts and derogation by showing that it was not
a radical enough move. Kelsen is right to claim that metarules (such as Lex posterior)
are not logical necessities. They are part of a legal system’s positive law: even though
they are not necessarily formally enacted, some metarules at least exist under a cus-
tomary form.
Kelsen is also right to argue that derogation is a specific normative function. But he
is wrong to assume that derogation is a function of metarules. The link between nor-
mative conflict resolution and derogation is weaker than Kelsen is willing to accept.
This is shown by the fact that metarules are most and foremost norms of applicability.
This goes for Lex posterior, which is the only metarule actually discussed by Kelsen.
But as I have shown, the same goes for Lex Superior. Deflating it as a logical principle
gives room for a much more flexible view of hierarchical normative conflicts.
It could be objected that the unified conception of metarules which has been ad-
vocated here is mistaken. Metarules, the objection goes, serve each a different func-
tion. Such is the view espoused by Riccardo Guastini63 and Giovanni Battista Ratti64.
They claim that Lex superior is a criterion of invalidity ex tunc, whereas Lex posterior
is a criterion of derogation ex nunc, and Lex specialis is a criterion of priority, in the
sense that it derogates some logical consequences of the more general norm. It bears
stressing out that this picture still rests on a strong link between normative conflict
62 This is over-simplistic. I am mainly talking here about constitutional review; constitutional courts gen-
erally have other functions (such as adjudicating electoral disputes), where they will have to apply statutes
as well as other sources of law.
63 Riccardo Guastini, Interpretare e argomentare, 2011, 113 ff.
64 Giovanni Battista Ratti, Normative Inconsistency and Logical Theories: A First Critique of Defeasibi-
lism, in: Coherence: Insights from Philosophy, Jurisprudence and Artificial Intelligence, ed. Michał Araszkiew-
icz / Jaromír Šavelka, 2013, 133; Giovanni Battista Ratti, Negation in Legislation, 147

resolution and derogation. As such, there are many problems with it. For instance, the
idea that Lex superior is a criterion of invalidity ex tunc can be understood two ways.
On a “strong” reading, it means that in a hierarchical conflict, the defeated norm has
never been valid in the first place: I refer the reader to Section IV.A and B above for my
arguments against this idea. On a weak reading, it means that when courts invalidate
an unconstitutional statute, such an invalidation has retroactive effect. But this claim is
wrong as an empirical matter of fact. Moreover, I could argue that a unified conception
of metarules as rules of applicability fits better our intuitions about how legal systems
function and law-applying organs solve normative conflicts. It rests on a simple dis-
tinction between membership and applicability and does not need any further distinc-
tion or superfluous elaboration. As such it serves better than its rivals the requirement
of Denkökonomie65 which is central to Kelsen’s jurisprudential method.
One last thought. The reader may ask: what is the philosophical relevance of all this?
Why analyse normative conflicts in the first place? Pierluigi Chiassoni once quipped
that there are two traditions in modern jurisprudence: one the one side, there are the
watch makers “who deal with a clumsy conceptual machinery laid down by tradition
and embodied in lawyers’ common sense”; on the other side, there are the philoso-
phers who address “the real, big, theoretical (and practical) issues at stake”66. The pres-
ent paper is definitely an essay in watch-making. However normative conflicts have
philosophical relevance as well. They are ubiquitous in practical reasoning, and moral
philosophy has been debating for centuries the question whether there are genuine
moral normative conflicts. Law and legal reasoning are the product of human reason;
the way they deal with normative conflicts is instrumental for any study of law’s inner
(ir)rationality.
Mathieu Carpentier
Université Toulouse 1 Capitole, 2, rue du Doyen-Gabriel-Marty, 31042 Toulouse cedex 9,
FRANCE, mathieu.carpentier@ut-capitole.fr
65 Kelsen borrowed this methodological principle from Mach via Pitamic. Hans Kelsen, Hauptprobleme
der Staatsrechtslehre entwickelt aus der Lehre vom Rechtssatze, 1922, xv
66 Pierluigi Chiassoni, A Tale from Two Traditions: Civil Law, Common Law, and Legal Gaps in Analisi e
diritto 2006, ed. Paolo Comanducci and Riccardo Guastini, 2007, 49. Chiassoni uses the distinction between
the watchmaker and the philosopher in the course of an analysis of the literature on legal gaps, but it can
be generalized to cover the topic of normative conflicts as well. However, Chiassoni identifies these two
traditions with the civil law / common law divide. This seems to me to be over-simplistic. Joseph Raz for
instance is certainly both a watchmaker (see for instance his Concept of a Legal System) and a philosopher
in that respect; so is Robert Alexy.

Suspension als eine Art von Derogation
oder als weitere Funktion der Rechtsnorm?
MATHEUS PELEGRINO DA SILVA

Suspension as a Kind of Derogation or as Another Function of the Legal Norm?
Abstract: According to Robert Walter the suspension should be understood as a kind of

derogation and not as a different normative function. In the article it is highlighted that
the consequences of the suspension of a norm are different from the consequences of the
derogation of a norm, since a derogated norm must be considered as completely invalid,
while the suspended norm may eventually continue to be valid. In order to support the
conception of the suspension as a normative function and not as a kind of derogation one
of Merkl’s ideas is employed, according to which the derogation of a norm requires an
empowerment for such a legal act, so that it can be analogically argued that the possibility
of suspending a norm presupposes an empowerment to suspend norms.
Keywords: Derogation, Hans Kelsen, Invalidation, Suspension, Theory of the hierarchical

structure, Robert Walter
Schlagworte: Derogation, Hans Kelsen, Invalidation, Suspension, Stufenbaulehre, Robert

Walter
I. Einleitung
Nach Adolf Julius Merkl sind Rechtsnormen in der Regel unveränderlich, und ihre
Veränderlichkeit muss positiv bestimmt werden, d. h. jede Änderung ist von einer Er-
mächtigung zur Derogation abhängig.1 Das Ziel dieses Aufsatzes ist, Robert Walters
1 „Weyr sieht den Verfassungssatz, der die Unabänderlichkeit postuliert, für abänderbar an – sein logisches
Prinzip kann ihm selbst durch einen Rechtssatz für den bestimmten Fall nicht entkräftet werden –, ich
postuliere dagegen, um zur Erkenntnis der Abänderlichkeit zu gelangen, angesichts der über ihre Abän-
derbarkeit schweigenden Verfassung einen Rechtssatz, der Abänderbarkeit statuiert; denn die Unabänder-

150 MATHEUS PELEGRINO DA SILVA
Auffassung von der Suspension als einer besonderen Art von Derogation anhand von
drei Fragen darzustellen und zu zeigen, dass anders als von Walter behauptet die Sus-
pension als eine weitere Funktion der Rechtsnormen zu identifizieren ist. Um Klarheit
über die Natur der Suspension zu gewinnen, wird auch erläutert, aus welchen Grün-
den die Invalidation, im Gegensatz zu Suspension und Derogation, keine Normfunk-
tion ist. Schließlich wird die Relevanz der Unterscheidung zwischen Derogation und
Suspension für die Diskussion über die Möglichkeit eines Stufenbaues nach der de-
rogatorischen Kraft aufgezeigt.
II. Die Suspension als eine eigene Normfunktion
In „Der Aufbau der Rechtsordnung“ hat Robert Walter die Suspension auf folgende
Weise beschrieben:
Eine gewisse […] derogatorische Kraft käme den Anordnungen in einer bestimmten
Rechtsform zu, wenn sie nach den Bestimmungen des positiven Rechts zwar die Geltung
einer Anordnung beeinträchtigen, diese jedoch nicht vollständig vernichten können, da
sie wegen dieser eintretenden Derogationswirkung fehlerhaft und deshalb zu beseitigen
sind, wenn durch die Beseitigung die in ihrer Geltung beschränkte Anordnung wieder un-
eingeschränkte Rechtswirkung erlangt.2
Walter präsentiert die Suspension als eine Wirkung der Erzeugung einer Norm, die
angesichts der direkten Ermächtigung nicht hätte erfolgen dürfen. Das heißt: Wäre
der Erzeuger der Norm ermächtigt, diese Norm zu erzeugen, hätte er eine derogatori-
sche Norm erzeugt. Weil er dazu nicht ermächtigt ist, es ihm wegen einer alternativen
Ermächtigung aber rechtlich möglich ist, diese Norm zu erzeugen, wird die von ihm
erzeugte Norm eine andere Norm suspendieren.
Im Folgenden werden nun einige Aspekte von Walters Auffassung von der Suspen-
sion mittels dreier Fragen behandelt, um deren Unvollkommenheit aufzuzeigen.
1. Frage: Ist die Suspension eine notwendige Wirkung der gültigen Erzeugung einer
Norm, die das Ziel hat, eine andere Norm zu derogieren, aber nach den positivrecht-
lichen Bestimmungen keine derogatorische Kraft in Bezug auf diese andere Norm hat,
lichkeit ist mir normlogisches Prinzip. Ist mir aber die Abänderung einer über ihre Abänderungsmöglich-
keit schweigenden Verfassung eine Denkunmöglichkeit, so wird mir bei verfassungsmäßiger Statuierung
der Abänderbarkeit (der Verfassung und gleich ihr anderer Gesetze) die Unabänderbarkeit im einzelnen
Fall zur Normwidrigkeit, welche, um diesen Charakter zu verlieren, die Formen der Verfassungsänderung
annehmen muß.“ Adolf Julius Merkl, Die Unveränderlichkeit von Gesetzen – ein normlogisches Prinzip,
Gesammelte Schriften (hg. von Dorothea Mayer-Maly / Herbert Schambeck / Wolf-Dietrich Grussmann),
Bd. I/1, 1993, 165.
2 Robert Walter, Der Aufbau der Rechtsordnung, 1964, 58.

Suspension als eine Art von Derogation oder als weitere Funktion der Rechtsnorm? 151
sodass die Autorität, die diese Norm erzeugt, keine Ermächtigung erhalten hat, diese
Norm zu derogieren?
Zwei der Probleme bezüglich Walters Auffassung der Suspension sind einmal die
Idee, dass die suspendierende Norm irgendwann notwendigerweise als rechtswidrig an-
erkannt werden wird,3 und zum anderen die Ansicht, dass die suspendierende Norm
die Geltung der schon gültigen Norm notwendigerweise beeinflusst. In einem konkre-
ten Fall kann man von „Suspension“ sprechen, wenn zwei Bedingungen erfüllt sind:
1. Eine mit derogierender Absicht erzeugte Norm4 wird definitiv beseitigt; in dieser
Situation kann man behaupten, dass die vermeintlich derogierte Norm als gültig be-
trachtet werden kann. 2. Die Geltung dieser zweiten Norm wird für den Zeitraum zwi-
schen der Erzeugung der mit derogierender Absicht erzeugten Norm und der Erklä-
rung, dass diese Norm ungültig ist, als provisorisch aufgehoben betrachtet. Diesfalls
kann auch eine generelle positivrechtliche Bestimmung mittels über die Alternativer-
mächtigung erzeugte Normen existieren,5 nach der die in dieser Situation zu derogie-
rende Norm als provisorisch ungültig betrachtet werden soll.6
Die Suspension als Normfunktion muss zuerst (mittels genereller oder individu-
eller Normen) positiviert werden, bevor es möglich ist, sie in einer Entscheidung als
konkretisiert betrachten zu können. Wenn das nicht passiert, dann ist die obige Frage
zu verneinen, und beide Normen sind gültig und stehen (möglicherweise)7 miteinan-
der in Konflikt.8 Dies entspricht Merkls Auffassung, dass die Derogation einer Norm
3 Anders ist der Fall bei Lippold, der die Möglichkeit der Nicht-Anerkennung der rechtswidrigen Norm
problematisiert. Vgl. Rainer Lippold, Recht und Ordnung Statik und Dynamik der Rechtsordnung, 2000,
417.
4 Diese Absicht kann auf zwei unterschiedliche Arten und Weisen erfolgen: Es kann sein, dass die zweite
Norm nur das Ziel hat, eine andere Norm zu derogieren, oder dass die zweite Norm denselben Tatbestand
der anderen Norm mit einer von dieser Norm abweichenden Folge verbindet, sodass sie mittelbar die erste
Norm derogiert.
5 Bezüglich der österreichischen Rechtsordnung ist das der Fall. Vgl. Robert Walter, Der Stufenbau nach
der derogatorischen Kraft im österreichischen Recht, Österreichische Juristenzeitung (1965), 171.
6 Auch wenn keine generelle positivrechtliche Suspensionsbestimmung existiert, kann die in einer Ent-
scheidung angewendete Suspension trotzdem dank Alternativermächtigung als gültig betrachtet werden.
Zur Bedeutung der alternativen Ermächtigung, siehe Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 2. Aufl., 2017, 472–
487.
7 Sie sind im Konflikt miteinander, wenn eine Norm etwas vorschreibt und die andere Norm etwas ande-
res vorschreibt, aber nicht wenn die zweite Norm das einzige Ziel hat, die erste Norm zu derogieren. Vgl.
Hans Kelsen, Allgemeine Theorie der Normen, 1979, 86.
8 Hier ist zu berücksichtigen, dass Walter möglicherweise Folgendes angenommen hat: Weil es in einigen
Fällen der Normerzeugung mittels Alternativermächtigung passieren kann, dass aufgrund der Erzeugung
dieser Norm ein Normenkonflikt entsteht, und solange vorausgesetzt war (sowie Walter früher vertreten
hat), dass kein Normenkonflikt entstehen kann, dann ist anzuerkennen, dass es für das Vermeiden von Nor-
menkonflikten notwendig ist, auf irgendeine Weise – beispielsweise durch Postulierung eines suspensiven
Effektes – diese Normenkonflikte zu vermeiden. Es ist nicht möglich zu bestimmen, aus welchem Grund
Walter trotz des (durch Merkls Auffassung inspirierten) Einwands, dass die Ausübung einer Funktion von
der Ermächtigung für die Ausübung dieser Funktion abhängig ist, die Suspension und den suspensiven Ef-
fekt als notwendige Eigenschaft einer Rechtsordnung identifiziert hat. Eine mögliche Erklärung ergibt sich

von einer Ermächtigung zur Derogation abhängt. Anhand einer analogen Betrachtung
kann gesagt werden, dass eine Norm als suspendiert betrachtet werden kann, wenn
eine Autorität in der einen oder anderen Form die Ermächtigung bekommen hat, die-
se Norm zu suspendieren.
Einerseits könnte die Suspension in einer Rechtsordnung als Normfunktion vor-
bestimmt werden, sodass in solchen Fällen suspensive Normen existieren würden, die
nicht wegen einer „fehlerhaften“ Normerzeugung zustande gekommen sind, sondern
dank einer normgemäßen Normerzeugung – d. h. die Rechtsordnung würde bestim-
men, dass durch Erfüllung bestimmter Bedingungen eine Autorität ermächtigt (direk-
te Ermächtigung) war, suspensive Normen zu erzeugen. Ist das nicht der Fall, dann
kann die Suspension in individuellen Rechtsnormen konkretisiert werden und das
auch, wenn die Autoritäten, die diese Normen erzeugen, keine generelle Ermächti-
gung bekommen haben, um Normen als suspendiert betrachten zu können. Existiert
keine generelle positivrechtliche Bestimmung über die Suspension (keine Ermächti-

gung zur Normsuspension), dann kann (muss aber nicht) die in einer Entscheidung
angewendete Suspension dank einer Alternativermächtigung als gültig betrachtet wer-
den.
2. Frage: Kann die Suspension als eine Art Derogation betrachtet werden, oder ist sie
(neben den von Hans Kelsen identifizierten Normfunktionen)9 eine weitere Funktion
der Rechtsnorm?
Walter präsentiert uns die Suspension als eine Art von Derogation, die eine un-
vollständige „Vernichtung“10 einer Norm bewirkt.11 Aber abgesehen von einem gleich
zu behandelnden Aspekt, kann die Suspension nicht als eine Art von Derogation be-
trachtet werden, da ein wesentliches Merkmal der Derogation die Tatsache ist, dass
die derogierte Norm nicht mehr gültig werden kann, da sie (vollkommen) vernichtet
aus Walters Auffassung hinsichtlich der Existenz von Normkonflikten, denn wie Kammerhofer bemerkt,
habe Walter erst ab 1966 anerkannt, dass es Normenkonflikte geben könne: „Entgegen Walters Aussagen im
1955 erschienenen ‚Widerspruch‘ [gemeint ist Robert Walters Schrift „Über den Widerspruch von Rechts-
vorschriften“], wo die von Kelsen definierte Situation wohl in die Kategorie der faktischen Unvereinbarkeit
der Rechtsfolgen gefallen wäre, liegt der Normkonflikt jetzt [in Walters Artikel „Recht und Logik“ aus dem
Jahr 1966] in der ‚Situation, wonach a (eine Rechtsfolge) nach der einen Norm sein soll, wogegen nach der
anderen Norm diese Rechtsfolge nicht – somit: non a – sein soll.‘“. Jörg Kammerhofer, Robert Walter, die
Normkonflikte und der zweite Stufenbau des Rechts, in: Gedenkschrift Robert Walter, hg. von Clemens
Jabloner u. a., 2013, 243.
9 Diese sind: Ermächtigen, Erlauben, Gebieten / Verbieten sowie Derogieren. Vgl. Kelsen (Fn. 7), 3.
10 Walter (Fn. 2), 57.
11 Früher hatte Walter die Ansicht vertreten, dass beide Normen als gültig zu betrachten wären, aber auch
danach hat er die Situation nicht als Konflikt betrachtet, da für ihn eine der Normen zurückgedrängt war.
Da in diesem spezifischen Fall Walters Schrift die Problematik in Bezug auf die österreichische Rechts-
ordnung betrachtet, sind seine Bemerkungen im Hinblick auf diese Rechtsordnung begründet. Vgl. Robert
Walter, Können Verordnungen Gesetzen derogieren?, Österreichische Juristenzeitung (1961), 3 und 7.

ist.12 Es kann von Teilvernichtung (und Teilderogation) gesprochen werden, da eine

derogatorische Norm ein Gesetz (als Sammlung von Normen)13 zum Teil derogieren
kann, die Idee einer provisorischen Vernichtung aber ist als contradictio in adiecto zu
identifizieren.14
Der Wesensunterschied zwischen Derogation und Suspension zeigt sich in folgen-
der Überlegung: Ist die Beeinträchtigung der Geltung einer Norm das Kriterium für
die Klassifizierung, dann können Derogation und Suspension nebeneinandergestellt
werden. Auch unter diesem Kriterium kann die Suspension nicht als eine Art Dero-
gation betrachtet werden. Ist die Suspension in der einen oder anderen Weise in der
Rechtsordnung positiviert, dann hebt die suspensive Norm die Geltung von Rechts-
normen provisorisch auf. Diese Funktion kann die Derogation nicht ausüben, denn es
existiert keine provisorische Derogation einer Norm. Deshalb ist die Suspension als
eine weitere Funktion der Rechtsnormen und nicht als eine Art von Derogation zu
identifizieren.
Die Suspension wie die Derogation können aber als zwei Arten von „Beseitigung“15
oder als zwei Arten von Geltungsvernichtung von Normen einer Rechtsordnung be-
trachtet werden. Wegen der Erzeugung einer suspensiven Norm ist die Geltung einer
anderen Norm in einer änderbaren Weise beeinträchtigt, sodass, solange die suspensi-
ve Norm gültig bleibt, die suspendierte Norm als eine ungültige Norm zu betrachten
ist. Sie ist also mit Vorbehalt aus dem Bereich der gültigen Normen ausgeschlossen.
Wegen der Erzeugung einer derogatorischen Norm ist die Geltung einer anderen
Norm in einer unveränderbaren Weise beeinträchtigt mit der Folge, dass die derogier-
te Norm immer und ohne Vorbehalt aus dem Bereich der gültigen Normen ausge-
schlossen ist.
Die Suspension unterscheidet sich von der Derogation, denn jene ermöglicht
die Beschreibung einer Eigenschaft der gültigen Normen einer Rechtsordnung, die
durch die Anwendung des Begriffes „Derogation“ nicht erfolgen kann. Entweder sind
Normen derogiert und deswegen für immer als ungültig zu betrachten, oder sie sind
12 „The attempt to repeal the validity of a norm which has derogated the validity of another norm in re-
gard to this norm, by means of a derogating norm, would be without effect. The norm whose validity was
terminated by the first derogating norm would not regain its validity by the second derogating norm.“ Hans
Kelsen, Derogation, in: Die Wiener rechtstheoretische Schule, hg. von Hans R. Klecatsky / René Mar-
cic / Herbert Schambeck, Bd. 2, 2010, 1170.
13 Walter benennt die nach seiner Auffassung existierenden zwei Arten von Derogation folgendermaßen:
“Derogation als vollständige Vernichtung“ und „Derogation als beschränkte Beseitigung“. Walter (Fn. 2),
57 f.
14 In einer früheren Schrift hat Walter behauptet: „Anders als im Bereich der Natur kann die Vernichtung
wieder vernichtet, das Gesetz rückwirkend wieder zum Leben erweckt werden.” Walter (Fn. 11), 3, Fn. 28.
Walters Argumentation kann nicht gefolgt werden, da keine überzeugenden Gründe angeführt werden,
warum man eine neue Bedeutung des Wortes „vernichten“ schaffen sollte, nur um die Suspension als eine
Art Derogation klassifizieren zu können.
15 Walter (Fn. 2), 58.

nicht derogiert und deswegen als gültig zu betrachten. Die Eigenschaft einer gültigen
Norm, dass sie unter bestimmten Bedingungen als ungültig betrachtet werden soll,
diese schwebende Natur der Geltung dieser Norm, ist eine Besonderheit, die durch
die Anwendung des Begriffes „Derogation“ nicht ausgedrückt werden kann. Aus die-
sem Grund ist die Suspension eine Funktion der Normen, die nicht als eine Art von
Derogation betrachtet werden kann, denn der Begriff „Suspension“ drückt eine Situ-
ation aus, die durch die Anwendung des Begriffes „Derogation“ nicht ausdrückbar ist.
3. Frage: Sind angesichts der Beschreibung selbständiger Normen (für die Rechts-
ordnung) die Wirkungen der Erzeugung einer suspensiven Norm dieselben wie die
Wirkungen der Erzeugung einer derogatorischen Norm?
Ausgehend von Kelsens Definition einer unselbständigen Norm ist es möglich, die
selbständige Norm zu definieren. Nach Kelsen ist eine Norm unselbständig, denn „sie
bestimmt nur […] die Bedingung, an die die zweite [Norm] die Sanktion knüpft“.16
Die Norm ist als selbständige Norm zu verstehen, die die Bedingungen einer Sanktion
oder eines Zwangsaktes und die bedingte Sanktion oder den bedingten Zwangsakt
miteinander verknüpft.
Ist die Suspension in einer Rechtsordnung für den Fall der Rechtserzeugung dank
der Alternativermächtigung tatsächlich positiviert, kann gefragt werden, ob eine sus-
pensive Norm mit einem bestimmten Inhalt genau wie eine derogatorische Norm
mit demselben Inhalt eine selbständige Norm ändern wird. Sind in diesem Zusam-
menhang die Wirkungen der Erzeugung einer suspensiven Norm dieselben wie die
Wirkungen der Erzeugung einer derogatorischen Norm, dann kann die Suspension in
dieser Hinsicht dennoch als eine Art von Derogation betrachtet werden, d. h. als eine
Art von Derogation, die eine provisorische Wirkung hat.
Diese Situation involviert zwei mögliche Antworten, von denen eine Walters Auf-
fassung der Suspension als eine Art von Derogation in einem relativen und qualifizier-
ten Sinn bestätigen wird. Ist beispielsweise wegen der Erzeugung einer Erlaubnisnorm
eine Gebotsnorm suspendiert, dann wird eine selbständige Norm, die früher diese
Gebotsnorm umfasste, jetzt und in einem ganz bestimmten Sinne einen anderen In-
halt haben. Dank der Erzeugung dieser suspensiven Norm wird die Gebotsnorm jetzt,
in diesem Moment, nicht gültig sein. In diesem Sinne und nach einer Perspektive, die
nur einen bestimmten Zeitpunkt bei der Beschreibung der selbständigen Normen be-
rücksichtigt, wird eine suspensive Norm eine selbständige Norm so ändern, wie eine
derogatorische Norm mit demselben Inhalt diese selbständige Norm ändern würde.
Unter diesem Aspekt ist es in der Tat so, dass die Suspension als eine Art von Deroga-
tion betrachtet werden kann, sodass angesichts eines (vordefinierten) Zeitpunkts über
die „Beseitigung“ einer Norm gesprochen werden kann.
16 Kelsen (Fn. 6), 112.

Es gibt aber auch einen anderen Aspekt, der für den Fall der analysierten selbstän-
digen Norm zu beachten ist. Hat beispielsweise eine Erlaubnisnorm eine Gebotsnorm
derogiert, dann wird die selbständige Norm diesen neuen Inhalt ohne Vorbehalt aus-
drücken, sodass von nun an ein bestimmter Tatbestand erlaubt ist. Hat anderseits
eine Erlaubnisnorm eine Gebotsnorm suspendiert, dann wird die selbständige Norm
diesen neuen Inhalt mit einem Vorbehalt ausdrücken, sodass von nun an und solange
die suspensive Norm gültig ist, ein bestimmter Tatbestand erlaubt ist. Somit kann die
Suspension nicht als eine Art von Derogation betrachtet werden, denn sofern die Be-
schreibung der selbständigen Norm nicht nur die aktuellen Effekte der Erzeugung
einer Norm beachtet und ausdrückt, sondern auch mögliche zukünftige Wirkungen,
wird die Suspension einer Norm etwas anderes bedeuten als die Derogation dieser
Norm. Weil die Derogation demnach mit dem zeitlichen Element „nie mehr“ ver-
bunden ist, während die Suspension ein anderes zeitliches Element ausdrückt, das
Element der Änderbarkeit, der Vorläufigkeit, müssen Derogation und Suspension als
unterschiedliche Normfunktionen betrachtet werden.
III. Gründe für den Ausschluss der Invalidation als weitere Normfunktion
Die Behandlung der Derogation und der Suspension als zwei Arten von Exklusion
von Normen aus dem Bereich der gültigen Normen einer Rechtsordnung macht auch
deutlich, warum die Invalidation nicht als Normfunktion zu verstehen ist.
Walter präsentiert als eine Situation von Invalidation den Fall, in dem „eine (neue-
re) Verfassungsregelung nur zur Erzeugung von Normen bestimmter Art ermächtigt,
jedoch – auf Grund bisheriger Verfassung – Gesetzesnormen bestehen, die nach der
neueren Verfassungsregelung nicht erzeugt werden dürfen“.17 Bei der Invalidation einer
Norm geht es um die Situation, in der eine schon gültige Norm angesichts einer späte-
ren Änderung der Rechtsordnung nicht mehr so erzeugt werden kann, wie sie vorher
erzeugt wurde. Wäre diese schon erzeugte Norm nach der Änderung der Rechtsord-
nung erzeugt worden, könnte sie nicht als eine rechtmäßige Norm betrachtet werden.
Weil diese Norm aber vor dieser Änderung erzeugt wurde, entsteht die Frage, wie die-
se Norm nun betrachtet werden muss, ob sie gültig bleibt oder nicht.
Ohne Bezug auf eine konkrete Rechtsordnung ist es nicht möglich, eine Lösung für
dieses Problem anzubieten, sondern es können nur drei (grundsätzliche) Alternativen
präsentiert werden. Aufgrund der Änderung der Bedingungen für die Erzeugung einer
Norm einer bestimmten Art (mit einer bestimmten Rechtserzeugungsform) kann ent-
weder behauptet werden, dass die frühere Norm (1. Alternative) als eine invalidierte
17 Robert Walter, Derogation oder Invalidation, in: Hundert Jahre Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, fünfzig Jah-
re Verfassungsgerichtshof in Österreich, hg. von Felix Ermacora / Hans R. Klecatsky / René Marcic, 1968,
218.

Norm zu verstehen ist, d. h. als eine gültige, aber normwidrige Norm interpretiert wer-
den muss; oder (2. Alternative) dass die Frage über die normgemäße oder normwid-
rige Natur der früheren (und vielleicht zu invalidierenden) Norm offen bleibt; oder
(3. Alternative) dass die frühere Norm als gültig und normgemäß verstanden wird mit
dem Argument, dass der Normerzeuger, obwohl er von dieser Norm wusste (oder wis-
sen konnte), sie hätte derogieren können, dies aber nicht getan hat.
Unabhängig von der Alternative, die gewählt wird, muss die (vielleicht) invalidier-
te Norm als eine gültige Norm verstanden werden, denn es gibt keinen rechtlichen
Grund, diese Norm als ungültig zu betrachten. Weil die Invalidation einer Norm keine
Änderung in Bezug auf die Beschreibung der gültigen Normen einer Rechtsordnung
verursacht und diese Art von Änderung von derogatorischen und suspensiven Nor-
men in der einen oder anderen Weise provoziert wird (d. h. durch die Behauptung der
provisorischen oder definitiven Beseitigung einer Norm), ist die Invalidation, anders
als die Derogation und die Suspension, keine Art von Normfunktion.
IV. Der Unterschied zwischen Derogation und Suspension und die

Möglichkeit eines Stufenbaues nach der derogatorischen Kraft
Walter hat in einer sehr deutlichen Weise dargestellt,18 dass nach Merkls Auffassung
die Verhältnisse zwischen den Normen einer Rechtsordnung nicht unbedingt als eine
Stufenordnung, als ein hierarchischer Stufenbau (der Stufenbau nach der rechtlichen
Bedingtheit) repräsentiert werden sollten, sondern als zwei unterschiedlich konfigu-
rierte Stufenbauten (der Stufenbau nach der rechtlichen Bedingtheit und der Stufen-
bau nach der derogatorischen Kraft).19 Die Behauptung der Existenz eines Stufenbaues
nach der derogatorischen Kraft beinhaltet die Idee, dass wegen positivrechtlicher Be-
stimmungen Normen mit einer bestimmten Rechtserzeugungsform20 Normen einer
18 Walter (Fn. 2), 53–66.

19 Wie Merkl hervorgehoben hat, sind hierarchische Verhältnisse zwischen Rechtserzeugungsformen
(Arten von Normen) nicht eine notwendige Eigenschaft aller Rechtsordnungen, sondern von konkreten
positivrechtlichen Bestimmungen abhängig. „Der rechtliche Stufenbau ist nicht etwas Rechtsimmanen-
tes, das die Rechtssetzung hinnehmen müßte, sondern ist selbst ein willkürliches, verwandlungsfähiges
Produkt der Rechtsordnung.“ Adolf Julius Merkl, Prolegomena einer Theorie des rechtlichen Stufenbaues,
Gesammelte Schriften (hg. von Dorothea Mayer-Maly / Herbert Schambeck / Wolf-Dietrich Grussmann),
Bd. I/1, 1993, 482.
20 Kelsen hat den Begriff „Rechtserzeugungsformen“ verwendet, während bei Merkl der Begriff „Rechts-
satzformen“ zu finden ist. Siehe Kelsen (Fn. 6), 499; Merkl (Fn. 19), 437. Hinter diesen Begriffen steht die
Idee, dass mehrere Arten von Normen erzeugt werden können, die wegen der Bedingungen, die von der
Rechtsordnung gesetzt sind, voneinander hierarchisch unterschieden werden können. Merkl präsentiert
diese Idee mit den folgenden Worten: „Den Hauptanteil an der Differenzierung der Rechtssatzformen hat
indes die Komplikation der Rechtserzeugung durch das je nach den verschiedenen Staats- und Regierungs-
formen wechselnde Zusammenwirken verschiedener Organe, z. B. verschiedener Faktoren der Gesetzge-

anderen Rechtserzeugungsform derogieren können oder nicht. Sind in einer Rechts-

ordnung Bestimmungen dieser Natur zu finden, dann kann behauptet werden, dass in
dieser Rechtsordnung die Normen von unterschiedlichen Rechtserzeugungsformen
in hierarchischen Verhältnissen miteinander stehen.21
Im Rahmen der Darstellung der Existenz eines Stufenbaues nach derogatorischer
Kraft kann der Fall analysiert werden, in der eine Norm mittels Alternativermächti-
gung erzeugt wurde, die im Konflikt mit einer anderen Norm steht. Es sind grundsätz-
lich zwei Möglichkeiten denkbar.
Erstens: Enthält die Rechtsordnung eine generelle Normierung für diese Fälle von
Normkonflikten und gleichzeitig eine oder mehrere Bestimmungen über die suspen-
sive Kraft von Normen mit unterschiedlichen Rechtserzeugungsformen, dann kann
behauptet werden, dass eine vollständige Darstellung der Rechtsordnung auch die An-
wendung einer Stufung nach der suspensiven Kraft erfordert, mit der Konsequenz,
dass es auch einen Stufenbau nach der suspensiven Kraft geben kann. Darüber hinaus
ist zu beachten, dass der Stufenbau nach der suspensiven Kraft eventuell anders darge-
stellt werden muss als der Stufenbau nach der derogatorischen Kraft, sodass beispiels-
weise Verordnungen Gesetze suspendieren können, aber keine derogatorische Kraft
über Gesetze haben.
Zweitens: Enthält die Rechtsordnung keine generelle Normierung für die Fälle von
Normenkonflikten, die das Ergebnis der Ausübung einer alternativen Ermächtigung
konstituieren, und ist auch nicht der Fall, dass durch Gewohnheitsrecht22 eine allge-
bung an der Staatswillensbildung. Je komplizierter die Staatswillensbildung, desto mannigfaltiger die in der
Rechtserzeugung benutzten Rechtssatzformen.“ Merkl (Fn. 19), 438 f.
21 Dazu schreibt Merkl: „Ein Rechtssatz, der gegenüber einem anderen Rechtssatz derogierende Kraft
hat, während dieser andere Rechtssatz ihm gegenüber keine derogierende Kraft hat, ist aus diesem Grunde
von höherem Rang und der derogierbare Rechtssatz im Vergleich mit dem derogierenden Rechtssatz von
niedrigerem Rang. Wenn dagegen – zum Unterschied von den besprochenen Fällen bloß einseitiger De-
rogierbarkeit – zwei Rechtssätze gegenseitig derogierbar sind, so ist dies Erkenntnisgrund ihres gleichen
Ranges. Z. B. ist das Verfassungsgesetz von höherem Rang als das einfache Gesetz, das Grundsatzgesetz von
höherem Rang als das Ausführungsgesetz, das einfache Gesetz wiederum und im besonderen das Ausfüh-
rungsgesetz von höherem Rang als die Vollzugsverordnung, das Gesetz und die Vollzugsverordnung von
höherem Rang als das Gerichtsurteil und der individuelle Verwaltungsakt, wenn und weil der jeweils zuerst
genannte dem jeweils an zweiter Stelle genannten Akte derogieren kann, jedoch nicht umgekehrt. Und ein
Bundes- und Landesgesetz oder ein einfaches Gesetz und eine sogenannte selbständige Verordnung sind
darum als rangsgleich zu erkennen, weil sie einander gegenseitig derogieren können.“ Merkl (Fn. 19), 468 f.
22 Kelsens Auffassung bezüglich des Gewohnheitsrechts ist ambivalent. An einer Stelle der Reine[n] Rechts-
lehre betont er, dass das Gewohnheitsrecht nur als Rechtsquelle anerkannt werden kann, wenn durch eine
oder mehrere positivrechtlichen Normierungen das Gewohnheitsrecht als Rechtsquelle gesetzt wird. „Als
objektiv gültige Norm kann aber der subjektive Sinn der die Gewohnheit konstituierenden Akte nur ge-
deutet werden, wenn die Gewohnheit durch eine höhere Norm als normerzeugender Tatbestand eingesetzt
wird.“ Kelsen (Fn. 6), 34 f. Andererseits ist an einer anderen Stelle der Reine[n] Rechtslehre eine Aussage zu
finden, nach der das Gewohnheitsrecht eventuell auch ohne positivrechtliche Bestimmung als Rechtsquel-
le betrachtet werden darf: „Wenn Gerichte als ermächtigt angesehen werden, auch Gewohnheitsrecht anzu-
wenden, so müssen sie hiezu – ganz so wie zur Anwendung der Gesetze – durch die Verfassung ermächtigt
sein; das heißt: die Verfassung muß die Gewohnheit, die durch das habituelle Verhalten der der staatlichen

meine Lösung identifiziert werden kann, dann müssen beide in Konflikt stehenden
Normen als gültig betrachtet werden. Doch im Gegensatz zu Lippolds Behauptung23
wird diese Situation keine Folge in Bezug auf die Vertretung der Existenz einer Stufung
nach der derogatorischen Kraft verursachen, denn allein die Existenz von Normen, die
in Konflikt mit anderen Normen stehen und mit dem Ziel erzeugt sind, diese anderen
Normen zu derogieren, reicht noch nicht, um die Stufung nach der derogatorischen
Kraft in Frage zu stellen. Diese Stufung könnte ihre Nützlichkeit nur verlieren, wenn
die mittels Alternativermächtigung erzeugten Normen in der Tat in der Lage wären,
die mit ihnen in Konflikt stehenden Normen zu derogieren. Solange diese Situation
niemals oder nur ausnahmsweise erfolgt, existiert kein Grund, um die Relevanz einer
Stufung nach der derogatorischen Kraft in Frage zu stellen. In diesem Fall sind nun
zwei Aspekte hervorzuheben: Erstens, dass eine Stufung nach der derogatorischen
Kraft immer noch existiert; zweitens, dass es wegen der Abwesenheit von generellen
Bestimmungen über die Suspension nicht möglich ist, über eine Stufung nach der sus-
pensiven Kraft zu sprechen.
V. Schluss
Ist wegen der Erzeugung einer Norm eine andere Norm als provisorisch ungültig zu
betrachten, dann muss diese zweite Norm als suspendiert betrachtet werden. Weil mit-
tels Erzeugung dieser Norm eine provisorische Konsequenz bezüglich der Geltung
Rechtsordnung unterworfenen Individuen – der Staats-Subjekte (oder Untertanen) – konstituiert wird,

als rechtserzeugenden Tatbestand einsetzen. Wird die Anwendung von Gewohnheitsrecht durch die Ge-
richte als rechtmäßig angesehen, obgleich die geschriebene Verfassung keine solche Ermächtigung enthält,
kann die Ermächtigung […] nicht in einer Norm der ungeschriebenen, durch Gewohnheit entstandenen
Verfassung gegeben sein, sondern muß ebenso vorausgesetzt werden, wie vorausgesetzt werden muß, daß
die geschriebene Verfassung den Charakter objektiv verbindlicher Norm hat, wenn die ihr gemäß erlasse-
nen Gesetze und Verordnungen als verbindliche Rechtsnormen angesehen werden. Dann setzt die Grund-
norm – als die Verfassung im rechtslogischen Sinne – nicht nur den Akt des Verfassunggebers, sondern
auch die durch das Verhalten der der verfassungsmäßig erzeugten Rechtsordnung unterworfenen Subjekte
konstituierte Gewohnheit als rechtserzeugenden Tatbestand ein.“ Kelsen (Fn. 6), 401.
23 „Während der Stufenbau nach der rechtlichen Bedingtheit durch den Fehlerkalkül geradewegs bestä-
tigt wird, wird der Stufenbau nach der derogatorischen Kraft vom Fehlerkalkül in Frage gestellt. Zumin-
dest handelt es sich um eine deutliche Modifikation. Wenn im Fall des uneingeschränkten Fehlerkalküls
Rechtsvorschriften der einen Rechtsform (z. B. Gesetze) die Geltung von Rechtsvorschriften einer anderen
Rechtsform (die ersteren nach der rechtlichen Bedingtheit übergeordnet sind, hier der Verfassung) dauer-
haft suspendieren können, so läßt sich nur noch mit großen Einschränkungen behaupten, letztere seien
ersten hinsichtlich ihrer derogatorischen Kraft übergeordnet. Dies gilt zumal dann, wenn die Auslegung
ergibt, daß die Abänderung ‚höherrangiger‘ Rechtsvorschriften nicht die Derogation der abweichenden
‚niederrangigen‘ Rechtsvorschriften bewirkt, sondern nur ihre Fehlerhaftigkeit zur Folge hat (sog Invali-
dation). Spätestens dann kann die derogatorische Kraft nicht mehr als Kriterium eines Stufenbaues heran-
gezogen werden. Von einem Stufenbau nach der derogatorischen Kraft kann dann im strengen Sinn keine
Rede mehr sein.“ Lippold (Fn. 3), 418.

einer anderen Norm erfolgt und derogatorische Normen dazu nicht in der Lage sind,
sind suspensive Normen von derogatorischen Normen wesensunterschiedlich und
die Suspension ist als eine eigene Normfunktion anzuerkennen. Die Anerkennung
der Suspension als eine Normfunktion ist nicht nur für eine genauere Betrachtung
der Normfunktionen wichtig, sondern sie ist auch als Mittel, um in einigen Fällen die
Konsequenzen der Rechtserzeugung dank Alternativermächtigung zu erklären, und
zu erklären, warum die Existenz von Normen, die mittels Alternativermächtigung er-
zeugt sind, als solche kein Grund ist, die Möglichkeit einer Stufung der Normen nach
ihrer derogatorischen Kraft in Frage zu stellen.
Matheus Pelegrino da Silva

LL.M. (Freiburg), Postdoc Stipendiat des CAPES, Verfahrensnummer 88881.171237/
2018-01, Porto Alegre – RS – Brasilien, mathpelegrino@hotmail.com


Welche Rolle für die Rechtswissenschaft?
Zu einer Debatte innerhalb der Wiener
rechtstheoretischen Schule
THOMAS HOCHMANN
What is the Role of Legal Science?

A Debate inside the Vienna School of Legal Theory
Abstract: The task of legal science is to describe norms, and not to prescribe them. But
which are the norms that are susceptible of a description by legal science? Can a legal
scholar describe a norm that has not yet been applied? Can a legal scholar demonstrate
that a legal organ has committed an error, that its decision was an erroneous application
of a norm? In other words: is there an independent point of view of legal science, distinct
from the point of view of legal organs?
On these questions, no unanimity exists inside the Vienna school of legal theory. These
points were especially discussed in the early years of the movement by Fritz Sander and
Adolf Merkl. According to Sander, one can describe law only through the assertions of
competent organs. Legal science exceeds its limits as soon as it asks whether a legal act
was “correct”, i. e. whether it was produced in conformity with the superior norms. This
thesis was sharply criticised by Merkl in several writings. Kelsen did not expressly refute
what Merkl called “Sander’s sceptical resignation,” but he also never supported it. The es-
say examine Sander’s and Merkl’s views, shows the superiority of Merkl’s position, and try
to explain Kelsen’s silence on this issue.
Keywords: Legal Science, Adolf Julius Merkl, Fritz Sander, Hans Kelsen, Interpretation,
Pure Theory of Law
Schlagworte: Rechtswissenschaft, Adolf Julius Merkl, Fritz Sander, Hans Kelsen, Ausle-
gung, Reine Rechtslehre

162 THOMAS HOCHMANN
Die Wiener Schule verteidigt bekanntlich ein restriktives Verständnis von Rechtswis-
senschaft.1 Danach ist es die Aufgabe der Rechtswissenschaft, das positive Recht zu
beschreiben. Der Beobachter soll nicht seine eigenen subjektiven Meinungen in diese
Beschreibung einschmuggeln, sondern sich immer bewusst bleiben, dass er das Recht
nicht ändern kann. Nur die juristischen Organe können rechtliche Normen setzen.
Diese unumstrittenen Prämissen können aber zu sehr verschiedenen Auffassungen
führen. Hier möchte ich an eine Debatte erinnern, die regelmäßig Autoren gegenüber-
stellt, die sich mehr oder weniger auf Kelsen stützen: von Adolf Merkl und Fritz San-
der2 in den 1920er Jahren bis zu zeitgenössischen Kontroversen zwischen Otto Pfers-
mann und Michel Troper. Ich werde zunächst die zwei gegnerischen Thesen vorstellen,
wobei sich zeigen wird, dass die eine überzeugender als die andere ist. Anschließend
werde ich Kelsens vieldeutiges Schweigen in dieser zentralen Frage interpretieren.
I. Die Leugnung der Rechtswissenschaft (Sander)
Jeder der hier behandelten Autoren geht davon aus, dass es nicht Aufgabe der Rechts-
wissenschaft ist, Recht zu erzeugen. Die Rechtsetzung soll vielmehr ausschließlich den
Organen vorbehalten sein, die dafür zuständig sind. Die Rechtswissenschaft gehört
nicht dazu. Doch was bedeutet dieser Vorbehalt? Kann die Rechtswissenschaft einen
kritischen Blick auf die juristische Ordnung werfen? Anders formuliert: kann sie eine
Kritik leisten, die nicht auf politischen Wertungen, sondern auf juristischen Analysen
gestützt wird? Kann zum Beispiel die Rechtswissenschaft feststellen, dass ein juristi-
sches Organ eine Norm fehlerhaft angewendet hat?
Im Jahr 1923 schrieb Merkl dazu Folgendes: „Die Jurisprudenz hat bis vor kurzem
an der Annahme der Möglichkeit und Erkennbarkeit derartigen Organirrtums so gut
wie ausnahmslos festgehalten.“3 Bezüglich der heutigen Rechtswissenschaft, zumin-
dest in Frankreich, könnte man eine fast umgekehrte Bilanz ziehen. Es herrscht ein
Rechtsprechungspositivismus, der das Recht mit den gerichtlichen Entscheidungen
gleichsetzt, und der sich nicht vorstellen kann, diese Entscheidungen einer kritischen
Prüfung zu unterwerfen. Michel Troper wird manchmal als rechtstheoretischer Bürge
für diese Vorgehensweise betrachtet.
1 Vgl. Matthias Jestaedt, Der Staatsrechtslehrer Hans Kelsen – Provokateur aus Leidenschaft. Vier Schlag-
lichter auf ein Jahrhundert wechselvoller Beziehung, in: Hans Kelsen und die deutsche Staatsrechtslehre, hg.
von Matthias Jestaedt, 2013, 6 f.
2 Fritz Sander zählte sich selbst nicht zum Kreis von Kelsens Schülern. Biographisch wie substantiell
entwickelte sich sein Werk aber in enger Beziehung zu Kelsen. Vgl. Christoph Kletzer, Fritz Sander, in:
Der Kreis um Hans Kelsen: die Anfangsjahre der Reinen Rechtslehre, hg. von Robert Walter / Clemens Jablo-
ner / Klaus Zeleny, 2008, 445.
3 Adolf Merkl, Die Lehre von der Rechtskraft entwickelt aus dem Rechtsbegriff, 1923, 281.

Welche Rolle für die Rechtswissenschaft? 163
Diese Haltung wurde aber schon in den Anfangsjahren der Wiener Schule verteidigt,
und zwar insbesondere von Fritz Sander. Dieser Autor bezieht sich auf einen komple-
xen philosophischen Apparat, er verwendet ein schwieriges Vokabular, und hat – zu-
mindest aus französischer Sicht – wenig gemein mit Tropers immer sonnenklaren Stil.
Seine Auffassung des Rechts unterscheidet sich auch zweifelsohne von Tropers. Beide
Autoren leisten aber eine ganz ähnliche Kritik der „traditionellen“ Rechtswissenschaft.
Für Sander stellt jede Frage „nach der Rechtmäßigkeit einer Organhandlung [eine]
Grenzüberschreitung der Rechtswissenschaft“ dar.4 Das Objekt der Rechtswissen-
schaft ist das Recht, wobei das Recht als Gesamtheit von Verfahren verstanden wird.
Die Rechtswissenschaft soll sich damit begnügen, diese Verfahren zu beschreiben. Da
nur der Richter zuständig ist, ein Gesetz anzuwenden, sei es sinnlos, die „Rechtmä-
ßigkeit“ der richterlichen Entscheidung zu beurteilen oder zu fragen, ob andere Ent-
scheidungen „möglich“ gewesen wären. In einer Rechtssache, so Sander, „[m]ögen die
Parteien behaupten, ihre subjektive Ansicht sei die richtige; diese ‘Richtigkeit kommt
für die reine Rechtswissenschaft nur als ‘Naturrecht’ in Betracht, ‘richtig’ ist für die
reine Rechtswissenschaft nur die rechtlich erzeugte Rechtssatzform.“5
Sander geht dabei davon aus, dass es keinen Sinn macht, das Recht zu beschrei-
ben, bevor es angewendet worden ist.6 Vor dem Anwendungsakt existiere das Recht
einfach nicht, und jede Ansprüche in dieser Richtung seien nur „subjektive Wünsche
und Meinungen […], individuelle Abwägung der ‘Chancen’ gewisser Zielsetzungen.“7
Sander betont die „rechtliche Bedeutungslosigkeit der vorprozessualen Rechtslage.“8
Die Rechtswissenschaft könne nur a posteriori beobachten, was passiert ist, was „recht-
lich […] wirklich war.“ So könne die Rechtswissenschaft vor dem konkreten Urteil
nicht behaupten, dass eine Partei ein „Recht“ auf die Vertragsauflösung habe oder dass
ein Dieb zu einer bestimmten Strafe verurteilt werden „solle.“ Solche Behauptungen
bildeten nur Wünschen oder Hypothesen, aber keine Beschreibung des positiven
Rechts,9 das nur durch den Anwendungsprozess geschaffen werde.
Sander hat bestimmt Recht, wenn man an die konkrete Norm denkt. Vor dem Urteil
ist der Vertrag nicht aufgelöst, und der Dieb nicht verurteilt. Aber warum sollte es
unmöglich sein, die abstrakte Norm vor seiner Anwendung zu beschreiben? Sander
4 aaO, 281.
5 Fritz Sander, Das Faktum der Revolution und die Kontinuität der Rechtsordnung, ZöR (1919), 146, Fn. 2.
6 Vgl. Adolf Merkl, Das doppeltes Rechtsantlitz (1918), in: Gesammelte Schriften, hg. von Dorothea Ma-
yer-Maly, Herbert Schambeck und Wolf-Dietrich Grussmann, Bd. I/1, 1993, 237: Für Sander ist „Das Recht
[…] vor dem Stadium der Rechtsprechung, dieser letzten Erscheinung der Rechtserzeugung […], nicht
bloß unvollendet, sondern im Grunde überhaupt noch nicht gesetzt […]. Das führt zu der Konsequenz,
dass es der Rechtswissenschaft überhaupt versagt ist, das Recht inhaltlich irgendwie zu zeichnen, bevor der
Rechtsanwender in der Person des Richters oder des Verwaltungsbeamten gesprochen hat […].“
7 Fritz Sander, Das Faktum der Revolution und die Kontinuität der Rechtsordnung, ZöR (1919), 147.
8 Ebd.
9 Vgl. aaO 148: „Jede Stufe des Rechtssystems bedeutet nur abstrakte Möglichkeit – ‘Hypothesis’ – im Ver-
hältnis zur untergeordneten Stufe.“

164 THOMAS HOCHMANN
scheint jede statische Auffassung der Rechtsordnung auszuschließen. Das Recht ist für
ihn ein kontinuierlicher Prozess, und die Rechtswissenschaft kann nur diese kontinu-
ierliche Erzeugung beobachten.10 Sander kann also nur an einen a posteriori Beitrag der
Rechtswissenschaft denken. Sie kann nur beschreiben, was geschehen ist. In keinem
Fall kann sie untersuchen, wie die Dinge im Einklang mit dem Recht ablaufen könnten
(oder sollten).11 Viele Jahren später wird Michel Troper zum selben Schluss kommen
(wenn auch mit einer anderen Argumentation). Es sei nicht möglich, das Recht zu
beschreiben, bevor das zuständige Anwendungsorgan eingetreten ist: „Die anzuwen-
dende Norm existiert noch nicht und kann nicht beschrieben werden.“12
Aus denselben Erwägungen ist es Sander zufolge ausgeschlossen, vom rechtswis-
senschaftlichen Standpunkt aus nach der Rechtmäßigkeit oder Rechtswidrigkeit eines
Rechtsaktes zu fragen: „Eine ‘Rechtswidrigkeit’ vor einem konkreten Rechtsmittelver-
fahren, eine ‘Rechtswidrigkeit’ an sich gibt es nicht.“ Alles, was ein Beobachter geltend
machen kann, sei eine „Naturrechtswidrigkeit“:

„der ‘rechtswidrige’ Akt ist, wenn er überhaupt in der Rechtserfahrung zu finden, also für
die Rechtswissenschaft bedeutsam ist, ein rechtlicher Akt, der nur als Tatbestand eines sog.
Rechtsmittelverfahrens eine besondere rechltliche Qualifikation, nämlich die der ‘Rechtswid-
rigkeit’ erhält: ‘Rechtswidrigkeit’ als Gegenstand der Rechtswissenschaft ist nur innerhalb
des Rechtes, als besondere Art des Rechtes zu finden. Diese positive, rechtsreale ‘Rechts-
widrigkeit’ ist aber niemals eine ‘apriorische’, sondern immer nur eine ‘aposteriorische’, in
einem konkreten Rechtsverfahren gesetzte Rechtswidrigkeit: Eine ‘Rechtswidrigkeit’ vor
einem konkreten Rechtsmittelverfahren, eine ‘Rechtswidrigkeit’ an sich gibt es nicht. Die
‘apriorische’ Rechtswidrigkeit hingegen, von welcher Merkl spricht, ist eine metarecht-
liche Qualifikation, ist eine ‘Naturrechtswidrigkeit.’ “13
Auch hier kommt Michel Troper zum selben Ergebnis: die Feststellung des Irrtums
des Rechtsorgans könne nur eine subjektive und deshalb unwissenschaftliche Wer-
10 aaO 150: „‘System’ bedeutet aber der reinen Rechtswissenschaft nicht eine geordnete Mannigfaltigkeit
gegebener starrer Rechtsdinge (der Rechtssatzformen), sondern kontinuierliche Erzeugung aus einem Ur-
sprunge. Die Dynamik der Methode durchströmt die Statik des Systems. Die starre metaphysische ‘Ding
an sich’ der Rechtssatzform wird in kontinuierlich fließende Funktionen aufgelöst.“ Vgl. auch Fritz Sander,
Staat und Recht, Prolegomena zu einer Theorie der Rechtserfahrung, 1922, 1190: „Denn Merkl vollzieht eine
Umdeutung der Dynamik des realen Rechtes in die Statik der formalen Logik der Rechtswissenschaft.“ Her-
vorhebung im Original.
11 Eine Entscheidung ist gefallen, und es soll die Rechtswissenschaft gleichgültig sein, ob eine andere Ent-
scheidung möglich war. Vgl. Sander (Fn. 10), Staat und Recht, 1197: „eben rechtlich allein dieses ‘subjektive’
Ermessen wirklich war, wenn auch logisch ein anderes ‘subjektives’ Ermessen möglich war.“ Hervorhebung
im Original.
12 Michel Troper, La théorie du droit, le droit, l’État, 2001, 12: „La norme applicable n’existe pas encore et
ne peut être décrite.“
13 Sander (Fn. 10), Staat und Recht, 1206.

tung sein.14 Nur die Geltung der Entscheidung sei von Bedeutung. Ihre angebliche
(Nicht-)Übereinstimmung mit dem anzuwendenden Recht sei nicht Gegenstand der
Rechtswissenschaft.15
Die eigentliche Rechtswissenschaft prüfe also nicht die Beachtung einer höheren
Norm durch eine niedrigere Norm. Sie müsse sich damit begnügen, die Entscheidun-
gen der juristischen Organe zu beobachten. In Sanders Worten: „Die Rechtswissen-
schaft kann die ‘Wahrheit’ des Rechtes nicht kraft eigener Regeln erfassen, sondern nur
durch Analyse der Urteile des Rechtes.“ Es sind „ausschließlich die Urteile des Rechtes,
welche ‘Unrecht und Recht erkennen’, während die Urteile der Rechtswissenschaft jene
‘Erkenntnis’ nur reflektierend analysieren, ihre eigene – rechtswissenschaftliche – Wahr-
heit mittelbar auf die rechtliche Wahrheit stützen.“16 Was allein zählt, ist die „Rechtser-
fahrung“, das Verständnis, das das Recht von sich selbst gewinnt.17 Die Rechtswissen-
schaft könne nur die Entscheidungen der juristischen Organen beschreiben, sie könne
aber diese Entscheidungen weder juristisch kritisieren, noch sie untersuchen, bevor
sie durch ein anderes Organ konkretisiert worden sind.
Wie Merkl bemerkt, gelangt Sander damit zu einer Leugnung der Rechtswissen-
schaft.18 Dasselbe gilt für Troper. Was bleibt, ist eine Beschreibung der Entscheidun-
gen, die nicht mit Rechtsmitteln angegriffen werden können. Diese können zwar kriti-
siert werden, aber nicht anhand einer juristischen Analyse. Sander und Troper nennen
dieses Unternehmen „Dogmatik“.19 Jeder Versuch, die Rechtsordnung rechtswissen-
schaftlich zu durchdringen, laufe auf eine Art des (unwissenschaftlichen) Naturrechts-
denkens hinaus. Solche Pseudo-Rechtswissenschaft kann allenfalls zum Objekt einer
echten Wissenschaft werden: die „Wissenschaft der Rechtswissenschaft.“20
14 Troper (Fn. 12), 13.

15 aaO 88.
16 Sander (Fn. 10), Staat und Recht, 1208. Hervorhebung im Original.
17 Vgl. Kletzer (Fn. 2), 453.
18 Merkl (Fn. 6), 236: „die Bestreitung dieser Überprüfungsmöglichkeit – was zugleich den Verzicht auf
eine Rechtswissenschaft von irgendwelchem Inhalt in sich schließt.“ Vgl. auch aaO 249: „jenen unausge-
sprochenen Verzicht auf rechtswissenschaftliche Erkenntnis.“
19 Z. B. Fritz Sander, Rechtsdogmatik oder Theorie der Rechtserfahrung? Kritische Studie zur Rechtslehre
Kelsens, ZöR (1922), 523; Troper (Fn. 12), 5.
20 Der Ausdruck erscheint bei Sander (Fn. 10), Staat und Recht, 1207. Michel Troper und seine Schüler
haben zahlreiche interessante Werke zur Analyse der dogmatischen Diskurse geleistet. Vgl. Michel Troper,
Pour une théorie juridique de l’Etat, 1994, 44, der eine Rechtswissenschaft erwägt, die sich nicht mit den
Normen sondern mit dem rechtlichen Diskurs und der rechtlichen Denkweise beschäftigen würde („une
science du droit qui prendrait pour objet non plus les normes, ni les comportements, mais le discours et
le raisonnement juridiques, objet à la fois spécifique et sur lequel peuvent être énoncées des propositions
vraies.“) Vgl. auch, zur „Wissenschaft der Rechtswissenschaft“, Matthias Jestaedt, Perspektiven der Rechts-
wissenschaftstheorie, in: Rechtswissenschaftstheorie, hg. von Matthias Jestaedt / Oliver Lepsius, 2008, 189.

166 THOMAS HOCHMANN
II. Die Verteidigung der Rechtswissenschaft (Merkl)
Gegen solche Angriffe hat Merkl die Rechtswissenschaft verteidigt. Sanders Aus-
gangspunkt ist richtig, erklärt Merkl. Er geht aber zu weit. Die Rechtswissenschaft sei
traditionell geneigt gewesen, sich die Rolle der juristischen Organe anzueignen. Sie
habe behauptet in der Lage zu sein, die einzige rechtlich erforderliche Lösung in jedem
konkreten Fall geben zu können. So hat sie tatsächlich die Grenzen ihrer Beschrei-
bungsfunktion überschritten, weil die anzuwendenden Normen immer ein Ermessen,
eine Entscheidungsfreiheit dem Anwendungsorgan überlassen. Darin liegt eine we-
sentliche Komponente der Stufenbaulehre, die Merkl oft betont hat.21
Deshalb muss „die Rechtswissenschaft den einzelnen Akt der Rechtsanwendung
erwarten […], um sagen zu können, was in dem einzelnen Falle Recht ist.“22 Hier muss
man aber aufpassen: diese Feststellung bedeutet nicht, dass die Rechtswissenschaft
von den rechtlichen Organen „entthront“ wird.23 Es ist ja ein Irrtum, der Rechtswis-
senschaft eine normative Funktion zuzuweisen. Aber man begeht auch einen Irrtum,
wenn man der Rechtsanwendung eine Rechtserkenntnisfunktion zuweist. Sander
übertreibe „in entgegengesetzter Richtung,“ erklärt Merkl.24 Er gehe zu weit, wenn
er „schon die bloße Fragestellung nach der Rechtmäßigkeit einer Organhandlung als
Grenzüberschreitung der Rechtswissenschaft“ ablehnt,“25 oder die wissenschaftliche
Beschreibung einer Norm vor ihrer Anwendung verwirft. Solche Stellungnahmen der
Rechtswissenschaft bilden für Sander eine „Zerreißung der Einheit der Bedingungen
der Rechtserzeugung.“26
Merkl zeigt demgegenüber, dass es durchaus möglich ist, quasi eine Linie durch den
Prozess zu ziehen und das Recht auf einer bestimmten Ebene des Stufenbaus zu be-
schreiben.27 Die Argumente, die Merkl Sander entgegenhält, werden später auch gegen
21 Vgl. z.B. Adolf Merkl, Das Recht im Lichte seiner Anwendung (1916–1919), Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.
I/1 (Fn. 6), 104 f.
22 Merkl (Fn. 6), 246.
23 Ebd.: „Es bedeutet dies, wie noch klar werden soll, durchaus keine Entthronung der Rechtswissen-
schaft, sondern im Gegenteil ihre Selbstbehauptung.“ Interessanterweise erscheint hier eine Formel – die
„Entthronung der Rechtswissenschaft“ –, die von Bernhard Schlink in seiner berühmten Kritik des Bun-
desverfassungsgerichtspositivismus viel später verwendet wurde. Bernhard Schlink, Die Entthronung der
Staatsrechtswissenschaft durch die Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, Der Staat (1989), 161–172.
24 Merkl (Fn. 6), 247: „Die heutige Rechtswissenschaft maßt sich nämlich Fähigkeiten der Rechtsanwen-
dung an, und es ist nur eine gesunde Reaktion gegen diesen Übergriff, eine Reaktion, die freilich als Über-
treibung in entgegengesetzter Richtung wirkt, wenn der Rechtsanwendung eine Rechtserkenntnisfunktion
zugedacht wird, die ihr fremd ist.“
25 Merkl (Fn. 3), 281.
26 Sander (Fn. 10), Staat und Recht, 1196: „Wenn wir die Entgegensetzung der logischen Möglichkeit und
der rechtlichen Wirklichkeit bis zu ihrer letzten Wurzel verfolgen, so finden wir, dass sie auf einer Zerreißung
der Einheit der Bedingungen der Rechtserzeugung […] beruht.“ Hervorhebung im Original.
27 Merkl (Fn. 3), 288.

Michel Troper, insbesondere von Otto Pfersmann, verwendet.28 Hier kann ich nur ein
paar Beispiele geben.
Beginnen wir mit Sanders „rechtliche Bedeutungslosigkeit der vorprozessualen
Rechtslage.“29 Zwar existiert kein Recht, bevor es vom zuständigen Organ gesetzt
wird. Der Richter ist aber nicht das einzige Rechtsorgan. Recht wird auf jeder Stufe
der Rechtsordnung gesetzt. So ist beispielsweise das Gesetz die Grundlage des Urteils
wie auch das Ergebnis des Gesetzgebungsverfahrens.30 Jede Norm – bis auf die erste,
deren Geltung nur vorausgesetzt werden kann – ist eine Anwendungsnorm. In Merkls
Worten, „jede vorprozessuale Rechtslage [ist] zugleich auch nachprozessuale Rechtslage “31
Die Tatsache, dass das Recht sprachlich gefasst wird, begründet auch keine„skepti-
sche Resignation“, wie Merkl Sanders Einstellung nennt.32 Die Unbestimmtheit oder
Mehrdeutigkeit der normativen Sätze hindere nicht daran, mehrere Auslegungen als
unzweifelhaft richtig oder falsch zu beschreiben.33 Sander – sowie später Troper – sieht
in jeder Auslegung eine reine subjektive – und deshalb unwissenschaftliche – Wer-

tung.34 Dagegen kann Merkl einwenden: Warum sollte das Recht in einer Sprache
verfasst sein, die nur den juristischen Organen verständlich ist?35 Wenn die Sprache
keinen besonderen Sinn mitteilen könnte, fügt dann Otto Pfersmann hinzu, wie kann
man behaupten, richterliche Entscheidungen, dogmatische Schriften, oder überhaupt
irgendeinen Text zu studieren?36
Ein anderes Argument von Merkl wird später in der Widerlegung von Tropers The-
sen wieder auftreten.37 Wenn es unmöglich ist, das Verhältnis zwischen einem Akt und
die ihn bedingende Norm zu prüfen, wie kann man behaupten, dass ein bestimmtes
Organ ein Rechtsorgan ist, dass es als solches zuständig ist, um Rechtsnormen zu set-
zen?38 Soll die Rechtswissenschaft alles als Recht erkennen, was sich als solche vor-
stellt? Ist die Rechtswissenschaft nicht in der Lage, die Befehle des Hauptmannes von
Köpenick als Nicht-Recht zu brandmarken?39 Das Recht, erklärt Sander demgegen-
28 Otto Pfersmann, Contre le néo-réalisme juridique. Pour un débat sur l’interprétation, Revue française de
droit constitutionnel (2002), 789–836.
29 Sander (Fn. 5), 147.
30 Merkl (Fn. 3), 282. Vgl. in der selben Richtung Olivier Jouanjan, Une interprétation de la théorie réaliste
de Michel Troper, Droits (2003), 43.
31 Merkl (Fn. 3), 282. Hervorhebung im Original.
32 Merkl (Fn. 6), 249.
33 Ebd.
34 Sander (Fn. 19), 523; Troper (Fn. 12) 13, 74.
35 Merkl (Fn. 6), 238.
36 Pfersmann (Fn. 28), 828, 835. Vgl. auch Jouanjan (Fn. 30), 43.
37 Riccardo Guastini, Michel Troper sur la fonction juridictionnelle, Droits (2003), 116 f.
38 Merkl (Fn. 3), 283; Merkl (Fn. 6), 237; Adolf Merkl, Das Problem der Rechtskontinuität und die Forde-
rung des einheitlichen rechtlichen Weltbildes (1926), Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. I/1 (Fn. 6), 391.
39 Hans Kelsen, Über Staatsunrecht. Zugleich ein Beitrag zur Frage der Deliktsfähigkeit juristischer Perso-
nen und zur Lehre vom fehlerhaften Staatsakt (1914), Werke, hg. von Matthias Jestaedt, Bd. 3, 2010, 486, 511.
Dieser Beispiel wird auch von Merkl benützt. Vgl. Merkl (Fn. 3), 283, Fn. 1; Merkl (Fn. 6), 239.

168 THOMAS HOCHMANN
über dann tatsächlich, lege sich selbst aus. Es komme darauf an, einzusehen, „dass der
objektive Sinn jeder Rechtserscheinung nicht in der Subjektivität der Auslegung, son-
dern lediglich in der objektiven, verfahrensmäßigen Beziehung dieser Rechtserschei-
nung auf alle anderen Rechtserscheinungen sich vollzieht […].“40 Wie kann aber die
Rechtswissenschaft feststellen, dass ein Vorgang in einer „verfahrensmäßigen“ Bezie-
hung mit anderen steht, wenn solche Urteile ihr verwehrt sind?
Schließlich wirft Merkl noch ein politisches Argument auf. Die Unterwerfung der
Rechtswissenschaft unter jedem als Recht auftretenden Vorgang würde zu einer Vor-
stellung führen, die günstig für den Absolutismus ist. Umgekehrt erlaubt das Behalten
einer kritischen Fähigkeit, das Individuum vor einem angeblichen Rechtsorgan, das
seine Zuständigkeiten überschreitet, zu schützen.41 Merkl betont, dass er auf keinen
Fall dazu neigt, solche absolutistische Tendenzen bei Sander zu identifizieren. Man
muss hier aber anmerken, dass Sander sich später dem Faschismus angenähert hat.42
Merkl vertritt also überzeugend die Möglichkeit einer Rechtswissenschaft, die

keine bloße Registrierungskammer von allem wäre, was sich als Recht ausgibt. Sie
muss ihr Objekt identifizieren, und deshalb Recht von Nicht-Recht unterscheiden.
Dieses Unternehmen ist die notwendigeVorbedingung für jede Analyse des positiven
Rechts.43 Sanders Replik darauf ist brutal – zumindest im Kontext der Wiener Schule.
Merkls Theorie sei eine Naturrechtstheorie,44 sie sehe die Rechtswissenschaft als eine
Rechtsquelle,45 oder genauer eine Unrechtsquelle.46 Die Rechtswissenschaft sei aber
nicht imstande, Recht in Nicht-Recht zu verwandeln.
Sanders Kritik verfehlt aber ihr Ziel. Merkl benutzt zwar irreführende Formeln,
wenn er behauptet, dass „Recht ist, was die Rechtswissenschaft als wahr erkennt“,47
wenn er von dem „Richterstuhl der Rechtserkenntnis“ spricht,48 wenn er dem „Gel-
tungsanspruch“ von angeblichen Rechtserscheinungen „die höhere Autorität der
Rechtswissenschaft“ gegenüberstellt,49 oder wenn er schreibt, dass die Rechtswissen-
40 Sander (Fn. 19), 522. Hervorhebung nicht im Original.

41 Merkl (Fn. 6), 252; Merkl (Fn. 3), 284, 287, Fn 1.
42 Kletzer (Fn. 2), 463 f.
43 Merkl (Fn. 3), 291.
44 Sander (Fn. 10), Staat und Recht, 1201: „Merkls Gedankengang läuft eben auf die naturrechtliche Speku-
lation hinaus, dass es ‘Recht’ gebe, welches […] seine ‘Geltung’ nur aus der logischen Anerkennung durch
die Rechtswissenschaft schöpfe.“ Hervorhebung im Original.
45 Sander (Fn. 19), 521, Fn. 1.
47 Merkl (Fn. 3), 290.
48 aaO, 286.
49 aaO, 286, Fn. 1.

schaft das Anwendungsorgan „kontrollieren,“50 dass sie die „Erscheinungen, die mit
dem Schein von Recht auftreten, als Nichtrecht disqualifizieren“ könne.51
Es ist aber ganz klar, dass diese Urteile der Rechtswissenschaft für Merkl immer de-
klarativ, und niemals konstitutiv sind. Die Rechtswissenschaft kann nur feststellen, dass
manche Rechtsnormen oder scheinbare Rechtsnormen die höheren Normen nicht
beachten. Die Rechtswissenschaft verfügt nicht über die Macht, irgendeine Norm zu
vernichten oder in Geltung zu setzen. Sie beobachtet nur, dass – aufgrund verschie-
dener Normen – eine angebliche Rechtsnorm nichtig ist, oder dass sie nur kraft einer
anderen Norm trotz ihre Fehlhaftigkeit gilt (Fehlerkalkültheorie).52
Merkl hat nie den Standpunkt des rechtlichen Organs – den Standpunkt des Rechts,
in Sanders Theorie – und den Standpunkt der Rechtswissenschaft verwechselt. Er
hat nie vergessen, „dass eben rechtlich allein dieses ‘subjektive’ Ermessen wirklich war,
wenn auch logisch ein anderes ‘subjektives’ Ermessen möglich war.“53 Ganz im Gegen-
teil hat er es oft unterstrichen, dass nur die rechtlichen Organe dafür zuständig sind,
Rechtsnormen zu setzen.54 „Will sie [die Rechtswissenschaft] erkunden, was im einzel-
nen Rechtens sei, dann frage sie – beim Richter an!“55
Die „Antinomie,“ die Verdross später zwischen Sander und Merkl beobachten wird,
wird also falsch aufgestellt. Merkl hätte keine Schwierigkeit, der These zuzustimmen,
die Verdross als das Gegenteil von Merkls Lehre darstellt: dass „jede Rechtsnorm nur
durch einen Organakt niederer Stufe, niemals aber unmittelbar durch die Rechts-
wissenschaft in verbindlicher Weise ausgelegt werden kann.“56 Die Gegensätzlichkeit
zwischen Sander und Merkl dreht sich nicht um die Lokalisierung der Entscheidungs-
macht, sondern um die Möglichkeit eines wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis.
Denn für Merkl bedeutet das Entscheidungsmonopol der Rechtsorgane kein Er-
kenntnisprivileg.57 Die Rechtswissenschaft kann nicht statt des zuständigen Organs
entscheiden, aber das heißt nicht, dass sie nichts über diese Entscheidung hinaus sagen
kann. Das Rechtsorgan genießt nämlich eine Ermessensfreiheit, aber er soll innerhalb
50 aaO, 285. Vgl. auch das folgende Zitat, das Sander (Fn. 19), 522, Merkl zuschreibt, und das ich aber nicht
finden konnte: ‚Insoweit kann er [der Rechtsanwender] aber von der Rechtswissenschaft kontrolliert und
ins Unrecht gesetzt werden.’
51 Merkl (Fn. 3), 291
52 Vgl. Merkl, Die gerichtliche Prüfung von Gesetzen und Verordnungen. Die Idee einer gerichtlichen
Rechtskontrolle (1921), Gesammelte Schriften, hg. von Dorothea Mayer-Maly, Herbert Schambeck und
Wolf-Dietrich Grussmann, Bd. II/1, 1999, 434 f.; Merkl (Fn. 3), 277 ff. und im Besonderen 294 ff.
54 Merkl (Fn. 6), 235.
55 Merkl (Fn. 21), 108
56 Alfred Verdross, Eine Antinomie der Rechtstheorie (1951), in: Die Wiener rechtstheoretische Schule, hg.
von Hans Klecatsky / René Marcic / Herbert Schambeck, Bd. 2, 1968, 1126.
57 Merkl (Fn. 21), 110, 113, 132 f.: „Der Rechtsanwender […] hat Recht, […] nicht auf Grund eines Ken-
nens, sondern eines Könnens, nicht weil es besser weiß, sondern weil er es besser kann.“ Vgl. auch Merkl
(Fn. 6), 245: „Die Ermächtigung zur Rechtsanwendung bedeutet doch […] zwar die Übertragung einer
Willensmacht, aber nicht einer Erkenntnisfähigkeit.“

170 THOMAS HOCHMANN
der Grenzen dieser Freiheit entscheiden. Die Rechtswissenschaft ist also nicht ge-
zwungen, jede Entscheidung der Rechtsorgane zu billigen, sie soll die Grenzen seiner
Freiheit feststellen: „der Rechtsanwender, ebenso wie er in der Willenssphäre frei und
der Kontrolle von Seite der Rechtswissenschaft ledig ist, in der Erkenntnissphäre ge-
bunden und der Orientierung durch die Rechtswissenschaft fähig und bedürftig ist.“58
Kurz: die Rechtswissenschaft ist „darauf beschränkt, das Gebiet des freien Ermessen
klarzustellen.“59 Die Grenzen dieses Gebiets werden aber von der Rechtsordnung ab-
gesteckt. Die Rechtswissenschaft bemüht sich, sie zu erkennen. Sie entscheidet nichts.
Auch die Wahl, sich mit dem Wortlaut der Rechtssätze zu beschäftigen, vermag
keine Verweisung ins Naturrecht zu begründen. Die Analyse des positiven Recht er-
fordert nämlich solche Voraussetzungen. Man kann nicht das Recht studieren, ohne
davor klarzustellen, was das Recht ist.60 Das zeigt das Bild von Münchhausen, „der
sich am eigenen Zopfe aus dem Sumpf zieht.“61 Eine Vorkonzeption des Objekts ist
erforderlich, um dieses Objekt zu erforschen. Betrachtet man die Rechtsordnung als

eine sprachliche Erscheinung, wird man dazu geführt, diese Äußerungen zu studieren:
„Die Sprache ist aber doch wohl kaum solch ein verbotenes Hinterpförtchen, durch
das sich das Naturrecht hereinstiehlt – sie ist vielmehr die breite Pforte, durch die das
gesamte Recht ins menschliche Bewusstsein tritt.“62
Die Überlegenheit des Merklschen Ansatzes ist nicht zu leugnen. Er vermeidet San-
ders Widersprüche und traut der Rechtswissenschaft eine viel interessantere Rolle zu.
Sie kann das Recht vor seiner Anwendung beschreiben, und einen kritischen Blick auf
seine Konkretisierungen werfen. Umso mehr überrascht es, dass Kelsen keine klare
Stellung in dieser Debatte genommen hat.
III. Das Desinteresse für die Rechtswissenschaft (Kelsen)
Bezüglich einer Kontroverse, die sich im Rahmen der Wiener Schule entwickelt, liegt
es nah, nach der Stellung des Gründers und produktivsten Autors dieser Schule zu
suchen. Im Jahr 1951 erinnerte Verdross an die Merkl/Sander Debatte und verortete
Kelsen auf Sanders Seite gegen Merkl.63 In Wahrheit scheint Kelsen eher im Hinter-
grund geblieben zu sein. Die Frage nach der Rolle der Rechtswissenschaft betrifft das
Problem der Auslegung, und es wurde oft bemerkt, dass Kelsens Ausführungen zu
58 Merkl (Fn. 6), 248

59 aaO, 248, Fn. 1.
60 aaO, 250.
61 Merkl (Fn. 21), 88. Vgl. auch Hans Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrechts,
Beitrag zu einer reinen Rechtslehre, 1920, 96.
62 Merkl (Fn. 6), 249.
63 Verdross (Fn. 56), 1123.

diesem Thema – trotz des Eröffnungsversprechens der Reinen Rechtslehre64 – nicht sehr
ausführlich sind.65
Kelsen hat nie, wie Sander, die Möglichkeit einer echten Rechtswissenschaft ge-
leugnet. In diesem Sinn steht er also näher bei Merkl (1). Er hat aber nicht beabsich-
tigt, zu der Entwicklung der Rechtswissenschaft beizutragen. Sein theoretisches Werk
hat er fast ausschließlich der Ontologie des Rechts (Rechtstheorie) und nicht der
Epistemologie der Rechtswissenschaft (Rechtswissenschaftstheorie) gewidmet66 (2).
Kelsens Behauptungen, die eine Nähe zu Sander zu beweisen scheinen, müssen in die-
sem Kontext gesehen werden (3). So kann man auch die überraschende theoretische
Regression erklären, die Kelsen mit der Theorie der „Alternativermächtigung“ bewirkt
hat (4).
1. Keine Leugnung der Rechtswissenschaft
Wie Sander selbst bemerkt, hatte Kelsen nie die Absicht, die traditionelle Rechts-
wissenschaft zu zerstören.67 Nie hat er, wie Sander, deren Unmöglichkeit behauptet.68
Ganz im Gegenteil hat Kelsen die Aufgabe der Rechtswissenschaft darin gesehen,
nach dem „Rahmen,“ den verschiedenen Auslegungsmöglichkeit eines Rechtssatzes
zu suchen.69 Obwohl Kelsen nicht viel über der Methode dieser wissenschaftlichen
Auslegung zu sagen hatte, verträgt sich dieser Ansatz schwerlich mit einer Leugnung
der Rechtswissenschaft.
Vor allem hat Kelsen sehr früh ein paar Intuitionen ausgedrückt, die Merkls The-
se stark beeinflusst haben.70 Kelsens Ausführungen über dem Unterschied zwischen
64 H. Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, Studienausgabe der 2. Auflage 1960, hg. von Matthias Jestaedt, 2017, 1 (Ori-
ginalpaginierung).
65 Vgl. Christoph Schwaighofer, Kelsen zum Problem der Rechtsauslegung, in: Untersuchungen zur Reinen
Rechtslehre, Ergebnisse eines Wiener Rechtstheoretischen Seminars 1985/96, hg. von Robert Walter, 1986, 232;
Stanley Paulson, Kelsen on Legal Interpretation, Legal Studies (1990), 136; Heinz Mayer, Die Interpreta-
tionstheorie der Reinen Rechtslehre, in: Schwerpunkte der Reinen Rechtslehre, hg. von Robert Walter, 1992,
61; Ludwig Adamovich, Reine Rechtslehre und Hermeneutik, in: Für Staat und Recht, Festschrift für Herbert
Schambeck, hg. von Johannes Hengstschläger et al., 1994, 132; Matthias Jestaedt, Wie das Recht, so die Aus-
legung. Die Rolle der Rechtstheorie bei der Suche nach der juristischen Auslegungslehre, ZöR (2000),
138 f.; Stanley Paulson, Formalism, ‘Free Law’, and the ‘Cognition’ Quandary: Hans Kelsen’s Approaches
to Legal Interpretation, University of Queensland Law Journal (2008), 7; Jörg Kammerhofer, Uncertainty in
International Law, A Kelsenian Perspective, 2011, 107; Nicoletta Bersier Ladavac, Zur Interpretationstheorie
von Hans Kelsen, in: Gedenkschrift Robert Walter, hg. von Clemens Jabloner et al., 2013, 52.
66 Zu diesem Unterschied, s. z. B. Oliver Lepsius, Themen einer Rechtswissenschaftstheorie, in: Rechts-
wissenschaftstheorie (Fn. 20), 3.
67 Sander (Fn. 19), 525.
68 Vgl. z.B. aaO, 522.
69 Kelsen (Fn. 64), 349.
70 Vgl. z.B. Merkl (Fn. 3), 292; Adolf Merkl, Justizirrtum und Rechtswahrheit (1925), Gesammelte Schriften,
Bd. I/1 (Fn. 6), 370, Fn. 1.

172 THOMAS HOCHMANN
Nichtigkeit und Vernichtbarkeit71 bilden die Ursprung von Merkls These. Nur hat Kel-
sen im Unterschied zu Merkl nie weiter in diese Richtung gesucht.
2. Eine Theorie des Rechts, nicht der Rechtswissenschaft
Kelsens reine Rechtslehre ist eine Theorie des Rechts, und nicht der Rechtswissen-
schaft. Kelsens Interesse liegt, wie gesagt, bei der Ontologie, nicht der Epistemologie.
Er versucht hauptsächlich zu erklären, wie das Recht funktioniert. Und wenn die rei-
ne Rechtslehre eine „Theorie der Interpretation“ beinhaltet, dann nur als „allgemeine
Rechtslehre,“ und nicht als Theorie der Rechtswissenschaft.72 Der Schwerpunkt diese
Theorie der Interpretation ist also die „authentische Auslegung,“ das heißt die Aktivi-
tät der Rechtsorgane, und nicht die wissenschaftliche Auslegung.
Die wenigen Bemerkungen Kelsens über die wissenschaftliche Auslegung bilden

bestenfalls einen Exkurs zur Rechtswissenschaftstheorie. Kelsen unterstreicht, dass
die Bemerkungen der Rechtswissenschaft vom Standpunkt des Rechts gleichgültig
sind: sie haben keine Auswirkung auf sein Funktionieren. Vor allem kritisiert er die
dogmatischen Ansätze, die anstreben, die einzige Lösung in jedem rechtlichen Fall an-
zugeben.73 Kelsen hat nur betont, was die Rechtswissenschaft nicht tun könnte.74 Seine
Bemerkungen sind negativ, destruktiv, aber fast nie konstruktiv.75 Diese Herangehens-
weise muss man in Erinnerung behalten, um ein Missverständnis von Kelsens Lehre
zu vermeiden.
3. Ein Interesse für die Entscheidung, nicht für die Erkenntnis
Im 1914 veröffentlichten Aufsatz „Über Staatsunrecht,“ scheint Kelsen, die Existenz ei-
nes Fehlers im Herstellungsprozess einer Norm mit den rechtlichen Konsequenzen seiner
Feststellung zu verwechseln. Wenn ein Akt durch einen Mangel getroffen ist, der keine
Nichtigkeitsgrunde sondern nur eine Anfechtungsgrunde ist, dann schafft er eine gül-
71 Kelsen (Fn. 39), 483.

72 Kelsen (Fn. 64), 1: „Die Reine Rechtslehre […] ist allgemeine Rechtslehre […]. [S]ie gibt eine Theorie
der Interpretation.“
73 Vgl. Robert Walter, Das Auslegungsproblem im Lichte der Reinen Rechtslehre, in: Festschrift für Ulrich
Klug zum 70 Geburtstag, hg. von Günter Kohlmann, Bd. 1, 1983, 189 f.; Rudolf Thienel, Kritischer Rationalis-
mus und Jurisprudenz, 1991, 183; Horst Dreier, Rechtslehre, Staatssoziologie und Demokratietheorie bei Hans
Kelsen, 2. Aufl., 1990, 153 f.; Pfersmann (Fn. 28), 808.
74 Mayer (Fn. 65), 62.
75 Walter (Fn. 72), 190.

tige Norm, solange die Mangel vom zuständigen Organ nicht festgestellt worden ist.76
Aber die Tatsache, dass die Rechtswissenschaft nicht in der Lage ist, diese Norm zu
vernichten, bedeutet nicht, dass sie nicht in der Lage ist, diesen Mangel festzustellen.
Kelsen interessiert sich aber nur für die Unfähigkeit zu entscheiden, er vernachlässigt
die Fähigkeit zu erkennen: „die Frage, ob ein solcher Fehler dem Akte anhafte oder
nicht, ist keineswegs bloß eine rechtslogische; sie wird nicht von der Autorität der in-
dividuellen Vernunft, sondern vor der des Staates entschieden.“77 Deshalb sei es unge-
nau, in solchem Fall von einem fehlerhaften Akte zu sprechen: solange dieser Mangel
vom zuständigen Organ nicht festgestellt worden ist, reicht dieser Mangel nicht an „die
juristische Erkenntnisebene.“78 Also dürfe „man einen anfechtbaren Staatsakt nicht vor
durchgeführtem Anfechtungsverfahren für fehlerhaft erklären.“79
Die Sander erinnernde Verwechslung zwischen Entscheidung und Erkenntnis er-
scheint deutlich in dieser Formel der „juristischen Erkenntnisebene,“ und wird noch
klarer in einem vierzig Jahren später veröffentlichten Aufsatz. Dieser Text bildet einen
Antwort zu jenem Aufsatz, in dem Verdross an die Kontroverse zwischen Sander und
Merkl erinnerte.80 Kelsen vermeidet aber diese Debatte, anstatt Stellung zu nehmen.
Er interessiert sich nur für die Zuständigkeit, Normen zu schaffen oder zu vernichten,
und überhaupt nicht an die Erkenntnisfunktion der Rechtswissenschaft. Kelsen er-
klärt nicht genau, was die Rechtswissenschaft erkennen kann. Er wiederholt nur, wie-
der und wieder, dass sie nichts entscheiden kann.81
Wenn zum Beispiel nur ein Gericht dafür zuständig ist, ein Gesetz für verfassungs-
widrig zu erklären, sei die Aussage der Rechtswissenschaft bezüglich der Verfassungs-
mäßigkeit des Gesetzes „rechtlich irrelevant,“82 „juristisch sinnlos.“83 Aber die Ähnlich-
76 Kelsen (Fn. 39), 483: „Solange der Staat den vermeintlichen oder behaupteten Mangel nicht autoritativ
festgestellt hat, muss der von irgend jemandem für fehlerhafte gehaltene Akt als Staatsakt angesehen und
respektiert werden. Solange nicht staatlicherseits der behauptete Fehler festgestellt ist, hat der Staatsakt wie
ein fehlerloser alle von der Rechtsordnung vorgesehenen Wirkungen.“ Hervorhebung im Original.
77 Ebd. Hervorhebung nicht im Original.
78 aaO, 511.
79 Ebd.
80 Verdross (Fn. 56).
81 Hans Kelsen, Was ist ein Rechtsakt? (1951), in: Die Wiener rechtstheoretische Schule, hg. von Hans Kle-
catsky / René Marcic / Herbert Schambeck, Bd. 2, 1968, z. B. 1131: „Die Rechtswissenschaft als Wissenschaft
kann keine Normen produzieren, sie kann nur die im Rechtsverfahren von Rechtsorganen produzierten
Normen […] beschreiben“; 1134: „diese [die Rechtswissenschaft] kann […] überhaupt nichts entscheiden“.
Hervorhebung nicht im Original.
82 aaO, 1132. Vgl. auch Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, 1945, 154: „The opinion of any other
individual is legally irrelevant.“
83 Kelsen (Fn. 80), 1135: „Kann man juristisch sagen, dass der Präsident seine Kompetenz überschritten
habe? Ist ein solches Urteil, wenn es von einem juristischen Schriftsteller ausgesprochen wird, etwas an-
deres als eine juristisch irrelevante Interpretation der Amerikanischen Verfassung, der die juristische relevan-
te Interpretation des Präsidenten selbst entgegensteht, der zuständig ist, die Verfassung anzuwenden und
daher auch zu interpretieren? Ist es nicht juristisch sinnlos, unter solchen Umständen zu behaupten, der
Präsident habe seine Kompetenz überschritten […]?“ Hervorhebung nicht im Original.

174 THOMAS HOCHMANN
keit mit Sander soll hier nicht täuschen: diese juristische Irrelevanz bedeutet nur, dass
diese rechtswissenschaftlichen Analysen keine juristischen Wirkungen herbeiführen.
Kelsen schreibt nicht, dass sie nicht von wissenschaftlichem Interesse sind, auch wenn
er damit nicht viel anfangen mag.
Die Unterscheidung zwischen authentischer und wissenschaftlicher Auslegung hat
nämlich nicht die geringste Verbindung zur Möglichkeit einer wissenschaftlichen Er-
kenntnis des Rechts.84 Die Geltung einer Norm bedeutet nicht, dass sie konform zu
höheren Normen ist.85 Und umgekehrt: die Rechtswissenschaft kann keine Norm set-
zen, das heißt aber nicht, dass sie das Recht nicht erkennen kann.
Trotz des Anscheins behauptet Kelsen nicht, dass eine rechtliche Norm unbedingt
völlig konform zu höheren Normen ist. Sein einziges Anliegen ist zu betonen, dass sie
gültig ist. Kelsen insistiert nur auf die rechtliche Zuständigkeit des Rechtsorgans. Die
Frage der Erkennbarkeit der Rechtsordnung durch die Rechtswissenschaft beantwor-
tet er nicht. Kelsens vorherrschende Interesse für die Entscheidungsmacht (das heißt:
das Recht) entwickelt sich auf Kosten der Erkenntnisfähigkeit (das heißt: der Rechts-
wissenschaft).
4. Eine Regression: die Theorie des Alternativermächtigung
Dank dieser Bemerkung kann man ein Rätsel der reinen Rechtslehre erklären. Kelsen
hat Merkls Stufenbaulehre schnell angenommen. Die Fehlerkalkültheorie, die eine
wesentliche Ergänzung der Stufenbaulehre ist, hat Kelsen aber nicht einmal erwähnt.
Warum? Die ersten Intuitionen, die Merkls beeinflusst haben, finden sich ja bei Kel-
sen. Warum hat Kelsen das Fehlerkalkül nicht explizit angenommen? Warum hat er
statt dieser schönen Theorie das wackelnde Gebäude der alternativen Ermächtigung
entwickelt?
Die Antwort beruht auf Kelsens Desinteresse für die Rechtswissenschaft. Die alter-
native Ermächtigung ist kein Instrument der Rechtswissenschaft, sondern eine Beob-
achtung über das Funktionieren des Rechts. Um eine Norm als gültig zu betrachten,
muss man annehmen, dass eine höhere Norm zum Erlass dieser Norm ermächtigte.
Kelsen fragt sich nicht, wie die Rechtswissenschaft die Rechtswidrigkeit erkennen
könnte. Diese Erkenntnis entwickelt keine rechtliche Wirkung und liegt deshalb außer
Kelsens Interesse. Im Vergleich mit der Fehlerkalkültheorie ist die alternative Ermäch-
tigung ein theoretischer Rückschritt.
84 Vgl. Pfersmann (Fn. 28), 827 f.; Riccardo Guastini, Réalisme et anti-réalisme dans la théorie de l’inter-
prétation, in: Mélanges Paul Amselek, 2005, 438.
85 Vgl. Eugenio Bulygin, Cognition and Interpretation of Law, in: Cognition and Interpretation of Law, hg.
von Letizia Gianformaggio / Stanley Paulson, 1995, 21 und 23.

Mit der Fehlerkalkülstheorie kann man beobachten, dass eine Norm trotz ihrer
Mangelhaftigkeit gültig ist.86 Mit der Alternativermächtigung behauptet man die Gül-
tigkeit der Norm und versucht anschließend diese Gültigkeit rechtstheoretisch zu be-
gründen.87 Mit dieser Theorie vermeidet Kelsen die Debatte über die Rolle der Rechts-
wissenschaft.
Kelsen übernimmt also nicht Sanders Skeptizismus. Er vertritt überhaupt nicht die
Unmöglichkeit einer Rechtswissenschaft. Auf dem Bereich der Epistemologie hat er
sich aber kaum gewagt. Seine Zurückhaltung bezüglich der Rechtswissenschaft öffnet
den Weg zu den skeptischen Entwicklungen von Sander und Troper.
Merkls Theorie ist stärker. Er unterscheidet die Rechtswissenschaft von seinem
Objekt, aber er vergisst sie nie. Gerade hierin liegt das doppelte Rechtsantlitz. Diese
Formel ist oft mit der Idee verbunden, dass jeder Rechtsakt gleichzeitig eine Norm-
anwendung und eine Normsetzung ist.88 Aber dieser wichtiger Aufsatz behandelt
auch ein anderes Thema,89 nämlich die zwei Standpunkte, von denen aus das Recht
betrachtet werden kann: der Standpunkt der Rechtsanwendung und der Standpunkt
des Rechtswissenschaft.90 Merkl vernachlässigt nicht die Rechtswissenschaftstheorie.
Und so hat er, im Unterschied zu Kelsen,91 eine echte Theorie der wissenschaftlichen
Interpretation entworfen.92
Es sollte deshalb nicht verwundern, dass die Juristen, die eine kritische Rechtswis-
senschaft zu entwickeln versuchen, eine festere Stütze bei Merkl als bei Kelsen finden.93
Thomas Hochmann
Université de Reims Champagne-Ardenne, Faculté de droit, 57, rue Pierre Taittinger,
F-51096 Reims Cedex, Thomas.Hochmann@gmail.com
86 Merkl (Fn. 3), 294.

87 Vgl. kritisch Rainer Lippold, Gilt im Deutschen Recht ein Fehlerkalkül für Gesetze? Eine Untersuchung
des Problems des verfassungswidrigen Gesetzes auf der Grundlage der Reinen Rechtslehre, Der Staat
(1990), 196; Rainer Lippold, Recht und Ordnung, 2000, 412 ff.
88 Merkl (Fn. 6), 234.
89 Ebd.: „Aber noch in einem anderen Sinne kann man von einem doppelten Rechtsantlitze sprechen.“
90 aaO, 246: „Hinter welchem dieser beiden Rechtsantlitze birgt sich das wahre richtige Recht?“
91 Vgl. Matthias Jestaedt, Methoden(r)einheit und Disziplinenvielheit – Das unvollendete Verwissen-
schaftlichungskonzept der Reinen Rechtslehre, in: Gedenkschrift Robert Walter (Fn. 65), 226.
92 Adolf Merkl, Zum Interpretationsproblemn (1916), Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. I/1 (Fn. 6), 63–83.
93 Vgl. z.B. Walter (Fn. 72); Jestaedt (Fn. 65); Otto Pfersmann, La production des normes: production
normative et hiérarchie des normes, in: Traité international de droit constitutionnel, hg. von Michel Troper /
Dominique Chagnollaud, Bd. 2, 2012, 484–528.


Alternativermächtigung vs. Fehlerkalkül
Wie geht das Recht mit Fehlern um?*1
RODRIGO GARCIA CADORE

Alternative Authorization v. Fehlerkalkül

How does the law cope with legal errors?
Abstract: Who decides that the process of law creation has been conducted “incorrect-
ly” in a specific legal case and what follows from this decision? These questions split the
Vienna Circle around Hans Kelsen in the formation years of the Pure Theory of Law. In
an attempt to manage those issues two “diametrically opposed” models have arisen: the
one of the primacy of jurisprudence (Adolf Julius Merkl) and the so-called primacy of
the legal process (Fritz Sander). The ensuing debate ultimately mobilizes the entire Vien-
nese School and provides occasion for the development of creative readings of the prob-
lems at stake. The aim of this essay is to reconstruct and contrast Fehlerkalkül (calculus
of non-conformity) and Alternativermächtigung (alternative authorization) as available
strategies to cope with the problem of legal errors in such a way that central differences of
opinion between the two main architects of the Stufenbau theory are revealed, namely be-
tween the Pure Theory of Law as it is conceived by Merkl and the Kelsenian Pure Theory
of Law. By achieving clarity about the conceptual divergences and the different theoretical
backgrounds of these models, which are not to be washed away and must be taken serious-
ly, the respective gains and losses (prices to be paid) of knowledge attached with each of
these solution attempts to the problem of “unlawful law” should become easier to identify.
Keywords: alternative authorization, Fehlerkalkül, legal dynamics, Adolf Julius Merkl,

Hans Kelsen, legal errors
Schlagworte: Alternativermächtigung, Fehlerkalkül, Hans Kelsen, Adolf Julius Merkl, Re-

chtsdynamik, Rechtsfehler
* Für zahlreiche wertvolle Anregungen bedanke ich mich herzlich bei Herrn Professor Dr. Matthias Jes-
taedt.

178 RODRIGO GARCIA CADORE
Eine der intensivsten schulimmanenten Auseinandersetzungen in den Anfangsjahren

der Reinen Rechtslehre ist diejenige um das Problem des sogenannten „rechtswidri-
gen Rechts“. Ausgelöst durch einen Beitrag Hans Kelsens (1881–1973) zum „Staatsun-
recht“ im Jahr 19131 findet eine auf hohem rechtstheoretischem Niveau ausgetragene
Diskussion statt, die die brillantesten Schüler der ersten Generation der Kelsen-An-
hänger polarisiert. Die Quintessenz der Debatte besteht darin, eine plausible Antwort
auf die Frage zu liefern: Wer entscheidet, dass die Rechtserzeugung in einem bestimm-
ten Rechtsfall „fehlerhaft“ betrieben worden ist, und mit welchen Konsequenzen?2
Die Lösungsversuche setzen auf abweichende Kandidaten für den ersten Teil der
Fragestellung: das dem Recht unterworfene Individuum, die Rechtsorgane oder die
Rechtswissenschaft. Einerseits plädiert Adolf Julius Merkl (1890–1970) im Rahmen
seiner reiferen Version des „Irrtumskalkül“-Konstrukts vehement für das Primat der
Rechtswissenschaft. Rechtens ist, was die Rechtswissenschaft qua spezialisierte Wis-
sensform der Juristen als Recht erkennt. Anderseits macht Fritz Sander (1889–1939),
der gefallene Engel der Gründungsjahre, die Unvermeidbarkeit des Primats des
Rechtsverfahrens geltend, wonach als Rechtsfehler nur das nachträglich anerkannt
werden kann, was von den zuständigen Rechtsorganen zuvor als (Un-)Recht bestimmt
wurde. An der Diskussion beteiligen sich mit unterschiedlichen rechtstheoretischen
Vorschlägen auch andere Mitglieder der Wiener Schule der Rechtstheorie. Kelsen sel-
ber oszilliert lange Zeit unentschieden zwischen den Auffassungen seiner streitenden
Schüler, entscheidet sich dann aber für eine Auffassung zur Rechtsfehlerproblematik,
die sich eher der Lösung Sanders annähert, also der Leugnung der Möglichkeit von
Rechtsfehlern als rechtstheoretische Kategorie. Er definiert die sogenannte „Alterna-
tivbestimmung“.
Ziel des vorliegenden Artikels ist, Fehlerkalkül und Alternativermächtigung als
Umgangsstrategien mit der Rechtsfehlerproblematik dergestalt zu rekonstruieren und
zu kontrastieren, dass zentrale Auffassungsunterschiede zwischen den „Architekten“
des rechtlichen Stufenbaumodells aufgedeckt werden, nämlich zwischen den Reinen
Rechtslehren Merkls und Kelsens.3
1 Zuerst erschien der Text 1913 als Separatdruck von dem erst 1914 in der Grünhuts Zeitschrift publizierten
Beitrag: Hans Kelsen, Über Staatsunrecht. Zugleich ein Beitrag zur Frage der Deliktsfähigkeit juristischer
Personen und zur Lehre vom fehlerhaften Staatsakt, Grünhuts Zeitschrift für das Privat- und Öffentliche Recht
der Gegenwart 40 (1914), 1–114 = HKW 3, 439–531. Siehe auch zum Thema: Hans Kelsen, Reichsgesetz und
Landesgesetz nach österreichischer Verfassung, Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 32 (1914), 202–245, 390–438
(418–435) = HKW 3, 359–425 (412–423).
2 Marinus Maurits van Praag, Die Rechtsfunktionen, Alphen aan den Rijn 1932, 88.
3 Einige Auffassungsunterschiede sind jüngst untersucht worden, siehe: Patrick Hilbert, Fehlerkalkül oder
Alternativbestimmung – zu den Strategien der Geburtshilfe im Stufenbau der Rechtsordnung, Zeitschrift
für öffentliches Recht 72 (2017), 549–576 und Thomas Hochmann, Les théories de la „prise en compte des dé-
fauts“ et de l’„habilitation alternative“, in: Thomas Hochmann, Xavier Magnon und Régis Ponsard (Hrsg.),
Un classique méconnu: Hans Kelsen, Paris 2019, 301–326.

Alternativermächtigung vs. Fehlerkalkül 179
I. Der Fehlerkalkül4
1. Von der Rechtskraftlehre zur Lehre des Fehlerkalküls
Der Fehlerkalkül (in männlicher Form) wird von Merkl in Konnex mit seiner Rechts-
kraftlehre eingeführt. Aus der Einsicht in die relative Unveränderbarkeit der Rechts-
erscheinungen, die zur Permanenz neigen und nur nach den Maßgaben des Rechts-
systems selbst erzeugt, geändert oder vernichtet werden dürfen,5 ergibt sich die
Gleichwertigkeit aller Rechtsbedingungen für die Erzeugung neuen Rechts.6 Beim
diesbezüglichen Schweigen des positiven Rechts führe jedes durch den Intellekt kon-
statierbare Defizit bei der Erfüllung der Rechtserzeugungsbedingungen zum Schei-
tern des Rechtserzeugungsversuchs.
Die Rechtskraftlehre verkörpert Merkls Konzept der Eigengesetzlichkeit des
Rechts, die in wenigstens zwei Richtungen mit unterschiedlichen normativen Ansprü-

chen ausstrahlt. Nach außen gewendet, manifestiert sie sich in der Selbstbestimmung
des positiven Rechts. Das positive Recht in seinen verschiedenen Erscheinungsformen
bestimmt, was als Recht gilt. Neue Rechtserscheinungen entstehen und augenblick-
liche Rechtserscheinungen vergehen ausschließlich und allein nach den Maßgaben
des Rechts. Rechtsveränderung kann nur als rechtsimmanente Operation prozessiert
werden. „Die Geltung ist das Symbol der Selbstreproduktion des Rechts“,7 sodass
rechtliche Geltung nur unter den von dem eigentlichen Validationssystem „Recht“
gesetzten Bedingungen erlangt werden kann: „An den (positiv)rechtlich dafür vor-
gesehenen Institutionen, Prozeduren und Kompetenzen vorbei kann keine Norm zu
einer Rechtsnorm der betreffenden Rechtsordnung werden.“8 Die sich aus der rela-
tiven Unveränderlichkeit der Rechtsnormen, d. h. aus der Rechtskraft jeder Rechter-
scheinung ergebende Eigengesetzlichkeit des Rechts lässt sich nach außen folglich als
„Undurchdringlichkeit“ des Rechtssystems übersetzen. Das Rechtssystem zeigt sich
fundamental abgeneigt gegen fremde Eingriffe auf seine Selbstprogrammierung. „Nur
durch Delegation von Seiten“ des Rechtssystems „kann eine diesem System a priori
fremde Erscheinung a posteriori zu deren Bestandteil werden“:9 Ohne Delegation von
Seiten der eigengesetzlichen Rechtsnormwelt keine Rechtsänderung.
4 Im Folgenden wird der Versuch unternommen, die Lehre des Fehlerkalküls systematisch in ihren grund-
legenden Umrissen darzulegen. Eine Evolution und Änderungen berücksichtigende diachronische Dar-
stellung dieser Thematik in der Reinen Rechtslehre Merkls wird einer anderen Gelegenheit vorbehalten.
5 Vgl. Adolf Julius Merkl, Die Lehre von der Rechtskraft, entwickelt aus dem Rechtsbegriff, Wien 1923, 244.
6 Adolf Julius Merkl, Das doppelte Rechtsantlitz, Juristische Blätter 47 (1918), 425–427; 444–447 und 463–
465 (446).
7 Niklas Luhmann, Die Geltung des Rechts, Rechtstheorie 22 (1991), 273–286 (280).
8 Matthias Jestaedt, Die Eigengesetzlichkeit des Rechts. Normativität, Kausalität und die Antwort der Ver-
fassung, 5 (Typoskript – Im Erscheinen).
9 Adolf Julius Merkl, Die Lehre von der Rechtskraft (Anm. 5), 238.

Nach innen gewendet erweist sich in der Eigengesetzlichkeit des Rechts eine beson-
dere Ausdrucksform der Normativität des Rechts, sprich: des Befolgungs- und Anwen-
dungsanspruchs der Rechtsnormen. Sie kommuniziert die normative Erwartung, dass
die Rechtsakteure, vor allem die Rechtsorgane, sich an die durch die vorgegebenen
Rechtsvorschriften gezogene Schiene bei der Rechtsanwendung bzw. Rechtserzeu-
gung halten. Die künftige Rechtserzeugung hat sich an der „eingeschlagenen Entwick-
lungslinie des Rechts“10 zu orientieren. Die anzuwendenden Rechtnormen markieren
einen Horizont von zulässigen Rechtserzeugungsmöglichkeiten und es wird von dem
internal point of view11 aus erwartet und beansprucht, dass die Rechtsakteure „auf den
vom Recht vorgezeichneten Wegen Recht zu erzeugen imstande sind“.12 Daraus geht
der Rahmencharakter der rechtsbedingenden Normen hervor, die als Deutungssche-
ma für die Qualifikation der weiteren Rechtsoperationen als rechtmäßig/rechtswid-
rig dienen. Das positive Recht erhebt den normativen Anspruch, die Wirklichkeit der
Rechtserzeugung innerhalb bestimmter Grenzen, der durch das anzuwendende Recht

aufgerichteten Schranken, zu konfinieren.
2. Die Rechtserzeugungsstrukturen zwischen Kognition und Dezision
Die Grundstruktur des Rechtssystems weist ein „Abhängigkeitsverhältnis“13 zwischen

bedingenden Rechtsnormen und bedingten Rechtserscheinungen auf. Eine Rechts-
erscheinung gilt, weil sie dem bedingenden Normenkomplex entsprechend erzeugt
wurde und solange sie nach den von diesem Rechtssystem statuierten Bedingungen
nicht vernichtet bzw. derogiert wird.14 Das Abhängigkeitsverhältnis signalisiert eine
Kognitionskomponente in der Rechtserzeugung. Der (rechts)erkennende Intellekt
konfrontiert die prätendierte, erlassene Rechtserscheinung mit den als Maßstab die-
nenden bedingenden Normen und konstatiert die Entsprechung oder Nicht-Ent-
10 Adolf Julius Merkl, Das Recht im Spiegel [Lichte] seiner Auslegung [Anwendung], Deutsche Richter-
zeitung 8 (1916), Sp. 584–592; 9 (1917), 162–176, 394–398, 443–450; 11 (1919), 290–298 (175).
11 Klassische Wendung in Herbert L. A. Hart, The concept of law, Oxford 1961, 86 ff.
12 Matthias Jestaedt, Die Eigengesetzlichkeit des Rechts. Normativität, Kausalität und die Antwort der
Verfassung (Anm. 8), 5.
13 Vgl. Adolf Julius Merkl, Prolegomena einer Theorie des rechtlichen Stufenbaues, in: Alfred Verdross
(Hrsg.), Gesellschaft, Staat und Recht, Untersuchungen zur Reinen Rechtslehre, FS Hans Kelsen, Berlin 1931,
252–294 (279).
14 Im vorliegenden Beitrag wird der sogenannte zweite Stufenbau, nämlich der Stufenbau nach der De-
rogationskraft nicht thematisiert. Siehe dazu aber: Robert Walter, Der Stufenbau nach der derogatorischen
Kraft im österreichischen Recht: Zum 75. Geburtstag von Adolf Julius Merkl, Österreichische Juristen-Zei-
tung 20 (6. April 1965), 169–175 und Jörg Kammerhofer, Robert Walter, die Normkonflikte und der zweite
Stufenbau des Rechts, in: Clemens Jabloner et al. (Hrsg.), Gedenkschrift Robert Walter, Wien 2012, 237–256.
Für die Herausforderungen, die die Fehlerkalküllehre der Idee eines Stufenbaus nach der derogatorischen
Kraft bereitet, siehe Rainer Lippold, Recht und Ordnung, Statik und Dynamik der Rechtsordnung, Wien
2000, 400–420.

sprechung der bedingten Erscheinungen, d. h. das Gelingen oder Scheitern eines

Rechtserzeugungsversuchs. Die Rechtserzeugung wie die Rechtsvernichtung erfolgt
dabei durch Delegation bzw. Kompetenzverteilung innerhalb des Rechtssystems. Ein
zuständiges Rechtsorgan wird zur Rechtserzeugung auf Basis der Rechtsanwendung
berufen. Auf jeder Stufe des Rechtsgewinnungsverfahrens werden rechtserzeugende,
autoritative Entscheidungen getroffen. Dem rechtlichen Delegationszusammenhang
sind Entscheidungsmomente kongenial. Statik qua Ableitbarkeit und Dynamik qua
Entscheidbarkeit greifen bei jedem Akt der Rechtserzeugung wie der Rechtsvernich-
tung ineinander.
Rechtsinhalt wird angewandt, transportiert und individualisiert über Dezisionen,
Willensakte, sodass die bedingenden Normen beanspruchen, den Rechtsorganen
rechtlich begrenzte Kompetenzen, d. h.: Rechtsentscheidungsmacht, zu übertragen.
Sobald diese Delegation vorgenommen wurde, verliert sie jedoch die Oberhand über
die Rechtsproduktion. Mit dieser Kompetenzübertragung geben die bedingenden

Normen das Heft aus der Hand: „Die Geister, die gerufen wurden, lassen sich nicht
mehr bannen“!15 Diskrepanzen zwischen den bedingenden Normen und den mit der
Prätension der Rechtlichkeit gesetzten neuen Erscheinungen können nicht ausge-
schlossen werden. Und genau da setzt der Fehlerkalkül an, sprich: bei der Menschlich-
keit bzw. Fehleranfälligkeit der Rechtserzeugung.
3. Die eigengesetzliche Fehlerhaftigkeit der Rechtsentscheidungen
Die Eigengesetzlichkeit des Rechts in der Lesart Merkls spiegelt sich exemplarisch bei
seiner Rekonstruktion des Umgangs des positiven Rechts mit „Fehlern“ wider. Aus
der durch statische Kognitionsmomente mediatisierten dynamischen Struktur der
Rechtsordnung geht die Einheit des Rechts in seiner rechtserkenntnismäßig konstitu-
ierten Differenz zum Nicht-Recht hervor: der Erkenntnisgrund des Rechts ist dersel-
be wie der des Nichtrechtes.16 Die Kehrseite der Selbstbestimmung der Rechtlichkeit
menschlicher Entscheidungen durch das positive Recht ist (mangels Fehlerkalküls)
die Ausgrenzung „fehlerhaft“ erzeugter Normen aus dem Bereich des gültigen Rechts.
Auch was als Rechtsfehler zu erkennen ist, wird als solcher nach den Maßgaben des
Rechts bestimmt. Die „Rechtsrichtigkeit“ wird systemintern als „Rechtmäßigkeit“
verarbeitet. Das Rechtsverfahren liest die eventuell auftauchenden „Rechtsfehler“ als
(In-)Konsistenzprobleme neu. Fehlerhaftigkeit erscheint als Rechtswidrigkeit bei der
Rechtsanwendung/Rechtserzeugung.
15 Adolf Julius Merkl, Die Verordnungsgewalt im Kriege, Juristische Blätter 44 (1915), 375–376, 387–388
(von der Zensur gestrichen), 509–512; 45 (1916), 397–399, 409–411, 493–495, 505–507, 517–519; 48 (1919),
337–341 (511).
16 Vgl. René Marcic, Die bedingte Natur des positiven Rechts, Juristenzeitung 15 (1960), 198–203 (200).

Nach außen gewendet immunisiert die Eigengesetzlichkeit des Rechts die posi-
tiv-rechtlichen Operationen gegen die Anmaßungen außerrechtlicher Normativi-
tätsformen. Die (Un-)Vollkommenheit der Rechtserscheinungen lässt sich nicht
aufgrund systemexterner Maßstäbe beurteilen. Logische Fehlschlüsse, moralische
Fehler, Ungerechtigkeiten, strategische Irrtümer, politische Ungeschicktheiten usw.
sind in der Grammatik des Rechts nicht ohne weiteres als Rechtsfehler zu verstehen.
Außerrechtliche Kriterien für die Evaluierung der „Korrektheit“ und Gültigkeit der
erlassenen Rechtserscheinungen müssen „durch das Nadelöhr positivrechtlicher Er-
zeugungsvoraussetzungen geführt werden“,17 um rechtlich relevant bzw. um maßgeb-
lich für die Beantwortung der Frage nach der Rechtsfehlerhaftigkeit einer Rechtser-
scheinung werden zu können. Nach innen gewendet deckt die Eigengesetzlichkeit des
Rechts die möglichst ausdifferenzierte Regulierungsgestaltung der Rechtsfehlerfolgen
auf. Sie sorgt je nach positiver Rechtordnung für unterschiedlich ausgefeilte und kom-
plexe „Rechtswidrigkeitsregime“.18 Nicht nur was als Rechtsfehler zu qualifizieren ist,

sondern auch wie gravierend jeder Rechtsfehler in Bezug auf die valide Entstehung ei-
ner Rechtserscheinung zu wirken hat, wird lediglich mit Rekurs auf die Rechtsnormen
qua Selektionsschema entschieden werden können. Welche Rechtsfehler zu welcher
Reaktion einer Myriade möglicher Umgangsstrategien gehören, selektiert und sortiert
das positive Recht selbst aus.
Die Vorstellung der Grundstruktur des Rechtssystems qua Abhängigkeitsbezie-
hung zwischen bedingenden und bedingten Rechtserscheinungen hebt die Funktion
der Rechtserzeugungsregel als Erkenntnisgrund weiterer Rechtsgestalten hervor. Die
Überprüfung der Rechtswidrigkeit der Rechtserzeugung setzt die Unterscheidung
von Ranghöherem und Rangniedrigerem, von Form und Formmangel,19 voraus und
wird durch die Erkenntnis des rechtlichen Deutungsschemas konditioniert. Das er-
kennende Subjekt konfrontiert den mit dem Anspruch auf Rechtserzeugung auftre-
tenden Willensakt mit dem Komplex bedingender Rechtsnormen, die institutionelles
Setting, Kompetenzen, Verfahren und möglicherweise auch den Inhalt der künftigen
Rechtsnormen mitzubestimmen versuchen. Gesucht wird nach der „Entsprechung“
zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit, bedingender und bedingter Erscheinung, so-
dass man von einem mehr oder weniger statischen „Norm-Norm-Ableitungszusam-
menhang“20 reden könnte.
Die Dynamisierung des Rechtserzeugungsverfahrens über die sukzessiven Er-
mächtigungen zur Schaffung von neuem Recht und zur Anwendung von rechtlichen
17 Matthias Jestaedt, Die Eigengesetzlichkeit des Rechts. Normativität, Kausalität und die Antwort der
Verfassung (Anm. 8), 5.
18 Matthias Jestaedt, Selbstand und Offenheit der Verfassung, in: Isensee/Kirchhof (Hrsg.), Handbuch des
Staatsrechts, Bd. XII: Normativität und Schutz der Verfassung, Heidelberg 2014, 327–382 (352).
19 Vgl. René Marcic, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit und Reine Rechtslehre, Wien 1966, 29.
20 Konzept in Matthias Jestaedt, Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein…, Tübingen 2006, 42.

Sanktionen durch die Rechtsorgane bringt aber die Möglichkeit von „Abirrung“, „Ab-
weichung“, „Devianz“, „Diskrepanz“, „Dissonanz“, „Entgleisung“, „Nicht-Deckung“,
„Nicht-Entsprechung“, „Nicht-Übereinstimmung“ und/oder „Unableitbarkeit“21 zwi-
schen bedingenden und bedingten Rechtserscheinungen mit sich. Das erkenntnismä-
ßig feststellbare Auseinanderfallen von Rechtserkenntnis und Rechtserzeugung plau-
sibilisiert im Modell Merkls die Handhabe der Kategorie „Rechtsfehler“ – als Signum
für die Differenz zwischen dem durch die Rechtswissenschaft konstruierten Rahmen
für die rechtmäßige Rechtserzeugung und dem Produkt der autoritativen Entschei-
dung des zuständigen Rechtsanwenders. Die „Rechtsfehler“ besetzen die Stelle eines
Anzeigers des Abdockens zwischen der Rechtsordnung laut Rechtserkenntnis und
der Rechtsordnung laut Rechtserzeugung, weshalb die Bezeichnung der doppelten
Rechtsordnung nicht völlig unangebracht sein dürfte.22
Mit dieser Devianzmöglichkeit rechnet, ja kalkuliert das positive Recht.
4. Der Fehlerkalkül als Devise der Interdependenzunterbrechung
Das positive Recht selbst spannt eine tolerierbare „Fehlerlatitüde“,23 indem ausdiffe-
renzierte Fehlerreaktionsmechanismen vorgesehen werden,24 die am Maß der be-
dingenden Norm gemessen für die Geltung bzw. rechtliche Wirksamkeit defizitärer
Rechtserscheinungen sorgen.25 Zum Wesen des Fehlerkalküls gehört die „Verbindlich-
machung solcher potentiell rechtswidriger Staatswillensäußerungen“ durch die kon-
tingent vom positiven Recht auszugestaltende „Gutmachung des Fehlers“.26 Es handelt
sich um ein positivrechtliches Instrumentarium zur Widerspruchsbehebung,27 das
21 Merkl bedient sich sämtlicher Ausdrücke, um das Auseinanderfallen von Rechtserkenntnis und Recht-
serzeugung zu charakterisieren. Hier wird auf einen ausführlichen Nachweis verzichtet.
22 Adolf Julius Merkl, Die Verordnungsgewalt im Kriege (Anm. 15), 511.
24 Fehlervorsorgestrategien können auch den positivrechtlichen Fehlerkalkül integrieren, dem eine Anti-
zipationslogik – dem Konzept nach – innewohnt. Vgl. Adolf Julius Merkl, Die Lehre von der Rechtskraft
(Anm. 5), 293. In diese Facette des Fehlerkalküls qua Fehlervorsorge zoomt Johannes Buchheim, Subjek-
tive Rechte als Fehlerkalkül, in: Ruwen Fritsche et al (Hrsg.), Unsicherheiten des Rechts. ARSP-Beiheft 162,
Stuttgart 2020, 223–236.
25 Merkl definiert Fehlerkalkül als „jene positivrechtliche Bestimmung, die es juristisch ermöglicht, dem
Staat solche Akte zuzurechnen, die nicht die Summe der anderweitig positivrechtlich aufgestellten Vor-
aussetzungen ihrer Entstehung und damit ihrer Geltung erfüllen, die es erlaubt, solche Akte trotz jenes
Mangels als Recht zu erkennen“. Vgl. Adolf Julius Merkl, Die Lehre von der Rechtskraft (Anm. 5), 293; Sie-
he auch ders., Die gerichtliche Prüfung von Gesetzen und Verordnungen, Österreichisches Zentralblatt für
die juristische Praxis 39 (1921), 569–609 (434 ff.); ders , Justizirrtum und Rechtswahrheit, Zeitschrift für die
gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft 45 (1925), 452–465 (458); ders., Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht, Berlin 1927,
196 ff.; ders., Prolegomena einer Theorie des rechtlichen Stufenbaues (Anm. 13), 491 ff.
26 Adolf Julius Merkl, Individualismus und Universalismus als staatliche Baugesetze, Internationale Zeit-
schrift für Rechtstheorie 8 (1934), 243–265 (254).
27 Adolf Julius Merkl, Justizirrtum und Rechtswahrheit (Anm. 25), 451.

ermöglicht, dass erkenntnismäßig nicht mehr auf einen Komplex von bedingenden
Rechtsnormen rückbeziehbare – weil außerhalb des Rahmens erzeugte – bedingte
Rechtserscheinungen in den einheitlichen Rechtserzeugungszusammenhang Eingang
finden. In gewissem Sinne modifiziert der Fehlerkalkül die Rechtserzeugungsregel, ja
das anzuwendende Recht. Er reduziert das intendierte Abhängigkeitsverhältnis zwi-
schen den Rechtserscheinungen auf ein Minimum und sorgt für eine Art von Inter-
dependenzunterbrechung. Auch die „fehlerhaften“ Rechtserscheinungen sind gültig,
solange das positive Recht selbst für diese Geltung sorgt. Im rechtlichen Validations-
system bleibt immer „ein mehr oder minder großer unauflösbarer Rest von Diskonti-
nuität bestehen“.28
Die bedingte Rechtserscheinung muss „bis zu einem gewissen Minimum von Be-
dingungen […] der rechtlichen Erzeugungsregel entsprechen“,29 sie kann aber je nach
positivrechtlicher Konfigurierung qua fehlerhafte, unvollkommene Rechtserschei-
nung bestehen bleiben, ohne dem Maximum der Bestimmungen von Form und Inhalt
zu entsprechen. In dieser Konstruktion ist ein Minimum an Rechtsanwendung nicht
verhandelbar, denn „in der nächsttieferen – wenn man will: nächsthöheren – Rechts-
schichte muß sich nun die [vorhergehende Fremdprogrammierung] wiederfinden“,30
damit man für die in Frage kommende Rechtserscheinung noch einen Erkenntnis-
grund parat hat. Indem ein Minimum von einem Maximum an Rechtsbedingungen
unterschieden wird, schafft der positivrechtliche Fehlerkalkül Raum für die rechts-
theoretische Disjunktion von rechtlichem Können und rechtlichem Dürfen31 bzw. von
Rechtswirksamkeit und Rechtmäßigkeit.32 Solange eine Rechtserscheinung sich im
Bereich des Rechtskönnens bewegt, existiert sie rechtlich, ist sie rechtswirksam, auch
wenn sie in einer unzulässigen Form oder mit unzulässigem Inhalt erlassen wurde, d. h.
wenn sie außerhalb der Grenzen des Rechtsdürfens gesetzt wurde.
Der Fehlerkalkül verarbeitet den Richtigkeitsanspruch im Recht als Rechtmäßigkeits-
anspruch und beschreibt die Spannung zwischen Normativitätsanspruch der Rechts-
erscheinungen und Positivität/Wirklichkeit der Rechtsentscheidungen durch die zu-
ständigen Organe als eine dem Recht immanente Konstante, die sich bei jeder Stufe
der Rechtskonkretisierung aufs Neue wiederholt. Der sogenannte fehlerhafte Rechtsakt
weist rechtliche Mängel auf, aber „nur seine Unrechtmäßigkeit, nicht der Widerspruch
28 Adolf Julius Merkl, Das Problem der rechtlichen Kontinuität und die Forderung nach der Einheit des
rechtlichen Weltbildes, Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 5 (1926), 497–527 (509).
29 Adolf Julius Merkl, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht (Anm. 25), 192.
30 Adolf Julius Merkl, Das doppelte Rechtsantlitz (Anm. 6), 427.
31 Ausführlich dazu siehe Philipp Reimer, Können und Dürfen. Zur rechtstheoretischen Zentralität eines
unterschätzten Begriffspaars, Rechtstheorie 48 (2017), 417–439. Siehe auch Matthias Jestaedt, Vom Beruf der
Rechtswissenschaft – zwischen Rechtspraxis und Rechtstheorie, in: Horst Dreier (Hrsg.), Rechtswissen-
schaft als Beruf, Tübingen 2018, 227–255 (244–246).
32 Vgl. Philipp Reimer, Die Unabhängigkeit von Rechtmäßigkeit und Rechtswirksamkeit, Rechtstheorie 45
(2014), 383–414.

zu jedem beliebigen Wertsystem, nur der Widerspruch zum Rechtswertsystem, zur

Rechtsordnung, macht einen Staatsakt in technischem Sinne zum ‚fehlerhaften‘“.33
5. Das Primat der Rechtswissenschaft
Die Möglichkeit der Korrektur eines Fehlers saniert die Fehlerhaftigkeit der unvoll-
kommenen Rechtserscheinungen, die doch gelten, obwohl sie laut der rechtswissen-
schaftlichen Vernunft nicht rechtmäßig sind. Das rechtliche Können erklärt die Geltung
eines unzulässigen, weil außerhalb der Schranken des Dürfens erzeugten, Rechtsaktes.
Wenn der Bogen des Könnens eigentlich nur angesichts der weiteren möglichen Re-
aktionen auf „rechtserzeugende Rechtserkenntnisfehler“34 gespannt wird, stößt dieses
Spiel bei der Entscheidung einer letzten, der Rechtskontrolle nicht mehr unterworfe-
nen Instanz, an seine Grenzen. Erst hier wird das starke Primat der Rechtswissenschaft
von Merkl aktiviert. Es ist die Aufgabe der Rechtstheoretiker, Fehler, Inkongruenzen
zwischen bedingenden und bedingten Rechtserscheinungen als solche (an)zuerken-
nen und dementsprechend diese in die Domäne des Nicht-Rechts zu verweisen.35 Die
durch die bloße Vorstellung des positiven Rechts als dynamischer Delegationszusam-
menhang gerufenen Geister bzw. fehlerhaften Rechtserscheinungen will Merkl an der
Spitze des Fehlerkalküls mit der Fackel der rechtstheoretischen Vernunft verbannen
können. Die Beantwortung der „Grundfrage“ nach der Rechtswahrheit „fällt nie in die
Kompetenz des Objekts, sondern des Subjekts“, ist „nie Kompetenz der Rechtspraxis,
ausschließlich Kompetenz der rechtlichen Theorie“.36
II. Die Alternativermächtigung37
1. Denken von der Kompetenz her
Während Merkl das Problem des rechtswidrigen Rechts letztendlich als Problem der
fehlerhaften Rechtserscheinungen darlegt, auf der Erkennbarkeit der Fehler beharrt
33 Adolf Julius Merkl, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht (Anm. 25), 192.

34 Matthias Jestaedt, Wirken und Wirkungen höchstrichterlicher Judikatur – Rechtsprechung von Grenz-
organen aus Sicht der Reinen Rechtslehre, in: Clemens Jabloner (Hrsg.), Wirken und Wirkungen höchstrich-
terlicher Judikatur, Wien 2007, 9–34 (29).
35 Vgl. Adolf Julius Merkl, Die Lehre von der Rechtskraft (Anm. 5), 286–287.
36 Vgl. Adolf Julius Merkl, Das Recht im Spiegel seiner Auslegung (Anm. 10), 447.
37 Genau wie bei der Darstellung des Fehlerkalküls beansprucht die vorliegende Auseinandersetzung mit
der Lehre der Alternativermächtigung keine Kartographie der unterschiedlichen Formulierungen dieses
Konstrukts in der Reinen Rechtslehre Kelsens, sondern meint, eine systematische, treue Rekonstruktion
der reiferen Version dieser Lehre anbieten zu können.

und unter anderem nach der substanziellen Bestimmung der Rechtswahrheit fragt, die
er über Umwege der Rechtswissenschaft zuspricht, schildert Kelsen diese Problematik
primär als diejenige des Normenkonflikts.38 Ausgangspunkt und Horizont der Frage-
stellung ist die Einheit des Rechts.39 Fragt sich Merkl in diesem Zusammenhang „Was
ist die Wahrheit?“ und weist auf die Rechtmäßigkeit als Maß bzw. Kriterium für die Be-
handlung dieser Fragestellung, wirft Kelsen unmittelbar die Frage nach der Entschei-
dungsmacht auf und arbeitet diese Irritation systemimmanent als eine Kompetenz-
angelegenheit aus. Die Frage, „ob eine von einem Rechtsorgan erzeugte Norm der ihre
Erzeugung oder auch ihren Inhalt bestimmenden höheren Norm entspricht“, kann
nicht von der Frage getrennt werden, „wer zur Entscheidung der vorangehenden Frage
von der Rechtsordnung ermächtigt ist“.40 „Rechtswidriges Recht“ ist daher der Anlass
zur Ausarbeitung einer Ermächtigungstheorie bzw. einer Theorie des rechtlichen Kön-
nens,41 die mit der Theorie des rechtlichen Dürfens aber nicht richtig verbunden wird.
Bei der Behandlung des Problems des „rechtswidrigen Rechts“ wird – vermut-
lich bewusst! – in den reiferen Werken Kelsens die Semantik der „Rechtsfehler“ eher
vermieden.42 Genau wie Merkl sieht Kelsen im dynamischen Operationsmodus des
positiven Rechts, dessen selbstreferentielle Anwendung bzw. Weitererzeugung auf
die Entscheidung autoritativer Instanzen angewiesen ist, eine strukturelle, von der
Rechtsverwirklichung nicht weg zu definierende „Rechtsfehlerquelle“. Sobald Rechts-
macht für die Rechtsanwendung und Rechtserzeugung delegiert wird, entsteht die
nicht eliminierbare Möglichkeit autoritativer Rechtsentscheidungen, die sich durch
Rechtserkenntnis nicht auf den Rahmen der anzuwendenden Rechtsnormen zurück-
führen lassen. Anders als Merkl löst Kelsen diese Angelegenheit aber rechtstheore-
tisch in die Eigendynamik des Rechts auf, indem er die rechtlichen Fragen primär als
Ermächtigungsfragen rekonstruiert und aus der „Rechtsfehler- bzw. Fehlerfolgefrage“
eine „Kompetenzfrage“ macht. Die Quelle des Problems ist zugleich die Quelle seiner
Lösung; das Gift wird zum Antidot.
38 Vgl. Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, Einleitung in die Rechtswissenschaftliche Problematik [fortan
RR1], Wien 1934, 84–89; Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, Mit einem Anhang: Das Problem der Gerechtig-
keit [fortan RR2], Wien 1960, 271–280.
39 So schon deutlich in den frühesten Thematisierungen der Alternativermächtigung, wenn auch mit ei-
nem noch etwas mehr substanzialistich beladenen Verständnis der Einheit des Rechts. Vgl. Hans Kelsen,
Die philosophischen Grundlagen der Naturrechtslehre und des Rechtspositivismus, Charlottenburg 1928, 22.
40 Hans Kelsen, RR2 (Anm. 38), 272.
41 Zur Prominenz der Ermächtigung (des rechtlichen Könnens) bei der Strukturierung der Rechtsdyna-
mik in der Reinen Rechtslehre siehe Stanley Paulson, Ermächtigung: Grundmodalität der Reinen Rechts-
lehre, in: Erich Schweighofer / Meinrad Handstanger / Harald Hoffmann et al. (Hrsg.), Zeichen und Zauber
des Rechts. Festschrift für Friedrich Lachmayer, Bern 2014, 21–34. Noch früher: Stanley Paulson, An Emp-
owerment Theory of Legal Norms, Ratio Juris 1 (1988), 58–72.
42 Anders ist die Lage in den früheren Schriften. Pars pro toto: „Darin, daß die ‚normwidrige‘ Norm aufge-
hoben werden kann oder daß ein Organ ihretwegen bestraft werden soll, liegt dasjenige, was man besser als
mit ‚Normwidrigkeit‘ (‚Verfassungswidrigkeit‘, ‚Gesetzeswidrigkeit‘), mit ‚Mangel-‘ oder ‚Fehlerhaftigkeit‘
der Norm bezeichnet“, Hans Kelsen, RR1 (Anm. 38), 96.

2. Die Eigengesetzlichkeit des Rechts: „Einen anderen entscheiden zu lassen“43
Die Eigengesetzlichkeit des Rechts qua differentia specifica des (modernen) positiven
Rechts manifestiert sich – in der Grundmelodie der Reinen Rechtslehre Kelsens –
nicht zuletzt in seinem „Gerichtsrecht“-Charakter.44 Im sich dynamisch in Gestalt
eines Entscheidungsnetzes bzw. einer Entscheidungsordnung strukturierenden posi-
tiven Recht wird der Rechtsindividualisierungsakt auf jeder Ebene des Rechtsgewin-
nungsverfahrens durch ein „von dem Verpflichteten verschiedenes, objektives ‚Organ‘
besorgt“.45 Die Einsicht in diese Facette der Positivität des Rechts – „Kein Recht
ohne Gericht!“46 – ist zugleich das, was die Möglichkeit der Meinungsunterschiede
zwischen den Parteien eines Rechtsstreits, der Lesart der rechtlichen Lage durch die
Rechtswissenschaft und der diesbezüglichen Entscheidung eines Rechtsorgans beson-
ders prägnant erkennbar macht und was die Fehlerhaftigkeit der Rechtsentscheidun-
gen gewissermaßen wieder invisibilisiert, indem die Meinung des Rechtsanwenders

als die einzige rechtserhebliche Meinung wahrgenommen wird.47
Das Ausblenden des Organmoments48 bei der Auseinandersetzung mit Rechtspro-
blemen weist auf ein Überbleibsel der Naturrechtslehre hin,49 genauer: auf ein ethi-
sierendes Rechtsverständnis beim Umgang mit rechtlichen Problemen.50 Typisch für
diese Rechtsauffassungen ist die Vorstellung eines unmittelbaren, rechtserheblichen
Zugangs der individuellen, autonomen Vernunft zu den rechtlichen Vorgaben.51 Die
43 Vgl. Jakob Faig, Beziehungsprobleme – Überlegungen zur Theorie des Fehlerkalküls, in: Ruwen Frit-
sche et al (Hrsg.), Unsicherheiten des Rechts. ARSP-Beiheft 162, Stuttgart 2020, 209–222 (276).
44 Vgl. Hans Kelsen, Die Idee des Naturrechts, Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 7 (1927/1928), 221–250 (239).
45 Hans Kelsen, Die Idee des Naturrechts (Anm. 44), 237.
46 Hans Kelsen, Die Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtlehre, entwickelt aus der Lehre vom Rechtsatze, Wien 1911,
35 = HKW2, 21–878 (120).
47 Hans Kelsen, RR2 (Anm. 38), 245: „Vom Standpunkt der durch Menschen anzuwendenden Rechts-
ordnung kommen nur Meinungen von Menschen darüber in Betracht, ob ein bestimmter Mensch einen
bestimmten Mord begangen hat. […] Wenn die generelle Rechtsnorm angewendet werden soll, kann nur
eine Meinung gelten. Welche, das muß durch die Rechtsordnung bestimmt werden. Es ist die Meinung, die
in der Entscheidung des Gerichtes zum Ausdruck kommt.“
48 Dies in der Entstehungsgeschichte der Reinen Rechtslehre hervorgehoben zu haben ist das bleibende
Verdienst von Fritz Sander. Vgl. z.B. Fritz Sander, Der Begriff der Rechtserfahrung, Logos 11 (1922–1923),
285–308 (299 ff.).
49 Vgl. Karl Olivecrona, Law as a fact, 2. Aufl., London 1971, 268 ff.
50 „Fast die gesamte herrschende Rechtsphilosophie und Rechtswissenschaft fußt auf dem uralten Dogma
von der Normativität des Rechtes: Recht ist ihr ein Inbegriff von Normen, Imperativen, Vorschriften, Wil-
lensäußerungen, Wunsch- und Befehlsätzen, ein Komplex von Bedeutungen, der in nahem Zusammenhang
mit der Ethik steht, also ein Sollen, das über jedes Sein hinausgreift“, Fritz Sander, Der Begriff der Rechts-
erfahrung (Anm. 48), 286.
51 „Nur eine Rechtslehre, welche am Dogma von der Normativität des Rechtes festhält, richtet ihren Blick
nicht auf in Rechtsverfahren aktuelle, sondern in Rechtssätzen potentielle Norminhalte, sucht den Um-
gang dieses potentiellen Norminhaltes durch die formallogischen Mittel der ethisch-politischen Postula-
te folgenden Auslegung zu ermitteln“, Fritz Sander, Rechtsdogmatik oder Theorie der Rechtserfahrung?
Kritische Studie zur Rechtslehre Hans Kelsens, Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 2 (1921), 511–670 (557–558).

Entscheidung über die Rechtmäßigkeit oder Rechtswidrigkeit einer menschlichen

Handlung wird nun dezentralisiert bzw. nicht durch die Interposition einer Autorität
mediatisiert. Im sich aus dieser Lesart ergebenden Modell fordert das Recht von den
handelnden Rechtssubjekten ein bestimmtes Verhalten, das durch Interpretation zu
bestimmen ist.52 Die Rechtsnormen sprechen das Individuum unmittelbar an,53 sodass
Herr Jedermann auch dazu berufen ist, zu entscheiden, was Rechtens ist. Das heißt
auch, Recht von Schein-Recht zu unterscheiden, und zwar mit dem Anspruch, die
auf Erkenntnis basierte Entscheidung mit Rechtsbindung auszustatten. In diesem Ge-
danken findet die Idee der „Fehlerhaftigkeit“ der Rechtsakte wie die Sprechweise der
„Rechtsfehler“ ihren Raum. Darin liegen die tiefen Wurzel der herkömmlich rechts-
wissenschaftlichen, eher statisch gefassten und materiell beladenen Behandlung der
„Rechtsfehlerproblematik“, gegen die sich die Reine Rechtslehre Kelsens der Intuition
Fritz Sanders folgend in gewissem Sinne wendet.
3. Die Differenzierung von Rechtmäßigkeit und Rechtswidrigkeit als Aufgabe

des positiven Rechts
Im Validationssystem der Reinen Rechtslehre Kelsens hingegen gibt es keinen Raum

für „Rechtmäßigkeit“ oder „Rechtswidrigkeit“ schlechthin. Berücksichtigt man das
eigengesetzliche Funktionieren der Rechtsmaschinerie, ergibt die Rede über eine
Rechtswidrigkeit an sich keinen Sinn.54 Die Rechtmäßigkeit wird in Relation zum In-
halt der Entscheidung des zuständigen Rechtsorgans konstituiert. Rechtsindividuali-
sierung und -konkretisierung ereignen sich im Verlauf eines Verfahrens, in dem eine
Kette von sukzessiven Entscheidungskompetenzen sichtbar wird. Will man erfahren,
was Rechtens ist, muss man auf die Bestimmungskraft der zuständigen Rechtsanwen-
der bei jeder Stufe des Rechtsgewinnungsverfahrens warten.
„Rechtswidriges Recht“ und „normwidrige Rechtsnorm“ erweisen sich in dieser
Variante der Reinen Rechtslehre als Selbstwidersprüche. Alles, was im Bezug auf das
Koordinatensystem des Rechtserzeugungszusammenhangs von einem zuständigen
Rechtsorgan als Recht bestimmt wird, ist rechtmäßig. Mit einer dem Fehlerkalkül ähn-
lichen Begrifflichkeit macht Kelsen geltend, das positive Recht „rechnet mit rechts-
widrigem Recht und bestätigt dessen Existenz gerade dadurch, daß es mannigfache
Vorkehrungen trifft, es zu verhindern und einzuschränken“.55 Im gleichen Zug, in dem
52 Vgl. Christoph Kletzer, The Idea of a Pure Theory of Law, London 2018, 16–20.
53 Sander bezeichnet als „Grundvoraussetzung“ der von ihm bekämpfte „Rechtsdogmatik“ die Auffas-
sung, „daß das ‚Recht‘ an die menschliche Subjektivität [der Rechtsunterworfenen] gerichtete Normen
oder Imperative bedeute[t]“. Fritz Sander, Rechtsdogmatik oder Theorie der Rechtserfahrung? (Anm. 51),
519.
54 Vgl. Hans Kelsen, RR2 (Anm. 38), 274.
55 Hans Kelsen, RR1 (Anm. 38), 84; Vgl. auch ders , RR2 (Anm. 38), 271.

es „unerwünschte Normen gelten läßt, nimmt es diesen den eigentlichen Charakter

der Rechtswidrigkeit“.56 Der Rechtswissenschaft steht die Aufgabe zu, die Maschinerie
der Rechtserzeugung und Rechtsvernichtung reflexiv zu rekonstruieren. Die zuständi-
gen, dazu ermächtigten Rechtsorgane und nicht die Rechtswissenschaft entscheiden,
was rechtmäßig und was rechtswidrig ist.57 Die Rechtswissenschaft darf sich die Be-
richtigung der angeblichen „Rechtsfehler“ der Rechtsanwender nicht anmaßen, will
sie ihre das Recht lediglich beschreibende Kompetenzen nicht überschreiten.
4. Der Alternativcharakter der Ermächtigungsnormen
Die Zentralisierung der Entscheidungsbefugnisse über Ermächtigungsnormen schafft

selbstverständlich nicht das Erkenntnis- bzw. Urteilsvermögen der in der Rolle der
Rechtswissenschaftler agierenden Individuen aus der Welt. Bei der Betrachtung der
dynamischen, durchgängig selbstreferenziellen Erzeugung und Vernichtung des posi-
tiven Rechts macht man immer wieder die Erfahrung, dass in unterschiedlichem Maß
rechtliche Determinierung auf dem Weg der Rechtskonkretisierung verloren gehen
kann und und zum großen Teil auch verloren geht.58 Die Lehre der Alternativermäch-
tigung ist die von Kelsen konzipierte Lösung für die rechtswissenschaftliche Beschrei-
bung der Entstehung geltenden Rechts in solchen Situationen. Es kommt also darauf
an, die eigengesetzlichen Rechtsoperationen zu rekonstruieren. Wie die Rechtstheorie
den alltäglichen Befund der – laut der Rechtsdogmatik oder den in eine Rechtsstrei-
tigkeit verwickelten Parteien – außerhalb des rechtmäßigen Rahmens liegenden Ent-
scheidungen auseinanderdröseln kann, steht dabei im Fokus. „Das peinliche Faktum
eines ‚doppelten Rechtsbodens‘“59 kann nicht vermieden werden. Mit ihm muss die
Rechtstheorie umgehen.
Beobachtet man, dass sich Rechtsnormen in einer konkreten Rechtserfahrung als
solche durchsetzen, die durch die „autonome Vernunft“ nicht auf den durch den an-
zuwendenden Rechtsnormenkomplex demarkierten Rahmen zurückzuführen sind,
ist davon auszugehen, dass die als Deutungsschema fungierenden Ermächtigungsnor-
men einen alternativen Charakter besitzen:60 Das zur Anwendung des Rechts berufe-
56 Hans Kelsen, RR1 (Anm. 38), 84–85.

57 Vgl. Hans Kelsen, Was ist ein Rechtsakt?, Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 4 (1951–1952),
263–274 (265 und 268).
60 Kelsen verwendet leicht unterschiedliche Begriffe für die Bezeichnung des in der Lehre der Alterna-
tivermächtigung beschriebenen Phänomens: „Alternation“ (Hans Kelsen, Wesen und Entwicklung der
Staatsgerichtsbarkeit, in: VVDStRL 5 (1929), 30–88 (79)), „Alternativ-Bestimmung“ (Hans Kelsen, RR1
(Anm. 38), 86) und „Alternativ-Vorschrift“ (Hans Kelsen, RR1 (Anm. 38), 88.). In der unter der Betreu-
ung Kelsens aus dem deutschen Manuskript in die englische Sprache übersetzten „General Theory of Law

ne Rechtsorgan kann entweder die durch die bedingenden Rechtsnormen vorselektio-

nierten möglichen Rechtsinhalte in der durch den vorgegebenen Komplex geltender
Normen beanspruchten Form konkretisieren, oder eine neue Rechtsnorm zur Geltung
bringen, die keine der durch den Rechtsrahmen positiv markierten Möglichkeiten –
frei nach C. Möllers – aktualisiert. Der durch die höherrangigen Rechtsnormen vorge-
gebene Weg für die künftige Rechtserzeugung fungiert in so einer Konstellation beob-
achtbarer, als geltendes Recht hingenommener „rechtswidriger Rechtsentscheidung“
nicht als eine eindeutige Bestimmung, sondern muss im Sinne einer „Alternation“
verstanden werden: „entweder so, aber wenn nicht, dann auch – beinahe beliebig – an-
ders“.61 Das Konstrukt der Alternativermächtigung ermöglicht die Unterbringung von
durch die kognitiven Fähigkeiten des Beobachters konstatierten „Rechtswidrigkeiten“
in der formellen Einheit der Rechtsordnung. Rechtmäßig ist dementsprechend alles,
was sich als Recht im Gang des Rechtsverfahrens durchsetzt. Das Effektivitätsprinzip,
wie Kelsen sich hier ausdrückt, begrenzt das Legitimitätsprinzip.62

Vom Standpunkt der Rechtsbindung aus gleichwertig, würden sich die durch die
direkte Ermächtigung gedeckten Rechtsnormen von denen der alternativen Ermäch-
tigung lediglich dergestalt unterscheiden, dass den Ersteren durch das vorgegebene
geltende Recht eine Art Präferenz geschenkt wird.63 Der bestehende Rechtsrahmen
markiert positiv eine Fülle von Möglichkeiten der Rechtserzeugung, er äußert einen
rechtlichen Vorzug, der sich des Weiteren darin äußern kann, dass das positive Recht
die „rechtswidrige Rechtserzeugung“ als Vernichtbarkeitsgrund reguliert oder die Ver-
antwortlichkeit des Rechtsorgans dafür vorsieht. In der nicht hinreichend ausdifferen-
zierten Begrifflichkeit der Kelsenschen Lesart des Problems steht Rechtmäßigkeit für
den Bezug auf das Rechtserzeugungsverfahren und wird nicht sauber von der Rechts-
and State“ heißt es „alternative prescription“ (Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, Cambridge
1945, 159). In der auch von Kelsen betreuten französischen Übersetzung der ersten Auflage der Reinen
Rechtslehre liest man „dispositions alternatives“ (Hans Kelsen, Théorie pure du droit, Paris 1953, 131). Die
kanonische Formulierung befindet sich in: Hans Kelsen, RR2 (Anm. 38), 273 und 277, wo die Rede von
„Alternativbestimmungen“ ist. Siehe noch Hans Kelsen, Allgemeine Theorie der Normen, Wien 1979, 200.
61 Hans Kelsen, Wesen und Entwicklung der Staatsgerichtsbarkeit (Anm. 60), 79.
62 Hans Kelsen, RR 2 (Anm. 38), 280. Diese Auffassung unterscheidet sich von früheren Stellungnahmen
Kelsens zu der Rechtsfehlerproblematik: „Allein das Prinzip der Selbstlegitimation der Rechtsakte hat sei-
ne Grenzen: Letzten Endes ist es doch die rechtstheoretische Vernunft, die auf den Grund ihrer Hypothesis
zum einheitlichen System zusammengeschlossenen Tatbeständen ihren rechtlichen Sinn, ihre spezifische
Bedeutung verleiht […]“ Hans Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre, Berlin 1925, 278. Liest man die verschiedenen
Formulierungen Kelsens zu dem Thema im Laufe seines Lebenswerks losgelöst von der Betrachtung der
schulimmanenten Kontroversen innerhalb des Kelsen-Kreises, kann man nicht anders als sich mit Erstau-
nen fragen, ob in der Brust Kelsens eigentlich zwei Herzen schlugen. Die Schwankungen des Haupts der
Wiener Schule müssen im Zusammenhang mit den Auseinandersetzungen mit seinen Schülern behandelt
werden, was einer anderen Gelegenheit vorbehalten wird – sie spiegeln die Existenz unterschiedlicher Les-
arten der Reinen Rechtslehre in den Gründungsjahren der Wiener Schule der Rechtstheorie wider.
63 Hans Kelsen, RR2 (Anm. 38), 278. In der ersten Auflage der RR war von einer Disqualifikation der über
den Weg der Alternativbestimmung erzeugten Rechtsnorm gegenüber der durch die direkte Regelung der
Ermächtigungsnorm gedeckten Rechtserscheinung die Rede. Vgl. Hans Kelsen, RR1 (Anm. 38), 87.

geltung unterschieden. Sie referiert eher die Verbindlichkeit des Rechts nach außen
als die Konformität zur Erzeugungsregel. Soweit in diese aber auch eine Alternativbe-
stimmung integriert wird,64 fehlt im Repertoire der Reinen Rechtslehre Kelsens ein Si-
gnum für die Rechtswidrigkeit der Rechtserzeugung, da die allumfassende rechtliche
Ermächtigung alles verrechtlicht.
5. Der mangelnde Fehlerbegriff oder: Das Primat der Rechtserzeugung
Die Alternativermächtigung läuft daher auf ein Fehlerkalkül ohne Fehler hinaus.65 Dies
mag für eine verblüffende und in Verlegenheit setzende Beschreibung rechtlicher Phä-
nomene sorgen, ist aber immanent betrachtet kein Fehler, sondern Programm in der
Matrix der Reinen Rechtslehre Kelsenscher Art. Sogar die „Gesetzwidrigkeit“ einer
Entscheidung oder die „Verfassungswidrigkeit“ eines Gesetzes werden dabei in Anfüh-

rungszeichen gesetzt. In ihrem rechtswissenschaftlich kritischen Potenzial werden die-
se Kategorien als Meinungsunterschiede zwischen der rechtsrelevanten autoritativen
Entscheidung und den nicht rechtsverbindlichen Interpretationen anderer entschärft.
„Von der Interpretation durch die Rechtsautorität zu sagen, sie sei richtig oder falsch,
ist juristisch sinnlos; denn selbst wenn sie vom Standpunkt reiner Erkenntnis falsch
wäre, ist sie doch Recht, d. h. Norm, und als solche weder wahr noch falsch […]“.66 Die
Lehre der Alternativermächtigung ist prägnanter Ausdruck des Primats der Rechtser-
zeugung in der Reinen Rechtslehre Kelsens, indem der Standpunkt des autorisierten
Rechtsanwenders eingenommen und privilegiert wird. „Wenn ein gültiger Akt des
rechtsanwendenden Organs keine der vom Standpunkt der Rechtswissenschaft mög-
lichen Deutungen der anzuwendenden Rechtsnorm darstellt, kann der wissenschaft-
liche Jurist nur feststellen, daß durch diesen Akt neues Recht […] erzeugt wurde.“67
Mangels präziser Formulierungen und Arrondierung des Konzepts kulminiert die
Alternativermächtigung in einer Art Selbstermächtigung der in ihrer Stellung qua
autorisierten Rechtsanwendern kraft eines gewissen institutionellen Settings stabi-
lisierten Rechtsorgane. Auch außerhalb des Rahmens der anzuwendenden Normen
liegende Entscheidungen schaffen geltendes und rechtmäßiges Recht, das letztendlich
als solches von den eigenen rechtserzeugenden Organen bestimmt wird. Deren rechts-
schöpferische Betätigungen sind über den Weg der Alternativbestimmungen ohnehin
vom Mantel der Rechtmäßigkeit gedeckt.
64 „Diese beiden Normen bilden eine Einheit.“ Hans Kelsen, RR2 (Anm. 38), 273. Schon ähnlich in Hans
Kelsen, RR1 (Anm. 38), 86.
65 Vgl. Johannes Buchheim, Fehlerkalkül als Ermächtigung?, Rechtstheorie 45 (2014), 59–78 (70).
66 Hans Kelsen, Was ist die Reine Rechtslehre?, in: Demokratie und Rechtsstaat, Festschrift zum 60. Ge-
burtstag von Prof. Dr. Zaccaria Giacometti, Zürich 1953, 143–162 (150–151).
67 Hans Kelsen, Was ist die Reine Rechtslehre? (Anm. 66), 151.

III. Fehlerkalkül vs. Alternativermächtigung
Ausgehend von der Konturierung des Fehlerkalküls und der Alternativermächtigung

als konkurrierende Modelle für die Rekonstruktion des Umgangs des positiven Rechts
mit „Rechtsfehlern“ durch die Rechtswissenschaft lassen sich philosophische, recht-
wissenschafts- und rechtstheoretische Annahmen und Implikationen der unterschied-
lichen Ansätze identifizieren. Sich Klarheit über diese Divergenzen und deren Wur-
zeln zu verschaffen, soll eine nüchternere Einschätzung der Potenziale und Grenzen
der beiden Lesarten der Rechtsfehlerproblematik ermöglichen. Dass die eine rechts-
theoretische Lösung sieht, was die andere nicht sehen kann, ist nicht zuletzt dadurch
bedingt, dass sie unterschiedliche Perspektiven, ja Blickwinkel, für die Annäherung an
das Problem auswählen.
1. Philosophische Annahmen
Der Merklsche Fehlerkalkül fügt sich philosophisch gesehen in ein rechtstheoretisches

Gebäude ein, das aufgrund der Annahme relativer Unveränderlichkeit des Rechtli-
chen (der Rechtskraft) eruiert wird. Die Sandersche Rechtsauffassung, der sich die
Rechtskraftlehre Merkls als diametral entgegengesetzt versteht,68 rekonstruiert das
Recht nicht nur in Bewegung, sondern als Bewegung (Recht ist Rechtsänderung).
Sieht Merkl in der Rechtkraft das statische Gegengewicht zum dynamischen Prozess
der stufenförmigen Rechtskonkretisierung im Delegationszusammenhang,69 wobei
das normative, kontrafaktische Anspruchsmoment der rechtlichen Verhaltensteue-
rung hervorgehoben wird, radikalisiert Sander die dynamische Betrachtung durch
seine Lehre des Verfahrenscharakters allen Rechts und meint das zu einem statischen
rechtlichen Weltbild führende Dogma der Normativität des Rechts überwinden zu
müssen.70 Die Alternativermächtigung Kelsens nutzt Elemente beider Konstrukte, die
sich auf unterschiedliche philosophische Voraussetzungen stützen, in einem – nicht
unproblematischen – Versuch, statische (Kognition) und dynamische Momente (De-
zision) von Rechtssystemen zu vereinbaren.
Das Rahmen-Theorem71 ruft z. B. den Norm-Norm-Ableitungszusammenhang in
Erinnerung, macht aber zugleich die Entscheidungsdependenz der Rechtserzeugung
besonders sichtbar. Verweist die Erkenntnis der Gültigkeit und Rechtmäßigkeit von
Rechtsnormen, deren Abstammung sich über den Weg der direkten Regelung durch
68 Vgl. Adolf Julius Merkl, Die Lehre von der Rechtskraft (Anm. 5), 284.
69 Vgl. Adolf Julius Merkl, Die Lehre von der Rechtskraft (Anm. 5), VI.
70 Fritz Sander, Rechtsdogmatik oder Theorie der Rechtserfahrung? (Anm. 51), 516 ff.
71 Die konsolidierte Formulierung des Konzepts der anzuwendenden Rechtsnorm als eines Rahmens be-
findet sich in: Hans Kelsen, RR2 (Anm. 38), 348–349. Früher schon so in: Hans Kelsen, RR1 (Anm. 38), 94–95.

die höherrangigen Rechtsnormen nicht mehr rekonstruieren lässt, auf die Positivi-
tät des (sich immer aufs Neue erzeugenden) Rechts, beharrt gleichzeitig der Versuch
einer Verankerung der außerhalb des Rahmens der expliziten Erzeugungsregel getrof-
fenen Rechtsentscheidung in einer impliziten anzuwendenden Norm auf dem Norma-
tivitätsanspruch des Rechts. Wo es keinen ausdrücklichen Sinngehalt gibt, der zu einer
bestimmten, schon gefallenen Entscheidung ermächtigt, muss der Alternativcharakter
der Ermächtigungsnorm vorausgesetzt werden. Die „rechtswidrige“ Rechtsschöpfung
bleibt Rechtsanwendung unter der Voraussetzung einer alternativen Autorisierung.
Ihre Geltung beruht genau wie die der rechtmäßigen Rechtserscheinungen auf „einer
ihrer Erzeugung vorangehenden präexistenten generellen Norm“,72 die das Rechtsge-
winnungsverfahren alternativ regelt.
Auch bei dem klassischen Thema des Verhältnisses zwischen Ratio und Voluntas
im Recht scheiden sich die Geister Merkls und Kelsens. Entkoppelt der Fehlerkalkül
Wahrheit von Autorität, indem der Rechtswissenschaft die „Kompetenz“ zugespro-

chen wird, fehlerhaften Rechtserscheinungen den Geltungsanspruch abzuerkennen,73
verschmilzt die Alternativermächtigung die beiden, indem die Rechtswahrheit zum In-
halt der Äußerungen der Rechtsorgane relativiert wird. Eine dem Rechtserzeugungs-
zusammenhang extra-systematische Wahrheit ist dabei nicht relevant. Rechtsgröße
entsteht bei Kelsen wie bei Sander nur in Relation zum dynamischen Rechtsverfahren.
2. Rechtserkenntnistheoretische Dissonanzen
Rechtserkenntnistheoretisch gesehen liegt dem Merklschen Fehlerkalkül eine Rechtswis-

senschaftsauffassung zugrunde, die der Rechtstheorie letztendlich eine Kontrollfunktion
gegenüber der Rechtspraxis zuspricht: Vom Richterstuhl der rechtswissenschaftlichen
Erkenntnis aus wird determiniert, was Rechtens ist.74 Die Rechtswissenschaft maßt sich
72 Hans Kelsen, RR2 (Anm. 38), 273.

73 Vgl. z. B. Adolf Julius Merkl, Die Lehre von der Rechtskraft (Anm. 5), 286–287. Über einen langen Umweg
werden kraft des Primats der Rechtswissenschaft Merklscher Art aber doch Wahrheit und Autorität im
Modell des Fehlerkalküls wieder verkoppelt, wenn das positive Recht keine weitere Korrekturmöglichkeit
in Bezug auf fehlerhafte Rechtserscheinung vorsieht und es der Rechtswissenschaft zusteht, Recht von Un-
recht bzw. Nicht-Recht „autoritativ“ zu (unter)scheiden. Was rechtsfehlerhaft ist, darf am Ende des Tages
nicht als Recht gelten.
74 Vgl. Adolf Julius Merkl, Das doppelte Rechtsantlitz (Anm. 6), 450; ders., Das Recht im Spiegel seiner Aus-
legung (Anm. 10), 172; ders., Die Lehre von der Rechtskraft (Anm. 5), 286. Vielleicht nirgendwo anders kommt
das Merklsche Primat der Rechtswissenschaft klarer zum Ausdruck als in folgendem Satz: „Äußert sich der
Irrtum in entgegengesetzter Richtung, indem ein verfassungsmäßiges Gesetz oder eine gesetzmäßige Verord-
nung wegen vermeintlicher Rechtswidrigkeit für aufgehoben erklärt wird, so schafft auch diese Fehlerkennt-
nis nicht Recht; das bedeutet nun aber: es braucht vom Bundespräsidenten nicht exequiert, es braucht auch
von der ‚zuständigen‘ Behörde nicht als aufgehoben kundgemacht zu werden, ja es darf dies im Grunde gar
nicht“, Adolf J. Merkl, Die gerichtliche Prüfung von Gesetzen und Verordnungen (Anm. 25), 569.

die Prärogative an, die „Errata“ der Rechtspraxis zu schreiben. Die Alternativbestimmung
Kelsens beruht ihrerseits auf der Zusprechung einer ex post facto deskriptiven Intentiona-
lität zur rechtstheoretischen Beschäftigung mit dem Recht: Die Rechtswissenschaft wird
bei der Frage nach dem Rechtlichen auf das positive Recht verwiesen. Ausschließlich die
dazu ermächtigten Rechtsorgane können im vorgesehenen Rechtsverfahren den getrof-
fenen Rechtsentscheidungen ein rechtserhebliches Erratum hinzufügen, bzw. einen von
ihnen als rechtswidrig gedeuteten Rechtsakt vernichten.
3. Rechtstheoretische Implikationen
a. Rechtliches Können und rechtliches Dürfen

Die Ermöglichung der Disjunktion der Rechtsgeltung von der Rechtmäßigkeit, des
rechtlichen Könnens vom rechtlichen Dürfen durch den Fehlerkalkül rekonstruiert in
einer plausibleren Weise die Praxis nicht nur des positivrechtlichen, sondern auch des
rechtsdogmatischen Umgangs mit „Fehlurteilen“, indem man Defizite bei der Recht-
serzeugung an dem immanenten Maßstab der Rechtsvorschriften messen kann, ohne
die Geltung der autoritativen Entscheidungen der Rechtsorgane in Frage zu stellen.
Fehlerbestimmung und Fehlerfolgenregime werden entkoppelt. Solange positivrecht-
liche Korrektur- bzw. Reaktionswege bestehen, gilt sogar die „rechtswidrige Rechts-
erscheinung“ fort. Die Konsequenzen eines „rechtwidrigen Rechtsaktes“ sind posi-
tivrechtlich kontingent geregelt. Rechtswidrigkeit impliziert nicht Nichtigkeit und
bedeutet auch nicht notwendig Vernichtbarkeit des entsprechenden Rechtsaktes. Die
von Kelsen nur grob skizzierte Alternativermächtigung verkoppelt Rechtsgeltung und
Rechtmäßigkeit, verquickt durch ihre Formulierung Können und Dürfen: Alles was
rechtlich geschieht, wird rechtmäßig; alles was ein Rechtsorgan entscheiden kann, darf
es auch entscheiden; was rechtsautoritativ entschieden wird, ist rechtsauthentisch.
b. Statik vs. Dynamik: Verhaltenssteuerung und Rechtserzeugungsstrukturen
Der Fehlerkalkül zeigt sich als Bemühen, die verhaltenslenkende, die Erwartungen
der Rechtsunterworfenen stabilisierende Normfunktion des Rechts nicht von einer
rechtsdynamischen Betrachtungsweise zu trennen. Man könnte sagen: Die durch
die Figur der Entsprechung zu den bedingenden Normen konstruierte Kategorie der
Rechtmäßigkeit zeichnet einen Bereich des rechtlichen Dürfens aus, der sich mit dem
des rechtlichen Könnens nicht deckt. Nicht alles, was man rechtlich kann, darf man
rechtlich auch. Der von Merkl angekündigte Bremsmechanismus, der der Dynamik
des Rechtsverfahrens entgegenwirkt, wird geliefert. Der Fehlerkalkül beharrt auf dem
Normativitätsanspruch des Rechts schlechthin und verweigert sich, sich mit einer

„anything goes“-Einstellung den Entscheidungen der Rechtsorgane zu unterwerfen.

Ein statisches Minimum an Ableitbarkeit aus den bedingenden Normen muss sein.75
Durch die Alternativbestimmung wird das Recht zum Kriterium für die Entscheidung
der dieses Kriterium autoritativ determinierenden Rechtsorgane, d. h. die autoreferen-
zielle Rechtserzeugung wird thematisiert, was eher an die Radikalisierung der Rechts-
dynamik durch das Sandersche Rechtsverfahren erinnert, bei dem das Recht sich
nur in Bezug auf das Koordinatensystem der Urteile der zuständigen Rechtserzeuger
konstituiert.76 Mann kann hier von einer „Normanspruchsvergessenheit“77 sprechen:
In den Fokus gerät nicht die Verhaltenssteuerung durch das Recht, sondern geraten
die Rechtserzeugungsstrukturen.78
c. Zwischen Anforderungsmodell und Prozessbetrachtung

Dem Fehlerkalkül haftet noch eine Sichtweise an, die man als „Anforderungsmodell
des Rechts“79 bezeichnen könnte, das sich noch sehr für die Frage nach der durch das
Recht beanspruchten Handlung der Normadressaten interessiert, wobei das Begriffs-
paar rechtmäßig-rechtswidrig eine relevante Orientierung liefert. Die Alternativer-
mächtigung denkt hingegen das Recht von der Kompetenz zur Entscheidung her und
fokussiert auf die rechtliche Selbsterzeugung: Nicht, was vom Recht gefordert wird,
sondern, wie das Recht die Realität schematisiert, nämlich wie Rechtsrelevanz im
Flow des Rechtsverfahrens konstituiert wird, steht primär auf dem Spiel.
d. Interpretationsfragen und Strukturanalyse
Die Rechtserzeugung wird über den Fehlerkalkül von der anzuwendenden Norm aus
betrachtet. Man fragt dabei nach der rechtmäßigen Handlung in einer ex ante Perspek-
tive. Fehlerfragen werden zu Interpretationsangelegenheiten. Konfrontiert mit einer
Rechtsentscheidung, will man rechtswissenschaftlich noch sagen können: Es hätte
75 Zur statischen „Befangenheit“ der Merklschen Rechtsdynamik siehe: Fritz Sander, Zur Methodik der
Rechtserfahrung, Kant-Studien 28 (1923), 283–310 (307); Josef Kunz, [Buchbesprechung] Adolf Merkl,
Die Lehre von der Rechtskraft, entwickelt aus dem Rechtsbegriff. Eine rechtstheoretische Untersuchung
(1923), Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 4 (1925), 355–362 (359).
76 Fritz Sander, Kelsens Rechtslehre, Eine Kampfschrift gegen die normative Jurisprudenz, Tübingen 1923,
130.
77 Vgl. Alexander Somek, Wissen des Rechts, Tübingen 2018, 33.
78 Zu den Implikationen eines dynamischen Verständnisses des Rechts vgl. Rainer Lippold, Recht und
Ordnung (Anm. 14), 133 ff.
79 Dies wird brillant rekonstruiert von Christoph Kletzer – m. E. Sanderschen wie Olivecronas Geist at-
mend – als „demand model of functioning of law“. Vgl. Christoph Kletzer, The Idea of a Pure Theory of Law
(Anm. 52), 16–20.

dem vorgegebenen positiven Recht gemäß anders sein sollen. Daher die sprachliche
Bezeichnung gewisser Rechtserscheinungen als „fehlerhaft“, die Beibehaltung des
„Rechtsfehlers“ als eine anschlussfähige rechtstheoretische Kategorie. Die Alternativ-
ermächtigung kapituliert vor dem Befund der schon außerhalb des Normrahmens ge-
troffenen Entscheidungen und bietet einen Rekurs für deren Deutung als rechtmäßiges
Recht. Auch die die Fremdprogrammierung ignorierend geschaffene Norm integriert
das positive Recht. Was interessiert, ist zu erklären, wie es dazu kommt. Die Pointe
dabei ist, die variationsfähigen, möglichen Szenarien der aktuellen Rechtserzeugung
zu beschreiben, in der „rechtswidrige Rechtsnormen“ problemlos als Anreiz für weite-
re Rechtskommunikationen fungieren. Vor diesem Hintergrund gewinnt die in dieser
Konstruktion auf das rechtliche Können verweisende Ermächtigung Zentralität bei
der Beschreibung des positiven Rechts, denn auch rechtmäßige Rechtserscheinungen
können von den zuständigen Autoritäten vernichtet werden.80
Nicht zufällig sind im Modell Kelsens Interpretationsfragen weitgehend ein rechts-

politisches Problem81 – so wie es auch bei Sander der Fall ist. Dabei geht es nicht da-
rum, die Grenzen der zulässigen Entscheidungen, den Bereich der Rechtmäßigkeit
zu demarkieren, sondern die dem Rechtssystem immanente Konstitution rechtlicher
Relevanz bzw. Rechtsbindung einheitlich zu rekonstruieren. Anders sieht Merkl den
Platz der Auslegungslehre in den Rechtswissenschaften. „Denn die Resultate der Juris-
prudenz sind Ergebnisse der Auslegung, die Interpretation selbst (und nicht deren Me-
thodenlehre) ist die Funktion der Jurisprudenz“.82 Die Lehre der Alternativermächtigung
ist eben keine Interpretationsthese, sondern sie stellt einen Beschreibungsversuch der
Strukturen des positiven Rechts dar,83 sodass die Verarbeitung des Phänomens des
„rechtswidrigen Rechts“ plausibilisiert wird.
e. Das Problem der Entscheidung letzter Instanz
Der Fehlerkalkül Merkls stößt bei den Entscheidungen letzter Instanzen an seine
Grenzen, wenn keine positivrechtliche „Korrektur“ mehr vorgesehen ist.84 Dabei sieht
80 „Der objektive Grund“ für die Vernichtbarkeit einer Rechtserscheinung ist „die von der Rechtsordnung
vorgesehene Möglichkeit, in einem dazu bestimmten Verfahren die andere, von der angefochtenen Entschei-
dung nicht verwirklichte Alternative zu definitiver Geltung zu bringen“ – und eben nicht eine angebliche
„Rechtswidrigkeit“ an sich der angefochtenen Rechtserscheinung, Hans Kelsen, RR 2 (Anm. 38), 273–274.
81 Hans Kelsen, RR1 (Anm. 38), 108; Hans Kelsen, RR2 (Anm. 38), 350.
82 Adolf Julius Merkl, Zum Interpretationsproblem, Grünhuts Zeitschrift für das Privat- und Öffentliche
Recht der Gegenwart 42 (1916), 535–556 (537).
83 Vgl. Riccardo Guastini, Realismo e antirealismo nella teoria dell’interpretazione, Ragion pratica 17
(2001), 43–52 (48); ders , Réalisme et anti-réalisme dans la théorie de l’interprétation, in: Mélanges Paul
Amselek, Bruxelles 2005, 432–443 (438).
84 Vgl. Christoph Kletzer, Kelsen’s Development of the Fehlerkalkül-Theory, Ratio Juris 18–1 (2005), 46–63
(51).

sich Merkl genötigt, der Rechtswissenschaft eine Richterrolle gegenüber der Rechts-
praxis anzuvertrauen. Mangels vorgesehener Fehlerreaktionsmechanismen sollte man
die fehlerhaften Entscheidungen gelten lassen. Da aber der Kunstgriff der Lehre des
Fehlerkalküls darin besteht, die Geltung defekter Rechtserscheinung in den posi-
tiv-rechtlich gewährleisteten Beseitigungschancen oder Gleichgültigkeitserklärungen
zu verankern, verliert das Konstrukt im Fall definitiver Rechtsentscheidung teilweise
seine Erklärungsmacht. Die Alternativermächtigung Kelsens, die die „Fehlerhaftig-
keit“ der rechtserzeugenden Akte und deren Produkte eher unsichtbar macht, da sie
schnell wieder in das rechtmäßige Recht rückgekoppelt werden, kennt dieses Prob-
lem nicht. Der zu zahlende Preis ist aber anscheinend nicht geringer.85 Die Lehre der
Alternativermächtigung macht sich eine Art Ausnahmezustand zu eigen, indem das
positive Recht die Möglichkeit des sich über die normativen Rechtsvorgaben Hinweg-
setzens durch autoritativen Entscheidungen auf jeder Ebene des Rechtsgewinnungs-
verfahrens normalisiert. Von einer „permanenten Revolution“ – die aber invisibilisiert

wird – könnte sogar die Rede sein, „denn unter dem Vorzeichnen der Rechtsdynamik
kann alles, was ‚rechtsstatisch‘ als ‚Fehlerhaftigkeit‘ gedeutet werden könnte“, durch
den Alternativcharakter der Ermächtigungsnormen absorbiert werden.86
f. An den Grenzen der Rechtserkenntnis
Bei der Setzung des i-Tüpfelchens in den jeweiligen rechtstheoretischen Modellen

zum Umgang mit der Möglichkeit „rechtswidrigen Rechts“ verweisen beide Varian-
ten der Reinen Rechtslehre, namentlich die Merklsche und die Kelsensche letztend-
lich auf das Jenseits der rechtlichen Programmierung stricto sensu. Der Fehlerkalkül als
rechtstheoretisches Konstrukt ermächtigt die Rechtswissenschaft zur Erkenntnis und
Entscheidung über das geltende Recht in Namen einer Verstärkung der Normativität
bzw. der Anspruchsdimension des Rechtlichen. Scheiden die Rechtsordnungen der
85 Von der Lehre der Alternativermächtigung kann gesagt werden, was Horst Dreier zur Interpretations-
theorie der Reinen Rechtslehre Kelsens äußerte: „Sie rettet ihre Wissenschaftlichkeit, so will es scheinen,
um jegliche Praxisrelevanz, verstanden als direkte Einflußnahme auf die reale Rechtsgestaltung zu verlie-
ren. […] Anleitende Kraft kann die Rechtswissenschaft insofern kaum entfalten. […] Kelsen, der ange-
treten war, die Rechtswissenschaft auf die Höhe einer echten Wissenschaft zu heben, muss offenbar am
entscheidenden Punkt, dem der Auslegung und Anwendung des Rechts, kapitulieren“, Horst Dreier, Der
Preis der Moderne – Hans Kelsens Rechts- und Sozialtheorie, in: Elif Özmen (Hrsg.), Hans Kelsens Politi-
sche Philosophie, Tübingen 2017, 3–27 (23–24).
86 Vgl. Alexander Somek, Rechtssystem und Republik, Wien 1992, 489. Kammerhofer zieht in diesem Zu-
sammenhang die Möglichkeit in Erwägung, auf jeder Ebene der stufenförmigen Rechtskonkretisierung
eine neue Grundnorm vorauszusetzen, die die – über die von Kelsen benannte „indirekte Regelung“ der
Rechtserzeugungsregel gedeckte – Norm als eine eher zu einer unterschiedlichen Normenordnung gehö-
rige Rechtsnorm deutet. Vgl. Jörg Kammerhofer, Uncertainty in International Law: A Kelsenian Perspective,
London 2011, 293.

Rechtserkenntnis und der Rechtserzeugung aus, bestimmt der das Rechtsverfahren

beobachtende Rechtswissenschaftler, was Rechtens ist, bzw. was durch das vergange-
ne/vorgegebene Recht von den Rechtsanwendern erwartet und gefordert wird. Die
Alternativermächtigung redet einem Primat der Rechtserzeugung das Wort. Zwi-
schen den konkurrierenden Rechtsdeutungen der in Frage kommenden rechtlichen
Deutungsschemata gibt sie der durchgesetzten, der effektiv gewordenen, durch die
zuständige Autorität erzeugten Norm den Vorzug. Die Entscheidungsdimension des
Rechts bzw. die Rechtspositivität wird im Ergebnis einer dynamischen Betrachtung
des Rechts qua Rechtsgewinnungsverfahren auf den Punkt gebracht. Dynamisch ge-
sehen lässt sich kaum ein Grund dafür finden, dass die vergangenen Rechtsnormen
zulasten der gerade zu erzeugenden Rechtserscheinungen privilegiert werden. Auch
die außerhalb des kognitiv festgestellten Rahmens getroffene Entscheidung gilt als
Rechtsnorm. Letztlich verweist die Reine Rechtslehre Kelsens auf die Effektivität, ja
auf die durchgesetzte Macht, die sich selber aus ihrer Durchsetzung für Rechtsmacht
erklärt.
IV. Unterschiedliche Baupläne
Die Divergenzen zwischen den „Architekten“ der Reinen Rechtslehre bei der Behand-
lung der „Rechtsfehlerproblematik“ entlarven grundlegend verschiedene Rechtswis-
senschaftskonzepte. Wie hoch Merkl den Stellenwert der Erkennbarkeit der Fehler
mit deren folgerichtiger Verbannung in das Nicht-Recht ansetzt, manifestiert sich
darin, dass er davon die „Existenzberechtigung der Jurisprudenz“87 abhängig macht.
„Die Eingliederung in die Rechtshierarchie bedeutet die Unterordnung unter höhe-
re Rechtsgebilde, wobei die Frage, ob das Unterordnungsverhältnis gewahrt ist, sehr
wohl eine logische Überprüfung zuzulassen scheint. Die Bestreitung dieser Über-
prüfungsmöglichkeit [schließt] zugleich den Verzicht auf eine Rechtswissenschaft
von irgendwelchem Inhalt in sich [ein].“88 Steht der Rechtswissenschaft ein kritisches
Potenzial gegenüber der Rechtspraxis nicht zu, konsentiert man mit der Ent-Stufung
der Rechtsordnung, der Stufenbau selbst implodiert, also büßt das Rechtssystem seine
Grenze ein. Die bloße Idee der Rechtsanwendung wird entleert. Für Kelsen genügt es
andererseits, dass das Recht als eine souveräne, nicht vom Jenseits her weiter ableit-
bare, normative Ordnung vorausgesetzt wird. Eine selbständige Rechtswissenschaft
erfordert eine eigengesetzlich operierende Rechtsnormativität.89 Ob diese Eigenge-
setzlichkeit mit den Gesetzen der Logik oder der rationalen Erkenntnis vereinbar sein
muss, spielt für Kelsen keine Rolle.
87 Adolf Julius Merkl, Justizirrtum und Rechtswahrheit (Anm. 25), 465.

88 Adolf Julius Merkl, Das doppelte Rechtsantlitz (Anm. 6), 444.
89 Vgl. Hans Kelsen, Der soziologische und der juristische Staatsbegriff, Tübingen 1922, 87.

In gewissem Sinne liegen dem Fehlerkalkül und der Alternativermächtigung unter-

schiedliche Rechtsweltbilder zugrunde.90 Merkl scheint es wichtig zu sein, die Gren-
zen des Rechtlichen zu ziehen. So umfasst in der Grammatik Merkls das Nicht-Recht
als kontradiktorischer Gegensatz zum Recht auch dessen konträre Erscheinungen, das
Unrecht.91 Das „rechtswidrige Recht“ soll durch die Rechtswissenschaft in den Bereich
des Außer-Rechtlichen verwiesen werden. Kelsen redet einer Version der von Sander
früher artikulierten König-Midas-These das Wort.92 Aus der Warte des Rechtssystems
ist das Nicht-Recht nicht sichtbar, es lässt sich nicht erfassen. Alles, was das Recht im
Rechtsverfahren ‚anfasst‘, wird Recht.93 Dank der Devise der Alternativermächtigung
auch rechtmäßig.
Dem Grenzcharakter der eigentlichen Problematik der Grenzziehungsversuche ge-
mäß,94 begleiten diese schulimmanente Diskussion gelegentlich politische bzw. welt-
anschauungsbasierte Bemerkungen. Der Befürworter der Reinen Rechtslehre qua in-
dividualistischer Rechtstheorie,95 Adolf Merkl, sieht in der Kontrolle der Rechtspraxis

durch die Rechtswissenschaft das letzte Bollwerk des Rechtsunterworfenen gegen die
Staatsgewalt, nämlich den „Triumph des durch das Kollektivum vergewaltigten Indi-
viduums über dieses Kollektivum“.96 Kelsen seinerseits macht sich viel öfter Sorgen
um die anarchischen Konsequenzen einer radikalen Dezentralisierung der Bestim-
mung der Rechtlichkeit. Soll der Herr Jedermann regelmäßig bestimmen können, was
rechtmäßig ist, verliert das Recht seine widerwillige Durchsetzungsmacht, werden die
Normansprüche des Rechts nicht mehr plausibel.97
V. Aus den (Rechts-)Fehlern lernen
Aus der vielschichtigen Debatte um den Umgang des Rechts mit „Fehlern“ scheint
sich bei allen Konstruktionsunterschieden wenigstens ein gemeinsames Resultat zu
ergeben: Die Bedeutung der Rechtmäßigkeit für die rechtlichen Operationen wird
relativiert, die Zentralität dieses Attributs einer Rechtserscheinung als rechtstheo-
retische Kategorie wird deplatziert. Durch den Fehlerkalkül Merkls via Begriffspaar
90 Zu den Hintergründen beider Modelle, vgl.: Patrick Hilbert, Fehlerkalkül oder Alternativbestimmun-
gen – zu den Strategien der Geburtshilfe im Stufenbau der Rechtsordnung (Anm. 3), 556 für den Fehler-
kalkül und 565–566 für die Alternativbestimmung.
91 Vgl. Adolf Julius Merkl, Die Lehre von der Rechtskraft (Anm. 5), 291.
92 Vgl. Hans Kelsen, RR2 (Anm. 38), 282.
93 Fritz Sander, Staat und Recht, Prolegomena zu einer Theorie der Rechtserfahrung, Bd. 2., Wien 1922, 1202–
1203.
94 Zur herausfordernden Natur der Frage nach der Möglichkeit „rechtswidrigen Rechts“ vgl. Hans Kelsen,
Allgemeine Staatslehre (Anm. 62), 278 und 299.
95 Adolf Julius Merkl, Individualismus und Universalismus als staatliche Baugesetze (Anm. 26), 247.
97 Vgl. z. B. Hans Kelsen, RR2 (Anm. 38), 275.

Dürfen und Können zwar deutlicher als durch die Alternativermächtigung Kelsens,
die sich aber doch in einer Gestalt rekonstruieren lässt, dass man eine Rechtmäßigkeit
nach außen qua Rechtsverfahrensbezogenheit98 von einer Rechtmäßigkeit nach innen
qua Rückbeziehbarkeit auf den rechtlichen Rahmen ausdifferenziert.
Der (inhaltlichen) Rechtmäßigkeit nach innen trägt der Fehlerkalkül Rechnung.
Seine Weiterbildung und Verfeinerung anhand der Unterscheidung von Können
und Dürfen vergrößert die Kommunikationschancen der Rechtstheorie mit dem
sprachlichen Gebrauch und der Denkweise der Rechtsdogmatiken, indem sie ihnen
sowohl ein anschlussfähiges Instrumentarium für die Markierung des Raums zuläs-
siger Rechtsentscheidungen liefert, als auch ein erklärungsmächtiges Modell für das
Verständnis der positiv-rechtlich vorhandenen, möglichen Reaktionen auf fehlerhafte
Rechtserscheinungen anbietet. Die Alternativermächtigung kümmert sich von einer
rechtsstrukturellen Perspektive aus hingegen eher um die Rechtmäßigkeit nach außen
und macht besonders stark darauf aufmerksam, dass „Rechtsfehler“ – das, was in den
Augen der Rechtsdogmatik fehlerhaft aussieht – die Maschinerie des Rechts nicht blo-
ckieren.
In beiden nun so neukalibrierten Modellen erweist sich die Rechtmäßigkeit oder
Rechtswidrigkeit einer Rechtserscheinung als möglicher Anknüpfungspunkt bzw.
als Anreiz für weitere Kommunikation im Rechtssystem. Rechtmäßigkeit ist ja oft
Kampfbegriff, taugt in der rechtlichen Alltagspraxis als Streitgegenstand. Wie Kelsen
übrigens schon 1914 geltend machte: „Es ist im Grunde genommen unrichtig, wenn
man bei theoretischer Behandlung des Problems des fehlerhaften Staatsaktes stets von
der stillschweigenden Voraussetzung ausgeht, daß der fragliche Fehler mit absoluter
Sicherheit festgestellt oder feststellbar ist.“99 Der Fehlerkalkül und die Alternativer-
mächtigung thematisieren die tagtäglichen Auffassungskonflikte bezüglich dessen,
was rechtskonform ist und was nicht. Sie entblößen, wenn auch mit unterschiedlichen
Akzenten, das rechtswidrige Recht als ein durchgängiges Rechtsphänomen.
Bringt die Alternativermächtigung die Rechtsdynamik auf den Punkt und verweist
den Rechtstheoretiker auf die Entscheidungen der Rechtsorgane, ermöglicht der Feh-
lerkalkül eine rechtsdogmatische Rechtsschichtendarstellung, die sich am Rechts-
dürfen orientiert, um sagen zu können, was vom positiven Recht bei jeder Stufe der
Rechtskonkretisierung normativ verlangt wird, welche Erwartungen von der rechtli-
chen Normativität stabilisiert werden.
98 „Rechtmäßig“ ist in diesem Sinne Nichts als das Zeichen dafür, dass der in Frage kommende Akt „in ei-
nem vom Recht geordneten Verfahren“ erzeugt wurde. Vgl. Hans Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre (Anm. 62),
277. Hier findet man einen Anknüpfungspunkt für die Differenzierung zwischen Rechtsgeltung und Recht-
mäßigkeit stricto sensu, die von Kelsen selber nicht präzise vorgenommen wurde.
99 Hans Kelsen, Über Staatsunrecht (Anm. 1), 92 = HKW 3, 439–531 (513).

Beide Modelle tragen dazu bei, der Problematik des rechtlichen Umgangs mit
„rechtwidriger Rechtserscheinung“ den Status der „partie honteuse“100 der Rechtstheo-
rie zu rauben, ohne ihr den Status einer Erkenntnisherausforderung zu entziehen. Die
Rechtsfehlerproblematik zwingt dazu, über die fundamentalsten Fragestellungen der
Rechtstheorie nachzudenken. Sie fordert Klarheit über die unterschiedlichen mögli-
chen Betrachtungsstandpunkte und deckt ein Spezifikum der rechtlichen Operatio-
nen in der Perspektive der Reinen Rechtslehre(n) auf: die Markierung von Recht-
serzeugungsmöglichkeitshorizonten durch Ermächtigungen, das Zusprechen von
rechtlicher Relevanz durch autoritative Deutungsschemata.
Rodrigo Garcia Cadore

Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, Institut für Staatswissenschaft und Rechts-
philosophie, Abteilung 3: Rechtstheorie (LS Prof. Matthias Jestaedt), Hebelstraße 25
(Hinterhaus), 79104 Freiburg im Breisgau, rodrigo.cadore@jura.uni-freiburg.de
100 Fritz Sander, Merkls Rechtslehre, Prager Juristische Zeitschrift 4 (1924), 16–31 (26).


Kelsen meets Cognitive Science
The Pure Theory of Law, Interpretation, and Modern
Cognitive Pragmatics
BENEDIKT PIRKER *1
Abstract: The present paper examines Kelsen’s take on interpretation in the framework
of his Pure Theory of Law and contrasts it with later legal theoretical perspectives on in-
terpretation and the findings of modern cognitive linguistics and pragmatics. A nuanced
picture emerges. Kelsen’s views on the inevitability of interpretation withstand scrutiny,
whereas his “frame” conceptualization of language appears wanting in light of modern
knowledge on the operation of language in communication. By comparison, some later
theoretical contributions such as literalist approaches see their foundations questioned
even more fundamentally.
Keywords: Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, Interpretation, cognitive linguistics, prag-
matics, Relevance Theory
Schlagworte: Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, Auslegung, Kognitive Linguistik, Pragma-

tik, Relevanztheorie
I. Introduction
Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law addresses numerous questions of legal theory. The
present paper focuses on its take on legal interpretation, and contrasts this take with
the more recent emergence of cognitive linguistics, in particular cognitive pragmatics.
* University of Fribourg. The author thanks Jennifer Smolka as well as the participants of the 2018 IVR
German Section’s Conference “Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law: Conceptions and Misconceptions”, in
particular Matthias Jestaedt and Clemens Jabloner, for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
All internet resources have been last accessed on January 31 2019.

204 BENEDIKT PIRKER
The goal is to work out to what extent Kelsen’s point of view can still be useful today
or needs to be revised.
To approach the subject, we use two core ideas of Kelsen – the inevitability of inter-
pretation and his conceptualization of language – as starting points; we then contrast
these points with selected later relevant developments in legal thinking. Finally, we
demonstrate what cognitive pragmatics has to say on the matter. The approach of law
and pragmatics used here has been developed in the field of international law and its
interpretation.1 Consequently, the paper takes its examples and some of the literature
from this field. Kelsen’s later work has also extensively dealt with international law.2
However, like Kelsen’s theoretical contributions to the law the present paper aims to
provide some generally applicable conclusions, notably with regard to language in law
and the phenomenon of interpretation.
II. Preliminaries
Before we engage with individual points in Kelsen’s oeuvre3 that elicit commentary
from a linguistic perspective there are some preliminaries to be settled. First, as resorts
clearly from his work, Kelsen aims to contribute to the development of the legal sci-
ence as an independent discipline, independent in particular with regard to politics
and legal politics.4 He is not a linguist, or trying to contribute to linguistics. Interpreta-
tion is also not the sole or primary focus of his work. The point of the present paper is
therefore not to criticize Kelsen for not being a linguist or for not taking into account
a state of knowledge that was simply not available to him. Instead, Kelsen’s work pro-
vides a useful starting point to set out elements of modern linguistics that may help
lawyers to better understand the phenomenon of language. Kelsen’s views are still part
of the knowledge of many lawyers today. To explain present day linguistic findings
against the backdrop of Kelsen’s work ideally makes them more palatable and relatable
for lawyers.
1 Jennifer Smolka / Benedikt Pirker, International Law and Pragmatics – An Account of Interpretation in
International Law, International Journal of Language & Law 5 (2016), 1–38; Benedikt Pirker / Jennifer Smol-
ka, Making Interpretation More Explicit: International Law and Pragmatics, Nordic Journal of International
Law 86 (2017), 228–266; Jennifer Smolka / Benedikt Pirker, International Law, Pragmatics and the Dis-
tinction Between Conceptual and Procedural Meaning, International Journal of Language & Law 7 (2018),
117–141. Whereas the focus lies on interpretation to date, the approach could also be used for the drafting of
international treaties or domestic legislation.
2 Bardo Fassbender / Helmut Philipp Aust, Basistexte: Völkerrechtsdenken, 2012, 52.
3 The present focus lies on Kelsen’s earlier work. See on hints about interpretation in Kelsen’s later work
Matthias Jestaedt, Wie das Recht, so die Auslegung – Die Rolle der Rechtstheorie bei der Suche nach der
juristischen Auslegungslehre, Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 55 (2000), 133–158, 139 footnote 16.
4 Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 1960, 1.

Kelsen meets Cognitive Science 205
Second, terminological clarity is needed. The present paper has initially somewhat
interchangeably spoken of cognitive linguistics and cognitive pragmatics, while choos-
ing the latter for its title. Linguistics encompasses numerous directions of research. For
the present purposes, semantics and pragmatics are most relevant. The two notions
will be set out in more detail below. Moreover, linguistic research can be undertaken
with different emphases. Many approaches focus e. g. on the role of social conventions
in interpreting meaning. Often, they are called externalist approaches because they
focus on phenomena external to the human mind. By contrast, internalist approaches
focus on what is happening in the human mind. Their emphasis is more psychological.
For example, in pragmatics they would focus less on elements of conveying meaning
in language use that are based on social conventions, but rather on the functioning of
language as explained by universal, psychological features of the human mind.5 We
will see this explained in more detail with Relevance Theory. Crucially, approaches
focusing on what happens in the human mind are typically also referred to as cogni-
tive. With regard to some approaches to cognitive pragmatics like Relevance Theory,
scholars disagree as to whether it even still constitutes part of linguistics or whether it
should already be counted as part of the broader field of cognitive sciences.6
With all this in mind, the present contribution uses linguistics as an umbrella term.
Cognitive linguistics designates linguistic approaches that focus on the operation of
the human mind and its role in communication. Cognitive pragmatics is an approach
to pragmatics, the study of language use, with a cognitive focus. These clarifications
should help to avoid confusion in the following discussion.
III. The inevitability of interpretation
Kelsen perceives interpretation as omnipresent and inevitable. Against the back-

ground of later voices in legal theory, we find that Kelsen’s views are quite modern.
Modern linguistics confirms the baselines of Kelsen’s thinking, although it refines
them somewhat.
1. Kelsen on the necessity of interpretation
Kelsen examines the “problem of interpretation” in the framework of his inquiry into
the hierarchical structure of the legal system. Despite this slightly different focus, in-
5 See for a more detailed overview Benedikt Pirker / Jennifer Smolka, The Future of International Law
is Cognitive – International Law, Cognitive Sociology and Cognitive Pragmatics, German Law Journal 20
(2019), 430–448.
6 Smolka/Pirker (footnote 1), Account of Interpretation, 5.

206 BENEDIKT PIRKER
terpretation for him moves from the higher level of the structure of the legal system
to the lower level. For example, a statute as the general norm is interpreted so that it
can be applied to a concrete material fact, to arrive at an individual norm (e. g. a judi-
cial decision).7 In Kelsen’s view, there is always interpretation. Not only law-applying
authorities, but also individuals who need to understand the law to avoid sanctions or
legal scholars describing positive law have to interpret the law, even though the legal
consequences are different in each case.8
In this process, there are always external circumstances to be taken into account for
Kelsen. Notably, he argues that a higher-level norm can never be binding with respect
to every detail of a lower-level act putting it into practice. There always remains a range
of discretion9:
If official A orders official B to arrest subject C, B must use his own discretion to decide
when, where, and how he will carry out the warrant to arrest C; and these decisions de-
pend upon external circumstances that A has not foreseen and, for the most part, cannot
foresee.10
This is not only how hierarchies between norms operate in Kelsen’s account. It is also a
very fundamental feature of the operation of language in light of cognitive pragmatics,
as will be shown below.
2. The doctrinal and legal theoretical debate on the necessity of interpretation
Some selected examples from a long and rich debate on interpretation in various fields
of law and legal theory offer contrasting views.
Marmor argues that interpretation is not always necessary and that there is a fixed,
semantic content of the law because of which there is no difficulty for understanding
the relevant communication in some cases.11 Contrary to other conceptualizations of
language,12 Marmor strongly insists on the existence of natural language, in the sense
7 Hans Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory (translated by Bonnie Litschewski Paulson
and Stanley L. Paulson), 1997, 77, pointing also to interpretation of the constitution and of individual norms
such as judicial decisions.
8 Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (translation from the second (revised and enlarged) German edition
by Max Knight), 2009, 348.
9 Kelsen (footnote 7), 78.
10 Ibid., 78.
11 It should be noted that in more recent writing, Marmor seems to have somewhat changed views and
begins to recognise an increased role for pragmatics in determining what an utterer has meant with an ut-
terance, see Andrei Marmor, ‘Defeasibility and Pragmatic Indeterminacy in Law’ in: Pragmatics and Law –
Philosophical Perspectives, (eds.) Alessandro Capone / Francesca Poggi, 2016, 15–32, 18. We nonetheless pres-
ent the early, classic approach he suggested for interpretation as a phenomenon.
12 See e. g. Stanley Fish’s views in section IV.3.1.

that meaning is for him semantically determined by the rules and conventions of nat-
ural language.13
Such semantic determination means for Marmor that no interpretation is neces-
sary in certain cases. Relevant aspects of the context are “common knowledge” be-
tween speaker and hearer that the latter can easily grasp.14 Interpretation is in his view
a unique type of reasoning or understanding limited to the ascertainment of utteranc-
es that are not semantically determined. Therefore, interpretation must ascertain the
communicative intent of the author, or of a stipulated hypothetical speaker, whose
identity is explicitly defined by law or is presupposed by a particular interpretation
offered.15
Another distinction drawn typically in the context of theoretical debates on inter-
pretation in United States constitutional law is that between interpretation and con-
struction. According to this distinction, interpretation is limited to the elucidation of
the semantic meaning of a legal text. By contrast, construction means putting such
meaning into effect by applying it in specific cases.16 Supposedly, only where the se-
mantic meaning of a text is vague, an interpreter must enter the “construction zone”
and have recourse to extra-textual material to apply a particular provision.17
Both presented views rely strongly on the idea of a high degree of semantic deter-
minacy of language to develop their particular concept of interpretation. Some have
challenged Marmor’s concept of interpretation at a legal-theoretical level. Notably,
Endicott argues that interpreting in the sense of a process of identifying reasons is nec-
essary in the first place to determine whether there is any indeterminacy in a commu-
nication, i. e. to determine what a communication means. This interpretation serves to
resolve doubts as to what conclusion is to be reached on a communicative act. Inter-
pretation’s role ends if no such conclusion can be reached, and then there is indeter-
minacy.18 Nonetheless, such theoretical assessments do not venture further into the
intricacies of linguistic meaning.
Summing up, “indeterminacy”, “the law is clear”, “interpretation vs. construction”
and similar statements stem from a rich tradition in legal philosophy and theory. What
is suggested at this point is, however, not to add another nuance to this theoretical
body of work. Cognitive pragmatics rather is the attempt not to slice the same cake
13 Andrei Marmor, Law and Interpretation: Essays in legal philosophy, 1997, 64.
14 Andrei Marmor, Philosophy of Law, 2011, 140.
15 See in more detail Andrei Marmor, Interpretation and Legal Theory, 2005, 9 ff.
16 Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 34 (2011),
65, 65.
17 Lawrence Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, Constitutional Commentary 27 (2010),
95, 108.
18 Timothy Endicott, Interpretation and Indeterminacy: Comments on Andrei Marmor’s Philosophy of
Law, Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies 10 (2014), 46–56, 51–52.

208 BENEDIKT PIRKER
differently, but to assess the cake using a completely different toolbox.19 The paper thus
turns to the linguistic distinction between semantics and pragmatics. The reasoning
process that legal theory sees in action in “interpretation” is only superficially the same
as the view developed by modern linguistics.
3. The necessity of interpretation and cognitive pragmatics
As the above discussion has shown, there is disagreement among lawyers over whether
law always needs to be interpreted to be applied or whether there can be “clear” cases
where no interpretation is necessary, i. e. where “semantics” does all the work. Kelsen
appears to argue the first position, adding that there are always external circumstances
that need to be taken into account. Let us now assess what linguistics says on this point.
Of course, linguistics will not answer this exact question, as it has not asked this
question in the first place. Rather, certain approaches of linguistics will deal with how
communication succeeds. For this purpose they focus on the actual operation of lan-
guage. What linguistics can show us is that interpretation in the sense of requiring both
a text and extra-textual elements for comprehension is inevitable, and language (and
with it legal texts) is much less semantically determined than lawyers tend to think.
When is interpretation necessary? To answer the question from a linguistic point of
view, we must retrace the notions of semantics and pragmatics. As becomes visible, the
way language works is always a comprehension process that for lawyers comes close to
what they understand as “interpreting” and taking into account circumstances external
to a written text, i. e. the “norm text”.20
Semantics is concerned with meaning that is encoded in the formal components of
language. By contrast, pragmatics looks at the way in which the mentioned components
with encoded meaning are used in particular contexts to communicate thoughts.21 Se-
mantics and pragmatics can be said to rely on distinct models of how communication
operates. A code model suggests that communication is encoded, directly or indirectly,
in language. An inferential model argues that a communicator provides evidence of
their intention to convey a meaning which is, in turn, inferred by the audience on the
basis of the evidence provided as well as contextual information and the audience’s
19 See also on the very selective and fragmentary reception of linguistic ideas in legal theory generally
Dietrich Busse, ‘Semantik des Rechts: Bedeutungstheorien und deren Relevanz für Rechtstheorie und Re-
chtspraxis’ in: Handbuch Sprache im Recht, (eds.) Ekkehard Felder / Friedemann Vogel, 2017, 22–44, 26 ff.
20 See generally on the difficulty of lawyers to connect their legal notions and categories (such as inter-
pretive methods) with the notions and categories of semantics and pragmatics Alan Durant / Janny H. C.
Leung, ‘Pragmatics in legal interpretation’ in: The Routledge Handbook of Pragmatics, (eds.) Anne Barron /
Yueguo Gu / Gerard Steen, 2017, 535–549, 536.
21 Robyn Carston, ‘Legal Texts and Canons of Construction: A View from Current Pragmatic Theory’ in:
Law and Language, (eds.) Michael Freeman / Fiona Smith, 2013, 8–33, 9.

knowledge.22 These models should not be seen as exclusive, but in practice operate
simultaneously. Verbal comprehension can thus be described as including decoding of
linguistic information as one input to an inference process that yields an interpretation
of a speaker’s meaning.23 This – pragmatic – perspective suggests that the simultaneous
operation of the two models is necessary because meaning is linguistically underdeter-
mined. Put differently, the intended meaning to be conveyed in communication is only
partly decodable from linguistic elements. As a consequence of this linguistic under-
determinacy, an addressee must contextually enrich or adjust meaning in a number of
ways to infer the speaker’s meaning.24
Let us look at an example to illustrate these concepts. Take the question “Can you
pass me the salt?”. Part of the meaning of the linguistic items in the example, such
as “salt”, can be decoded. However, it cannot be decoded whether the interrogative
sentence is to be understood as a request or as a question. This must be contextually
inferred. Typically, in a situation where the speaker and addressee sit at the dinner ta-
ble with the salt shaker standing in front of the addressee, the addressee will infer that
the question is to be understood as a request and not as a question about their physical
ability to pass the salt.
The omnipresence of decoding and inference in processes of communication is not
limited to everyday conversations, but can just as well be observed in legal contexts.
Take the seemingly simple example of the word “or”. Put simply,25 “or” only has a min-
imal semantics. Namely, it is a kind of coordination, a syntactic construction in which
two phrases or sentences conjoined by “or” form a single processing unit. This process-
ing unit is true if one or both of the phrases conjoined by “or” are true.26 Put differently,
“or” encodes a so-called inclusive reading: “P ∨ Q” is logically equivalent to “P or Q or
both”. This minimal encoded meaning can be used to convey a pragmatically modified
or rather enriched meaning: “P or Q but not both”, i. e. an exclusive reading.27 The ex-
22 Deirdre Wilson / Dan Sperber, ‘Relevance Theory’ in: The Handbook of Pragmatics, (eds.) Laurence
Horn / Gregory Ward, 2006, 607–632, 607; Sandrine Zufferey / Jacques Moeschler, Initiation à l’étude du
sens, 2012, 88.
23 Jacques Moeschler, Pragmatics, Propositional and Non-Propositional Effects. Can a Theory of Utter-
ance Interpretation Account for Emotions in Verbal Communication?, Social Science Information 48 (2009),
447–463, 452.
24 Wilson/Sperber (footnote 22), 613; Carston (footnote 21), 12–13.
25 See in much more detail on the problem of conceptual and procedural meaning and other aspects of
“or” and similar words Smolka/Pirker (footnote 1), Conceptual and Procedural Meaning, 121 ff.
26 Maria Aloni, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2016, Disjunction (sections 3, 6 and 7, available at
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/disjunction/).
27 A cross-linguistic comparison reveals in this context that some languages do not have any connective
meaning “or” or connectives that encode semantic distinctions not identified within logic; the exclusive vs.
inclusive distinction is thus not necessarily relevant to all languages, see Coralie Chevallier / Ira Noveck /
Tatjana Nazir / Lewis Bott / Valentina Lanzetti / Dan Sperber, Making Disjunctions Exclusive, The Quarter-
ly Journal of Experimental Psychology 61 (2008), 1741–1760, 1744.

210 BENEDIKT PIRKER
clusive reading is compatible with the semantics of “or” in the sense that at least one of
the conjoined phrases or sentences is true.28
An example for the relevance of these distinctions in law can be found in the recent
decision of the International Criminal Court’s Pre-Trial Chamber on the Prosecutor’s
request for a ruling on whether the Court may exercise jurisdiction over the alleged de-
portation of members of the Rohingya people from Myanmar to Bangladesh.29 Article
7 (1) (d) of the relevant Rome Statute30 includes “[d]eportation or forcible transfer of
population” as one of the crimes against humanity that are within the jurisdiction of
the Court. The Chamber had to interpret the provision to decide whether it contained
a single crime or two separate crimes. It ultimately found that there were two separate
crimes, but based on interesting arguments. As its core argument, the Chamber held
that the ordinary meaning of “or” provided a very strong indication that the provision
contained two crimes.31 Then, it added a number of supporting arguments relying on
additional materials, the status of the relevant crimes in other international law, the
object and purpose of the Statute and its own previous jurisprudence.32 Based on the
previous findings, “or” is, however, more complex than the Chamber interprets it to be.
The ordinary meaning of “or” is thus a weaker argument than the Chamber suggests.
If we take the phrase “ordinary meaning” to mean the meaning that can be taken from
the text without context, i. e. by decoding and not by drawing inferences, “or” does not
mean what the Chamber says it means. The decoded meaning would be “deportation
or forcible transfer of population or both”. This makes a reading possible under which
the two are only one crime (“deportation and forcible transfer of population”). This
could be a reading according to which the Statute clarifies what crime (not crimes) we
are supposed to imagine under Article 7 (1) (d) of the Statute by expressing it in two
exemplary ways (“something along the lines of deportation, forcible transfer of popu-
lation”). That is, of course, the opposite of how the Chamber read “or”. The Chamber’s
exclusive reading of “or” only emerges from inferences drawn from the other argu-
ments relied upon by the Chamber. The example shows thus that an interpreter has to
pragmatically enrich “or” for it to mean “deportation or forcible transfer of population,
but not both”. The Chamber’s conclusion can still be defended, as it only partly relies
on its approach to ordinary meaning. Nonetheless, linguistics shows that the inferenc-
28 Caterina Mauri / Johan van der Auwera, ‘Connectives’ in: Cambridge Handbook of Pragmatics, (eds.)
Allan Keith / Katarzyna Jaszczolt, 2012, 347–402, 393.
29 International Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Request under Regulation 46 (3) of the Regulations
of the Court, Public Decision on the Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 19 (3) of the
Statute, Case No. ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18, 6 September 2018.
30 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 United Nations Treaty Series 3.
31 Para 54 of the decision.
32 Paras 55–59. See in more detail also Benedikt Pirker / Jennifer Smolka, The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber’s
Reading of “or” in the Myanmar Jurisdiction Ruling: On the Relevance of Linguistics to Interpretation,
EJIL:Talk! Blog, 2 October 2018.

es drawn from the interpretation of “or” are essential and that the ordinary meaning
of “or” is much less evident than the Chamber’s reasoning suggests. The fact that the
Chamber speaks of a “strong indication” illustrates simultaneously that in reality com-
municators do not separate semantic from simultaneous pragmatic processes.
Based on a sound understanding of the semantic and pragmatic process of language
comprehension, it becomes clear that law – as it is based on language – cannot operate
without processes that lawyers would classify as interpretation. There is no fundamen-
tal “closedness” of the semantic part of language, only an extremely limited “content”
that can be taken independently of context from the text. Language simply does not
operate in this way. Decoding is intertwined with inference; and in this sense, at least
under a charitable reading Kelsen seems to be correct in finding (in his own context)
that there is always interpretation, and that external circumstances must always be tak-
en into account. The operation of decoding and inference also casts doubt on the inter-
pretation/construction distinction. Linguistically speaking, we are not in the presence

of separable kinds of processes. In both cases, language is processed for communica-
tion purposes. Yet, the linguistic terminology cannot and is not intended to replace
legal categorizations. Of course, lawyers can thus continue to distinguish between
interpretation and construction, or develop their own notion of what interpretation
means.33 These legal categorizations fulfil useful functions after all. For example, the
interpretation/construction distinction is a somewhat necessarily vague normative
claim that at some point while processing language an interpretive agent is going “too
far”; the legal consequence is that a particular burden of legitimation has to be fulfilled
to justify such behaviour.
IV. Kelsen and the conceptualization of language between code

and inference
A second topic that looms large within the Pure Theory of Law’s account of interpre-
tation is its conceptualization of language – namely reliance on the notion of a “frame”.
This approach can be contrasted with other current conceptualizations. In light of cog-
nitive pragmatics the picture of a frame reveals itself to be unsatisfactory. But cognitive
pragmatics also requires some rethinking of other, more recent attempts to refine the
way lawyers look at language.
33 This corresponds to some extent to the discussion on the “Wortlautgrenze” or limits of the wording of a
norm often evoked in the (German-speaking) doctrine. Linguists have rather convincingly shown – as the
subsequent discussion of Relevance Theory and loosening and broadening should demonstrate, too – that
this is a reductivist, unrealistic perception of the operation of language. In particular, its reductivism focuses
excessively on the semantics of words, to the detriment of any larger unit of text (or even texts as such). See
with further references Busse (footnote 19), 28–29.

212 BENEDIKT PIRKER
1. Kelsen’s conceptualization of language
When Kelsen speaks of cases of intended and unintended “indeterminacy”, a certain

perception of language that is not uncommon among lawyers becomes apparent. In-
determinacy, for Kelsen, is the “ambiguity of a word or a phrase used in expressing the
norm”; the “not unequivocal” linguistic “sense” of the norm.34
There is, of course, a difference between the norm and its “linguistic expression”.35
This becomes clear when Kelsen speaks of cases where there is a discrepancy between
the linguistic expression of a norm and the will of the norm-issuer.36 But exactly how
these situations of indeterminacy come about, what role language plays in them and
how an actual understanding of such a linguistic expression of a norm eventually
emerges seems to be left aside. The technicalities of methods of interpretation and of
how indeterminacy emerges also do not seem to be his focus. Legal theorists have crit-
icized his views in this regard as incomplete or unconvincing.37 Nonetheless, his dicta
are of interest as they offer a certain perception of language widely held by lawyers.
Note that Kelsen describes a norm to be applied in situations of indeterminacy as a
“frame within which various possibilities for application are given”, leaving a number
of options of conformity.38 Interpretation is then the discovery of this frame, namely
“the cognition of the various possibilities”. This leads to not one correct decision, but
possibly a number of decisions of equal standing even if only one of them ultimately
becomes positive law, e. g. through a judicial decision.39 Kelsen refutes the “traditional”
theory that would suggest that in this interpretation process, one correct decision can
be reached based on the positive law alone.40 Such a theory would describe the process
as a mere intellectual act of clarification or understanding, the interpreter using only
their reason and not their will.41 Kelsen disagrees. The methods of interpretation do
not help either in his view, as they can be used to reach opposing conclusions, without
any criterion to decide when to use one or the opposite method.42 Even the weigh-

35 As it has been put in earlier legal-theoretical writings, the language of a norm can be described as its
representation, see e. g. early Robert von Mohl, Staatsrecht, Völkerrecht und Politik – Bd. 1 Staatsrecht und
Völkerrecht, 1860, 107. Arguably, additional knowledge on the functioning of language becomes, notwith-
standing, even more important, as interpretation remains the only approach to identify a norm in law, see
early Hans Klinghoffer, ‘Über mehrfache Auslegungsmöglichkeiten’ in: 33 Beiträge zur reinen Rechtslehre,
(eds.) Rudolf Aladár Métall / Hans Aufricht, 1974, 153, 163.
37 See e. g. Stanley L. Paulson, Kelsen on legal interpretation, Legal Studies 10 (1990), 136–152; Jestaedt
(footnote 3), 141 ff. with further references.
39 Ibid., 80.
40 Ibid., 81.

ing of interests (Interessenabwägung) is merely a “formulation of the problem, not a

solution”.43 Interpretation is to be understood as the “cognitive ascertainment” of the
meaning of the object of interpretation; its results are typically several possibilities
within the “frame”, all of equal value; only one of them becomes an individual norm
if chosen by e. g. the court at issue.44 The real question of interpretation is thus neces-
sarily for Kelsen neither one of cognition of the positive law nor of legal theory, but of
legal policy.45 It is thus a “function of will” to arrive at an individual norm through ap-
plying e. g. a statute. The positive law must authorize any value judgments and norms
of morality which are used to arrive at any final determination of the individual norm.46
Such norms are then and thereby transformed into positive law.47 Otherwise, positive
law can only give a negative qualification to all other norms such as social values, moral
rules etc.; namely, that they are not part of positive law.48
2. Cognitive pragmatics’ conceptualization of the operation of language
At this point, cognitive pragmatics can be brought into play to engage in more detail
with Kelsen’s position and other views about language in the context of law. We focus
for this purpose on one prominent approach, Relevance Theory.49 Relevance Theory
can show us with a focus on the human mind – thus its designation as a cognitive the-
ory – how communication can succeed.
Relevance Theory as a pragmatic theory claims that the pragmatic “side” is much
richer than the “semantic” side in communication.50 It postulates a model of osten-
sive-inferential communication. The communicator (speaker) must explicitly or
overtly show a communicative intention to communicate a particular piece of infor-
mation to the addressee (ostension); the addresse has to infer the piece of information
(inference).51 Decoding is put in a position subservient to inference, although it does
not become irrelevant.52 Any utterance, i. e. a word or sentence uttered by a commu-
nicator, involves a linguistically coded piece of evidence; a correct interpretation in

44 Ibid., 351.
46 Ibid., 83.
48 Ibid., 353.
49 This should not mean it is the only possible one; moreover, it also has its critics, see in more detail Smol-
ka/Pirker (footnote 1), Conceptual and Procedural Meaning, 121; see also Louise Cummings, Pragmatics: A
Multidisciplinary Perspective, 2005, 122 ff.
50 Ewa Walaszewska, Relevance-Theoretic Lexical Pragmatics, 2015, 35.
51 Zufferey/Moeschler (footnote 22), 108.
52 Walaszewska (footnote 50), 35.

214 BENEDIKT PIRKER
Relevance Theory is ultimately a joint product of linguistic information, contextual

premises and deductive processes.53
The linguistic underdeterminacy of meaning is seen as an essential property of nat-
ural language.54 Relevance Theory suggests in this regard that an addressee must always
contextually enrich or adjust meaning in different ways to infer the communicator’s
meaning.55 This concerns the implicit and explicit content of utterances.56 Take an ex-
ample. Peter says to Mary “It is four o’clock” and intends to communicate that they
will be late for a meeting starting at four o’clock. Mary can decode elements of Peter’s
utterance, for example “four o’clock”. Certain explicit elements will require, moreover,
that Mary enriches and adjusts their meaning by inference. Four o’clock could be on any
day, anywhere in the world. Peter, however, probably intends to express that it is four
o’clock in the afternoon on that exact day at the exact place they find themselves at. This
content thus falls on the explicit side, although it is inferred. There are, at the same time,
implicit elements that must be inferred. Mary knows that they are to attend a meeting at
four o’clock. She can thus infer from the situational context – not from the explicit parts
of Peter’s utterance – that Peter is implying they will be late for the meeting.57
If language is so underdetermined in the first place, successful communication may
appear to be nearly impossible. In Relevance Theory, the principle of relevance as a fun-
damental feature of human cognition provides an explanation for the frequent success
of communication. Human cognition in communication as in other matters always
aims to achieve a maximum of cognitive effects in exchange for a minimum of process-
ing effort. There is thus a relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure that can be de-
scribed in a number of steps. Follow a path of least effort in computing cognitive effects;
test interpretive hypotheses in order of accessibility; stop when your expectations of
relevance are satisfied.58 Positive cognitive effects in this account are worthwhile differ-
ences to an individual’s representation of the world, for example a true conclusion59 or
in law the establishment of a legally convincing interpretation of a norm.60 Communi-
cation works in this manner because it relies on the human ability to read each other’s
minds. Mind-reading is to be understood based on the so-called intentional stance as
the capacity to form fallible hypotheses of what is happening in the interlocutor’s mind
53 Moeschler (footnote 23), 452.

54 Robyn Carston, ‘Relevance Theory and the Saying / Implicating Distinction’ in: The Handbook of Prag-
matics, (eds.) Laurence Horn / Gregory Ward, 2006, 633–656, 654.
55 Carston (footnote 21), 12–13 ; Wilson/Sperber (footnote 22), 613.
56 Walaszewska (footnote 50), 35.
57 See for a more extensive discussion Pirker/Smolka (footnote 1), 241 ff.
58 Carston (footnote 21), 28.
59 Wilson/Sperber (footnote 22), 608.
60 Pirker/Smolka (footnote 1), 237.

and what he or she intends to communicate.61 Take our example of “It is four o’clock”.
Mary will in all likelihood find it unsatisfactory to stop her interpretation of Peter’s ut-
terance at the point where he tells her the time. By drawing additional inferences, she
will reach sufficient positive cognitive effects, i. e. a satisfactory interpretation of Peter’s
utterance. Thereby her expectation of relevance will be satisfied.
Thus, Relevance Theory as a core theory of modern cognitive pragmatics aims at
building a psychologically plausible, empirically testable62 pragmatic theory of meaning
and utterance interpretation in context.63 At the same time, it must be noted that the
theory takes an individualist and psychological64 and not a sociological perspective.65
Relevance Theory thus does not consider that conventions of language use66 are issues
of pragmatics, but rather leaves them to sociology.67 It assumes that social conventions
can be reduced to the knowledge about them accessible in the individual’s mind.68
3. Later accounts in legal theory, Kelsen, and cognitive pragmatics
On the basis of these insights into Kelsen’s views and cognitive pragmatics provided so
far, we can now turn to other approaches in legal theory. Innumerable later accounts
have dealt in one way or another with language in legal theory and its role in law and
61 Jacques Moeschler / Antoine Auchlin, Introduction à la linguistique contemporaine, 2009, 178 ; Dan-
iel Dennett, The Intentional Stance, 1987; Moeschler (footnote 23), 453, relying on Simon Baron-Cohen,
Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind, 1995.
62 Deirdre Wilson, ‘Relevance Theory’ in: The Oxford Handbook of Pragmatics, (ed.) Yan Huang, 2017,
79–100, 81; Billy Clark, Relevance Theory, 2013, 334.
63 Dan Sperber / Gloria Origgi, ‘A pragmatic perspective on the evolution of language’ in: Meaning and
Relevance, (eds.) Deirdre Wilson / Dan Sperber, 2012, 331–338, 331.
64 Susan Foster-Cohen, Relevance Theory, Action Theory and second language communication strategies,
Second Language Research 20 (2004), 289–302, 289 and 294; Diane Blakemore, Understanding Utterances:
Introduction to Pragmatics, 1992, 4.
65 Blakemore (footnote 64), 92; Carmen Curcó, ‘On the Status of Procedural Meaning in Natural Lan-
guage’ in: Procedural Meaning: Problems and Perspectives, (eds.) Victoria Escandell-Vidal / Manuel Leonet-
ti / Aoife Ahern, 2011, 33–54, 37.
66 See on the distinction between conventionalist and non-conventionalist approaches to the study of
language Pirker/Smolka (footnote 5), 441–442.
67 Anne Reboul / Jacques Moeschler, La pragmatique aujourd’hui: une nouvelle science de la communi-
cation 1998, 172.
68 Louis De Saussure, Procedural pragmatics and the study of discourse, Pragmatics & Cognition 15 (2007),
139–159, 142. There are other linguistic approaches that focus on the social determination of linguistic be-
haviour. Only part of them, however, pursue the goal of explaining natural language understanding pro-
cedures. This is, for example, often not the case with Speech Act Theory and approaches to the study of
discourse in a broad sense, which are rather tools for an analyst of language, see ibid., 140 and 145. With re-
gard to legal linguistics, there are some approaches that ground linguistic rules in social conventions of use.
They often follow up on Wittgenstein’s work, see Friedemann Vogel, ‘Zwischen Willkür, Konvention und
Automaten – Die interdisziplinäre Suche nach Bedeutungen in Recht und Gesetz’ in: Zugänge zur Rechts-
semantik – Interdisziplinäre Ansätze im Zeitalter der Mediatisierung, (ed.) Friedemann Vogel, 2015, 3–17, 3 ff.

216 BENEDIKT PIRKER
interpretation generally. We necessarily restrict ourselves again to some example cases

that show how scholars have perceived language in their quest to unravel the mystery
of legal interpretation. Then, we contrast these approaches with the core findings of
Relevance Theory and cognitive pragmatics.
3.1 Textualist, author-centred and social conventions-based accounts

of interpretation
A number of approaches have developed by criticizing each other. Therefore, we treat

them together presently. For a start, there are “textualist” positions such as Marmor’s.
Such views, often also referred to as literalist positions, argue that meaning is fully con-
tained in a text as it is. There is no need to look into any other elements to obtain the
meaning, such as an author’s intent or a legal act’s drafting history. In other words,
language is as a fixed code under these views. Meaning can fully be enshrined in such
an account, independently of context.
An opposite account stems from literary criticism and has been brought to the legal
realm prominently by Stanley Fish.69 For him, words have no inherent meaning; they
can mean anything an author wishes them to mean.70 Language and its meaning are
thus based on the author’s intent. In international legal interpretation, Koskenniemi
has developed a strand of thought going in a similar, yet somewhat less extreme direc-
tion.71 In his view, arguing on the basis of a natural code in language is a camouflaged
attempt to impose a particular speaker’s ideology or political interpretation on others
in the context of legal interpretation.72 Interpretation – namely the interpreting agent –
thus practically always “creates” meaning rather than discovering it in his view.73
Opposing this view, Bianchi suggests a slightly different perspective. Strongly based
on Fish’s idea of interpretive communities, he argues that there must be a middle-way
69 International law scholars have also picked up these ideas, see e. g. Andrea Bianchi, ‘Textual Interpre-
tation and (International) Law Reading: The Myth of (In)Determinacy and the Genealogy of Meaning’
in: Making Transnational Law Work in the Global Economy, (eds.) Pieter Bekker / Rudolf Dolzer / Michael
Waibel, 2010, 34–55.
70 Stanley Fish, There is No Textualist Position, San Diego Law Review 42 (2005), 629–650, 647.
71 Koskenniemi is often counted among the proponents of the Critical Legal Studies movement within
international law; it should nonetheless be noted that his work does not seem to follow some of the more
extreme perspectives that would e. g. suggest that applying the law is always solely about non-legal, politi-
cal interests of those with power, a mere pretense or rhetorical means, see Andrew Altman, Critical Legal
Studies: A Liberal Critique, 1993, 152. Such a position would appear to render any closer engagement with
linguistics and law nugatory.
72 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (Reissue
with a new epilogue), 2005, 18.
73 Ibid., 531. See for a sceptical appraisal Sergio Dellavalle, Law as a Linguistic Instrument Without Truth
Content? On the Epistomology of Koskenniemi’s Understanding of Law, ZaöRV 77 (2017), 199–233, 232–
233.

between formalist approaches that suggest that everything is in the text and radical
critical approaches that give no intrinsic value to the text. In his view, we should ex-
amine sociological aspects to the interpretative process.74 Under this approach of a
turn to sociology, meaning is thus a product of social relations formed by interpretive
communities and their strategies. Following up on this trend, Venzke’s work has in
this regard turned the focus on the interpreting agents as law-creators. Interpretation
“makes” international law in his view, in the sense that interpretation is not only clari-
fying pre-existing meaning, but engaging in its construction.75 What is not always ad-
dressed in sufficient clarity in these accounts is whether they consider language to be
a completely social or natural product, in the sense that interpretive communities can
create practically any meaning without constraints.76
In light of Relevance Theory and cognitive pragmatics, both literalist as well as Fish’s
author-centred approach to meaning are hardly tenable. With what we know through
modern cognitive pragmatics, it appears implausible and empirically untenable that

semantic meaning, or the plain or literal meaning of a text in lawyer’s diction, could
be in any way complete or self-contained. If not even a word like “or” can be read in-
dependently of context, it appears hard to uphold claims such as the ones developed
by Marmor.
An author-centred approach or Koskenniemi’s depiction of natural language codes
constituting camouflaged attempts to impose a speaker’s ideology must equally be re-
jected as imprecise. Of course, the choice of lexical items by a speaker matters. But, as
Relevance Theory’s account shows, there is a certain latitude for the addressee’s mind
to interpret these items, inferring additional elements from context, their own knowl-
edge etc. Author-centred approaches would give language a capacity to contain mean-
ing that it simply does not have, as linguistics shows. Language is ultimately a natural
product in so far as it relies on fundamental, universal features of the human cognitive
system to function, but it also relies on social conventions as part of what is considered
to be meaning.
At the same time, this criticism should not be taken too far. Koskenniemi’s argu-
ment that any interpreter “creates” law, already developed in a different context by
Kelsen and taken up by others, possesses merit. If communication – and in the present
context interpretation – is so fundamentally dependent on contextual elements, by
74 Bianchi (footnote 69), 53. See also Fouad Zarbiev, Le discours interprétatif en droit international con-
temporain: un essai critique, 2015.
75 Ingo Venzke, How Interpretation Makes International Law – On Semantic Change and Normative
Twists, 2012. This is becoming somewhat of a mainstream view, see e. g. writing on Kelsen with a rather
classic positivistic approach Katharina Berner, Authentic Interpretation in Public International Law, ZaöRV
76 (2016), 845–878, 850.
76 See in this regard hints in this direction in Venzke (footnote 75), 46; Andrea Bianchi, ‘Law, Time, and
Change: The Self-Regulatory Function of Subsequent Practice’ in: Treaties and Subsequent Practice, (ed.)
Georg Nolte, 2013, 133–141, 136–137.

218 BENEDIKT PIRKER
means of the very functioning of the organ processing language, namely the human
mind, there is no interpretation that does not in some major or minor way impact on
the original intention with which a (legal) text was written.
The turn to sociology suggested by scholars like Bianchi and Venzke to study mean-
ing in international law can be accepted only partly. As a rather obvious starting point,
sociology is not concerned with the operation of language. It is thus not its purported
mission to help us understand phenomena of interpretation, unless one wants to focus
merely on the behaviour of certain groups or communities in the larger context of in-
terpretation.77 It comes as little surprise in this context that an examination of referenc-
es to language in the relevant works shows that legal scholars engaged in sociological
inquiries seem to overwhelmingly rely exclusively on the code model of language.78 As
shown above, this is outdated in light of the newer findings of pragmatics.
3.2 Hermeneutics and cognitive pragmatics
Hermeneutics is yet another approach to interpretation.79 As has been criticized e. g.

in international law, it has not been given a lot of room in the classic literature on the
subject of interpretation.80 As a prominent example, Gadamer describes interpretation
as a fusion of horizons between the interpreter and the text. In conversation like in
interpretation, the horizons of interlocutors or interpreter and text must merge so that
interpretation can succeed.81 Application, as the fundamental circularity problem of
hermeneutics would put it, is not a first understanding developed of a given universal
and then an application to a concrete case (e. g. of a norm); rather, application is the
very understanding of the universal, e. g. the text.82
The interpreter’s situation, for Gadamer, is not an obstacle to interpretation, but
conditions the very possibility of interpretation. This contradicts Kelsen’s positivistic
account of interpretation. It is impossible to “methodologically bracket” the situation
77 See for a critical appraisal of Bianchi’s and Venzke’s work in this regard Smolka/Pirker (footnote 1),
Account of Interpretation, 17 ff.
78 Pirker/Smolka (footnote 5), 7–8.
79 For example, Dworkin has taken up Gadamer’s views in his contributions to legal theory, see Ronald
Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 1986, 55. See in more detail on Dworkin Daniel Peat / Matthew Windsor, ‘Playing
the Game of Interpretation: On Meaning and Metaphor in International Law’ in: Interpretation in Interna-
tional Law, (eds.) Andrea Bianchi / Daniel Peat / Matthew Windsor, 2015, 3–33, 15–16.
80 See, e. g. already early Outi Korhonen, New International Law: Silence, Defence or Deliverance?, Euro-
pean Journal of International Law 7 (1996), 1–28; Jörg Kammerhöfer, Review – A Orakhelashvili, The Inter-
pretation of Acts and Rules in Public International Law, European Journal of International Law 20 (2009),
1283; on the neglect of philosophical hermeneutics specifically, see Fouad Zarbiev, Review – R Kolb, In-
terprétation et création du droit international, Leiden Journal of International Law 22 (2009), 211–212, 212.
81 See on legal interpretation Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 1989, 321–336.
82 Ibid., 341.

to gain a standpoint ensuring access to an original range of meaning of a norm.83 The

excluded background assumptions are vital and also contain normative assumptions.
The latter contradicts Kelsen’s view that value-free interpretation of the law is possi-
ble (before actively deciding in favour of one solution).84 However, for Gadamer legal
interpretation is nonetheless not arbitrary, as e. g. the judge as an interpreter is bound
by the legal system and constrained to justly weigh “the whole” to reach a judgment
including an interpretation.85
Hermeneutics adds important elements to the picture. Most crucially, it focuses on
the influence of external circumstances and the situatedness of the interpreter. There-
by, it brings similar aspects to lawyers’ attention as Relevance Theory does. Phrased
differently and in more relevance-theoretic terminology, one could paraphrase Gad-
amer as suggesting that interpretation is not possible without an interpreter’s mind –
including its contextual and encyclopaedic knowledge and other influencing factors –
processing that which is to be interpreted. Relevance Theory can add an explanation

of why the “merging” of horizons between e. g. an interpreter and a legal text should
occur and be felicitous in the sense of reaching an interpretation. The reason that this
“merging” exists and works can be found in the mentioned principle of relevance, i. e.
human cognition’s feature of searching for the maximum of relevance and using the
mentioned intentional stance for this purpose.86
3.3 Kelsen’s “frame” conceptualization and cognitive pragmatics
Based on this tour d’horizon of later approaches, let us assess Kelsen’s views in light of
modern pragmatics to see how they fare compared to what we have seen. As shown,
under Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law he conceives of the norm as a “frame” and argues
that interpretive methods do not operate to achieve a correct result on their own, but
merely carve out the possible interpretive solutions of a norm. It may be easiest to
show with the help of two examples in the following how cognitive pragmatics sug-
gests refinements to Kelsen’s views. These refinements concern first the metaphor of
the frame and second the role of interpretive methods in the actual interpretation pro-
cess of the human (lawyer’s) mind.
The first chosen example is taken from international law scholarship.87 In a well-
known treatise on the practice and interpretation of international treaties, Aust, the
83 Hans Lindahl, Gadamer, Kelsen, and the Limits of Legal Interpretation, Phänomenologische Forschungen
(2002), 27–49, 35–36.
84 Ibid., 35–36.
85 Gadamer (footnote 81), 329.
86 See in more detail also about the problem of “mutual knowledge” versus “mutual manifestness” Smol-
ka/Pirker (footnote 1), Account of Interpretation, 22–23.
87 See for the discussion of a similar example in an international dispute settlement situation ibid., 12.

220 BENEDIKT PIRKER
author, describes an example of in his view “good” interpretation.88 Under the section
title “implied terms”, he argues that sometimes it is necessary for international tribu-
nals to “imply a term” without, however, thereby revising a treaty. He then provides
an example that did not “end up in court”. In 1982 during the Falklands conflict there
was at one point not enough accommodation in the territory held by the British for
the approximately 10,000 Argentine prisoners of war (POWs) captured on land in the
final stages of the conflict. The tents that they should be provided with had been lost
at sea because the ship carrying them was sunk by the enemy. After consultations with
the International Committee of the Red Cross, the United Kingdom decided to hold
the POWs on merchant ships and warships in Falklands waters until their repatriation.
Now, the relevant Article 22 of the Third Geneva Convention prescribes that such pris-
oners “may be interned only in premises located on land and affording every guarantee
of hygiene and healthfulness”. Under a literal approach to interpretation, it would ap-
pear rather straightforward for any legal commentator to suggest that the United King-
dom violated the norm; holding POWs on ships is not, as prescribed, holding them
on land. Aust, however, argues in his book that this is not the case. As the primary
purpose of the Convention is the welfare of POWs, in his view one can “imply a term”
in the norm. This has the effect that a party is allowed to hold POWs on ships if there
are circumstances beyond its control and holding them like this would be preferable
to leaving them on land without sufficient protection from weather conditions. Aust
concludes that “[g]ood interpretation is often no more than common sense”.
As indicated, the example may lend itself to dogmatic criticism. However, it also
constitutes a good example of the explanatory force of a linguistic approach to inter-
pretation. If we take Kelsen’s frame approach, we would now use the methods of inter-
pretation to find out the various possible interpretations that “fit within” the frame of
the norm. A look through the prism of cognitive pragmatics, however, provides us with
a more realistic picture and at the same time an explanation for the seemingly blatant
way in which Aust seems to “overlook” the wording of the norm he is confronted with.
A relevance-theoretic account would suggest that Aust is both decoding the con-
cept “land” and at the same time enriching his interpretation pragmatically.89 There
is a process of so-called broadening or loosening of the linguistic content encoded in
“land” at play.90 The concept of “land” encodes a certain decodable meaning, for exam-
ple the assumption that land is firm ground that may border on water but is different
from it. Semantic meaning is, however, underdetermined.91 The decoded meaning of
88 Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, 2013, 221–222. The example is discussed in more detail
and with several other arguments in Pirker/Smolka (footnote 5).
89 As he is doing this with respect to an explicit element of the utterance, namely “land”, it is called an
explicature, Kristin Börjesson, The Semantics-Pragmatics Controversy, 2014, 114.
91 Ibid., 1–2.

“land” must therefore be pragmatically enriched. This may result in a so-called ad hoc
concept.92 In the formation of such a concept, the semantic content of a lexical item
is pragmatically adjusted based on the principle of relevance to express conceptual
content that may be narrower (narrowing) or looser (loosening) than the decoded
meaning.93 At the same time, this is not to be confused with any non-literal use.94
In our example, Aust can thus be said to modulate the linguistic content of “land”
with remarkable effect, all based on context. Article 22 joins another condition to the
obligation to intern POWs on land, namely affording “every guarantee of hygiene and
healthfulness”. What Aust calls to read an implied term into the norm seems to be to
develop the notion of “land” so as to include the second condition (without, however,
arguing expressly so at the legal level). “Land” is thus “land” only under certain con-
ditions, namely with regard to protection from the elements and weather conditions.
Aust narrows the conceptual meaning of “land” in this manner. Then, he loosens the
previously narrowed explicit content, relying on the fact that accommodation and pro-
tection from the elements can also be provided on ships. The conceptual content of
“ship” makes available sufficiently similar information to the narrowed ad hoc concept
of “land”, such as “firm ground”. The linguistic content of “land” is thus loosened so it
includes “land” that is adjacent or even continguous, even if this “land” is technically
located on top of water. Because of this loosening following the initial narrowing of
the linguistic content of “land”, the ad hoc term no longer applies to land that lacks
adequate accommodation; holding POWs on ships becomes for Aust the only option
compliant with the norm.
If we accept this view and thus observe how Aust reached the ad hoc conceptual
understanding of “land”, the “frame” view of a norm appears to be rather misleading.
The language of a norm seems to be less a frame in which various interpretations can
fit. Certainly, this may appear to be at first the result of operations of interpretation.
In fact, however, taking into account such issues as loosening and narrowing, there
is much more diversity and leeway within the operation of language than the picture
of the “frame” admits. Under a truly linguistic understanding, we have to accept that
processes such as broadening and loosening happen, that the encoded content is thus
much less definitive than lawyers’ intuition would suggest, and that inferences affect
the explicit and implicit content of utterances. Rather than a “frame”, a norm is thus
linguistically speaking an “anchor point” or “pointer” for the cognitive process of com-
munication, or in our case, legal interpretation. Again, this should in no way be mis-
construed as an “anything goes” argument or a plea for interpretation relying on any
non-literal use of language. The “frame” metaphor may be valid as a matter of principle,
92 Wilson/Sperber (footnote 22), 618.

93 Börjesson (footnote 89), 117–118.
94 Carston (footnote 21), 11–12. For example, such a non-literal use could be a metaphor as in “John is a
bulldozer” (with John being an actual person with a strong will).

222 BENEDIKT PIRKER
but so diffuse that it becomes nearly pointless. Simply, we will understand better how
humans process language by relying on modern linguistics.
3.4 Kelsen’s view on interpretive methods and cognitive pragmatics
In light of the previous findings, it is rather straightforward to agree with Kelsen that
in and of themselves, interpretive methods will not lead to one irrefutably correct
solution. This is already the case because they are too broad to reach such a suppos-
edly specific result. However, this does not mean that they do not play a role at all.
There have been some early attempts to link the operation of pragmatic maxims and
of interpretive methods and to explaining the relationship between these two sets of
principles.95 In essence, if we look at the process of interpretation as Relevance Theory
would explain it, there is the mentioned process of following a path of least effort in
computing cognitive effect, testing interpretive hypothesis in order of accessibility and
of stopping when the expectations of relevance are satisfied.
Interpretive maxims such as those of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties96 for the case of international law and international treaties would then influence
the inferences to be drawn.97 Notably, they appear to be manifest as contextual assump-
tions and act as implicit premises that affect the strength and acceptability of inferenc-
es.98 This can be clarified with another example, this time with a criminal prohibition.
In EU law, recently a new regulation on market abuse entered into force harmonising
certain elements of the law including the prohibition of insider trading. However, Ger-
many made a mistake while aligning its law with the new legal situation. The relevant
German prohibition was abrogated one day too early, leading to a factual situation in
which insider trading was permissible for a whole day in Germany. This was obviously
a mistake, as all parties involved in drafting the law agreed.99 A lay person would thus
have tried to find an interpretation that takes into account this error. The German leg-
islator ordered the German prohibition to lose its force with 2 July 2016 and the EU
prohibition entered into force with 3 July 2016. Linguistically, there would be – as seen
95 See for a first tentative attempt Pirker/Smolka (footnote 1), 262–263, see also Carston (footnote 21);
Busse (footnote 19), 34; see with regard to so-called Gricean principles Fabrizio Macagno / Douglas Wal-
ton / Giovanni Sartor, Pragmatic Maxims and Presumptions in Legal Interpretation, Law and Philosophy 37
(2018), 69–115.
96 See Articles 31–33, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 United Nations Treaty Series, 331.
97 See for a less benevolent take on international law’s rules of interpretation in legal theory Jörg Kam-
merhofer, Taking the Rules of Interpretation Seriously, but not Literally? A Theoretical Reconstruction of
Orthodox Dogma, Nordic Journal of International Law 86 (2017), 125–150, 143–144.
98 Pirker/Smolka (footnote 1), 263.
99 See on the legal details of the case Christoph Rothenfußer / Christian Jäger, Generalamnestie im Ka-
pitalmarktrecht durch das Erste Finanzmarktnovellierungsgesetz, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (2016),
2689–2695, 2689–2690.

above – a possibility to loosen the meaning of 2 July somewhat so that an ad hoc con-
cept could emerge that allows for the German prohibition to remain into force for the
whole day of 2 July. Nonetheless, a lawyer will balk at the prospect of interpreting the
law so as to extend the punishability of behaviour retroactively. Consequently, inter-
pretive maxims cut off certain inferences in this example.
In a nutshell, Kelsen’s basic point about interpretive methods’ imprecision can thus
be accepted. Matters are, however, more complicated. Rules of interpretation do not
simply not lead to one clear, “correct” result. Norms of interpretation put prevailing
constraints on both utterer and addressee with the aim of facilitating successful com-
munication.100 There is thus no one rule of interpretation that decides matters on its
own. Interpretive rules influence the balance of cognitive effects and processing effort,
so that certain interpretations – due to the increased cognitive effect it takes to uphold
them – would appear more far-fetched and require additional reasoning to be justified.
The latter point also clarifies that, in line with Kelsen’s view, evaluative judgments re-
main necessary under a linguistic perspective on legal interpretation.101
V. Conclusion
The present paper has examined Kelsen’s take on interpretation in the framework of
his Pure Theory of Law and contrasted them with later theoretical perspectives and
the findings of modern cognitive linguistics and pragmatics. A nuanced picture emerg-
es. Of course, a number of points can arguably be refined with more recent scientific
knowledge on how language is processed in the human mind. Nonetheless, at least on
a charitable reading several points of Kelsen remain acceptable. By comparison, some
later theoretical contributions see their foundations questioned more fundamentally.
Notably, the notions of decoding and inference show very clearly that – as Kelsen
also states – there always has to be interpretation, and all theories based on an assumed
complete, context-free semantic content that allows successful interpretation must be
rejected. Linguistics also confirms Kelsen’s views on the law-creating character of in-
terpretation and the inconclusiveness of methods of interpretation. By contrast, his
“frame” conceptualization of language is not particularly helpful, as a closer look at
Relevance Theory and cognitive pragmatics demonstrates. Still, it is closer to the cur-
rent state of knowledge as some other theoretical approaches, e. g. the idea of a purely
author-centred way of conveying meaning through language or of language’s mean-
ing being ultimately determined purely by social conventions. Hermeneutics is much
more in line with cognitive pragmatics, although it can still learn from e. g. Relevance

101 Pirker/Smolka (footnote 1), 264; Smolka/Pirker (footnote 1), Account of Interpretation, 29 ff.

224 BENEDIKT PIRKER
Theory with regard to the actual motivations underlying language processing in the
human mind.
In conclusion, it should be noted as perhaps the most important lesson that Kelsen
did what made sense in his time. Today’s lawyers should no longer be happy with any
simplistic approaches, for example leaving linguistics aside and “escaping” to sociol-
ogy or relying on outdated or incomplete theories of communication. There is much
value to be found in recent scientific findings of cognitive pragmatics that lawyers
would be well advised to take into account. Arguably, such an approach would also
be in line with Kelsen himself, who aimed to challenge traditional doctrines of his
time. The Pure Theory of Law may not be able to provide us with a tenable theory of
interpretation for today, but it can most certainly pass on its spirit of contestation of
the existing “dogma”.
Benedikt Pirker
Institut für Europarecht, Avenue de Beauregard 11, CH-1700 Freiburg,
benedikt.pirker@unifr.ch

III. Die Anwendung der Reinen Rechtslehre
auf Rechtsordnungen / Applying the Pure Theory
of Law to Legal Orders


Hans Kelsen, das Privatrecht und die Demokratie
LENA FOLJANTY
Hans Kelsen, Private Law, and Democracy
Abstract: In the field of private law, the pure theory of law has received little attention,
although Kelsen challenged the traditional understanding of private law profoundly. In
order to locate private law within the hierarchical structure of law, he reformulated key
concepts such as subjective law and private autonomy and questioned the divide public
law and private law. In this contribution, Kelsen’s conception of private law is brought to-
gether with his conceptions of judiciary lawmaking and of democracy. By this, an unfamil-
iar view of Kelsen’s conception of law is presented, which offers material for reflecting on
the current challenges of private law.
Keywords: Pure Theory of Law, Hans Kelsen, Private Law, Judge Made Law, Democracy,
Private Autonomy
Schlagworte: Reine Rechtslehre, Hans Kelsen, Privatrecht, Richterrecht, Demokratietheo-

rie, Privatautonomie
Die wieder erwachende Kelsen-Rezeption der vergangenen Jahre fand zumindest in

Deutschland vorwiegend im öffentlichen Recht statt,1 das Privatrecht blieb von ihr
weitgehend unberührt. Und auch in der internationalen Forschung zu Kelsen gibt es
nicht viele Abhandlungen zu Kelsens Privatrechtskonzeption2 – wobei mit dem Buch
1 Zuerst Horst Dreier, Rechtslehre, Staatssoziologie und Demokratietheorie bei Hans Kelsen, 1990; nun Matthi-
as Jestaedt (Hg.), Hans Kelsen und die deutsche Staatsrechtslehre, 2013.
2 Rafael Encinas de Munagorri, Kelsen et la théorie générale du contrat, in: Carlos Miguel Herrera (Hg.),
Actualité de Kelsen en France, 2001, 109–119; Natalino Irti, Privatautonomie und Staatsform. Kelsen und das
Privatrecht, in: Agostino Carrino / Günther Winkler (Hg ), Rechtserfahrung und Reine Rechtslehre, 1995,
3–14; Klaus Adomeit, Heteronome Gestaltungen im Zivilrecht (Stellvertretung, Weisungsbefugnis, Ver-
bandsgewalt), in: Adolf Merkl / Alfred Verdross / René Marcic / Robert Walter (Hg.), Festschrift für Hans
Kelsen zum 90 Geburtstag, 1971, 9–21.

228 LENA FOLJANTY
von dem italienischen Rechtsphilosophen Michele Prospero „Hans Kelsen: Normati-

vismo e diritto privato“ von 2012 nun Belastbares vorliegt.3
Auch der Kreis um Kelsen befasste sich vorwiegend mit dem Staatsrecht,4 eine
Ausnahme war hier allenfalls die Brünner Schule, wo sich zum Beispiel mit Jaromír
Sedláče, Vladimír Kubeš, Karel Gerlich oder František Bauer durchaus namhafte Zivil-
rechtler finden.5 So wurde die Reine Rechtslehre denn auch von Zeitgenossen als ein
primär die Staatsrechtswissenschaft adressierendes Projekt wahrgenommen – aller-
dings als eines, vor dem sich auch die Zivilrechtswissenschaft in Acht zu nehmen habe.
In seiner Polemik gegen die Reine Rechtslehre schrieb Ernst Fuchs Ende der 1920er
Jahre: „Zwar treibt der Kelsenismus bisher seine Bovigusherde hauptsächlich auf den
staatsrechtlichen Gefilden umher. Aber die Gefahr ist nicht zu unterschätzen, daß er
auch auf das zivilrechtliche Gelände übergreift.“6
Die Sorge von Fuchs war voll und ganz unbegründet – wenn wir die Entwicklung
der Privatrechtswissenschaft in Deutschland in den Blick nehmen, so bestand die Ge-

fahr, dass Kelsens Lehren rezipiert werden könnten, zu keinem Zeitpunkt. Zunächst
versperrten Freirechtsschule und Interessenjurisprudenz den Weg, sodann konkretes
Ordnungsdenken und nationalsozialistische Gemeinschaftsideologie, in der unmittel-
baren Nachkriegszeit christliches Naturrecht und Wertungsjurisprudenz,7 später so-
zial- und wohlfahrtsstaatliche Ansätze.8 Wenn Natalino Irti von einem „tiefliegenden
Unverständnis zwischen Privatrechtswissenschaft und den Kelsenschen Theorien“9
spricht, so trifft er zumindest für die deutsche Privatrechtswissenschaft unzweifelhaft
den Nagel auf den Kopf.
3 Michele Prospero, Hans Kelsen: Normativismo e diritto privato, 2012.

4 Siehe Robert Walter u. a. (Hg.), Der Kreis um Hans Kelsen Die Anfangsjahre der Reinen Rechtslehre, 2008;
Axel Johannes Korb, Kelsens Kritiker Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Rechts- und Staatstheorie (1911–1934), 2010.
5 Vladimír Kubeš / Ota Weinberger (Hg.), Die Brünner rechtstheoretische Schule (Normative Theorie), 1980.
6 Ernst Fuchs, Gesunder Menschenverstand, Neu-Wiener Begriffsnetz und französische „neue Schule“,
Die Justiz, Bd. 4 (1928/29), 129 (140). Außerhalb der Brünner Schule v. a. Fritz Schreier, Reine Rechtslehre
und Privatrecht, in: Alfred Verdross (Hg.), Gesellschaft, Staat und Recht Untersuchungen zur Reinen Rechts-
lehre, 1931, 309–353.
7 Zur Kontinuität antipositivistischer Ansätze in der Privatrechtstheorie des 20. Jahrhunderts Überblick
bei Joachim Rückert, Schlachtrufe im Methodenkampf – ein historischer Überblick, in: ders. / Ralf Seine-
cke (Hg.), Methodik des Zivilrechts – von Savigny bis Teubner, 3. Aufl. 2017, 541–608; zur Nachkriegszeit auch
Ilka Kauhausen, Nach der Stunde Null: Prinzipiendiskussionen im Privatrecht nach 1945, 2007; Lena Foljanty,
Recht oder Gesetz Juristische Identität und Autorität in den Naturrechtsdiskussionen der Nachkriegszeit, 2013,
bes. Kap. 5.
8 Zur Rechtstheorie der 1970er und 1980er Jahre gibt es bislang nur wenige historisierende Analysen, siehe
aber Hasso Hofmann, Rechtsphilosophie nach 1945, 2012, 29 ff.; Foljanty (Fn. 7), 349 ff.; Ulfrid Neumann,
Rechtsphilosophie in Deutschland seit 1945, in: Dieter Grimm (Hg.), Rechtswissenschaft in der Bonner Re-
publik, 1994, 145 (164 ff.) sowie Eric Hilgendorf, Die Renaissance der Rechtstheorie zwischen 1965 und 1985,
2005, dort S. 58 ff. zu den über die 1960er Jahre hinaus fortdauernden „Ressentiments gegen den liberalen
Positivismus“ Kelsens.
9 Irti (Fn. 2), 11.

Hans Kelsen, das Privatrecht und die Demokratie 229
Auch wenn Kelsen Staatsrechtslehrer war, so hat er sich doch mit seinem Anspruch,
eine umfassende Rechtslehre zu entwickeln, selbstverständlich auch mit dem Privat-
recht befasst. In allen seinen Hauptwerken – den „Hauptproblemen der Staatsrechts-
lehre“ (1911), der „Allgemeinen Staatslehre“ (1925), der „Reinen Rechtslehre“ in erster
und zweiter Auflage (1934 und 1960) und in dem Nachlasswerk „Allgemeine Theo-
rie der Normen“ (1979) – finden sich einschlägige Passagen. Abgesehen von dem auf
Französisch verfassten Aufsatz „La théorie juridique de la convention“, den er im Gen-
fer Exil verfasste und der 1940 in der Zeitschrift „Archives de philosophie du droit et
de sociologie juridique“ erschien, steht das Privatrecht in seinen Schriften jedoch nicht
im Mittelpunkt. Um die Privatrechtskonzeption Kelsens nachzuzeichnen, ist es daher
nötig, Passagen aus verschiedenen Werken zusammenzulesen. Deutlich zu erkennen
sein wird der ideologiekritische Zugriff auf die tradierte Zivilrechtslehre. Mein Haupt-
interesse gilt dabei den Ausführungen Kelsens, in denen eine Verbindung zwischen
Rechtslehre und Demokratietheorie angedeutet wird. In welches Verhältnis setzte er

das Privatrecht zur Demokratie? Was gibt Kelsen uns im Nachdenken über ein demo-
kratisches Privatrecht mit auf den Weg? Meine Überlegungen stützten sich dabei auf
nur wenig Material: Nur an einer einzigen Stelle bringt er Privatrecht und Demokratie
explizit zusammen. Um den Mangel an Ausführungen Kelsens zu kompensieren, wer-
de ich daher einen Umweg gehen – einen Umweg über das Richterrecht, das ich als
Bindeglied zwischen Privatrecht und Demokratie ins Spiel bringen möchte.
1. Das Privatrecht
Die Grundidee von Kelsens Privatrechtskonzeption ist schnell benannt. Er gliedert

das Privatrecht in das Gesamtsystem des Rechts ein und stellt damit alle Versuche in
Frage, ein vor- oder außerstaatliches Privatrecht anzunehmen. Grundbegriffe des Pri-
vatrechts wie Privatautonomie, subjektives Recht und Rechtssubjekt werden im Lich-
te ihrer Bedeutung innerhalb des Stufenbaus der Rechtsordnung re-formuliert. Privat-
autonomie ist für Kelsen nicht gegeben, sondern erst durch das Recht geschaffen, das
Rechtssubjekt nicht bereits vorgefunden, sondern erst durch das Recht konstituiert,
das subjektive Recht lediglich der „Reflex einer Pflicht“ und die Dichotomie von öf-
fentlichem Recht und Privatrecht kein „absoluter Wesensgegensatz“. Schauen wir uns
dies genauer an.
a. Privatautonomie soweit vom positiven Recht gewährt
Kelsen geht von der Grundfigur des Privatrechts, dem Vertrag aus. Seine Überlegung
ist einfach und naheliegend: Der Vertrag kommt durch freie Einigung zwischen zwei
Individuen zustande. Die Freiheit hierzu ist im Rahmen einer modernen Rechtsord-

230 LENA FOLJANTY
nung keine überpositiv vorgegebene, sondern eine durch das Recht selbst geschaffe-
ne.10 Privatautonomie ist dann eine zentrale Kategorie des Privatrechts, wenn sie vom
Recht selbst vorgesehen ist.11 Freiheit ist nicht vorstaatlich. Sie ist kontingent und muss
durch positives Recht – idealerweise durch Verfassungsrecht – abgesichert werden.
Das Gleiche gilt für die zweite Grundfigur des Privatrechts, das subjektive Recht.
Auch das subjektive Recht gebe es nur, weil das objektive Recht die Voraussetzung
hierfür geschaffen habe.12
Soweit überrascht Kelsen nicht, er befindet sich vielmehr in einer Linie mit Zeit-
genossen, die von dem Credo „kein Privatrecht ohne Staat“ ausgingen.13 Hatte die
Aufklärung das autonome Subjekt und das freie Privatrecht zu Grundpfeilern mo-
dernen Rechts erhoben, verkehrte sich dieses Verhältnis im Zuge von Systembildung
und Verrechtlichung im Laufe des 19. Jahrhunderts. Am Ende der pandektistischen
Durchdringung des Rechts stand die Einsicht Windscheids, dass Rechte eine „von der
Rechtsordnung verliehene Macht bzw. Herrschaft“ seien,14 eine Einsicht, die durch so-
ziologische und rechtsrealistische Ansätze zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts noch unter-
strichen wurde.15
b. Der Primat der Pflicht
Doch Kelsen blieb nicht bei der Feststellung stehen, dass es kein Privatrecht ohne
Staat gebe. Wie konsequent er die Einordnung des Privatrechts in den Stufenbau der
Rechtsordnung denkt, wird deutlich an seinen Ausführungen zum Begriff des subjek-
tiven Rechts, der Sequenz, in der er am nachhaltigsten mit der traditionellen Privat-
rechtskonzeption aufräumt. Das subjektive Recht war Kelsen zufolge nicht nur einfach
abhängig vom objektiven Recht, wie bereits Windscheid festgestellt hatte. Es tauge
genau genommen überhaupt nicht als Grundfigur des Privatrechts: Es sei seiner Natur
nach weniger ein Recht, denn der „Reflex einer Pflicht“.16
Kelsens Überlegung war die Folgende: Durch einen privatrechtlichen Vertrag ver-
pflichten sich die Parteien zu einer Leistung. Der Inhalt der hierdurch geschaffenen
primären Norm ist somit zunächst einmal eine Pflicht – nicht ein Recht. Wird diese
Pflicht verletzt, so kann die Rechtsordnung die Berechtigung verleihen, die Erfüllung
der Pflicht oder den Ersatz des aus der Nichterfüllung resultierenden Schadens vor
10 Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 1. Aufl. 1934 (im Folgenden RR1), 43; ders., Reine Rechtslehre, 2. Aufl. 1960
(im Folgenden: RR2), 174 f.
11 Ebd.
12 Ebd.
13 Marietta Auer, Der privatrechtliche Diskurs der Moderne, 2014, 63 ff.
14 Bernhard Windscheid, Pandekten, Bd. 1, 85 f.
15 Auer (Fn. 13), 63 ff.
16 Hans Kelsen, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre, 2. Aufl. 1923 (im Folgenden: HdSL), 570; ebenso RR1, 46.

Gericht geltend zu machen. „Jeder Rechtssatz muß notwendigerweise eine Rechts-

pflicht, er kann aber auch möglicherweise eine Berechtigung statuieren“, schrieb er
hierzu in der ersten Auflage der Reinen Rechtslehre.17 Bereits in den „Hauptproblemen
der Staatsrechtslehre“ hatte er sich eingehend mit der Konzeption des subjektiven
Rechts durch die Privatrechtswissenschaft des ausgehenden 19. Jahrhunderts befasst,
namentlich mit der Interessentheorie Jherings und der Willenstheorie Windscheids,
und den materiellen Charakter dieser Konzeptionen scharf kritisiert. Sie wiesen eine
Nähe zum Naturrecht auf, das das subjektive Recht ebenfalls materiell-politisch, an-
statt formal-juristisch begreife.18 Die materiellen Gesichtspunkte – das Interesse oder
der Wille des Berechtigten – seien aber aus juristischer Sicht unerheblich für die Frage,
ob eine Rechtspflicht bestehe und ob diese durch den Berechtigten eingeklagt werden
könne.19 Die traditionelle Lehre sitze einer Verwechslung auf, indem sie auf materiel-
le Gesichtspunkte rekurriere: „[D]as Recht ist Form und nicht Inhalt, ist Schutz und
nicht Geschütztes.“20 Nur wenn dies erkannt werde, könne die Struktur des Schutzes,
den das objektive Recht gewähre, zutreffend beschrieben werden: „Damit wird das
subjektive Recht nicht als ‚Wille‘ oder ‚Interesse‘ oder als ‚Gut‘ oder wie sonst die von
der Rechtsordnung geschützten Objekte benannt werden mögen, sondern selbst als
Schutz, als Bestandteil der Rechtsordnung, nämlich als der Rechtssatz erkannt und
zwar als der Rechtssatz in einer besonderen Beziehung auf ein Subjekt.“21
Das Privatrecht von der Pflicht her zu denken, mutet eigentümlich an, war es doch
eine Errungenschaft der Aufklärung, nicht Pflichten, sondern Freiheiten und Rechte
zum Ausgangspunkt des Privatrechts zu machen.22 Der Rechtsverkehr zwischen Pri-
vaten sollte nicht länger unter dem Eingriffsvorbehalt der Obrigkeit stehen, die Frei-
heitssphäre der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft geschützt werden. Der Primat des öffent-
lichen Rechts, der sich im Absolutismus entwickelt hatte, sollte gebrochen und ein
autonomes Privatrecht begründet werden.23 Im österreichischen ABGB findet sich
dies mit aller Deutlichkeit, doch auch das ein knappes Jahrhundert jüngere deutsche
17 RR1, 47 f.
18 HdSL, 570 ff.
19 HdSL, 570.
20 HdSL, 619.
21 Ebd.
22 Joachim Rückert, HKK vor § 1, Rn. 69 ff.
23 Dieter Grimm, Zur politischen Funktion der Trennung von öffentlichem und privatem Recht in
Deutschland, in: ders., Recht und Staat in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, 1987, 84–103. Zur gleichermaßen
gegen Absolutismus und Revolution gerichteten Stoßrichtung eines staatsfrei konzipierten Privatrechts
Michael Stolleis, Öffentliches Recht und Privatrecht im Prozeß der Entstehung des modernen Staates, in:
Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem / Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann (Hg.), Öffentliches Recht und Privatrecht als wech-
selseitige Anforderungen, 1996, 41 (57).

232 LENA FOLJANTY
BGB war vom Anspruch und nicht von der Pflicht aus konzipiert.24 Hiergegen richte-
ten sich anti-liberale und anti-individualistische Angriffe auf die Privatrechtskodifika-
tionen von konservativer und rechter wie auch von sozialistischer Seite in den 1920er,
1930er und 1940er Jahren sowie in der frühen Nachkriegszeit. 25 Es besteht kein Zweifel,
dass Kelsen die von ihnen bemühte Pflichtenrhetorik nur allzu gut kannte.
Die Pflicht in den Mittelpunkt der Privatrechtskonzeption zu rücken, hatte bei Kel-
sen allerdings wenig zu tun mit essentialistischen Vorstellungen von dem Recht vor-
gegebenen (sittlichen) Pflichten, wie sie der anti-liberalen Pflichtenrhetorik zugrunde
lagen.26 Pflichten wurden in Kelsens Konzeption erst durch das Recht erzeugt – durch
die rechtliche Ermächtigung, einen Vertrag zu schließen, was grundsätzlich heißt: in
Freiheit. Von den Pflichten auszugehen, war keine substantielle, sondern eine kon-
zeptionelle Entscheidung, die es möglich machte, dem subjektiven Recht einen klar
umrissenen Platz im Stufenbau zuzuweisen. Indem er die Pflicht ins Zentrum seiner
Überlegungen zum Privatrecht rückte, machte Kelsen sichtbar, dass das subjektive
Recht erst entsteht (a.) durch die Verletzung einer vereinbarten Pflicht und (b.) durch
die durch das objektive Recht verliehene Ermächtigung, die Erfüllung der Pflicht vor
Gericht geltend zu machen. Mit dem Fokus auf die Pflicht wurde das subjektive Recht
also gerade nicht aus der Privatrechtskonzeption eliminiert, ihm wurde vielmehr ein
Platz im Stufenbau zugewiesen, indem es definiert wurde als die durch die Rechtsord-
nung verliehene Macht, Klage zu erheben.
c. Eingeschränkte Autonomie des Privatrechts
Doch nicht nur, dass Kelsen die Privatautonomie unter den Primat des objektiven
Rechts stellte und die Pflicht und nicht das subjektive Recht zum normlogisch zen-
tralen Begriff machte: Er stellte auch in Frage, ob das Prinzip der Freiheit überhaupt
als ein Wesensmerkmal des Vertragsrechts und damit als Kernstück des Privatrechts
anzusehen sei. Der Vertrag war für Kelsen ein Akt der Normsetzung. Zwar erkannte
er die Autonomie der Rechtsetzung als Charakteristikum des Vertrages an und stellte
ihm die Heteronomie der Rechtssetzung durch den Gesetzgeber gegenüber. In seinem
im Jahr 1940 erschienenen Aufsatz zur Theorie des Vertrages unternahm er es aber
aufzuzeigen, dass der Gegensatz zwischen vertraglicher und legislativer Rechtsetzung
24 Joachim Rückert, in: ders. / Lena Foljanty / Thomas Pierson / Ralf Seinecke, Berliner Schuldrecht –
eine neue Epoche?, in: Thomas Duve / Stefan Ruppert (Hg.), Rechtswissenschaft in der Berliner Republik,
2017, 504 (520 ff.).
25 Joachim Rückert, Das Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch – ein Gesetzbuch ohne Chance?, JZ 2003, 749–808.
26 Zur antiliberalen Pflichtenkonzeption im bürgerlichen Recht und ihrem Wiederaufleben in der Schuld-
rechtsreform Rückert, Berliner Schuldrecht (Fn. 24), 520 ff.

nicht vorgegeben, sondern relativ sei.27 Weder regele ein Vertrag notwendig nur in-
dividuell-konkrete Normen im Gegensatz zum abstrakt-generellen Gesetz, noch sei
die personelle Geltung eines Vertrags stets nur auf die vertragsschließenden Parteien
begrenzt. Es gebe zahlreiche Ausnahmen, wovon insbesondere das kollektive Arbeits-
recht und das Recht der juristischen Person zeugten.
Kelsen machte deutlich, dass es eine politische Entscheidung sei, die Autonomie zum
Grundprinzip des Privatrechts zu erheben.28 Am Beispiel von Verträgen zugunsten oder
zulasten Dritter argumentierte er, dass das für die Autonomie wesentliche Prinzip der
Identität der normsetzenden und der verpflichteten Parteien nicht zwingend vorgegeben
sei. Die Rechtsordnung könne vielmehr auch andere Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten eröff-
nen. „[R]ien n’empêche un ordre juridique de stipuler qu’une norme conventionnelle
peut avoir des effets juridiques quant aux tiers, c’est-à-dire quant aux sujets autres que
les parties contractantes. Ni la nature de la volonté humaine, ni celle du droit n’y font
obstacle.“29 Auch wenn das Element der Autonomie fehle oder stark eingeschränkt sei,
könne ein Normsetzungsakt als privatrechtlicher Vertragsschluss bezeichnet werden.30
Zugleich insistierte er, dass die Autonomie des Privatrechts stets eine eingeschränkte
Autonomie sei. Er stellte klar, dass auch dort, wo Autonomie zum Grundprinzip erho-
ben sei, von voller Freiheit keine Rede sein könne. Anders als die liberalen Theoretiker
des 19. Jahrhunderts integrierte er damit die Einsicht, dass sich rechtliche Autonomie in
Bindung und Beziehung realisiert, in seine Vertragsrechtslehre. Der Vertrag setze voraus,
dass sich zwei Menschen auf Normen einigten, an die einer von beiden oder auch beide
gebunden sein sollten. Damit sei der Kompromiss im Vertrag angelegt: „La norme fon-
damentale de la convention n’est pas: tu dois seulement ce que tu veux – qui est la norme
de l’autonomie pure; mais: tu dois, ce que non seulement toi, mais aussi un autre veux.“31
d. Keine Trennung von öffentlichem Recht und Privatrecht
Mit der Einordnung des Vertrags als Akt der Normsetzung, der sich nicht kategorisch,
sondern nur graduell von der heteronomen Normsetzung durch den Gesetzgeber un-
terscheide und mit der Relativierung der Bedeutung der Autonomie unterzog Kelsen
nicht nur das tradierte Privatrechtsverständnis einer grundlegenden Revision. Er stell-
te vielmehr auch die Trennung von Privatrecht und öffentlichem Recht und damit die
Autonomie der beiden Teildisziplinen in Frage. Das Privatrecht und das öffentlichen
27 Hans Kelsen, La théorie juridique de la convention, Archives de philosophie du droit et de sociologie

juridique, Bd. 10 (1940), 33–76.
28 Kelsen, La théorie juridique de la convention (Fn. 27), 48.

234 LENA FOLJANTY
Recht seien nicht wesensverschieden.32 Während das öffentliche Recht Ermächtigun-

gen zur individuell-konkreten Normerzeugung an Hoheitsträger verleihe, basiere das
Privatrecht auf der Delegation von Normerzeugungskompetenzen auf private Akteu-
re. Beide fügten sich damit in gleicher Weise in den Stufenbau der Rechtsordnung ein.
Auch wenn sich die ermächtigten Akteure unterschieden, liege kein qualitativer oder
struktureller Unterschied vor.
Alle Ausführungen Kelsens zum Privatrecht zielten auf die Eingliederung des Pri-
vatrechts in den Stufenbau der Rechtsordnung. Das Privatrecht diente Kelsen als Ma-
terial, um die strukturelle Einheit des positiven Rechts herauszuarbeiten. 33 Es ging ihm
darum, wie Dieter Wyduckel treffend bemerkt hat, die privatrechtliche „Teilfunktion
im staatlich organisierten Rechtssystem“ herauszuarbeiten und aufzuzeigen, dass die
Trennung in die Teildisziplinen des öffentlichen Rechts und des Privatrechts keines-
falls normlogisch vorgegeben ist, sondern nur ein möglicher Gesichtspunkt ist, nach-
dem das positive Recht strukturiert werden kann.34

Doch nicht nur normlogische, sondern auch ideologiekritische Überlegungen lagen
dem zugrunde. Durch die konsequente Eingliederung in den Stufenbau der Rechtsord-
nung und das Aufzeigen der fließenden Grenzen zwischen den beiden Rechtsgebieten
sollte das Verhältnis zwischen politischem Gestaltungsspielraum und rechtlicher Kont-
rolle sichtbar gemacht werden. Dies galt zu allererst für das Privatrecht, das im 19. Jahr-
hundert als außerstaatlich und damit unpolitisch konzipiert worden war.35 So schrieb
Kelsen, dass „die Verabsolutierung des Gegensatzes von öffentlichem und privatem
Recht auch die Vorstellung [erzeugt], als ob nur der Bereich des öffentlichen Rechts,
das ist vor allem das Verfassungs- und Verwaltungsrechts, die Domäne der politischen
Herrschaft, diese aber aus dem Gebiet des Privatrechts völlig ausgeschlossen sei.“ Die
Trennung von Privatrecht und öffentlichem Recht verhindere die Einsicht, „daß das
im rechtsgeschäftlichen Vertrag erzeugte ,private‘ Recht nicht minder Schauplatz der
politischen Herrschaft ist wie das in Gesetzgebung und Verwaltung erzeugte öffentliche
Recht.“36 Private Rechte seien „in demselben Sinn politische Rechte sind wie diejeni-
gen, die man allein so zu bezeichnen pflegt, weil beide, wenn auch auf verschiedene
Weise, Anteil an der staatlichen Willensbildung, das ist aber an der politischen Herr-
schaft haben“.37
32 RR1, 111; dazu auch Dieter Wyduckel, Über die Unterscheidung von Öffentlichem Recht und Privatrecht
in der Reinen Rechtslehre, in: Werner Krawietz / Helmut Schelsky (Hg.), Rechtssystem und gesellschaftliche
Basis bei Hans Kelsen, 1984, 113–128.
33 Wyduckel (Fn. 32), 119.
34 Wyduckel (Fn. 32), 128.
35 Hans-Peter Haferkamp, The Science of Private Law and the State, in: Nils Jansen / Ralf Michaels (Hg.),
Beyond the State: Rethinking Private Law, 2008, 245–267.
36 RR1, 113 f.
37 Ebd.

e. Zusammenfassung
Das Privatrecht nicht als vor- oder außerstaatlich zu denken, war sein Ziel, das damit
verfolgte Programm ein ideologiekritisches: Die Kontingenz privatrechtlicher Institu-
te und Grundfiguren sollte sichtbar gemacht werden. Und mit der Einsicht, dass auch
ganz andere Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten bestünden, sollte der politische Charakter des
Privatrechts aufgezeigt werden.38 Anders als in herkömmlichen Privatrechtskonzeptio-
nen üblich, sah Kelsen als wesentlichen Inhalt privater Rechtserzeugung die Pflicht an.
Aus Pflichten könnten dann subjektive Rechte werden, wenn die Rechtsordnung die
Macht zur gerichtlichen Geltendmachung einräume.
Kelsen zeigte damit die Abhängigkeit des subjektiven Rechts von den höherran-
gigen Normen des Stufenbaus auf, zum anderen aber auch seine Bedeutung für die
Erzeugung von Normen niedrigeren Ranges – also von Gerichtsentscheidungen. Das
subjektive Recht war für Kelsen nichts anderes als eine „Gewährung der Teilnahme an
der Rechtserzeugung.“39 In den Fokus rücken damit die Gerichte als Orte der Recht-
serzeugung. Diesen möchte ich daher im Folgenden den Blick zuwenden.
2. Die Gerichte
Kelsens Ausführungen zum Privatrecht stammen aus den 1910er bis 1930er Jahren. Sie
fallen damit in eine Zeit, in der sich die Rechtstheorie verstärkt den Gerichten und der
richterlichen Rechtsschöpfung zuwandte, während das Gesetz in die Schranken ver-
wiesen wurde. Während in der Staatsrechtslehre der Methodenstreit tobte,40 propa-
gierte die Freirechtslehre in der Zivilrechtswissenschaft einen starken, ungebundenen
Richter und die soziologische Jurisprudenz forderte eine Einbeziehung von gesell-
schaftlichen und wirtschaftlichen Überlegungen in Rechtswissenschaft und Rechts-
praxis.41 Zugleich war eine Re-essentialisierung durch neo-idealistische Strömungen
zu beobachten.42 Diese für sich genommen sehr unterschiedlichen Strömungen wa-
ren sich in einem Punkt einig: Sie stellten alle den Richter stärker in den Mittelpunkt
der Rechtsschöpfung, als es die Jurisprudenz des 19. Jahrhunderts getan hatte.43 Weit
stärker als das öffentliche Recht war das Privatrecht der Ort, an dem das Richterrecht
erprobt, dogmatisiert und theoretisiert wurde.
38 Hierzu Peter Römer, Die Reine Rechtslehre Hans Kelsens als Ideologie und Ideologiekritik, Politische
Vierteljahresschrift, Bd. 12 (1971), 579–598.
39 RR1, 49.
40 Siehe nur Michael Stolleis, Der Methodenstreit der Weimarer Staatslehre, 2001.
41 Zum Ganzen Jan Schröder, Gab es eine (Privat-)Rechtstheorie in der Weimarer Republik?, in: Martin
Löhnig / Mareike Preisner (Hg.), Weimarer Zivilrechtswissenschaft, 2014, 151–173.
42 Schröder (Fn. 41).
43 Ebd.

236 LENA FOLJANTY
Auch an Kelsen ging diese Entwicklung nicht vorbei. Seine Reine Rechtslehre
wandte sich gleichermaßen gegen den Richter als „Subsumtionsautomaten“, wie auch
gegen den von jeder Bindung an das Gesetz befreiten Richterkönig der Freirechtsschu-
le. Der Idee eines „Subsumtionsautomaten“ erteilte er schon deswegen eine Absage,
weil eine bloße Rechtsanwendung ohne eigene Wertung normtheoretisch überhaupt
nicht möglich sei. Die generelle Norm, die in der Gerichtsentscheidung zur Anwen-
dung komme, sei niemals eine vollständige. Die individuelle Norm, die in der rich-
terlichen Entscheidung geschaffen werde, sei nicht bereits in der generellen Norm
enthalten, sie werde vielmehr erst durch einen Willensakt des Gerichts geschaffen.44
Die Idee, durch bloße Interpretation könne die eine richtige Entscheidung gewonnen
werden, sei nichts als eine Fiktion.45 Sie werde von der Rechtswissenschaft um der „Il-
lusion der Rechtssicherheit“ willen aufrechterhalten, so Kelsen46 – eine Ideologie also,
die es zu de-mystifizieren galt. Unter Ideologieverdacht stand auch die Idee des Rich-
terkönigs, der, ungebunden an das Gesetz, Einzelfallgerechtigkeit walten lassen sollte.

Dieser folge statt dem Gesetz einer selbstgesetzten generellen Norm, so Kelsen – das
hieß für ihn nichts anderes als: Naturrecht.47
Kelsens Modell war das des Richters, der innerhalb eines vom Gesetz gesetzten
Rahmens im eigenen Ermessen eine individuelle Norm setzte.48 Der Unterschied zwi-
schen dem Fall, in dem ein Richter als Gesetzgeber fungiere, also offen Rechtsfort-
bildung betreibe, und normaler Rechtsanwendung sei „graduell“ – beides seien Fälle
der Rechtserzeugung.49 Der Unterschied liege einzig in dem Umfang des Ermessens
des Gerichts, also in der Frage, wie eng oder wie weit das Gesetz den Rahmen ziehe, in
dem die Entscheidung getroffen werden müsse.50
Recht ist damit in gewisser Weise immer auch Richterrecht. Die Reine Rechtsleh-
re berührte sich in dieser Hinsicht mit der Freirechtslehre, wenn auch die Ausgangs-
punkte völlig andere waren. Kelsen selbst schrieb, gewiss nicht ohne Spitze, dass die
Reine Rechtslehre durch die Einsicht in den Stufenbau der Rechtsordnung erst eine
theoretische Grundlage für eine der Hauptpositionen der Freirechtslehre geliefert
habe: „Indem das Gesetz als bloßer Rahmen erkannt wird, der durch die rechtserzeu-
gende Tätigkeit der Rspr. und Verwaltung erst ausgefüllt werden muß, indem im rich-
terlichen Urteile ebenso wie im Verwaltungsakt nur die Fortsetzung eines Prozesses
der Rechtserzeugung erblickt wird, in dem die Gesetzgebung nur eine vorangehende
Stufe darstellt, betont die reine Rechtslehre, gestützt auf die Erkenntnisse der Frei-
rechtsschule, daß auf Grund des Gesetzes, im Rahmen des Gesetzes meist eine Mehr-
44 Hans Kelsen, Allgemeine Theorie der Normen, 1979 (im Folgenden: ATN), Anm. 180, 358.
45 RR2, 353 f.
46 Ebd.
47 RR2, 258 f.
48 RR2, 250.
49 Ebd.
50 Ebd.

heit von Entscheidungen möglich ist.“51 Welche dieser möglichen Entscheidungen ge-
troffen werde, liege im Ermessen des Gerichts. Es handele sich um einen „Willensakt“,
der sich „keineswegs nur durch die Beziehung auf das Gesetz rechtfertigt.“52
Noch deutlicher als bei Kelsen findet sich ein Bekenntnis zum Richterrecht bei
Adolf Merkl. In seiner Schrift „Gesetzesrecht und Richterrecht“ (1922) schrieb er, das
Gesetz sei nur „Zwischenform, Rohprodukt des Rechtes“.53 Es erhalte erst durch die
richterliche Entscheidung in einem konkreten Fall seine endgültige Form. Die herr-
schende Rechtslehre verkenne dies. Sie gebe daher dem Richterrecht keinen angemes-
senen Platz: „Das Gesetzesrecht wird gewissermaßen als die Regel, das Richterrecht
als die Ausnahme gedacht. Dem Gesetze wird, wenn auch nicht die Fähigkeit, so doch
der Wille zur Alleinherrschaft im Rechtsbereiche zugemutet, das Richterrecht nur zu
oft noch als eine Art Eindringling angesehen.“54 Merkl forderte offensiv, den Prozess
der Rechtsschöpfung als einen „arbeitsteiligen“ zu verstehen, an dem der Gesetzgeber
wie auch die Gerichte ihren Anteil hätten.55

Auch wenn dies sich ganz nüchtern aus normtheoretischen Überlegungen ergibt,
klingt in den Worten Merkls durchaus eine gewisse Sympathie für das Richterrecht an.
Und auch bei Kelsen findet sich eine solche. In der unter dem Einfluss der in den USA
gesammelten Erfahrungen stehenden zweiten Auflage der Reinen Rechtslehre schreibt
er, dass eine Anerkennung von Präjudizien eine konsequente Fortführung des Gedan-
kens sei, dass Gerichte Recht erzeugten. Soweit hierbei generelle Normen erzeugt wür-
den, handele es sich um eine „Dezentralisierung der Gesetzgebungsfunktion.“56
3. Die Demokratie
Wir haben gesehen, dass das Privatrecht, eingegliedert in den Stufenbau, auf die Durch-
setzung von Pflichten durch die Gerichte verweist. Doch diese staatliche Einhegung ist
in dem Modell Kelsens eine flexible, denn Rechtsprechung ist immer auch richterliche
Rechtsschöpfung, der ein gewisser Ermessensspielraum zur Verfügung steht.
Auch wenn Kelsen seine Normtheorie und seine Demokratietheorie strikt trenn-
te, finden sich in seinen Ausführungen Stichworte, die einladen, nach Verbindungen
zwischen beiden zu fragen. So spricht er für das Privatrecht davon, dass private Recht-
51 Hans Kelsen, Juristischer Formalismus und reine Rechtslehre, JW 1929, 1723 (1726).
52 Ebd.
53 Adolf Merkl, Gesetzesrecht und Richterrecht (1922), Nachdruck in: Hans Klecatsky u. a. (Hg.), Die
Wiener Rechtstheoretische Schule, Bd. 2, 1968, 1615 (1624).
54 Merkl (Fn. 53), 1616.
55 Adolf Merkl, Freirecht und Richterfreiheit (1920), Nachdruck in: Hans Klecatsky u. a. (Hg.), Die Wiener
Rechtstheoretische Schule, Bd. 2, 1968, 1573 (1577).
56 RR2, 256; ähnlich auch Fritz Pardon, Reine Rechtslehre und Richterrecht, in: Werner Krawietz / Helmut
Schelsky (Hg.), Rechtssystem und gesellschaftliche Basis bei Hans Kelsen, 1984, 369 (379).

238 LENA FOLJANTY
serzeugung „Anteil an der staatlichen Willensbildung“ und damit an der „politischen

Herrschaft“ gewähre.57 Für das Richterrecht weist das Stichwort der „Dezentralisie-
rung der Gesetzgebungsfunktion“ in eine entsprechende Richtung.58 Ich möchte im
Folgenden versuchen, eine Brücke zu schlagen zwischen der normtheoretischen
Reinen Rechtslehre und der Demokratiekonzeption, die Kelsen in seinen Schriften
zur politischen Theorie entfaltet. Hierfür werde ich zunächst das Verhältnis von Pri-
vatrecht und Demokratie, sodann das Verhältnis von Richterrecht und Demokratie
in den Blick nehmen. Methodisch werde ich damit die Pfade der Reinen Rechtslehre
verlassen. Und doch kann sich ein solches Unterfangen lohnen, wenn es darum geht,
gegenwärtige Herausforderungen eines zunehmend richterrechtlich geprägten und
jenseits des demokratischen Nationalstaates organisierten Privatrechts zu reflektieren.
a. Private Rechtserzeugung und Demokratie
Der liberale Geist, der Kelsens Privatrechtskonzeption zugrunde liegt, zeigt sich be-
sonders deutlich dort, wo es um den Vertragsschluss als Kern privatrechtlicher Rechts-
erzeugung geht. Während Kelsen auf der einen Seite das Privatrecht vollständig in den
Stufenbau der Rechtserzeugung eingliedert und auf den Akt der Gerichtsentschei-
dung zurückführt, erinnert er auf der anderen Seite daran, dass das Privatrecht auch
als Ort zivilgesellschaftlicher Rechtserzeugung gedacht werden kann – also von unten.
Während das öffentliche Recht „der typische Fall einer autokratischen Rechtserzeu-
gung“ sei, schreibt Kelsen in der Reinen Rechtslehre 1934, sei der „privatrechtliche
Vertrag eine ausgesprochen demokratische Methode der Rechtsschöpfung.“59 Bereits
in der Allgemeinen Staatslehre heißt es: „Dieser relativ höchste Grad demokratischer
Rechtserzeugung findet sich in weiterem Ausmaße auf der untersten Stufe des soge-
nannten Zivilrechts. Es ist die typische Form rechtsgeschäftlicher Willensbildung.“60
Autokratie und Demokratie sind die Begriffe, mit denen Kelsen die Pole seiner poli-
tischen Theorie markierte. Beides sind Idealtypen; sie kommen, wie Kelsen einräum-
te, kaum in Reinform vor.61 Autokratie und Demokratie als Herrschaftsformen seien
relevant für die Frage, wie in einem Gemeinwesen Recht erzeugt wird – und dies gelte
für alle Stufen der Rechtserzeugung.62 In einem demokratischen Staatswesen müsse
also grundsätzlich nicht nur die Erzeugung von Gesetzen demokratisch organisiert
57 RR1, 114.
58 RR2, 256.
59 RR1, 110.
60 Hans Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre, 1925 (im Folgenden: AStL), 367.
61 AStL, 327.
62 AStL, 321.

sein, sondern auch die Erzeugung von Normen niederer Stufe63 – im Privatrecht sind
das die individuellen vertraglichen Abreden.
Kelsen relativierte diese Aussage an anderer Stelle. Private Rechtssetzungsmacht
könne durch die Gesetzgebung eingeschränkt werden, ohne dass das Recht damit
undemokratisch würde, heißt es in der zweiten Auflage der Schrift „Vom Wesen und
Wert der Demokratie“, in der er sich eingehend mit dem Verhältnis von Freiheit und
Demokratie auseinandersetzte. In dem Maße, in dem die der staatlichen Ordnung
Unterworfenen an der Erzeugung der Ordnung beteiligt seien, entkoppele sich die
Demokratie von der individuellen Freiheit.64 Die rechtsgeschäftliche Willensbildung
stellte für Kelsen somit zwar eine ideale Form demokratischer Rechtserzeugung dar,
ein normatives Gebot, Rechtsetzung stets entsprechend zu organisieren ergab sich
hieraus für ihn aber nicht.
b. Gerichtliche Rechtserzeugung und Demokratie
Was für Rechtsgeschäfte und Verträge gilt, gilt ebenso für die Vollziehung von Geset-
zen durch die Gerichte. Gegen die Staatslehre der konstitutionellen Monarchie ge-
wandt, in der das Volk zwar an der Gesetzgebung beteiligt war, die Vollziehung jedoch
autokratisch organisiert worden sei, schrieb Kelsen in der Allgemeinen Staatslehre:
„Daß dem Volke nicht nur die Gesetzgebung, sondern auch die Vollziehung möglichst
unmittelbar zustehen solle, versteht sich als demokratische Forderung von selbst.“65
Konkret und pragmatisch gedacht sollte die Vollziehung von Gesetzen durch gewählte
Kollegialorgane erfolgen – gewählt, um das Volk zu beteiligen, kollegial, da dies schon
durch die Möglichkeit der „Rede und Gegenrede“ mehr Demokratie verspreche, als
die Entscheidung durch Einzelne.66
Das klingt soweit schlüssig – und weitreichend. Doch kaum ausgesprochen, nahm
Kelsen dies auch schon wieder zurück. Seine Sorge galt dem Prinzip der Gesetzesbin-
dung: Werde die Vollziehung in die Hand von gewählten Kollegialorganen gelegt, so
bestehe die Gefahr, dass diese „keineswegs die Gesetzmäßigkeit ihrer Akte als höchs-
tes Ziel ansehen.“67 Eine auf Gesetzmäßigkeit zielende Vollziehung gerate daher fast
zwangsläufig mit den Idealen der Demokratie in Konflikt, so Kelsen.68 Um der Legali-
tät willen seien daher in gewissen Schranken autokratische Formen der Vollziehung
hinzunehmen – „und zwar im Interesse der Erhaltung der Demokratie selbst“.69 Kelsen
63 Ebd.
64 Hans Kelsen, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie, 2. Aufl. 1929, 10.
65 AStL, 362.
66 Ebd.
67 AStL, 366.
68 Hans Kelsen, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie, (Fn. 64), 70 ff.
69 AStL, 366 f.

240 LENA FOLJANTY
plädierte für einen Kompromiss: Um dem Gesetz zur Geltung zu verhelfen, brauche
es eine autokratische Struktur in Rechtsprechung und Verwaltung. Darin solle aber so-
weit als möglich den lokalen Entscheidungsinstanzen Ermessen eingeräumt werden.70
Die Auseinandersetzung mit diesem Ermessen findet sich bei Kelsen, wie auch bei
seinen Mitstreitern Adolf Merkl und Alfred Verdross vor allem in Bezug zu Verwal-
tungsentscheidungen. Doch dies darf nicht darüber hinwegtäuschen, dass der Begriff
des Ermessens bei allen drei Autoren weiter gefasst ist: Er ist nicht allein auf die Ver-
waltung zugeschnitten, sondern bezeichnet vielmehr allgemein den Entscheidungs-
spielraum, der auf jeder Ebene des Stufenbaus der Rechtsordnung unweigerlich gege-
ben ist.71 Ermessen ist dem Modell der dynamischen Rechtserzeugung im Stufenbau
inhärent: Auf jeder Stufe besteht eine Bindung an die Normen der höheren Stufe, die
den Rahmen der Entscheidung auf der unteren Stufe vorgeben. Innerhalb einer jeden
Stufe ist jedoch Freiheit bei der Rechtserzeugung gegeben.
Ein qualitativer Unterschied zwischen Verwaltungs- und Gerichtsentscheidungen

besteht in dieser Konzeption nicht.72 Auch richterliche Entscheidungen fänden im
Rahmen des „vom Gesetz freigelassenen Ermessens“ statt, wie Kelsen in seinen demo-
kratietheoretischen Schriften nicht ohne ein gewisses Pathos schreibt.73 Obgleich er,
wie dargelegt, auch die Gefahren eines zu weitgehenden Ermessens für die Realisie-
rung der Gesetzesbindung sah, galt seine Sympathie doch einer Dezentralisierung von
Entscheidungen. In seinem Vortrag zur Demokratie von 1927 heißt es denn auch: „Nur
bei weitgehender Ermessensfreiheit ist eine ersprießliche Funktion demokratischer
Verwaltung zu erwarten“74 – das gleiche könnte für die Rechtsprechung gelten.
4. Demokratie, Richterrecht, Privatrecht: Reflexionsfundus
Der Versuch, Kelsen „von unten“ zu lesen, mag seine Grenzen haben. Kelsen zu einem
Parteigänger einer Deregulierung zugunsten privater Rechtssetzung und richterlicher
Rechtschöpfung zu stilisieren, ist sicher abwegig. Doch das Experiment hat gezeigt:
Kelsens Theorie lässt sich nicht nur von der Grundnorm und von der Verfassung her
denken, sondern vielmehr auch vom individuellen Vertrag und vom lokalen Richter.
Es entsteht das Bild eines dynamischen Rechts von unten, dem vom Stufenbau ein
Rahmen gegeben wird. Nimmt man seine demokratietheoretischen Schriften ernst,
70 Hans Kelsen, Demokratie (1926), Nachdruck in: ders., Verteidigung der Demokratie, hrsg. v. Matthias
Jestaedt und Oliver Lepsius, 2006 (im Folgenden: Demokratie), 128 f.
71 Ausführlich dazu Alfred Verdross, Das Problem des freien Ermessens und die Freirechtsbewegung,
ÖZÖR, Bd. 1 (1914), 616–644.
72 So auch Thomas Elsner, Das Ermessen im Lichte der Reinen Rechtslehre, 2011, 112 ff.
73 Demokratie, 52.
74 Ebd.

steht Kelsen für eine gewisse Dezentralisierung bei gleichzeitiger Wahrung des durch
die Rechtsordnung gegebenen Rahmens.
Auf die in der Privatrechtswissenschaft seit über einem Jahrzehnt virulenten Dis-
kussionen um staatliche Interventionen, Deregulierung, Transnationalisierung und
Entstaatlichung von Rechtsprechungsorganen gibt Kelsen keine Antworten. Kelsens
Äußerungen zum Privatrecht sind knapp, die zu einem demokratischen Privatrecht
erst recht. Er bietet keine voll ausformulierte Theorie, nicht für die Zeit, in der er lebte
und wirkte, nicht für eine spätere. Doch das bedeutet nicht, dass seine Gedanken heute
ohne Bedeutung wären. Sie bieten Anregungen für die Reflexion heutiger Herausfor-
derungen. Zum Schluss möchte ich daher auf der Grundlage von Kelsens Konzeption
einige Gedanken zum gegenwärtigen Privatrecht formulieren:
(1) Kelsen legt nahe, das Privatrecht als ein voll und ganz in den Stufenbau integriertes
Rechtsgebiet zu verstehen. Dies bedeutet, dass es kein vorpositives Privatrecht und

auch kein Reinheitsgebot des Privatrechts gibt. Gesetzgeberische Intervention in das
Privatrecht stellen auf Grundlage der Reinen Rechtslehre grundsätzlich kein Problem
dar. Privatautonomie ist kein Proprium des Privatrechts. Der Gesetzgeber hat sie zu
schützen, soweit die Verfassung dies gebietet. Darüber hinaus obliegt ihm die Gestal-
tungsfreiheit. Es mag bessere oder schlechtere, angemessenere oder unangemessenere
Gestaltungen des Vertragsrechts geben – Kelsen erinnert daran, dass die Ausgestaltung
im Einzelnen nicht eine Frage der Wahrheit ist, sondern eine Frage, um die politisch
gerungen werden muss. Dies gilt gerade dort, wo es darum geht, gleichen Zugang zu
privater Rechtssetzung zu verschaffen, also tatsächliche Gleichheit im Privatrechtsver-
kehr zu schaffen, z. B. im Bereich des Antidiskriminierungsrechts. Bei der Einführung
des Allgemeinen Gleichbehandlungsgesetzes (AGG) im Jahr 2006 war dieses von Ver-
tretern der Privatrechtswissenschaft als illegitimer Eingriff in eine vorstaatlich gedach-
te Privatautonomie vehement bekämpft worden. Die Wogen haben sich mittlerweile
geglättet und es hat sich eine eigenständige „Bereichsdogmatik“ entwickelt.75
(2) Privatrecht kann, wie jedes andere Recht auch, nur durch Recht erzeugt werden.
Das bedeutet, dass auch private Rechtssetzung einer Ermächtigung durch das positive
Recht bedarf. Private Ordnungen sind nicht schon deswegen Recht, weil sie tatsäch-
lich gegeben sind.76 Sie werden vielmehr erst dann zu Recht, wenn die Rechtsordnung
sie als solche anerkennt. In einer demokratischen Rechtsordnung ist dies schon des-
wegen von Bedeutung, weil positives Recht demokratisch legitimiert ist. Die positiv-
75 Anna Katharina Mangold, Von Homogenität zu Vielfalt, in: Thomas Duve / Stefan Ruppert (Hg.),
Rechtswissenschaft in der Berliner Republik, 2018, 461 (484 ff.).
76 Anders in den aktuellen Theoretisierungen privater Ordnungen, siehe z. B. Gregor Bachmann, Private
Ordnung Grundlagen ziviler Regelsetzung, 2006.

242 LENA FOLJANTY
rechtliche Ermächtigung zu privater Rechtssetzung stellt somit zugleich die Rückbin-

dung an den demokratischen Gesetzgeber sicher.77
(3) Kelsen erinnert an den grundsätzlichen Wert privater Rechtssetzung als einer demo-
kratisch-zivilgesellschaftlichen Form der Rechtserzeugung. Die Idee gleichberechtigter
Teilhabe an dieser Rechtserzeugung mutet angesichts des Ungleichgewichts zwischen
Unternehmen und Verbrauchern in der modernen Massengesellschaft romantisch an.
Die ursprüngliche Idee einer „bürgerlichen“ oder, in heutigen Begriffen gesprochen,
„zivilgesellschaftlichen“ Rechtserzeugung spielt im gegenwärtigen Privatrechtsver-
ständnis allenfalls eine Nebenrolle. Indem er daran erinnert, dass das Privatrecht einen
Rahmen bereithält, in dem sich Individuen und private Verbände an der Herstellung
von objektivem Recht beteiligen können, geht Kelsen zu dieser Idee zurück. Wenn er
schreibt, dass private Rechtserzeugung „Anteil an der staatlichen Willensbildung“ ge-
währe, so mag dies in erster Linie normtheoretischen Erwägungen geschuldet sein. Er

nimmt jedoch zugleich eine gesellschaftspolitische Verortung des Privatrechts vor, zeigt
er doch auf, dass mit der privaten Rechtserzeugung politische Gestaltungsmacht der
Individuen wie auch zivilgesellschaftlicher Akteure verbunden ist.78
(4) Die Frage, wie ein Richterrecht auszusehen hat, dass demokratischen Anforde-
rungen genügt, ist in einer Zeit, in der eine „schleichende Verschiebung der Norm-
setzungsmacht von der Legislative zur Judikative“ beobachtet wird79 und die als „Zeit-
alter des Richterrechts“ bezeichnet wird,80 von zentraler Bedeutung. Kelsens Antwort
lautete, dass ein demokratisches Richterrecht sich dadurch auszeichne, dass es sich im
vom demokratisch legitimierten Gesetz vorgegebenen Rahmen bewege, also die Ge-
setzesbindung respektiere, ohne dabei die Beweglichkeit aufzugeben, den gegebenen
Entscheidungsspielraum zu nutzen und eine auf den konkreten Einzelfall zugeschnit-
tene Norm zu setzen. Indem er den Ermessensspielraum und damit den politischen
Charakter der gerichtlichen Entscheidung aufzeigt, macht Kelsen die richterliche
Rechtssetzung für die Öffentlichkeit diskutierbar. Ist nun heute eine zunehmende Be-
deutung des Richterrechts zu beobachten, so ließe sich auf Grundlage dieser Einsicht
argumentieren, dass ein Mehr an Richterrecht auch ein Mehr an Transparenz verlan-
77 Florian Rödl, Private Law beyond the Democratic Order?, AJCL 56 (2008), 743–767; Anne Röthel,
Entstaatlichung des Rechts, in: Deutsche Sektion der Internationalen Juristen-Kommission e. V. (Hg.), Ent-
staatlichung des Rechts, 2014, 17 (22 f.); anders Nils Jansen / Ralf Michaels, Private Law Beyond the State?
Europeanization, Globalization, Privatization, AJCL 54 (2006), 843 (880 f.).
78 In diesem Sinne auch Irti (Fn. 2). Ähnliche Überlegungen bei Gralf-Peter Calliess, Die Zukunft der
Privatautonomie, in: Gesellschaft junger Zivilrechtswissenschaftler (Hg.), Prinzipien des Privatrechts und
Rechtsvereinheitlichung, 2001, 85 (96 ff.).
79 Bernd Rüthers / Christian Fischer / Axel Birk, Rechtstheorie, 9. Aufl. 2016, Rn. 236.
80 Eduard Picker, Richterrecht und Rechtsdogmatik, in: Christian Bumke (Hg.), Richterrecht zwischen Ge-
setzesrecht und Rechtsgestaltung, 2012, 85 (94).

ge – und gegebenenfalls auch ein Mehr an Reflexion auf dem Gebiet des Prozessrechts.
Denn wer in welchem Ausmaß vor Gericht Gehör findet, ist eine Frage, die in Zeiten
zunehmender richterlicher Normsetzung nicht nur für die individuelle Rechtsdurch-
setzung, sondern auch für die Gewährung gesellschaftlicher Teilhabe bedeutsam ist.
(5) Mit Kelsen lässt sich damit die Diskussion um die Frage, wie auf die Verände-
rungen des privaten Rechtsverkehrs reagiert werden kann, zurück in den politischen
Raum verlegen. Die Beschäftigung mit seinen Ausführungen zum Privatrecht wie auch
zum Richterrecht haben gezeigt, dass auch in diesen Bereichen sein Projekt eines der
Transparenz ist, das politische Gestaltungsräume als solche sichtbar und damit disku-
tierbar macht. Transparenz und Diskutierbarkeit mögen nicht ausreichen, um heutige
Komplexität zu bewältigen; doch die Erinnerung an ihre Bedeutung lohnt auch und
gerade in Zeiten zunehmender Rechtserzeugung außerhalb nationaler Parlamente.
Statt auf Dogmatik und Expertendiskurs zu setzen, wie dies in der Privatrechtstheorie
häufig geschieht,81 lässt sich mit Kelsen in eine andere Richtung denken. Seine von
Ulrike Lembke so treffend auf den Punkt gebrachten Projekte des wertrelativistischen
Universalismus, der partizipatorischen und pluralistischen Demokratie und der Ent-
machtung der Dogmatik zugunsten der politischen Rechtssetzung stehen dem Privat-
recht der heutigen Zeit gut an.82
Lena Foljanty
Max-Planck-Institut für europäische Rechtsgeschichte, Hansaallee 41, 60323 Frankfurt
am Main, foljanty@rg.mpg.de
81 Siehe nur, mit weiteren Nachweisen Jansen/Michaels (Fn. 77), 862 f., 879.
82 Ulrike Lembke, Weltrecht – Demokratie – Dogmatik, in: Matthias Jestaedt (Hg.), Hans Kelsen und die
deutsche Staatsrechtslehre, 2013, 223–240.


Hans Kelsen’s Ideas on Public and Private Law
and their Applicability to a Critical Analysis of the
Theory of Administrative Law
FERNANDO MENEZES 1
Abstract: The traditional opinion of jurists, particularly within the scope of administrative
law, is based on the theoretical constructions of the dichotomy “public law vs. private law.”
Hans Kelsen’s critical approach to this topic allows not only a more precise scientific un-
derstanding of the issue but also an improvement to the function of public administration
in the context of a rule of law system. The specific case of traditional French thought on
administrative law, strongly present in various Western legal systems, including the Brazil-
ian one, offers a propitious field for a reconstruction attempt according to the conceptual
framework of Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law.
Keywords: Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, Léon Duguit, public and private law, auton-
omy and heteronomy principles, theory of administrative law
Schlagworte: Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, Léon Duguit; öffentliches Recht und Pri-
vatrecht, Prinzipien der Autonomie und Heteronomie, Theorie des Verwaltungsrechts
I. Introduction
In his autobiographical piece Selbstdarstellung, written in 1927, Hans Kelsen indicated

three dualisms that provided the basis for the then prevalent theory of law which the
Pure Theory of Law opposed and argued were inconsistent. The dichotomies were (i)
1 The author registers his gratitude to Rodrigo Cadore, for the discussion of the ideas presented in this
paper, and the bibliography related to them, opening perspectives for further development; and also to
Mariane Comparato, Georghio Tomelin, Guilherme Carvalho and Fernanda Hapner for the English ver-
sion of the manuscript.

246 FERNANDO MENEZES
law in a subjective sense vs. law in an objective sense; (ii) public law vs. private law; and
(iii) law vs. state.2
The object of the present article is to analyze Kelsen’s critique of the dichotomy (ii.)
public law vs. private law and to connect it to a perspective of the theory of adminis-
trative law.
First, it is important to point out some preliminarily caveats concerning the use of
the expressions “public” and “private” and the different meanings they can assume in
the legal language. Indeed, the dichotomy “public” and “private” can refer to three dif-
ferent scenarios:
a) the total accessibility to knowledge (for instance, in defense of transparency)
versus a reserved and personal treatment (in the interests of privacy);3
b) human activities aiming at the supply of the vital needs of men (“labor”)4 ver-
sus the activities that aim to produce the artificial world in which the human
species lives – which transcends the existence of each individual – and the
corresponding activities for the social and political interaction of men in their
condition of plurality (respectively “work” and “action”);5
c) utility from the point of view of the interests of the abstract entity that personi-
fies human society versus utility from the point of view of individual interests.6
The latter is usually the meaning referred to by legal theory when it considers the di-
chotomy of public and private law. Nevertheless, even this meaning, which was already
present in Roman law, can be traced back to different perspectives in contemporary
2 Here is how the author himself presents the problem: “Aus der Einsicht, dass das Recht notwendigerwei-
se Norm sei, ergab sich mir, dass alles subjektive Recht auf objektives rückzuführen und der ganze für un-
sere Rechtssystematik so verhängnisvolle Dualismus von objektivem und subjektivem Recht aufzuheben
sei. Aus dem Gegensatz zweier Systeme: eines Systems des objektiven Rechts und eines Systems der sub-
jektiven Rechte musste eine intrasystematische Differenz werden. Eine durchaus analoge Notwendigkeit
ergab sich mir auch für den Dualismus von öffentlichem und privatem Recht. Während meiner Arbeit an
den Hauptproblemen waren mir die politischen Tendenzen noch nicht klar, die sich in der traditionellen
Theorie hinter dem Dualismus von objektivem und subjektivem, privatem und öffentlichem Recht ver-
bergen. […] Mit der Vertiefung in die auf höchste Methodenreinheit abzielende Kantische Philosophie
Marburger Richtung schärfte sich mein Blick für die zahlreichen höchst bedenklichen Trübungen, die
die juristische Theorie durch bewusste oder unbewusste politische Tendenzen der Autoren erfährt. […]
Nunmehr erkannte ich auch den dritten und bedeutungsvollsten Dualismus, der der herrschenden Lehre
zugrunde liegt, den Gegensatz von Recht und Staat, der die beiden früher genannten Gegensätze von sub-
jektivem und objektivem, privatem und öffentlichem Recht fundiert” (Hans Kelsen, Selbstdarstellung, in:
Hans Kelsen Werke: Hans Kelsen im Selbstzeugnis, ed. Matthias Jestaedt, 2006, 22–24).
3 Celso Lafer, A reconstrução dos direitos humanos: um diálogo com o pensamento de Hannah Arendt, 2006, 243.
4 Hannah Arendt, A condição humana, 2008, 15.
5 Tércio Sampaio Ferraz Junior, Introdução ao estudo do direito, 2007, 133; Lafer, (footnote 3), 262 ff.
6 We apply here the classical distinction proposed by Ulpianus (Digest – 1.1.1.2): “Hujus studii duæ sunt
positiones, publicum et privatum. Publicum jus est quod ad statum rei Romanæ spectat, privatum quod ad
singulorum utilitatem: sunt enim quædam publice utilia, quædam privatim”.

Hans Kelsen’s Ideas on Public and Private Law 247
law. In sum, the concepts of public law and private law are usually differentiated on the
basis of three sets of criteria:7
a) the organic criteria, founded on the quality of the people in question; e. g. if
government agents are present in the legal relation, it means it will be under
the ruling of public law;
b) the material criteria, based on the content of the rules, in relation to the inter-
ests they intend to protect: public interests (of the community as a whole), or
private interests (of private members of the community);
c) the formal criteria, based on the form of legal relations, those of public law
characterized by “procedures of constriction and unilateral action”, and those
of private law based on the “free agreement of wills”.
The combination of these non-exclusive criteria resulted in the elaboration of a theo-

retical notion for the identification of what is called “public law”. This is the notion of
an “administrative (legal) regime” in the scope of administrative law from the perspec-
tive of traditional jurists, especially in its French matrix.8
Although this is not a theme included in the main object of this article, it is inter-
esting to briefly register the incoherence of labeling law using the dichotomy “public
law vs. private law” without discriminating whether the use of the word “law” refers to
legal doctrine or jurisprudence (the “legal science”) or to a normative order.
The use of labels such as “public” or “private” in jurisprudence is not accurate. (Le-
gal) Science is not public or private. The limit between these concepts is narrow and
fluid. This differentiation can hardly be used for the purpose of the division of labor in
the faculties of law.
The impropriety of the qualification also applies to law as a normative order. Adopt-
ing Kelsen’s perspective from the outset,9 legal norms – whether they take the form of
a legislative act or a contract – are always part of the legal system and ultimately refer
to an act of the state as a centralized legal order and, in this sense, do not carry the
public or private adjectives. It makes even less sense to label a specific normative act as
public or private. Is the Civil Code private law? Even if it contains, as does the Brazilian
Civil Code, rules on expropriation or on public property – topics usually ascribed to
the realm of public law? And what would be the limits of the normative set to be con-
7 We follow the thesis of Maurice Duverger, Élements de droit public, 1995, 20–21.
8 Maurice Hauriou opens his Précis precisely with a chapter entitled “le régime administratif ”, whose three
essential elements are: a) “un principe d’action, le pouvoir administratif, dérivé du pouvoir exécutif ”; b) “un
objectif à atteindre, l’accomplissement de la fonction administrative”; c) “une méthode pour atteindre ce
but, l’entreprise de gestion administrative” (Maurice Hauriou, Précis de droit administratif et de droit public,
1933, 7–8).
9 Kelsen, La Théorie Juridique de la Convention, Archives de Philosophie du Droit et de Sociologie Juridique,
1–4 (1940), 63.

sidered in such an analysis, in order to classify normative acts as public or private? A

statute? Or an article in a statute? Or a subdivision of such an article?
Thus, it seems that neither “law” as science nor as a normative order can be ade-
quately reconstructed as being public or private. Rather, these adjectives are simply
instruments of presentation. They facilitate the communication in the praxis of legal
language, but at the expense of creating a great margin of imprecision. The gains of
knowledge which may be found in the discussion of a possible useful meaning for the
distinction between public and private in the context of the scientific reconstruction
of the legal relations remain to be investigated.
Having established these premises, this article aims to apply Kelsen’s critique to
the way in which the traditional legal theory – especially under the clipping of ad-
ministrative law – works with the dichotomy “public law vs. private law” in Brazil.
This discussion confronts Kelsen’s ideas to the French main administrativist think-
ing, which has great influence in Western legal systems and thought, both from
the traditional perspective and from the perspective of the criticism developed in
France by Léon Duguit, an important interlocutor of Kelsen in demystifying legal
thinking.
II. Why Brazilian administrative law as a case study?
A few more introductory words are required to justify the relevance of this reference
to the Brazilian case. Brazil is a great laboratory for comparative law analysis, especially
in the fields of constitutional and administrative law. Initially, Brazil adopted a typical
French model. Then, it adapted the North American system of jurisdiction without
wholly abandoning the ideas of French jurists. More recently, Brazil moved towards
the German constitutional practice. This miscellany resulted certainly in an original
outcome, but created, at the same time, some inconsistencies, mainly due to the rather
careless and uncontextualized transposition of foreign theoretical ideas.
Since its independence from Portugal in 1822, Brazil had shaped its administrative
institutions according to the French model. During the Napoleonic period, French law
consolidated its structures based on – and I highlight two points that are most relevant
to the development of this article – (i) the so-called summa divisio between “public law
and private law”; and (ii) a system of duality of jurisdictions between administrative
and judicial jurisdictions.
With the proclamation of the Republic in Brazil at the end of the nineteenth centu-
ry, Brazil opted for a substantial reform and for the explicit adoption of the US model
of a federal state, organized under a presidential system with a unified jurisdiction of
the courts.
In spite of this change of models in the Brazilian federation scenario, throughout
the twentieth century and, to a certain extent, up to present times, traditional French

structures have continued to serve as the foundation of the academic studies on ad-
ministrative law and of the practice of the Brazilian public administration.
In this sense, almost all Brazilian jurists continue to refer to the division of law be-
tween the public and private spheres, without the critical awareness that such division
lacks both theoretical and practical foundations. This paper aims to explore this point
in order to contrast traditional thinking with Hans Kelsen’s ideas.
III. The traditional French view and its transposition to Brazil
In France, according to Charles Eisenmann,10 academic scholars of administrative law

traditionally have discussed the distinction between public and private law from two
perspectives. The first is more abstract and seeks a theoretical foundation for the dis-
tinction. The second is more concrete and seeks to use the distinction as a criterion for
the distribution of powers (competences) between the administrative jurisdiction and
the legal jurisdiction.
In the first perspective, the mainstream converges at the concept that in public law
there are rules that assert special prerogatives of unilateral and self-executing action in
favor of the public administration. This special regime of public law is conceived on the
grounds of the position of superiority which the state (or the public administration as
one of its manifestations) is supposed to possess in relation to individuals as a conse-
quence of its attribute of sovereignty.
In general, the traditional view involves the acceptance, as an a priori, of the superi-
ority of the state in relation to individuals and, therefore, also of the supremacy of the
will and the interest of the state in the sphere of legal relations, without further scien-
tific justification for its claim on the basis of the content of existing normative acts.
A discordant thought, however, emerged from Léon Duguit, who diverged from
the received view among legal scholars and, in this regard, even from his colleagues at
“École du Service Public”. Duguit was Kelsen’s partner in some important initiatives
that sought to foster a scientific and realistic, demystifying vision of the law, such as
the bilingual Revue Internationale de la Théorie du Droit / Internationale Zeitschrift für
Theorie des Rechts, of which they were the founders and original editors, together with
František Weyr11.
10 Charles Eisenmann, Cours de droit administratif, 1982, 306 ff.

11 Revue Internationale de la Théorie du Droit / Internationale Zeitschrift für Theorie des Rechts. Brünn: Édi-
tions Polygraphiques / Zürich: Rudolf Rohrer. The journal was published from 1926 to 1939. After the de-
cease of León Duguit, in December 1938, Zaccaria Giacometti and Roger Bonnard joined the board of
editors. The main objectives and premises of this original scientific project are clearly presented in the
preface of the first volume (1926).

According to Duguit, the distinction between public and private law can be reason-
able in terms of self-enforced sanctions applied by the state, or for didactic utility, but
not in the sense of absolute separation. In his words:
J’estime qu’on ne saurait trop énergiquement protester contre une pareille conception.
Elle est contraire à la vérité des faits et surtout elle conduit forcément à donner, au moins
en apparence, une base juridique à la toute-puissance de l’Etat12.
Duguit13 founded his objection to this distinction on the basis of his denial of the per-
sonality of the state14 and of his conception that rulers are common individuals, “im-
prisoned like others by the bonds of social solidarity”, which is the “foundation” of
both public and private law.
Duguit15 also explained that public and private law are not distinguished by the
“method” that is imposed on their study, as there is only one method, applied to juris-
prudence as a social science.

The French author also refuted the claim that public and private law could be distin-
guished by the nature of the legal acts that would result from each of them because of
an alleged qualitative difference between the wills that had created those acts. Indeed,
he “strongly rejected” the proposition of the superiority of the will resulting from the
puissance publique.16
However, Duguit17 accepted the distinction between public and private law follow-
ing one criterion: the mode of the applicability of legal sanctions, “how to apply the
sanction” being the decisive question. The explanation for this distinction was based
on the fact that it was the state who held, with exclusivity, the power to impose sanc-
tions in a given legal order.
Thus, in situations where the state is in a position to require a given conduct from a
person, it may use material force for that purpose. Hence the idea of bénéfice (or priv-
ilège) du préalable, which leads to self-enforceable administrative acts both in the sense
12 Léon Duguit, Traité de Droit Constitutionnel, 1927, 685.

13 Duguit, Manuel de droit constitutionnel, 1923, 42.
14 Treating the state, as is traditionally done, as a person endowed with sovereignty which expresses the
collective will is for Duguit (L’état, le droit objectif et la loi positive, 1901, 9) a “fiction imagined to justify the
power of the strongest, an ingenious fiction invented by the holders of the force to legitimize this force, and
nothing more”. The facts that correspond to reality in this matter are: a) the existence of “human groups
based on the community of needs, on the diversity of individual skills, on the reciprocity of services ren-
dered” and; b) the existence, in these groups, of “individuals stronger than others, either because they are
better armed, or because they are recognized as holders of a supernatural power, because they are the rich-
est, or because they are the most numerous, being able, thanks to this greater force, to make themselves
obeyed by others”. These facts have to be considered when referring to the state, which, in essence, express-
es the human group, fixed in a determined territory, in which the strongest impose their will on the weakest;
and political sovereignty expresses the power of the strongest over the weakest.
15 Duguit, Manuel de droit constitutionnel, 1923, 43.
16 Duguit, ibid, 44–45.
17 Duguit, ibid, 46–47.

of taking the decision independently of judicial procedure and in the sense of execut-
ing the decision ex officio, once the state is the law itself in action.
On the other hand, the use of force for the enforcement of a legal relationship by
individuals depends on the intervention of the state through its legal apparatus. Nev-
ertheless, the predominant view of French jurists (not Duguit’s) is misunderstood
and uncritically accepted in Brazil, leading to the wrong conclusion that the so-called
public law regime rules the public administration, which now enjoys a position of su-
premacy in its legal relations. The reception of this view, already improper from the
theoretical point of view, has an aggravating factor in the Brazilian case: the lack of
connection with the valid positive law and, moreover, the lack of connection with the
operating institutional setting – to consider the second above mentioned perspective
as it was framed by Eisenmann.
As for this second perspective in France, the distinction between public law and
private law has the practical utility of serving as an element of the distribution of ju-
risdictional competences. As a general rule, the application of public law indicates the
jurisdiction of the administrative courts, and the application of private law leads to the
jurisdiction of the judicial courts.18 However, in Brazil the practical dimension of the
issue is lost, since there is no duality of jurisdictions.
Worse, the tendency of traditional dogmatic thinking is to suppose that there is a
“one-size-fits-all” regime of unilateral and self-executing prerogatives of public admin-
istration – presumably according to the Constitution, even if not written there. This
all-encompassing regime is said to be applicable to any legal relationship in which pub-
lic administration is present, even when confronted with eventual concrete regulations
by the enacted law that explicitly point to a different regime.
The result of this tendency is not only inconsistent from the theoretical point of
view, but also entails authoritarian positions, causing legal uncertainty connected to
the functioning of the public administration.
IV. Public and private law according to Kelsen’s ideas
The present section of this paper aims to emphasize that the administrative law think-
ing could achieve important theoretical improvement with the adoption of Kelsen’s
ideas. As a consequence, the legal order could function more properly under the re-
quirements of a rule of law system.
Kelsen19 – in harmony with Duguit, although through distinct arguments – denied
the separation, in absolute terms, that traditional theory made between public law and
18 Eisenmann, (footnote 10), 306, 342, 348.

19 Kelsen, Pure theory of law, 1967, 280.

private law from the point of view of the legal relations. In the traditional view, private
law would imply a relation between subjects in positions of equality, subjects of the
same value, while public law would imply a relationship between a “super- and a sub-
ordinate subject” with diverse legal values.
However, when we investigate the situation more closely, it becomes clear that the
subjects in the relation are the same: the subject of an obligation is subjected only to
the authority of the norm that creates the obligation, not to the person who creates the
norm.20
The true difference lies in the methods of creating the law. Within the public law
regime, the legal order allows the subjects that act as state organs the faculty to compel
the administered ones by unilateral manifestation of will. On the other hand, in so-
called private relations, the parties commonly participate in the creation of the binding
norm.21 But these different ways of creating the law are derived from options taken by
the legal system and not from the supposedly superior position of one of the parties in
the legal relationship.
An additional aspect of this phenomenon should be remarked upon: “the Pure The-
ory of Law, from its universalistic viewpoint, always directed toward the whole of the
legal order […], sees in the private legal transaction just as much as in an administra-
tive order an act of the state, that is, a fact of law-making attributable to the unity of the
legal order”22 – in this case, an act of law-application by means of the individualization
of general norms.
Still, according to Kelsen:
The difference between administrative law, as public law, and private law does not lie in
the fact that the relationship between State and private person is different from the rela-
tionship between private persons but in the difference between a heteronomous and an
autonomous creation of secondary norms.23
In short, the same notions of autonomy and heteronomy used to distinguish the dem-
ocratic and autocratic forms of state24 are present in this distinction.
On the other hand, it does not mean that the proper mode of normative production,
which might be called “public law” or “administrative law”, must be regarded as typical
of autocratic states. At different levels of the same legal order, different forms of legal
production can have a different application. Thus, a democratic production of general
legal norms may be linked to an autocratic production of individual legal norms and,
20 Kelsen, General theory of law and state, 1961, 205.

21 Kelsen, Pure theory of law, 1967, 281.
22 Kelsen, ibid, 282.
24 Kelsen, Pure theory of law, 1967, 281; and General theory of law and state, 1961, 205.

conversely, an autocratic production of general legal norms may be linked to a demo-

cratic production of individual legal norms.25
Therefore, it would be more coherent from the point of view of the general theory
of law, and – to resume the example explored above – it would be more consistent
with the Brazilian institutional reality, to conceive “public” and “private” as normative
production techniques established by the legal order and not as species of law regimes
aprioristically attached to different subjects and distinguished in an evaluative way.
Finally, to conceive the distinction between public and private law as something
absolute – expressing, in the first case, the relation of subjects of different value – has
no scientific character, but rather an ideological one, which can lead, for example, to an
attempt to reduce the mandatory character of the laws to the public administration, or
even to the suggestion that there is no domination, but only coordination between the
parties in private law relations.26
In other words, the pretension of an absolute distinction between public law and
private law by the traditional theories, associating public law with the relations in
which the public administration is present, can have a different result from what was
first intended. This association may suggest, supposedly in the name of serving the
public interest, a performance of the administration not linked to the law, but “merely
within the framework of the law and, in an emergency […] even against the law”, in a
“unfettered realization of the state’s purposes”.27
V. Final considerations: degrees of autonomy and heteronomy in the

creation and application of the law
Summarizing the ideas stated above, the solid basis on which Kelsen’s analysis is found-
ed is the recognition of two fundamental principles which define different modes of
creation of legal norms: autonomy and heteronomy, each depending on whether the
individual to be bound by the norm participates in its production or not.
This distinction applies to the process of elaboration of legal norms in a more gener-
al and abstract sphere – democracy and autocracy being the ideal examples28. It is also
applicable to the sphere of individual and concrete norms, where we have the contract
as an example of normative production governed predominantly by the principle of
autonomy. Here are Kelsen’s words, in a specific study on the subject of the contract:29
25 Kelsen, Pure theory of law, 1967, 284; and General theory of law and state, 1961, 299–300.
26 Kelsen, Pure theory of law, 1967, 282–283.
27 Kelsen, ibid, 282.
29 Kelsen, (footnote 9), 63.

[…] le caractère propre de cette procédure de création du droit, qu’on appelle conven-
tion, apparaît, lorsqu’on le compare aux autres procédures de création du droit. Et alors se
dégagent (envisagés sous l’angle de la liberté, qui est le point décisif pour la création des
liens normatifs) deux types idéaux, deux méthodes possibles de création des normes :
hétéronomie et autonomie ; l’individu, que la norme liera, participe ou ne participe pas
à son élaboration. La loi dans l’autocratie, dans la monarchie absolue, représente une ap-
proximation aussi grande que possible du cas de l’hétéronomie, le contrat de droit privé,
une approximation aussi grande que possible du cas idéal de l’autonomie (c’est pourquoi
nous parlons d’‘autonomie privée’). Mais dans les deux cas, ce ne sont que des approxi-
mations.
Interpreting Kelsen’s thought, it can be suggested that, also as to the applicability of

the norm – either tendentially general and abstract such as a statute, or tendentially
individual and concrete, such as a contract – there is also a basic difference between an
execution done directly by a subject that is part of the legal relationship to which the
other must submit or by the use of a legal instance external to the relationship, equidis-
tant from the parties (e. g., the Judiciary, or an arbitral tribunal).
The direct enforcement by one of the parties runs parallel to the heteronomous pro-
duction of law: the subject to whom the enforcement is directed receives its effects
without influencing the decisions that govern it, just as the subject that is bound by the
norm does not participate in its production.
The enforcement carried out by a legal instance external to the relationship can
be considered, in turn, parallel to the autonomous production of law: the subject to
which the enforcement is directed debates with the other part of the relation before
the impartial judge, presenting his arguments and defending his point of view, just as
the subject that is bound by the norm participates, stating, expressing his own will, in
its production.
Then, if there is a consistent and scientifically observable difference between the
autonomous or heteronomous creation and application of the law (although a rela-
tive difference, as a matter of degree), it is reasonable to use distinct names to char-
acterize them.
A more precise meaning for the “public vs. private” dichotomy applied to legal rela-
tions can therefore be: the “public” associated with the predominantly heteronomous
process of creation and application of legal norms; and the “private”, the predominant-
ly autonomous process of legal creation and application.
A peculiar case of a legal relationship which lends itself well to illustrating this ana-
lysis – as Kelsen did in his Théorie Juridique de la Convention – concerns the contracts’
regime. Contracts, taken in a broader sense, already express essentially an autonomous
way of creating the law: they manifest the lawmaker’s perception, from the point of
view of legislative policy, that certain normative matters should be left to the decision
of the parties involved:

Le législateur veut laisser aux sujets de droit le soin de régler eux-mêmes leurs intérêts
économiques et autres, et parce qu’il estime qu’une réglementation indépendante et auto-
nome de ces intérêts est la solution la mieux indiquée et la plus juste.30
However, one could associate the adjective “public” with the legal form “contract”
without any contradiction with what has just been said: the public contract – called
“administrative” – entails a greater degree of heteronomy in its execution.
Moreover, this heteronomy is the basis of a main principle of the administrative act,
which is its self-enforceability, both in the sense of taking the decision independently
of judicial procedure and in the sense of enforcement of the decision ex officio 31
It should be noted that this reading of the self-enforceability of the administrative
act is another way of explaining the phenomenon of legality applied to the administra-
tion, as something different from the principle of legality applied to individuals. When
the legal system states that “nothing may be prevented which is not forbidden by law,
and no one may be forced to do anything not provided for by law”32, and that, in the
absence of law, any individual conduct is permissible, it recognizes that there is a space
in which individuals may give expression to their free will.
The situation of the administration, or the state, to speak more broadly, is different.
Because the state is not a natural substance, but consists of an abstraction, a fiction cre-
ated by man, its existence is essentially linked to the law as a system of norms. In fact,
it overlaps with the legal system itself. In other words, the state is not a being endowed
with will: its will does not correspond even to the subjective will of its agents, but to
the “objective will” of the law. Thus, in the absence of legal norms, the state has no
“freedom” and does not even exist; therefore, it cannot act.
Summarizing the reasoning for self-enforceability: if the state is the law itself in ac-
tion, it is understandable that its actions are, as a rule,33 self-enforceable. This is the
sense of “public”.
Once the distinction between legal relations of public law and private law in the
terms proposed above is finally accepted, the use of the concept “public law” (or ad-
ministrative law, in particular) for a legal relationship will only mean this relationship
results from a process of creation and application of the law that follows a specific tech-
nique, based on heteronomy. In any case, it is a relative distinction involving degrees,
not a qualitative one.
Kelsen’s approach of conceiving private and public as different normative produc-
tion techniques based on a balance between autonomy and heteronomy not only has
30 Kelsen, ibid, 48
31 Duguit (footnote 13), 46–47.
32 Here quoting the classic text of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man from 1789.
33 “As a rule” because the law itself may choose a different solution, for example, requiring judicial action
to take certain measures.

the virtue of greater theoretical precision but also allows the conscious improvement
of the dynamics of the creation and application of the law in the context of a democrat-
ic system under the rule of law.
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(translated from the 1958 English edition by Roberto Raposo).
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& Cie., 1927.
– . Manuel de droit constitutionnel (4th edition). Paris: Éditions Panthéon Assas, 2007 (facsimile
edition of Paris: Fontemoing, 1923).
– . L’état, le droit objectif et la loi positive. Paris: Dalloz, 2003 (facsimile edition of Paris: Fontemoing,
1901).
Duverger, Maurice. Élements de droit public (13th ed.). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1995.
Eisenmann, Charles. Cours de droit administratif, t. I. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de
Jurisprudence, 1982.
Ferraz Junior, Tércio Sampaio. Introdução ao estudo do direito (5th edition). São Paulo: Atlas, 2007.
Hauriou, Maurice. Précis de droit administratif et de droit public (12th edition). Paris: Dalloz, 2002
(facsimile edition of Paris: Sirey, 1933).
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Jestaedt. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006.
– . Pure theory of law. Clark: The Lawbook Exchange, 2005 (translated from the second German
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Fernando Menezes
Universidade de São Paulo – Faculdade de Direito, Largo de São Francisco, 95, São Paulo,
SP, Brazil, 01005-010, fmenezes@usp.br

Problems of Translation and Interpretation
A Kelsenian Commentary on Positivist Originalism
D. A. JEREMY TELMAN
Abstract: According to William Baude and Stephen Sachs, originalism is U. S. law because
judges generally interpret the Constitution in accord with originalism and judges never
disavow originalism. Because originalism is law, and because judges have a duty to up-
hold the law, Baude and Sachs contend, judges should be bound by originalist method in
constitutional interpretation. This essay offers a Kelsenian critique of Baude and Sachs’s
defense of originalism. Baude and Sachs have not explained how originalism can provide
substantive legal norms that govern the law of interpretation, nor have they established
that originalism in any way limits the mechanisms for distinguishing lawful from unlawful
paths in U. S. constitutional history.
Keywords: Pure Theory of Law, Originalism, interpretation, US Constitution, Legal pos-

itivism, Hans Kelsen
Schlagworte: Reine Rechtslehre, Originalismus, Auslegung, US-Verfassung, Rechtsposi-

tivismus, Hans Kelsen
I. Introduction: Kelsen Matters
Up until now, in my work on Kelsen, I have diagnosed the reasons for American igno-
rance of Kelsen, attempting to persuade my U. S. colleagues that our neglect of Kelsen
is a product of the sociology of education unrelated to the intrinsic merits of Kelsen’s
approach.1 I reiterate my findings from that earlier work in Part II. In Part III, I provide
1 D. A. Jeremy Telman, A Path Not Taken: Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law in the Land of the Legal
Realists, in: Hans Kelsen Anderswo, ed. Robert Walter, et al , 2010, 353–76; D. A. Jeremy Telman, Selective
Affinities: On U. S. Reception of Hans Kelsen’s Legal Theory, in: The Fruits of Exile: Central European Intel-
lectual Immigration to America in the Age of Fascism, ed., Richard Bodek & Simon Lewis, 2010, 40–58; D. A.

258 D. A. JEREMY TELMAN
a short overview of the theoretical movement for originalism in interpretation of the

U. S. Constitution. Finally, in Part IV, I offer an example of what a Kelsenian interven-
tion into an American debate can offer.
William Baude and Stephen Sachs have offered a contingent defense of originalism
in constitutional interpretation based on Hartian positivism.2 Originalism, they argue,
either is our law (Baude) or is endorsed by positive law and is a theory of lawful legal
change (Sachs). Having accepted that reality, they contend, one cannot avoid the con-
viction that legal decision-makers ought to pursue originalist interpretation, consist-
ent with their duty and their oath to uphold the law. From the perspective of Kelsen’s
pure theory of law, Baude has not explained how originalism can provide substantive
legal norms that govern the law of interpretation, and Sachs has not established that
originalism in any way limits the mechanisms for distinguishing lawful from unlawful
paths in U. S. constitutional history.
II. Hans Kelsen in America: A Missing Persons Report
Why has the U. S. academy never had much interest in Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law?
Some leading U. S. legal theorists have a straightforward explanation for their lack of
interest in Kelsen: either Hart proved Kelsen wrong about fundamental issues,3 or, in a
slightly more generous approach, there are things of value in Kelsen, but the same ide-
as can be found in the writings of other legal thinkers,4 who come without the unnec-
essary burden of Kelsen’s neo-Kantian apparatus and who had the good sense to write
in English.5 However, precisely because of his outsider status, Kelsen’s legal theory can
speak to us in ways that other approaches, more grounded in the Anglo-American legal
systems, cannot. For example, Kelsen’s pure theory of law raises interesting challenges
to Baude and Sachs’s purportedly positivist defense of originalism in constitutional
interpretation.
Supplementing the excellent work of Stanley, Paulsen,6 Michael Steven Green,7 and
others, my earlier work explored six sociological explanations for why Kelsen has nev-
Jeremy Telman, The Reception of Hans Kelsen’s Legal Theory in the United States, in: L’Observateur des
Nations Unies 24 (2008), 299–315.
2 William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, Colum L Rev 115 (2015), 2349–2408, 2352; Stephen E. Sachs,
Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, Harv L & Pol’y Rev 38 (2015), 817–88, 819.
3 Brian Leiter, Why Don’t American Philosophers of Law Talk about Kelsen?, Brian Leiter’s Legal Philos-
ophy Blog (Oct. 3, 2007).
4 Lawrence B. Solum, Should We Study Kelsen?, Legal Theory Blog (Oct. 5, 2007).
5 Leiter (footnote 3).
6 Stanley L. Paulson, Die Rezeption Kelsens in Amerika, in: Reine Rechtslehre im Spiegel ihrer Fortsetzer und
Kritiker, ed. Ota Weinberger & Werner Krawietz, 1988, 179–202.
7 Michael Steven Green, Hans Kelsen and the Logic of Legal Systems, Ala L Rev 64 (2003) 365–413, 366.

Problems of Translation and Interpretation 259
er appealed to an American audience. My aim was not to offer a comprehensive treat-

ment of the subject immune to supplementation. Rather, I sought to highlight some
overlooked causes of the neglect of Kelsen in the U. S. academy. The first relates to the
differences between the continental and common law legal systems, three turn on the
nature of legal education in the United States, and two address the political and theo-
retical obstacles Kelsen faced when he arrived in 1939.
The paramount translation difficulties that Kelsen faced and faces still today in the
United States have little to do with language. The biggest, perhaps insuperable, obsta-
cle to an American engagement with Kelsen is the abstract, theoretical nature of his ap-
proach. The American approach to law is empirical, relating to social facts.8 For Kelsen,
by contrast, only certain social facts, those pertaining to the generation of legal norms,
are relevant to legal science.9 American legal practitioners and scholars rarely consider
the nature of law in the abstract, divorced from its application to particular scenarios.10
U. S. lawyers have developed a drive that hardens into an instinct to test legal rules by
considering them in the context of a range of scenarios, real or imagined. Our induc-
tive approach has little use for legal norms conceived as abstractions.
Even if one could overcome the basic lack of fit between Kelsen’s way of theoriz-
ing about the law and Americans’ lived experience of it, one would still need to in-
troduce Kelsenian approaches into our system of legal education so that there could
be a broad audience receptive to such approaches. But there too the challenges are
daunting. First, our law students come to us having completed their first degrees. They
have already experienced a liberal arts education, and they come to law school with the
aspiration of attaining a professional degree that will lead immediately to well-com-
pensated employment. Their appetite for theoretical approaches has been sated, and
law schools increasingly face pressures to prepare students for the practicalities of the
bar exam and practice.11 Second, even if U. S. law professors were inclined to teach legal
theory, very few of our students have the background to work with, let alone master, a
philosophical system as complex as Kelsen’s. Faculty members would also find Kelsen’s
work perplexing, because the vast majority of law professors have J. D.s but have never
done doctoral work in any field. In order to assimilate Kelsen’s approach to law into
their thinking, U. S. academics would have to undertake a complete rethinking of their
understanding of their fields and their approaches to legal pedagogy.12 Third, Kelsen’s
approach to legal education would be very hard to translate into our common-law,
case-based, teaching method. A Kelsenian law course would not be structured like a
8 Ibid , 366.
9 Ibid , 385.
10 Telman (footnote 1), Selective Affinities, 47; Telman (footnote 1), Reception, 303.
11 Telman (footnote 1), Path Not Taken, 369; Telman (footnote 1), Reception, 308–10.
12 Telman (footnote 1), Path Not Taken, 373–76; Telman (footnote 1), Reception, 313–14.

conventional law class, and the students might flee thinking they had accidentally wan-
dered into a graduate seminar.13
Kelsen’s arrival in the United States could not have been more poorly timed, from
the perspectives of both the intellectual and the political environments in which he
landed. Kelsen arrived in the United States when the reigning model for legal reason-
ing was legal realism. His potential American colleagues regarded his system as, at best,
not legal realism, and, at worst, a new version of the legal formalism that the realists
had rejected.14 Finally, the American academy distrusted legal positivism, which they
regarded as politically anemic, given its inability to protect Central Europe from Na-
zism’s Gleichschaltung of legal institutions.15 Kelsen arrived in the United States along
with much of the intelligentsia of Central Europe and at a time when enrollments at
American universities were declining as a result of World War II. Recent scholarship
suggests that such practical considerations also contributed significantly to Kelsen’s
inability to find work at a U. S. law school.16
III. Originalism in Constitutional Interpretation
Although one U. S. scholar has identified seventy-two separate versions of originalism,

I find it helpful to think of three broad strains within the movement,17 each of which
plays some part in my assessment of Baude and Sachs’s positivist defense of original-
ism. First, popular originalism began as a backlash against the perceived excesses and
progressive political activism of the Warren and Burger Courts.18 Populist originalists
are political heirs to the eighteenth-century anti-Federalists and Jeffersonian Repub-
licans, who valued individual liberty and states’ rights and distrusted the federal gov-
ernment. According to popular originalists’ republican principles, because judges are
not elected, they should defer to the legislature and not make law. Among academ-
ics, this position is best represented by Raoul Berger, Robert Bork, and Christopher
Wolfe.19 At the same time, popular originalists demand that judges invalidate legislative
13 Telman (footnote 1), Path Not Taken, 367–69.

14 Telman (footnote 1), Path Not Taken, 361–62; Telman (footnote 1), Reception, 46.
15 Telman (footnote 1), Path Not Taken, 362–63; Telman (footnote 1), Selective Affinities 46–47; Telman
(footnote 1), Reception, 304–05.
16 Oona Hathaway & Scott Shapiro, The Internationalists, 2017, 268–69.
17 Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, N Y U L Rev 84 (2009), 1–96, 14.
18 Stephen Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, U Ill L Rev (2008) 1185–1223, 1188.
19 Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment (1977); Robert
Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (1990); Christopher Wolfe, The Rise of
Modern Judicial Review: From Constitutional Interpretation to Judge-Made Law (1977).

enactments that they regard as infringing on individual rights, such as the right to bear
arms20 or property rights. 21
Second, Larry Solum has provided two principles, the fixation thesis and the con-
straint principle, to which all versions of academic originalism adhere in different
ways. The fixation thesis provides that the meaning of each constitutional provision
was fixed at the time of its adoption.22 The constraint principle means that all consti-
tutional decision-makers (although as we shall see most originalists focus on the judi-
ciary) should be constrained by that original meaning.23 These principles distinguish
originalism from non-originalism, but they also leave room for a great deal of variation
within the family of originalist theories.
Finally, Baude and Sachs’s understanding of originalism highlights the capacious-
ness of Solum’s big-tent originalism.24 Their originalism comprises three elements.
First, consistent with Solum’s two principles, they regard the original meaning of the
Constitution to be “the ultimate criterion for constitutional law.” Second, they temper
this bit of originalist dogma by embracing “the validity of other methods of interpreta-
tion or decision.” Finally, Baude and Sachs maintain that “our law is still the Founders
law, as it’s been lawfully changed,” encompassing constitutional precedent (if “lawful”)
and even changed circumstances “to the extent that they lawfully derive from the law
of the founding.”25 This “inclusive originalism” constitutes what they call “the positive
turn” in originalism. Whatever originalism is, they maintain, it is U. S. law. Their pos-
itivist defense of originalism has a contingent normative component: because judges
are bound to uphold the law, they must interpret the Constitution in a manner consist-
ent with originalist principles.26
Their positive turn in originalism “evokes the basic tenets of legal positivism: that
the content of the law is determined by certain present social facts and that moral con-
siderations do not determine whether legal statements [are] true or false.”27 Original-
ism is “our law,” they claim, because courts interpret the Constitution in accordance
with originalist tenets, broadly construed, and because judges never reject such orig-
inalism as the basis for constitutional interpretation.28 At first this seems like an odd
claim, because part of the fun of being an originalist is the bitter pleasure of denounc-
20 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U. S. 742 (2010); Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570 (2008).
21 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U. S. 469 (2005); Gideon Kanner, The Public Use Clause: Constitu-
tional Mandate or “Hortatory Fluff “?, Pepp L Rev 33 (2006) 335–84.
22 Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and the Unwritten Constitution, 2013 U Ill L Rev (2018) 1935–84, 1941.
23 Ibid , 1942.
24 Sachs (footnote 2), Originalism as a Theory, 821, 822.
25 William Baude & Stephen Sachs, Originalism’s Bite, Greenbag 2d 20 (2016) 103–08, 104.
26 Baude (footnote 2), Our Law, 2353.
27 Ibid , 2351, n. 5.
28 Ibid , 2371–86.

ing non-originalist court rulings.29 The claim is less odd, given how broadly Baude
and Sachs construe originalism. Their originalism entails constitutional construction
or liquidation, presumptions, such as the presumption of constitutionality, and com-
mon-law background rules (such as waiver), adherence to precedent, widely accepted
practices lacking originalist pedigrees, and a recognition that judges exercise discre-
tion in choosing which legal rules to apply and how to apply them.30
Despite its inclusivity, their originalism has “bite,”31 as is clear from the approaches
that they reject. They specifically reject the notion that the U. S. Constitution can be
and has been changed through an informal amendment process. They reject the no-
tion that our actual working Constitution consists of the constitutional practices that
contemporary Americans can be said to have accepted, as opposed to the written man-
ifestations of consent embodied in the document itself. They reject these approaches
based on their empirical claim that they do not accurately track what the law is.32
IV. Positivist Originalism: A Theory and Four Challenges
Before elaborating my critical comments on Baude & Sachs’s writings on originalism,

I want to recognize some of their unique contributions. Most importantly, their at-
tempts to provide a positivist defense of originalism, if taken up in the community
of originalist scholars, could provoke a very useful inquiry into the nature of law and
constitutional adjudication in the United States. That discussion could extend beyond
the originalist scholarly community, because Baude and Sachs, like Jack Balkin,33 have
done great work demonstrating through their “inclusive originalism” that differences
between the originalist and non-originalist narratives of U. S. constitutional history
are a matter of degree. They have also contributed richly to the discussion of the law
of interpretation in the United States.34 They stress the difference between linguistic
and legal ambiguity. In the debates surrounding originalism, non-originalists focus
on textual ambiguities that originalism cannot resolve,35 while originalists claim that
linguistic analysis can resolve textual vagueness and ambiguity. John McGinnis and
Michael Rappaport contend that modern techniques allow us to discern the meaning
of the constitutional text by applying the original methods of interpretation.36 Corpus
linguistics scholars think that they can use computerized searches to specify the orig-
29 Ibid , 2354; Sachs (footnote 2), Originalism as a Theory, 826.

30 Baude (footnote 2), Our Law, 2356–60.
31 Baude & Sachs (footnote 25), Originalism’s Bite.
32 Ibid., 2364–65.
33 Jack Balkin, Living Originalism, 2011.
34 William Baude & Stephen Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, Harv L Rev. 130 (2017), 1079–1147.
35 Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, B U L Rev. 60 (1980), 204–38.
36 John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good Constitution, 2013, 199.

inal meaning of words used in the U. S. Constitution.37 Baude and Sachs introduce a
theory of interpretation that resolves ambiguities and vagueness through legal rather
than linguistic means.
The law of interpretation imposes meaning on legal documents, even where lin-
guistic analysis, standing alone, cannot resolve indeterminacy. For example, the rules
of linguistic interpretation may provide no resolution to the meaning of a hopelessly
vague insurance contract. However, the law of interpretation provides a solution, inter-
posing a clear legal principle, contra proferentem, according to which such contracts are
construed against the drafter. In the case of an ambiguous insurance contract, courts
favor the interpretation offered by the insured. Similarly, where plaintiff has the burden
of proving her claims, she loses if the trier of fact is unable to conclude that plaintiff ’s
theory of the case is superior to that of the defendant.38
Baude and Sachs describe originalism in various ways. They claim that it is law, a
Hartian secondary rule of change, and a part of the law of interpretation.39 In the space
remaining, I will offer four criticisms of Baude and Sachs’s positivist defense of origi-
nalism from the perspective of the pure theory of law. First, I maintain that originalism
cannot be “our law,” because originalism is a mode of constitutional interpretation and
has none of the characteristics of law. Second, in making their claim that “originalism
is our law,” Baude and Sachs seem to have lost sight of what law is. Discovering what
law is and how it is made is the pure theory of law’s primary object.40 Baude and Sachs
make their claim based on a review of case law, but U. S. law does not come, in the
main, from courts. Not only is their review of case law inadequate, they look for law
in the wrong place. Third, Baude and Sachs’s positivist defense of originalism is based
on what courts do. However, according to Kelsenian positivism, one cannot reason
from an is to an ought. Assuming that courts are engaged in interpretation and that
the law is the Constitution, court decisions articulate only individual norms. Such
norms are useful in settling disputes, but they can neither establish nor supplant high-
er norms. Those norms derive their validity from the normative legal order and not
from a mode of interpretation. Finally, setting aside the is/ought distinction, Baude
and Sachs acknowledge that a lot of decisions, while not disavowing originalism, are
incorrect “from an originalist perspective.”41 If our law is whatever courts do, as Baude
and Sachs seem to believe, their acknowledgment of so many “incorrect” decisions in-
dicates that originalism does not capture what courts do. On the contrary, opposition
to what courts do is what gave rise to originalism in the first place.
37 Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, Yale L J 127 (2018) 788–879.
38 Baude & Sachs (footnote 34), Law of Interpretation, 1111–12.
39 Sachs (footnote 2), Originalism as a Theory, 818, 833; Baude (footnote 2), Our Law, 2356.
40 Hans Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory, Bonnie Litschewski Paulson & Stanley L.
Paulson trans. 1992 (1934), § 1, 7.
41 Baude & Sachs (footnote 25), Originalism’s Bite, 108.

1. No Positive Law Requires Originalism
Most fundamentally, when Baude and Sachs claim that originalism is “our law,” they do
not explain what they mean by “law,” and they do not explain how originalism, a mode
of constitutional interpretation, could be a legal norm. Baude and Sachs argue that
judges in particular, pursuant to their oath and professional obligations, should follow
the law. Because originalism is our law, they argue, judges are bound by their oath to
uphold the Constitution and follow the law. That means that they are legally obligated
to issue originalist decisions.42
However, the law provides for no remedy if a judge issues a non-originalist opin-
ion. Positive law requires that “if A is, then B ought to be.”43 That is, if a delict occurs,
punishment should follow. If I commit a criminal act, the law provides a detailed code,
according to which my crime will be categorized, and sentencing guidelines, pursuant
to which I will be punished. Private law similarly provides penalties for breach of con-
tract, tort, trespass to property, etc. Not all criminals are captured or punished, and not
all contract breakers or tortfeasors are called to account. 44 However, a legal norm that
never results in punishment is invalid under the doctrine of desuetude.45 This is so not
only as a matter of Kelsenian positivism. Hart also acknowledges “that the theory of
law as coercive orders . . . started from the perfectly correct appreciation of the fact that
where there is law, there human conduct is made in some sense non-optional or ob-
ligatory.”46 Nonetheless, judges are perfectly free to issue originalist or non-originalist
opinions. Adherence to originalism remains optional, not obligatory. The law provides
no consequences for non-originalist judges, and consequences are what differentiate
legal obligations from other kinds of normative constraint.
If originalism is our law, it is a law that has never been enforced and for which an
enforcement mechanism is utterly lacking. Originalism as law cannot even be said to
have expired under desuetude because it never operated as a legal norm. It is really
an example of lex imperfecta, which is best understood as expressing not legal norms
but moral or customary admonitions.47 Citizens are expected to stand for the nation-
al anthem, but there is no legal sanction for failing to do so. Kelsen defines a delict
as something to which the positive legal system could appropriately respond with a
coercive act.48 If originalism were our law, judges who issue non-originalist opinions
would be committing constitutional delicts. However, the only legal remedy available

43 Kelsen (footnote 40), Introduction, § 11(b), 24.
44 Ibid., § 11(b), 25.
45 Ibid , § 30(d), 63.
46 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2d ed. 1994, 82.
47 Thomas A. J. McGinn, The Expressive Function of Law and the Lex Imperfecta, Roman Leg Trad 11
(2015) 1–41, 26–39.
48 Kelsen (footnote 40), Introduction, § 14(b), 29.

for judicial improprieties is impeachment,49 and no judge has ever been impeached or
even disciplined for authoring non-originalist opinions. The law provides no sanction
for the delict of non-originalist constitutional adjudication.
Nor could there be a legal sanction. The purpose of a system of laws is to encourage
people “to behave so as to avoid the threatened coercive act”; that is, the punishment
that follows as a consequence of a delict.50 Originalism provides no guidance as to ex-
pected behaviors; it is a family of theories incapable of resolving disputes.51 Originalists
often disagree on how particular cases ought to be decided, and some originalists, in-
cluding Baude and Sachs for the most part, refuse to comment upon particular cases, re-
luctant to permit such details to interfere with the elaboration of their theoretical mod-
els.52 Originalism thus fails to provide the sort of guidance we look for in legal norms.
American legal scholar Andrew Coan recently published a short thought experi-
ment, exploring the consequences of two opposing hypothetical amendments to the
U. S. Constitution.53 The first provides that “originalism is not our law and never has
been.”54 The second provides, “The United States Constitution, including this Amend-
ment, shall be construed to reflect the original public meaning of its text as amended.”55
Coan explores the ramifications of such hypothetical amendments for originalists and
non-originalists, but what interests me here is Stephen Sachs’s response, which was
published together with Coan’s essay.56 Sachs acknowledged in passing that Coan’s
first hypothetical amendment would indeed invalidate Baude and Sachs’s claim that
originalism is “our law.”57 However, Sachs’s more pointed response has nothing to do
with positivism. He instead argues that “the substantive effect of [the first hypothetical
amendment] would be unambiguously bad” and that the moral status of originalism
and of our law more generally is not so tractable as to be settled by new law.58
Coan’s thought experiment should have pushed Sachs to defend his positivist take
on originalism. Sachs’s response instead suggests that he is not a positivist at all. He is
not an originalist because he thinks originalism is law; he is an originalist because he
49 Randy J. Kozel, Precedent and Constitutional Structure, Northwestern U L Rev 112 (2018), 789–837,
806 & n. 75.
50 Kelsen (footnote 40), Introduction, § 12, 26.
51 James E. Fleming, The Inclusiveness of the New Originalism, Fordham L Rev 82 (2013) 433–52, 435;
Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, Georgetown L J 99 (2011) 713–78, 719–20.
53 Andrew Coan, Amending the Law of Constitutional Interpretation, Duke J Const’l L & Pub Pol’y 13
(2018), 85–102.
54 Ibid., 87.
55 Ibid., 88.
56 Stephen E. Sachs, The Law and Morals of Interpretation, Duke J Const’l L & Pub Pol’y 13 (2018) 103–14.
57 Ibid., 103.
58 Ibid , 103.

thinks originalism is good and that non-originalism is bad.59 Legal positivism does not
traffic in such value judgments.
Coan’s thought experiment may not have succeeded in its purpose, which was to
show that non-originalist modes of constitutional interpretation are unavoidable,60 but
it did reveal that a very thin veneer of positivism conceals Sachs’s more substantive
commitments to originalism. Sachs argues that “Coan’s thought experiment cannot
prevent debate over the moral status of our law, because it’s just as embedded within a
legal system as anything else.”61 Sachs, returning to positivist mode, then laments the
tendency in American constitutional scholarship to conflate legal and moral duties.62
His response to Coan enacts rather than counters that tendency.
The positivist response must concede, as Sachs does, that Coan’s first hypothetical
amendment, providing that originalism is not our law, would negate positivist origi-
nalism. However, as a positivist originalist, Sachs should argue that Coan’s second hy-
pothetical amendment, providing that originalism is our law, is unnecessary, because

originalism already is our law. Sachs makes no such argument. Baude and Sachs con-
tend that originalism is U. S. law because originalism is what courts do. But Kelsen’s
pure theory of law emphatically rejects any basis for the validity of a legal norm other
than the validity of some other (higher) legal norm.63 Coan has shown how one could
unambiguously make originalism our law. Absent some legal norm, such as Coan’s sec-
ond hypothetical amendment, no higher norm validates originalism as a legal norm of
constitutional interpretation.
2. The Role of Courts as Lawmakers
In response to Coan, Baude and Sachs might claim that there is no need for a statute
inscribing originalism into our constitutional order because judges have already put it
there through their lawmaking power. However, Baude and Sachs have not established
that judges are empowered under the U. S. Constitution to make law. A positivist ap-
proach must identify the institutions empowered to promulgate laws. From the per-
spective of positive law, whether originalism is our law cannot turn on what judges do,
unless judges are lawmakers.64
Baude and Sachs assume that judges are lawmakers, but originalists have not uni-
formly embraced that perspective. Sachs himself acknowledges that the courts’ as-
59 Sachs (footnote 56), Law and Morals, 104–05.

60 Coan (footnote 53), 88–93.
61 Ibid., 110.
62 Ibid., 113.
63 Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, Max Knight, trans. 1967 (1960), 193–94.
64 See Stanley L. Paulson, Introduction, in: Kelsen (footnote 40), Introduction, xvii, xxv–xxix.

sumed roles as lawmakers is controversial precisely because that role is not obviously
conferred upon them by positive law.65 The U. S. Constitution does not confer consti-
tutional law-making power on the courts expressly.66 Early originalists assumed that
judges are not and ought not to be constitutional lawgivers.67 While there is some
controversy over whether the Framers contemplated a judicial check on the consti-
tutionality of legislative enactments,68 the historical record seems pretty clear that the
expectation was that, if such judicial power existed, it was to be exercised rarely,69 and
it involved a great deal of deference to the political branches.70 It may be that, while the
Framers did not think that courts could make law on their own, they could, in clear
cases, invalidate legislative or executive actions that exceeded constitutional authority.
Originalism itself does not resolve the status of courts as generators of legal norms.
With the help of Kelsen’s pure theory of law, we can hypothesize three possible origi-
nalist positions. One originalist perspective would treat judicial law-making as an act
of constitutional usurpation, a second might find judge-made constitutional law legit-

imate. However, the third approach, most consistent with Kelsen’s pure theory of law,
treats courts as announcing individual norms, not general constitutional norms. This
intermediate position makes a much more modest claim for courts’ law-making power
than do Baude and Sachs.
Originalists who hold the first position believe that the Framers of the U. S. Consti-
tution did not contemplate judicial review of legislative acts. They may not regard judi-
cial pronouncements on constitutional law as binding law.71 They are not alone. There
have been times in U. S. constitutional history when presidents and governors have
refused to comply with the legal rulings of the U. S. Supreme Court, believing their
own powers to execute the laws superior to the courts’ interpretive powers. President
Andrew Jackson rendered the Supreme Court’s ruling in Worcester v Georgia72 nugato-
ry by forging ahead with his Indian removal policy. Although historians doubt that he
ever said “John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it,” his actions at
least suggested sentiments consistent with that pronouncement.73 President Jackson
also did not think himself bound by the Court’s determination that Congress had the
65 Sachs (footnote 56), Law and Morals, 113.

66 Raoul Berger, Against an Activist Court, 31 Cath U L Rev 31 (1982) 173–80, 176.
67 Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1977; Wolfe
(footnote 19).
68 Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review, 2004; Philip
Hamburger, Law and Judicial Duty, 2008.
69 The Federalist (A. Hamilton), Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961, Number 78, at 502, 506.
70 Eric J. Segall, Constitutional Faith, 2018.
71 Kramer (footnote 68); William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v Madison, Duke L J
(1969) 1–47, 26–29.
72 31 U. S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
73 Joseph L. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics and Morality, 21 Stan L Rev 21(1969),
500–31, 524–25.

power to establish a national bank,74 contending that “[t]he Congress, the Executive,
and the Court must each for itself be guided by its own opinion of the Constitution.”75
Abraham Lincoln similarly did not think the Court’s Dred Scott76 decision was binding
on the U. S. government.77 The Virginia and Kentucky resolutions of the late 1790s,78
protesting the Alien and Sedition Acts, and the nullification crisis of the early 1830s,79
opposing the so-called Tariff of Abominations, indicate significant support for inter-
pretations of the Constitution in which the states retain their sovereignty and are the
ultimate arbiters of constitutionality. Southern governors drew on that decentralized
view of authority to interpret the Constitution when they engaged in massive resist-
ance to the Court’s requirement that public schools be racially integrated.80
For such originalists and for such executive officers, courts do not have law-making
power simply because they claim it. Kelsen notes that a military junta might confuse its
putsch for a legitimate military action.81 Similarly, a judge who purports to make con-
stitutional law may in fact be engaged in an act of usurpation. The legal consequences
of such a usurpation could be impeachment or other disciplinary actions. More likely,
a higher legal authority (a higher court or a legislative body) will invalidate the ruling.
A court that acts ultra vires by deciding cases over which it has no jurisdiction cannot
give rise to new legal norms.
A second group of originalists concludes that the Constitution adopted constitu-
tional review as part of the common-law heritage that was included implicitly as an
unwritten supplement to the Constitution’s text.82 Many originalists are willing to ac-
commodate precedent; some even allow following non-originalist precedent.83 If that
is so, one can rely on case law to establish that originalism is a part of our law. Baude
and Sachs’s inclusive originalism could thus allow for judicial review, if only because
74 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U. S. 316 (1819).

75 Andrew Jackson, Veto Message ( July 10, 1832), in: 32 Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presi-
dents, 1789–1897, James D. Richardson ed., 1896, 1139, 1145.
76 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U. S. 393 (1856).
77 Josh Blackman, The Irrepressible Myths of Cooper v Aaron, Georgetown L J 107 (forthcoming 2019),
manuscript at 4, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3142846.
78 Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky Resolutions (Nov. 10, 1798 & Nov. 14, 1799), reprinted in: 5 The Founders’
Constitution, Phillip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987, 131–35; James Madison, Virginia Resolutions
Against the Alien and Sedition Acts (Dec. 21, 1798), reprinted in: James Madison, Writings, Jack N. Rakove
ed., 1999, 589–91.
79 Richard E. Ellis, The Union at Risk: Jacksonian Democracy, States’ Rights and the Nullification Crisis, 1987.
80 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954); Brown II, 349 U. S. 294 (1955).
81 Kelsen (footnote 40), Introduction, § 3, 9–10.
82 See Scott Douglas Gerber, The Supreme Court Before John Marshall, U St Thomas L J 4 (2018) 27,
38–39.
83 McGinnis & Rappaport (footnote 36), 175; Steven G. Calabresi, Text, Precedent, and the Constitution:
Some Originalist and Normative Arguments for Overruling Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylva-
nia v Casey, Const Comment 22 (2005), 311–48, 328.

judicial review has been an established constitutional precedent since at least 1803.84
Still, judge-made law, even if valid, accounts for a very small portion of our constitu-
tional norms. Baude and Sachs have not suggested that originalism informs legislative
or regulatory processes, which generate the vast majority of our constitutional norms,
a topic I will explore below.
The third path, consistent with originalism, best captures the implications of Kels-
en’s pure theory for constitutional adjudication. Judges take note of certain facts and
issue individual norms applicable to that set of facts.85 In so doing, a judge is not es-
tablishing constitutional norms but applying those norms to a specific set of facts.86 In
a common-law system, with binding precedents and stare decisis, the individual norm
may well have ramifications beyond the individual case. However, because each court
judgment results from a particular factual scenario, legal decision-makers often will
not know whether new situations come within the ambit of the individual norm that
the court announces. Even in a precedent-based and hierarchical court system, lower
courts may determine that new cases are legally distinguishable from prior cases that
establish binding precedents.
On that basis, judges enjoy the discretionary authority to apply or not to apply indi-
vidual norms announced by higher courts to similar but not identical cases. Within the
Kelsenian system, however, judge-made law is never the ultimate test of legality. From
the perspective of Kelsen’s pure theory of law, judicial opinions and administrative de-
cisions are functional equivalents, distinguished only by the judiciary’s relative inde-
pendence.87 To the extent that judicial opinions or other individualized norms drift
from constitutional norms, the institutions that generate higher norms can invalidate
them.88 Sachs adopts this position, but only with respect to originalist opinions that
overturn non-originalist precedent, contending that the originalist interpretations are
“in some sense already the law.”89 But his is an idealist position, in which originalist in-
terpretations conform to some notional constitution. In reality, originalist interpreta-
tions are just as likely as non-originalist interpretations to be overturned by the proper
law-generating authority.
Originalism might lead to the conclusion that courts establish binding constitution-
al norms or that they have no authority to state constitutional norms at all. Kelsen’s
pure theory of law adopts a middle position. Courts play a vital role in the realization
and concretization of legal norms. But they do so on the individual level and they cre-
84 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U. S. 137 (1803).

85 Kelsen (footnote 40), Introduction, § 5, 11–12; § 28, 56–57.
86 Ibid , § 31(c), 68.
87 Ibid., § 31(d), 68–69; Kelsen (footnote 63), Pure Theory, 263–64.
88 Kelsen (footnote 40), Introduction, § 31(h), 72–73.
89 Sachs (footnote 2), Originalism as a Theory, 826.

ate only contingent norms. Courts announce only individual norms, subject to checks
from authorities empowered to promulgate higher legal norms.90
3. Originalism within the Political Branches
My third criticism of Baude and Sachs stems from their near-exclusive focus on judge-
made law. Legislatures and executive agencies promulgate the vast majority of our con-
stitutional norms. Executive agencies do so pursuant to statutory directives, but U. S.
legislators are not part of the process of checking low-level legal norms against the
basic norm that the Constitution embodies. These facts pose a fundamental problem
for Baude and Sachs, but it is one that they can easily remedy, at least on the concep-
tual level, by expanding their inquiry to determine whether originalism also informs
legislative and regulatory constitutional lawmaking. I have my doubts, however, that

originalism guides our political branches.
Baude and Sachs clearly know that case law is only a part of our law – after all, orig-
inalism is a theory of constitutional interpretation, and the U. S. Constitution is not
judge-made law. However, when it comes to questions of legal interpretation, they
focus almost exclusively on case law, as though judges were the only ones who said
what the law is. Their very interesting work on the law of interpretation includes some
discussion of legislative processes, but only as an aid in determining how law should be
interpreted. They do not discuss what institutions might be doing the interpretation,
and their main focus remains on constitutional adjudication and case law.91
The focus on judge-made law is typical of contemporary originalism. Most original-
ist theory centers on the judiciary, as if judge-made law were the whole of the law. Few
remark on the irony: originalism, which began as a critique of the perceived judicial
activism of the Warren and Burger Courts, now elevates the judiciary to the center
of constitutional inquiry. A movement that insisted that judges not legislate from the
bench now limits its examination of constitutional interpretation exclusively to those
same judges. Tellingly, on the rare occasion when Baude and Sachs discuss constitu-
tional decision-making in the executive branch, it is to acknowledge scholarship that is
outside of the broad confines of their inclusive originalism.92
90 Kelsen (footnote 40), Introduction, § 31(c), 68.

91 Baude & Sachs (footnote 34), Law of Interpretation.

4. Originalist Rhetoric and Judicial Practice
If judges are lawgivers, then calling our law “originalist” appears to be inaccurate. No
law-giving authority has issued a valid edict that requires judges to adopt originalism as
their mode of constitutional adjudication, and most originalists do not think that our
constitutional jurisprudence has been consistently originalist.
Baude and Sachs acknowledge that originalists have been quite critical of what judg-
es do. As Justice Scalia put it memorably:
It would be hard to count on the fingers of both hands and the toes of both feet, yea, even
on the hairs of one’s youthful head, the opinions that have in fact been rendered not on
the basis of what the Constitution originally meant, but on the basis of what the judges
currently thought it desirable for it to mean.93
Baude and Sachs themselves have a list of cases that they think are wrongly decided
from the perspective of originalism.94 Bad decisions do not invalidate the methodolo-
gy, Baude and Sachs claim, any more than a bad call by a scorer undermines the rules of
the sport.95 But if judge-made law is our law, then these incorrect opinions are our law
just as much as are opinions that fit within the bounds of Baude and Sachs’s inclusive
originalism. Baude and Sachs’s positivism focuses on the Court’s rhetoric, both on its
adoption of originalism rhetoric and its refusal to disavow originalism expressly. How-
ever, even if the law is what the courts say it is, it is not clear why the proper positivist
approach is to focus on rhetoric rather than on the courts’ legal conclusions. As Rich-
ard Primus pointed out in commenting on Baude’s work, if we focused only on what
politicians say, we might conclude that our politics are theocratic. After all, politicians
frequently invoke God in the United States, and they never denounce God.96
Even within the realm of case law, Baude and Sachs’s positivism describes an inter-
pretive methodology that does not actually help decide cases. They claim that all case
law employs originalism as an interpretive methodology. The majority opinions are
originalist; the dissents are originalist. A judge deploying originalist methodology can
still get a case wrong “as a matter of originalism.”97 Indeed, Baude has gathered exten-
sive evidence that, unlike popular originalists, academic originalists no longer believe
that originalism can restrain judges.98 If originalism does not help to decide cases, it is
hard to know what it means to say that it is our law.
93 Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, U Cin L Rev 57 (1989), 849–65, 852.
95 Baude (footnote 2), Our Law, 2371–72, citing Hart (footnote 46), 144.
96 Richard Primus, Is Theology Our Politics?, Columbia L Rev Sidebar 116 (2016) 44–60.
98 William Baude, Originalism as a Constraint on Judges, U Chi L Rev 84 (2017), 2213–29, 2215–17.

Baude and Sachs encourage the resolution of ambiguities in the constitutional text
through the law of linguistic interpretation rather than through theories of interpreta-
tion sounding in linguistics or through appeals to extra-legal norms.99 In their view –
and here they are quite similar to original methods scholars, John McGinnis and Mi-
chael Rappaport – the law of interpretation, as it existed at the time of the Framing, can
resolve most disputes regarding the Constitution’s meaning. Proving that claim would
require an exercise in historical reconstruction. To the extent that their positivist de-
fense of originalism requires empirical support, it diverges from the pure theory of law,
where law is law without regard to the facts.
Moreover, while Baude and Sachs have identified numerous elements of the law
of interpretation, they have no compelling argument that originalism is a part of that
law. The law of interpretation can resolve legal disputes not because it is what courts
do but because it is law. It is firmly established in our common-law system and often
embodied in statutes as well. Originalism is neither a common-law nor a statutory rule.

It may be that Baude and Sachs are not engaged in legal science at all; they are legal so-
ciologists. They are not explaining what law is and how it is generated; rather, they are
explaining why, through interpretive processes that are a matter of judicial discretion,
judges choose some norms rather than others.100
Within the law of interpretation, Kelsen acknowledges that the norm is but a
frame.101 Legal norms provide the frame within which various interpretations can arise,
but those interpretations do not involve cognition and application of higher norms but
exercises of will in the furtherance of legal policy.102 Judges resolve issues within the
framework of the legal norm by consulting non-legal normative systems.103
V. Conclusion: Is Positivist Originalism Possible?
While much of what I have had to say here is critical, I do want to emphasize that
Baude and Sachs’s work is interesting, inventive, and important. Others seek to ground
originalism in their personal values, be they libertarian, consequentialist, Aristotelian,
majoritarian, or supermajoritarian. Baude and Sachs correctly note that judges should
not be in the business of deciding cases on the basis of their personal political or theo-
retical commitments, and if they are bound by originalism, they ought to be bound by
originalism because it is law.

101 Ibid § 36, 80–81; Kelsen (footnote 63), Pure Theory, 350–51.
102 Kelsen (footnote 40), Introduction, § 38, 82; Kelsen (footnote 63), Pure Theory, 353.

Still, I think Baude and Sachs are simply wrong, as an empirical matter, to think
that originalism either is or has ever been our law, and they are wrong, as a matter of
Kelsenian positivist theory, to think that it could be our law even if it were what courts
do. They look for a positive basis for law in the wrong place. In the U. S. system, the po-
litical branches, not courts, take the lead in generating high-level positive legal norms.
Nobody has studied whether they do so according to an originalist model.
From the perspective of Kelsen’s pure theory of law, Baude and Sachs’s arguments
do not establish a basis for a claim that originalism in constitutional interpretation is a
part of the positive law of the United States. Originalism is not an independent source
of law, and no lawmaker has established it as a part of our substantive law, either as part
of our law of interpretation or a Hartian rule of change. If some legislature attempted
to dictate to courts the mode of interpretation that they were to apply to constitutional
matters, as Andrew Coan has suggested they might, such an act would raise significant
separation of powers issues under the normative system established by the U. S. Con-
stitution.
By so arguing, I do not intend to offer a refutation of originalism. As a mode of
constitutional interpretation, originalism yields various possibilities for application.
These possibilities retain their validity if they can be reconciled with higher norms.
This is true of all manners of interpretation, not just originalist modes of interpreta-
tion. Baude and Sachs acknowledge that originalism is not the only mode of consti-
tutional interpretation.104 They merely claim that originalism is the primary mode of
constitutional interpretation and that, in case of a conflict, originalism prevails.105 This
is an empirical claim. I think it is false, but its truth or falsity is irrelevant in a Kelsenian
system, in which “there is simply no method according to which only one of several
readings of a norm could be distinguished as ‘correct.’ ”106
D. A. Jeremy Telman
Valparaiso University Law School, 656 S. Greenwich St., Valparaiso, IN 46383, USA,
jeremy.telman@valpo.edu
104 Baude (footnote 2), Our Law, 2355; Baude & Sachs (footnote 25), Originalism’s Bite, 104.


Kelsen’s Monism and the Structure of Global Law
On the Relevance of a Kelsenian Account for the
Polycentric International Law
TOMASZ WIDŁAK* 1
Abstract: In contrast to Gunther Teubner’s and Andreas Fischer-Lescano’s view, this arti-
cle argues for continued relevance of a Kelsenian approach in face of the structural prob-
lems of modern international legal system. Legal scholars often take their own discipline’s
terminological and explanatory shortcomings in explaining ‘global law’ phenomena for
granted and fall back for methodological guidance on sociological approaches, like the
systems theory. This article argues that Kelsen’s and Merkl’s conceptual tools, including
the Stufenbaulehre, remain relevant for descriptive and explanatory purposes in relation
to transformations of the international legal system, including its inherent polycentrism,
heterarchy or the emergence of transnational private regulatory regimes.
Keywords: Hans Kelsen, international law, global law, polycentric, Stufenbaulehre, Stufen-
bau
Schlagworte: Hans Kelsen, Völkerrecht, Global Law, polyzentrisch, Stufenbaulehre,

Stufenbau
Introduction: global transformations of international law
The assumption from which the following argument departs is that the present inter-
national law is undergoing a profound transformation that touches upon its structure.
A more sophisticated international legal order has been taking shape that includes,
besides the traditional law between nations (ius inter gentes, in the doctrinal view of the
*University of Gdańsk, associate professor of law; This article is part of a research project financed by the
National Science Centre, Poland (DEC-2016/23/D/HS5/02613).

276 TOMASZ WIDŁAK
discipline), the ius gentium, or the law of the larger international community, a new or-
der on the universal level. In this context, an ascending paradigm of the so-called ‘glob-
al law’ has been gaining currency in the recent years among scholars, although it is far
from being defined or clearly conceptualised by legal theory and philosophy, let alone
the scholarship of international law.1 Clearly, the notion is used in various contexts and
is ascribed with different meanings and the ‘global law discourse’ has been confronted
with criticism for blurring the clear-cut picture and undermining the functions of the
traditional international law, together with its elaborate and well-fitting arsenal of legal
notions, understandings and doctrinal concepts.2 The global law discourse is usually
connected with the need or aspiration for overcoming the barrier, or even divide, be-
tween the ‘international’ and ‘national’ realms (understood as ‘spheres of action, struc-
tures of authority and forms of normativity” in Neil Walker’s description).3 Therefore,
it is essential for the proponents of a more universal view of the present legal world,
among other aims, to overcome the primordial and determinative position of state-
hood or sovereignty as the strongest structural organising principle of the global legal
order. This is self-evident in view of legal phenomena such as the standing of global
non-governmental organizations, governance by and through transnational regulatory
regimes, the increasing role and demand for regulation of the global commons (cli-
mate, sea, space) or the emergence of normative forms such as jus cogens norms of
international law, erga omnes obligations or universal jurisdiction over the most serious
crimes of international character. Yet, global law, or globalization of law, remains am-
biguous; it does not merely equal contemporary international law,4 neither it is entirely
any other concrete order of positive rules, nor merely an aspiration or guiding ideal,5
although comprehending its essence as a dynamic state of becoming, which includes
pre-positive instances rather than a closed set of complete norms, has been accounted
for as its important trait.6
One of the most pervasive features of the current process of globalization of law is
its plurality understood as multiplicity of overlapping legal and other normative or-
ders that a single person may be simultaneously subject to. This dimension of global
law is perhaps one of its most problematic traits in the eyes of legal scholars, because
of its structural consequences. Acknowledging that globalization of law involves not
only permeability of the boundaries between legal orders, but also fracture, fluidity
1 For a recent attempt to conceptualize global law in legal theory cf. Neil Walker, Intimations of Global Law,
2015.
2 See William Twinning, Globalisation and Legal Theory, 2000, 14–24; cf. Richard Collins, The Slipperiness
of ‘Global Law’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 37 (2017), 714–739.
3 Cf. Walker (note 1), 12.
4 Cf. Willem van Genugten, Public International Law: a Forerunner in the Field of Global(ization of) Law,
Tilburg Law Review 17 (2012), 159–167.
5 Cf. Randall Lesaffer, The Lighthouse of Law, Tilburg Law Review 17 (2012), 153–158.
6 Walker (note 1), 23, 27.

Kelsen’s Monism and the Structure of Global Law 277
and polycentrism7 of the very structure of the domain, so far occupied by international
law and state law, poses a serious challenge to existing representations of the arche-
typical order. For instance, this uncertainty is brought about by the debate over the
pressing issue of the ‘fragmentation of international law’, which has become sort of
a signum temporis of the scholarship of international law at the beginning of the new
millennium.8
The turn of legal scholarship to sociological theories
As the result of the above-mentioned changes, as well as due to the intensiveness and
dynamics of the academic discourse on the ‘law beyond the state’, there is an observ-
able shortage of proper vocabulary for explaining, among other issues, the ontology
and structure of the legal world at the global level. Thus, the legal academia has been
struggling to cognize the new realm not easily describable by traditional legal notions
of public international law, which rely heavily on the idea of the state being the central
subject and unit of analysis. This semantic and conceptual crisis, or perhaps merely the
erosion of the traditional paradigm of international law,9 sooner or later was bound to
create a methodological vacuum and draw critique from outside of the core of the dis-
cipline. As a result, there has been a pronounced turn to other theoretical approaches
by legal scholars, often representing more or less ‘alien’ methodological lineage in rela-
tion to traditional positivist legal scholarship.10 One of the most influential of them are
those originating in sociology, especially the social systems theory as interpreted by
Niklas Luhmann11 and adapted by Gunther Teubner12. Using theoretically developed
7 Cf. Larry Catá Backer, The Structural Characteristics of Global Law for the 21st Century: Fracture, Fluid-
ity, Permeability, and Polycentricity, Tilburg Law Review 17 (2012), 177–199.
8 For the general overview of fragmentation, see the report by International Law Commission chaired
by Martti Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification
and Expansion of International Law. Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission,
2006, A/CN.4/L.682; Martti Koskenniemi / Päivi Leino, Fragmentation in International Law? Postmodern
Anxieties, Leiden Journal of International Law 15 (2002), 553–579; cf. Mads Andenas / Eirik Bjorge (eds.), A
Farewell to Fragmentation Reassertion and Convergence in International Law, 2015.
9 Cf. Tomasz Widłak / Jerzy Zajadło, Constitutionalisation: A New Philosophy of International Law?
in: Fragmentation vs the Constitutionalisation of International Law A Practical Inquiry, eds. Andrzej
Jakubowski / Karolina Wierczynska, 2016, 15–31.
10 It is worth noting that the ‘law and globalization’ movement is akin to interdisciplinary and plurality of
methodological approaches, especially influenced by sociology, whereas ‘traditional’ local approaches to
law have been typically focused on formalistic and positivistic analysis constituting a ‘methodic monism’.
See Lesaffer (note 5), 157; cf. Andrea Bianchi, International Law Theories An Inquiry into Different Ways of
Thinking, 2016, 234–238.
11 Niklas Luhmann, Soziale Systeme: Grundriß einer allgemeinen Theorie, 1984.
12 Gunther Teubner (ed.), Autopoietic Law: A New Approach to Law and Society, 1988; recently see Gunther
Teubner, Constitutional Fragments: Societal Constitutionalism and Globalisation, 2012.

278 TOMASZ WIDŁAK
and sophisticated terminology and methodology, these approaches have been able to
describe and explain the complex network of international legal regimes as a reflection
of the social systems’ dynamics.
The purpose of this article is not to analyse, nor to criticise social systems approach.
It is worth pointing out however, that these external approaches, inspiring as they may
be, at the end of the day tend to downplay the normativity of law and reduce legal the-
oretical problems to epiphenomena of social dynamics, politics, power or any other
forces that they deem as foundational. The example of social systems theory discussed
here serves rather as an illustration of a wider issue of the largely uncritical methodo-
logical turn in the scholarship of international law. The problem of legal theory is not in
engaging with external insights, which may be seen as an indication of its inclusiveness,
but rather in the methodological ease with which the legal scholarship in some cases
depreciates more internal, normative analysis. Such is the instance of the Kelsenian
Pure Theory of Law, often being called forth as an example of a prima facie outdated,
formalistic approach, allegedly useless for the task of describing and explaining the
complex structure of the global legal system. An example of such a critique can be
found in the work by Gunther Teubner and Andreas Fischer-Lescano:
Even if it were possible, albeit with great effort, for political regulatory regimes to sub-
ordinate themselves to a State hierarchy of legal norms, constituted in line with Kelsen’s
and Merkl’s stratified methodology, and in which national legal acts, national legislation,
national constitutional law and international law would be capped by a law that could be
construed as an international constitutional law, the emergence of autonomous non-statal
regimes necessarily collapses the hierarchy.13
The above quote represents a simplified and misconceived account of Hans Kelsen’s
and Adolf Merkls’s Stufenbaulehre, which itself constitutes a method of a formal and
dynamic analysis of the structure of any legal order. Contrary to what Teubner and
Fisher-Lescano seem to suggest, it does not imply by itself any concrete hierarchy of
the ‘sources’ of law,14 interpreted as particular types of legal acts or branches of law, nei-
ther does it demand any expanded multi-level structure (in a form resembling a ‘pyr-
amid’, as universally depicted). Kelsen never spoke of any such essential international
constitutional law; he may have only understood his Grundnorm as a sort of a con-
stitution in a purely formal, logical-legal sense (Verfassung im rechtslogischen Sinne).15
Its role may be foundational but not substantively ‘constitutional’ – the conclusion
13 Andreas Fischer-Lescano / Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in
the Fragmentation of Global Law, Michigan Journal of International Law 25 (2004), 1012.
14 See Jörg Kammerhofer, Sources in Legal Positivist Theories: The Pure Theory’s Structural Analysis of
the Law, in: The Oxford Handbook of the Sources of International Law, eds. Samantha Besson / Jean d’Aspre-
mont / Sévrine Knuchel, 2017, 343–364.
15 Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 1992, 202, 228–230.

which norms are constitutional, i. e. axiologically or substantively central for the par-
ticular legal order, depends entirely on the positive contents of the law, not on the con-
cepts of the Pure Theory or its methodological assumptions. Stufenbau of a legal order
should be comprehended as an epistemological tool – a structural principle ordering
the sequence of legal norms as pure forms. The point here, however, is not to make
an argument relating only to Teubner’s and Fischer-Lescano’s statement, but rather to
make a case for the contrary thesis and to unfold the capabilities of the normativistic
approach in the context of global law. In the following part of this article, I will focus on
reconstructing a possible model structure of the global legal order, understood as the
overarching legal system that includes, besides international law or state law, also other
components, such as non-state regimes mentioned by Kelsen’s critics.
The concept of legal order
The concept of legal order plays a key role in Kelsenian description of the structure of
global law.16 It is defined as ‘an aggregate or a plurality of general and individual norms
that govern human behavior’.17 The state is thus, according to Kelsen, merely a personi-
fication of a legal order, a ‘common point of imputation for certain acts of individuals’.18
Adequately, when the state as a complete legal order ‘bestows personality’ upon legal
subjects, it only establishes rights and obligations of further personified orders – ju-
ristic persons. Even though they may be phrased as rights or duties of organizations,
corporations etc., these norms ultimately aim at regulating the behavior of individual
human beings.19 This means that these rights and obligations are related (imputed)
to the unity of a ‘corporate’ order as a personified, partial legal order (Teilrechtsord-
nung).20 This is precisely the case of legal persons, such as associations (communities),
which are partial orders in relation to the municipal legal order, constituting in this
case a complete legal order.21 The relationship between the state and the legal person
(corporation) is the relation of delegation of the partial order by the overall complete
order. Legal norms are primary in this context, and the very concept of personality as
a doctrinal construct is secondary to them – not vice versa. A person (physical, legal)
is therefore a certain description, an ‘auxiliary concept of juristic thinking’22 – a typi-
16 The assertion that the concept of legal or normative order is central for global law is also shared by other
approaches, although according to some accounts its normative nature is disputed; see Hans Lindahl, Legal
Order and the ‘Globality’ of Global Law, Tilburg Law Review 17 (2012), 168–176.
17 Hans Kelsen, The Concept of the Legal Order, The American Journal of Jurisprudence 27 (1982), 64.
18 Hans Kelsen, Law and Peace in International Relations The Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures 1940–41, 1942, 75.
19 Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law, 2012, 97.
20 Kelsen (note 15), 270.
21 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, 1945, 96–99.

280 TOMASZ WIDŁAK
fication of a specific team or a bundle of norms. A natural or legal person – according

to Kelsen – does not ‘have’ legal obligations and subjective rights, but rather is these
rights, the unity of the norms constituting them.23 In this way, a kind of continuum
arises, in which, the positive law in principle does not know any limitations to the pos-
sibility of constructing legal subjectivity and personality.
It is true to say that Kelsen granted the state with priority in the normative architec-
ture of international law24. However, his ‘Leviathan’ has been completely desacralized
due to the radical criticism of sovereignty that took place in his 1920 book Das Problem
der Souveränität 25 As an effect, sovereignty was reduced by Kelsen to a quality of a le-
gal order pertaining to the relation between municipal and international law.26 A state
legal order may be called sovereign if it is directly dependent on the international legal
order.27 In other words, there has to be a direct link between the sovereign order and
international law; sovereignty becomes Völkerrechtsunmittelbarkeit.28 Therefore, the
norms of international law as a general legal order are bound to define municipal law
by delimitating its territorial, personal, substantive and temporal dimensions of its ‘ex-
istence’ or validity. The state, as a result, becomes a legal order limited in its dimensions
as defined by international law.29
The situation is similar for all other legal orders or communities, which are also par-
tial orders – some relative to state law, others to international law. It is possible to dis-
tinguish three variables that differentiate them typologically. The first one determines
the static and the second the dynamic aspect of centralization or decentralization.30
The principle of static centralization, originally referred by Kelsen to the national or-
der, was based primarily on the criterion of the territorial scope of the validity of the
norms. This however, may only be of secondary importance in the context of global
law, which hardly relates to any specific territory in a clear way. Therefore, I propose
a typology of legal orders according to the modified static criterion of the substan-
tive scope of regulation: from relatively particular to total ones. Particular orders or
communities would have a narrow, more detailed or even particular subject matter
of regulation and thus jurisdiction over individual rights (for instance: international
postal system), while the total (complete) ones would be those that regulate rights
and obligations of individuals concerning a relatively wide field of human activity, like

24 See Hans Kelsen, Zur Grundlegung der Völkerrechtslehre. Ein Auseinandersetzung mit Heinrich Drost,
Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 1 (1946/1948), 69.
25 Hans Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrechts. Beitrag zu einer reinen
Rechtslehre, in: Hans Kelsen Werke 4 (ed. Matthias Jestaedt), 2013.
26 See Hans Kelsen, Sovereignty and International Law, Georgetown Law Journal 48 (1960), 628.
27 Ibid., 632.
28 Hans Kelsen, Souveränität, in: Wörterbuch des Völkerrechts, 1962, 281.
30 Hans Kelsen (note 21), 303–316.

in the case of maritime law or international financial regulations. The second criteri-
on of differentiation of legal orders pertains to the degree of dynamic centralization,
which refers to the method of creation and application of the norms of a given order.
Decentralization in this case proceeds along the horizontal increase in the number
and collegiality of the organs or institutions creating general and individual norms of
a given order. The global reach and prevalence of human rights law with its dense net-
work of decision-making and promoting institutions could serve an example of such
a dynamically decentralized structure, while the regime on the control of the use of
force tends to be left in the hands of as few institutions as possible with relatively small
number of members having a decisive say, as is the case with the Security Council
of the United Nations. The third useful typology of legal orders could be established
along the lines of the criterion of directness of regulation in relation to human individ-
uals. This is particularly relevant in the case of supranational regulations. Individual
legal communities can be sorted according to this criterion from indirect (or distant)
orders, which create only potential and not directly accessible rights and obligations
for individuals, perhaps only for those acting in the capacity of organs of communities,
up to substantially direct ones, which use norms to shape the legal situation of human
beings as their primary subjects. International criminal law is one of the most obvious
candidates for a direct legal order, while for instance nuclear non-proliferation regime
is rather distant – concerning primarily the states and scarcely directly touching upon
the legal status of an individual.
International regimes
Having agreed with the above reasoning, it is easy to observe that any entity estab-
lished in the sphere of global law, that may be imputed with rights or duties beyond
the context of particular state’s law, such as an international organization, a community
of states, international corporation, non-state organization – in principle qualifies as a
legal order within the structure of global law. These orders differ only in terms of their
completeness and partiality in relation to each other as well as by the degree of cen-
tralization. This is particularly true of all those orders which, if not directly valid under
international legal norm, originate under state law, including the so-called ‘non-state’
subjects usually being juristic persons (associations) established under one or another
state legal order.31
31 According to the Kelsenian approach, one can see these entities as members of global legal structure,
especially when they are also recognized or empowered by international law or other regimes (for instance,
they hold consultative status basing on Art. 71 of the U. N. Charter). However, along the Kelsenian line of
thinking, it is not possible to reverse the direction of reasoning – one cannot infer the status of these entities

282 TOMASZ WIDŁAK
It is imperative to see in the analogical way the status of the so-called international
regimes, which may be defined as sets of norms, procedures and institutions, focus-
ing on specific issues that require international regulation.32 They produce formal and
informal decision-making structures with a broad scope, generally going beyond the
institutional framework of individual international organizations or relevant multilater-
al international agreements.33 What is meant here is the full spectrum of this phenom-
enon, considering two basic types: the first includes traditional regulatory regimes as
sets of norms and procedures originating in the public legal sphere and usually arising in
specific functional areas of international legal regulation (public regimes). They are cre-
ated primarily by states in cooperation with international organizations and sometimes
even with sub-state actors and use traditional methods of lawmaking as known to public
international law, such as treaties or jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals.
The situation of these regimes is in fact similar to that of international organizations or
other entities like the legal communities. The difference is that these types of regimes
constitute legal orders, that are usually more decentralized and less clearly institutional-
ized than international organizations. One of the most recent examples of such a regime
in statu nascendi is the climate change law or international climate law regime.34
More challenging for a Kelsenian inspired approach is the case of the second type
of regimes, often referred to as ‘private’ due to their non-state or non-public origin
and inherently global nature. Lex mercatoria,35 or international trade law regime is one
of the paradigmatic examples of such a private type. Their trait is that these regimes
function effectively outside the jurisdiction and framework of any particular state law
or public international organization, so they cannot be explicitly related as partial to
any of the other of the above-mentioned ‘public’ orders. It may even happen that such
regimes are genuinely autonomous normative orders, developing their para-juridical
institutions and methods of applying norms, resolving disputes and developing their
norms through their own specific dispute resolution system. An example of such a case
would be the international sports law (lex sportiva).36 Obviously, the key question is,
whether it is possible to consider these forms as legal orders under the global law sys-
tem, since the nature of their pedigree is often unclear. The response of the traditional
from the empirical facts, for instance that their actual political, law-making, economic or socio-cultural
significance as sociological ‘actors’ on the world stage.
32 Cf. similar definition in Margaret A. Young, Introduction: The Productive Friction between Regimes,
in: Regime Interaction in International Law: Facing Fragmentation, ed. Margaret A. Young, 2012, 9.
33 See Anu Bradford, Regime Theory, in: The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, ed. R.
Wolfrum, http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/epil, Accessed June 19, 2018.
34 See Kyle W. Danish, An Overview of the International Regime Addressing Climate Change, Sustainable
Development Law and Policy 7 (2007), 10–15.
35 See Stephan W. Shill, Lex mercatoria, in: The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, ed. R.
Wolfrum, http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/epil, Accessed July 27, 2018.
36 Cf. Ken Foster, Is There a Global Sports Law?, Entertainment Law 2 (2003), 1–18.

positivistic legal theory to this issue would be manifestly negative, while the systems
theory steps in with its sociological explanations and approaches, applied to theory of
law precisely in response to this problem of ‘private’ or ‘stateless’ law in the first place.
The abovementioned case of lex mercatoria as described by Teubner or, more recently,
the lex digitalis of the Internet are among the most prominent examples.37
A possibility to conceive of private regimes as legal orders being part of the construed
positive structure of the global legal system may be open along the Kelsenian line of
thinking. The basic relationship between norms in the legal system is constituted by the
dynamic principle of formal delegation of one norm by another. This in turn creates a
‘chain of validity’38 that transmits the normativity and the quality of legality from the
basic norm (Grundnorm) down to the subsequent norms in the system. On the one
hand, this delegation steaming from the general order (for instance international law)
equips the private autonomous regime as a partial order with a competence of defining
or providing for the particular, detailed elements of a legal norm, which would later in
turn be reconstructed in the act of law’s application as a complete legal norm (that is a
norm containing antecedent elements up from the basic norm and the general interna-
tional law all the way down to the individual norms of the partial order).39 On the other
hand, a delegation by a higher norm constitutes a dynamic act of authorization of the
indicated authority on a lower level, empowering it to create further norms. Thus occurs
a legitimate transmission of authority (competence) to create individual legal norms.
This means that a further (downstream) delegation may be subject to any limitation as
to the subject, object, temporal and even territorial scope, as is the case with the dele-
gation of state legal orders by international law. Kelsen states explicitly that the unity of
the dynamic system rests on the uninterrupted sequence of delegations.40 Against this
background, it becomes clear that the relationship of delegation between the norms or
orders (complete and partial) is logical, but not necessarily chronological. Therefore,
a specific regime, already ‘existing’ as a matter of fact, to the extent that it consists of
norms, may be secondarily delegated by a norm belonging to the order of internation-
al law or, more broadly, of global law. In such instance, the relation of delegation that
37 Gunther Teubner, Fragmented Foundations. Societal Constitutionalism beyond the Nation State, in:
The Twilight of Constitutionalism?, eds. Petra Dobner / Martin Loughlin, 2012, 332.
38 The phrase was coined by Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law Essays on Law and Morality, 1979, 125.
39 The concept of a complete legal norm involves the reproduction in a microscale of the entire gradual
structure of the legal order within the contents of a concrete, reconstructed individual legal norm, per-
ceived from the ex post facto perspective of its application. The act of applying the law, located at the end
of the ‘chain of validity’, even if it primarily reflects the standards (norms) of a given private regime, ob-
jectively also includes the relevant norms of all preceding levels of the legal system up to the Grundnorm.
All preceding norms in this chain are antecedents that condition the final act of coercion, making it an act
of application of the law. See Stanley L. Paulson, How Merkl’s Stufenbaulehre Informs Kelsen’s Concept
of Law, Revus – Journal for Constitutional Theory and Philosophy of Law 21 (2013), 38–39, doi:10.4000/re-
vus.2727, Accessed July 11, 2019.

284 TOMASZ WIDŁAK
links the Grundnorm’s global law system to the norms of the hitherto isolated normative
order is established. This replaces the possible particular basic norm of the previously
non-legal normative order, making it part of the legal system. Kelsen himself describes
this type of reasoning as ‘the Midas principle’ by referring to the name of the mytho-
logical king whose touch turned anything into gold.41 In a similar fashion, everything
that the universal legal system links to by way of normative delegation, acquires a legal
character, or becomes part of law. The previously autonomous non-legal order becomes
connected to the source of normativity of the law.42
Nonetheless, doubts may arise. Why an effective regime should risk questioning
and verification of its self-developed standards in the first place? Those rules are usu-
ally being developed basing on the regime’s own specific context rationality, precisely
suited for its own ends. By submission of the regime to the larger legal system, they
essentially become open for limitation or repeal against the contents of higher legal
norms. Also, this ‘connection’ to the larger legal order by definition means the imple-
mentation of social control and a pattern of coercion, which is characteristic of the
law.43 Given that the social organizational ‘sanctions’ specific of a given private regime,
such as exclusion (e. g. under the sports law system) or non-certification turn out to
be effective, why would the regime want to resort to legal instruments? Moreover, the
reason for the creation of such regimes is often precisely the need to avoid the heter-
onomous (external) character of regulation typical of the law – they often arise by way
of self-regulation of the subjects involved, and therefore require implementing some
kind of ‘softer’ degree of persuasiveness as compared to traditional public legal regula-
tion. Such an argument may in fact seem convincing, however it only works under the
assumption that the particular private regime operates correctly (as designed) under
normal circumstances and is not biased by partisan interests, particularly of those ac-
tors, whose activities the regime is designed to constrain. As long as an autonomous,
largely private regime functions properly and is well-balanced in terms of aims and
values, it can continue to be effective without the aid from legal norms. If, however, it
finds itself in a crisis situation, it may turn out to be more prone to collapse or regaining
its functional capacity by reform than a legal public regime. Examples range from var-
ious financial market and banking self-regulation private regimes, operating and col-
lapsing, sometimes spectacularly, in both recent and more distant past,44 to the failed

42 Cf. The opposite view, that the ‘transmission’ of normativity (validity) between norms within the
Stufenbau cannot occur: András Jakab, Probleme der Stufenbaulehre: Das Scheitern des Ableitungsgedank-
ens und die Aussichten der Reinen Rechtslehre, ARSP: Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 91 (2005),
333–365.
43 Kelsen (note 15), 34–59.
44 See eg. Lori Qingyuan Yue / Jiao Luo / Paul Ingram, The Failure of Private Regulation. Elite Control
and Market Crises in the Manhattan Banking Industry, Administrative Science Quarterly 58 (2013), 37–68.

attempts of private regulation to keep down international roaming tariffs in the EU.45
Among other possible causes, those failures may be due to the fact, that an isolated ex-
tra-legal autonomous rationality, which stands at the foundation and purpose of such
systems’ function may become corrupted and undermined easier than the normativity
and authority of the whole legal system. The price for the autonomy and self-regula-
tion is paid by the fact that the regime runs on bare efficiency, which in turn reduces
the importance of its standards to the realm of the factual. This implies, that the regime
simply stands or falls with certain facts which justify its creation and functioning in the
first place. The remarkable flexibility of action that private-regulation may entail, often
also turns out to be its Achilles’ heel in a crisis situation. In contrast, due to separation
of Sein and Sollen and axiological neutrality in its application, the law in a comparable
crisis situation may be reasonably expected to be far more resilient to pressures from
both the inside and the outside of the system.
Third monism: the plurality of various legal orders and the primacy
of international law
In contrast to the abovementioned widely held stereotypes about Kelsen’s normativ-

ism, the assumptions of the Pure Theory of Law in fact do allow for a diverse, flexible
configuration of the structure of the modern global law. Apart of the two well-known
variants of monism with the primacy of international law and with the primacy of mu-
nicipal law,46 which are useful only in the context of considering the particular relation
between two orders: a state legal order and the international legal order, it is also worth
considering a more pluralistic version of monism, called here the ‘third monism’. Kels-
en writes:
(…) two norm complexes may form a single system of norms also in that fashion that
both orders are coordinated, that is, that their spheres of validity are delimited against each
other. This coordination, however, presupposes a third, higher, order which determines
the creation of the other two (…)47
This setting in fact allows for a plurality of orders within the unity of one system. It
suggests however, that the relations between the orders within the system are orderly
or structured in analogous way to the relations between individual norms within any
given legal order. Moreover, some orders may have equal position to each other in the
45 See Fabrizio Cafaggi / Andrea Renda, Public and Private Regulation. Mapping the Labyrinth, Doven-
schmidt Quarterly 1 (2012), 15–32.
46 See e. g. Hans Kelsen, The Concept of the Legal Order, trans. Stanley L. Paulson, American Journal of
Jurisprudence 27 (1982), 75–84.
47 Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, 2005, 332.

286 TOMASZ WIDŁAK
system; for instance, several states are directly delegated by the ‘third’ higher order co-
ordinating and delimiting the others, thus they are equal in being directly delegated by
international law. This variation of the pluralistic monism has a clear potential for ob-
jectivizing international law, as the delegation principle in operation between the var-
ious legal orders creates the unity of the entire legal system. For Kelsen, the supreme
overall order that delegates the state orders is, of course, the universal international
law. Its contents and scope of jurisdiction, as well as other features such as the degree
of centralization, remain an open question. Because it is the highest order and the most
complete one within the whole system, international law needs therefore to be general
and universal in terms of matter that it can choose to regulate. In such a view, all the
other orders in the system are of course partial to international law. In addition, as any
other legal order, this superior coordinating international law can hypothetically be
shaped freely in terms of the degree of centralization or directness (depth) of regu-
lation. This opens the way for envisaging different conceptions of international law:
from the minimalist version as the of coordination and limitation48 to denser and more
centralized models, embracing it’s potential for constitutionalisation.49
Nothing in the above argument on the structural relation between international law
and the multitude of state legal orders prevents it from being extended further by em-
bracing other constitutive elements of the contemporary global legal system. Other
legal entities and juristic persons listed above, and even international regimes qua legal
orders, may be envisioned as parts to the structure of the global law. Depending on the
specific case, most individual organizations or regimes may be defined as partial legal
orders in relation to international law, state law or even to other non-state orders. Any
such relatively centralized order can therefore be delegated by a norm of another spe-
cific legal order, virtually at any level of the ‘chain of validity’ of the global legal system.
This creates subsequent, relatively centralized clusters of norms on different levels of
the structure. In the following part, I will argue that inclusion of these different partial
orders makes the overall structure rather heterarchical than traditionally hierarchical.
Polycentrism
The notion of ‘polycentrism’ or ‘multi-centricism’ represents the thesis that in the con-
temporary legal system numerous decision centers coexist in the same normative plane
48 See Danilo Zolo, Towards a Modern, Realist Philosophy of International Law, in: Jura Gentium, Rivista
di filosofia del diritto internazionale e della politica globale, http://www.juragentium.org/topics/thil/en/zolo.
htm, Accessed July 27, 2018.
49 See Jan Klabbers / Anne Peters / Geir Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization of International Law, Oxford
University Press, Oxford – New York 2009.

and at the same time, especially as far as law creation and application is concerned.50
Each of the ‘centres’ can generate its own sub-system or partial legal order concen-
trated around local axis of hierarchy within the larger system. Polycentrism therefore
explicitly denies the notion of only one central, clear hierarchy of law-creation or ap-
plication within the modern legal order. The distinguishing feature of this theoretical
model is however, that although the existence of a hierarchical relationship between
the various ‘centers’ is generally denied, all of them undoubtedly operate within the
same system, and thus tend to be mutually conditioned, at least in a functional way. In
addition, the individual ‘centers’ often create their own hierarchies, which means that a
holistically perceived multi-centric system appears as a kind of heterarchy. This is clear-
ly seen in municipal law of modern states; for instance, the judiciary in many European
countries forms multiple hierarchies. The administrative courts often have their own
supreme tribunal, civil and criminal (or general) courts are headed by a supreme court
and all are often balanced by a separate constitutional court. However, polycentrism
is not a concept which descriptive usefulness is limited only to the municipal context.
On the contrary, it seems convergent with the contemporary pluralistic approach to
global law.51 However, it does not equal the fragmentation understood as an extreme
autonomization of particular legal orders. The difference between polycentrism and
fragmentation or global legal pluralism is that in the end of the day, the narrative of
polycentrism upholds the systemic nature of international law and, in a broader per-
spective, of the whole of global law. ‘Polycentric’ may be thus interpreted to mean a
certain degree of diversity or competition, however only within the context of basic
epistemic unity of the normative order. From the Kelsenian perspective, polycentrism
without normative unity would amount to political or even power pluralism – a notion
barely specific or relevant to legal science.
The concept of polycentrism may adequately serve to describe the complex nor-
mative sphere of global legal system in the Kelsenian interpretation. The polycentric
system indicates, that apart of including the basic norm within it and the foundational
order emanating directly from it, that is either the universal international law, or – ac-
cording to some other accounts – its reinterpretation as an international constitutional
law, there is room for numerous other partial legal orders. They are either states (mu-
nicipal orders) delegated directly by international law, as well as other orders of differ-
ent degree of centralization, located in different ‘spaces’ (or on different ‘levels’) of the
system. In general, these local orders may be in fact more centralized (at least in one
of the possible dimensions of centralization discussed above) than the universal order
50 See in general e. g. Marek Zirk-Sadowski / Marcin Golecki / Bartosz Wojciechowski (eds.), Multicen-
trism as an Emerging Paradigm in Legal Theory, 2009.
51 See Larry Catá Backer, The Structural Characteristics of Global Law for the 21st Century: Fracture, Flu-
idity, Permeability, and Polycentricity, in: Reflections on Global Law, eds. Shavana Musa / Eefje de Volder,
2013, 45–67.

288 TOMASZ WIDŁAK
of international law itself, constituting substantially dense local ‘pockets’ of norms (in-
cluding institutions and procedures) within the larger system. For instance, the legal
regime of the World Trade Organization (WTO) may be considered as an example of
such a denser, more centralized statically and dynamically sub-order within the global
legal system. At the same time, these local legal orders may generate further partial
orders, delegated either by one order alone or jointly, in cooperation with other orders
(e. g. states) – for instance when they are founded on the basis of a multilateral treaty.
Such a polycentric structure with multiple delegations can hardly constitute a simple
hierarchy. However, this configuration does not deny in any way the Grundnorm that
ensures the unity of the whole system. All the legal orders within the system’s structure
are conjugated within one chain of validity (even though it may have several branch-
es). The nature of this link is at least by formal delegation, which ultimately allows for
tracing the normativity of the whole and its parts back to the one basic norm.
Hierarchy, heterarchy or panarchy?
It has been repeatedly suggested above, that in the case of the structure of international
law or even more so the overall global law, the term ‘hierarchy’ may not be epistemical-
ly adequate. Instead of the basic supremacy relation suggested by using the word ‘hier-
archy’, the case of international or global law requires more nuanced descriptions of its
specific, complex multistage structure. This does not mean however, that hierarchical
relation should be rejected altogether; as pointed out above, it is inherent to Merkl’s
and Kelsen’s doctrine of Stufenbau. Nonetheless, the hierarchical relation was under-
stood by Merkl in a rather minimalistic and formal way, pertaining to the fundamental
subordination of the so-called derivative norms (abgeleitete Normen) to the basic norm
(Grundnorm). This refers to the core binary configuration of two kinds of norms: con-
ditional and conditioned (bedingende und bedingte), which is sufficient and defining
for any legal order.52 In other words, hierarchy essentially exists only between the basic
norm and its immediate derivatives, so to say, ‘first order norms’, but is not essential on
the lower levels (does not require further secondary delegations). Adding to this the
fact that the basic norm is to be understood as a transcendental assumption of norma-
tivity, and is not a positive norm in itself,53 the conclusion may be that a hierarchical
nature of a relationship between two positive legal norms is not defining for the con-
cept of a legal order. Delegation of one positive norm by another in any given positive
52 Adolf Merkl, Die Lehre von der Rechtskraft entwickelt aus dem Rechtsbegriff, 1923, 210.
53 Merkl however would not agree as his concept of an Ursprungsnorm was a sort of a legal condition and
not merely a supposition as is the case of one of the possible Kelsenian interpretations of Grundnorm used
here. More on the Kelsen’s account of the Grundnorm in the context of international law see Jörg Kammer-
hofer, Uncertainty in International Law A Kelsenian Perspective, 2011, 241–261.

legal system is obviously common, however in extreme cases it remains a possibility,

not a necessity. This leads to the conclusion, that contrary to widely held accounts of
Kelsenism, hierarchy, especially a multi-level one, is not a determinative characteristic
of the structure of a legal order, at least amongst its positive-norm members.
As suggested earlier, the structure of the global legal system could also be described
in terms of a heterarchy. This term, as used in social sciences, usually refers to such a
configuration between individual elements in a system, that does not imply any per-
manent privilege of one over another. Heterarchies are often characterized by mutu-
al dependencies between individual elements, position and role of which may vary
depending on the current needs of the system, making the whole configuration nec-
essarily dynamic. The notion has been used to describe either circular or networked
systems, where each element disposes numerous connections (relations) with many
other elements at the same time.54 Although heterarchy may often be perceived as an
antithesis of hierarchy, in essence the relationship between the two terms is dialecti-
cal and both types of systems can co-exist. It is sometimes even implied that heterar-
chy is a broader category.55 This amounts to the perception of heterarchy as a possible
relationship between numerous, equivalent hierarchies. In the context of the above
analysis of the structure of the global legal system, it can be concluded that the system
of normative dependencies, especially the plurality of delegations between numerous
partial orders within the global law system, may be seen as exhibiting such heterarchic
features. This includes also the possibility of existence of local normative hierarchies
within the overall structure of the global law, for instance among norms within particu-
lar partial legal orders such as municipal law.
This model, however, may still be interpreted as insufficiently considering the role
and place of the fundamental body of general international law or its part interpreted as
the global dimension of this law. What I am referring to is the primary legal order of the
global legal system, the one that is directly delegated by the Grundnorm. Alternatively,
it can be perceived as a network of universal norms of global relevance that affects it at
every point of its normative structure or – to put it in other words – ‘encases’ the entire
pluralistic architecture consisting of the numerous partial orders. For the purposes of
adequate description of this Kelsenian reconstruction, it is worth considering yet an-
other concept of a ‘panarchy’.56 The term consists of the Greek words pan- (‘παν’ – all,
everything) and -archy (from ‘ἀρχή’ – government, power) and can be interpreted as
54 See Satoshi Miura, Heterarchy. Social Sciences, in: Encyclopaedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.
com/topic/heterarchy, Accessed July 27, 2018.
55 Carole L. Crumley, Heterarchy. in: International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, https://www.
encyclopedia.com/social-sciences/applied-and-social-sciences-magazines/heterarchy, Accessed April 27,
2018.
56 See Lance H. Gunderson / Crawford S. Holling (eds.), Panarchy Understanding Transformations in Hu-
man and Natural Systems, 2002, 5.

290 TOMASZ WIDŁAK
the universal system of governance, encompassing the totality of its entities.57 In the
present context, panarchy would therefore refer to the meaning and the role played by
the abovementioned global or universal element of international law. It can therefore
be used to describe the system as consisting of the universal, perhaps constitutional,
‘superstructure’ and the heterarchy of numerous partial legal orders delegated by it. In
other terms, it can refer to a network or a normative environment in which the heter-
archic configuration of state and other legal orders, including the non-state regimes is
embedded.
Conclusion
Kelsen’s universal theory of legal order as well as his and Merkl’s remarkable Stufen-
baulehre pave the way for a meaningful conceptualization of a global legal system,
even as it stands today – in constant flux, polycentric, multilevel and predominantly
non-territorial. Kelsen remains to be one of the very few legal scholars who developed
foundations for a legal theory of international law of such complexity and extent.58 This
sets the pure theory of law to be one of the few distinctively legal approaches that can
be put up by legal scholarship against the advancing global governance or systems the-
ory methodologies, which are drawing on non-legal (non-normative) rationalities. It
is imperative therefore, that neo-Kelsenian project of global law is further explored and
developed as one of legal science’s possible responses. On the one hand, as it has been
shown, application of Kelsenism for the analysis of the structure of global legal system
by no means can be dismissed as out of date. On the other hand, it is also not a sinister
hegemonial project pursuing a world state tyranny. Kelsenian account of global law is
epistemic, not political in its nature. Its application shows that it is the explanatory and
normative power of an adequate legal theory what is essential in addressing the trans-
formative challenges of international law.
Tomasz Widłak
University of Gdańsk, ul. Jana Bażyńskiego 6, 80-309 Gdańsk, Poland,
tomasz.widlak@prawo.ug.edu.pl
57 The word is sometimes also related to the Greek mythological god Pan, symbolizing the universal laws;
see James P. Sewell / Mark B. Salter, Panarchy and Other Norms for Global Governance: Boutros-Ghali,
Rosenau, and Beyond, Global Governance 1 (1995), 373–382.
58 Cf. Similar observations by L. Murphy, Law Beyond the State: Some Philosophical Questions, European
Journal of International Law 28 (2017), 203–232.

Constitutional Pluralism and the Problem of the
Hierarchy of Norms beyond National Law
ANNE KÜHLER
Abstract: The idea of a hierarchy of norms, an important element of Hans Kelsen’s Pure
Theory of Law, faces massive criticism in legal doctrine and theory when it comes to law
beyond the state. In current European constitutionalism it is criticized on empirical, nor-
mative and epistemic grounds. The article analyses and discusses this critique. The central
argument defended in this article is that this criticism is too comprehensive because there
is a way to understand the idea of a hierarchy of norms beyond national law in a productive
manner. The proposed understanding of this idea depends on adopting an internal point
of view. It departs from Kelsen’s theoretical framework but maintains that two invaluable
insights of Kelsen are of particular interest in this debate: the epistemological value of the
hierarchy of norms beyond national law and the political character of the question.
Keywords: hierarchy of norms, legal monism, international law, law of the European Un-
ion, European constitutionalism, constitutional pluralism
Schlagworte: Normenhierarchie, rechtlicher Monismus, Völkerrecht, Recht der Europäis-

chen Union, europäischer Konstitutionalismus, Verfassungspluralismus
I. Introduction
In this article, I want to explore the current critique of the idea of the hierarchy of
norms beyond national law. This idea remains the unresolved subject of vital disputes
in controversies about the legal framework of Europe. Whereas the hierarchy of norms
(with the Constitution as the supreme law) is widely acknowledged in the constitu-
tional tradition of many democratic states and seen by many as essentially linked to
modern constitutionalism, it faces massive criticism in legal doctrine and legal theory
when it comes to law beyond the state. In current European legal theory, it is criticized

292 ANNE KÜHLER
on empirical, normative and epistemic grounds. I will examine this criticism in the
context of constitutional pluralism. The central argument defended in this article is
that this criticism encompasses too much because there is a way to understand the
idea of a hierarchy of norms beyond national law in a constructive manner, using its
potential in times when international law and EU law are often under attack in the na-
tional arena. The proposed understanding of this idea depends on adopting an internal
point of view. It departs from the theoretical framework of the Pure Theory of Law but
maintains that two of Hans Kelsen’s invaluable insights are of particular interest for
explaining the importance of the hierarchy of norms beyond national law: the episte-
mological value of this idea and the political character of the question.
It should be stressed, however, that this article is not about applying Kelsen’s con-
cept of the hierarchy of norms to the complex relationships between the different legal
orders in Europe. Moreover, it contains some preliminary thoughts about the useful-
ness of an idea that was central to Kelsen’s thinking. Although Kelsen contributed con-
siderably to its proliferation, the idea has spread independently of other aspects of his
work in international legal discourse. I will first try to sketch some core aspects of Kels-
en’s view on the idea of a hierarchy of norms beyond national law in order to illustrate
how this idea has emancipated itself from Kelsen’s theoretical background (II). I will
then argue that it constitutes a normative concept of constitutional democracy (III.),
assess the current critique of this idea in the context of European constitutionalism
(IV.), and draw a conclusion (V.).
II. A few remarks on Kelsen’s view on the hierarchy of norms and on

the emancipation of this idea in international legal doctrine
The idea of the hierarchy of norms is an important element of Kelsen’s Pure Theory of
Law.1 Kelsen relied on the theory of the “Stufenbau der Rechtsordnung” developed by
Adolf Julius Merkl,2 and incorporated it into the Pure Theory of Law.3 The idea of legal
1 Hans Kelsen, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre, 1923, XV; Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 1934, 62–89,
129; Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 1960, 228–282.
2 Adolf Merkl, Das Recht im Lichte seiner Anwendung, in: Die Wiener rechtstheoretische Schule, ed. Hans R.
Klecatsky / Rene Marcic / Herbert Schambeck, 1969, 1167–1201; Adolf Merkl, Das doppelte Rechtsantlitz,
in: Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Dorothea Mayer-Maly / Herbert Schambeck / Wolf-Dietrich Grussmann,
1993, 227–252; Adolf Merkl, Die Lehre von der Rechtskraft, 1923, 211 et seq; Adolf Merkl, Prolegomena einer
Theorie des rechtlichen Stufenbaus, in: Gesellschaft, Staat und Recht Untersuchungen zur Reinen Rechtslehre,
Festschrift Hans Kelsen, ed. Alfred Verdross, 1931, 252–294.
3 Kelsen adopted Merkl’s theory to his Pure Theory of Law under the title “Stufenbau der Rechtsordnung”
in the first (1934) and second (1960) edition of “Reine Rechtslehre”, and under the title “the hierarchy of
the norms” in “General Theory of Law and State” (1945). See also Kelsen, Hauptprobleme (footnote 1), XV.
Kelsen addressed the hierarchy of norms between state law and international law already in Hans Kelsen,
Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrechts, 1920, 111 et seq.

Constitutional Pluralism and the Problem of the Hierarchy of Norms beyond National Law 293
hierarchies is old and can be traced back to natural law traditions, serving as a means to
legitimise and to structure the law.4 But Kelsen connects the hierarchy of norms with
his theory of law as a dynamic system of norms in order to deliver a justification for
his positivist theory of law. The hierarchy of the norms is established by the specific
relations between the norms in a legal system (“hierarchy of conditions”): The higher
norm determines the conditions of validity of the lower norm. A valid norm has the ca-
pacity to grant the power to create and validate lower norms. Each legal norm derives
its validity from a higher norm. This chain of validity can be traced to the Grundnorm
or basic norm which is not a norm of positive law but rather a hypothesis of juridical
thinking. The function of the hierarchy of norms is to establish the identity and the
formal unity of law created by the basic norm. Hence, the law is a hierarchical sys-
tem regulating its own creation. Kelsen argues on this basis that law is a system that is
autonomous from other normative systems such as morality: law is a self-contained
order and morality must play no part in identifying the law.5

Kelsen applies the hierarchy of norms to his theory of international law, advocating
for a monistic reading of international law. The main elements of legal monism accord-
ing to Kelsen include the following: National and international law form a single legal
order (system of norms) because they receive their validity from the same source.6
For Kelsen, such a unitary system of international and national law is “only” an episte-
mological postulate. However, it is a logical necessity because it is impossible to con-
ceive of simultaneously valid norms belonging to different systems.7 Kelsen considers
it equally possible that the relationship between national and international law could
be conceived on the basis of the primacy of national law rather than of international
4 Werner Krawietz, Reinheit der Rechtslehre als Ideologie?, in: Ideologiekritik und Demokratietheorie bei
Hans Kelsen, ed. Werner Krawietz / Ernst Topitsch / Peter Koller, Rechtstheorie (Beiheft 4) 1982, 409; Horst
Dreier, Rechtslehre, Staatssoziologie und Demokratietheorie bei Hans Kelsen, 1986, 130; Robert Walter, Der
Aufbau der Rechtsordnung, 1964; Theo Öhlinger, Der Stufenbau der Rechtsordnung, 1975, 9.
5 Juan Antonio García Amado, Grundnorm und Gewohnheitsrecht bei Kelsen, in: Hans Kelsen: Staatsre-
chtslehrer und Rechtstheoretiker des 20 Jahrhunderts, ed. Stanley Paulson / Michael Stolleis, 2005, 96; Peter
Koller, Zur Theorie des rechtlichen Stufenbaus, in: Hans Kelsen: Staatsrechtslehrer und Rechtstheoretiker des
20 Jahrhunderts, ed. Stanley Paulson / Michael Stolleis, 2005, 106 et seq.
6 Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 1934, 134 et seq.; Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 1960, 333 et seq. See on Kelsen’s the-
ory of international law Jörg Kammerhofer, Hans Kelsen in Today’s International Legal Scholarship, in:
International Legal Posivitism in a Post-Modern World, ed. Jörg Kammerhofer and Jean d’Aspremont, 2014,
81–113; Jörg Kammerhofer, Hans Kelsen’s Place in International Legal Theory, in: Research Handbook on the
Theory and History of International Law, ed. Alexander Orakhelashvili, 2011, 143–167; Joseph Gabriel Starke,
Monism and Dualism in the Theory of International Law, British Yearbook of International Law, 17 (1936), 74.
7 Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 1934, 134–135; Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 1960, 329. See Paul Gragl, Legal Monism
Law, Philosophy and Politics, 2018; Christoph Kletzer, The Normative Jinx, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies,
37 (2017), 98–813; Jörg Kammerhofer, Kelsen – Which Kelsen? A Reapplication of the Pure Theory to Inter-
national Law, Leiden Journal of International Law, 22 (2009), 225–249; Alexander Somek, Monism: A Tale of
the Undead, in: Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond, ed. Matej Avbelj / Jan Komárek,
2012, 372; Alexander Somek, Kelsen Lives, The European Journal of International Law, 18 (2007), 409–451;
Alfred Rub, Hans Kelsens Völkerrechtslehre Versuch einer Würdigung, 1995.

294 ANNE KÜHLER
law. The choice between these alternatives is to be made on political rather than legal
grounds.8 Whereas for Kelsen, there is a choice between the primacy of international
law and the primacy of national law, it was his student Alfred Verdross who developed
the understanding of legal monism that national and international law form one single
legal order, in which international law “wenigstens in seiner obersten Spitze” (at least
on top) is superior to the national legal orders.9
However, in current legal doctrine and practice, legal monism has emancipated it-
self from this theoretical background. For a scholar mainly educated in Switzerland,
this is no surprise, since “moderate monism”, which is still seen as the dominant theory
of the relationship between national and international law in Switzerland, does not
tackle questions about the basic norm. In fact, the “theory” that is nowadays labelled
as legal monism seems to be a “reduced” theory consisting mainly of two elements:
international and national law form a single unitary legal order (no act of transforma-
tion into domestic law is required) and the relation between national and international
law is hierarchical (primacy of international law v. domestic law in cases of conflicts
as a principle with exceptions).10 Even though legal monism and the idea of a hierar-
chical relationship between different normative orders are often ascribed to Kelsen in
current constitutional and international legal discourse, these concepts appear to be
detached from Kelsen’s theoretical framework in current legal doctrine and practice.
Legal monism, as it is applied in case law and described in the textbooks, has evolved
to take the status of a somewhat “practical theory” or a theory sui generis and the idea
of a hierarchy of norms beyond national law is discussed and applied mostly without
reference to legal positivism (or natural law theories following Verdross) – it stands
on its own and is occasionally seen as a useful doctrinal tool even by scholars who
disagree with Merkl or Kelsen.11 The idea of a hierarchy of norms beyond national law
is therefore strongly associated with the work of Hans Kelsen, but it is important to
highlight the independent status of this idea in current international legal discourse.12
8 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, 1945, 373; Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität (foot-
note 3), 111.
9 Alfred Verdross, Völkerrecht und staatliches Recht, in: Die völkerrechtswidrige Kriegshandlung und der
Strafanspruch der Staaten, 1920; Alfred Verdross, Grundlagen und Grundlegungen des Völkerrechts, Nie-
meyers Zeitschrift für internationales Recht, XXIX (1921), 65; Alfred Verdross, Die Einheit des rechtlichen
Weltbildes auf Grundlage der Völkerrechtsverfassung, 1923, VI. See also Robert Walter, Die Rechtslehren von
Kelsen und Verdross unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Völkerrechts, in: Hans Kelsen und das Völker-
recht Ergebnisse eines internationalen Symposiums in Wien (1 –2 April 2004), ed. Robert Walter / Clemens
Jabloner / Klaus Zeleny, 2004, 37–49.
10 Walter Kälin / Astrid Epiney / Martina Caroni / Jörg Künzli, Völkerrecht, 2016, 110; Anne Peters, Völker-
recht, 2016, 196–197; Knut Ipsen, Völkerrecht, 2018, 47; Daniel Thürer, Verfassungsrecht und Völkerrecht, in:
Verfassungsrecht der Schweiz, ed. Daniel Thürer / Jean-François Aubert / Jörg Paul Müller, 2001, 186 et seq.
11 See Gragl (footnote 7), 78 with further references.
12 Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law, The American Journal of International Law,
100 (2006), 291–323.

III. Legal hierarchy as a normative concept of constitutional democracy
The idea of a hierarchy of norms plays a role in international legal discourse, but much
more so on the domestic level. In the constitutional tradition of many democratic
states, the hierarchy of norms (with the Constitution as supreme law) is widely ac-
knowledged and seen by many as essentially linked to modern constitutionalism.13 It
constitutes a normative concept of constitutional democracy operating as “a check
on the hubris of unbound liberty, both the collective and the individual”.14 It ensures
that the provisions of the Constitution guaranteeing fundamental values trump other
values and norms.15 Within the constitutional state, the hierarchy of norms is an in-
strument for limiting state power.16 It binds all state powers to the Constitution. This
manifests the outright political function of the hierarchy of norms.
Several arguments are put forth to highlight the value of this idea. The following
six arguments feature prominently: (1) The hierarchy of norms enables a structuring
of the legal system that aligns the lower ranked law with the higher ranked law.17 This
increases the transparency and rationality of legal argumentation. (2) A second argu-
ment in favour of a hierarchy of norms can be deduced from Kelsen’s formal account
with a view to the assumption that a normative system should not make contradictory
requirements: the formal ranking of criteria of validity will prevent such conflicts or
solve them if they arise. From a practical point of view, the ranking allows to establish
a rule for conflict resolution (“lex superior derogat legi inferiori”), which provides legal
certainty in an increasingly complex legal system and facilitates conflict resolution.18
(3) Third, it is argued that the hierarchy of norms promotes the effectiveness of the high-
er norms. Due to the aforementioned structuring, the hierarchy of norms raises the
significance of the higher ranked law and facilitates its implementation, thereby allow-
ing for its greater effectiveness.19 (4) A fourth argument in favour of the hierarchy of
norms is its guiding and legitimizing function because the principles of the higher level
serve as a guidance and legitimation for the lower ranked law.20 (5) The hierarchy of
norms also establishes a validity relationship between norms and enables to determine
the possibilities of creating valid new law (according to the Constitution). It facilitates
13 Joseph H. H. Weiler, Prologue: global and pluralist constitutionalism – some doubts, in: The Worlds of
European Constitutionalism, ed. Gráinne de Búrca / Joseph H. H. Weiler, 2012, 16–18; Dieter Grimm, Types
of Constitutions, in: The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law, ed. Michel Rosenfeld / An-
drás Sajó, 2012, 103; Jutta Limbach, Vorrang der Verfassung oder Souveränität des Parlaments?, 2001, 9, 13–17.
14 Weiler (footnote 13), 17.
15 Ibid.
16 Anne Peters, Elemente einer Theorie der Verfassung Europas, 2001, 61.
17 Merkl, Prolegomena (footnote 2), 252 et seq.
18 Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 1934, 84 et seq.
19 Peters (footnote 16), 60–61.
20 Ibid; Anne Peters, Rechtsordnungen und Konstitutionalisierung: Zur Neubestimmung der Verhält-
nisse, Zeitschrift für Öffentliches Recht 2010 (65), 46.

296 ANNE KÜHLER
the traceability of valid law to a common source. (6) Last but not least, considering its
already mentioned political character, the hierarchy of norms with the Constitution as
the ultimate source is an idea which fits well into a political philosophy of constitution-
alism.21
The aforementioned six arguments for a hierarchy of norms are appealing, not least
from the standpoint of legal practice. However, it is important to take into account
that their success does not depend on formal considerations alone, but also on the
normative (substantive, material) content of the point of reference at the top of the hi-
erarchy. The idea of a hierarchy of norms is not an end in itself, it is only of conditional
and instrumental value because it is dependent on the value of the highest norm(s).
Therefore, to argue for a hierarchy of norms does not mean that evaluating different
interests, principles and perspectives is unnecessary. The hierarchy requires deliber-
ate structuring, aligned with a normative basis. We need a reason for ranking specific
norms higher than others. The reason is that we consider the higher norms especially
important and fundamental. In this sense, the idea of a hierarchy of norms is a means
to an end, namely to foster constitutional values.
IV. Criticism of the concept of a hierarchy of norms in the context

of European constitutionalism
1. The pluralist turn in European constitutionalism
Before discussing current arguments against the hierarchy of norms in the context of
European constitutionalism, it seems appropriate to characterize the pluralist turn in
European constitutionalism. The diverse legal orders (national, supra-, trans- and in-
ternational) in Europe have evolved to form a more and more complex system. How-
ever, the relationships between them are far from clear. Hierarchy could be seen as a
key concept in order to structure these relationships, for instance, like in the monistic
tradition.22 But in the European context, the monistic approach in international and
supranational law has come under pressure. Instead, the legal architecture in Europe is
currently often described in terms of constitutionalism and pluralism.23 The prevalent,
though not uncontested, view in current theory and practice of the European legal
21 Matthias Mahlmann, Normative Universalism and Constitutional Pluralism, in: New Developments in
Constitutional Law Essays in Honour of András Sajó, ed. Iulia Motoc / Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque / Krzyst-
of Wojtyczek, 2018, 281–282.
22 See the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ), Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL (1964) ECR 585.
23 Neil MacCormick, The Maastricht Urteil: Sovereignty Now, European Law Journal (1995), 259; Ingolf
Pernice, Europäisches und nationales Verfassungsrecht, in: Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen
Staatsrechtslehrertagung, 60 (2001), 153; Neil Walker, The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism, The Modern Law
Review, 65 (2002), 317; Klemen Jaklic, Constitutional Pluralism in the EU, 2014, 30. For a critical account, see

arena today is that there are multiple and overlapping coexisting legal orders such as
the laws of the States, the law of the European Union, the law of the United Nations
and the law of the Council of Europe. These different legal orders each make their
own constitutional claims.24 The current situation is described as pluralist because the
relations between those legal orders are said not to be hierarchical, but heterarchical.
From the point of view of the Member States of the European Union for example, it
seems appropriate to recognize that the “legal orders of Member States are not hierar-
chically integrated into the European legal orders”,25 because national courts on occa-
sion resist such a subordination. A famous early example was the Maastricht decision
of the German Federal Constitutional Court of 1993, in which the Court held that “the
Federal Constitutional Court will examine whether legal acts of the European institu-
tions and organs are within or exceed the sovereign powers transferred to them.”26 As
is well known, the resistance of national courts to a complete subordination of national
laws to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the law of the European Union did
not remain undetected by legal theory. The (alleged) absence and denial of hierarchies
in the European constitutional practice have been crucial for the development of con-
stitutional pluralism. It was MacCormick who famously argued in his contribution
to the European Law Journal in 1995 after the Maastricht decision that “(t)he most
appropriate analysis of the relations of legal systems is pluralistic rather than monistic,
and interactive rather than hierarchical. The legal system of Member States and their
common legal system of EC law are distinct, but interacting systems of law, and hier-
archical relationships of validity within criteria of validity proper to distinct systems
do not add up to any sort of all-purpose superiority of one system over another.”27 So,
MacCormick challenged the then conventional wisdom that Community law was sup-
posed to have absolute supremacy over the Member States’ legal orders. Whereas the
idea of constitutional pluralism has developed, spread and diversified,28 evolving into
a new and very influential scholarship, almost all its protagonists agree on one point:
they criticise the idea of legal hierarchies beyond national law.
I will now take a closer look at this criticism in the context of European constitu-
tionalism. Three current forms of criticism shall be briefly examined: an empirical
Matthias Jestaedt, Der Europäische Verfassungsverbund, in: Verfassungswandel im europäischen Staaten- und
Verfassungsverbund, ed. Christian Calliess, 2006, 111 et seq.
25 Matthias Mahlmann, Conditioned Hierarchies of Law in Europe. Content, legitimacy and default lines,
in: Schweizerisches Jahrbuch für Europarecht 2012/2013, ed. Astrid Epiney / Stefan Diezig, 2013, 395; Mattias
Kumm, Rethinking Constitutional Authority: On the Structure and Limits of Constitutional Pluralism, in:
Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond, ed. Matej Avbelj / Jan Komárek, 2012, 39.
26 BVerfGE 89 (1993), 155, 188.
27 MacCormick (footnote 23), 259.
28 See Matej Avbelj / Jan Komárek, Introduction, in: Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and
Beyond, ed. Matej Avbelj / Jan Komárek, 2012, 4.

298 ANNE KÜHLER
account (with a view to the practice of courts), a normative account and an episte-
mological account. I will discuss these arguments and first ask whether it is true that
there is no hierarchy of norms in the world of European public law and how we can
sensibly frame this empirical question.
2. Empirical account
Constitutional pluralists argue that the idea of a hierarchy does not adequately de-
scribe the reality of European public law.29 The courts in Europe construe a pluralist
structure of the European legal order, holding that the legal orders of the Member
States are not hierarchically integrated into the European legal order (or, indeed,
into the international legal order).30 In particular, it is argued that conflicts between
competing legal orders are not hierarchically regulated.31 A famous case in point in
this respect is the aforementioned Maastricht decision of the German Federal Con-
stitutional Court, which seems to confirm the empirical claim with regard to the
relationship between national law and the law of the European Union. A similar
argument is possible from the point of view of the Court of Justice of the Europe-
an Union (CJEU) concerning the relationship between EU law and international
law. The position taken in Kadi I (2008) can be called “robustly pluralist” because
it emphasizes the separateness, autonomy and constitutional priority of the EU le-
gal order over international law.32 Also, the famous Lisbon decision of the German
Constitutional Court (2009)33 and the Bosphorus decision of the European Court of
Human Rights (2005) can be appropriately interpreted in the light of constitutional
pluralism.34
Indeed, the idea of constitutional pluralism proved to be very influential not only
for legal theory, but also for judicial practice. But the first point of criticism is perplex-
29 Walker (footnote 23), 337; Miguel Poiares Maduro, Contrapunctual law: Europe’s constitutional plu-
ralism in action, in: Sovereignty in Transition, ed. Neil Walker, 2003, 501; Jean L. Cohen, Sovereignty in the
Context of Globalization: A Constitutional Pluralist Perspective, in: The Philosophy of International Law, ed.
Samantha Besson / John Tasioulas, 2010, 274–275. See also the critique of Gunther Teubner with respect to
law in general: Gunther Teubner, The King’s Many Bodies. The Self-Deconstruction of the Law’s Hierarchy,
Law and Society Review 31 (1997), 763; Gunther Teubner, “And God Laughed …”: Indeterminacy, Self-Ref-
erence and Paradox in Law, in: Critical Legal Thought: An American-German Debate, ed. Christian Joerges /
David M. Trubek, 1989, 399–434.
30 Kumm (footnote 25), 39; James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, 2012, 50.
31 Poiares Maduro, Three Claims of Constitutional Pluralism, in: Constitutional Pluralism in Europe and
Beyond, ed. Matej Avbelj / Jan Komárek, 2012, 69.
32 ECJ, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, Joined Cases C-402/05
P and C-415/05 P, ECR I-6351.
33 BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08, 2 BvE 5/08, 2 BvR 1010/08, 2 BvR 1022/08, 2 BvR 1259/08 und 2 BvR 182/09, Judg-
ment of 30 June 2009.
34 ECtHR, Case 45036/98, Judgment of 30 June 2005, Bosphorus v Ireland.

ing because this “empirical” claim is at the same time easy and difficult to understand.
It is easy to understand with respect to the notion of a hierarchy of regimes based, for
instance, on a common Grundnorm, because there are good reasons to accept, from an
empirical standpoint, that there is no such hierarchy between the different legal orders
in Europe, i. e. the laws of the States, the law of the European Union and the law of the
Council of Europe.35 It is also evident that there is no single European legislator and
no central supreme court of Europe establishing a hierarchy of norms that would be
analogous to the situation within a federal state. There is no formal “Constitution” of
Europe that would substitute the national Constitutions and allow for a constitutional
hierarchy in analogy to the law of constitutional states. And national courts do some-
times claim the supremacy of “their” law, thus rejecting the superiority of EU law or
international law. Therefore, as a description of European legal orders from an “exter-
nal point” of view36 the idea of a hierarchy admittedly does not adequately describe the
reality of European public law.

But there is more to it than that. The hierarchy of norms is dependent on the way
we think about law and on our interpretation of the law. When we take into account
the insider’s perspective,37 focussing on the persons who participate in the practice of
the courts in Europe, there are good reasons to assume that the idea of a hierarchy of
norms is alive because it is part of their understanding of the relationships between
legal orders and of their legal repertoire for solving conflicts between norms. The em-
pirical claim therefore loses much of its force when we take into account the internal
point of view. From this perspective, the hierarchy of norms constitutes a method-
ological concept, a hermeneutic tool or a regulative idea of legal natives that guides
the interpretation and serves for conflict resolution. But how can the existence of a
methodological idea or a hermeneutic tool be “empirically proved”? One suggestion
is to look at the decisions of courts. The idea of the hierarchy of norms is alive because
courts in Europe apply it in cases when they have to decide in conflicts between norms
of different legal orders.
As was shown, it is true that in some instances, courts do not accept the uncondi-
tional supremacy of international or European Union law. But the hierarchy of norms
is nevertheless an idea that guides and constrains considerations concerning the re-
lations between normative orders. It is present in disputes about the relationship be-
tween different legal orders, even when courts do not accept the primacy of interna-
35 Werner Schroeder, Das Gemeinschafsrechtssystem, 2002, 203, 251; Dana Burchardt, Die Rangfrage im eu-
ropäischen Normenverbund, 2015, 62; Michael Potacs, Das Verhältnis zwischen der EU und ihren Mitglied-
staaten im Lichte traditioneller Modelle, Zeitschrift für Öffentliches Recht 65 (2010), 117–139.
36 I borrow the distinction between the external and the internal point of view from Klaus Günther, Re-
chtspluralismus und universaler Code der Legalität: Globalisierung als rechtstheoretisches Problem, in:
Die Öffentlichkeit der Vernunft und die Vernunft der Öffentlichkeit, Festschrift für Jürgen Habermas, ed. Lutz
Wingert / Klaus Günther, 2001, 557.
37 On the internal point of view, see Günther (footnote 36).

300 ANNE KÜHLER
tional law over other legal orders in Europe in the outcome of a concrete case. The
fact that the “deviation” from the hierarchy of norms has been intensely discussed and
justified in these cases shows the importance and the influence of the idea. The Kadi
I decision serves as an example because it maintains the principle that international
law enjoys supremacy over the European Union legal order, but holds that the relevant
instruments of international law must satisfy certain requirements such as the protec-
tion of fundamental human rights in order to be granted supremacy. Therefore, the
hierarchy of norms as a tool used in juridical practice (conflict rule or regulative idea)
has to be distinguished from a formal hierarchy of regimes or of legal orders beyond the
States.38 There is no such hierarchy of regimes; nevertheless, the idea of the hierarchy
of norms is a guiding principle of adjudication, an intentional process of structuring
the law and connecting legal norms and systems.39
Furthermore, and as a second important caveat of the empirical criticism of the hi-
erarchy of norms, even if we did not accept a formal (internal) hierarchical principle to
structure the relations between the different normative orders of states, the European
Union, the UN, and the ECHR, there is at least a formal (source-based) hierarchy of
norms as a rule for the regulation of conflicts within the regime of the UN, as man-
ifested in Article 103 of the UN Charter. Article 103 determines that in the case of a
conflict between obligations under the UN Charter and obligations for Member States
under any other international agreement, their Charter obligations shall prevail. The
rationale for this hierarchy is the importance of the United Nations, especially for the
maintenance of international peace and security. Additionally, there are often implicit,
but widely accepted material hierarchies guiding the relations between normative or-
ders in the world of European (and international) public law. This can be seen in the
case of the priority of jus cogens norms over other international norms as concretized
in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Jus cogens norms repre-
sent fundamental values of the international community.40 Such “material hierarchies”
represent a further important caveat of the empirical claim.
Therefore, it seems at least plausible to argue that the empirical claim has important
caveats. I would like to counter the empirical claim by saying that there is an influential
idea called “the hierarchy of norms” in the world of European public law. This idea
does influence our thinking about the relations between national, supranational and
international law. But it does not apply unconditionally and is contested in many in-
stances. Whether this is desirable or not is the next question.
38 Mahlmann (footnote 25), 395; Samantha Besson, Theorizing the Sources of International Law, in: The
Philosophy of International Law, ed. Samantha Besson / John Tasioulas, 2010, 183.
39 See Burchardt (footnote 35), 62.
40 Besson (footnote 38), 183; Erika de Wet, Sources and the Hierarchy of International Law, in: The Oxford
Handbook on the Sources of International Law, ed. Samantha Besson / Jean d’Aspremont, 2017, 632. Such
hierarchies of international legal norms are not to be equated with the existence of a hierarchy of sources of
international law. The sources of international law, as they are listed in Article 38 ICJ Statute, are not ranked.

3. Normative account
A second strand of criticism holds that the diverse legal orders in Europe should not
be hierarchically structured.41 They should be accepted as autonomous systems with
equally legitimate claims to authority. As the former Advocate General at the Europe-
an Court of Justice Poiares Maduro incisively puts it: “Heterarchy is superior to hierar-
chy as a normative ideal in circumstances of competing constitutional claims of final
authority”.42 The normative criticism of the idea of a hierarchy of legal orders lies at the
core of the pluralist vision of the “new world order”. It departs from the state-centred
picture of constitutionalism, acknowledging the constitutional claims of a plurality of
legal orders, while maintaining that none can assert supremacy over another.43 In the
context of constitutional pluralism, it entails institutional conceptions concerning the
European Union in its relationship with the Member States such as the thesis of divid-
ed sovereignty.
I understand the “classic constitutional pluralist” claim as a plaidoyer for admitting
that national state law or national constitutionalism are not the only legitimate con-
stitutional sites. The normative claim is often put forth in the context of questions
regarding the legitimacy and perhaps autonomy of European Union law. What is at
stake then, is the possibility for national courts, in certain constellations, to claim the
supremacy and legitimacy of “their” law and not to accept the primacy of European
or international law. But just as with regard to the empirical account of criticism, here
again, the normative claim perplexes. After all, it does not exclude the possibility that,
for instance in legal practice, there is value in a hierarchy of norms beyond national law
as an idea, a methodological tool, a presumption, a conflict rule, a structuring princi-
ple, or a regulative ideal.
What is the value of the hierarchy of norms beyond national law? Some arguments
in favour of this idea have been mentioned in the context of constitutional democracy:
its function in structuring the law, facilitation of conflict resolution and legal certain-
ty, ensuring greater effectiveness, guidance and legitimation of the higher ranked law.
These arguments apply equally to the law beyond the state.44 But in the international
context, the aspect of political philosophy needs to be highlighted. The hierarchy of
norms with international law on top is an idea that fits the political philosophy of cos-
mopolitanism because it emphasises the importance of the global community.
Therefore, the political character of the idea of a hierarchy of norms obviously does
not only come to bear within the paradigm of the nation state. Kelsen highlighted the
political character of this idea also for law beyond the state. To him, the question of
41 Walker (footnote 23), 337; Poiares Maduro (footnote 31), 75; Cohen (footnote 29), 274–275.
42 Poiares Maduro (footnote 31), 75.
43 Neil MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty, 1999, 104.

302 ANNE KÜHLER
whether international law or national law should be ranked higher in the hierarchy, is
an entirely political decision.45 This part of Kelsen’s theory of international law high-
lights one of his motives for establishing a Pure Theory of Law: to postulate purity in
legal sciences in order to protect the legal sciences from political influence and from
instrumentalization by ideologies.46 If the Pure Theory of Law is the foundation of Kels-
en’s theory of international law and the latter an application of the former, his the-
ory of international law plays a part in this critical intention of demasking political
ideologies like imperialism or pacifism.47 The Pure Theory of Law reduces these ideo-
logical influences to political arguments. The clarity with which Kelsen identified the
political nature of the decision concerning the hierarchy of norms beyond national
law is remarkable and still topical – but it must be acknowledged that he conceived of
the term “political” mainly in a pejorative sense48 and that he declared the question to
be political without explicitly taking sides in the controversy.49 Be that as it may, it is
one of the invaluable insights in this debate that arguing for or against the superiority
of international law has significant political implications.50 But this insight should be
turned into a constructive argument. Contrary to Kelsen, I do not think that the legal
sciences could be entirely separated from political philosophy or be indifferent to it.
When applied to the interpretation of international law, the commitment to a – possi-
bly conditional, leniently applied – priority of international law is of utmost political
importance given the collective action and coordination problems that the world fac-
es. It also touches upon the commitment to multilateralism. In comparison, heterarchy
appears to be an instrument for weakening a precious achievement that should not be
weakened, namely the achievement of a body of international law that applies equally
to all and that entails individual rights also applying equally to all.
45 Kelsen held: “Die Entscheidung … liegt ausserhalb der Rechtswissenschaft. Sie kann nur durch andere
als wissenschaftliche, sie kann durch politische Erwägung bestimmt werden.”, see Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre,
1960, 345.
46 Ernst Topitsch, Einleitung, in: Hans Kelsen, Aufsätze zur Ideologiekritik, ed. Ernst Topitsch, 1964, 11–27;
Ernst Topitsch, Hans Kelsen – Demokrat und Philosoph, in: Ideologiekritik und Demokratietheorie bei Hans
Kelsen, ed. Werner Krawietz / Ernst Topitsch / Peter Koller, Rechtstheorie, Beiheft 4, 1982.
47 Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 1960, 345; see also Rub (footnote 7), 130.
48 For a critical account see Lando Kirchmair, Die Theorie des Rechtserzeugerkreises, 2013, 180.
49 On this question, see Gragl (footnote 7), 110 with further references.
50 A Swiss example of the political implications of the idea of the hierarchy of norms is the Self-determina-
tion Initiative (“Swiss law, not foreign judges”, “Selbstbestimmungsinitiative”) of the Swiss People’s Party.
This popular initiative sought to alter the way in which Switzerland treats international agreements in case
of a ‘conflict’ between those agreements and Swiss constitutional law. It aimed to lay down in the Consti-
tution what should happen when a popular initiative is incompatible with an international agreement in
certain areas. In such a situation, Switzerland should consistently seek to ensure that the Constitution takes
precedence: it should not be able to apply the agreement unless it is approved by referendum. It should
also have to amend the agreement by renegotiating it with the relevant countries. If that was impossible, it
should withdraw from the agreement. The Swiss electorate voted on the popular initiative on 25 November
2018 and rejected it.

That is why the notion of “conditioned hierarchies” that embraces formal and ma-
terial aspects offers a promising approach to the question of the hierarchy of norms
beyond national law.51 Conditioned hierarchies of norms carve out a space for constitu-
tional principles from a strict understanding of hierarchy. Such principles include the
protection of human rights, democratic legitimacy, the rule of law or judicial review.
In the context of the political philosophy of cosmopolitanism, a convincing argument
is made for the general presumption “in favour of applying the law of the more exten-
sive legal order over the law of the more parochial one, unless there are countervailing
concerns of sufficient weight that suggest otherwise”.52 In this spirit, Kumm contends
that “the refusal of a legal order to recognize itself as hierarchically integrated into a
more comprehensive legal order is justified, if that more comprehensive order suffers
from structural legitimacy deficits – relating to human rights protection of democratic
legitimacy – that the less comprehensive legal order does not suffer from.”53 Indeed,
the concept of conditioned hierarchies proves to be very productive for explaining ju-
dicial practice in Europe and when dealing with questions about the relations between
different normative orders since it leaves scope for balancing different perspectives.54
4. Epistemic account
Arguably the strongest attack on the concept of a legal hierarchy beyond national law
consists in epistemic claims. The argument is that the different stakeholders, for in-
stance the EU and the Member States, international actors and States, represent dis-
tinct sites with incompatible epistemic conditions.55 They have different epistemic
starting points and there is no neutral perspective from which their claims can be rec-
onciled. They should therefore be treated as epistemically incommensurable. Because
of the incommensurability of their claims, it is not possible to construe a relation in the
51 Mahlmann (footnote 25), 407; Mattias Kumm, Constitutional Democracy Encounters International
Law: Terms of Engagement, NYU Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No.
06–40 (2006).
52 Kumm (footnote 25), 65.
53 Ibid.
54 The “conditioned instrumental value” of the hierarchy of norms for the protection of human rights is
mirrored in the European human rights case law. Two cases that involved acts of the UN Security Council
serve as examples. First, the ECJ’s (already mentioned) Kadi I decision indicates that the blind acceptance
of higher ranked norms (e. g. the UN law) does not foster the protection of human rights, when the UN’s
institutions have constitutional deficits. Second, the Behrami case of the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) demonstrates that adherence to the hierarchy of norms does not per se promote the protection of
human rights. In Behrami, the ECtHR took a legal monist position vis-à-vis international law, and decided
to defer and therefore to exempt UN Security Council legal acts from fundamental rights review. Thus, the
monistic approach was to the detriment of the rights of the individual.
55 Walker (footnote 23), 317; Gunther Teubner, Verfassungsfragmente, 2012, 229.

304 ANNE KÜHLER
form of a hierarchy between the different legal orders. It follows from this argument
that pluralism is an adequate framework because it denies the existence of an absolute,
external point of observation from which to resolve a conflict.
This third strand of criticism seems problematic as well. The epistemic account con-
siders the different orders too abstractly as systems or entities that cannot interact,
and underestimates the possibility of communication between those legal orders. It
thereby disregards the internal point of view of those who actually work at the inter-
section of the different legal orders and neglects the perspectives of those protagonists.
Legal experts, lawyers and judges in all kinds of institutions and organizations apply
the law in concrete cases and decide in cases of normative conflict. They all claim to
make use of the language of law that is determined by certain factors such as dogmatic
requirements, mechanisms and patterns found in precedents, legal sources and tradi-
tional conflict rules. Such determining factors must necessarily be acknowledged and
followed by the protagonists when referring to law – even when the adequate interpre-
tation of those requirements may be controversial and contested in a concrete case.56
The act of solving legal cases is carried out by persons who share an understanding
of certain principles and background assumptions on how to apply the law.57 The as-
sumption of a set of shared legal principles, tools and patterns does not lead to uniform
conceptions of a universal legal order but it strongly relativizes the epistemic critique
that there is no possibility of a common standpoint.
For this reason, the epistemic criticism does not adequately reflect the practice of
courts. At the same time, the epistemic critique overestimates the very concept of the
hierarchy of norms which takes a methodological stance (in the sense of a “Denkfigur”)
especially about solving conflicts of law. A hierarchization of legal norms with regard to
the relations of the respective legal orders is a conscious process connecting legal norms
and orders, and thereby relativizing the self-referential character of those orders.58 It is
therefore the perspective of legal practice that deeply challenges epistemic pluralism.
The “different constitutional sites” are not monolithic blocks existing independently in
a separate empire apart from human beings. On the contrary, jurists can embrace a the-
oretical construction that contains a hierarchy of norms and courts in most instances do
accept EU law as higher ranked than domestic law.
In this context, the epistemological aspect of the hierarchy of norms is another
important aspect of Kelsen’s writings. According to Kelsen, accepting a connection
between international and national law necessarily presumes them as simultaneously
56 Klaus Günther, Normativer Rechtspluralismus – Eine Kritik, in: Das Recht im Blick der Anderen Zu
Ehren von Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann, ed. Thorsten Moos / Magnus Schlette / Hans Diefenbacher, 2016,
64–82.
57 Ibid.
58 Werner Krawietz, Die Lehre vom Stufenbau des Rechts, Rechtstheorie, Beiheft 5 (1984), 255, 266 et seq.;
Krawietz (footnote 4), 408 et seq.; Burchardt (footnote 35), 62; Peter Gailhofer, Rechtspluralismus und Re-
chtsgeltung, 2015, 256.

valid.59 In other words, the perception of two normative orders as simultaneously valid
necessitates a connection;60 we must necessarily conceive of them as both being valid
and related to each other61 and on a Kelsenian reading, the connection between nation-
al and international law is established by the hierarchy of norms.62 Kelsen’s conviction
is that we cannot cognize the law if we do not understand it as an interrelated whole.63
In other words, we cannot grasp the law without some notion of unity. But Kelsen em-
phasized repeatedly that the unity of all law is only an epistemological kind of unity.64
By contrast, dualism (“pluralism”) is an epistemological impossibility to him. Even
if Kelsen went very far regarding the “logical necessity” of the alleged unity, it seems
plausible that we must assume a relation between norms and orders when applying the
law. In light of the current debate about epistemic pluralism, we realize that Kelsen’s
theory has much to offer to those who actually work at the intersection of the different
legal orders.
V. Conclusion
The current criticism of the concept of hierarchy is comprehensive and entails differ-
ent notions and distinct contexts of this concept. In order to get a clearer picture, it
seems important to distinguish on an analytical level between at least four different
notions of legal hierarchies beyond national law:
(1) the hierarchy of regimes or of legal orders,
(2) the hierarchy of sources of international law as a statement about the rank of
legal sources,
(3) hierarchy as the basis of a hermeneutic conflict rule (lex superior derogat legi
inferiori)65 and
(4) the formal or material hierarchy (primacy) of certain legal norms based on
their formal source or on their higher (supreme) value.
It is possible and appropriate to argue for a hierarchy of norms as a (hermeneutic)

conflict rule (3) and as the formal or material priority of certain norms based on their
formal source or on their higher value (4) while denying a formal hierarchy of regimes
59 Kelsen, Problem der Souveränität (footnote 3), 111.

60 Kammerhofer (footnote 7), 233.
61 Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 1960, 329.
62 Gragl (footnote 7), 129.
63 Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 1934, 134, following Kantian epistemology (Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen
Vernunft ( Johann Friedrich Hartknoch, 1781/1787), A 89–90/B 122). See Kammerhofer (footnote 7), 234.
64 Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 1934, 134; Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 1960, 328 et seq.; Hans Kelsen, The Law of
the United Nations, 1951, 328 f.
65 In German, this dimension is often called “Anwendungsvorrang” as opposed to “Geltungsvorrang”.

306 ANNE KÜHLER
based, for instance, on a common Grundnorm (1) and a hierarchy of the sources of
international law (2). Kelsen did not elaborate on all of these distinctions. But he was
right in highlighting the political character of the question and in defending the episte-
mological value of the idea of a hierarchy of norms beyond national law.
To sum up, the current attack on the idea of a hierarchy of norms is too compre-
hensive. Moreover, the focus on heterarchy obscures some of the true problems of our
times. How can we account for the enormous importance of international law given
the collective action and coordination problems that the world faces? In light of pop-
ulist movements, nationalist tendencies and outright attacks on international law in
Europe and elsewhere: How can we strengthen a global legal order, multilateralism,
law-based relations between States, the international rule of law, and overcome mere
power politics?
The idea of a hierarchy of norms is of course not the best nor the only tool with
which to strengthen international legality and the rule of law, but it is a useful one.
That is why in my opinion, we should not underestimate the virtues of this idea. It is
not God-given or imposed on us. It should not be unconditioned but must leave room
for balancing different perspectives. It requires deliberate structuring, aligned with a
normative basis. We need a reason for the higher rank of norms. The reason is that we
consider the higher norms especially important and fundamental. A legal hierarchy
may help to bind and control power, to enhance legal certainty, the rule of law and
human rights, if the reference point at the top of the hierarchy is tied to such princi-
ples. This must also apply to the worlds of European constitutionalism. However, such
substantive, material and political arguments for the relevance of a hierarchy of norms
transcend the framework of Kelsen’s theory. To argue for the relevance of the hierarchy
of norms in this way most probably means to argue with Kelsen against Kelsen.
Anne Kühler
Senior Researcher and Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Zurich, Treichlerstrasse 10,
8032 Zurich, Switzerland, anne.kuehler@rwi.uzh.ch

IV. Ideengeschichtlicher Kontext / Kelsen in Context


Fuller and Kelsen – Fuller on Kelsen*
FREDERICK SCHAUER
Abstract: The relationship between Lon Fuller and Hans Kelsen is complex and impor-
tant, but remains understudied. Fuller, the most prominent American legal philosopher of
Kelsen’s time, was not only knowledgeable about Kelsen’s fame and writings, but was also
sympathetic to Kelsen’s personal situation. Yet at the same time Fuller used Kelsen as his
foil in attacking legal positivism, and appears to play a substantial role in Kelsen’s relative
invisibility, even today, in North American legal philosophy. This article seeks to explore
and explain the complex relationship between these two important figures.
Keywords: Hans Kelsen, Lon Fuller, legal positivism, natural law, Pure Theory of Law,
Harvard Law School
Schlagworte: Hans Kelsen, Lon Fuller, Rechtspositivismus, Naturrecht, Reine Re-

chtslehre, Harvard Law School
I.
It is a commonplace that Hans Kelsen’s work is, in the words of Jeremy Telman, “al-
most completely unknown in the legal academy and the legal profession in the United
States.”1 And by way of providing some evidence for this conclusion, we can observe
that Kelsen is mentioned not once in any of the books or articles by Ronald Dworkin,
legal positivism’s leading American critic, nor is he mentioned at all in various promi-
nent American works on legal positivism, including, for example, those by Larry Alex-
*
Thanks to Jeremy Telman and Nicoletta Bersier Ladavac for helpful comments, conversation, and references.
1 See D. A. Jeremy Telman, Introduction: Hans Kelsen for Americans, in: Hans Kelsen in America – Selective
Affinities and the Mysteries of Academic Influence, ed. D.A. Jeremy Telman, 2016, 1–16. See also D. A. Jeremy
Telman, A Path Not Taken: Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law in the Land of the Legal Realists, in: Hans
Kelsen anderswo / Hans Kelsen Abroad, ed. Robert Walter / Clemens Jabloner / Klaus Zeleny, 1994, 353–376.

310 FREDERICK SCHAUER
ander and Emily Sherwin,2 Jules Coleman,3 Kenneth Einar Himma,4 Gerald Postema,5
and Anthony Sebok.6 Nor does he appear in a 1973 book designed as the basic text in a
course on jurisprudence and the philosophy of law.7
Given Kelsen’s prominence in Europe, in Latin America, and in much of the rest of
the academic world, his invisibility in legal philosophy in North America generally,
and in the United States in particular, is curious. And it is especially curious now in
light of the fact that it was not always so. In the late 1930s Karl Llewellyn engaged, albeit
critically, with Kelsen’s work,8 as did Edwin Patterson, even if not quite so critically, in
his 1940 textbook on jurisprudence.9 But after the Second World War, Kelsen’s juris-
prudential presence in the United States began to suffer a precipitous decline, and this
despite the fact that Kelsen taught and wrote in the United States from his 1940 arrival
at Harvard until his death thirty-three years later at the University of California.10
Although several scholars have valuably speculated on the causes of the absence of
Kelsen’s footprints in post-War American legal theory,11 virtually no attention has been
paid to the intellectual connections between Kelsen and Lon Fuller, the latter arguably
being the most well-known and influential American legal philosopher in the 1940s,
1950s, and 1960s. The aim of this paper is to explore this connection, not so much as
to make definitive causal claims about the influence of Fuller on Kelsen’s recession in
the American jurisprudential background as to suggest that examining the relationship
may tell us something not only about Kelsen, but also about Fuller.
II.
Lon Fuller’s relationship with Kelsen personally and with Kelsen’s scholarship is com-
plex. As with many other American intellectuals of the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury (and earlier),12 Fuller was a fluent reader of professional and academic German,
2 Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, The Rule of Rules: Morality, Rules, and the Dilemmas of Law, 2001.
3 Jules Coleman, The Practice of Principle: In Defence of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory, 2001.
4 Kenneth Einar Himma, The Nature of Law: Philosophical Issues in Conceptual Jurisprudence and Legal The-
ory, 2011.
5 Gerald J. Postema, Bentham and the Common Law Tradition, 1986.
6 Anthony J. Sebok, Legal Positivism in American Jurisprudence, 1998.
7 George C. Christie, Jurisprudence: Text and Readings on the Philosophy of Law, 1973.
8 See Karl N. Llewellyn, The Theory of Rules (ed. Frederick Schauer), 2011 (1938–1939), 46, 51. See also Karl N.
Llewellyn, Law and the Social Sciences – Especially Sociology, Harvard Law Review 62 (1949), 1286–1305, 1290.
9 Edwin W. Patterson, Jurisprudence: Men and Ideas of the Law, 1953 (1940), 259–265.
10 See Nicoletta Ladavac, Philosophy of Law and Theory of Law: The Continuity of Kelsen’s Years in
America, in: Telman (Hans Kelsen in America, footnote 1), 229–248.
11 See Brian Bix, Kelsen in the United States: Still Not Understood,” in: Telman (Hans Kelsen in America,
footnote 1), 17–30; Telman A Path Not Taken, (footnote 1).
12 Including, most notably, Karl Llewellyn (see footnote 8), who not only was fluent in German, and who
not only referred to Kelsen’s writings in his own books and articles, but who also served as a decorated

Fuller and Kelsen – Fuller on Kelsen 311
and references to untranslated legal and philosophical scholarship written in German

appear throughout the Fuller corpus. More particularly, Fuller read and engaged with
Kelsen’s work, especially Reine Rechtslehre, long before it had been translated into Eng-
lish.13 And soon after the first English translation into English of that work had been
published,14 Fuller made it a required (and not inexpensive) text in his course in Juris-
prudence at the Harvard Law School.15
Perhaps more importantly, Fuller and Kelsen had some number of personal con-
nections, most prominently with respect to Kelsen’s desired and eventual emigration
to the United States after the rise of Nazism made his remaining in Austria or Germany
no longer a professionally fruitful or personally safe option. Although Fuller himself,
who had served on the law faculties at the University of Oregon, the University of
Illinois, and Duke University, did not have a permanent Harvard Law School appoint-
ment until 1940, he had met Kelsen, with an introduction arranged by Harvard’s Ro-
scoe Pound, in Europe in 1938.16 Given this time line, it is likely that Kelsen’s honorary
Harvard LL.D. in 1936 was initiated by Pound, and likely as well that Pound, presuma-
bly with the support (or at least not the opposition) of Fuller and others, was the mo-
tivating force behind the invitation to Kelsen to deliver the prestigious Oliver Wendell
Holmes Lectures at the Harvard Law School in 1941.
Although Kelsen spent most of the years from 1940 to 1942 at Harvard as a visit-
ing research fellow, he was not, to his deep disappointment, offered a permanent pro-
fessorship.17 The reasons for this have been lost to history, although Kelsen’s lack of
fluency in English at the time, his inability to teach basic American law courses, and
the post-Depression financial issues all appeared to play some role, as did the alleged
opposition of senior faculty in international law.18 We do not know where Fuller stood
on the issue of a permanent professorship for Kelsen at Harvard, but we do know that
he actively sought to find Kelsen a position elsewhere, including at the University of
Illinois, Fuller’s own former academic home.19
member of the German army in the First World War. See William Twining, Two Works of Karl Llewellyn,
Modern Law Review 30 (1967), 514–530, 514.
13 Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechstlehre, 1934.
14 Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, trans. Max Knight, 1967.
15 This is a personal recollection of the author, dating from the Fall semester of 1969 at the Harvard Law
School.
16 See Robert S. Summers, Lon L Fuller, 1984, 5–9.
17 See Carlo Nitsch, Holmes Lectures, 1940–1941, in: Hans Kelsen, Diritto e Pace Nelle Relazioni Interna-
tionali, 209, v.
18 See Nicoletta Bersier Ladavac, Hans Kelsen (1881–1973), Bibliographical Note and Biography, European
Journal of International Law 9 (1998), 391–400; Nitsch (footnote 17); Thomas Olechowski, Hans Kelsen,
the Second World War and the U. S. Government, in: Telman (Hans Kelsen in America, footnote 1), 101–112.
19 See references in footnote 18, and also Frederick Schauer, Law’s Boundaries, Harvard Law Review, 130
(2017), 2434–2462, 2446–2447 footnote 54.

Even apart from general biographical and historical interest, the relevance of these
personal and intellectual connections between Fuller and Kelsen lies in suggesting that
Fuller’s connections with Kelsen, on a personal level, seem likely to have engendered
some sympathy, and that Fuller’s German fluency likely made him especially famil-
iar with Kelsen’s writings, reputation, and influence. And it is against this background
that we can evaluate, with perhaps unexpected implications, the treatment of Kelsen
in Fuller’s own writings.
III.
The various reasons for Fuller’s likely sympathy with Kelsen on a personal level make
even more surprising the strong and almost-vitriolic tone with which Fuller treated
Kelsen as the exemplar and standard-bearer of the version of legal positivism20 that
Fuller persistently wished to attack.
Although Fuller’s attack on legal positivism is nowadays associated most promi-
nently with Fuller’s side of his famous 1958 debate with H. L. A. Hart,21 and with Full-
er’s subsequently published The Morality of Law,22 in fact Fuller’s earliest, strongest,
and most extended challenge to what he perceived to be the core commitments of
legal positivism are to be found in his 1940 book, The Law in Quest of Itself.23 It is in this
book that Fuller first took issue with legal positivism’s insistence on the distinction
between the legal is and the legal ought, a distinction, as Fuller well recognized, that
was much earlier offered, explicitly and with vehemence, by Jeremy Bentham24 and
then by John Austin.25
20 It is hardly clear that the form of legal positivism that Fuller wished to attack could fairly be attributed to
Jeremy Bentham, to John Austin, to Hans Kelsen, or to H. L. A. Hart, but exploring Fuller’s understandings
and misunderstandings of legal positivism would take us too far afield. See Brian Leiter, Positivism, For-
malism Realism, Columbia Law Review, 99 (1999), 1138–1164, 1139; Frederick Schauer, Fuller’s Internal Point
of View, Law and Philosophy, 13 (1994), 285–312; Anthony J. Sebok, Misunderstanding Positivism, Michigan
Law Review, 93 (1995), 2054–2132.
21 Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart, Harvard Law Review, 71 (1958),
630–672, responding to H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, Harvard Law Re-
view, 71 (1958), 593–629.
22 Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, 1969 (rev. ed.).
23 Lon L. Fuller, The Law in Quest of Itself, 1940.
24 See Jeremy Bentham, Of the Limits of the Penal Branch of Jurisprudence, ed. Philip Schofield, 2010 (1780–
1782); Postema (footnote 5); Arnon Ben-David, The Distinction Between the Expository and the Censorial
Modes in Enquiry in Bentham, Revue d’études Benthamiennes, [online], 9 (2011); Xiaobo Zhai, Bentham’s
Exposition of Common Law, Law and Philosophy, 36 (2017), 525–560.
25 John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, ed. Wilfrid E. Rumble, 1995 (1832). And see Ro-
scoe E. Hill, Legal Validity and Legal Obligation, Yale Law Journal, 80 (1970), 47–75; D. N. MacCormick,
Law, Morality and Positivism, Legal Studies, 1 (1981), 131–145.

Fuller, as is well-known,26 resisted, then and subsequently in all of his later writings,
the distinction, at least in law, between the is and the ought – between what the law is
and what the law ought to be – and for reasons that foreshadowed Ronald Dworkin’s
later position to substantially the same effect.27 But in using Kelsen as a foil for his cri-
tique of legal positivism and of positivism’s commitment to the distinction between is
and ought, Fuller recognized the role that oughts – norms – played in the Kelsenian
scheme. And of course Fuller had no disagreement with Kelsen’s view that the science
of law was the science of oughts. But Fuller did object to the distinction between what
law is and what law should be, and he did use Kelsen’s dismissive reference to “wish
law” (“Wunschrecht”28) as the foil for the argument. Moreover, Fuller took Kelsen’s
now well-known ethical non-cognitivism as exemplary,29 but it is at this point that mat-
ters become more complex. For Fuller, who was plainly an ethical cognitivist of some
sort,30 ethical non-cognitivism was wrong, and perniciously and dangerously so, and so
it seemed to Fuller especially in 1940 in The Law in Quest of Itself. But although Kelsen
was a non-cognitivist about ethics and morality, and although Kelsen was plainly a
legal positivist of his own variety, Fuller’s mistake was in believing and insisting that
there was some sort of necessary connection between Kelsen’s legal positivism and
Kelsen’s ethical non-cognitivism, and also between legal positivism generally and eth-
ical non-cognitivism generally. But Fuller’s conclusions in this regard appear initially
to be a mistake, in part because most modern and not-so-modern positivists appear
to reject Kelsen’s meta-ethical views but nevertheless develop positivist accounts of
the nature of law. Bentham’s utilitarianism is the most prominent example, of such a
cognitivist positivist, but he is hardly the only example.31
26 See especially Kristin Rundle, Forms Liberate: Reclaiming the Jurisprudence of Lon L Fuller, 2012; Kristin
Rundle, Fuller’s Internal Morality of Law, Philosophy Compass, 11 (2016), 499–506; Kenneth I. Winston,
Introduction, in: Lon L. Fuller, The Principles of Social Order: Selected Essays of Lon L Fuller, ed. Kenneth I.
Winston, rev. ed. 2002 (1981), 23–58; Kenneth I. Winston, Is/Ought Redux: The Pragmatist Context of Lon
Fuller’s Conception of Law, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 8 (1988), 329–349.
27 The rejection of a strong is/ought distinction is implicit (and sometimes explicit) in Dworkin’s concep-
tion of law as interpretation, as developed principally in Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986), and then
developed further in the various essays in Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes (2008), especially “Thirty Years
On,” at 187–222. For useful explication, see James Donato, Dworkin and Subjectivity in Legal Interpreta-
tion, Stanford Law Review, 40 (1988), 1517–1541; Carlos S. Nino, Dworkin and Legal Positivism, Mind, 89
(1980), 519–543.
28 See Johann Braun, Einführung in die Rechtstheorie – Der Gedanke des Rechts, 2011, 272.
29 See generally Shia Moser, Ethical Non-Cognitivism and Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law, University of To-
ronto Law Journal, 29 (1979), 93–113.
30 See Rundle (footnote 26); Lon L. Fuller, Human Purpose and Natural Law, Journal of Philosophy, 53
(1956), 697–705; David Luban, Natural Law as Professional Ethics: A Reading of Fuller, Social Philosophy
and Policy, 18 (2000), 176–205; Connie S. Rosati, Is There a “Higher Law”? Does It Matter,” Pepperdine Law
Review, 36 (2009), 615–630.
31 For description and discussion of the various cognitive meta-ethical commitments of many (but not
all) legal positivists, see Frederick Schauer, Positivism as Pariah, in: The Autonomy of Law: Essays on Legal
Positivism, ed. Robert P. George (1996), 31–55.

But here is where the complexity sets in. For although ethical cognitivism is argu-
ably a necessary condition for most (although maybe not for Fuller’s) versions of an-
ti-positivism,32 including but not limited to classical or traditional natural law theory,33
the reverse is not the case. Ethical non-cognitivism is not a necessary property or pre-
supposition of virtually any version of legal positivism, nor is ethical non-cognitivism a
property or presupposition of the separation of law and morality in Bentham and Aus-
tin’s sense of separation,34 or the separation of the legal is and the legal ought more gen-
erally. As with Bentham and Austin, most obviously, it is entirely possible to believe
that there are knowable moral rights and moral wrongs but believe as well not only
that the law can and does often diverge from this knowable morality, but also both that
(contingently) the content of the law can be identified without reference to that moral-
ity, and that the concept of law is such that morality would not be a necessary property
of law in all possible legal systems in all possible worlds.35 So although non-cognitivist
natural law is, roughly, impossible, cognitivist legal positivism is not only possible but
widely extant.36 And thus Fuller, in assuming that Kelsen’s non-cognitivism was a nec-
essary component of his or anyone else’s legal positivism, mistakenly attributed ethical
non-cognitivism and what Fuller believed to be its pernicious consequences to legal
positivism, without recognizing the foundational disconnections between the two.37
IV.
But although Fuller, mistakenly in my view, uses Kelsen as the foil for his argument
that the flaw of legal positivism resides in its non-cognitivism, Fuller spends far more
of his time (and pages) attacking Kelsen for the purity of the Pure Theory, or at least
what Fuller took to be the purity of the Pure Theory. Part of the problem with Fuller’s
attack on the Pure Theory, however, is that Fuller mistakenly confused, in the felici-
32 Fuller was in fact an ethical cognitivist, but two of the main pillars of his legal philosophy – the rejection
of the distinction between the is and the ought, and the necessity of looking to purpose both to identify and
to interpret law – are compatible with a wide variety of non-cognitivist views about morality.
33 As exemplified in the writings over the years of, for example, Thomas Aquinas, William Blackstone, and
John Finnis. See generally Robert Alexy, The Argument from Injustice: A Reply to Legal Positivism, 2002; John
Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 1980; Mark C. Murphy, Natural Law in Jurisprudence and Politics,
2006; Mark C. Murphy, Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays, ed. Robert P. George, 1992; John Finnis,
Natural Law Theories, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (https://plato.stanford.edu), 2015 (2007).
34 See Leslie Green, Positivism and the Inseparability of Law and Morals, New York University Law Review,
83 (2008), 1035–1058.
35 A valuable discussion is Torben Spaak, Meta-Ethics and Legal Theory: The Case of Gustav Radbruch,
Law and Philosophy, 28 (2008), 261–290.
36 See footnote 31.
37 See also Schauer, Positivism as Pariah (footnote 31).

tous phrasing of Iain Stewart, the pure theory of law with a theory of pure law.38 But
Kelsen did not believe that there was pure law in the sense that Fuller imagined him
as believing, and Kelsen never believed that legal institutions and the phenomenon of
law did or could exist in isolation from other social phenomena, nor did he believe that
the substance of law and the structure and design of legal institutions could not be, or
should not be, evaluated from a political or sociological standpoint. Kelsen’s purity is
about the purity of cognition,39 or the purity of academic inquiry, and he hardly denied
that law could be examined from a sociological point of view, however sceptical he
might have been about the philosophical value of such an inquiry. And thus Fuller, like
Julius Stone after him,40 erred, in part, by misunderstanding just what Kelsen meant
by describing his theory of law as “pure.” But although Fuller’s mistake is regrettable,
nevertheless the purity of the pure theory, even from the perspective of what Kelsen
mean by purity, exposes a deeper divide between Fuller’s understanding of his enter-
prise and how Kelsen his own.

As is made explicit in The Law in Quest of Itself, and assumed less explicitly in many
of his later writings, Fuller was most interested in writing for, and teaching, lawyers and
judges.41 And thus it is not surprising that Fuller was concerned to define law, insofar as
he defined law at all, as pretty much coextensive with what lawyers and judges actually
do.42 Moreover, because Fuller was at least enough of a legal positivist to recognize that
there could be and was immoral positive or human law, he wanted lawyers and judges,
in their professional activities, and in the name if the law, to try to improve the defects
in the existing positive human law. From the perspective of the lawyer or the judge,
therefore, or at least from the perspective of the morally good lawyer or judge – from
one form of an internal point of view43 – the distinction between the legal is and the le-
gal ought no longer appeared to Fuller to be so important, or even so correct. In terms
of the professional activities – the behavior – of the good lawyer or the good judge (or
the good law student), every application of morally suboptimal positive law presented
an opportunity to improve that law. And if this is the case, then for the practicing law-
yer or judge the sharp distinction between what the law is and what the law ought to
be can no longer, Fuller believed, be sustained.
38 Iain Stewart, Kelsen Tomorrow, Current Legal Problems, 51 (1998), 181–196.

39 This is well-recognized in Edwin W. Patterson, Hans Kelsen and His Pure Theory of Law, California Law
Review, 40 (1952), 5–10. See also Lars Vinx, Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law: Legality and Legitimacy, 2007;
Joseph Raz, The Purity of the Pure Theory, Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 35 (1981), 441–459.
40 Julius Stone, Legal System and Lawyers’ Reasoning, 1964.
41 See Schauer (footnote 20). Fuller’s entire career was spent teaching aspiring practicing lawyers (and
judges) in American law faculties.
42 This understanding of law as closely aligned with what lawyers and judges do, with what counts as law, and
with what lawyers and judges should use in argument and decision, is especially apparent in Lon L. Fuller, The
Case of the Speluncean Explorers, Harvard Law Review, 62 (1949), 616–645. See Frederick Schauer, Fuller’s
Fairness: ‘The Case of the Speluncean Explorers,’ University of Queensland Law Review, 35 (2016), 11–20.
43 Schauer (footnote 20).

From this perspective, much of the difference between Kelsen and Fuller can now
be explained by their quite different views about the relationship between law and
what lawyers (and judges) do. Fuller in The Law in Quest of Itself explicitly charges
Kelsen with not offering an explanation of what lawyers actually do, and of what law-
yers actually should do, a charge to which Kelsen would almost certainly plead guilty,
and without embarrassment. And that is because Kelsen insisted on the distinction
between law and what lawyers do, and insisted that no legal act – no decision of a
judge, for example – was completely determined by the law.44 This is exemplified Kels-
en’s famous metaphor of the law being the frame without a picture.45 For Kelsen, and
these days for, most prominently, Joseph Raz, who distinguishes between law and legal
reasoning,46 law properly so-called is merely a subset of what lawyers and judges do.47
But for Fuller, and, more recently, for Ronald Dworkin, law is, almost by definition,
virtually co-extensive with what lawyers do,48 or at least with the full array of legal,
moral, political, and social sources and norms on which lawyers and judges might rely
for their decisions and for their judgments.
If, with Fuller, one seeks a conception – or definition, if you will – of law that captures
the broad scope of the professional activities of lawyers and judges, and if, with Full-
er, one seeks a conception of lawyers’ and judges’ behavior and professional practice
that imposes on them the morally desirable task of pressing against morally suboptimal
law if and when it appears, then it is not surprising that Fuller would choose Kelsen as
his target. Fuller may well have erroneously attributed ethical non-cognitivism to le-
gal positivism, and thus may have erroneously used Kelsen’s ethical non-cognitivism
to make a moral argument against legal positivism. And Fuller, in later being so per-
suaded by Gustav Radbruch, may well have mistakenly attributed to legal positivism
the grave wrongs of the Third Reich, as Stanley Paulson has persuasively argued.49 But
in choosing Kelsen, more than Bentham (whose work on legal theory specifically was
largely unknown in 1940 and even in 1958) and Austin (whose work on legal theory was
very much known and discussed in 1940 and 1958), as his principal foil, Fuller may have
selected an entirely appropriate opponent for the claim that lawyers and judges should
have an understanding of the legal enterprise that incorporated the moral duties of par-
ticipants in that enterprise. And because Fuller thought it necessary to have a concep-
44 “[E]very law-applying act is only partly determined by law.” Kelsen (footnote 14), 349.
45 Kelsen (footnote 14), 245. And also at Hans Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory, ed.
Bonnie L. Paulson and Staney L. Paulson, 1992, 80.
46 Joseph Raz, On the Autonomy of Legal Reasoning, Ratio Juris, 6 (1993), 1–15.
47 And perhaps at best a subset. Whether lawyers should argue from the law, and whether judges should
decide according to the law, are questions to which neither Kelsenian nor Razian legal theory can provide
an answer.
48 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 1986; Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 1977.
49 Stanley L. Paulson, Lon L. Fuller, Gustav Radbruch, and the “Positivist” Theses, Law and Philosophy, 13
(1994), 313–359.

tion of law that tracked this understanding of the legal enterprise, it is hardly surprising
that so much of his attack on legal positivism was transformed into an attack on Kelsen.
V.
We thus return to the causal question about Kelsen’s contemporary North American
invisibility. And to address that question we should understand the way in which legal
philosophy in North America is practiced – principally in faculties of law whose pri-
mary role is the production of lawyers. Unlike some universities elsewhere, American
universities do not have faculties or even departments of legal philosophy, and it is
the rare American law faculty that has more than one legal philosopher. And although
there are plainly boundary issues about who does or does not count as a legal philos-
opher, jurisprude, or legal theorist, it is not surprising that Fuller spent most of his
career as the only legal philosopher on his faculty, and most of his career teaching and
writing as much about the law of contracts as about jurisprudence, and teaching and
writing for audiences of aspiring or practicing lawyers. As a result, Fuller’s attempt to
merge a theory of law with a theory of what lawyers and judges do, and with a norma-
tive theory of what lawyers and judges ought to be doing, is the expected function of
legal theory in the professional institutions that Fuller inhabited for his entire career.
And thus when Fuller used Kelsen as the standard-bearer of a view he wished to attack,
perhaps he was using Kelsen as a standard-bearer for a conception of the task of legal
philosophy, and a conception of the relationship between law and morality, that was
inconsistent with the standpoint from which, and the role in which, Fuller found him-
self. And because that standpoint and role still characterizes the North American law
faculty, perhaps Kelsen’s contemporary marginality in North America is a function not
only of his views being dismissed, often hastily and unfairly, by a figure so influential as
Fuller, but also because Kelsen’s views of the tasks of legal philosophy do genuinely fit
awkwardly with what American law faculties even now see themselves as doing.
Frederick Schauer
David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Virginia School
of Law, 580 Massie Road, Charlottesville, Virginia 22903, USA, fschauer@law.virginia.edu


The Impact of Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory
on Alf Ross’s Ideas
A Case of Scientific Plagiarism?*
URSZULA KOSIELI Ń SKA-GRABOWSKA

Abstract: Alf Ross is recognised as the leading Scandinavian legal theorist of the twentieth
century. Hans Kelsen – Ross’s first master – immensely influenced Ross’s thinking, to the
point where Ross was even accused of plagiarising Kelsen’s original ideas. The paper deals
with the problem of scientific plagiarism, discussed in the context of a similar concept that
is commonly used in the field of art. It appears that Ross’s ideas, though strongly inspired
by Kelsen, were innovative and insightful. And Ross’s own analysis of the early version of
the Reine Rechtslehre was critical enough to absolve him from any charge of intentional
plagiarism.
Keywords: Alf Ross, Hans Kelsen, plagiarism, Pure Theory of Law, Scandinavian legal re-
alism, Kelsen reception
Schlagworte: Alf Ross, Hans Kelsen, Plagiat, Reine Rechtslehre, skandinavischer Rechts-
realismus, Rezeption Kelsens
The label “plagiarist” can ruin a writer, destroy a scholarly career, blast a politician’s
chances for election, and cause the expulsion of a student from a college or university.
Richard Posner1
* I owe special thanks to Professor Stanley L. Paulson for his helpful comments and invaluable help with
the English translation of excerpts from Hans Kelsen’s Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre, Allgemeine
Staatslehre and Alf Ross’s Theorie der Rechtsquellen. I would like to thank the organisers and all the par-
ticipants of the IVR German Section’s Conference, Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law: Conceptions and
Misconceptions (Freiburg 2018) for the open and stimulating discussion.
1 Richard Posner, On Plagiarism. In the wake of recent scandals some distinctions are in order, The At-
lantic (April) 2002, Accessed January 18, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2002/04/
on-plagiarism/302469/.

320 URSZULA KOSIELIŃSKA-GRABOWSKA
Alf Ross was one of Hans Kelsen’s most prominent Schüler. Ross arrived in Vienna at
the beginning of 1924 and spent over a year there, learning, studying new ideas and
participating in seminars and private classes at Kelsen’s home. Ross truly admired him:
‘He was like Napoleon, who by squeezing a corporal’s ear could make him perform
miracles.’2 In his letters to Frederik Vindig Kruse, Ross expressed his avid fascination
with Kelsen’s new approach to legal philosophy, jurisprudential methods and the fun-
damental concepts of the Reine Rechtslehre 3
Ross’s scholarship in Vienna culminated in his doctoral thesis: Theorie der Rechts-
quellen: Ein Beitrag zur Theorie des positiven Rechts auf Grundlage dogmenhistorischer
Untersuchungen. Ross submitted his thesis to his home Law Faculty of Copenhagen
University in Autumn 1926. The evaluation committee was composed of the univer-
sity professors Viggo Bentzon,4 Knud Berlin,5 Frederik Vinding Kruse6 and Jørgen
Jørgensen7 (a unique expert in the domain of philosophy; however, being a newly ap-
pointed professor, he had very limited power and influence). The configuration of the
committee was quite unfortunate for Ross8; so, not surprisingly, the evaluation com-
mittee rejected his dissertation. Among other things, Ross was accused of being:
‘full of affectation’ [in language] with the inclusion of many needless loan-words and an
entirely unnecessary learned apparatus, which ‘must be ascribed to youth’. […][‘]He feels
the need to add to the Danish vocabulary words like […] “philosophico-theoretical”, al-
though all these new artificial words do not add anything to a real understanding of the
subject’. In addition to these were the meaningless and irritating Germanic neologisms:
‘gain-laying’ (widerlegen), ‘walting’ (walten) and so on.9
Ross’s alleged errors were his focus on ‘the question of how something is perceived as
law’ instead of on ‘the causes of the origin of law’ or ‘the question of what law should be’,
and of showing a ‘lack of maturity’. The committee stated that his conclusions were ‘far
2 Jens Evald, Alf Ross. A life, 2014, 64.

3 Evald (footnote 2), 85.
4 Viggo Bentzon (1861–1937) was Professor of Maritime Law at Copenhagen University, and from 1918–
1919, he was the rector of the university.
5 Knud Berlin (1864–1954) was Professor of Public and Icelandic Law at Copenhagen University.
6 Frederik Vinding Kruse (1880–1963) was Professor of Property Law at Copenhagen University.
7 Jørgen Jørgensen (1894–1969) was Professor of Philosophy at Copenhagen University, and the author of
the famous dilemma – cf. his Imperatives and Logic, Erkenntnis 7 (1937–1938), 288–296.
8 According to Evald (footnote 2), 82 f., Prof. Bentzon, due to his eyesight problems, was spared as much
as possible from having to read the whole thesis. As he stated in the review: “I could not verify Alf Ross’s
choice of literature.” Prof. Berlin was “a legal scholar of the old school and he had a deeply utilitarian view
of the task of legal science” and, as Evald states: “The philosophy of law had never been an area of interest
to Berlin and he apparently had no knowledge of new European trends in legal philosophy.” And Prof.
Kruse was a person “with no knowledge of real life who was both rigid and suffering from several errors of
judgment”.

The Impact of Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory on Alf Ross’s Ideas 321
too marked by German legal philosophy’.10 For a young and revolutionary scholar, this
was a devastating verdict.
In 1927, Ross’s life reached a turning point. Following the advice of Gunnar Myrdal,
he moved to Uppsala and began his research work under Axel Hagerstöm’s supervi-
sion. Two years later, on the 28th of May 1929, he received a PhD (in philosophy) at
Uppsala University, based on the thesis that had been rejected in Copenhagen. In the
same year, the thesis was published (with no changes) in the book series edited by
Kelsen11 (which, incidentally, Ross dedicated to his ‘Napoleon’). The academic reac-
tions to his book were shattering. Vindig Kruse wrote:
A young jurist Alf Ross has been strongly affected by Kelsen during his journeys and the
fruit[s] of his labours in this area [are] now available in this work. It is not only externally
that this work belongs to the Vienna School – it is dedicated to Kelsen […] – but it is,
even though it is critical of certain theories or postulates of Kelsen, in reality, in its abstract
speculative spirit and methodology – the ‘critical transcendental logic’ in his own phrase –
a work by a strongly influenced a[coly]te.12
Bentzon emphasised that Ross was ‘far too influenced by the Vienna School’. He also
stated that:
Naturally one can often see what he has learned at home, but he either does not quote his
domestic sources or thinks that he wins his victories too easily since not he, but his domes-
tic teachers have often thought the thoughts that he drops into the fire.13
Also, Poul Andersen (the father of Danish administrative law14) shared a similar opin-
ion; namely, that the thesis was simply ‘too German’.15 Although none of the reviews
contained any direct accusations of plagiarism, it was quite obvious what veiled insin-
uations the reviewers had hidden beneath their words (‘strongly influenced’, ‘does not
quote domestic sources’, ‘too German’, ‘strongly affected’) – allegations concerning the
replication of other scholars’ ideas, especially German ones.
Unfortunately, this was not an isolated allegation, nor the only harsh criticism Ross re-
ceived during his career. In 1933, Ross published his second book: Kritik der sogenannten
praktischen Erkenntnis Zugleich Prolegomena zu einer Kritik der Rechtswissenschaft 16 This

11 Alf Ross, Theorie der Rechtsquellen. Ein Beitrag zur Theorie des positiven Rechts auf Grundlage dog-
menhistorischer Untersuchungen, Wiener Staats- u. Rechtswissenschaftlichen Studien 13 (1929).
12 Evald (footnote 2), 104–105.
14 Ragnhildur Helgadottir, The Influence of American Theories on Judicial Review in Nordic Constitu-
tional Law, 2005, 171.
15 Helgadottir (footnote 14).
16 Alf Ross, Kritik der sogenannten praktischen Erkenntnis. Zugleich Prolegomena zu einer Kritik der
Rechtswissenschaft, 1933.

treatise was in turn strongly influenced by his new Swedish master, Axel Hägerström,
and it was dedicated to him. Shortly afterwards, one of Hägerström’s Swedish students,
Anders Wedberg, wrote the review of Ross’s Kritik. He directly stated that ‘the theory
produced [by Ross] is not the fruit of his own research.’17 He stressed that the pathetic
preface, in which Ross pointed out the antimetaphysical character of his book, was sim-
ply not enough, as the whole of Ross’s work was based upon Hägerström’s realistic legal
philosophy, whilst within the rest of the book, Hägerström was quoted only four times,
and for this there was no excuse.
From this very moment onwards, the stigma of ‘plagiarism’ accompanied Ross, even
after his death in 1979. In 1986, Preben Stuer Lauridsen expressed the opinion that ‘vir-
tually all Ross’ fundamental ideas were fully developed in Kelsen’s work’.18 It is also
worth noting that Ross’s biographer, Jens Evald, maintains that Ross:
never went further in his investigation than his role models […] The originality of Ross’
work is primarily to be found in his ability to transfer philosophical theories and discus-
sions into legal philosophy and thus create new, fruitful discussions concerning the foun-
dations of the study of law, tasks, methods and concepts, which taken as a whole can be
seen as a new scientific paradigm that replaced older paradigms.19
Ross’s biographer did not make an open claim of plagiarism against him; nevertheless,
he firmly states: ‘it is common in Denmark to regard Theorie der Rechtsquellen as an
imitation of Kelsen’s ideas of jurisprudence.’20
Is it really the case that Ross did not create his own, new and original approach to
law and legal science? That his only scientific ‘achievement’ was the transformation of
the ideas of others? That he plagiarised Kelsen in the Theorie der Rechtsquellen?
Before dealing with these specific questions concerning the originality of Ross’s
works, more general questions require some discussion regarding what plagiarism,
copying, imitation and transformation consist of. In particular, questions concerning
the extensions of these concepts are important here: Where are the borders between
the original work and the copy, the imitation, the transformation etc.? Additionally,
from the methodological viewpoint, the main problem concerns from where – and
how – these new ideas come into the mind of the author.
In the legal sphere, copyright law protects authors against plagiarism and determines
what is legally protected (cf. the legal concepts of the public domain, fair use, licensed
materials etc.21); however, there is no precise definition of many of the terms used in the
17 Anders Wedberg, Kritik der sogenannten praktischen Erkenntnis, Svensk Juristtidning 1 (1933), 433.
18 Preben Stuer Lauridsen, Kelsen og Ross, in: Samfunn, rett, rettferdighet: festskrift til Torstein Eckhoffs
70-årsdag, ed. Anders Bratholm / Torstein Eckhoff / Torkel Opsahl / Magnus Aarbakke, 1986, 681 ff.
21 In the USA, whether a use is fair will depend on the specific facts of the use. It is decided by a court on a
case-by-case basis after balancing the four factors listed in Section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976.

field. Terms such as ‘plagiarism’, ‘transformation’, ‘paraphrasing’, not to mention ‘sim-

ilarity’, ‘derivation’ (which constitute derivative work), ‘transformation’, or ‘aesthetic
difference’ have often been the objects of legal controversy. One may say that copying
100 % of someone else’s work via a copy&paste operation is a ‘clear’, ‘easy’ example of
plagiarism, whereas a 100 % innovative piece of work is not, but what about the rest? Is
copying 20 % of someone’s work tantamount to plagiarism? However, there have been
many ‘clear cases’ of plagiarism.22 In several cases concerning the infringement of cop-
yrights, judges have dealt with the penumbra of uncertainty of the abovementioned
terms, trying to define them so as to determine the borderline between originality and
plagiarism.23 Yet, no precise definitions of the terms in question have commonly been
accepted, nor has the exact, precise and sharp borderline between fair use, transforma-
tion and plagiarism been established. The partial solution to solving the problem is a
regulative (or even a stipulative) definition, which is used in anti-plagiarism software
such as Turnitin, where an ‘acceptable’ quotation level has been established.24 It has to
be noted that not only does it not solve the ‘borderline’ problem, but its use is limited
to written works. Yet, plagiarism does not only apply to written works, but to any field
dealing with human inventiveness, discovery and creativity such as music, painting,
design or simply the invention of new ideas.
A great number of experts from various fields have attempted for decades to define
and determine the borderline between originality and plagiarism.25 In the literature on
the subject, four different kinds of plagiarism are usually distinguished in reference to
linguistic works: (i) direct plagiarism (a word-for-word transcription of a section of
22 For example, famous Belgian artist Luc Tuymans used a photo of a politician made by Katrijn Van Giel
to create his own sculpture with, stating that it was a parody, which is protected by EU law, and he was found
guilty of plagiarism. Jonah Lehrer, the journalist from The New Yorker, first plagiarised himself then fabricated
quotations from Bob Dylan in his book about creativity. Freed Zakaria, a CNN correspondent and editor at
Time magazine, plagiarised sections of another writer’s article about gun control. Han van Meegeren plagia-
rised Brazilian artists, Matheus Lopez Castro and Rubens LP, and Polish artist Adrian Knopik. Michel Houel-
lebecq was also accused of plagiarism; namely, of copying the descriptions from Wikipedia and other websites.
23 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc (2018); Star Athletica v Varsity Brands (2018); Lenz v. Universal Music
(2018), Penguin Random House v. Colting (2018); Temple Island Collections Ltd v New English Teas Ltd,
(2012), Zeccola v Universal City Studios Inc (1982); Cuisenaire v Reed (1963), Hawkes & Son (London)
Ltd v. Paramount Film Service Ltd (1934); Corelli v. Grey (1913), and many more.
24 Russell K. Baker, Barry Thornton, Michael Adams, An Evaluation Of The Effectiveness Of Turnitin.
Com As A Tool For Reducing Plagiarism In Graduate Student Term Papers, College Teaching Methods &
Styles Journal, 4(9), 2008, Accessed September 10, 2018, https://doi.org/10.19030/ctms.v4i9.5564.
25 Cf. Walter Enders, Gary A. Hoover, Whose Line Is It? Plagiarism in Economics, Journal of Economic
Literature XLII (2004), 487 ff.; Johndan Johnson-Eilola, Stuart A. Selber, Plagiarism, Originality, Assem-
blage, Computers and Composition, 24 (2007), 375 ff.; George Buelow, G. Originality, Genius, Plagiarism
in English Criticism of the Eighteenth Century, International Review of the Aesthetics and Sociology of
Music, 21(2) (1990), 117 ff., Accessed June 19, 2018, doi:10.2307/837018; Originality, Imitation, and Plagia-
rism: Teaching Writing in the Digital Age, ed. Caroline Eisner / Martha Vicinus, 2008; Morris Freedman,
The Persistence of Plagiarism, the Riddle of Originality, The Virginia Quarterly Review 70 (1994), Accessed
June 25, 2018, https://www.vqronline.org/essay/persistence-plagiarism-riddle-originality.

someone else’s work, without attribution and without quotation marks); (ii) self-pla-
giarism; (iii) mosaic plagiarism (interlaying someone else’s phrases or text within one’s
own research); and (iv) accidental plagiarism (neglecting to cite the sources, misquot-
ing them, or unintentionally paraphrasing a source by using similar words, groups of
words, or sentence structures without attribution).26 All of them share the same core;
namely, using someone else’s work as one’s own (so-called unreferenced use). It has to
be noted, however, that only in the case of direct plagiarism is the differentiation be-
tween the original and the plagiarised piece not at all complicated – in the present-day
situation, thanks to new and elaborate computer programmes, we can easily find the
instances of copy&paste plagiarism.
The investigation concerning the nature and limits of plagiarism, copying, imita-
tion and transformation can be undertaken in various ways, the most orthodox of
which would probably be the analysis referring to the context of the discovery of
scientific ideas.27 However, such an approach would mean that the examination of
the empirical psychological aspects of scientific discoveries could only elucidate the
essence of the concepts discussed in an indirect way. The other option is to elaborate
upon another unorthodox approach, for example, by comparing the phenomena of
inventions in science with the analogous phenomena taking place outside the sci-
entific domain. In order to check this aspect, the domain of artistic painting will be
discussed and referred to. In my opinion, the chosen, unconventional method can
be both interesting and fruitful, since within painting, as within science, we usually
deal with invention, discoveries, masters, schools, imitations, copies and plagiarism.
Certainly, the law and literature (L&L) movement could be another option for a po-
tential comparative conceptual analysis, but, in the terms of this inquiry, I do not find
it an appropriate alternative, since the L&L movement mainly focuses on the analysis
of the relations between law and literature and that is not the objective of this current
investigation.
So, let our first question be: How should we define copy and imitation in the art
of painting?28 In such a domain, the borderline between copying and imitation is also
hard to establish. Quite often, imitation is understood as something that is made or
26 Panya Luksanapruksa, Paul Millhouse, Guidelines on What Constitutes Plagiarism and Electron-
ic Tools to Detect it, Clinical Spine Surgery 29(3) (2016) 119 f., Accessed June 25, 2018 doi: 10.1097/
BSD.0000000000000371; Rajesh Singh Laishram, Nepram Sanjib Singh, Plagiarism: A concern for editors,
Journal of Medical Society 27(1) (2013), Accessed June 25, 2018, doi: 10.4103/0972-4958.116619; Izet Masic,
Plagiarism in Scientific Research and Publications and How to Prevent It, Materia Socio Medica 26(2),
(2014), 141 ff., Accessed June 25, 2018, doi: 10.5455/msm.2014.26.141-146.
27 Cf. Hans Reichenbach, Experience and Prediction. An Analysis of the Foundations and the Structure
of Knowledge, 1938.
28 Imitation is understood not as an imitation of the theory of art related to the imitation of nature in art,
but as an imitation of the work of another artist.

produced as a copy,29 but at the same time, imitating is often perceived as an acceptable
general learning method (i. e. children learn by imitating adults, apprentices imitate
their masters). Artists, on their path to creative maturity, usually go through the stage
of copying and imitating their masters’ works, then on to the transformation of old
ideas, eventually reaching the phase of mastery in their own right.30 This applies to the
art of painting, music or writing.31 In the history of art one can find many examples
confirming this common pattern of a talented artist’s career: first you imitate, then
you transform it, then you create your own, completely original(?) style. In its hey-
day – namely, in the Renaissance period – both copying and imitation were traditional
methods that novices employed to learn their master’s style.32 Rembrandt’s studio is
historically one of the most famous workshops. Trainees studied his past works and
tried to imitate their master’s style: the colours, compositions, painting techniques
etc.33 The Dutch master tutored dozens of artists. Some of them were just mediocre
painters but the most talented not only imitated Rembrandt, but after that educational
phase, they went through the stage of transforming their master’s works, to eventually
creating their own, original style. Rembrandt’s famous apprentice, Govaert Flinck,34
and his works, are the best examples of the evolution of an artist. Flinck’s art developed
from an imitation of his master’s style in Self-Portrait (1639), through Bust of an Old
Man and Portrait of a Man (both dated 1645 and regarded as Flinck’s first departure
from Rembrandt’s style35) to A Young Woman as a Shepherdess, painted in the manner
known as the Flemish style pioneered by Rubens and Van Dyck.36 He became the lead-
ing painter in Amsterdam after abandoning Rembrandt’s chiaroscuro. The same can be
said about the masters and scientific schools. The characteristic feature of a scientific
school is the relation between the master and his disciples or followers. It does not
matter if the influence of a master (and the school) is spatially or culturally limited. The
29 Richard Shiff, The Original, the Imitation, the Copy, and the Spontaneous Classic: Theory and Painting
in Nineteenth-Century France, Yale French Studies 66 (1984), 28 f.; Harold Ogden White, Plagiarism and
Imitation During the English Renaissance: A Study in Critical Distinctions, 1935, vii.
30 Chiaki Ishiguro, Takeshi Okada, How Can Inspiration Be Encouraged in Art Learning?, in: Arts-Based
Methods in Education Around the World, ed. Tatiana Chemi / Xiangyun Du, 2018, 220 ff.; Scott Shields, The Art
of Imitation, The English Journal 96 (6) (2007), 56 ff.; Noël Carroll, Art, Creativity, and Tradition, in: The Cre-
ation of Art: New Essays in Philosophical Aesthetics, ed. Berys Gaut / Paisley Nathan Livingstone, 2003, 218 ff.
31 Anis Bawarshi, Genres as Forms of In(ter)vention, in: Eisner/Vicinus (footnote 25), 77 ff.; Caroline
Eisner, Martha Vicinus, Introduction, in: ibid., 3 ff.
32 Bruce Cole, The Renaissance Artist at Work: from Pisano to Titian, 1983, 180 ff.; John Paoletti, Gary
Radke, Art in Renaissance Italy, 2005, 20 ff.
33 Svetlana Alpers, Rembrandt’s Enterprise: The Studio and the Market, 1988, 70 ff.; Holm Bevers, Draw-
ings by Rembrandt and His Pupils: Telling the Difference, 2009, 1 ff.
34 Hilbert Lootsma, Tracing a Pose: Govert Flinck and the Emergence of the van Dyckian Mode of Por-
traiture in Amsterdam, Simiolus: Netherlands Quarterly for the History of Art 33(4) (2007/2008), 221 ff.
35 Josua Bruyn, Book Review: Sumowski’s Gemälde der Rembrandt-Schüler, II, Oud-Holland 101 (1987), 226.
36 Erna Kok, Zonder vrienden geen carrière De succesvolle loopbanen van de zeventiende-eeuwse kunste-
naars Govert Flinck en Ferdinand Bol, De Zeventiende Eeuw 27(2) (2011), 328.

members of a scientific school share a specialisation in a particular field, a common

methodology, accepted initial hypotheses and/or theories.37 Obvious examples are the
Vienna Circle, the French School of Exegesis, the Vienna School of Legal Thinking, or
British historical jurisprudence.
The second question is as follows: What, then, does transformation stand for? One
can find various definitions of transformation (such as the definition of plagiarism),
but the common definitional element is the change made (by the artist) to the origi-
nal work. The following questions thus arise: When does transformation begin? How
much must the original painting be changed in order not to be called an ‘imitation’ or a
‘copy’? A marked change? A 20 % or a 50 % change? What must the creator change? The
colour? The technique? Both? According to the Longman dictionary, ‘transformation’
is ‘a complete change in someone or something’38 but in the theory of art, a precise
definition of the transformation itself does not exist, nor is the necessary degree of
change established to call it ‘a complete change’. When dealing with the nature of trans-
formation and the particular object, the only common component is the use of some-
one else’s work as the point of departure. Someone else’s idea acts as the crucial start-
ing point and the ‘modifier’ does some creative work that is then presented as his own
work. The original piece is recognisable in the transformed painting ‘just’ as a source
of inspiration.39 The problem of transformation and transformative or derivative work
has been the object of many litigations, including the problem of appropriation in art.40
It is not an easy task to determine the borderlines of ‘transformation’, ‘plagiarism’
etc. in art. It always involves the personal aesthetical evaluation of a judge, unless we
are dealing with a copy&paste case (however, even in such cases, the painting might be
an ‘original piece of art’, as Sturtevant’s works proved41). It requires answering funda-
37 Kazimierz Opałek, Zagadnienia teorii prawa i teorii polityki, 1986, 39.

38 The Longman dictionary: “to transform – to completely change the appearance, form, or character
of something or someone, especially in a way that improves it”. Accessed August 20, 2018 https://www.
ldoceonline.com/dictionary/transform.
39 Emily Meyers, Art on Ice: The Chilling Effect of Copyright on Artistic Expression, The Columbia Jour-
nal of Law & the Arts, 30 (2006–2007), 219 ff.
40 Eric D. Gorman, Appropriate Testing and Resolution: How to Determine Whether Appropriation Art
is Transformative Fair Use or Merely an Unauthorized Derivative, Darren Hudson Hick, Appropriation
and Transformation, Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal 43 (2012), 290 ff.;
Dave Davis, Copyright Perspectives: “Appropriation Art” – Transformative Use, or Derivative Abuse?, 29
August 2017, Accessed July 2, 2019, http://www.copyright.com/blog/appropriation-art-transformative-
use-derivative-abuse/; William M. Landes, Copyright, Borrowed Images, and Appropriation Art: An Eco-
nomic Approach, John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper No. 113 (2000), Accessed
August 20, 2018, doi: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics/133/.
41 Elaine Frances Sturtevant (née Horan; 1924–2014), also known simply as “Sturtevant”, was an Ameri-
can artist. She achieved recognition for her carefully inexact repetitions of other artists’ works. Sturtevant
did far more than replicate, but her “copied” or transformed renditions of other artists’ works defined her
career. Her goal was to question the borderline between original and copy, invention and plagiarism. She
stated that relations were “constantly up for negotiation” ( Jason Farago, Good artists copy, great artists
steal, 12 November 2014, Accessed August 23, 2018, http://www.bbc.com/culture/story/20141112-great-

mental questions regarding what plagiarism is, the limits of fair use, the scope of trans-
formation and many others. By studying the past and present-day court interpreta-
tions, we can further our knowledge of many important doctrines and concepts within
the copyright field.42 For example, in the early case Folsom v. Marsh (1841), when the
term ‘fair use’ appeared for the first time in the context of plagiarised excerpts in a bi-
ography of George Washington:
The plaintiff claimed the defendant used excerpts of letters from the plaintiff ’s earlier pub-
lished and copyrighted biography. Whilst the defendant had copied 353 pages of the plain-
tiff ’s multivolume work, the copied material amounted to less than 6 percent of the total.
However, the court held for the plaintiff, finding that the defendant had copied the most im-
portant material in the plaintiff ’s earlier volumes […] Judge Story included concerns about
how much of the original work was taken, and stated that the issue was one of whether ‘pi-
racy’ occurred […] Judge Story’s discussion in the Folsom case sets forth the elements that
were later folded into the four-factors fair-use test of Section 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act.43
For instance, it seems appropriate to discuss the so-called thematic inspiration. When
looking at Picasso’s El Almuerzo sobre la hierba (Luncheon on the Grass), there is no
doubt that Édouard Manet’s Le déjeuner sur l’herbe (Luncheon on the Grass) was the
source of the Spaniard’s inspiration. But Manet was not the inventor of the Le déjeuner
thematic idea.44 The French painter conceived his Déjeuner after viewing Titian’s Con-
cert champêtre (Pastoral Concert) in the Louvre museum.45 There are, of course, many
more examples of such transformations in painting. Manet’s Olympia (1863) is a rework-
ing of Titian’s Venus of Urbino (1538), which, in turn, is a reworking of Giorgione’s Sleep-
ing Venus (1508), which, in turn, is also a reworking of one of the woodcut illustrations
of Francesco Colonna’s Hypnerotomachia Poliphili (1499). All the paintings mentioned
above, however much they have been inspired by other artists, unquestionably are mas-
terpieces per se. Every artist added something new, removed some elements, or changed
the original idea and created something new – and original. Sometimes the technique
was changed, sometimes the colour, perspective, or composition. These paintings reveal
not only the chains of transformation, but the enormous progress made in painting as
well. Nota bene, chains of transformation in scientific theories are also traceable. Just to
artists-steal). This meant that she was faking Warhol, Lichtenstein, Johns and many others; however, with
the permission of the original author. Some even lent her their paintings such as Warhol. Cf. Belinda Bow-
ring, Sturtevant: On Art and Its Time, Afterall: A Journal of Art, Context and Enquiry, 18 (2008), 82 ff.
42 Cf. James Meese, Users, and Pirates. Copyright Law and Subjectivity, 2018.
43 Martine Courant Rife, “Fair Use”, Copyright Law, and the Composition Teacher, in: Eisner/Vicinus
(footnote 25), 148.
44 Robert Shore, Beg, Steal and Borrow: Artists against Originality (An Elephant Book), 2017, 83 ff.
45 David Platzer, Picasso and his masters: an exhibition juxtaposing Picasso with the artists who influenced
him is an almost overwhelmingly rich experience, Apollo. Academic OneFile (Dec. 2008), 99 ff.; Jennifer
DeVere Brody, Black Cat Fever: Manifestations of Manet’s “Olympia”, Theatre Journal 53(1) (2001), 95 ff.

give one German example of such a chain: Emil Lask, Gustav Radbruch, Arthur Kauf-
mann, and, last but not least, Ulfrid Neumann and Frank Saliger.
The education of the painting apprentices, their paths towards their own mastery
and the development of their art, can be compared to their counterparts in academ-
ia. Studying under the supervision of the master or professor, exploring one master’s
works, and then the transformation of ‘old ideas’ (or, simply, the ideas of others) all
direct the scholar towards the level of mastery and eventually the apprentice becomes
the master – or even surpasses the master. There are many famous examples of the
mastery of the student who surpassed the teacher, just to name a few: Caravaggio
who trained under Simone Peterzano, Verrocchio who taught Leonardo da Vinci,
Velázquez who served as an apprentice under Francisco Pacheco, Raphael Santi whose
father placed him in the workshop of the Umbrian master Pietro Perugino, Titian and
Gentile Bellini, Cézanne and Camille Pissarro, and, last but not least, Édouard Manet
who studied under Thomas Couture.

The progress in science has been explicated by numerous theories. Niels Bohr’s ‘prin-
ciple of correspondence’ (1913) states that a new theory replacing the current one in any
given field is its generalisation and at the same time its modification and improvement.46
For example, the theory of special relativity (Einstein) is the ‘correspondence generali-
sation’ of classical mechanics and the general theory of relativity is the ‘correspondence
generalisation’ of special relativity. This principle is indeed the basic principle of the
progress of every advanced science.47 The cumulative view of scientific progress con-
ceives development as accumulating knowledge. Popper’s falsificationism and Kuhn’s
account of scientific revolutions grasp the concept of scientific progress differently.
Both philosophers claimed that science does not grow simply by accumulating new
established truths upon the old ones. According to Kuhn, a theory’s change is not cu-
mulative or continuous (except perhaps during periods of so-called normal science).48
The earlier achievements of science are rejected, replaced and reinterpreted by new
theories and conceptual frameworks.49 However, many philosophers of science claim
that the scientific revolution does not violate the principle of correspondence (in its
Bohrowian sense). Similarly, this is also explained in Imre Lakatos’s theory. The research
programme, according to this Hungarian philosopher, consists of a series of theories in
46 Niels Bohr, Über die Serienspektra der Element, Zeitschrift für Physik 2(5) (1920), 423 ff., Accessed
June 22, 2018, doi:10.1007/BF01329978 (English translation in: Niels Bohr: Collected Works. Vol. 3. The
Correspondence Principle 1918–1923, ed. Rud Nielsen, 1976, 241 ff.).
47 Władysław Krajewski, Correspondence Principle and Growth of Science, 1977, viii.
48 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1962, 172 ff.; Erik Jürmann, Thomas Kuhn:
Theory of Progress or Theory of Change?, Bachelor’s Thesis in Philosophy, 2016, Accessed August 20, 2018,
http://dspace.ut.ee/bitstream/handle/10062/55581/Erik_Jurmann_BA.pdf; Richard L. Purtill, Discus-
sion. Kuhn on Scientific Revolutions, Philosophy of Science 34(1) (1967), 53 ff.
49 Ilkka Niiniluoto, Scientific Progress. Accessed August 22, 2018, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
scientific-progress/.

which the ‘hard core’ (a set of theories referring to shared ideas), or the core of the pro-
gramme, remains unchanged, whilst its ‘protective belt’ (auxiliary hypotheses that take
on the burden of possible falsification, adapting the programme) is subject to changes.50
No matter which theoretical explanation will be accepted as adequately elucidating
the process of scientific progress, the historians of science (such as Herbert Butterfield,
who emphasised the importance of conceptual transformation rather than the infusion
of new empirical information51) seem to agree that great scientific discoveries and new
paths of scientific development are not the work of explorers of new experimental facts
but of scientists who are able to look at the current achievements in a given field and de-
velop new theoretical concepts.52 So, again, the ‘old master’s’ ideas are usually the point
of departure. Scientific development occurs due to subverting, criticising and trans-
forming old concepts, and the subsequent creation of new concepts, ideas and theories.
In painting, what needs to be changed within a transformed work could be the (i)
technique, (ii) colours, and (iii) composition. When compared with science, these el-
ements seem to be somehow analogous to the (i) metatheory or methodology, (ii) the
basic concepts used within a theory, and (iii) its main theses. At this point I assume
that we are already prepared to return to Ross’s case, and the accusation of plagiarism,
or, at the very least, the imitation of Kelsen’s ideas.
To present an adequate assessment of plagiarised scientific work one needs to
make the analogous effort to examine comparisons that are usually made within art53;
namely, to compare elements of the original theory and the supposedly ‘imitative’
one. Without a doubt, the comparison of the whole of Kelsen’s and Ross’s theories
is fraught with many difficulties. The most important issue is linked to the evolution
of the ideas presented in both theories. So, to begin with, one has to establish an
acceptable periodisation of Kelsen’s work, on the one hand, and of Ross’s work, on
the other. However, as regards to Kelsen, the periodisation of his work was and still is
the object of thought-provoking disputes. One famous controversy of this kind took
place between Stanley L. Paulson54 and Carsten Heidemann.55 According to Paulson,
50 Alan Musgrave, Method of Madness, in: Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos, ed. Robert S. Cohen / Paul
K. Feyerabend / Marx W. Wartofsky, 1976, 458 f.
51 Carl T. McIntire, Herbert Butterfield. Historian as Dissenter, 2004, 158 f.
52 Alex Rosenberg, Philosophy of Science. A Contemporary Introduction, 2005, 70 ff.
53 Original painting vs. Copies or Reproductions. Accessed March 18, 2018, https://www.caldwellgallery.
com/original_copies.html.
54 Cf. Stanley L. Paulson, Toward a Periodization of the Pure Theory of Law, in: Hans Kelsen’s Legal Theo-
ry a Diachronic Point of View, ed. Letizia Gianformaggio, 1990; idem, On the Origins of Kelsen’s Spätlehre,
in: Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt: A Juxtaposition. Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für Deutsche Geschichte 20 (1997);
idem, Introduction, in: Normativity and Norms: Critical Perspectives on Kelsenian Themes, ed. Stanley
L. Paulson / Bonnie Litschewski Paulson, 1998, xxiiif; idem, Four Phases in Hans Kelsen’s Legal Theory?
Reflections on a Periodization, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 18(1) (1998); idem, Review article. Arriving
at a defensible periodization of Hans Kelsen’s legal theory, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 19(2) (1999).
55 Cf. Carsten Heidemann, Die Normen als Tatsache Zur Normentheorie Hans Kelsens, 1997.

three periods can be distinguished in Kelsen’s theoretical evolution: The first, of ‘crit-
ical constructivism’ (1911–1921), the second, the longest one, being his ‘classical’ pe-
riod (1921–1960), and the third, his late ‘sceptical’ period (1960–1973). The question
of the periodisation of Ross’s work is even more complicated, since – as Ross openly
admits – ‘I have never (such as Lundstedt) experienced any ‘conversion’ but felt the
different phases of my thinking to be steps in a continuous evolution.’56
Thus, the question arises as to what should be compared in order to assess the
grounds for the plagiarism charge against Ross? I choose some elements selected
from Kelsen’s Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre (2nd ed. 1923) and Ross’s Theorie der
Rechtsquellen (1929). There are important reasons for such a choice. First and foremost,
the basis for this decision is the fact that Ross’s Theorie got the harshest reviews, being
described as an imitation of his Vienna master’s work. Second, it is undeniable that
Theorie der Rechtsquellen was written under Kelsen’s strong influence (‘Ross did not
come back to Copenhagen with a heap of notes and drafts awaiting a stage of new re-
flection and elaboration but with a finished manuscript’57).
For the comparison, the following concepts were chosen: one belonging to the
metatheoretical level (‘is’ (Sein) and ‘ought’ (Sollen)), one belonging to the level of
methodology (‘legal science’) and three basic theoretical concepts (‘validity’, ‘basic
norm’ (Grundnorm), ‘will of the state’). The juxtaposition between Ross’s and Kelsen’s
ideas is shown in the following table (my emphasis).
The concepts compared on the chart below show many similarities, but also es-
sential divergences between Kelsen’s and Ross’s ideas. This observation is not very
revealing unless the allegations of plagiarism made against Ross are accepted: ‘pla-
giarism’ in the sense that it is presented at the beginning of the analysis. Without a
doubt, Kelsen made a big impact on Ross’s early work and the Scandinavian realist
admitted it explicitly:
Apart from some minor papers Theorie der Rechtsquellen (1929) is my first published
work. It was written (in Danish) during a study tour in Europe [from] 1923–26 and is
to a high degree influenced by the legal thinking of Hans Kelsen whom I met in Vienna
[from] 1924–25.58
56 Alf Ross, Autobiografía intelectual, ed. R. Hernández Martín, Anuario de Filosofía del Derecho. Nueva
Epoca IV (1987), 277.
57 Knud Waaben, Alf Ross 1899–1979: A Biographical Sketch, European Journal of International Law 14(4)
(2003), 661.
58 Ross, (footnote 56), 273.

Kelsen Ross
‘is’ (Sein) and ‘ought’(Sollen)
Ein vollkommener Gegensatz zwischen Natur- Das Recht als reines Sein (die soziologischen
gesetz und Norm ist nur möglich auf Grund einer Theorien), das Recht als reines Sollen (die
vollkommenen Disparität von Sein und Sollen. normative Rechtswissenschaft) und das
A complete contrast between natural law and Recht sowohl als Sein wie als Sollen (Kul-
norm is possible only on the basis of a com- tur-Seins-Theorien). Mehr Möglichkeiten scheint
plete disparity of ‘is’ and ‘ought’. es nicht zu geben. […] Wir können deshalb mit
Der Gegensatz von Sein und Sollen ist ein mathematischer Sicherheit feststellen: wenn man
formal-logischer und insolange man sich in den uns in der im Vorangegangenen dargestellten
Grenzen formal-logischer Betrachtung hält, führt Kritik der drei erwähnten Theorien beistimmt,
kein Weg von dem einen zum andern, stehen gibt es nur einen möglichen Weg, den man zu
beide Welten durch eine unüberbrückbare gehen versuchen kann, um zu einer annehm-
Kluft getrennt einander gegenüber. baren Rechtstheorie zu gelangen – nämlich die
The antithesis of ‘is’ and ‘ought’ is a for- gemeinsame Voraussetzung anzugreifen, auf
mal-logical one, and as long as we find der die drei erschöpfenden Theorien beruhen,
ourselves within the limits of formal-logical den kategorial radikalen Unterschied zwischen
analysis there is no path leading from the one Sein und Sollen. Ob dieser Weg auch wirklich zu
to the other and two worlds are separated einem Resultat führen wird, können wir nicht von
from each other by an unbridgeable gulf. vornherein wissen.
Kelsen, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre, The law as pure ‘is’ (the sociological theo-
2nd ed. 1923, 7 f. ries), the law as pure ‘ought’ (the normative
jurisprudence) and the law both as ‘is’ as
well as ‘ought’ (cultural-‘is’-theories). It
seems to be no more possibilities. […] There-
fore, we can state with mathematical certainty:
if one agrees with the above-mentioned cri-
tique of the three mentioned theories, there is
only one possible way to follow in order to
arrive at an acceptable legal theory; namely,
to attack the common assumption on which
the three exhaustively theories rest, i. e. the
categorically radical distinction between ‘is’
and ‘ought’. Whether this path will really lead
to a result, we cannot know from the outset.
Ross, Theorie der Rechtsquellen, 1929, 265 f.

Kelsen Ross
Legal Science
Das Ziel, auf das die ‘Hauptprobleme’ gerichtet Wir kommen so zu dem Ergebnis, daß die Frage
sind und das seither auch all meine anderen nach dem ‘Wesen’ des Rechtes, seinem ‘Begriff’,
Arbeiten bestimmte, ist eine reine Rechtslehre identisch sein muß mit der Frage, wie rechtliche
als Theorie des positiven Rechtes. […] die Erkenntnis möglich ist. Die Reflexion über das
Rechtswissenschaft die Rechtssätze nur aus dem Wesen des Rechts ist Reflexion über den Cha-
Material des positiven Rechtes, insbesondere rakter der Rechtswissenschaft.
der Gesetze, bilden darf… We come to the conclusion that the question
The goal to which the Hauptprobleme is di- of the “essence” of law, of its “concept”, must
rected, and which has from this very moment be identical with the question of how legal
determined all my other works, is a Pure The- knowledge is possible. Reflection on the
ory of law conceived as a theory of positive nature of law is reflection on the nature of
law. […] Legal science may form the legal legal science.
propositions based only on the material of Ross, Theorie der Rechtsquellen (1929), p. 200
the positive law, in particular the statutes… So long as there is law, there will be normative
Kelsen, Vorrede zur zweiten Auflage, Hauptprob- jurisprudence. On this point I again agree with
leme der Staatsrechtslehre (1923), p. V Kelsen. I too do not share the conception that the
In einem völlig anderen Sinne wird das Wort usual doctrinal exposition should disappear and
Gesetz gebraucht, wenn man – nicht vom expli- be replaced by a sociology of law. My only claim
kativen, sondern normativen Standpunkte aus – is that the doctrinal point of observation is a
darunter jene Sätze versteht, die ein bestimmtes temporary abstraction, and that its propositions
Geschehen vorschreiben, indem sie die Forderung for the purpose of an epistemological critique
eines gewissen Verhaltens aufstellen, ein Sein oder must be interpreted so that the normative
Nichtsein befehlen: ein Sollen statuieren. Die content (the doctrine) is not seen as a content
Logik, Grammatik, Ästhetik, Ethik und Rechts- of cognition but as a fact that, as a fragment
wissenschaft sind die Disziplinen, die sich mit of a larger context of reality, is itself an object
solchen ‘Normen’ befassen: ihre Betrachtungs- of cognition.
weise wird darum als normative bezeichnet. Ross, The 25th Anniversary of the Pure Theory
In a completely different sense, the word of Law (1936), 254. Translated by H. P. Olsen
‘law’ is used when we understand – not (Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 31, No. 2
from an explicative, but from normative (2011), 243–272)
point of view – those sentences which
prescribe a particular event by establishing
the demand of a certain behaviour, i. e. to
command an ‘is’ or ‘non-is’; to set an ‘ought’.
Logic, grammar, aesthetics, ethics, and legal
science are the disciplines that deal with
such ‘norms’: their approach is therefore
termed normative.
Kelsen, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre,
1923, 6

Kelsen Ross
Validity
Die Norm soll nicht wie Naturgesetz Seiendes Kelsen will keineswegs erklären, was es bedeu-
erklären, sie soll ein Neues schaffen, ein Ge- tet, daß eine Norm Geltung hat. Er sagt bloß,
schehen hervorbringen. Allein auch die Norm daß, wenn wir begründen wollen, dass eine Norm
„gilt“ nicht, weil und insofern sie „wirkt“; ihre Geltung hat, das nur geschehen kann, indem wir
Geltung besteht nicht in ihrer Wirkung, in ihrem ihre Geltung auf eine andere Geltung zurückfüh-
tatsächlichen Befolgtwerden, nicht in einem Sein ren. […] Die Aussage „die Norm N gilt“, muß
(Geschehen), sondern in ihrem Sollen. Die Norm absolut verstanden sinnlos sein. Sie muß auf
gilt, sofern sie befolgt werden soll; der Zweck folgende Weise umgeformt werden: Die Norm
der Norm ist wohl ihre Wirkung. Sie kann, aber N1 gilt relativ zur Norm N0, d. h., N1 lässt sich
sie muß nicht ihren Zweck erfüllen; auch die wir- logisch von N0 ableiten, und nichts anderes.
kungslose Norm bleibt Norm. Für die spezifische Hierin liegt von Anfang an ein Fehler in Kelsens
„Soll“-Geltung der Norm bleibt die Realisierung Problemstellung. Kelsen übernimmt – sicher
ihres Zweckes bedeutungslos. unter Einfluß der historischen Kontinuität – die
The norm should not explain law of nature, it übliche Problemstellung, nach der nach dem
should create something new to bring about Grunde, weshalb das Recht gilt, und nicht da-
an event. The norm as such is not valid nach, was es bedeutet, und wie erkannt werden
because and insofar as it “works”; its validity kann, daß das Recht gilt, gefragt wird.
does not consist in its effect, in its actual Kelsen does not want to explain what it
adherence, not in Is (event), but in its ‘ought’. means that a norm is valid. He merely says
The norm is valid provided that it ought to be that if we want to establish that a norm is
followed; the purpose of the norm must be its valid, this can only take place by referring its
effect. It can, but it does not have to fulfil its validity to another validity. […] The state-
purpose; even the ineffective norm remains the ment ‘the norm N is valid’ is meaningless if
norm. For the specific ‘ought’ – validity of the understood in an absolute sense. It must be
norm, the realization of its purpose remains transformed in the following way: The norm
meaningless. N1 is relatively valid to the norm N0, i. e. N1
Kelsen, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre, can be logically derived from N0, with no
1923, 14 exception. This is an error in Kelsen’s formu-
lation of the problem right from the start:
Kelsen accepts – surely under the influence of
historical continuity – the usual approach to
problem, according to which we ask about
the grounds of validity and not what validity
means and also how it can be recognized
that the law is valid.
Ross, Theorie der Rechtsquellen, 1929, 260

Kelsen Ross
Basic norm (Grundnorm)
Dieser Stufenbau mündet in der die Einheit der Das Ideal für die normative Erkenntnis ist ein
Rechtsordnung in ihrer Selbstbewegung begrün- vollständiges, zusammenhangendes System, wo
denden Grundnorm. Indem diese allererst ein das alle Elemente sich im Verhältnis zu einer obersten
Recht erzeugendes Organ einsetzt, bildet sie die Norm – der Grundnorm – ableiten lassen. Das
Verfassung in einem rechtslogischen Sinne. Und ist auf die beste Weise in Kelsens System zum
indem der solcherweise geschaffene Gesetzgeber Ausdruck gekommen. Kelsen hat nur einseitig die
Normen setzt, die die Gesetzgebung selbst regeln, deduktive Entstehungsweise aus einer vorausge-
entsteht – als nächste Stufe – die Verfassung setzten Grundnorm betont, aber, wie wir gezeigt
im positivrechtlichen Sinne. Doch liegt die haben, muß es von einer solchen Betrachtungs-
‚Konstitution‘, d. h. die Konstituierung der einzel- weise aus unfaßlich bleiben, welche Grundnorm
staatlichen Rechtsordnung, die Begründung Deduktionsbasis bilden soll. Das läßt sich nur
ihrer Einheit, eigentlich in der als Verfassung im durch vorausgehende Induktion bestimmen. Nur
rechtslogischen Sinne bezeichneten, nicht gesetz- in der Weise wird die Positivität des Rechtes ver-
ten, sondern nur vorausgesetzten Grundnorm. ständlich. Es ist kein Widerspruch, dass die Ent-
This hierarchical, structural construction stehungsweise zugleich induktiv und deduktiv
results in the basic norm, which is justified ist; denn, wie wir mehreremale gesagt haben,
by the self-movement of the legal order sind diese nicht verschiedene und entgegen-
understood as the unity. Since the basic gesetzte Prozesse, sondern ein und derselbe ko-
norm creates the very first lawmaking body, it ordinierende Prozeß, von zwei Seiten gesehen.
forms the constitution in a legal-logical sense. The ideal for normative knowledge is a com-
And since the legislator created norms in such plete, coherent system, where all elements can
a way that legislation itself is regulated, the be derived in relation to a supreme norm – the
constitution itself emerges – at the next level – basic norm. This is expressed in the best way
in a juridico-positive sense. That is what the in Kelsen’s system. Kelsen has only unilaterally
‘constitution’ consist in, i. e. the constituting emphasized the deductive mode of origin from
of the national legal system, the establish- a presupposed basic norm, but, as we have
ment of its unity, actually in terms of the shown, it must remain incomprehensible from
constitution, in the juridico-logical sense, a view point that the basic norm seen as the
to an issued norm, but only a presupposed basis of deduction. This can only be deter-
basic norm. mined by previous induction. Only in this way
Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität, 1920, can the positivity of law be understood. It is
29, 33 Anm., 97 Anm., 107 not a contradiction that the mode of origin
Ein [dynamisches System] liegt vor, wann die is simultaneously inductive and deductive;
Grundnorm sich darauf beschränkt, einen because, as we have said several times,
bestimmten menschlichen Willen zur Setzung these are not different and opposite pro-
von Normen zu ermächtigen. […] Die von der cesses, but one and the same coordinating
Grundnorm ermächtigte Autorität kann dann ih- process, viewed from two sides.
rerseits wieder, sei es für den ganzen Bereich ihrer Alf Ross, Theorie der Rechtsquellen, 1929, 281
Zuständigkeit, sei es nur für einen Teilbereich,
eine andere Autorität delegieren.
A [dynamic system] is at hand when the
basic norm confines itself to authorizing
a certain human will to issue a set norms.
[…] The authority empowered by the basic
norm can then, for its part, delegate power to
another authority, be it for the whole area of its
competence, even if only for one subarea.
Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre,1925, 99, 249,
251

Kelsen Ross
Will of the State
In nationalen, religiösen, wissenschaftlichen Das Gesetz existiert (ist da) und ist Recht. Das
Gemeinschaften mag es zu einem Gesamtwillen Gesetz (das Recht) wird dann auch vom Ver-
kommen, nicht aber in einen rechtlichen, im fasser [i. e. Julius Binder] in naiv-positivistischer
staatlichen Verbande. Das, was hier als einheit- Weise als der faktische Volkswille definiert. Wie
licher Wille erscheint, das Gesetz […], kann unter den „Willens-theorien“ erwähnt, ist diese
unmöglich als Gesamtwille des Staatsvolkes Definition selbstverständlich ein Zirkel. Denn der
gelten. […] Daß die Mehrheit der Parlamentari- „Volkswille“, der „Gesellschaftswille“ tritt doch
er und deren Willensäußerung identisch sei mit nur rechtschaffend als Staatswille hervor, d. h.
dem gesamten Staatsvolke und diesen Willen, durch formgebenden Normen darüber, wie der
ist eine juristische Fiktion, die von Standpunkte Staatswille zur Existent gelangt, bestimmt.
der Psychologie – und das ist in dieser Frage der Diese Normen können aber nur rechtliche sein –
der organischen Staatstheorie – unhaltbar ist. wodurch der Zirkel offenbar wird.
In national, religious, scientific community a The statute exists (is at hand) and is law. The
collective will may arise, but not in a legal, or statute (law) is then also defined by the
state organization. What appears here as a author [i. e. Julius Binder] in a naïve-positiv-
unified will, the law […], can not possibly ist way as the factual will of the people. As
be considered as the collective will of the mentioned under “Will Theory”, this defini-
people of the state. […] The fact that the mation is obviously circular. For the “will of the
jority of parliamentarians and their expres- people”, the “will of society” only emerges,
sions of will are identical with the people’s legally speaking, as the will of the state, i. e.
will of the entire state and this will, is a legal it is determined through formulating norms
fiction, is untenable from the standpoint of about how the will of the state comes to ex-
psychology – and that is the standpoint of the ist. But these norms can only be legal – what
organic state theory. makes the circle evident.
[…] die Identifizierung von Staatswillen und Alf Ross, Theorie der Rechtsquellen, 1929, 255
Gesamtwillen eine nicht scharf genug zu ver-
dammende Fiktion ist.
[…] the identification of the will of the state
and the collective will is a fiction that can
never be condemned too sharply.
Kelsen, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre,
1923, 165 f., 399
Despite the fact that we can observe a certain correspondence between the concepts
presented in the chart, no copying and no plagiarism occurred. For instance, Ross
agrees on the necessary distinction between ‘is’ (Sein) and ‘ought’ (Sollen), yet in this
short excerpt, one can clearly see that he attempts to invent a category to include both
Sein and Sollen. According to Ross, Kelsen did not explain what validity means (which,
as the quote shows, is not accurate); moreover, Ross claimed that law had no other
‘validity’ than an empirical one. The Danish scholar partially agrees with Kelsen on
the nature of legal science, but he tried to stress the factual element, which later turned
into the claim that the propositions of legal science should be predictions about how
judges will decide future cases. When it comes to the basic norm, Ross tried to prove
that the mode of its origin was simultaneously inductive and deductive. Additionally,

Ross’s analysis of the concept of the will of the state shows clearly that he, again, agreed
with his master; however, his argument, being logical, was far more credible. This short
juxtaposition and the analysis of Theorie of Rechtsquellen demonstrates that Ross was
inspired by Kelsen, had analysed similar issues and had maybe even ‘fallen in love’ (as
Bentzon claimed à propos regarding his dissertation59). However, Ross’s theory can
hardly be classified as ‘imitation’ or ‘plagiarism’.
To make a final point, once again let us examine the famous Longman dictionary
definition of ‘plagiarism’. First, it is defined pragmatically, as an activity ‘when someone
uses another person’s words, ideas, or work and pretends they are their own’; second,
as the result or product of such an activity, as ‘an idea, phrase, or story that has been
copied from another person’s work, without stating where it came from’. Does this
definition apply to Ross’s work? The answer is negative when we compare the ideas
presented above in the table. But what about the remainder of his book? In the whole
volume, Kelsen is mentioned 153 times and there are over 40 footnotes referring to
his works. That sounds fair (especially in comparison to the four footnotes in Ross’s
Kritik referring to Axel Hägerström’s ideas), but the number of references is, of course,
not decisive evidence. In my opinion, what could help in evaluating scientific work, as
much as in art (compare e. g. the Sturtevant and Warhol case60), is the opinion of the
creator of the original idea; that is, the judgement made by the individual whose work
was allegedly ‘plagiarised’. Consequently, we can perhaps reformulate the Longman
definition by adding a clause of exception: ‘Plagiarism’ happens: (1) when someone
uses another person’s words, ideas, or work and pretends they are their own, (2) unless
the original author has authorised (or even welcomed) such a use of her/his ideas. Un-
doubtedly, the author of the allegedly plagiarised work knows best if his/her work has
been plagiarised, or not. Therefore, such a subjective clause is in order as a supplement
to the objective condition expressed by (1).
Thus, we can claim that Kelsen’s theory was truly an important stimulus for Ross
and he has never denied it:
Of crucial importance to me was the impression I received during my stay in Vienna from
Professor Hans Kelsen’s captivating researcher personality. Thanks to the inspiration I re-
ceived, I made the plan for the present work, and when I worked it out, the thought of
Professor Kelsen’s encouraging suggestion was often the best help.61
In this context, what is crucial for Ross’s ‘plagiarism’ case is Kelsen’s reaction to Ross’s
letter from the 15th of November 1932. The Danish scholar, after receiving harsh reviews
concerning Theorie der Rechtsquellen, wrote to his Vienna master. In the letter, dated
27th of November 1932, Kelsen not only expressed his support, but he explicitly evalu-
59 Evald, (footnote 2), 129.

60 Shore, (footnote 49), 14 ff.
61 Ross, (footnote 11), VII.

ated Theorie as independent scholarship. He wrote: ‘Dass diese [Ihre wissenschaftliche

Entwicklung] über die Anregungen hinaus geht, die Ihnen die reine Rechtslehre ge-
boten, begrüsse ich.’62 Even if we agree with Ross’s biographer Jens Evald that ‘Kelsen’s
letter can, however, also be read as an expression of the fact that the master was satis-
fied that his apprentice reproduced his ideas’, should we not take into account how the
master himself evaluated the book? If plagiarism is a kind of stealing,63 should not the
robbed person’s opinion matter? Should not the creator’s or inventor’s assessment – in
our case Kelsen’s approval and high estimation of Ross’s work – be essential in the
evaluation of the originality of Ross’s work? We have already answered these questions
positively by adding a condition of exception (2) to the Longman definition.
Finally, I would like to quote Kelsen’s general advice to Ross on academic work,
which seems to be, in my opinion, very important, not only for young scholars facing
accusations of plagiarism, but also for problems of other sorts within any given univer-
sity career:
More important and first of all more satisfying than [any] university career is the con-
sciousness of the creative power, the certainty that one has something to say in his field.64
Urszula Kosielińska-Grabowska
Department of Political Science, Pedagogical University of Cracow, Podchorążych 2
30-084 Kraków, Poland, grabowska@up.krakow.pl
62 “That it [your scientific development] goes beyond the suggestions offered to you by the pure theory
of law, I appreciate.” Cited by courtesy of Jens Evald, who shared a copy of Hans Kelsen’s letter to Alf Ross
with me (dated November 27, 1932).
63 The word “plagiarism” comes from the Latin “plagiarius” = “thief ”, from “plagium” = “hunting net”.
64 In original: “Wichtiger und vor allem befriedigender als Universitätskarriere, ist das Bewusstsein schöp-
ferischer Kraft, die Gewissheit, dass man auf seinem Gebiete etwas zu sagen hat”. Excerpt from Hans Kels-
en’s letter to Alf Ross (dated November 27, 1932). Cited by courtesy of Jens Evald.


Bobbios „Bekehrung“ zur Reinen Rechtslehre
Die Turiner Schule und die Rezeption Hans Kelsens
in Italien
MARIO G. LOSANO
Abstract: The mid-19th century reforms introduced philosophy of law into the Kingdom
of Piedmont. Later, following Italian unification, these then spread to all universities
throughout the new state. In Turin the legal philosopher Gioele Solari considered a com-
mand of German to be essential; thus in 1932 two of his students went to Germany, with
Norberto Bobbio going to Heidelberg to meet Husserl, and Renato Treves travelling to
Cologne to meet Kelsen. Treves then translated the first edition of the Reine Rechtslehre
in 1933, which thereby became known also in Italy. Bobbio on the other hand “converted”
to Kelsen only in 1949 and it was under his aegis that the second edition was translated in
1966, which became established in Italy also through his teaching.
Keywords: Beginning of the legal philosophy in Italy, Norberto Bobbio and Edmund Hus-
serl, Renato Treves and Hans Kelsen, European Dictatorships and Universities, Exile and
Teachers, Pure Theory of Law in Italy
Schlagworte: Anfang der Rechtsphilosophie in Italien, Norberto Bobbio und Edmund

Husserl, Renato Treves und Hans Kelsen, Europäische Diktaturen und Universitäten, Exil
und Dozenten, Reine Rechtslehre in Italien
1. Die Rechtsphilosophie und die Schule von Turin
Die Verbreitung von Kelsens Theorien in Italien ist eng mit dem Unterricht der
Rechtsphilosophie an der Universität von Turin verbunden. Dieser Unterricht weist

340 MARIO G. LOSANO
eine längere Tradition auf, sodass man von einer „Turiner Schule“ sprechen kann.1 Die-
se Tradition bezieht sich nicht so sehr auf die methodologische oder doktrinelle Ein-
heit, sondern eher auf die persönliche enge Verbundenheit zwischen den Lehrmeis-
tern und ihren Schülern: eine Tradition, die seit mehr als einem Jahrhundert andauert.
Die Geschichte der Rechtsphilosophie in Turin beginnt im Königreich Piemont
noch vor der Einigung Italiens, als mit der Reform von Minister Cesare Alfieri 1846 das
Lehrfach „Rationale Rechtsprinzipien“ eingeführt wurde. Das war eines der Ergebnis-
se der damals günstigen Haltung gegenüber dem Liberalismus und sollte 1848 im Al-
bertinischen Statut gipfeln. 1846 wurde der Lehrstuhl für „Enzyklopädie und Rechts-
geschichte“ Pietro Luigi Albini anvertraut.2 Das Lehrfach bestand aus zwei Teilen:
Einem analytischen Teil, den wir heute als „Einführung in die Rechtswissenschaft“
bezeichnen würden, und einem Teil, der die Rechtsgeschichte betraf. 1849 übernahm
Albini den Lehrstuhl für „Rationale Rechtsprinzipien“: Dies sollte den Beginn für die
Rechtsphilosophie in Turin einläuten. Diesem Thema widmete Albini 1857 sein Buch
„Prinzipien der Rechtsphilosophie“.
Albini war Mitglied der Kommission für die Reform des Rechtsunterrichts an der
sabaudischen Universität und über dieses Thema unterhielt er eine rege Korrespon-
denz mit Karl Mittermaier. Als Ergebnis dieser Aktivitäten wurde die Doppel-Diszi-
plin der juristischen Enzyklopädie in zwei voneinander unabhängige Lehrstühle auf-
geteilt, und zwar in „Rechtsgeschichte“ (im Titel von Albinis Buch aus dem Jahr 1847
liest man „in Italien“, denn zu jener Zeit gab es noch kein „italienisches Recht“) und
in „Rechtsphilosophie“. Mit der Einigung Italiens im Jahre 1861 wurde die sabaudische
Gesetzgebung auch auf das neue italienische Königreich angewendet und die Rechts-
philosophie, die sich auch aus dem Briefwechsel zwischen Albini und Mittermaier
entwickelt hatte, somit ein Pflichtfach an allen Universitäten des neuen Königreiches.
Es ist an dieser Stelle nicht möglich, die verschiedenen Richtungen der Rechtsphi-
losophie jener Jahre in Italien zu analysieren. Es sei lediglich darauf hingewiesen, dass
sie sich – mit einigen Ausnahmen einzelner Dozenten – von den allgemeinen philoso-
phischen Ansätzen von Rosmini und Gioberti inspirieren ließen, jedoch in Turin mit
einer konstanten Ausrichtung: dem Interesse für die sozialen Probleme.
Ich habe schon auf die Kontinuität der persönlichen Verbindung unter den verschie-
denen Dozenten hingewiesen, die nacheinander den Lehrstuhl in Turin innehatten.
Auf Pietro Luigi Albini, von 1863 bis 1872, folgten über kurze Zeiträume verschiedene
Dozenten; dann konsolidierte sich die Turiner Schule mit Giuseppe Carle von 1872 bis
1 Über die Turiner Schule und, im Allgemeinen, über Bobbio und seine Welt: Mario G. Losano, Norberto
Bobbio Una biografia culturale, Carocci, Roma 2018, 510 S.
2 Mario G. Losano, Alle origini della filosofia del diritto a Torino: Pietro Luigi Albini (1807–1863) Con due
documenti sulla collaborazione di Albini con Mittermaier, Accademia delle Scienze, Torino 2013, 104 S.; id., I
carteggi di Pietro Luigi Albini con Federico Sclopis e Karl Mittermaier (1839–1856) Alle origini della filosofia del
diritto a Torino, Accademia delle Scienze, Torino 2014, 304 S.

Bobbios „Bekehrung“ zur Reinen Rechtslehre 341
1917, auf den von 1918 bis 1948 Gioele Solari und schließlich von 1945 bis 1972 Norberto
Bobbio folgten: also exakt ein Jahrhundert Rechtsphilosophie in Turin. Nur zwei ab-
solut außergewöhnliche Ereignisse unterbrachen für kurze Zeit diese Kontinuität: die
zwei Weltkriege. Es handelte sich nicht nur um eine didaktische Kontinuität, sondern
auch um eine Kontinuität der Zuneigung, denn jeder der Schüler schrieb eine Biogra-
fie über seinen Lehrmeister: Solari über Carle, Bobbio über Solari. Parallel zu dieser
persönlichen kommt die europäische kulturelle Kontinuität, denn zur französischen
Kultur – die im sabaudischen Piemont immer präsent war – kam das Interesse für die
deutsche Kultur hinzu, deren Wurzeln im Bereich der Rechtsphilosophie in der Be-
ziehung zwischen Albini und Mittermaier lagen.
Auch für Gioele Solari, den Lehrmeister von Bobbio, konnte man ohne Deutsch-
kenntnisse kein Rechtsphilosoph sein. So traten seine Schüler, die nach Abschluss
ihres Universitätsstudiums eine akademische Karriere anstrebten, den Weg nach
Deutschland an.
2. Die Schule von Turin und die Reise nach Deutschland im Jahre 1932
Norberto Bobbio (1909–2004) erinnert sich, dass in seinen Jugendjahren, d. h. um

1930, „Deutschland die Heimat der Philosophie, des Rechts und der Rechtsphiloso-
phie war“. Er fährt fort: „Die bedeutendsten italienischen Philosophen der vorherge-
henden Generation, Giorgio Del Vecchio, Adolfo Ravà und auch Gioele Solari, mein
Lehrmeister, waren von der deutschen Kultur geprägt. In ihren Büchern finden wir
zahlreiche Hinweise und Zitate aus Werken, die in den berühmtesten Universitäten
Deutschlands entstanden waren. Die englische und amerikanische Literatur war
hingegen nahezu unbekannt“.3
Bobbio promovierte in Turin 1931 als Rechtsphilosoph an der Juristischen Fakultät
und 1934 in Theoretischer Philosophie an der Philosophischen Fakultät. Gleich nach
seinem Hochschulabschluss schrieb er 1931 an Solari, dass er die Universitätskarri-
ere einschlagen wollte, jedoch eine mit eindeutig nicht-kelsenscher Orientierung: Er
wolle sich dem Studium des Neukantianismus widmen, denn „nur in einer bewussten
und sicheren Kritik dieses Modells sind die Grundlagen und die Berechtigung der
neuen Philosophie“ zu finden.4
In der Zeit zwischen den zwei Universitätsabschlüssen schob er 1932 in seine Ausbil-
dung eine Reise nach Deutschland ein. Er unternahm sie mit dem Turiner Freund und
3 Norberto Bobbio, Diritto e potere Saggi su Kelsen, ESI, Napoli 1992, S. 5 (Prefazione); Norberto Bobbio,
Diritto e potere Saggi su Kelsen, (hrsg. von Tommaso Greco und mit einer Einführung von Agostino Carri-
no), Giappichelli, Torino 2014, S. 1.
4 Norberto Bobbio a Gioele Solari, Rivalta Bormida, 28 agosto 1931, in: Angelo D’Orsi, La vita degli studi
Carteggio Gioele Solari – Norberto Bobbio 1931–1952, Angeli, Milano 2000, S. 91–94.

342 MARIO G. LOSANO
künftigen Rechtssoziologen Renato Treves (der sich in Köln mit Hans Kelsen traf)
und mit dem künftigen Wissenschaftsphilosophen Ludovico Geymonat (der in Göt-
tingen seine Mathematikstudien vertiefte). Die Freundschaft dieser drei Gelehrten
hielt ein ganzes Leben lang (trotz der unterschiedlichen wissenschaftlichen und auch
politischen Interessen), aber wir wollen unsere Aufmerksamkeit auf die brüderliche
Freundschaft zwischen meinen Lehrmeistern Norberto Bobbio und Renato Treves
konzentrieren, denn diesen beiden ist die Verbreitung der Reinen Rechtslehre in
Italien und darüber hinaus zu verdanken.
a) Bobbio in Heidelberg: seine Begegnung mit Husserl
Bobbio hielt sich in Heidelberg auf, wo er seine Kenntnisse der Husserlschen Philo-
sophie vertiefte, was sich für ihn jedoch nur als ein kurzfristiges Interesse erwies. Der
„Philosophie der Krise“ näherte sich Bobbio (wie er 1944 schrieb) „mit entgegen-
gesetzten Gefühlen: mit Anziehung und mit Abstoßung“, denn „man kann sich nur
durch die eigene Erfahrung davon befreien“.5 In Wirklichkeit stellt das gelungene Buch
von 1944 über La filosofia del decadentismo (Die Philosophie des Dekadentismus) für
Bobbio „den Wendepunkt zwischen seiner ersten und seiner zweiten Lebensphase“
dar,6 denn es beendet die „Vorgeschichte“ seiner intellektuellen Tätigkeit. Die eigent-
liche Geschichte seines geistigen Wirkens beginnt in der Demokratie der Nachkriegs-
zeit und maßgeblich mit seiner „Bekehrung“ zu Kelsen im Jahre 1949.
Abschließend kann man sagen, dass der Aufenthalt in Deutschland im Jahre 1932
zu verschiedenen Ergebnissen für die zwei Turiner Freunde führte: „Während Kelsens
Verbreitung in Italien mit Treves begann, [so Bobbio,] […] gab es nie eine Fortset-
zung meiner Studien über die Phänomenologie“.7
b) Treves in Köln: seine Begegnung mit Kelsen
Renato Treves (1907–1992), der wie Bobbio ein gebürtiger Turiner und Schüler von
Gioele Solari war, promovierte mit einer Arbeit über Saint-Simon und wollte sich ei-
gentlich weiter mit Positivismus, Soziologie und Sozialismus befassen.8 Aber die Jahre
5 Norberto Bobbio, La filosofia del decadentismo, Chiantore, Torino 1944, 124 S.; Zitate auf S. 9, 10, 8 der
Premessa.
6 Norberto Bobbio, De senectute e altri scritti autobiografici, Einaudi, Torino 1996, S. 151.
7 Bobbio, Diritto e potere, zit., S. 5.
8 Norberto Bobbio, Renato Treves, “Atti dell’Accademia delle Scienze di Torino”, 1993, Bd. 127, S. 97–103;
id., Ricordo di Renato Treves, “Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia del Diritto”, 1993, S. 3–12; Mario G. Losano,
Renato Treves, sociologo tra il Vecchio e il Nuovo Mondo. Con il regesto di un archivio ignoto e la bibliografia di
Renato Treves, Unicopli, Milano 1998, VIII, 210 S.

nach 1930 waren die am wenigsten geeigneten Jahre für derartige Studien: Der Faschis-
mus hatte gerade seinen größten Erfolg und Treves konzentrierte seine Studien fol-
glich auf den Idealismus, auf die neukantianische Schule von Marburg und auf Hans
Kelsen. Deshalb wählte er 1932 Köln als Ziel seiner Reise nach Deutschland und traf
sich mit Kelsen. Aus dieser Reise stammt sein Buch von 1934: Il diritto come relazione
(Recht als Beziehung Essay über den zeitgenössischen Neukantianismus).
1933 musste Kelsen als erster die Willkür der Diktatur erfahren: Er wurde von der
Universität Köln als Sozialist verwiesen und musste sich eine andere akademische
Position außerhalb Deutschlands suchen. Zu diesem Zweck schrieb Kelsen eine Zu-
sammenfassung seiner Reinen Rechtslehre und schickte sie an die Kollegen verschie-
dener europäischer Universitäten, damit sie diese übersetzten und in einer Zeitschrift
ihres Landes veröffentlichten. Der größte italienische Rechtsphilosoph jener Jahre war
Giorgio Del Vecchio in Rom und Kelsen schickte auch ihm jenen Aufsatz mit der Bitte,
ihn in der „Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia del Diritto“ („Internationale Zeitschrift

der Rechtsphilosophie“) zu veröffentlichen, die Del Vecchio leitete und in der schon
vorher ein Artikel von Kelsen erschienen war. Del Vecchio kannte die Schwierigkei-
ten, mit denen sich Kelsen in Deutschland herumschlagen musste, denn Del Vecchio
selbst – obwohl Faschist – war auch Jude. Bei Del Vecchio überwog jedoch sein aka-
demisches Pflichtgefühl: Der Aufsatz von Kelsen konnte nicht in der Zeitschrift von
Del Vecchio veröffentlicht werden, denn hierin wurden nur Originalaufsätze veröf-
fentlicht; doch platzierte er den Aufsatz noch im selben Jahr, 1933, in einer anderen
bedeutenden italienischen wissenschaftlichen Zeitschrift9 und die Übersetzung wurde
einem jungen Italiener anvertraut, der Kelsen persönlich kannte: Renato Treves.
1967 erinnert sich Treves an seine Begegnung mit Kelsen folgendermaßen: „Ich
lernte Kelsen in Köln im September 1932 kennen. Ich hatte ihm einen Besuch abge-
stattet, da ich zu jener Zeit an seinen Schriften arbeitete und mir von ihm einige Erklä-
rungen über die philosophische Grundlage seines Gedankens erhoffte. Während des
Besuchs jedoch sprachen wir nicht nur über technische Themen der Rechtsphiloso-
phie; das Gespräch betraf auch andere Themen und vor allem die politische Lage jener
Tage. Der Sieg der nationalsozialistischen Bewegung war erkennbar und Kelsen […]
machte keinen Hehl aus seinen Absichten, Deutschland schnellstmöglich zu verlassen
und in ein anderes Land gehen zu wollen, wo er seine wissenschaftliche und didakti-
sche Arbeit in Freiheit fortführen könnte. – Kurz nach meinem Besuch schickte mir
Kelsen die maschinengeschriebene Abschrift einer neuen unveröffentlichten Arbeit,
welche die erste noch unvollständige Fassung des Werkes enthielt, das wir hier vorstel-
9 Hans Kelsen, La dottrina pura del diritto Metodo e concetti fondamentali. Traduzione di Renato Treves,
“Archivio Giuridico Filippo Serafini”, 1933, Bd. 110, n. 2, S. 121–171. Dieser Text zirkulierte später selbststän-
dig als Sonderdruck: Hans Kelsen, La dottrina pura del diritto Metodo e concetti fondamentali. Traduzione di
Renato Treves, Società Tipografica Modenese, Modena 1933, 53 S.

344 MARIO G. LOSANO
len“,10 d. h. die erste Ausgabe der Reinen Rechtslehre, mit der wir uns in Kürze befassen
werden.
c) Geymonat in Göttingen: Ausrichtung zur Philosophie der Wissenschaft
Zwei Worte zu Ludovico Geymonat (1908–1991): Er promovierte 1932 in Mathematik

und zwei Jahre später promovierte er (wie Bobbio) bei Annibale Pastore auch in Theo-
retischer Philosophie. Nach seiner Reise im Jahre 1932 mit den zwei Freunden aus Tu-
rin, die ihn nach Göttingen führte, ging er 1934 zu einem Studienaufenthalt nach Wien.
Dieser Aufenthalt sollte für seine Zukunft als Wissenschaftsphilosoph richtungwei-
send sein: Er nahm Kontakt zum Wiener Kreis und insbesondere mit Moritz Schlick
und seiner Schule auf.11 Geymonat wurde ein renommierter Wissenschaftsphilosoph
und (im Unterschied zu Bobbios und Treves’ gemäßigten Positionen) vertrat er in der
Kommunistischen Partei Italiens radikale linksgerichtete Standpunkte, weshalb er von
der Partei ausgeschlossen wurde.
3. Bobbio als Antikelsenianer: seine Dissertation
An der Universität verfolgte der knapp zwanzigjährige Bobbio den damals in Italien
vorherrschenden Gedanken, d. h. den Idealismus von Benedetto Croce. Das war da-
mals die einzige Möglichkeit, dem faschistischen Einheitsgedanken jener Jahre zu ent-
kommen und sich einem Philosophen anzuschließen, der schon 1925 das Manifesto
degli intellettuali antifascisti (Das Manifest der antifaschistischen Intellektuellen) veröf-
fentlicht hatte.
In dieser Dissertation, mit der Bobbio 1931 in der Juristischen Fakultät promovierte,
findet man zwei Hinweise auf Kelsen. Beide sind einigermaßen kritisch, aber sie zei-
gen, dass Bobbio die Reine Rechtslehre schon genau kannte: „In Deutschland führte
die Rechtswissenschaft zu einem starren Formalismus, welcher in der Neukantiani-
schen Philosophie von Stammler und Kelsen mündete“;12 außerdem: „führte Kelsen
diesen Formalismus, der vermutlich von Kant abgeleitet worden war, zu seinen äu-
10 Renato Treves, Prefazione [Milano, 1967], S. 11, in: Hans Kelsen, Lineamenti di dottrina pura del diritto,
Einaudi, Torino 1967, 227 S., bis heute mehrmals neuveröffentlicht. Vgl. außerdem: Hans Kelsen – Renato
Treves, Formalismo giuridico e realtà sociale. A cura di Stanley L. Paulson, Edizioni scientifiche italiane, Na-
poli 1992, 211 S.
11 Zu Geymonat vgl. Norberto Bobbio, La mia Italia, Passigli, Firenze 2000, S. 96–112; id., Ludovico Ge-
ymonat (1908–1991), “Atti dell’Accademia delle Scienze di Torino”, 1993, Bd. 127, S. 73–80 (fast wörtlich wie-
dergegeben in id., Ricordo di Ludovico Geymonat, „Rivista di Filosofia“, 1993, S. 3–19).
12 Norberto Bobbio, Filosofia e dogmatica del diritto, Tesi di Laurea in Filosofia del Diritto, 1931, S. 150; un-
veröffentlichtes Typoskript, aufbewahrt im Archivio Storico dell’Università di Torino. Eine Bewertung von

ßersten Konsequenzen“, sodass „die Rechtswissenschaft zur formellen Wissenschaft par

excellence wurde; die Allgemeine Rechtslehre neigte tendenziell dazu, sich in eine
‚Reine Rechtswissenschaft‘ zu verwandeln“.13
Diese aseptischen Formulierungen sind nicht respektvoller Ehrfurcht geschuldet,
denn der junge Bobbio erlaubte sich gerne auch bissige kritische Formulierungen.
Zum Beispiel haben die antihusserlianischen Anmerkungen von Julius Kraft – „kel-
senianischer Rechtsphilosoph und demzufolge Formalist“ – für Bobbio den Beige-
schmack der Bemerkungen eines Kunstlaien zu einem modernen Bild – „obwohl sie
häufig auch zutreffen und anregen zum Nachdenken“.14 In einem Buch des Jahres 1934
betont Bobbio kritisch, dass „die Neukantianer bei der Analyse der juristischen Erfah-
rung die Rechtsbegriffe zur Kategorie erhoben hatten“; sie hatten jedoch „kein Kapitel
hinzugefügt, das vorher fehlte“, sondern „sie hatten einzig und allein den unmissver-
ständlichen Sinn verdreht“.15
Der neukantianischen Philosophie, die ihm unfruchtbar erscheint, zieht der junge
Bobbio den damals in Italien dominierenden Neuidealismus von Croce und Genti-
le vor. Diese Auffassung der Rechtsphilosophie ist auch in den ersten akademischen,
zweifellos antiformalistischen Büchern von Bobbio vertreten: „Damals war ich nicht
so sehr ein Nicht-Kelsenianer, sondern vielmehr ein Anti-Kelsenianer“,16 schrieb er
1992, und Jahre später bezeichnet er selbst seine Annäherung an die Reine Rechtslehre
von Kelsen als eine „Bekehrung“.17
Der Verweis auf diese Bekehrung taucht auf diesen Seiten mehrmals auf und es
ist deshalb angebracht, darauf hinzuweisen, dass Bobbio selbst diese Bezeichnung
benutzt: „Ich spreche von ‚Bekehrung‘, denn nur so erkläre ich einerseits die Verges-
senheit, in die ich meine vorangegangenen juristischen Schriften geraten ließ, und an-
dererseits das schon mehrmals wiederholte Geständnis, dass mit dem gewaltsamen
Bruch mit der Vergangenheit, der zwischen 1934 und 1946 die Geschichte unseres Lan-
des kennzeichnete, ein Bruch meines privaten und öffentlichen, intellektuellen und
moralischen Lebens einherging. Incepit vita nova“.18
Bobbios Stellung in seinen Lehrjahren gegenüber Kelsen ist zu finden in Mario G. Losano, Norberto Bobbio.
Una biografia culturale, S. 214–219.
13 Bobbio, Filosofia e dogmatica del diritto, Tesi di Laurea, zit., S. 163 f.
14 Bobbio zitiert: “Kraft, Von Husserl zu Heidegger (Leipzig 1932)” (Bobbio, La fenomenologia di Husserl,
Tesi di Laurea in filosofia teoretica, 1934, S. 192 f., Fn 2; unveröffentlichtes Typoskript, aufbewahrt im Archi-
vio Storico dell’Università di Torino.
15 Bobbio, Filosofia e dogmatica del diritto, Tesi di Laurea, zit., S. 200; seine Kritik des Neukantianismus
endet auf S. 205.
16 Bobbio, Diritto e potere, zit., S. 5 (Prefazione).
17 Losano, Norberto Bobbio. Una biografia culturale, zit., S. 218 f.
18 Bobbio, Diritto e potere, zit., S. 7, vgl. auch Losano, Norberto Bobbio Una biografia culturale, zit., S. 218 f.

346 MARIO G. LOSANO
4. Treves als Kelsenianer: die Übersetzung von Kelsen und das Exil
Die Verfestigung des Faschismus zwang Treves zu einer radikalen Veränderung seines
Lebens. Wie von Bobbio in der bereits erwähnten Passage festgestellt, geht Kelsens
Rezeption in Italien erst mit der Übersetzung von Renato Treves (von dem ich in Kür-
ze sprechen werde) einher, obwohl der erste von Kelsens Aufsätzen schon 192419 ins
Italienische übersetzt worden war und sogar einige seiner Aufsätze über die Demokra-
tie unter der Schirmherrschaft des faschistischen Ministers Bottai20 in der Schule für
Korporationsstudien der Universität Pisa übersetzt und veröffentlicht wurden.
Der Aufsatz von Kelsen über seine Reine Rechtslehre des Jahres 1933 entstand im
Jahr der Machtübernahme des Nationalsozialismus in Deutschland. Fünf Jahre spä-
ter verabschiedete auch Italien seine ersten rassistischen Gesetze. So schiffte sich Tre-
ves 1938 nach Argentinien ein, in ein Exil, das bis zum Kriegsende dauern wird. Seine
argentinischen Erlebnisse und seine Studien der Rechtssoziologie (ein Fach, das er
später – bei seiner Rückkehr nach Kriegsende – nach Italien bringen wird) wurden
in Studien vertieft, auf die wir hier nur verweisen können;21 wir wollen unsere Auf-
merksamkeit mehr auf die italienische Rezeption der Reinen Rechtslehre lenken. Sie
begann mit der bereits erwähnten Übersetzung von 1933, die Renato Treves von Del
Vecchio anvertraut worden war. Jener Artikel in der Fachzeitschrift und der entspre-
chende Sonderdruck kursierten nur unter Fachleuten, denn die deutsche und die ita-
lienische Diktatur kontrollierten das kulturelle Leben immer eingehender, verabschie-
deten rassistische Gesetze (welche die Veröffentlichung und sogar die Erwähnung von
Schriften jüdischer Autoren verboten) und schließlich bereiteten sie den Krieg vor, der
in Deutschland 1939 und in Italien 1940 ausgebrochen ist.
19 Die erste in Italien veröffentlichte Schrift Kelsens ist aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach Diritto pubblico e
privato, “Rivista internazionale di filosofia del diritto”, 1924, S. 340–357. Ein Panorama der Rezeption Kel-
sens in Italien findet sich in: Mario G. Losano, La fortuna di Kelsen in Italia, in id., Forma e realtà in Kelsen,
Comunità, Milano 1981, S. 179–212.
20 Über das Interesse der Pisanischen Faschisten für Kelsen als Theoretiker der Demokratie, vgl. meine
Einführung Tra democrazia in crisi e corporativismo in ascesa: il primo libro italiano di Hans Kelsen, in: Hans
Kelsen – Arnaldo Volpicelli, Parlamentarismo, democrazia e corporativismo. Prefazione e cura di Mario G.
Losano, Nino Aragno Editore, Torino 2012, S. 7–79.
21 Carlo Nitsch, Renato Treves esule in Argentina, Accademia delle Scienze, Torino 2014, 239 S.; Mario G.
Losano, Renato Treves, sociologo tra il Vecchio e il Nuovo Mondo. Con il regesto di un archivio ignoto e la biblio-
grafia di Renato Treves, Unicopli, Milano 1998, VIII, 210 S.

5. Der Beginn der Demokratie in Italien und Bobbios „Bekehrung“

zu Kelsen (1949)
In seinen frühen Werken ist Bobbio sehr kritisch jedoch respektvoll gegenüber Kel-
sen; nach und nach verwandelt sich dieser Respekt in Aufmerksamkeit und schließlich
verwandelt sich die Aufmerksamkeit in Zustimmung. Diese Annäherung erfolgte in
Padua im Laufe seiner Vorlesungen 1940–1941 über die Rechtsquellen (durch „einen
Paragraphen über den Stufenbau des Rechtssystems, der mich seit damals faszinierte“)
und in den Vorlesungen im darauffolgenden Jahr 1941–1942 über das subjektive Recht
(„die letzten Seiten enthalten eine mit deutlicher Zustimmung präsentierte Darstel-
lung der kelsenianischen Kritik am subjektiven Recht“).22 Am Ende wurde diese offen-
sichtliche Sympathie für Kelsen im Jahre 1949 in der Kritik an der allgemeinen Rechts-
theorie von Francesco Carnelutti deutlich: Der oberflächlichen Kritik von Carnelutti
setzt Bobbio eine Erläuterung der kelsenianischen Lehre entgegen, die einer Zustim-
mung gleichkommt. „Wenn ich ein Datum bestimmen müsste, mit dem meine Werke
der Reife beginnen“, so Bobbio, „würde ich das Jahr 1949 angeben, als ich in Italien eine
Analyse und einen Kommentar zur Teoria generale del diritto (Allgemeine Rechtstheorie)
von Francesco Carnelutti“23 veröffentlichte.
6. Die Rückkehr von Treves und „Die Reine Rechtslehre“ als Band (1952)
Treves konnte sich erst nach seiner Rückkehr nach Italien im Jahr 1947 der Verbreitung
der Reinen Rechtslehre widmen. Für jene, die aus rassistischen oder politischen Grün-
den entlassen worden waren, sah das Gesetz nun die Wiedereingliederung in die vor-
herige berufliche Position vor, aber die Verfahren waren schwerfällig und erforderten
viel Zeit. Erst zu Beginn der 1950er Jahre konnte Treves wieder seine Übersetzung des
Kelsenschen Textes aufnehmen und so schlug er dem von Giulio Einaudi geleiteten
Turiner Verlag eine neue italienische Auflage vor. In der Zwischenzeit war Norberto
Bobbio – mit dem Treves während seines argentinischen Exils immer in Verbindung
geblieben war – von der Universität von Padua zu jener von Turin zurückgekehrt und
zwar auf den Lehrstuhl von Gioele Solari. Bobbio war auch ein einflussreicher Berater
im Einaudi-Verlag. Nach Diktatur und Krieg konnte die Schule von Turin wieder ihre
Aktivitäten aufnehmen.
22 Bobbio, Diritto e potere, zit., S. 6.

23 Norberto Bobbio, Prólogo a la edición española, in Contribución a la teoría del derecho. Edición a cargo
de Alfonso Ruiz Miguel, Fernando Torres, Valencia 1980, S. 10. Eine sorgfältige Darstellung von Bobbios
rechtstheoretischem Denken ist in der Einleitung zu jenem Buch enthalten: Alfonso Ruiz Miguel, Bobbio y
el positivismo jurídico italiano, S. 15–58; und vor allem im wichtigen Buch von Alfonso Ruiz Miguel, Filosofía
y derecho en Norberto Bobbio, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid 1983, 509 S.

348 MARIO G. LOSANO
Dank des wieder aufgefrischten Kontakts zwischen Bobbio und Treves übernahm
der Einaudi-Verlag 1952 die Überarbeitung und die Veröffentlichung einer Neufassung
des 1933 übersetzten kelsenianischen Aufsatzes. Der Text von 1933 erfuhr einige Ände-
rungen, die Treves folgendermaßen zusammenfasst: „Teil dieser Arbeit wurde von mir
aus dem nicht veröffentlichten, deutschen Original mit dem Titel Die Reine Rechtsleh-
re Grundlegende Methoden und Konzepte, 1933 im ‚Archivio Giuridico‘24 übersetzt. Die
vorliegende Arbeit ist die völlig neue Übersetzung des umfassenderen Werkes samt
Vorwort, das 1934 im Verlag Franz Deuticke, Leipzig und Wien, unter dem Titel Reine
Rechtslehre Einleitung in die rechtswissenschaftliche Problematik erschien.“25
In der Übersetzung bei Einaudi wurde der deutsche Untertitel weggelassen und der
Titel des Bandes war nur Die Reine Rechtslehre. Diese gekürzte Formulierung machte
später eine geringe Änderung des Titels erforderlich; doch damit werden wir uns in
Kürze befassen. Das Buch wurde in die von Antonio Giolitti und Norberto Bobbio
1943 gegründete „Collana di cultura giuridica“ („Reihe der Rechtskultur“) aufgenom-

men; nach 1945 wurde diese in „Reihe der Rechts- und Politikkultur“ umbenannt. Das
Buch aus dem Jahre 1952 ist umfassender als der Artikel von 1933, denn Treves hat ein
Vorwort des Übersetzers hinzugefügt sowie Kelsen zwei Aufsätze, die er in den Vereinig-
ten Staaten geschrieben hatte.26
Mit dieser Ausgabe von 1952 beginnt also die erfolgreiche Verbreitung der Reinen
Rechtslehre in Italien, die sich mit den zahlreichen darauffolgenden Ausgaben dieses
Werkes und mit der Übersetzung der zweiten deutschen Ausgabe im Jahre 1960 weiter
behauptet hat.
7. Die zweite Ausgabe der „Reinen Rechtslehre“ (1966)
Es ist gebräuchlich, dass der Verlag, der ein Werk eines Autors übersetzt hat, die Opti-
on auf die Übersetzung des folgenden Werkes hat. So hat der Einaudi-Verlag 1960 auch
die Übersetzungsrechte der zweiten Ausgabe der Reinen Rechtslehre erhalten. Dieses
Werk unterschied sich von dem des Jahres 1952, das Renato Treves in Italien vorgelegt
hatte. Die Grundauffassung war dieselbe, aber der Umfang der zweiten Ausgabe stieg
deutlich an. Von der ersten Ausgabe konnte man, wie von den Seiten Senecas, nichts
wegnehmen; zur zweiten Ausgabe konnte man, wie zu den Seiten Ciceros, nichts hin-
zufügen. Wenngleich dem Werk derselbe konzeptuelle Ansatz zugrunde lag, waren die
24 Vgl. Fn. 9.
25 Renato Treves, Prefazione del traduttore, S. 15, in: Hans Kelsen, La dottrina pura del diritto, Einaudi,
Torino 1952, 203 S.
26 Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence, “Harvard Law Review”, 1941, S. 44–70; id.,
Causality and Imputation, “Ethics”, 1950, S. 1–11. Beide Essays waren schon von Kelsen selbst in die Auflage
von 1934 der Reinen Rechtslehre aufgenommen worden.

zwei Ausgaben sehr unterschiedlich und deshalb benötigte die zweite Ausgabe eine
neue Übersetzung.
In jenen Jahren kam ich an die Juristische Fakultät in Turin; ich besuchte die Se-
minare von Bobbio und legte bei ihm am 3. Juni 1959 meine erste Prüfung ab: Dieses
Datum stellt den Beginn einer über vierzigjährigen Verbundenheit dar. Mit einer Ver-
trauensgeste, die mich heute noch verwundert, betraute Bobbio mich – der noch sein
Student war – mit der Übersetzung der zweiten Ausgabe der Reinen Rechtslehre.27 Das
Übersetzen von Kelsen unter der Aufsicht von Bobbio war für mich eine unvergleich-
liche Bildungserfahrung.
Im Laufe der Übersetzungsarbeit und in der Erwartung ihrer Veröffentlichung
schickte mir Hans Kelsen mehrere Briefe mit Korrekturen und Ergänzungen, die ich
in der Endversion der Arbeit berücksichtigte und die jetzt in der Studienausgabe von
201728 aufgenommen worden sind. Die Briefe wurden überdies getrennt veröffent-
licht.29 In jenem Schriftwechsel beschlossen wir auch, die Titel der zwei kelsenschen
Werke des Einaudi-Katalogs zu differenzieren: die Ausgabe von Treves des Jahres 1952
bekam den Titel Lineamenti di dottrina pura del diritto (Grundzüge der Reinen Rechts-
lehre),30 während der klassische Titel Die Reine Rechtslehre der zweiten italienischen
Ausgabe von 1966 vorbehalten wurde. Der Anhang über die Gerechtigkeit der zweiten
deutschen Ausgabe wurde in Italien als getrenntes Büchlein veröffentlicht.31
Die drei Werke von Kelsen gibt es noch heute im Katalog des Einaudi-Verlags und
seit ihrer Veröffentlichung trugen sie nicht nur in Italien, sondern auch im Ausland,
besonders in den romanischen Ländern zur Verbreitung der Reinen Rechtslehre bei.
Treves hatte seine Kontakte mit den südamerikanischen Kollegen sowie mit den spa-
nischen Kollegen aufrechterhalten, die während des Franquismus ihr Land verlassen
hatten und erst nach 1975 nach Spanien zurückgekehrt waren. Die Gelehrten Gregorio
Peces Barba aus Madrid und Celso Lafer aus São Paulo sowie ihre zahlreichen Schüler
27 Die Übersetzung war 1962 fertig, die Veröffentlichung verzögerte sich jedoch, weil die Reihe im Verlag
Einaudi umgestaltet wurde: Hans Kelsen, La dottrina pura del diritto. Saggio introduttivo e traduzione di Ma-
rio G Losano, Einaudi, Torino 1966, CIII, 418 S. (Nuova Biblioteca Scientifica Einaudi). Vgl. § 3.7. (Bobbio
e la filosofia del diritto nella casa editrice Einaudi), in: Losano, Norberto Bobbio. Una biografia culturale, zit.,
S. 185–187.
28 Die Korrekturen, die Hans Kelsen mir für die italienische Übersetzung zusendete, wurden als Fußno-
ten in der italienischen Ausgabe aufgenommen; auf Deutsch sind sie nun in: Reine Rechtslehre Studienaus-
gabe der 2 Auflage 1960, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2017, einverleibt, mit einem Kommentar des Herausgebers
Matthias Jestaedt, S. LXXX ff.
29 Nicoletta Bersier Ladavac (Hrsg.), Con esattezza kelseniana Precisazioni sulla Dottrina pura del diritto
nelle lettere di Kelsen a Losano, Giuffrè, Milano 2003, XIV, 98 S.; das Buch enthält auch die Schrift von Ruth
Erne, Eine letzte authentische Revision der Reinen Rechtslehre, „Rechtstheorie“ (Beiheft 5: Rechtssystem und
gesellschaftliche Basis bei Hans Kelsen), 1984, S. 35–62.
30 Hans Kelsen, Lineamenti di dottrina pura del diritto. Traduzione di Renato Treves, Einaudi, Torino 1967,
227 S. (Piccola Biblioteca Einaudi).
31 Hans Kelsen, Il problema della giustizia. A cura di Mario G. Losano, Einaudi, Torino 1975, XXXIX, 133
S. (Piccola Biblioteca Einaudi).

350 MARIO G. LOSANO
beziehen sich auf Bobbio und – sowohl durch Bobbio wie auch direkt – auf Kelsen.
Bobbio hatte sich einen lustigen Reim ausgedacht: „Di una cosa io mi glorio: | della
scuola di Gregorio“ (Auf eine Sache bin ich stolz: | Auf die Schule von Gregorio).
8. Bobbio von der Rechtsphilosophie zur Politikphilosophie:

die kelsenianische Kontinuität (1972)
Wie bei Kelsen enthält auch die Lehre Bobbios sowohl die Rechtsphilosophie wie
auch die politische Theorie. Bis 1972, als er zur Fakultät für Politische Wissenschaften
wechselte, beschäftigte sich Bobbio vorwiegend mit der Rechtsphilosophie. Ab jenem
Jahr überwogen bei Bobbio die politologischen Studien, auch wenn sein Interesse für
die Rechtsphilosophie nicht verschwand.32
So endet das Jahrhundert der Rechtsphilosophie in Turin: Es fing im Jahr 1872 mit
Giuseppe Carle an und endete im Jahre 1972 mit dem Wechsel von Bobbio zur Fakul-
tät für Politische Wissenschaften. Kelsen begleitete Bobbio auch in dieser Phase seiner
Überlegungen, denn Bobbio berief sich ständig auf den Begriff der Verfahrensdemo-
kratie, der von Kelsen stammte. Wir können hier abschließend bemerken: Mit dem
Jahr 1972 hatte sich die Reine Rechtslehre von Kelsen in Italien etabliert und Juristen
und Politologen können – billigend oder ablehnend – nicht umhin, sich darauf zu be-
rufen.
Mario G. Losano
Accademia delle Scienze, Via Maria Vittoria 3, 20121 Turin, Italien, mario.losano@yahoo.it
32 Dieser Periode in Bobbios Leben ist die ganze Parte terza meines Bandes Norberto Bobbio Una biografia
culturale, zit., S. 325–452, gewidmet.

Did Walter Jellinek Invent Hans Kelsen’s
Basic Norm?
STANLEY L. PAULSON
Abstract: Walter Jellinek (1885–1955), in Gesetz, Gesetzesanwendung und Zweckmäßigkeits-

erwägung (1913), offered a clear statement of a basic norm. Kelsen criticized Jellinek’s con-
cept in some detail in Das Problem der Souveränität and then returned to the issue in later
work, in a far more relaxed way. It is not at all obvious that Kelsen was influenced by Jellinek
in his own work on the basic norm. Still, the comparison of their respective approaches
and, in particular, Kelsen’s reactions at different points in his work to Jellinek are instructive.
Keywords: Walter Jellinek, Hans Kelsen, basic norm, validity, genesis, legal change
Schlagworte: Walter Jellinek, Hans Kelsen, Grundnorm, Geltung, Genese, Rechtsänderung
The career of Hans Kelsen’s basic norm (Grundnorm) has been one of notoriety. Some
have found it simply baffling – to draw on Churchill, “a riddle wrapped in a mystery in-
side an enigma”. One way of contending with the basic norm is largely to ignore it, a
stance evident in certain circles favourably disposed to Kelsen’s legal philosophy. Kelsen
himself, however, seems to have placed great stock in the notion, writing that “the presup-
positions of legal cognition are implied as a part of the sense of the basic norm”,1 that “the
normative import of all the material facts constituting the legal system” is “[r]ooted in the
basic norm”,2 that the basic norm “confers law-creating power”3 and therefore represents
“the point of departure for a procedure: the procedure for creating the positive law”.4
1 Hans Kelsen, Die philosophischen Grundlagen der Naturrechtslehre und des Rechtspositivismus (Charlotten-
berg 1928) [hereafter: PhG], § 10 (26) (emphasis in original). All translations from German texts stem from
the author and Bonnie Litschweski Paulson.
2 Hans Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory (Oxford 1992), a translation by Stanley L. Paulson
and Bonnie Litschewski Paulson of the first edition of the Reine Rechtslehre [hereafter: LT], § 29 (58).
3 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, trans. Anders Wedberg (Cambridge, Mass. 1945) [hereafter:
GTLS], 116.
4 Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, second edition (Vienna 1960) [hereafter: RR 2], § 34(c) (202).

352 STANLEY L. PAULSON
Should one seek to lend a modicum of sense to this most puzzling of all the con-
cepts in Kelsen’s répertoire, various approaches are at hand. For example, it would be
reasonable to track the various forms of the basic norm, where “form” is for the most
part taking its cues from Kelsenian norm theory.5 Thus, the form adumbrated in the
third and fourth quotations in the previous paragraph suggests the empowering norm
qua form of the basic norm, to wit: the basic norm qua ultimate basis of the empower-
ment to issue legal norms.6 Or, one might turn to the ostensible functions of the basic
norm, say, a grounding function alongside an explicative function, and this alongside
a unifying function.7 In the present paper, my tack is to ask: did Walter Jellinek invent
Kelsen’s basic norm? Therein lies a set of interesting developments, turning both on
what Jellinek was up to and on how Kelsen responded.
Walter Jellinek,8 in a major treatise, Statute, Statutory Application, and an Exam-
ination of Purposiveness (1913), introduces his own basic norm or, as he puts it, the
5 See generally Stanley L. Paulson, “The Makings of a Radical Norm Theory”, in Rechtsphilosophie und
Grundrechtstheorie Robert Alexys System, ed. Martin Borowski et al. (Tübingen 2017), 589–630.
6 It turns out, not surprisingly in my view, that the basic norm qua ultimate empowerment is the most fre-
quently encountered characterization of the basic norm in Kelsen’s writings. See e. g. Hans Kelsen, Der sozio-
logische und juristische Staatsbegriff (Tübingen 1920), § 17 (at 101 n.); Hans Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre (Berlin
1925), § 19(c) (at 99), § 36(a)(b) (at 249, 251); Kelsen, PhG (Fn. 1), § 3 (at 12), § 8 (at 19), § 9 (at 20), § 10 (at
21); Kelsen, LT (Fn. 2), § 30(a) (at 59); Kelsen, GTLS (Fn. 3), at 113, 116; Kelsen, RR 2 (Fn. 4), § 34(b)(c)(g)
(at 199, 202–3, 219). (These references to Kelsen’s texts on the characterization of the basic norm qua ultimate
empowerment are meant to be representative, but they are of course by no means exhaustive.)
7 See e. g. Stanley L. Paulson, “A ‘Justified Normativity’ Thesis in Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law?” in Insti-
tutionalized Reason. The Jurisprudence of Robert Alexy, ed. Matthias Klatt (Oxford 2012), 61–111, at 85–92; Stan-
ley L. Paulson, “Das regulative Prinzip als Rettung der Reinen Rechtslehre Hans Kelsens?” in Wissenschaftsphi-
losophie im Neukantianismus, ed. Christian Krijnen and Kurt Walter Zeidler (Würzburg 2014), 259–88.
8 Walter Jellinek (1885–1955), son of the celebrated public lawyer and legal theorist Georg Jellinek, studied pub-
lic law with the giants in the field, to wit: he was awarded the doctorate in 1908, supervised by Paul Laband in
Strassburg; his Habilitation, completed in 1912, was supervised by Otto Mayer in Leipzig. Jellinek held a profes-
sorship first in Kiel, then in Heidelberg, where he was professor of law to the end of his life, with the exception of
the Nazi period (ousted from his professorship in 1935 on the authority of the notorious statute of 7 April 1933).
Jellinek’s main field of research was administrative law. Along with the treatise cited below (Fn. 9), his treatise
Verwaltungsrecht is significant (see Fn. 10); it went through five editions, the last of them published posthu-
mously (1966). Jellinek’s doctoral dissertation, Der fehlerhafte Staatsakt und seine Wirkungen (Tübingen, 1908),
is an influential study of the treatment accorded to mistakes in the law; Kelsen, in an early paper, discusses the
book at length, see Hans Kelsen, “Über Staatsunrecht”, Grünhuts Zeitschrift für das Privat- und Öffentliche Recht
der Gegenwart 40 (1914), 1–114, at 47–95, in Hans Kelsen Werke, ed. Matthias Jestaedt (Tübingen 2008 ff.), over
30 vols. projected [hereafter: HKW with volume no.], HKW 3, 439–531, at 476–515. The secondary literature on
Walter Jellinek’s life and work includes Klaus Kempter, Die Jellineks 1820–1955 Eine familienbiographische Studie
zum deutschjüdischen Bildungsbürgertum (Düsseldorf 1998), 440–97 et passim; Kempter’s treatise is unusually
rewarding. See also Martin Schulte, “Walter Jellinek (1885–1995)”, in Staatsrechtslehrer des 20. Jahrhunderts, ed.
Peter Häberle et al. (Berlin 2015), 299–311. Jan Ziekow, “Die Einhelligkeit der Rechtsentscheidung – Zu Leben
und Werk Walter Jellineks”, Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 111 (1986), 219–30; Klaus-Peter Schroeder, “Eine Univer-
sität für Juristen und von Juristen”. Die Heidelberger Juristische Fakultät im 19 und 20 Jahrhundert (Tübingen 2010),
457–68 et passim. In his treatise A History of Public Law in Germany 1914–1945, trans. Thomas Dunlap (Oxford
2004), at 147, 185–6, 190, and 202–4, Michael Stolleis gives the reader a glimpse into Jellinek’s role at meetings
during the Weimar period of the Association of German Public Law Teachers.

Did Walter Jellinek Invent Hans Kelsen’s Basic Norm? 353
“highest principle of all legal systems”.9 He introduces this “highest principle” as fol-
lows:
If in a community, a highest wielder of power – be it the people, be it a monarch, be it a
particular social class – is at hand, then what he or it commands ought to be obeyed.10
Jellinek points out that this principle, while utterly distinct from the law of nature, can
nevertheless be compared with it in certain respects.
[I]t has the same inviolability as the law of nature. Just as with the law of nature, the
[highest principle of all legal systems] is independent of reality; reality consists simply of
instances of the application of the [respective] principles. Revolutions, the formation of
states, the destruction of states, constitutional norms, and so on are material facts to which
the highest principle attaches effects.11
Thus, the highest principle, Jellinek is claiming, attaches “effects” to various “material
facts”. What sorts of effects does Jellinek have in mind? He argues, for example, that
a constitutional norm cannot specify that the organ it has established as lawmaker is
“more powerful” than the various social forces in reality. “[I]n a revolution, the law-
makers will fall along with everything else”.12 Thus, in an idiom familiar from James
Bryce and A. V. Dicey, Jellinek is contending that no claim of legal sovereignty can
reach beyond the social forces in reality that represent political sovereignty.13
What is the status of Jellinek’s principle? Does he understand it as normative in
character? His answer stems from a very brief commentary on a passage from Hobbes’s
De Cive. Hobbes writes:
[W]e may understand likewise as a Corollarie in the naturall state of men, That a sure and
irresistible power confers the right of Dominion, and ruling over those who cannot resist.14
Jellinek quotes the latter clause of Hobbes’s text (beginning with “That”) and con-
cludes that Hobbes’s principle is a “practical rule”, a “dictate of right reason”, which is
9 Walter Jellinek, Gesetz, Gesetzesanwendung und Zweckmäßigkeitserwägung (Tübingen 1913) [hereafter:

Gesetz], 27 ( Jellinek’s emphasis omitted).
10 Ibid. 28, 178. Jellinek’s “highest principle” turns up in later works, too. See Walter Jellinek, Verwaltungsre-
cht, 1st edn (Berlin 1929), at 112–13 and 113 n., in the 2nd edn (1929), at 112 and 112 n., and in the 3rd edn (1931),
119 and 119 n.
11 Jellinek, Gesetz (Fn. 9), 28.
12 Ibid. 27.
13 See James Bryce, Studies in History and Jurisprudence, 2 vols. (Oxford 1901), vol. 2, at Essay X (49–111);
A. V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 8th edn (London 1915), at 68–83.
14 Thomas Hobbes, De Cive. The English Version. Originally entitled: Philosophical Rudiments concerning Gov-
ernment and Society (first publ. Latin 1642, English 1651), ed. Howard Warrender in the Clarendon Edition
of the Philosophical Works of Thomas Hobbes, vol. 3 (Oxford 1983), ch. 1, xiv (50) (emphasis in original).

to say that it is normative in character.15 Jellinek’s own principle, however, is different;

it counts as a “theoretical explanation of legal reality”.16 This is not to say that Jellinek
would have his principle understood as empirical rather than normative. His principle
and the law of nature are neither empirical nor normative; both are “independent of
reality”17 and occupy, so to speak, a third sphere.
Jellinek puts his principle to work in explaining legal change. “Every change in real-
ity”, he writes, “is understood only through the idea of cause and effect.”18 And changes
in the law? How are they to be understood? On the one hand, natural causality is per-
vasive in the law. On the other, peculiarly legal changes – that a statute becomes valid
at a particular point in time, that it is abrogated at a later point in time, and so on – are
“certainly not explained by way of ascriptions of natural causality”.19 The required ex-
planation, whatever it comes to in the end, is to be sharply distinguished from explana-
tions stemming from natural causality.
In speaking of peculiarly legal changes, Jellinek employs the language of causation,

but in a framework that is altogether distinct from natural causality. The theory he
defends turns on the idea of a “double cause”. The statute is the primary cause, and the
application of the statute – the instantiation of the type of fact set out in the antecedent
of the hypothetically formulated statutory provision – gives rise to the concrete mate-
rial fact as the secondary cause. “The legal consequence emerges from the combined
effect of two causes.”20 Quite apart from the question of whether this causal terminolo-
gy is helpful, Jellinek is clear on the distinction between his position and that of natural
causality.21
Kelsen, in The Problem of Sovereignty (1920), raises three objections to Jellinek’s
scheme. First, he writes, “the highest principle of all legal systems” cannot be embed-
ded in a legal community, for this highest principle first establishes the community.
Apparently Kelsen understands Jellinek’s highest principle as constitutive of the le-
gal community. Jellinek might have a rejoinder here. He might ask: must the “highest
15 Jellinek, Gesetz (Fn. 9), 28 n. Oddly enough, Jellinek does not quote the passage from De Cive that
would justify his claim that Hobbes’s principle counts as a “dictate of right reason”. The passage from De Cive
in question here follows directly upon the text Jellinek quotes, and it reads: “Yet cannot men expect any
lasting preservation continuing thus in the state of nature (i e ) of War, by reason of that equality of power,
and other humane faculties they are endued withall. Wherefore to seek Peace, where there is any hope of
obtaining it, and where there is none, to enquire out for Auxiliaries of War, is the dictate of right Reason;
that is, the Law of Nature, as shall be shewed in the next Chapter.” Hobbes, De Cive (Fn. 14) (emphasis in
original). See also Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (first publ. 1651), at ch. 13 and 14.
16 Jellinek, Gesetz (Fn. 9), 28 n.
17 Ibid. 28.
18 Ibid. 26 (emphasis in original).
19 Ibid. (emphasis in original).
20 Ibid. 27.
21 Not at all clear, however, is the question of how Jellinek’s “highest principle of all legal systems” serves
to explain peculiarly legal changes.

principle” be independent of that which it constitutes? If certain rules serve to consti-

tute a game, are they not, so to speak, embedded in the game?
Next, Kelsen turns to a related objection: the presupposition of a “highest wielder
of power”, Kelsen contends, is a petitio principii, for one becomes a highest wielder of
power only by means of the “hypothesis of a ‘highest’ authority”.22 This is obscure, but
it appears that Kelsen, in referring to the “hypothesis of a ‘highest’ authority”, is mak-
ing reference to his own basic norm. Here, too, Kelsen is apparently treating Jellinek’s
principle as constitutive.
Then, however, Kelsen pulls the rug out from under us, announcing that these are
not “decisive objections”.23 Indeed, one is tempted to add, they do not count as objec-
tions at all, for they represent the very confusion that Kelsen, elsewhere in his writings,
goes to great pains to clear up: the confusion between genesis and validity, Genese und
Geltung.24 That is, it is possible to interpret Jellinek’s “highest principle” in either of two
ways – either in terms that reflect its manner of coming into being or in terms that re-
flect its status, whether – a standard reading of “validity” – it holds. Thus, the principle
might be understood as constitutive – Kelsen’s interpretation of Jellinek’s principle –
or as validating. If, now, Jellinek’s own reading of the principle reflects the latter inter-
pretation, namely the highest principle as validating, then Kelsen cannot legitimately
raise objections that turn on Jellinek’s “highest principle” as a constitutive principle –
not, at any rate, without adducing arguments to the effect that Jellinek’s own reading is
mistaken. Simply to attribute to Jellinek the constitutive reading, without further ado,
is to construct a strawman.
Kelsen, however, is ready with a third objection to Jellinek’s principle. As we have
seen, Jellinek argues that his highest principle enjoys the same “inviolable” status as the
law of nature. “Like the law of nature”, Jellinek writes, “the highest principle cannot be
abolished.” Kelsen replies:
[T]his parallel to the law of nature could be discussed were it not for the fact that Walter
Jellinek’s juridical law of nature gives expression to the relation of cause and effect… [T]his
confounding of natural reality with legal reality is something I must emphatically reject.25
22 Hans Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität (Tübingen 1920) [hereafter: PS], § 24 (at 98 n.), in HKW 4
(Fn. 8), at 363–4 n., quoting from Jellinek, Gesetz (Fn. 9), 27.
23 Kelsen, PS (Fn. 22), § 24 (at 98 n.), in HKW 4 (Fn. 8), at 363–4 n.
24 Kelsen offers an elegant statement of the distinction: “The psychological determination [of an idea] is
irrelevant to the (logical) validity of the idea, the truth of its content. The thought process whose content is
the Pythagorean theorem is, for the correctness of the theorem, inconsequential.” Kelsen, PS (Fn. 22), § 3
(16) (emphasis in original). Indeed, the statement can be compared favourably with Frege’s: “No descrip-
tion of … mental processes which precede the forming of a judgement of number … can ever take the place
of a genuine definition of the concept.” Gottlob Frege, Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Breslau, 1884), § 26 (34).
25 Kelsen, PS (Fn. 22), § 24 (at 98 n.), in HKW 4 (Fn. 8), at 363–4 n.

This criticism of Kelsen’s is not warranted. Jellinek addresses peculiarly legal changes,
and it is in this context that he distinguishes the statute as the primary cause from the
concrete material fact as the secondary cause. Nothing here warrants the claim that
Jellinek has confounded “natural reality with legal reality”.
One could go further in spelling out Jellinek’s rejoinder. For example, he might re-
ply to Kelsen that he is working with two altogether separate distinctions. First, there is
the distinction between the normative and the empirical, with Jellinek’s “highest prin-
ciple” addressed to the former and the law of nature addressed to the latter. Second,
there is the distinction between, on the one side, the two spheres – one normative and
the other empirical – and, on the other side, a third sphere, that in which both Jellinek’s
“highest principle” and the law of nature are found. It goes without saying that one can
quarrel with Jellinek’s distinctions. But to proceed as though he had not made these
distinctions, to say, as Kelsen does, that Jellinek “confound[s] natural reality with legal
reality”, marks a failure on Kelsen’s part to address Jellinek’s position. The examination
of Kelsen’s objections to Walter Jellinek prompts the thought, gender aside: “Methinks
the lady doth protest too much.”
Many years later, Kelsen refers once again to Walter Jellinek, suggesting, this time
around, that Jellinek played a key role in the development of the basic norm as Kelsen
understands it. Challenging his critic, Albert Volanthen, who writes that “[t]he ba-
sic norm is one of the most fundamental innovations of the Pure Theory of Law”,26
Kelsen, nothing if not pugnacious, rejects Volanthen’s suggestion. As Kelsen explains,
writing in 1966:
I first employed the concept of the basic norm, namely, as a “highest norm, presupposed
as valid”, in an article … that appeared in 1914… . But, as I expressly acknowledged in my
monograph The Problem of Sovereignty, … Walter Jellinek (in a monograph of 1913) spoke
of a “highest principle of all legal systems”, which he formulated in a manner very similar
to my own formulation of the basic norm. … Walter Jellinek’s “highest principle of all legal
systems” is different from my basic norm, as I explain in the work cited above, but the two
are so similar that I cannot be characterized as the “inventor” – or, as Volanthen puts it, the
“discoverer” – of this concept.27
26 Albert Volanthen, Zu Hans Kelsens Anschauung über die Rechtsnorm (Berlin 1965), 30.
27 Kelsen, “Rechtswissenschaft oder Rechtstheologie”, Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 16
(1966), 233–55, at 241 (emphasis and quotation marks in original). Kelsen also mentions Walter Jellinek in a
second paper from this period, Hans Kelsen, “Recht, Rechtswissenschaft und Logik”, Archiv für Rechts- und
Sozialphilosophie 58 (1966), 545–52, at 549. Here he speaks of an “earlier parallel” between his own basic
norm and Walter Jellinek’s, inviting the attention of the critic to whom he is responding here, Ch. Boasson,
to the discussion of Jellinek’s views as taken up by Kelsen in The Problem of Sovereignty. Here, too, the thrust
of the paper stands in sharp contrast to the treatment Kelsen accords to Walter Jellinek in The Problem of
Sovereignty.

This, it scarcely need be added, is rather more charitable to Jellinek than Kelsen’s esti-
mate in The Problem of Sovereignty.
What general conclusions can be drawn? Nothing in Kelsen’s remarks in the 1966
paper suggests that he was actually influenced by Jellinek. One the one hand, one
might speculate, when Kelsen writes that he “cannot be characterized as the ‘inven-
tor’… of this concept”, he is perhaps suggesting that he is willing to share the limelight
with another thinker, Walter Jellinek, where the initial development or “invention” of
the basic norm is concerned. On the other hand, the reader may well protest, it is not
obvious that this bit of speculation can be taken seriously. Perhaps Kelsen’s position in
the paper is simply a reflection of his polemical stance vis-à-vis Volanthen. Of course
we do not know. It is, however, of interest in this connection that Kelsen’s remarks
in the 1966 article devoted to Volanthen’s monograph are strikingly polemical. In any
case, what he says in 1966 is clearly not a view that he was prepared to defend in The
Problem of Sovereignty.
As one would expect, a number of people in legal theory offered their views on
Kelsen and Walter Jellinek vis-à-vis the basic norm. Fritz Sander, the enfant terrible of
the Vienna School of Legal Theory and a gifted and unusually well-informed student
of Kelsen’s work, contended in a paper of 1924 that Jellinek’s basic norm and Kelsen’s
are “identical”.28 Sander’s comparison is interesting. He invites attention to the fact that
(i) both basic norms are conceptual necessities, not legal norms, (ii) both have refer-
ence to the unity of law,29 and (iii) both are inviolable. Still, there are also undeniable
differences. Jellinek’s three-sphere scheme, with the “highest principle” and the law
of nature found in a third sphere,30 has no counterpart in Kelsen’s theory, and Kelsen,
unlike Sander, introduces a number of basic norm forms, not just the form that reflects
the idea of the unity of law. By 1924, the date of Sander’s paper, this plurality of basic
norm forms was fairly clear.
Others, too, have introduced the notion of a basic norm, for example, Edmund Hus-
serl, who takes up a basic norm at several points in the “Prolegomena” to his Logical
Investigations.31 My focus in the present paper, however, has been on Walter Jellinek.
Can one say – drawing on my title – that Walter Jellinek invented Hans Kelsen’s basic
norm? I am inclined to answer negatively. Of course we cannot rule out a possible
28 See Fritz Sander, “Merkls Rechtslehre”, Wissenschaftliche Vierteljahrsschrift zur Prager Juristische Zeitschrift
4 (1924), 16–31, at 24. A comparable claim stems from Walter Jellinek, Grenzen der Verfassungsgesetzgebung
(Berlin 1931), at 16 n. 30; there Jellinek writes that “Kelsen’s fundamental norm” (Ursprungsnorm) is not
essentially different from [his own] highest principle”. Hermann Heller, Souveränität (Berlin and Leipzig
1927), at 55 n. 155, repr. Heller, Gesammelte Schriften, 3 vols., ed. Christoph Müller, 2nd edn (Tübingen 1992),
vol. 2, 31–202, at 77 n. 155, turns to both concepts, Jellinek’s and Kelsen’s, with blistering criticism.
29 See, on this, Jellinek, Gesetz (Fn. 9), at 175, to which Sander (Fn. 28) refers.
30 See the text at Fn. 17 above.
31 See Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations (first publ. 1900), 2 vols., trans. J.N. Findlay (London, 1970),
vol. 1, § 14 (at 85–6), § 16 (at 87–8).

influence stemming from Jellinek, but it seems more likely that Kelsen is following the
cues that he had first set out in Main Problems in the Theory of Public Law (1911).
In Main Problems, Kelsen is contrasting at this point the stance of the jurist with that
of the moral philosopher. He writes that the question: “why ought the legal norm be
complied with and applied?” is off limits for the jurist. Indeed, he continues, “the very
posing of this question seems on first glance to be absurd”. And it remains absurd for as
long as one is considering the matter from the standpoint of jurisprudence.
For it is intrinsic to the concept of the legal norm from the outset that the legal norm ought
to be complied with and applied. The idea of the legal norm qua ‘norm’ already contains
the qualification that the legal norm ought to be complied with and applied, so that this
question would be tantamount to asking, say, why ought a norm that ought to be complied
with be complied with?32
The punch line comes at the end of the quotation, and it underscores Kelsen’s view that
this line of enquiry is nonsense, the result of proceeding as though jurisprudence, with
its distinctly formal stance, could sensibly pose and answer the overriding material
questions.
What happens, now, if everything is in fact turned upside down? What happens if
the formal stance of jurisprudence is set aside and, with it, the idea that the legal norm
is a formal concept? Only then, from the standpoint of a “more general, higher norm”,
can one make sense of the question of obligation:
If … one does not assume the normative character of the legal norm to be a self-sufficient,
independent quality, not derivable from anything else, then the question of why a legal
norm ought to be complied with can be understood as a question about the more general,
higher norm that is superior to the legal norm at issue. For it is according to this higher
norm that behaviour complying with the legal norm appears to be commanded, to be ob-
ligatory.33
This “more general, higher norm” is a norm of morality or religion. Of course one is
free from this standpoint to pose the question of obligation as a material question.
Unless everything is in fact turned upside down, however, the jurist will not have
this freedom. It is for the moral philosopher to weigh critically an answer to the ques-
tion of obligation, while for the jurist
the normative character of the legal norm is an unshakeable presupposition, beyond all dis-
cussion. For the jurist, the knowledge that a legal norm conflicts with a moral norm cannot
in any way change the fact that he recognizes even this legal norm as a norm, that is, he
32 Hans Kelsen, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre (Tübingen 1911) [hereafter: HP], 352 (emphasis and
quotation marks in original), in HKW 2 (Fn. 8), 481.
33 Kelsen, HP (Fn. 32), 352, in HKW 2 (Fn. 8), 481.

does not doubt that it ought to be complied with and applied. Any other stance on the part
of the jurist would have him sawing off the very branch on which he sits.34
Kelsen also refers to presuppositions in the Foreword to the first printing of Main
Problems, writing that his point of departure, in addressing the problems of legal sci-
ence, is “rooted in a Weltanschauung, presuppositions that are subjective and do not
lend themselves to discussion”.35
Presupposition proves to be the key concept in Kelsen’s work on the basic norm
in his first efforts, in 1914 and 1915,36 and then continuing right up to, but not includ-
ing, the remarkable treatise of 1928, The Philosophical Foundations of Natural Law The-
ory and Legal Positivism At that point, a great deal changes. On the one hand, Kelsen
builds certain constraints into the basic norm with an eye to meeting the minimal
but necessary requirements of legal cognition, and, on the other, he takes steps in the
direction of an argument – a neo-Kantian transcendental argument – with an eye to
undergirding the basic norm as his means of grounding the legal system.37 But this is
material for another occasion.
Stanley L. Paulson
Hermann Kantorowicz-Institut, Juristisches Seminar, Leibnizstr. 6, D-24118 Kiel,
spaulson@law.uni-kiel.de
34 Kelsen, HP (Fn. 32), 353 (my emphasis), in HKW 2 (Fn. 8), 481, see also Kelsen’s use of the verb “to
presuppose” in HP, at 352, in HKW 2 (Fn. 8), at 481.
35 Kelsen, HP (Fn. 32), v, in HKW 2 (Fn. 8), 54.
36 See Hans Kelsen, “Reichsgesetz und Landesgesetz nach österreichischer Verfassung”, Archiv des öffent-
lichen Rechts 32 (1914), 202–45, 390–438, at 216–17, in HKW 3 (Fn. 8), 359–425, at 371; Hans Kelsen, “Eine
Grundlegung der Rechtssoziologie”, Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 39 (1914/15), 839–76, at
849–50, in HKW 3 (Fn. 8), 317–58, at 329–30.
37 See Kelsen, PhG (Fn. 1), §§ 10–12 (at 21–6), § 35 (at 64).


Rechtliche Natur des Staates nach Leonid Pitamic
The Legal Nature of the State according to
Leonid Pitamic
MARIJAN PAV Č NIK

Abstract: Leonid Pitamic considers the state as a normative phenomenon. Its core con-
sists of legal rules saying which territory, population and organizations belong to the state
and to which organizations this quality cannot be attributed: “The state is a juridical organ-
ization of men which is (1) established on a certain territory, which is (2) subject directly
to international law, but which has (3) authority over all juridical organizations on its terri-
tory save those which depend directly upon international law.” Thus, Pitamic qualifies the
concept of the sovereignty of the state. The state is the highest juridical organization on its
territory, yet international law, to which it is subject, is positioned higher. International i. e.
supranational rules are a necessary condition for sound relations among states.
Keywords: state, state as juridical organization, sovereignty of the state, international law,
human order, Leonid Pitamic
Schlagworte: Staat, Staat als Rechtsorganisation, Staatssouveränität, Völkerrecht, men-

schliche Ordnung, Leonid Pitamic
1. Einführung
Leonid Pitamic (1885–1971)1 war ein Zeitgenosse Kelsens. Kelsens Biograph Métall
berichtet, dass Kelsen noch während des (Ersten) Weltkriegs, als er begann die Frage
1 Über Pitamic siehe Adolf Merkl, Prof. Dr. Leonidas Pitamic zum 70. Geburtstag, Österreichische Zeit-
schrift für öffentliches Recht, 7 (1956), 145–147; Ivan Tomšič, Leonidas Pitamic in memoriam, Österreichische
Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, 23 (1972), 201–203, und Marijan Pavčnik, Leonid Pitamic (1885–1971), in:
Leonid Pitamic, Na robovih čiste teorije prava / An den Grenzen der Reinen Rechtslehre (Hrsg. und Einfüh-
rungsstudie: Marijan Pavčnik), 2005. Nachdruck: 2009 (in der Fortsetzung abgekürzt als „Pitamic, An den

362 MARIJAN PAV Č NIK
der Souveränität zu erforschen, ein Privatseminar gründete, wo ein Kreis von jünge-
ren Forschern offen über rechtstheoretische Probleme diskutierte. Zu ihnen gehör-
ten Adolf Merkl (1890–1970), Leonid Pitamic und Alfred Verdross (1890–1980), nach
Kriegsende schlossen sich noch andere an.2 Aus diesem Kreis entstand allmählich
„Die Wiener Rechtstheoretische Schule“, die „sich im wesentlichen unter dem unmit-
telbaren Einfluss Hans Kelsens entwickelt hat.“3 In Pitamic’ Fall spielten auch Merkls
Theorie des rechtlichen Stufenbaues (zusammen mit dem sogenannten Fehlerkalkül)
und Verdross’ Naturrechtstheorie (zusammen mit seiner Ansicht über die Einheit des
rechtlichen Weltbildes) eine bedeutende Rolle.
2. Der Staat als Rechtsvereinigung oder Rechtsorganisation

Kelsens Ausgangspunkt, dass Sollen (die Norm) nur aus Sollen und nicht aus Sein
hervorgehen kann, klingt bei Pitamic in der Behauptung nach, dass man (normative –
Anm. M.P.) Rechtseigenschaften nur aus Rechtseigenschaften deduzieren kann:
„Maßgebend ist nur das Verhältnis der durch positivrechtliche Formalzeichen bestimm-
ten Gruppe der Normen zu ihr positivrechtlich über- und untergeordneten Gruppen, was
jedoch mit der Rechtskraft der Norm identisch ist.“4
Die normative Ansicht weitete er auch auf den Staat, die Staatsorgane und die Ver-
hältnisse unter ihnen aus. Pitamic stellte schon in seiner Abhandlung Plato, Aristote-
les und die reine Rechtstheorie (1921) fest, dass Plato und noch stärker Aristoteles „bei
Erforschung der Begriffe Staat, Staatsbürger, Gesetz etc. streng normativ vorgingen“5
und fähig waren, methodischen Synkretismus zu vermeiden.6 Am Beispiel von Aris-
toteles’ Politik7 begründet er, dass für den Staatsbegriff „die Idee des Staates als Ord-
Grenzen der RR“), 337–340. – Der Verfasser dieses Beitrags hat sich schon mehrfach mit Pitamic beschäftigt.
Aus diesem Grund gibt es einige Überlappungen mit den früheren Aufsätzen; siehe insbesondere die Ab-
handlungen: 1. An den Grenzen der Reinen Rechtslehre, in: Pitamic, An den Grenzen der RR (Fn. 1), 153–173;
2. Leonid Pitamic, in: Robert Walter, Clemens Jabloner, Klaus Zeleny (Hrsg.), Der Kreis um Hans Kelsen
Die Anfangsjahre der Reinen Rechtslehre, 2008, 325–350; 3. Methodologische Klarheit oder gegenständliche
Reinheit des Rechts? Anmerkungen zur Diskussion Kelsen – Pitamic, Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilo-
sophie – Beiheft 136 (2013), 105–129; 4. Methodological Clarity or the Substantial Purity of Law? Notes on
the Discussion between Kelsen and Pitamic, Ratio Juris, 27 (2014) 2, 176–189; und 5. Čista teorija prava kot
izziv / Reine Rechtslehre als Anregung, 2015.
2 Rudolf Aladár Métall, Hans Kelsen Leben und Werk, 1969, 29.
3 Métall, Hans Kelsen (Fn. 2), 29. Siehe auch Walter, Jabloner, Zeleny, Der Kreis um Hans Kelsen (Fn. 1).
4 Leonid Pitamic, Ustava in zakon (Verfassung und Gesetz), Slovenski pravnik, 36 (1922), 9.
5 Leonid Pitamic, Plato, Aristoteles und die Reine Rechtstheorie, Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, 2 (1921), 700.
6 Pitamic, Plato, Aristoteles und die Reine Rechtstheorie (Fn. 5), 683.
7 Aristoteles, Politik, III, 1278b: „Staatsverfassung aber bedeutet Ordnung des Staates, der anderen Ämter und
vor allem des wichtigsten über alle; das wichtigste nämlich über alle ist die Lenkung des Staates, Staatslenkung
aber bedeutet die Staatsverfassung.“ Zitiert nach der Reclam Ausgabe (1989); übersetzt von Franz F. Schwarz.

Rechtliche Natur des Staates nach Leonid Pitamic 363
nung, als Verfassungs- oder Rechtsordnung“ wesentlich ist.8 Für jede Verbindung ist
„die Idee, das System, die Art der Verbindung, und nicht das Verbundene als entschei-
dend erkannt.“9 Pitamic erkennt, dass gerade darin eine Parallele besteht zwischen der
altgriechischen Auffassung, „die von den konstruktiven Hilfsmitteln der modernen
Jurisprudenz frei war“, und der Reinen Rechtslehre, welche „die Verselbständigung,
Verdinglichung, Hypostasierung dieser Hilfsmittel wieder auflöst und sie lediglich als
Hilfsmittel juristischer Denkökonomie gelten lassen will.“10
Das Grundwerk, in dem Pitamic die normative Natur des Staates untersucht, ist die
slowenische Monographie Država (Der Staat, 1927 – nachgedruckt 1996 und 2009).11
Sie ist seiner Natur nach eine „allgemeine Staatslehre“.12 Pitamic übersetzte das Werk
in leicht geänderter Form ins Englische und veröffentlichte es 1933 unter dem Titel
A Treatise on the State beim amerikanischen Verlag J. H. Furst Company (Baltimore,
Maryland).13
Er vertrat die Erkenntnis, dass des Staates ständiger Kern „eine Rechtsvereinigung
oder Rechtsorganisation von Menschen“ sei. Im Mittelpunkt des Staates stehen wie-
der Rechtsnormen, die besagen, welches Gebiet, Volk und welche Gewalten zum Staat
gehören und welchen Organisationen diese Qualität nicht zusteht: Der Staat ist
„die Rechtsorganisation von Menschen auf einem bestimmten Gebiet, die unmittelbar dem
Völkerrecht untergeordnet ist und der alle Rechtsorganisationen auf diesem Gebiet unter-
geordnet sind mit Ausnahme jener, die selbst unmittelbar vom Völkerrecht abhängen.“14
3. Der Inhalt des Buches Der Staat
Pitamic’ Država (Der Staat) ist in sechs Kapitel aufgeteilt, die sich auf eine abgeschlos-
sene Weise mit der rechtlichen (normativen) Natur des Staates befassen. Das erste

9 Pitamic, Plato, Aristoteles und die Reine Rechtstheorie (Fn. 5), 688. Siehe auch Alfred Verdross, Abend-
ländische Rechtsphilosophie, 2. Aufl., 1963, 44. Vgl. Hans Kelsen, Gott und Staat, Logos, 11 (1922/23), 261–284.
Zitiert nach dem Nachdruck in: Hans Klecatsky, René Marcić, Herbert Schambeck, Die Wiener rechtstheo-
retische Schule Ausgewählte Schriften von Hans Kelsen, Adolf Julius Merkl und Alfred Verdross, 1968, Bd. 1, 180.
11 Siehe auch die Abhandlung: Leonid Pitamic, Les déformations du raisonnement, sources d’erreurs dans
les théories de l’Etat, Revue internationale de la théorie du droit, 1 (1926), 47–58; darin fasste er seine Auffas-
sung vom Staat zusammen, die er ein Jahr später im Buch Država (Der Staat) entwickelte.
12 Siehe J. L. Kunz, A Treatise on the State. Von Leonidas Pitamic. 301 S. Baltimore: J. H. Furst Comp. 1933.
Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, 14 (1934), 2, 259.
13 Siehe ibidem, S. 259–261. – Diese englische Übersetzung ist jetzt auch im Nachdruck erhältlich; sie
wurde vom slowenischen Justizministerium im Herbst 2008 in Auftrag gegeben.
14 Leonid Pitamic, Država (Der Staat), 1927 (Dieses Buch wurde 1996 und 2009 anastatisch nachge-
druckt.), 44.

Kapitel spricht über das Wesen des Staates (S. 1–64).15 Der zweite Teil untersucht die
Staatsformen (S. 65–174). Im dritten Teil ist von Staatsnormen die Rede (S. 175–271).
Der vierte Teil analysiert die Staatsorgane (S. 272–445). Der fünfte Teil befasst sich
mit dem Staat und dem zwischenstaatlichen Recht (Völkerrecht) (S. 446–455), während
der sechste Teil das Verhältnis des Staates zu nichtstaatlichen Organisationen betrachtet
(S. 456–464). Aus Platzgründen möchte ich mich besonders auf das Kapitel über das
Wesen des Staates konzentrieren.
4. Die Souveränität als Qualifikation des Staates
Für Pitamic’ Definition des Staates ist es charakteristisch, dass sie den Begriff der
Staatssouveränität als der höchsten Rechtsgewalt relativiert. Die Staatsgewalt ist die
höchste Gewalt auf einem bestimmten Territorium und bezüglich der Menschen, die
sich darauf befinden, nach außen ist sie jedoch dem Völkerrecht untergeordnet. Die
Staatssouveränität ist mit dem Bestehen des Völkerrechts unvereinbar. Der Staat ist
die höchste Rechtsgewalt nach innen, auf ihrem Territorium sind alle Rechtsorgani-
sationen außer den internationalen dem Staat und nur über ihn, also indirekt dem
Völkerrecht untergeordnet.16 Dadurch erhält die Souveränität als Qualifikation des
Staates „ihre ursprüngliche Bedeutung, nämlich ‚höher‘ (lat. superanus – M. P.) an-
statt ‚höchster‘“.17 Der Staat ist also die höchste Rechtsorganisation auf dem Staats-
territorium, höher als er ist jedoch das Völkerrecht, dem der Staat untergeordnet ist.
Völkerrechtliche Normen sind die Bedingung für die Festigkeit der zwischenstaatli-
chen Beziehungen.18
5. Die Wirksamkeit und die Normativität des Staates
Der Umstand, dass der Staat von Pitamic normativiert wird, bedeutet nicht, dass der
Staat für ihn lediglich und ausschließlich „ein ideelles System von Rechtsnormen“ ist.
15 Wenn im Text nur Seitenzahlen angeführt sind, bedeutet das, dass ich mich auf Pitamic, Država (Der
Staat, Fn. 14), beziehe.
16 Pitamic, Država (Der Staat, Fn. 14), 40.
17 Pitamic, Država (Der Staat, Fn. 14), 40. Pitamic’ Ansicht über die Souveränität des Staates stimmt mit
Kelsens Ansicht über die Zukunft des Völkerrechts überein; das Dogma der Staatssouveränität muss die
Souveränität des Einzelstaates überschreiten. Siehe Hans Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theo-
rie des Völkerrechts, 1920, 320.
18 Pitamic, Država (Der Staat, Fn. 14), 37. Vgl. auch Kelsen, der in seinem Werk Das Problem der Souveräni-
tät (Fn. 17) Pitamic’ Abhandlung Die parlamentarische Mitwirkung bei Staatsverträgen in Österreich (1915)
zitierte und dabei darauf aufmerksam machte, dass Pitamic monistisch konstruiert, wenn er das Verhältnis
zwischen Staats- und Völkerrecht behandelt. Siehe Pitamic, Plato, Aristoteles und die Reine Rechtstheorie
(Fn. 5), 176–177.

Der Staat ist auch tatsächliche Gewalt, die sich „als die höchste Rechtsorganisation
eines Staates“ gefestigt hat. Der Staatsgewalt kommt die Qualität der „Rechtsgewalt“
und somit „einer legitimen normativen Rechtsquelle“ auf einem bestimmten Gebiet
zu, wenn sie durch das Völkerrecht bestimmte Bedingungen erfüllt. Die Wirksamkeit
des „ideellen Systems der Normen“ (das ist ihre Übereinstimmung, sagt Pitamic, mit
den Geschehnissen in der Welt der Ursachen und Wirkungen) ermöglicht und ver-
ursacht, dass das Recht positiv und dadurch überhaupt Recht ist, so wie andererseits
die Wirksamkeit des Rechts eine Bedingung dafür ist, dass auch der Staat selbst positiv
ist. Wirksam müssen insbesondere jene Rechtsnormen sein, die Pitamic mit dem Staat
gleichsetzt. Von diesen fundamentalen Rechtsnormen sagt er, dass sie die höchste, rea-
le und wirksame Rechtsorganisation auf einem bestimmten Gebiet darstellen.19
Fundamentale Normen, die die höchste Rechtsorganisation (den Staat) bilden, be-
ziehen sich auf gesetz- und verfassungsgebende Organe.20, 21 Diesen Normen rechnet
er als „nicht weniger wichtig“ auch alle jene Normen zu, die „bestimmten Organen die
Zuständigkeit erteilen, dass sie die höchsten Normen, insbesondere die Verfassung,
endgültig auslegen.“22 Es ist von besonderer Bedeutung, dass von diesen Normen auch
die Normativität des Rechts abhängt: Sobald der Staat mit auf einem bestimmten Ge-
biet geltenden fundamentalen Rechtsnormen identisch ist, bedeutet das, dass auch
alle anderen auf diesem Gebiet geltenden Rechtsnormen den ersteren Normen unter-
geordnet werden müssen.23 Keineswegs ist es jedoch der Staat, der – mit Pitamic’ Wor-
ten – „an der Quelle“ des Rechts steht: Wenn man die Staatsgrenzen überspringt, ist da
noch das Völkerrecht,24 schließlich handelt es sich um die Frage der Natur des Rechts,
der die Menschlichkeit das Grundkriterium der Rechtlichkeit ist.25
19 Siehe Pitamic, Država (Der Staat, Fn. 14), 7, 14–17.

20 Ibidem, S. 16.
21 Vgl. Pitamic, Plato, Aristoteles und die Reine Rechtstheorie (Fn. 5): „Es ergibt sich also: Staat bedeutet
die Gemeinschaft der Verfassung; Verfassung ist die Organisation oder die Ordnung der Behörden. Es findet
sich bei Aristoteles keine Spur von einer Subjektivierung oder Hypostasierung dieser Ordnung in einer Staats-
persönlichkeit, wohl aber nennt er in einer durchaus passenden Metapher die Verfassung, d. i. die oberste
Rechtsordnung, gewissermaßen das ‚Leben‘ des Staates (S. 686).“ Siehe auch Država (Der Staat, Fn. 14), 16.
22 Pitamic, Država (Der Staat, Fn. 14), 17.
23 Ibidem, S. 17.
24 Ibidem, S. 446 ff.
25 Die Genese von Pitamic’ Ansicht betreffend die Natur des Rechts erörtere ich in Marijan Pavčnik, An
den Grenzen der Reinen Rechtslehre (Die Rechtsauffassung von Leonid Pitamic), in: Pitamic, An den
Grenzen der RR (Fn. 1), 153–173; Marijan Pavčnik, Die Frage der rechtlichen Grundnorm (Pitamic’ Brief
an Hans Kelsen), Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, 96 (2010) 1, 87–103. Siehe auch Ulfrid Neumann,
Leonid Pitamic, An den Grenzen der Reinen Rechtslehre. Herausgeber und Einführungsstudie: Marijan
Pavčnik. Ljubljana 2009 (Erstausgabe 2005), Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, 97 (2011) 2, 279–281.

6. Die Spannung zwischen Macht und Moral
In diesem Zusammenhang machte er auch in Verbindung mit den Rechtsnormen aus-

drücklich auf die inhaltliche Bedeutung der Moral und der Grundrechte aufmerksam.
Bezüglich der Grundrechte stellt er ausdrücklich fest, dass sie zwar tatsächlich positiv-
rechtlich definiert werden, jedoch als Naturrechte „eine wichtige Voraussetzung für
die Existenz des positiven Rechts sind“ (S. 203). Mutatis mutandis betrachtet er auch
das Verhältnis zwischen Macht und Moral, zwischen denen immer eine entsprechen-
de Spannung besteht. Durch die positivrechtliche Regelung der Grundrechte wird
gerade bezweckt, dass die Spannung zwischen Macht und Moral nicht zu stark wird
(siehe S. 205).
7. Methodologische Klarheit der Rechtswissenschaft
Zur Zeit als Država (Der Staat) geschrieben wurde, hat Pitamic bereits eine klare
Front gegenüber der Reinen Rechtslehre (auf ihrer damaligen Entwicklungsstufe)
bezogen.26 Sein grundlegender Einwand war es, dass eine normative Methode den
Gegenstand der Rechtswissenschaft nicht einseitig definieren kann.27 Im Gegensatz
zur gegenständlichen Reinheit des Rechts, die von Kelsen begründet wurde, sprach
sich Pitamic für einen methodologisch reinen Ansatz, an das Recht heranzugehen, aus.
Es liegt in der Natur dieses Ansatzes, dass er neben der normativen Methode auch
die soziologische und axiologische Seite des Rechts und des Staates berücksichtigt.
Im Mittelpunkt stand zweifellos die normative Methode, die auf dem Grundsatz der
normativen Zurechnung aufbaute. Neben dieser Methode berücksichtigte er auch die
soziologische und insbesondere die axiologische Methode. Er unterschied scharf zwi-
26 Über die Periodisierung von Kelsens Theorie siehe insbesondere Stanley L. Paulson: 1. Toward a Pe-
riodisation of the Pure Theory of Law, in: Letizia Gianformaggio (Hrsg.), Hans Kelsen’s Legal Theory A
Diachronic Point of View, 1990, 11–47; 2. Introduction, in: Hans Kelsen: Introduction to the Problems of Le-
gal Theory, 1992, XVII–XLII; 3. Introduction, in: Stanley L. Paulson, Bonnie Litschewski Paulson (Hrsg.),
Normativity and Norms Critical Perspectives on Kelsenian Themes, 1998, XXIII ff.; 4. Four Phases in Hans
Kelsen’s Legal Theory? Reflections on a Periodization, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 18 (1998), 153–166;
5. Arriving at a Defensible Periodization of Hans Kelsen’s Legal Theory, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 19
(1999), 351–364; 6. Konstruktivismus, Methodendualismus und Zurechnung im Frühwerk Hans Kelsens,
Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts, 124 (1999) 4, 631–657; 7. Der Normativismus Hans Kelsens, Juristenzeitung
61 (2006) 11, 529–536 (530, Fn. 11). Vgl. Carsten Heidemann, Die Norm als Tatsache Zur Normentheorie
Hans Kelsens, 1997, 23 ff., 43 ff. Für Pitamic, seine Entwicklung und seine kritische Behandlung der Reinen
Rechtslehre ist vor allem die Zeit von Kelsens „Hauptproblemen der Staatrechtslehre“ (1910) bis zur Erst-
auflage der „Reinen Rechtslehre“ (1934) bedeutend. Über diese Zeit siehe auch Matthias Jestaedt, Von den
„Hauptproblemen“ zur Erstauflage der „Reinen Rechtslehren“, in: Robert Walter, Werner Ogris, Thomas
Olechowski (Hrsg.), Hans Kelsen: Leben – Werk – Wirksamkeit, 2009, 113–135.
27 Über das Verhältnis zwischen Forschungsmethode und -gegenstand siehe die kritischen Ausführungen
von Günther Winkler, Rechtstheorie und Erkenntnislehre, 1990, 89 ff., 147 ff., 184 ff.

schen den Methoden, weil er sich der Fallen bewusst war, die methodologischen Syn-
kretismus begleiten. Wenn man dem ausweicht, erreicht man, dass sich die Methoden
gegenseitig unterstützen.28
8. Kelsens Reaktion
Kelsen berücksichtigte teilweise die Kritik von Pitamic 29 Kelsen setzte als selbstver-
ständlich voraus, dass man von positivem Recht nur dann sprechen kann, wenn sei-
ne Normen wenigstens im Durchschnitt gesellschaftlich wirksam sind, und versuchte
eine entsprechende theoretische Lösung zu finden. Bis zu Pitamic’ Abhandlung Denk-
ökonomische Voraussetzungen der Rechtswissenschaft (1917) ist es Kelsen nicht gelungen,
diese Lösung so zu definieren, dass sie innerhalb der Grenzen der Reinen Rechtslehre
bleiben würde. Kelsen hat sich der Problematik der Grundnorm genähert.30 In der Ab-
handlung Reichsgesetz und Landesgesetz nach österreichischer Verfassung (aus dem Jahr
1914)31 stellt er ausdrücklich fest, dass jede juristische Konstruktion „von bestimmten
Normen als gültigen Rechtssätzen ausgehen“ müsse.32 Für Kelsen ist es typisch, dass
die Auswahl dieses Ausgangspunktes keine juristische, sondern eine politische Frage ist
und „daher vom Standpunkt juristischer Erkenntnis immer den Anschein von Will-
kürlichkeit haben“ muss.33
28 Siehe Leonid Pitamic, Denkökonomische Voraussetzungen der Rechtswissenschaft (in der Fortsetzung
abgekürzt als „Denkökonomische“), Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, 3 (1917), 367.
29 Hans Kelsen, Vorrede zur zweiten Auflage Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre entwickelt aus der Lehre
vom Rechtssatze, 1923, XV. An dieser Stelle wurden vier Abhandlungen von Pitamic zitiert: Denkökonomi-
sche (Fn. 28); Eine „Juristische Grundlehre“ (1918), Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, 3 (1918),
734–757; Plato, Aristoteles und die Reine Rechtstheorie (Fn. 5), und Kritische Bemerkungen zum Gesell-
schafts-, Staats- und Gottesbegriff bei Kelsen, Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, 3 (1922), 531–544 (in der Fort-
setzung abgekürzt als „Kritische Bemerkungen“). Alle diese Abhandlungen sind nachgedruckt in: Pitamic,
An den Grenzen der RR (Fn. 1). Alle Abhandlungen, die in diesem Buch nachgedruckt sind, haben eine
doppelte Seitenangabe: zuerst steht die Seite aus dem Erstdruck (in Klammern), dann folgt die laufende
Nummer des Buches. – Die Sekundärliteratur, die Pitamic’ Beitrag zu den Problemen der Bestimmung der
Grundnorm berücksichtigt, ist in den folgenden Aufsätzen von Pavčnik zitiert: 1. An den Grenzen der Rei-
nen Rechtslehre (Fn. 1), 166–167, Fn. 67 und 73; 2. Leonid Pitamic (Fn. 1), 332–333, Fn. 19, 30 und 33; 3. Die
Frage der rechtlichen Grundnorm (Pitamic’ Brief an Hans Kelsen), Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie,
96 (2010) 1, 96, Fn. 37. Siehe auch Aleš Novak, Metamorfoze Kelsnove temeljne norme in Leonid Pitamic
(Methamorphoses of Kelsen’s Basic Norm and Leonid Pitamic), Zbornik znanstvenih razprav, 68 (2008),
203–232.
30 Robert Walter, Entstehung und Entwicklung des Gedankens der Grundnorm, Schriftenreihe des Hans
Kelsen-Instituts, 18 (1992), 49.
31 Hans Kelsen, Reichsgesetz und Landesgesetz nach österreichischer Verfassung, Archiv des öffentlichen
Rechts, 32 (1914), 202–245, 390–438.
32 Kelsen, Reichsgesetz und Landesgesetz (Fn. 31), 216.
33 Kelsen, Reichsgesetz und Landesgesetz (Fn. 31), 217. Siehe auch Kelsen, Reichsgesetz und Landesgesetz
(Fn. 31), 413–414: „Es ist stets eine metajuristische, im Grunde eine politische Frage, welche Norm man der-
art als letzte oder oberste ansehen will, daß man auf eine weitere juristische Rechtfertigung ihrer Geltung

Pitamic ist überzeugt, dass Kelsen seinen Gedanken über die Wirksamkeit des
Rechts übernommen und in einer geänderten normativisierten Form ausgedrückt hat:
zunächst über die Norm des Völkerrechts und dann noch als den Inhalt der Grund-
norm. Kelsen hat, sagt Pitamic, „die erwähnte Idee vervollständigt, weil er das, was
ich nur als das Erkenntnisprinzip für konkrete Staatsrechte vorschlug, als Norm ins
Völkerrecht einbrachte.“34 Kelsens erkenntnistheoretisches Prinzip wurde „zum In-
halt einer Rechtsnorm erhoben“ und soll damit als juristisches Prinzip fungieren. „Da-
durch, daß das Faktische zum Inhalt einer Norm wird, erfährt es“, so Kelsen, „einen
ganz eigenartigen Bedeutungswandel, es wird sozusagen denaturiert, schlägt in sein
Gegenteil um, wird selbst zum Normativen.“35 Pitamic wird durch diese Lösung nicht
zufriedengestellt, weil dadurch „das grundlegende erkenntnistheoretische Problem nur
um eine Stufe zurückgeschoben wird und wieder im Völkerrecht auftreten muss.“36
Er drückt dieselben Bedenken auch angesichts der Grundnorm aus, wie sie von
Kelsen in der ersten Auflage des Werkes Reine Rechtslehre (1934)37 formuliert wurde.
Pitamic kommentierte es so:
„Diese Ordnung ist also das ‚empirische Material, das sich der rechtlichen Deutung dar-
bietet‘. Dieses Material muss also bereits vorliegen, bevor die Grundnorm, die ja ihren
konkreten Inhalt aus diesem Material schöpft, angewendet werden kann. Das Auslese-
prinzip für dieses Material ist aber keine Norm, sondern das ‚tatsächliche Verhalten von
Menschen‘, also ein Seinsfaktum, das außerhalb der normativen Sphäre liegt; daher ent-
hält auch die ‚Ordnung‘, die durch den früher erwähnten Tatbestand erzeugt wird, an
und für sich kein rechtliches Sollen; diese Qualität soll ihr ja erst durch die Grundnorm
verliehen werden. Nun ist aber eine bloß hypothetische Norm nicht imstande, Seinstat-
verzichtet. Irgendwo muß jede juristische Betrachtung auf einen solchen letzten Punkt stoßen, auf dem das
ganze System der juristischen Konstruktion ruht, gleichsam von außen her gestützt.“ Vgl. Kelsen, Reichs-
gesetz und Landesgesetz (Fn. 31), 435 ff.
34 Leonid Pitamic, Nove smeri v pravni filozofiji (Neue Richtungen in der Rechtsphilosophie – in der
Fortsetzung abgekürzt als „Nove smeri / Neue Richtungen“), Zbornik znanstvenih razprav, 1 (1921), 18. Vgl.
auch die Buchbesprechung: Hans Kelsen: 1. Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völker-
rechts (Tübingen 1928) und 2. Der soziologische und der juristische Staatsbegriff (Tübingen 1928), Zeit-
schrift für öffentliches Recht, 7 (1928), 641–642.
35 Siehe Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrechts (Fn. 17), 99, 240–241: „Was
dort als ein mehr oder weniger erkenntnistheoretisches Prinzip angegeben wurde: der Grundsatz, jene Ur-
sprungsnorm zu wählen, aus der sich in deduktiver Entfaltung eine Rechtsordnung ergibt, mit der das tat-
sächliche Verhalten der Menschen, deren Handeln den Inhalt der Rechtsordnung bildet, in relativ größter
Übereinstimmung steht, das tritt hier – weil zum Inhalt einer Rechtsnorm erhoben – als juristisches Prinzip
auf. / Dadurch, daß das Faktische zum Inhalt einer Norm wird, erfährt es einen ganz eigenartigen Bedeu-
tungswandel, es wird sozusagen denaturiert, schlägt in sein Gegenteil um, wird selbst zum Normativen.“ Vgl.
auch Stanley L. Paulson, A Role of Hermann Cohen in Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law?, in: Frank Saliger
(Hrsg.), Rechtsstaatliches Strafrecht Festschrift für Ulfrid Neumann zum 70 Geburtstag, 2017, 284, Fn. 7.
36 Pitamic, Nove smeri / Neue Richtungen (Fn. 34), 18. Siehe auch Kritische Bemerkungen (Fn. 29), 351.
37 Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 1934. Nachdruck: Scientia Verlag Aalen 1994, 65 ff.

sachen als gesollt zu autorisieren oder zu rechtfertigen, da sie ja als ‚hypothetisch‘ selbst
Rechtfertigung bedarf.“38
Die Entwicklung von Kelsens theoretischen Standpunkten bestätigt die Fundiert-

heit der Angaben von Pitamic, dass Kelsen (in einem bestimmten Umfang39) seine
kritischen Ausführungen darüber aufgenommen hatte, wie man die Wirksamkeit des
Rechts derart begründen könnte, dass sie annehmbar und mit der Reinen Rechtslehre
vereinbar wäre. Ungeachtet der Intensität dieses Einflusses auf Kelsen40 ist es eine Tat-
sache, dass ihn Kelsen nicht in jenem Punkt vertiefte, wo sich das Normative und das
Faktische, das Faktische und das Normative überschneiden41, sondern ihn in einem
solchen Maße aufnahm und kanalisierte, dass die Ausgangspunkte der Reinen Rechts-
lehre unangetastet blieben.42 In diesem Kontext stellte schon Behrend sehr bestimmt
fest, dass durch „die Aufnahme des faktischen Effektivitätsmomentes in die Grund-
normformulierung“ das rein normlogische System der Reinen Rechtslehre nicht ge-
38 Leonid Pitamic, Čista pravna teorija in naravno pravo (Die Reine Rechtslehre und das Naturrecht),
Razprave pravnega razreda Akademije znanosti in umetnosti v Ljubljani, 1 (1941), 180. Siehe auch die Buchbe-
sprechung: Hans Kelsen: Reine Rechtslehre (Leipzig, Wien 1934), Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, 15 (1935)
3, 414.
39 Darüber sprach Pitamic auch in einem umfangreichen Brief, den er am 16. 8. 1957 Kelsen sandte: siehe
Pavčnik, Die Frage der rechtlichen Grundnorm (Pitamic’ Brief an Hans Kelsen, Fn. 29), 87–103. Von Be-
deutung ist z. B. diese Stelle: „Ich sage nicht, dass meine Ausführungen den Grund zu Ihrer Einstellung
geboten haben, aber vielleicht haben sie Ihre Auffassung bestärkt. Freilich haben Sie mein seinerzeitiges
ökonomisches Prinzip nicht als solches aufgenommen, sondern Sie haben die Wirksamkeit in anderer Weise
in Ihren Ideengang eingereiht (hervorgehoben von M. P.). Wie ich von der Mach’schen wurden Sie, wie mir
scheint, von der Kant’schen Philosophie beeinflusst, zwar nicht vom kategorischen Imperativ Kants, son-
dern von seiner Kategorienlehre. (…) Diese hypothetische Grundnorm spielt also für die Rechtswelt eine
ähnliche Rolle, welche die Kategorien nach Kant überhaupt haben. Wie die Kategorien unserer Sinnenwelt,
so ist ihre Grundnorm dem positiven Recht gegenüber transzendental, denn sie ist nicht im positiven Recht
gesetzt, sondern vom Rechtsforscher vorausgesetzt, um das positive Recht als gesollt zu erkennen“ (91–92).
40 Vgl. Leonid Pitamic, Die Frage der rechtlichen Grundnorm, in: Völkerrecht und rechtliches Weltbild Fest-
schrift für Alfred Verdross, 1960, 210. Nachdruck in: Pitamic: An den Grenzen der RR (Fn. 1). Siehe auch Jür-
gen Behrend, Untersuchungen zur Stufenbaulehre Adolf Merkls und Hans Kelsens, 1977, 94: „Kelsens Aussage,
dass die Grundnorm als hypothetischer Denkakt nur auf solche Rechtsordnungen bezogen wird, die von
den Rechtsunterworfenen befolgt werden und damit im wesentlichen wirksam sind, entspricht dem von
Pitamic herausgearbeiteten denkökonomischen Prinzip.“, siehe auch 73 ff. Ebenso Rudolf Thienel, Kritischer
Rationalismus und Jurisprudenz, 1991, 117–118: „Und auch Kelsen hat – unter ausdrücklicher Berufung auf Pi-
tamic – die Auswahl gerade der effektiven Ordnungen als Rechtsordnungen damit begründet, dass dies dem
Grundsatz der Erkenntnisökonomie entspreche, weil man damit jene Ordnungen erfasse, denen die Realität
am nächsten komme.“
41 Vgl. Pitamic, Die Buchbesprechung Kelsen: Das Problem der Souveränität (Fn. 34), 642.
42 Vgl. mit Kelsens Formulierungen der Grundnorm in seinen späteren Werken; siehe besonders Hans
Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, 1945, 116–117, Reine Rechtslehre, 2. Aufl., 1960. Nachdruck: 2000,
209, und Allgemeine Theorie der Normen, 1979, 203 ff.

sprengt wird, da die „Geltung und Wirksamkeit einer Rechtsordnung streng vonein-
ander getrennt bleiben.“43
Pitamic’ Stärke war es, dass er ein Gespür für die Grenzen der Reinen Rechtslehre
hatte.44 Es handelt sich insbesondere um soziologische und axiologische Stellen, aus
denen Normativität entsprießt und auf die sie sich auch stützt. Im Mittelpunkt be-
findet sich jedenfalls die normative Dimension des Rechts und des Staates. Der recht-
liche (normative) Aspekt des Staates ist – ob man es will oder nicht – derjenige, dem
die Rechtswissenschaft nicht ausweichen kann, sie sollte ihn jedoch auch mit anderen
Gesichtspunkten befruchten und im Dialog mit ihnen das Spezifikum und die Reich-
weite des Staates als einer „Rechtsorganisation (hervorgehoben von M. P.) von Men-
schen auf einem bestimmten Gebiet“ begründen.
9. Methodologischer Beitrag von Pitamic
Pitamic’ methodologischer Ansatz ist breiter als Kelsens. Die methodologische Breite
ermöglichte ihm, dass er – wenigstens auf seine Weise – schärfer die Bedeutung der
normativen Zurechnung bewerten konnte, als das Kelsen möglich war. Für Pitamic
war es sehr charakteristisch, dass er auch hinter jedem noch so komplexen normativen
Aufbau den Menschen sah, der das Agens des Rechts ist und für den das Recht be-
stimmt ist. Diese Frage ist am empfindlichsten bei einer juristischen Person (z. B. dem
Staat), hinter der sich verschiedenste Individuen „verstecken“ können. Für Pitamic ist
die Frage der normativen (rechtlichen) Zurechnung immer auch eine Ethikfrage. „Wir
dürfen nicht vergessen,“ schrieb er in seiner Abhandlung Kritični pogledi na juridično
osebo (Kritische Betrachtungen über die juristische Person), dass „das Individuum die
Grundlage jeder Gesellschaft ist, dass ‚omne jus hominum causa‘ ist und dass auch
die Gesellschaft nicht bestehen kann ohne das Grundprinzip jeder Moral: dass der
Mensch individuell für seine Handlungen verantwortlich ist.“45
Soziologische und axiologische Grundlagen und Grenzen, die den Staat als Rechts-
organisation umschließen, negieren nicht die Normativität des Staates und die Be-
deutung dieser Normativität, sie sind allenfalls ein Impuls und Agens, die dem Staat
als einer Organisation von Menschen auf einem bestimmten Gebiet Sinn geben. Die-
se kurze methodologische Mitteilung kann, wenn man sie konsequent ausführt, der
normativen Theorie des Staates neue Dimensionen und auch einen neuen Auftrieb
43 Behrend, Untersuchungen zur Stufenbaulehre Adolf Merkls und Hans Kelsens (Fn. 40), 94. Vgl. dazu auch
Robert Walter, Wirksamkeit und Geltung, Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, N. F. 11 (1961),
536 ff.
44 Siehe auch die Buchbesprechung: Neumann, Leonid Pitamic, An den Grenzen der Reinen Rechtslehre
(Fn. 25).
45 Leonid Pitamic, Kritični pogledi na juridično osebo (Kritische Betrachtungen über die juristische Per-
son), Zbornik znanstvenih razprav, 4 (1925), 242.

geben. Jegliches Beharren bei der reinen Normativität (des Rechts und/oder des Staa-
tes) stößt – ob man es will oder nicht – auf unüberwindliche Hindernisse, die nur jene
Theorie überwinden kann, die anstatt auf gegenständlicher Reinheit auf einer ange-
messenen methodologischen Reinheit der Erkennung des Rechts und/oder des Staa-
tes aufbaut. Die Normativität des Rechts46 und/oder des Staates ist tatsächlich deren
wesentliches Merkmal, jedoch ein Merkmal, das in den Wertungs- und soziologischen
Raum, in dem die Menschen tätig sind, eingeordnet werden muss.
Marijan Pavčnik
Faculty of Law, Poljanski nasip 2, 1000 Ljubljana, Slowenien, Marijan.Pavcnik@pf.uni-lj.si
46 Vgl. mit den Stellungnahmen in der tschechischen Theorie des Rechts: Vladimir Kubeš, Ota Weinber-
ger (Hrsg.), Die Brünner rechtstheoretische Schule (Normative Theorie), 1980; Miloš Večeřa, František Weyr,
2001, und Tatiana Machalová, Ondřej Horak, Die Rezeption der Reinen Rechtslehre in der tschechischen
Rechtswissenschaft, in: Robert Walter; Clemens Jabloner; Klaus Zeleny (Hrsg.), Hans Kelsen anderswo,
2010, 187–202.


Kelsen was no Relativist
Reading Hans Kelsen in the Light of Isaiah Berlin’s
Value Pluralism
ULRICH WAGRANDL
Abstract: We do not have to take Kelsen’s relativism at face value. Indeed, what he calls
value relativism makes much more sense if read in the light of Isaiah Berlin’s value plural-
ism. In comparing Kelsen and Berlin, this paper sets out to liberate Kelsen’s theories of
the problematic legacy of relativism. It does so to give Kelsen’s work a better foundation
that is less fraught with problems. Kelsen and Berlin concur in that the question of values
is one of value conflicts; that in such conflicts, there is no rational solution; that therefore,
a choice, that is, a decision must be made; that nevertheless, this decisionism does not
prevent compromise, but on the contrary, enables it; and that this kind of pluralist deci-
sionism is a good foundation for liberal democracy.
Keywords: Hans Kelsen, Isaiah Berlin, relativism, pluralism, decisionism, democracy
Schlagworte: Hans Kelsen, Isaiah Berlin, Relativismus, Pluralismus, Dezisionismus,

Demokratie
The view that moral principles constitute only relative values does not mean that they
constitute no value at all; it means that there is not one moral system, but that there are
several different ones, and that, consequently, a choice must be made among them. Thus,
relativism imposes upon the individual the difficult task of deciding for himself what is
right and what is wrong. […] Relativism is rejected and – what is worse – misinterpreted,
not because it morally requires to little, but because it requires too much.1 – Hans Kelsen
1 Hans Kelsen, What is Justice? Justice, Law, and Politics in the Mirror of Science: Collected Essays, 1957, 22.

374 ULRICH WAGRANDL
The world that we encounter in ordinary experience is one in which we are faced with
choices between ends equally ultimate, and claims equally absolute, the realisation of
some of which must inevitably involve the sacrifice of others. Indeed, it is because this is
their situation that men place such immense value upon the freedom to choose; for if they
had assurance that in some perfect state, realisable by men on earth, no ends pursued by
them would ever be in conflict, the necessity and agony of choice would disappear, and
with it the central importance of the freedom to choose.2 – Isaiah Berlin
1. Introduction
Much has been said about relativism in general and its flaws in particular. This paper
will not delve into this debate. What it tries to do is to liberate Kelsen’s thoughts of the
problematic legacy of relativism by reading them in a value pluralist way. It does so not
out of interest for relativism and its problems, but because it cares about Kelsen’s the-
ories.3 In doing so, it hopes to give them a better, that is to say, less fragile, foundation.
It aims to show that Kelsen’s theories of law and of democracy do not suffer if we leave
relativism out. Kelsen does not need relativism; in fact, he was no relativist at all – at
least, not in the usual sense.
In order to bring Kelsen’s relativism into perspective and to eventually redefine it,
this paper wants to compare Kelsen’s thoughts to those of Isaiah Berlin. As we will see,
both scholars share a number of ideas, although it is not known whether they have
met. Their biographical similarities – both of Eastern European, Jewish origin, both
spending a good part of their lives in the Anglo-Saxon academia – and their work on
human values (relativism for Kelsen, pluralism for Berlin) calls for a closer examina-
tion. In comparing Kelsen and Berlin, this paper not only wants to shed new light on
Kelsen, but also to open a new avenue of research concerning possible cross-influences
between the two. It is pure speculation, but since Isaiah Berlin was friends at Oxford
with H. L. A. Hart, and as Hart knew Kelsen, they might even have heard of each oth-
er.4
Apart from biographical resemblance, why compare Kelsen and Berlin? And why
hope to better understand Kelsen’s work in doing so? As this paper will try to point
out, relativism and pluralism look strikingly similar. Kelsen has called himself a rela-
tivist throughout his life, whereas Berlin only gradually came to label his view ‘plural-
2 Isaiah Berlin, Liberty Incorporating Four Essays on Liberty, ed. Henry Hardy, 2002, 213–214.
3 A vindication of a kind of Kelsenian relativism is offered by Carlo Invernizzi Accetti, Relativism and Reli-
gion Why Democratic Societies Do Not Need Moral Absolutes, 2015.
4 Kelsen cites Berlin approvingly in Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 2nd edition, 1960, 100, regarding the free
will problem, something not irrelevant to the present subject. Footnotes have been omitted in the English
translation.

Kelsen was no Relativist 375
ism’. Expectably, Kelsen’s relativism is more thoroughly theorized and more vigorously
defended. Coming from the German-speaking academia of his time, he was deeply
steeped in Kantian and Neo-Kantian philosophy. His theory of relativism evolved as a
necessary prelude to his theory of law. In order to adequately grasp natural law – and
to subsequently refute it – he had to elaborate on its philosophical basis.5 All natural
law doctrine is founded upon ‘value absolutism’, as Kelsen says, although this term
interestingly first appears only in his writings on democracy and philosophy, not in
those on law. The first edition of his Pure Theory from 1934 mentions neither relativism
or absolutism in contrast to the first edition of his Essence and Value of Democracy from
1920.6 The second edition of the Pure Theory from 1960, however, contains lengthy re-
flections on the subject.7 As we will see later on, value absolutism essentially is the
belief that values are objectively given. Its logical counterpart, value relativism, in turn
is the basis for Kelsen’s project, a positivist legal theory that expressly rejects natural
law and thus has to consider that values are not objectively given, but autonomously
created. Hence they are ‘relative’ to the individual creating them.
Berlin’s value pluralism evolves from his background in the history of ideas. It is less
rigorously underpinned than Kelsen’s relativism, but more elegant, and is amenable
to common sense (which Kelsen, alas, mostly is not). It starts from the observation,
traceable to Machiavelli, that not everything that is good can be reconciled. Whereas
Machiavelli has, in general, a bad reputation for advocating ruthlessness in politics,
Berlin finds him interesting for something else: his insight that what might be good in
a certain respect might be bad in another, without there being a possibility to reconcile
the two. Values, therefore, seem to be plural, and some of them can come into conflict.
Pluralism maintains that in such a situation, a tragic decision is needed, as the conflict
cannot be solved by a rational inquiry into which value is higher, better, or truer.8 Ber-
lin then traces the history of pluralist thought through the enlightenment, and espe-
cially romanticism,9 unto the great ideological struggles of the 20th century. His famous
distinction between the hedgehog, which knows one thing, and the fox, which knows
many things, also has its roots here.10 Of course, the fox and Berlin are pluralists, while
others have famously adopted the hedgehog’s perspective.11 This difference is similar
to Max Weber’s distinction between the ethics of responsibility (Verantwortungsethik)
5 See e. g. Hans Kelsen, Die philosophischen Grundlagen der Naturrechtslehre und des Rechtspositivis-
mus, 1928, reprinted in: Die Wiener Rechtstheoretische Schule, vol. I, ed. Hans Klecatsky / René Marcic / Her-
bert Schambeck, 2010, 231–287.
6 See Hans Kelsen, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie, 1920, 36–37, reprinted in: Verteidigung der
Demokratie, ed. Matthias Jestaedt / Oliver Lepsius, 2006, 31–33.
7 See Kelsen (footnote 4), 18, 65–69.
8 See Isaiah Berlin, Against the Current Essays in the History of Ideas, ed. Henry Hardy, 2013, 33–100.
9 See Isaiah Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity, ed. Henry Hardy, 2nd Edition, 2013, 219–252.
10 See Isaiah Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox, ed. Henry Hardy, 2nd Edition, 2013.
11 See Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, 2013.

376 ULRICH WAGRANDL
and the ethics of conscience (Gesinnungsethik),12 as Berlin has indicated.13 It is essen-

tially the question if one is willing to subordinate everything to one single principle
and to follow through with it, regardless of the consequences, or if one acknowledges
that different principles can legitimately pull in different directions. Pluralism, as is
easy to tell, is the basis for an ethics of responsibility.
2. Values and norms
In order to compare Kelsen’s and Berlin’s take on values, we need to inquire into the
nature of values. This account will closely follow Kelsen’s thoughts on the subject, as he
devoted considerable effort to those questions which Berlin touched only en passant. A
common understanding of values is that they are something we aspire to realize. They
are a standard for measuring human behaviour and as such, they are norms. The value
of liberty does not tell us that we are free. Rather, it commands us to strive towards it,
to hold it dear, to avoid anything detrimental to it, and to fight its opponents. Thus,
the value of liberty serves to judge our behaviour: have we done as liberty requires?
As always, Kelsen’s definitions are more specific.14 According to Kelsen, values are not
norms, but are constituted by norms. To have value is to conform to a certain norm.
Value therefore refers to facts: they have value when they are in conformity with a
norm. In this sense, there are no ‘free-standing’ values, but to speak of values is to ren-
der a judgment, stating that a certain behaviour is good, which means that it conforms
to a norm commanding such behaviour. Thus, if a norm of morality obliges us to help
the poor, the concrete act of helping someone in need has value. Kelsen’s very specific
definition of value has not much bearing on our present discussion. Indeed, it seems
that he sometimes uses values interchangeably with norms, and that is what we will do
as well. It is closer to the common use of the term, where a value indicates, as described
above, something that serves as a standard and thus is a norm.
There is one aspect, though, where we must follow Kelsen’s very normative ap-
proach. Kelsen goes on to speak of the validity of values. They can be valid or non-
valid, just like norms, which means that they either exist or do not exist. Their validity
is absolute if they exclude the possibility of contradicting values, and only relative if
they do not (or cannot) exclude their opposite. Here we encounter Kelsen using the
term relativism in connection with values, and that is why we must emphasize this
point. Two things are striking: relativism refers to the validity of values and to their
12 Max Weber, Politik als Beruf, in: Max-Weber-Gesamtausgabe, Abteilung 1, vol. 17, ed. Horst Baier / M.
Rainer Lepsius / Wolfgang J. Mommsen / Wolfgang Schluchter / Johannes Winckelmann, 1992, 237.
13 See Seyla Benhabib, Exile, Statelessness, and Migration Playing Chess with History from Hannah Arendt to
Isaiah Berlin, 2018, 164 et seq.

possible conflict – not to their content. But how do values get valid in the first place?
For Kelsen, values are constituted by norms, and norms are created by subjects. There
is no imperative without an imperator, no ought without will.15 Values therefore only
exist because someone wills them, that is, has created them by an act of volition. It
is a positivist approach because it traces back every norm to a positive, human act.16
Everything normative, be it the law, morality, custom, or values, originates in the hu-
man will only. Humans are capable of moral judgments. They are because they have
autonomy, and thus create values for themselves. Relativism refers, as mentioned, to
the validity of values. All values humans create are equally valid. Their validity comes
from being created by autonomous subjects. They are equal because their originators
are equal: as humans, they are equally endowed with autonomy, that is the capabili-
ty to morally legislate for oneself. This line of reasoning deals a first blow to Kelsen’s
staunchly defended relativism. He might not have extended his own relativism far
enough, or understood its implications. But he firmly stood on the ground of a (neo-)
kantian conception of cognition and morality, which in turn presupposes a non-rela-
tivistic account of individual human autonomy.17
3. The conflict of norms and the clash of values
Relativism does not seem to be the perfect label for Kelsen’s ideas: his so-called relativ-
ism is the question of the conflict of values and its solution. This is a rather interesting
take on the subject. Indeed, Kelsen says that values are relative because they can con-
flict, that is, because one value cannot exclude the other. In his Pure Theory, he writes:
“the values as established by our norm-creating acts cannot claim to exclude the pos-
sibility of opposite values.”18 Non-exclusion means conflict, and this is vital because:
Where there is no conflict of interest, there is no need for justice. A conflict of interests
exists when one interest can only be satisfied at the expense of the other; or, what amounts
to the same, when there is a conflict between two values, and when it is not possible to
realize both at the same time; […] when it is necessary […] to decide which one is more
important, or in other terms, to decide which is the higher value, and finally: which is the
highest value. The problem of values is in the first place the problem of conflicts of values,
and this problem cannot be solved by means of rational cognition.19
15 Hans Kelsen, Allgemeine Theorie der Normen, 1979, 3, 23.

17 Kelsen cannot shed his being influenced by Kant, on whom he frequently drew, even when he disagreed with him, see
e. g. the lengthy footnote in Kelsen (footnote 4), 102–105, or his epistemological contemplations, to be discussed later on.
18 Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, 1967, 67.

378 ULRICH WAGRANDL
This formulation reminds one of the conflict of norms, a subject to which Kelsen
devoted much time and effort. What happens when two legal norms, like ‘A is prohib-
ited’ and ‘A is allowed’, contradict each other? During his lifetime, Kelsen developed at
least three different answers this problem. His first position was to apply the logical law
of noncontradiction to legal norms, so that only one of two contradicting norms can
be valid.20 He even goes so far as to apply this thought to law and morality in general,
saying that from the viewpoint of law, morality is not valid and vice versa.21
But the late Kelsen, becoming ever more the realist, denies this for two reasons.
The law of noncontradiction cannot be applied to norms, because they are statements
of ought. Because logic only deals with statements of is, a contradiction of norms is
not the same as a contradiction of declarative sentences.22 The real point seems to be,
however, that to talk about a conflict of norms only makes sense when both norms are
valid,23 something we will encounter in Berlin’s writings as well. Only then is there a
tension between two contradictory claims. This kind of situation would be no conflict
if one simply could act according to a rule of logic, and could demonstrate that one of
the two norms is not valid in the first place. The conflict we are trying to make sense
of would disappear in the same second it occured. Positive law may have rules on how
to deal with such situations: the principles of lex posterior, lex specialis, lex superior. But
Kelsen emphasises that these are rules of a given legal order, which may lack them, not
universal properties of law or postulates of logic. At any rate, they often do not solve a
conflict, but only push it further away. Imagine a legal norm stating that whenever mo-
rality contradicts the letter of the law, one should follow the law and disregard morality.
Form a moral point of view, this rule has not solved anything: if we deem it immoral
to always blindly follow the law, the conflict between law and morality pops up again.
Kelsen is at his most realist, though, when he says that one can simply want contra-
dictory things. The law originates in the acts of will of the lawgiver, and this lawgiver
may change its mind or want mutually exclusive things at the same time; even more so
when we consider that the lawgiver is made of fallible humans.
Only values having an equally good pedigree can clash. Other values can clash too.
But it is not the same thing: the conflict between something good and something bad
is easy to solve. You just have to opt for the good (this is what the notion of the good
implies). But when values are of equal worth, the conflict is between good and good.
Only this kind of opposition is a proper value conflict. It is this clash of equally legiti-
mate values that Kelsen has in mind when he speaks about relativism. Values are rela-
tive because they can conflict; they can conflict because they are equal; they are equal
20 Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 1934, 27.

21 Hans Kelsen, Naturrecht und Positives Recht, in: Die Wiener Rechtstheoretische Schule (footnote 5),
177–200 (180); Kelsen (footnote 4), 361.
23 Kelsen (footnote 15), 80, 172, 177.

because they come from individuals who are equally endowed with autonomy. Kelsen
does not say that all values are equally good. He possibly cannot, because this denies
the very idea of values. Values tell us what is right and what is wrong. To have them is
to discriminate between what is desirable and what is despicable. Kelsen, too, has his
values and judges the world accordingly. His so-called relativism only states that others
will have other values, that their conflict is inevitable, and that to be locked in conflict
does not mean that one of the two values is necessarily worse than the other.
His is therefore a formal account of relativism that only says that conflicting values
still are values. It means that a conflict of values cannot be solved by demonstrating
that one side is wrong, and therefore has no value at all. This would be the easy-to-
solve opposition between good and evil, which is no conflict at all, because it is clear
which side to choose. In such a situation, the evil value turns out to be no value at
all because values are only those that are of worth. Kelsen would reject this. Because
values originate in the human will, they can take any content one can want, and still
be values. They therefore can clash with other values without losing their ‘valueness’.
Their being values is not determined by their content, but by their originating in an act
of value creation. This parallels Kelsen’s positivism: the law is not content-sensitive as
well; the law can have every content whatsoever and still be law. What matters is the
procedure of norm creation, not their content.
Thus, Kelsen is not a nihilist who simply denies that there are such things as val-
ues. He is likewise not a relativist in the sense that he thinks that all values are equally
good. He is not a solipsist who thinks that his, and only his values are the right ones.
He is not, as we will see, someone who he calls an ‘absolutist’, who thinks that there is
a single, highest, and absolute value from which flows everything else. He is, in fact, a
pluralist, who simply acknowledges that there are many values that inevitably conflict,
without one of these values turning out to be false. Kelsen’s relativism is the insight
that values can conflict and still be values.
4. What are value conflicts?
The conflict of values, thus, turns out to be the crux of the matter. This is the first
of many indicators that Kelsen and Berlin have more in common than previously
thought. Whereas Kelsen’s definition of values is more sophisticated, it is Berlin’s work
which gave rise to more elaborate conceptions of value conflicts.24 We will therefore
continue our inquiry in Berlinian terms, which, as will become clear, seamlessly fit into
a Kelsenian perspective. There seem to be three different kinds of value conflicts: in-
24 See e. g. Thomas Nagel, Pluralism and Coherence, in: The Legacy of Isaiah Berlin, ed. Mark Lilla / Ronald
Dworkin / Robert B. Silvers, 2001, 105–111 (106); Connie Aarsbergen-Ligtvoet, Isaiah Berlin: A Value Plural-
ist and Humanist View of Human Nature and the Meaning of Life, 2006, 12 et seq.

380 ULRICH WAGRANDL
compatibility, incommensurability, and opposition (or contradiction). Incompatibili-

ty is easy to explain but hard to swallow. It follows from the limits of resources, of time,
and of space that define human life. One cannot have it all: either be a world-famous
pianist or a renowned brain surgeon. She whose idea of an accomplished life requires
to be both will probably end in despair. This insight must hold true for utopias as well:
in the state of perfect communism, the day still has 24 hours. A (somewhat simple)
communist, who, as we will see, adheres to value absolutism, will not acknowledge this
conflict, but will look for an error or a sign of evil, and therefore probably say that in the
state of true communism, people will simply be free of incompatible goals. This is to
deny that values can conflict and still be values, and to think that when values conflict,
one must necessarily be right and the other wrong, and thus, no value at all. Kelsen’s
and Berlin’s concern was to resist this line of thought. It begins by acknowledging the
limits of human lives, and stepping back from utopian aspirations.
The second kind of conflict is incommensurability. It means that some values do not
share the same currency. They cannot be traded against each other, because they have
no common denominator. They are not interchangeable, and the loss of one cannot
be compensated by the gain of another. They simply are different and cannot be made
identical. The popular conflict between liberty and security is such an example. A fa-
mous quip says that a people which trades liberty for security does not deserve both.
But this is only valid if one presupposes that liberty is the higher value, and that in such
a conflict, security must always yield. And that presupposes that they can be graded on
the same scale, that they both have a certain weight, but that the weight of liberty is
always greater. Incommensurability denies that values can be operated with in this way.
He who is always anxious and easily frightened will want more security, and will be
ready to sacrifice some liberty in the process. This is because liberty has not so much
bearing on the plans he has made for his life. He would not know what to do with more
liberty. But he knows that he wants security, because he has a certain concept of what
his life should look like, and to accomplish that, he needs security, but not necessarily
liberty. In this situation, liberty and security are not interchangeable. For him, a loss of
security cannot be compensated by more liberty. The inverse is true as well: she who
is very critical of authoritarian pretensions, the overreach of anti-terrorism legislation
and law-and-order politics in general will want more liberty and less security. But not
because they are interchangeable, but because security has no, or not as much, worth
for her idea of the good life. She is opposed to the politics of security, and she would
not know what to do with it. Likewise, she will not be persuaded when someone tells
her that we need more security and must be ready to accept a decrease in liberty. One
value cannot compensate the other. Incommensurability therefore means that values
are primarily valid and of worth for those who have them, and that value conflicts arise
even if every party has only the best intentions.
The last kind of value conflicts is opposition, or contradiction. Some values are not
simply different, but pitted against each other. That means that some values consist in

the rejection of other values. Liberalism and communism are not simply incompatible,
in the sense that one cannot be both at the same time. This is true enough. But their
conflict runs deeper. Communism is founded upon the express rejection of liberal-
ism, and liberal democracy has come to mean, especially after the Second World War,
the rejection of communism. This means that a real communist cannot be indifferent
towards liberalism in the way a pianist could be indifferent to brain surgery. Some val-
ues only make sense in their antagonistic dimension. A vegan cannot be indifferent
towards meat lovers, a pro-life person not towards pro-choice people. This is not to
say that such conflicts must always revert to outright civil war. Tolerance is possible.
In fact, tolerance only makes sense in such conflicts, as it consists in bearing what one
opposes.
Value conflicts can occur within the same person. This proves more than anything
else that two opposing values can be valid at the same time, and that one can genu-
inely want to fulfil both of them, even though one knows this to be impossible. What
remains is a tragic choice that will result in the loss of one of these values. A famous
example by Santre deals with a young Frenchman who feels he is compelled to take
up arms with the Résistance movement to fight the Nazis, but also to stay with his
mother whom the war has already cost her home, her family and her livelihood. If
he goes into battle, he betrays his mother, if he stays with her, he betrays his nation.
The conflict of values is genuine: he sincerely wants to uphold two opposing values;
and the conflict is genuine because he sincerely wants both. If he had a penchant for
one side, he would know what to do, but he has not. In such a conflict, there is no
solution. If there were one, the young Frenchman would simply need to apply it, and
the conflict would disappear. If he could measure, weigh, compare the values between
which he is torn, he could simply act accordingly. But his conflict is genuine because
he cannot.
5. Against value absolutism and value monism
The insistence on conflict, that defines Kelsen’s and Berlin’s works on the subject, is
explained by what both authors opposed. Thus, it seems worthwhile to inquire what
Kelsen actually means by value absolutism, and in doing so define his position ex
negativo. Value absolutism only is the consequence of something else, namely, met-
aphysical absolutism. According to Kelsen, this is the view that there is an absolute
reality, independent of the knowing subject. In rejecting that, we may call Kelsen an
idealist, subjectivist or constructivist, because he thinks, in the footsteps of Kant, that
reality is created in the process of cognition, and therefore depends on the subject;
thus, is relative.

382 ULRICH WAGRANDL
[A] relativistic epistemology […] interprets the process of cognition as the creation of its
object. This view implies that the human subject of cognition is – epistemologically – the
creator of his world, a world which is constituted in and by his cognition. Hence, freedom
of the knowing subject is a fundamental prerequisite of the relativistic theory of knowl-
edge. […] Since the laws of cognition originate in the human mind, the subject of cogni-
tion may be considered the autonomous lawgiver. His freedom is autonomy.25
Kelsen needs to reject absolute reality because it would necessarily encompass values
as well. It seems that in Kelsen’s idea of the absolute, there is no distinction between
is and ought.
If there is absolute reality, it must coincide with with absolute value. The absolute necessar-
ily implies perfection. Absolute existence is identical with absolute authority as the source
of absolute values. […] It is essentially connected with the view that value is immanent in
reality as a criterion or emanation of the absolute good, and consequently, the tendency
to identify truth (that is, conformity with reality) and justice (that is, conformity with an
absolute value).26
This line of critique sounds familiar to Kelsen’s supporters and detractors, as it is the
gist of Kelsen’s rejection of natural law. Metaphysical absolutism leads to value abso-
lutism. In denying that values, as everything else that is normative, only come from
humans, and in insisting that there are objective values discernible in nature, one nat-
urally also must appeal to practical reason. In Kelsen’s words, this would be cognition
leading to statements of ought, which for him is impossible, as we saw, because an
ought can only be created by an act of volition.
Whereas Kelsen emphasizes the equal pedigree, and thus equal validity of all human
values, Berlin is not concerned with such questions. Rather, what he stresses through-
out his writings is that values – no matter how they came about – can clash, and that
we are forced to choose between them. This is meant to subvert the classical, Platon-
ic idea that all values form a coherent whole, a pyramid with one single, highest and
absolute value at the top. This false conception takes the form of ‘three unquestioned
dogmas’, as Berlin puts it. First, every genuine question is supposed to have one, and
only one true answer. Second, this truth is thought to be accessible to humans. Third,
true answers to genuine questions cannot contradict each other, so that they form an
orderly system.27 For the question of value conflicts, this means that every apparent
contradiction will in the end reveal itself to rest on error (if unintended), or outright
evil (if done on purpose). There can be, in this sense, no ‘legitimate’ conflict of values,
but only one true value and many pseudo-values detracting our attention. This idea
25 Kelsen, (footnote 1), 200.

27 Berlin (footnote 9), 221–222.

lends itself, regarding the future, to a teleological view of history: tomorrow, all value
conflicts will be solved; and to a sense of Weltschmerz regarding the present: today, the
world is bad and people are misled. It is worthwhile to look at a longer quotation from
Berlin, if only for the genius of his language:
Thinkers from Bacon to the present have been inspired by the certainty that there must
exist a total solution: that in the fullness of time, whether by the will of God or by human
effort, the reign of irrationality, injustice and misery will end; man will be liberated, and
will no longer be the plaything of forces beyond his control – savage nature, or the con-
sequences of his own ignorance or folly or vice; that this springtime in human affairs will
come once the obstacles, natural and human, are overcome, and then at last men will cease
to fight each other, unite their powers, and co-operate to adapt nature to their needs (as the
great materialist thinkers from Epicurus to Marx have advocated) or their needs to nature
(as the Stoics and modern environmentalists have urged).28
Value conflicts, therefore, disturb the harmony in which men are supposed to live.
Hence the will, discernible in humankind’s history of ideas, to either explain value con-
flicts away, or to use them as a pretense for domination. In Berlin’s view, however, con-
flicts do not only exist (nobody will deny that), but they are inevitable: not contingent,
but conceptually necessary to the adequate understanding of human autonomy. There
can be many highest values, some of which contradict or even oppose each other. As
autonomous subjects, humans need to make their choice and be ready to accept the
loss of those values against which they opted.
The notion of the perfect whole, the ultimate solution, in which all good things coexist,
seems to me to be not only unattainable […] but conceptually incoherent. […] Some
of the Great Goods cannot live together. That is a conceptual truth. We are doomed to
choose, and every choice entails an irreparable loss.29
One might even go so far as to say that individual autonomy only makes sense in a
world of non-monist, thus pluralist values. When every moral question can, in prin-
ciple, be resolved by looking at the pyramid of values, no choice is needed. Indeed,
such choice would be absurd: because who needs to choose truth? Truth imposes
itself, truth is heteronomous. Only if absolute truth cannot be obtained, if there is no
preordained hierarchy of ends, is there room for meaningful choice. Choice entails
that there are at least two equally good options (if one were better, there would be
no need to choose). But choice also entails that one cannot have what one did not
choose:
28 Berlin (footnote 9), 225.


384 ULRICH WAGRANDL
To assume that all values can be graded on one scale, so that it is a mere matter of in-
spection to determine the highest, seems to me to falsify our knowledge that men are free
agents, to represent moral decision as an operation which a slide-rule could, in principle,
perform.30
Here Berlin rejects, just like Kelsen, the possibility of practical reason: There is no
slide-rule of justice.
6. Conflating truth with justice: the dangers of absolutism and monism
Both Kelsen and Berlin reject absolutism, or monism, respectively, not only on phil-
osophical grounds. Their position is decidedly political: both are liberals, and both
think that absolutism, or monism, is dangerous. To think that the perfect life, free of
all conflict and contradiction, is an unattainable ideal may be called apolitical – to un-
critically accept things as they are, to passively bear, and not to actively change society.
Berlin anticipates this charge a monist would bring against him:
For every rationalist metaphysician, from Plato to the last disciples of Hegel or Marx, this
abandonment of the notion of a final harmony in which all riddles are solved, all contradic-
tions reconciled, is a piece of crude empiricism, abdication before brute facts, intolerable
bankruptcy of reason before things as they are, failure to explain and to justify …31
But the contrary is true, at least for Kelsen and Berlin, because absolutism and monism
are incompatible with democracy (for Kelsen) and with individual liberty (for Berlin).
We will see that Kelsen, as well as Berlin, as a way out of the conundrum of pluralism,
advocate for compromise. A true value absolutist, just as a value monist, however, can-
not be open to compromise. If one really thinks that there are absolute, objectively
knowable values, and that all moral conflicts have, in principle, one true solution, to
compromise is to step away from justice. In this sense, practical reason gives us (maybe
not all of us, but only philosopher kings) the means to ascertain what is the true answer
to a moral problem. As we saw, however, values, as statements of ought, cannot be true
or false, only valid or invalid. Hence they do not flow from reason, but from will, and
thus the solution to value conflicts cannot always be discovered by thinking hard, but
only by deciding, by choosing one value over the other. A value absolutist, or monist,
would deny this, because if there really is truth, then no decision is needed, just as no-
body would say: I have decided that planet Earth is a sphere. If every value is traceable
to the summum bonum, he who has knowledge of this summum bonum cannot com-


promise, because he knows (or purports to know) what is good and what is bad, and
what justice requires in cases of value conflicts.
Thus, value absolutism and value monism both are characterized by the conflation
of truth and justice. For Kelsen, this is a cardinal sin, as truth only refers to facts, where-
as justice means to be in accordance with a norm considered just, and thus refers to the
normative, as we already saw. This conflation has two consequences. First, it follows
that in cases of value conflicts, one value must necessarily be false, and thus no value
at all. Therefore, adherents of this value will be cast as mistaken, at best, or as evil, at
worst – according to whether their adherence to untruth was unintentional or deliber-
ate. They will, however, never be seen as equals, and compromise with them will not be
possible, because truth cannot compromise with lie. The second consequence is that
there will always be some who claim to have better knowledge of justice – truth – than
others. Because values, in this view, do not flow from autonomy, with which everyone
is equally endowed, but from special insight in nature, the will of God, the laws of
History, the essence of the people, and so on, those who are in the know will self-right-
eously claim leadership, be it a Committee of Public Welfare, High Priests, the van-
guard Party or the Führer.
The belief […] in absolute values irresistibly leads – and has always lead – to a situation in
which the one who assumes to possess the secret of the absolute good claims to have the
right to impose his opinion as well as his will upon the others who are in error. And to be
in error is, according to this view, to be wrong, and hence punishable.32
This problem is masterfully captured Kelsen’s account of the trial of Jesus in the Gospel
of St. John. He has Jesus say ‘It was for this that I was born, and for this that I came to
the world, to give testimony for truth’, to which Pilate replies with a question: ‘What is
truth?’. Kelsen goes on to note that Jesus gives no answer and that Pilate did not expect
one, because, as both knew, the mission of Jesus was not truth, but justice.33 In value
absolutist fashion, Jesus proclaims truth and justice at once: divine justice is truth as
well, as it can, via the revelation, be known, that means, be grasped through cognition.
This is why Jesus is unimpressed when Pilate resorts to a popular vote. For Pilate, the
relativist, as Kelsen calls him, justice is a matter of deciding value conflicts, and as he
represents the culture of democratic Rome, he orders a referendum. As we know, the
people decide against Jesus, the representative of divine truth. A value absolutist must
claim that the people have erred or were intentionally evil, and Christian doctrine sub-
sequently has done so. A value pluralist, however, has no need for this line of thought.
Pluralism sees the the legitimacy of having equally valid options, and hence the ne-
cessity of decision. They are not equally valid because of their equally good content,


386 ULRICH WAGRANDL
but because they flow from equally autonomous decisions of equally autonomous
subjects. Value pluralists will be ready, however, to question their own dogmas and to
take a new decision, if needed. They have to, because they cannot only be pluralists for
other people’s values, and absolutists for themselves.
7. Another kind of decisionism
It follows from what we saw so far that value conflicts can have no ‘solution’ in the
proper sense of the word. Having defined values as originating in human acts of will,
and value conflicts as those in which values assert themselves against each other, and
where no value will reveal itself to be lower, or false, to speak about solution is to gloss
over what is at stake here. This term suggests that with the right solution, conflicts will
dissolve. It subliminally introduces a criterion of right and wrong that aims at revealing
that one of the two conflicting values is no value at all. The conflict is thus solved by
demonstrating that it was based on an error, on a false understanding of value, and
that, while it may have looked like a genuine confrontation of two contradicting prin-
ciples, in fact, it was none. Kelsen cannot adhere to this understanding of the word ‘to
solve’, even though he uses it (in German, he employs ‘lösen’, which carries the same
problems).
Thus, to ‘solve’ a conflict does not mean to make it go away. Indeed, by insisting that
to solve a conflict of values requires yet another value judgment, both Kelsen and Ber-
lin can be described as decisionists. Although this term is somewhat tarnished because
of its use by Carl Schmitt,34 it is useful to describe a specific outlook that acknowledges
the limits of rationality in the realm of values. By now, it has become clear that Kels-
en and Berlin share, with Max Weber actually,35 the assumption that ultimate values
are not amenable to scientific inquiry. Within the work of Hans Kelsen, this can be
based upon three different, but interrelated aspects. As we have seen, the act of will –
the element of volition – plays an important role in Kelsen’s thought. An act of will is
nothing else than a decision, and that is why it makes sense that for Schmitt, Kelsen’s
legal positivism is composed of normativism and decisionism.36 The decision recurs in
Kelsen’s (somewhat meager) theory of interpretation. He curtails legal scholarship’s
ambitions to find the one true answer to every interpretative problem. Rather, schol-
ars should only draw a ‘frame of interpretation’ and expose the many meanings and
34 See Carl Schmitt, Political Theology Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, 2005, 5: “Sovereign is
he who decides on the exception”; Carl Schmitt, Über die drei Arten des rechtswissenschaftlichen Denkens,
1934, 20.
35 See Benhabib (footnote 13), 165 et seq., who calls Berlin a decisionist and traces his thoughts back to
Weber. She is referring to Max Weber, Die “Objektivität” sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer
Erkenntnis, Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 19 (1904), 22–87 (30).
36 Schmitt, Über die drei Arten (footnote 34), 24.

solutions to a given issue. There is no right answer, or rather, it is up to the empowered

official (the judge, mostly) to pick a solution out of the panoply of possibilities. This
solution becomes law not because it is right, but because a decision has been made in
favour of it.37 But Kelsen’s theory nonetheless saves us from short-handedly dismissing
any attempt to sincere legal reasoning, as a (rather vulgar) form of pure Schmittian de-
cisionism (or legal realism?) would have us do. The official empowered to authentically
interpret a provision is still bound by it, and by the provisions that confer authority on
her. Otherwise, the vindication of legal scholarship that was Kelsen’s lifelong project
would make no sense, just as the ideas of the Stufenbau38 and the Fehlerkalkül.39 Thus,
Kelsen is no decisionist in the Schmittian sense. The decision does not come out of
nowhere, nor is it inexplicable.40 The decision consists in acknowledging the limits of
what is positively knowable, and to pursue nonetheless. It is a gesture of humility. This
is why value pluralism is amenable to compromise, as we will shortly see. But there is a
third element in Kelsen’s thought that makes him a decisionist, and that is is theory of
democracy. Democracy, in a Kelsenian perspective, must presuppose value pluralism
(or relativism, as Kelsen says). Only if values are plural, is there meaningful choice, and
elections only make sense when the absolute good is unknown. Otherwise, why vote
in the first place?
In fact, the [very] assumption that knowledge of absolute truth and insight to absolute val-
ues are possible confronts democracy with a hopeless situation. For what else could there
be in the face of the towering authority of the absolute Good, but he obedience of those
for whom it is their salvation? There could only be unconditional and grateful obedience
to the one who possesses – i. e. knows and wills – the absolute Good.41
This reveals Kelsen to be a liberal decisionist. His decisionism is not a violent self-im-
position, is not forcefully bringing order into chaos. It considers itself to be the sec-
ond-best option; the only option that remains once we have understood that the abso-
lute good is out of reach. It is a decisionism of resignation, and thus a self-restraining
decisionism. I claim that Berlin’s emphasis on the necessity of choice is nothing else
but that. What we have, then, is much more of a Weberian decisionism than a Schmit-
37 Kelsen (footnote 4), 242, 351; (footnote 18), 350–351.

38 Kelsen (footnote 4), 228 et seq; (footnote 18), 221 et seq.
39 Fehlerkalkül (anticipation of errors) is the idea that the law expects some errors to be made in its crea-
tion and provides for certain corresponding procedures and remedies. The key feature is that because the
law anticipates that some legal acts will be, in fact, illegal, it confers them interim validity until they are
invalidated by an organ empowered to do so. Kelsen adopted this idea from Adolf Merkl, Die Lehre von der
Rechtskraft entwickelt aus dem Rechtsbegriff, 1923, 277, 291–297. Fehlerkalkül is the reason why unconstitution-
al statutes must be obeyed until a Constitutional Court has annulled them.
40 As Schmitt would have it, see Schmitt, Political Theology (footnote 34), 31 et seq.
41 Hans Kelsen, The Essence and Value of Democracy, 2013, 102.

388 ULRICH WAGRANDL
tian one.42 It is a liberal decisionism because it frees us from bowing to the law in the
way we would have to submit ourselves to truth and justice. The law commands obedi-
ence not because it is true, or just, but because it has been decided upon by the compe-
tent authorities. Only then is it possible to dissent from the law and still be honest and
just. The moment law, truth, and justice are conflated, to disobey the law is to relegate
oneself to lie and to injustice. The legitimate existence of a minority in a democracy
presupposes, as Kelsen explained, that it is not totally wrong, because the majority, and
the law it creates, is not totally right.43 The minority can only be treated as legitimate if
it is not forced to believe in the truth and justice of what the majority has decided. A
decision that makes no claims to truth and justice, but only to the relevant procedures,
frees the minority of that imposition. Only a decisionistic account of democracy can
explain why it is legitimate that majorities change, and that the laws are altered again
and again. It is legitimate because the majority does not represent the immutable pre-
cepts of truth and justice, but the temporarily empowered persons to take temporary
decisions.44 As Herrmann Lübbe surmises, this is a problem for deliberative theories
of democracy. The ‘force of the better argument’ leaves no space to dissent, because to
resist the better argument is to be unreasonable, and thus, negligible. Law, truth and
justice are conflated all over again: “One notices: to identify the binding force of political
decisions with the binding force of discursively established truth has either totalitarian or
anarchic consequences.”45 Kelsen and Berlin certainly were not deliberative democrats.
8. Pluralism, decision, and compromise
To call Kelsen (and Berlin, for that matter) decisionists seems to contradict their com-
mitment to compromise. Indeed, for all their emphasis on choice, judgment and acts
of will, both think that there need not always be an either-or-decision. A closer look
will reveal this to be quite obvious: first, compromises are decisions as well. Second,
only a pluralist, who acknowledges that there often are many legitimate, but opposing
values at stake, will be ready for compromise, because she knows that her values are
not the only ones, and because the values of other people cast her in perpetual doubt.
A value monist, or absolutist, however, will always see compromise as only the sec-
42 See also Christian Schwaabe, Freiheit und Vernunft in der unversöhnten Moderne Max Webers kritischer
Dezisionismus als Herausforderung des politischen Liberalismus, 2002, 191.
44 The quest for a liberal decisionism is associated with the work of Hermann Lübbe. See Hermann Lüb-
be, Theorie und Entscheidung Studien zum Primat der praktischen Vernunft, 1971, 12; Praxis der Philosophie,
Praktische Philosophie, Geschichtstheorie, 1978, 65; Fortschrittsreaktionen Über konservative und destruktive
Modernität,1987, 48 ff.; Philosophie nach der Aufklärung Von der Notwendigkeit pragmatischer Vernunft, 1980,
161–178.
45 Lübbe, Philosophie nach der Aufklärung (footnote 44), 162–163 (my own translation).

ond-best option, or even as an outright treason of his principles. Monists can make
compromises too, to be sure. But they hardly will have any more legitimacy than the
unsatisfying predicament of a temporary modus vivendi, inevitable, perhaps, but not
right. Berlin, on the other hand, advocates for a middle-ground precisely because of his
pluralist reluctance to subordinate everything to one single principle.
But if one believes this doctrine [monism] to be an illusion, if only because some ulti-
mate values may be incompatible with one another, and the very notion of an ideal world
in which they are reconciled to be a conceptual (and not merely practical) impossibility,
then, perhaps, the best that one can do is to try to promote some kind of equilibrium,
necessarily unstable, between the different aspirations of differing groups of human beings
[…] and to promote the maximum practicable degree of sympathy and understanding,
never likely to be complete, between them.46
This way, a decisionist pluralism espouses tolerance as one of its greatest virtues. Based
on what we have seen so far, it is no coincidence, then, that tolerance and compromise
also are central to Kelsen’s thought. In fact, pluralism (or relativism in Kelsen’s words)
breeds tolerance, which breeds compromise.
He who views absolute truth and absolute values as inaccessible to the human under-
standing cognition must deem not only his own, but also the opinion of others at least as
feasible. […] The stronger the minority, however, the more the politics in a democracy
become politics of compromise. Similarly, there is nothing more characteristic of the rela-
tivistic worldview than the tendency to seek a balance between two opposing standpoints,
neither of which can by itself be adopted fully, without reservation, and in complete nega-
tion of the other.47
What about decisionism, then? Is not compromising the very opposite of deciding?
Only if we inadvertently follow a Schmittian decisionism, in which a sovereign decider
acts outside normal procedures.48 Obviously, this is not what Kelsen and Berlin can
have in mind. Following their rejection of practical reason, though, they also cannot
think that compromise simply occurs spontaneously after an exhaustive discussion.
Kelsen and Berlin are not adherents of deliberative democracy, and therefore com-
promise cannot be conceived of in discursive terms. Still, it is possible do reconcile a
decisionist reading of Kelsen and Berlin with their insistence on tolerance, equilibri-
um and the middle ground. Examined closely, compromises reveal themselves to be
decisions as well, even twofold decisions, for that matter. Parties pursuing conflicting
aims based on contradicting values must first take the decision to abandon the extreme
46 Berlin (footnote 9), 18, 50.

48 See, e. g., the concept of sovereign dictatorship in Carl Schmitt, Dictatorship. From the origin of the mod-
ern concept of sovereignty to proletarian class struggle, 2014, 117.

390 ULRICH WAGRANDL
position, which means to stop demanding that their claim ought to be met in full. This
is a decision because any value whatsoever demands complete, and not only partial
satisfaction, and to move away from this ideal is the first choice – thus: sacrifice – to be
made. It is a choice made with regard to other values, not at stake in the present con-
flict, but hopefully valid for both parties; for instance, tolerance, mutual understand-
ing, but also the need for expeditious action, the will to appear resolved towards a third
party, and so on. To open oneself to compromise, then, is in itself a compromise. The
second decision constituting any compromise is to decide on the matter itself. As the
‘solution’ does not flow from practical reason, it must be created in the act of opting for
it. Even the best compromise is dead if no one wants it. Compromises therefore have
to be willed, they need a choice in favour of them. This is why every time we do not
agree spontaneously, we resort to procedures at whose end stands a decision: the act of
voting in Parliament is the perfect example. Members of Parliament vote because they
do not agree, and they vote for the compromise they have reached because without
vote, there would be none.
9. Conclusion: Kelsen was a pluralist
In comparing Kelsen’s views on the question of values and their conflict with those of
Berlin, it became apparent that Kelsen’s relativism can be reconstructed as a Berlinian
pluralism. We do not have to take Kelsen’s self-description as a relativist at face value.
In fact, his so-called relativism is not what we usually associate with that therm. This
is so because the word ‘relative’, for Kelsen, only denotes that values depend on those
who create them, and because everyone is equally endowed with autonomy (that is,
the capacity to give oneself moral principles), such values may clash, so that it is not
possible to discern which value is the better, higher or truer one. His relativism is thus
a formal one, just like his theory of law: leaving out questions of the content of the
law, and concentrating on problems of norm, or value creation. All values are ‘relative’
because their pedigree is equal since they all derive from equally autonomous individ-
uals. In insisting on individual autonomy, Kelsen’s relativism is, in one central aspect,
not relativistic at all. But to delve into the problems of relativism has not, as indicated,
been the aim of this paper. It is precisely because of such problems that it attempted to
leave relativism aside and to read Kelsen’s relativistic thoughts in a value pluralist way.
Pluralism is not problem-free, of course. But it serves as a more stable foundation
for Kelsen’s work because the claims it makes are more modest. Pluralism leaves open
the question whether values are objectively given, or not. Berlin, for his part, de-
fended himself against the allegation of relativism and believed in objective values. If
everything was relative, so he thought, we would not be able to understand each other.
The very fact that one can comprehend why someone holds something dear and de-
spise it nonetheless proved for Berlin that values have an objective existence. He only

posited that there are many of them.49 But we need not burden pluralism with such
considerations. Its central insight is that values can come into conflict without one
value being necessarily inferior, wrong or no value at all. On the contrary, a conflict of
values is genuine if and only if the values that clash are of equal importance. The pres-
ent paper claims that this Berlinian thought is Kelsenian as well, and that therefore,
Kelsen’s relativism is, in fact, a pluralism.
Pluralism entails decisionism. In this aspect, too, Kelsen and Berlin are on the same
page. A conflict of values needs to be terminated (not ‘solved’ in the proper sense) by
making a choice, that is, a decision. Berlin talks about the inevitability of tragic choices
in an almost existentialist fashion. Kelsen justifies it by claiming that values, as state-
ments of ought, always flow from an act of volition, not cognition, and that therefore,
there is no practical reason. One gets out of value conflicts by making yet another value
judgment, not by applying one’s knowledge. This kind of decisionism could be iden-
tified with Carl Schmitt. But that would be premature, since both Kelsen and Berlin,
for all their talk about choices, were staunch defenders of equanimity, compromise,
and tolerance. How does this fit together? It works by recognizing that compromises,
too, are decisions. To compromise means to decide to give up extreme positions, and
it means to decide for the solution that has been agreed, since it does not flow from
practical reason, but needs to be supported by an active and deliberate choice.
Decisionism is one possible foundation of liberal democracy, but certainly the
foundation that Kelsen and Berlin would have agreed upon. To decide means not to
claim any higher authority than the power that comes from institutions and proce-
dures. While this may sound shallow, even immoral to some, it actually is liberating.
The existence of a legitimate minority as well as the possibility to legitimately dissent
from the law only make sense if the majority cannot and does not proclaim the im-
mutable precepts of truth and justice. Kelsen and Berlin would have agreed that truth
and justice are unattainable ideals. Theirs is not an attitude of futility and of despair,
however, but one of confidence and of resolve: To decide in the face of uncertainty is
to be truly free.
Ulrich Wagrandl
Verfassungsgerichtshof, Freyung 8, 1010 Wien,
ulrich.wagrandl@univie.ac.at


The Democratic Value of Law
Hans Kelsen on the Theory and Praxis of Relativism
FEDERICO LIJOI
Abstract: The Pure Theory of Law means the guarantee of a science, which is neutral with
respect to subjective values and the elaboration of a scientific analysis of law. The principle
that no values should prevail over others means primarily that all of them must be afforded
the same opportunities to enter into comparison and competition with each other. Each
value thus has a dignity that is equal to all others, because here value-freedom means rela-
tivism. Relativism, therefore, does not mean an indifference to values, but an alternative to
the two extremes of dogmatism and scepticism. The main purpose of my paper is to illus-
trate the characteristics of Kelsenian relativism with a particular reference to two impor-
tant aspects of his thought: on the one hand, the relationship between form and content,
and on the other, the relationship between truth and freedom.
Keywords: Law, Relativism, Form, Freedom, Value, Democracy
Schlagworte: Recht, Relativismus, Form, Freiheit, Wert, Demokratie
1. The ‘difficult’ formalism of the Pure Theory of Law
The Reine Rechtslehre represents the most important contribution that Hans Kelsen
made to legal theory and the philosophy of law in the twentieth century. Its purity
offers the guarantee of a science that is indifferent to subjective values, especially po-
litical ones, and that provides a scientific analysis of law. However, one must not let its
purported neutrality lead one to conclude that its meaning and relevance transcend
the historical and political situation in which it was formulated and developed. On the
contrary, the institutions of the Habsburg Empire offered the young Kelsen an excel-
lent opportunity for engaging in a discriminating reflection.
In his ‘autorisierte Biographie’, R. A. Métall provides the following quotation by
Kelsen:

394 FEDERICO LIJOI
Angesichts des österreichischen Staates, der sich aus so vielen nach Rasse, Sprache, Reli-
gion und Geschichte verschiedenen Gruppen zusammensetzte, erwiesen sich Theorien,
die die Einheit des Staates auf irgendeinen sozial-psychologischen oder sozial-biologis-
chen Zusammenhang der juristisch zum Staat gehörigen Menschen zu gründen versuch-
ten, ganz offenbar als Fiktionen. Insofern diese Staatstheorie ein wesentlicher Bestandteil
der Reinen Rechtslehre ist, kann die Reine Rechtslehre als eine spezifisch österreichische
Theorie gelten.1
The context of the Habsburg Empire represents not only the background to the Reine
Rechtslehre, but also the driving force behind it: his awareness of a problematic rela-
tionship between law and society, between political institutions and a pluralism of val-
ues, pushed Kelsen towards a formulation of law with the aim of constructing a model
for the coexistence of nationalities that would be able to overcome the contrasts and
political inequalities between the provinces of the Empire.

It is no coincidence that the young Kelsen immediately devoted his academic ac-
tivity to the themes of Austrian public law (stimulated in particular by the lectures of
Edmund Bernatzik in Vienna and of Georg Jellinek in Heidelberg) and electoral law,
as evidenced by his studies on the Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre (1911), the Kom-
mentar to the new electoral law for the Reichsrat (1907), and the essay on Reichsgesetz
und Landesgesetz (1914). Furthermore, in 1911 Kelsen was given his first teaching post
as Privatdozent of public law and the philosophy of law, teaching a course on the Aus-
tro-Hungarian Ausgleich.
It will therefore be useful to start with a brief look at Austrian constitutional histo-
ry, especially the troubled transition from the monarchy to the republic, in order to
introduce the main thesis of this essay. This consists in the idea that, through the real-
ization of a doctrine that was ‘indifferent to values’ and therefore pure, Kelsen did not
intend to separate the law from its real and concrete substratum, i. e. from the values it
contains, but instead that he wished to establish a method for managing and resolving
the conflicts between the values that were so characteristic of modern society, in a par-
ticular way and in a new way. As paradoxical as it may seem, for Kelsen the Reinheit of
legal science represents the only possibility for law to recover ‘adherence’ to its object.
In Kelsen’s thought a certain conception of the law is at stake, which can rightly be
defined as formalist, although in a way that is very peculiar and indeed difficult The ide-
ality and purity of the Rechtslehre constitute the premise – and, one could say, also the
promise – of a ‘return to reality’: to that same political and social reality which, precisely
because it had become surprisingly conflictual and problematic, had stimulated Kelsen
to respond to the urgent therapeutic need for a Reinigung of the nineteenth-century
1 R. A. Métall, Hans Kelsen Leben und Werk Eine autorisierte Biographie, Deuticke, Vienna 1969, 42.

The Democratic Value of Law 395
Staatslehre, which he considered inadequate2 and no longer able to satisfy the exacting
demands of modern knowledge.
Finally, I would like to show that, especially in the period of imperial Austria, and
therefore during the bitter confrontation between parliament and government that is
typical of constitutionalism, although Kelsen’s project of a Reine Rechtslehre initially
seemed to be a defence of the positive, rather than the natural, character of the law,
during the republican phase it then revealed its true character as an affirmation of the
intrinsically democratic nature of the juridical form.
2. From the constitutional conflict to the parliamentary democracy
Brauneder wrote that ‘in 1848, Austria became one of the constitutional monarchies’.3
In his Österreichisches Staatsrecht (1923) Kelsen describes the Pillersdorf Constitution4

(the Aprilverfassung) as a ‘law of the absolute monarch, without any cooperation (Mit-
wirkung) of popular representation’.5 Despite its commendable drawing up of Grundre-
chte (§§ 17–31), it was severely criticised by the liberals, first of all because the monarch
possessed an absolute veto on the deliberations of the parliament (§ 15), as well as the
power to adjourn it and dissolve it at his will. (§ 16). Moreover an appointed senate was
associated with an elected chamber of deputies as a ‘behindernde Kugel’, in such a way
that the parliament did not correspond to the model of pure popular representation.
In the aftermath of this concession by the sovereign, the dissatisfaction of the
students and the population forced the Imperial Court to issue a proclamation (the
Mai-Novelle) which instituted a Reichstag with a single-chamber, elected by universal
suffrage and endowed with the rights of a constituent assembly. A commission was set
up within it which had the aim of drafting a constitution, but as soon as it had prepared
its Entwurf the Reichstag was dissolved and in March 1849 the emperor introduced a
new constitution (the Märzverfassung), which fully restored monarchical absolutism.
2 Carl Schmitt instead refers to the outdated aspects of parliamentarianism in his famous essay Die geistes-
geschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus, Duncker & Humblot, Munich and Leipzig 1923.
3 W. Brauneder, Die Verfassungsentwicklung in Österreich 1848 bis 1918, in A. Wandruszka / P. Urbanitsch,
Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848–1918 Im Auftrag der Kommission für die Geschichte der österreichisch-ungar-
ischen Monarchie (1848–1918), Verlag der österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. VII/1, Vienna
2000, 69–237.
4 Politische Gesetzsammlung LXXVI, Nr. 49; see also E. Bernatzik, Die österreichischen Verfassungsgesetze mit
Erläuterungen, Manz, Vienna 1911, 102 ff. On the source of this constitution, particularly with reference to the
belgische Verfassung of 1831, see W. Brauneder, Die Verfassungsentwicklung, cit , 91 ff.
5 H. Kelsen, Österreichisches Staatsrecht Ein Grundriss entwicklungsgeschichtlich dargestellt, J. C. B. Mohr
(Paul Siebeck), Tübingen 1923, 1.

396 FEDERICO LIJOI
The draft drawn up by the parliament of Krems6 was particularly important, even
though it never entered into force. Kelsen defined its content as ‘crucial for future con-
stitutional development’7 and pointed out its similarities to the Republican Bundesver-
fassung. On the liberal model of the Paulskirche of Frankfurt it gave the monarch a veto
that was only suspensive (§ 160) and in § 1 it stated the principle of popular sovereignty
(‘alle Staatsgewalten gehen vom Volke aus’).
The transition from a constitutional to a parliamentary monarchy envisaged by the
Entwurf was evidently considered too threatening for the rights of the crown. It was
no coincidence that over the next few years (1849–1860), from the Märzverfassung to
the Sylvesterpatent of 1851 and the Organische Grundsätze of 1852, there was a strength-
ening of absolutism: ‘above all a repeated accentuation of the rights of the crown’ and
an emphasis on ‘the unity of the whole monarchy’.8 The Oktoberdiplom of 1860, which
proposed a cautious return to constitutionalism, with more room for federalism and
parliamentary Mitwirkung, was replaced in the following year by the centralist Febru-
arpatent (1861).
Nevertheless the pressing demands for a constitution did not simply disappear.
Czechs, Poles, Ruthenians, Romanians, Slovenes, Croats and, above all, the King-
dom of Hungary, were all claiming autonomy and representation. The budget deficit,
the huge public debt, the Schleswig-Holstein question and the war against Prussia
also played a decisive role. After the closure of parliament and the Sistierung of the
Februarpatent in 1865, the development of a constitution resumed with the Dezem-
berverfassung, which sanctioned the Austro-Hungarian compromise in 1867, and
which Brauneder defines as a ‘parliamentary constitution’.9 It strengthened feder-
alism (§§ 11 and 12 of L. 141),10 introduced the separation between judicial and ad-
6 The system of governance outlined in the Kremsier Entwurf is conceived in accordance with the principles
of Hochkonstitutionalismus. In § 41 we find the first clear formulation – absent from the Aprilverfassung – of
the principle of legality, i. e. of the subordination of the rights and powers of the monarch to the text of a
constitution. On this point see the entry “Constitution”, in K. Rotteck / K. Welcker (ed.), Das Staats-Lex-
ikon: Encyklopädie der sämmtlichen Staatswissenschaften für alle Stände, vol. IV, Brockhaus, Leipzig 1860,
94–112.
7 H. Kelsen, Österreichisches Staatsrecht, cit., 3.
8 A. Dudan, La monarchia degli Asburgo Origini, grandezza e decadenza, vol. II, C. A. Bontempelli, Rome
1915, 269. On this point, see also E. Bernatzik, Die österreichischen Verfassungsgesetze, cit., 168–169.
9 W. Brauneder, Die Verfassungsentwicklung, cit., 206–207; F. Tezner, Die Volksvertretung, Manz, Vienna
1912, 122–156.
10 A. Dudan, La monarchia degli Asburgo, cit., 162. On this point see P. Petta, Il sistema federale austriaco,
Giuffrè, Milan 1980, 22. The Dezemberverfassung consisted of five laws: n. 141, which amended the law con-
cerning the Reichsvertretung Act of 1861; n. 142, on the general rights of citizens for the kingdoms and coun-
tries represented in the Council of the Empire; n. 143, on the establishment of a court of law of the Empire;
n. 144, on judicial power; and n. 145, on the exercise of governmental and executive power.

ministrative power (§ 14 of L. 144),11 and provided a catalogue of civil and political

rights.12
The constitution of 1867 remained in force until the fall of the Habsburg Empire in
1918. During this period the conflict between crown and parliament continued to rage.
Even the struggle between federalists and centralists was exacerbated. In 1873 there
was a serious economic and financial crisis, which had a profound and lasting effect
on liberalism and its economic ideology of the free market.13 On the political level, it
led to a re-evaluation of the role of the state in the economy, because, as Wandruszka
explains, ‘that moment saw an end to the myth that the free play of economic forces
would lead to the continual growth of well-being in general, and at that time in Austria
the idea was rekindled that the state has the task, and indeed the duty, to protect the
economically weaker classes’.14
Although law n. 15 of 26 January 1907 – the so-called Beck15 electoral reform – abol-
ished the system of curias and introduced universal suffrage for men over 24 years of
age,16 parliamentary life, especially after 1878, was greatly damaged by the abuse of the
decree of urgency17 in § 14 of law n. 141: ‘There was the period between ‘67 and ‘78,
11 ‘The administration of justice will be separated in all instances from the political administration’ (§ 14,
L. 144). In § 6 we read that ‘the judges are autonomous and independent in the exercise of their functions’,
in the sense that ‘in the exercise of their office of judge – unlike the administrative authorities – they are
subject only to the law and not to the orders of higher authorities’ (see H. Kelsen, Österreichisches Staats-
recht, cit., 46). Finally, in § 15 the establishment of an administrative tribunal is announced, before which
anyone who ‘claims that his rights are damaged by a decision or by an order of an administrative authority,
may decide to assert his claims’.
12 These rights were the right of citizenship (§ 1), equality before the law (§ 2), freedom of movement and
the right of active and passive electorate (§ 4), inviolability of property, personal liberty and domicile (§ 5,
§ 8, § 9), right of petition (§ 11), right of association and assembly (§ 12), freedom of opinion (§ 13), freedom
of faith and conscience (§ 14), freedom of science and its teaching (§ 17), equality of the nations within the
state (§ 19).
13 A. Dudan, La monarchia degli Asburgo, cit., 206 and 208.
14 A. Wandruszka, La socialdemocrazia austriaca 1867–1920, in P. Schiera (ed.), La dinamica statale austri-
aca nel XVIII e XIX secolo, il Mulino, Bologna 1981, 39–40.
15 On this point, see H. Kelsen, Österreichisches Staatsrecht, cit., 27; Id., Kommentar zur österreichischen
Reichsratswahlordnung (Gesetz vom 26 Jänner 1907, RGBl Nr 17), Manz, Vienna 1907.
16 On this point, see Kelsen, Österreichisches Staatsrecht, cit., 27, in which we also read a critique of the vio-
lation of the principle of equality due to the exclusion of women from the vote in the 1907 reform.
17 The constitutional standardization of the emergency decree constitutes an example of progress with
respect to the absolute state. However, the idea of subordinating – albeit at a later moment – these measures
to the approval of parliament, according to the logic of the Rechtsstaat and, therefore, of the legal constructi-
bility of the action of the state, struggled to be affirmed. For example, as regards the obligation to present
parliament with the motivations for the urgent measures adopted, § 87 of the Märzverfassung, by revoking
the wording contained in § 157 of the Kremsier Entwurf, did not provide for any deadline or any penalty in
the event that this obligation might not be fulfilled. In addition § 120 provided for the possibility to adopt
Verordnungen with the force of a definitive (not provisional) law, i. e. that did not require the approval or
justification of parliament for their adoption. Even more radically § 13 of the Februarpatent neither provided
for any explicit assumption of responsibility of the ministry, nor did it request the subsequent approval by
parliament of the provision adopted. Some progress was made with § 14 of the Dezemberverfassung, which

398 FEDERICO LIJOI
in which the parliament was able to make itself respected; then […] the crown and
the court took control again and now – despite all the universal suffrage, and indeed
now worse than before – the parliament in Austria is alive but it vegetates and it often
sleeps, leaving the way clear for the absolutism of the § 14.18 The Sarajevo attack of June
28, 1914, the declaration of war against Bosnia and the military and economic catastro-
phe that ensued, were the death-knells of the Austrian Empire.
During the period of the First Austrian Republic Kelsen took on an important role
in public life. In 1918, after completing his military service as the direct representative
of the Kriegsminister, he was commissioned by Karl Renner, at that time the Chancellor
of State of the Austrian Provisional Government, to draw up the final draft of a republi-
can constitution to be submitted to the national assembly. The essential political poli-
cies were a federal structure and a representative system. The model to be followed, ‘so
weit dies tunlich schien’, was the preussian one of the Weimar constitution, which was
a course of action that ‘doch war nur in einem sehr geringen Masse möglich, da Ren-
ner in der Loesung der Presidentschafts-Frage einen weit demokratischen Standpunkt
einnahm als die Weimarer Verfassung’.19
To a head of state who, according to art. 60, was to be elected by the Federal Assem-
bly and not by the people, a constitutional court was therefore added, as a guarantee
that the functions of the state would be carried out correctly. For Kelsen, who saw it
as ‘mein persoenlichstes Werk’, this was ‘der juristische Kern der Verfassung’20 in a ju-
risdiction that had no precedents in the history of constitutional law, because ‘bisher
hatte noch kein Gericht die Kompetenz erhalten, Gesetze wegen Verfassungswidrig-
keit mit genereller nicht auf den Einzelfall beschraenkter Wirkung aufzuheben’.21
Kelsen’s enthusiasm did not last long after he was elected as a constitutional judge
in 1919 and as a permanent rapporteur in 1921, because in 1929 a radical constitutional
reform proposed by the Christian-Social Bundeskanzler Ignaz Seipel ‘hatte in erster
Linie zum Ziel, die Macht des Bundespresidenten und damit der ganzen Exekutive
wesentlich zu verstaerken und so eine Regierung auch ohne Parlament moeglich zu
allowed for the provisional validity of the provision, and parliamentary approval was required within four
weeks of its publication, on pain of the revocation of the measures adopted. Nevertheless § 19 of the same
law gave the emperor the power to adjourn or dissolve parliament, which predictably threatened the exist-
ence of popular representation in the event of a contrary vote. On this point, see G. D. Hasiba, Das Notver-
ordnungsrecht in Österreich (1848–1917) Notwendigkeit und Mißbrauch eines ‘Staatserhaltenden Instrumentes’,
Verlag der österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Vienna 1985.
18 A. Dudan, La monarchia degli Asburgo, cit., 175.
19 M. Jestaedt (ed.), Hans Kelsen im Selbstzeugnis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2006, 68–69.
20 Ibid., 69.
21 Ibid.; G. Bongiovanni, Reine Rechtslehre e dottrina giuridica dello Stato H Kelsen e la costituzione austriaca
del 1920, Giuffrè, Milan 1998, 141 ff.; S. Lagi, Il pensiero politico di Hans Kelsen (1911–1920) Le origini di Essenza
e valore della democrazia, Name Edizioni, Genoa 2008, 161–190.

machen’,22 and led to a reorganization of the Constitutional Court, the judges of which
were now no longer elected by parliament, but by the government. This was an attack
on judicial independence that Kelsen considered intolerable, especially because ‘eine
der wesentlichsten Funktionen des Gerichtshofs die Kontrolle der Verfassungsmaes-
sigkeit von Regierungsakten war’.23
Deeply embittered and exposed to repeated political attacks and personal criticism,
Kelsen left Vienna and accepted a post at the University of Cologne. Appointed a pro-
fessor of international law in August 1930, he spent three ‘sehr angenehme’ years there24
and in 1932 he was elected dean of the Faculty of Law. But the Austrian experience
was not an isolated episode. In a letter of December 16th 1930 addressed to William
Rappard, referring to a positive review of Schmitt’s Verfassungslehre written by his stu-
dent Eric Voegelin (the ZÖR issue is dated 1931, but it is certain that Kelsen already
knew its content, as he was the director), the Austrian jurist denounced ‘the influence
of certain intellectual currents that are growing in Germany – not for the benefit of
science – for which it is fashionable to replace exact conceptual determination and
empirical research with the romantic construction, oriented only toward the feelings’.
And he concluded that ‘today it is genuinely difficult for young people to escape this
intellectual fashion, especially since – clearly for political reasons – it has the applause
and support of some very influential professors’.25
In 1933 Kelsen was one of the first professors in Germany to be dismissed by the
Nazi government. He managed to obtain authorization for expatriation and accepted a
position from the Institut Universitaire des Hautes Études Internationales in Geneva. Ru-
dolf Métall relates how Carl Schmitt, nominated with Kelsen’s support as the successor
to Fritz Stier-Somlo, who had died of heart disease the previous year, was the only one
among his colleagues in the faculty of Cologne who did not sign the letter of protest
against Kelsen’s dismissal from the University of Cologne, written on the initiative of
the new dean, Nipperdey.26
3. The dangerous contradiction of using dictatorship to defend democracy
As mentioned above, the nature of Kelsen’s struggle in defence of the positivity of law
during the period of the constitutional monarchy was revealed even more clearly dur-
22 M. Jestaedt (ed.), Hans Kelsen im Selbstzeugnis, cit., 71. On this point and others, see: P. Petta, Schmitt,
Kelsen e il ‘custode della costituzione’, in Storia e politica, XVI, 1977, 505–551.
23 M. Jestaedt (ed.), Hans Kelsen im Selbstzeugnis, cit., 79.
24 Ibid., 81.
25 Letter by Hans Kelsen to William Rappard, Cologne, 16 December 1930, Vienna University Archive.
26 R. A. Métall, Hans Kelsen: Leben und Werk, cit., 61; R. Mehring, Carl Schmitt: Aufstieg und Fall, C. H.
Beck, Munich 2009, 294 ff.; C. Schmitt, ‘Solange das Imperium da ist’ Carl Schmitt im Gespräch 1971, Duncker
& Humblot, Berlin 2010, 92.

400 FEDERICO LIJOI
ing the years of the First Austrian Republic, when it was transformed into a struggle
for the democratic production of law. The idea proposed in the Hauptprobleme that leg-
islation is a function of society and not of the state reached its full realization in the no-
modynamic interpretation of the principle of legality, which Kelsen began to elaborate
from 1914,27 but which was not definitively formulated until 1920, in Das Problem der
Souveranität. The democratic context of republican Austria is thus the place where the
scientific analysis of law, initially elaborated to debunk the ideological character of the
nineteenth-century Staatslehre and its monarchical institutions, reveals its potential
value, taking on the systematic form of an original ‘democratic legal positivism’.
In the following pages I intend to show how this connection between legal form
and democracy emerged to its full extent in the precise moment when democracy was
seriously threatened, in the years when dictatorship was looming and when autocracy,
also from a theoretical point of view, was dramatically considered as the only solution
to the alleged inadequacy of the forms of democratic government and its parliamenta-
ry institutions.28 Kierkegaard’s statement that ‘if one really wants to study the universal,
one only needs to look around for a legitimate exception’29 seems to be very relevant
to this situation.
I would like to start from a passage in the last paragraph of Verteidigung der
Demokratie, a short essay published by Kelsen in 1932, the year he was elected dean of
the Faculty of Jurisprudence of Köln, which was a critical moment for Weimar Ger-
many. Kelsen wrote as follows: ‘wer für die Demokratie ist, darf sich nicht in den verhäng-
nisvollen Widerspruch verstricken lassen und zur Diktatur greifen, um die Demokratie zu
retten’.30 Although couched in a rhetorical form, this passage expresses the extremely
important theme of the contradiction that Kelsen identifies between democracy and
dictatorship.
The first thing to note is that it is not a contradiction between law and non-law, i. e.
between law and force. In § 46 of the Allgemeine Staatslehre, Kelsen affirms that dic-
27 On this point, see H. Kelsen, Reichsgesetz und Landesgesetz nach österreichischer Verfassung, in Ar-
chiv des öffentlichen Rechts, 32, 1914, 202–245, 390–438.
28 This was certainly Schmitt’s position. Together with Kelsen, the following jurists instead fought in fa-
vour of democracy: H. Heller, Freiheit und Form in der Verfassung, in Die Justiz, 5, 1929–30, 672–677: 672;
E. Fraenkel, Abschied von Weimar? (1932), in Id., Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 1, Nomos, Baden Baden 2011,
481–495: 488; O. Kirchheimer, Bemerkungen zu Carl Schmitt’s ‘Legalität und Legitimität’, in Id., Von der
Weimarer Republik zum Faschismus: die Auflösung der demokratischen Rechtsordnung, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt
on the Main 1981, 113–151.
29 S. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling. Repetition, in Kierkegaard’s Writings, VI, edited and translated with
an introduction and notes by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton University Press, Princeton,
New Jersey 1983, 227.
30 H. Kelsen, Verteidigung der Demokratie (1932), in M. Jestaedt / O. Lepsius (ed.), Hans Kelsen Verteidi-
gung der Demokratie, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2006, 237. Kelsen’s implicit reference is obviously the posi-
tion of Carl Schmitt, Der Hüter der Verfassung, J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen 1931; H. Kelsen, Wer
soll der Hüter der Verfassung sein? in Die Justiz, 6, 1931, 576–628.

tatorship is just as much a legal order as democracy, so that ‘was als Willkür gedeutet
wird, ist nur die rechtliche Möglichkeit des Autokraten, jede Entscheidung an sich zu
ziehen. Ein solcher Zustand ist ein Rechtszustand, auch wenn er als nachteilig emp-
funden wird’.31 As in a democracy, also in a dictatorship the will of the state appears
as the content of a norm, and it is therefore subjected to the principle of legality. A
dictatorship is not rechtswidrig, that is to say Unrechtsstaat, but Rechtsstaat, just as a
democracy is.
I wish to define this peculiar contradiction by referring to the theory of contrariety
adopted by Aristotle: democracy and dictatorship are the contraries of the same genus
(the law), just as black and white are the contraries of the genus of colour.32 We need to
understand whether this contrariety also implies a scale of values involving a progres-
sion from the lower legal value of dictatorship to the higher legal value of democracy.
In this case, the specific difference between democracy and dictatorship brings out a
difference of value within the legal form.

Kelsen considers the legal form as the genuine essence of the principle of legality.
Within it (wenn A soll B) the action of the state (B) is seen as the consequence of a
condition (A), and thus not as an arbitrary and immediate action, but as one that is
conditioned and mediated. This Grundform des Rechts is the result of two fundamental
theoretical moves: the statement of the Sein-Sollen dualism and the elimination of the
dualisms within Sollen: between subjective right and objective law on the one hand,
and between private and public law on the other hand.
3.1. The Sein-Sollen dualism
The Sein-Sollen dualism originated in the context of the contraposition between for-
malism and anti-formalism, spawned by juridical positivism. While Kelsen was cer-
tainly a formalist, he did not conceive of the form of law as the outcome of a process
of logical abstraction, but rather as the product of a transcendental analysis (Kritik).
Kelsen’s doctrine therefore appears to be closer to legal dogmatics33 than to the soci-
31 H. Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre (1925), Österreichische Staatsdruckerei, Vienna 1993, 336.

32 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1018a 25–31.
33 H. Kelsen / R. Treves, Formalismo giuridico e realtà sociale, Esi, Naples 1992, 39–54.

402 FEDERICO LIJOI
ology of law. Having recourse to Neo-Kantianism34 as a movement of reaction to ‘em-

pirical positivism’,35 Kelsen argued that law has an ideal rather than a natural existence.
Kelsen made contact with the Neo-Kantian school of Baden (Windelband, Rick-
ert, Lask) during his stay in Heidelberg, when he attended Georg Jellinek’s seminar
in 1908. In Leipzig, Jellinek had been first a student and then a friend and colleague of
Windelband.36 In the Begriffsjurisprudenz of Jellinek and his predecessors, Gerber and
Laband,37 Kelsen identified a useful application of the (Neo-)Kantian contraposition
between Sein and Sollen,38 i. e. of the effort to establish the autonomy of practical reason
before theoretical reason, that of value before reality, and that of law before nature.
Gerber, in his Grundzüge des deutschen Staatsrechts (1865), was the first jurist who
endeavoured to satisfy ‘das Bedürfniss einer schärferen und korrekteren Präzisierung
der dogmatischen Grundbegriffe’,39 by elaborating, in the field of public law, the dis-
tinction between two Betrachtungsweisen: that of natural knowledge and that which
pertained to legal knowledge.40 A decade later, in Das Staatsrecht des Deutschen Reiches
(1876), Laband followed this up by asserting that ‘alle historischen, politischen und
philosophischen Betrachtungen – so werthvoll sie an und für sich sein mögen – sind
für die Dogmatik eines konkretes Rechtsstoffes ohne Belang und dienen nur zu häufig
dazu, den Mangel an constructiver Arbeit zu verhüllen’.41 Finally Jellinek developed
34 M. Jestaedt (ed.), Hans Kelsen im Selbstzeugnis, cit., 23: ‘Die für die Rechtswissenschaft unerlässliche
Methodenreinheit schien mir durch den von keinem Philosophen so scharf wie von Kant betonten Ge-
gensatz von Sollen und Sein gewährleistet. Die kantische Philosophie war mir daher von allem Anfang an
Leitstern. Ich akzeptierte sie zuerst in jener Form, die sie durch die Philosophen der südwestdeutschen
Richtung, vor allem durch Windelband, erhalten hatte’. On this point, see what Kelsen wrote in the Pref-
ace to the second edition (1923) of Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre, Scientia Verlag, Aalen 1984: ‘Im
Anschluß an die Kant-Interpretation Windelbands und Simmels wird mir das Sollen zum Ausdrucke für
die Eigengesetzlichkeit des von der Rechtswissenschaft zu bestimmenden Rechtes zum Unterschied von
einem ‘soziologisch’ erfaßbaren sozialen Sein’ (VI).
35 M. G. Losano, Sistema e struttura nel diritto, vol. II Il Novecento, Giuffrè, Milan 2002, 28 ff.
36 J. Kersten, Georg Jellinek und die klassische Staatslehre, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2000, 19; C. Jellinek,
Georg Jellinek. Sein Leben, sein Werk, in ‘Neue österreichische Biographie ab 1815’, vol. VII, Amalthea, Vienna
1931, 136 ff.
37 H. Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre, cit., VII–IX.
38 S. L. Paulson, Introduzione, in H. Kelsen / R. Treves, Formalismo giuridico e realtà sociale, cit.: ‘Georg
Jellinek could be considered as the author who influenced Kelsen the most. Undoubtedly, in this context
we think above all of Jellinek’s contributions to public law, but the work of Georg Jellinek, a good friend of
Max Weber, also reflects a philosophical conviction: the Neo-Kantianism of Heidelberg’ (13).
39 C. F. von Gerber, Grundzüge des deutschen Staatsrechts, 3rd edn, Bernhard Tauchnitz, Leipzig 1880, V;
M. G. Losano, Sistema e struttura nel diritto, vol. I Dalle origini alla Scuola storica, Giuffrè, Milan 2002, 306–
307.
40 C. F. von Gerber, Grundzüge des deutschen Staatsrechts, cit., 1–2.
41 P. Laband, Das Staatsrecht des Deutschen Reiches, vol. I, 2nd edn, J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Freiburg
1888, XI (preface to the second edition); W. Wilhelm, Zur juristischen Methodenlehre im 19 Jahrhundert, V.
Klostermann, Frankfurt on the Main 1958, 5: ‘Von Bergbohm, dem Zeitgenossen Labands, stammt das Wort,
Jurisprudenz sei ‘gereinigtes Denken’. Sucht man eine bündige Formel für Labands Wissenschaftstheorie,
so ist sie in diesem Wort zu sehen’ (7); P. Zorn, Die Entwicklung der Staatsrechts-Wissenschaft seit 1866, in
Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts, I, 1907, 65; M. Stolleis, Geschichte des öffentlichen Rechts in Deutschland, vol.

Gerber’s idea by elaborating, in the Allgemeine Staatslehre (1900) the famous ‘Zwei-
Seiten-Lehre’, the doctrine of the two sides of the state, according to which the same
object, the state, could be understood either from a sociological point of view or from
a strictly normative one.
These attempts, albeit imperfect, all aimed exclusively at making jurisprudence an
authentic and autonomous science.42 For Kelsen law consists of a series of hypotheti-
cal legal propositions (objective value judgements). Value (Sollen) and reality (Sein) con-
stitute the object of legal science and that of natural science respectively,43 and they
are forms of representation of a single (modally indifferent) substratum 44 In both cases,
science is the science of forms, and therefore of judgements: on the one side those of
the law (as scheme of interpretation), and on the other side those of nature, which are
synthetic. This does not mean, as claimed by those who accused Kelsen,45 that law, in
its role as a judgement, is a product of the science of law, and that it therefore loses
its authoritative origin, but that law is a function of knowledge, since the legal norm is
properly speaking the sense of an act of will (Sinngehalt eines Willensakt), and not the
act of will itself.
According to Kelsen, legal science, as a (pure) legal theory of law, therefore has an
analytical rather than a constitutive function. It does not establish the norms, but only
extracts from the law – understood as a series of synthetic judgements – its fundamen-
tal form (Grundform). Therefore we must not confuse the synthetic function of the
value judgements which constitute the law with the analytical function that pertains to
the judgements of juridical science.
Let us now examine Kelsen’s critique of the dualisms of Sollen.
II, 1800–1914, C. H. Beck, Munich 1992, 331 ff.; E. Schwinge, Der Methodenstreit in der heutigen Rechtswissen-
schaft, L. Röhrscheid Verlag, Bonn 1930, 7.
42 H. Kelsen, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre, J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen 1911: ‘Nur daß
ich die Trennung zwischen Sein und Sollen, zwischen explikativer und normativer Betrachtung gerade der
Rechtswissenschaft gegenüber schärfer durchführe, als es bisher üblich war, und für diese Disziplin eine
rein normative Betrachtung in Anspruch nehme’ (VI).
43 On the asymmetrical relationship between critique of the science of nature (transcendental philosophy)
and legal science as a pure doctrine of law, see H. Kelsen, Rechtswissenschaft und Recht, Deuticke, Vienna
and Leipzig 1922.
44 On this point, see H. Kelsen, Die Rechtswissenschaft als Norm- oder als Kulturwissenschaft (1916), in
H. Kelsen, A. Merkl, A. Verdross, Die Wiener rechtstheoretische Schule, Europa Verlag, Vienna 1968, 65; Id.,
Allgemeine Theorie der Normen, Manz, Vienna 1979, 44–48.
45 On this point, see F. Sander, Staat und Recht Prolegomena zu einer Theorie der Rechtserfahrung, Deuticke,
Vienna and Leipzig 1922; Id., Kelsens Rechtslehre Kampfschrift wider die normative Jurisprudenz, J. C. B. Mohr
(Paul Siebeck), Tübingen 1923. See also A.-J. Korb, Kelsens Kritiker Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Rechts- und
Staatstheorie (1911–1934), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2010.

404 FEDERICO LIJOI
3.2. The dualisms within Sollen
The critique of the first dualism within Sollen, between subjective right and objec-
tive law, is directed against the idea that such a thing as natural, namely pre-juridical,
rights exist, such as the right to property (here John Locke comes to mind46). In the
Allgemeine Staatslehre (1925), the subjective right is defined as ‘rechtlich geschütztes
Interesse’ (as in the case of Jhering), or as ‘rechtlich gewährleistetes Wollen’ (as Wind-
scheid defines it).47 Immediately afterwards Kelsen specifies that ‘in beiden Fällen ruht
der Akzent auf einem metarechtlichen, jenseits des Rechts in seinem spezifischen Ei-
gensinn liegenden Moment, demgegenüber das Recht nur als Mittel, als Schutz- oder
Garantiemittel [… ] in Betracht kommt’48 According to this theory, therefore, the sub-
jective right is considered logically and temporally prior to the objective law. The fun-
damental idea is that originally only subjective rights existed (the prototype of which
is the right to property) and only at a later stage the objective law, such as the legal
order of the state, was added to these rights in order to endorse and protect the rights
that had arisen independently of the legal order itself.
A few pages further on, it becomes evident that according to Kelsen this distinction
between subjective right and objective law only reproduces the opposition between
natural law and legal positivism: ‘Es ist die Idee der angeborenen, unzerstörbaren oder
auch ‘erworbenen’ Rechte des Individuums, die seit je mit der Prätention aufgetreten
ist, absolute Schranken gegen das positive Recht aufzurichten. In dem Dualismus von
objektivem und subjektivem Recht verbirgt sich somit auch der Alte Dualismus von
positivem Recht und gerechtem, natürlichem Recht’.49 But it is in the General Theory
of Law and State (1945) that Kelsen provides the most lucid account of the political
character of this distinction. Here it is obvious that Kelsen believes that the theory of
subjective rights ideologically deforms the positive nature of law (if this is scientifical-
ly analyzed), rendering non-modifiable and therefore impossible to produce legally
(either autocratically or democratically) a certain number of rules and prescriptions
directed at the behaviour of the Normadressaten (so that, for example, the violation
of the right to property is punished not only because it is against the law, i. e. malum
prohibitum, but above all because it is against nature, i. e. malum in se).
The whole passage is as follows:
Though logically untenable, the theory of the priority of rights is of the utmost political
significance. Its purpose is obviously to influence the formation of law, rather than to
analyze the nature of positive law. If the legal order cannot create but merely guarantee
46 J. Locke, Second Treatise of Government (1689–90), C. B. Macpherson (ed.), Hackett Publishing Compa-
ny, Indianapolis-Cambridge 1980.
47 H. Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre, cit., 55.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid., 59.

rights, it cannot abolish existing rights either. It is then legally impossible to abolish the
institution of private property, nay, legislation is then incapable of depriving any particular
individual of any particular proprietary right of his. All these consequences of the doctrine
of the priority of rights are in contradiction to legal reality. The doctrine of the priority of
rights is not a scientific description of positive law but a political ideology.50
As regards the second dualism within Sollen, between private and public law, Kelsen
strongly argues against the existence of a political Mehrwert of the public power, which
allows the state to pursue the public interest in a manner that is untrammelled, i. e.
legibus solutus As I pointed out in the previous paragraph, the story of the Habsburg
Empire was characterized by a bitter struggle between the parliament and the govern-
ment, and by the ceaseless attempts made by the monarchical institutions to circum-
vent the principle of representation and legality. The aim was to block the parliamenta-
ry development of the constitutional monarchy by causing it to revert to the practices

of an absolutist government. Two means were employed to reach this aim: on the one
hand the doctrine of the distinction between formal law and material law, and on the
other hand the theory of administration as a free activity of the state. In both cases,
the purpose was to free the state, as an administration, i. e. as an expression of royal
power, from the legal system, guaranteeing it a sphere of free action not regulated by
the norms produced by parliament. ‘Es ist der der deutschen Staatstheorie politisch
zwar geglückte, rechtslogisch aber mißglückte Versuch’ – writes Kelsen – ‘ein Stück des
monarkischen Absolutismus auch unter der Geltung der konstitutionellen Verfassung
zu konservieren’.51
Whereas previous to the development of the constitutional system ‘hatte Gesetz
stets nur die eine Bedeutung einer bindenden, das heißt rechtspflichtenschaffend-
en oder einen Rechtssatz formulierenden Vorschrift der kompetenten staatlichen
Autorität, ohne Rücksicht auf die besondere Form, in der diese Vorschrift erlassen
wurde’,52 in his formulation of the distinction between formal law and material law La-
band introduced the explicit distinction between legal norms that have the form of
the law, i. e. deliberations by parliament that are then sanctioned by the monarch and
enacted, and norms that, despite not having the form of the law, nevertheless possess
its substance, because they establish legal obligations.53 The fact that both these types
of norms are defined as law means that the monarch and the administrative authori-
ties are implicitly legitimized to institute legal obligations without submitting them to
50 H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts 1945,
80.
51 H. Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrechts (1920), Scientia, Aalen 1960, 27.
52 H. Kelsen, Zur Lehre vom Gesetz im formellen und materiellen Sinn, in H. Kelsen, A. Merkl, A. Ver-
dross, Die Wiener rechtstheoretische Schule, cit., 1534.
53 On this point, see P. Laband, Das Budgetrecht, Guttentag, Berlin 1871.

406 FEDERICO LIJOI
the procedure of parliamentary formulation. The notion of law in the material sense
thus resulted in maintaining, in the constitutional state, a ‘materielles Gesetzgebungs-
recht’54 directly entrusted to the monarch and the administration, both of which pre-
served the power to institute legal obligations running parallel to the formal legislative
power of the parliament.55
The same intention of introducing Machtreservate in favour of the executive pow-
er was supported by the doctrine, advocated by Otto Mayer, that administration was
a free activity of the organs of the state. The primacy of the administration over the
private subjects of civil society was in this case justified by the fact that it alone could
interpret, and therefore realize, the public interest. According to Mayer, only the State,
understood as Macht that was free from the constraints of the legal system, was able
to mediate the conflicts of the Gesellschaft, the energies of which (for example, in the
activity of political parties) could not be activated except in terms of a divisive particu-
larization of the common good.56

The first dualism within Sollen is used by the bourgeoisie as a protection against the
state (the King), while the second dualism within Sollen is used by the state to prevail
over society (the bourgeoisie). As we have seen, this contraposition between state and
society perfectly reflects the structure and the characteristics of constitutional monarchy.
3.3. The identity of state and law
The main thesis of Kelsen’s Rechtslehre, the identity of state and law, follows on from
this criticism of the dualisms within Sollen. But what exactly does this thesis entail?
54 H. Kelsen, Zur Lehre vom Gesetz im formellen und materiellen Sinn, cit., 1540.
55 On this point, see also Kelsen’s critique of the principle of the division of power in H. Kelsen, Grundriß
einer allgemeinen Theorie des Staates, Rudolf M. Roher, Vienna 1926, § 58.
56 This theory is expressed in the two volumes of Otto Mayer’s Deutsches Verwaltungsrecht (1895–1896),
and above all in his essay Zur Lehre vom öffentlichrechtlichen Vertrage, in Archiv für öffentliches Recht,
3, 1888, 1–86, which Kelsen would explicitly oppose in 1913 with his Zur Lehre vom öffentlichen Rechts-
geschäft, in Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts, 31, 1913, 53–98, 190–249. On this point see, inter alia, the essays by
M. Fioravanti, Otto Mayer e la scienza del diritto amministrativo and Kelsen, Schmitt e la tradizione giu-
ridica dell’Ottocento, now in Id., La scienza del diritto pubblico, cit., 451–518 and 605–656. Kelsen’s critique
of the primacy of the state over civil society does not, however, make him a liberal anti-statist thinker. The
image of a purely economic-private form of civil society is completely alien to Kelsen. From a political point
of view, in the preface to the first edition of the Hauptprobleme (1911), he proclaims himself a ‘neo-liberal’
(XI), which means that he considers himself among those who were opposed to the excesses of Manchester
Liberalism, by advocating social legislation and moderate regulatory interventions by the state. For a lucid
definition of neo-liberalism, see C. Mortati, Le forme di governo Lezioni, Cedam, Padua 1973, 47. Kelsen’s
critique of liberalism is radical in Politische Weltanschauung und Erziehung, in H. Kelsen, A. Merkl, A.
Verdross, Die Wiener rechtstheoretische Schule, cit., 1506–1507, in which he adopts a position that is rather
close to ‘collectivism’. Finally, in Hans Kelsen im Selbstzeugnis, cit., 61, he explicitly declares his adherence to
the ideals of social democracy.

First of all, it means that if the state is nothing but the form of society (as stated in the
Hauptprobleme), then, since the state is law, law is the ‘Form der Gesellschaft, die als das
substantielle Element, als der Inhalt dieser Form zu denken ist’.57 The most lucid sense of
the thesis that identifies state and law lies in the critique of constitutional monarchy
with its opposition between state and society, that is to say in the same motive that
prompted Kelsen to debunk the ideological character of the dualisms within Sollen.
It is not too difficult to find the error at the root of Kelsen’s criticism of these two
dualisms. In fact he stigmatizes the attempt to naturalize a subjective affirmation of
value, so as to ideologically elevate it above all others and place it outside the positive
creation of law.58 In this case, precisely because it emerges as the main result of a scientif-
ic critique of ideology, the structure of the legal form not only confirms that authentic
law is only positive law, but it also seems to convey a certain interpretation of that pos-
itivity. According to this interpretation, the prohibition against immunizing subjective
values corresponds to the obligation to subject them to discussion, and to the duty of
not making them exempt from criticism.
This is a particularly important point, as I believe that the operation of purification
of the Rechtswissenschaft necessarily entails a preference for a certain form of society,
which means a certain kind of state. In this sense, the indifference to values implied
by the neutrality of the scientific method does not produce an immoral or amoral law,
which is something that Kelsen has often been accused of,59 but also makes it possible
to identify the kind of state, i. e. the specific approach towards managing conflicts be-
tween values, that can be considered worthy of modern knowledge, and particularly of
the scientific spirit that characterizes it.60
57 H. Kelsen, Hauptprobleme, cit., 410.

58 On this point, see H. Kelsen, Gott und Staat (1922), in H. Kelsen, A. Merkl, A. Verdross, Die Wiener
rechtstheoretische Schule, cit.: ‘Der Dualismus von Staat und Recht bedeutet nicht nur einen logisch-sys-
tematischen Widerspruch, er ist inbesondere auch die Quelle eines rechtlich-politischen Mißbrauchs. Er
ermöglicht, im Gewande rechts- und staatstheoretischer Argumentation rein politischen Postulaten gegen
das positive Recht zum Durchbruch zu verhelfen. Der Dualismus von Staat und Recht wird zu einem Du-
alismus zweier verschiedener, miteinander in Widerspruch stehender Normsysteme, von denen man das
eine unter dem Namen “Staat”, Staatsraison, Staatsinteresse (auch öffentliches Wohl, öffentliches “Recht”)
immer dann zur Geltung bringt, wenn das andere, das “positive” Recht, zu einer für die Herrschenden, die
in Wahrheit mit diesem “Staat” identisch sind, unerwünschten Konsequenz führt’ (186–187).
59 On the relationship between law and morals, see H. Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 2nd edn (1960), Verlag Ös-
terreich, Vienna 2000: ‘Nimmt man an, daß das Recht seinem Wesen nach moralisch ist, dann hat es keinen
Sinn, unter Voraussetzung eines absoluten Moralwertes die Forderung zu stellen, daß das Recht moralisch
sein soll. Eine solche Forderung ist nur dann sinnvoll [… ], wenn die Möglichkeit eines unmoralischen,
moralisch schlechten Rechtes zugegeben, wenn also in die Definition des Rechtes nicht das Element eines
moralischen Inhalts aufgenommen wird’ (68).
60 On the ‘scientific spirit’ of modernity, see S. Freud, Die Zukunft einer Illusion, Internationaler Psychoan-
alytischer Verlag, Vienna 1927; J. Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, Minton Balch, New York 1929. On the con-
nection between democracy and education, see inter alia J. Dewey, The Ethics of Democracy (1888), in J. A.
Boydston (ed.), John Dewey The Early Works (1882–1898), Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale

408 FEDERICO LIJOI
Although it cannot be denied that Kelsen presents his inquiry as free from value
and from any preference concerning the models it describes, it seems equally evident
that Kelsen’s critique of ideology has a superior value as a practical, and ultimately
political, guide. This is not just a ‘side effect’ of purity, but its ‘practical consequence’.
As Kelsen points out in Justiz und Verwaltung, first published in 1929: ‘Man sieht, zu
welch bedeutsamen praktischen Konsequenzen eine falsche Theorie vom Wesen des
Staates [… ] führen kann und welch eminent praktische Bedeutung eine gereinigte
Lehre hat’.61
4. The degree of law: on the deformability of the form
Now I’d like to return to the idea that the indifference to values required by the neutral-
ity of the scientific method leads Kelsen to attribute a higher value to democracy than
to dictatorship, by commenting on a passage in Das Problem der Souveranität (1920)
that concerns the conditions for exercising the right of secession in a federal contract, as
for example in the case of a threat to vital interests (but it could also refer to a right to
emergency legislation, a Notverordnungsrecht). Kelsen states as follows:
Durch einen solchen Inhalt wird allerdings die Rechtsform bis zur äussersten Grenze ihrer
Aufnahmsfähigkeit gespannt. Hier droht der Inhalt schon die Form zu sprengen. Immer-
hin, solange nicht jede Interessengefährdung als Bedingung dieses Rechtes gesetzt, sol-
ange die Bundesordung nicht nur zu solchem Verhalten verpflichten will, das, weil im eige-
nen Interesse der Subjekte, von ihnen selbst gewollt wird, solange die mögliche Differenz
von Sollen und Wollen nicht auf Null sinkt, ist formell die Rechtsidee gewahrt.62
In this passage Kelsen shows that when the content of the legal obligation coincides
with the will of the subject who is under obligation, the form of Sollen implodes, be-
cause the existence of the obligation is undone by any behaviour that does not corre-
spond to it. As we know, for Kelsen the idea of law requires instead that the juridical
obligation (i. e. Geltung) should remain indifferent to the will of Normaddressaten (i. e.
Wirksamkeit).
I wonder if this relationship of indifference between form and content, and especial-
ly the concept of a zero degree to which such indifference can be reduced, with the risk
of undoing the legal form, can be used to interpret the relationship between society
and its form, i. e. the law, when it comes to the formation of the will of the state. Such a
1969, vol. I (1882–1888), 227–249; Id., Democracy and education: an introduction to the philosophy of education,
The Macmillan company, New York 1916; G. Calogero, La scuola dell’uomo, Sansoni, Florence 1939.
61 H. Kelsen, Justiz und Verwaltung (1929), in H. Kelsen, A. Merkl, A. Verdross, Die Wiener rechtstheore-
tische Schule, cit., 1796.
62 H. Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrechts, cit., 308.

situation, in which the form is stretched to the furthest limits of receptivity and is thus
at risk of being undone, might occur when the subjects involved in the formation of ju-
ridical conditions – that is to say those facts to which the action of the State is attached
in the primary norm – are limited to only one of the interested parties that constitute
society, as in the case of a dictatorship. The resulting totalization of the part, or of the
party, therefore represents a type of content, i. e. a type of state, which, although jurid-
ically qualified, is located at the extreme limit of the form. For this reason, although
Kelsen includes dictatorship within the law, he places it at the very furthest limit of the
legal form, which it almost oversteps to reach the kind of naturalization inherent in the
ideology of natural law and in that of public power as Mehrwert.
This fascinating image of the form that can be deformed and undone seems to
me very useful and fruitful in order to understand correctly what ‘indifference to the
content’ means for Kelsen. The indifference of the legal form to values by no means
implies that, since one value is worth the same as another, it doesn’t matter whether
society takes the form of an authoritarian or a democratic state. In fact it has nothing to
do with nihilistic relativism. Instead it means that no value can be subtracted from dis-
cussion and placed above others without corrupting the perfection of the legal form.
Therefore, in order for no value to prevail over others, and for the law to remain a form
because it is not exclusively assigned a single value, every value must have an equal pos-
sibility of being subject to discussion, and thereby competing and contributing to the
formation of the public will.63 The idea that the state is identical to the law, and that it is
therefore the form of society, thus means, to adopt another image, that it represents the
circumference on which subjects and values are arranged, all of which are equidistant
from the centre. Kelsen’s relativism is nothing but this equal distance from the centre.
In Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie (1929) he writes: ‘Darum ist der Relativismus,
die Weltanschauung, die der demokratische Gedanke voraussetzt. Demokratie schätzt
den politischen Willen jedermanns gleich ein, wie sie auch jeden politischen Glauben,
jede politische Meinung, deren Ausdruck ja nur der politische Wille ist, gleicher-
maßen achtet’.64 This is what is meant by ‘indifference of the form to the content’ and
‘indifference of the law to values’.
I think that the image of the form as a circumference aptly expresses the idea that
the neutrality of juridical science as regards values does not imply any nihilistic rel-
ativism or lack of interest in the question of value on Kelsen’s part. On the contrary,
the neutrality of science allows him to discover the highest and most effective form of
law in parliamentary democracy (and herein lies ‘die praktische Bedeutung der reinen
Rechtslehre’). Therefore, for Kelsen the democratic state is the most genuinely scien-
tific form of society (let us consider, once again, the central idea of the Hauptprobleme,
63 On this point, see Kelsen’s preference for the proportional electoral system, in H. Kelsen, Vom Wesen
und Wert der Demokratie (1929), in Hans Kelsen Verteidigung der Demokratie, cit., 193–204.
64 H. Kelsen, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie (1929), cit., 226.

410 FEDERICO LIJOI
according to which legislation is a function of society, and not of the state, as Jellinek
instead believed65). Here Kelsen highlights a structural correspondence between the
neutrality of science and the relativism of parliamentary democracy. He includes dic-
tatorship within the law, but at its lowest possible level, at which the form is the most
deformed, since – precisely because it subtracts (by law) a certain value from debate,
which is reserved for the immediate production of the autocrat – it does not possess a
method for resolving conflicts of interest. This is because within it, as Kelsen acutely
notes: ‘es hier überhaupt an der Möglichkeit politischer Strömung und Gegenströ-
mung fehlt’.66
Again in Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie Kelsen uses the terminology of psy-
choanalysis to explain this concept, attributing a special ability to democracy, namely:
‘den politischen Affekt der Masse über die Schwelle des sozialen Bewußtsein zu heben,
um ihn hier abreagieren zu lassen’, while in an autocracy ‘ruht das soziale Gleichgewicht
[…] gerade umgekehrt auf der Verdrängung des politischen Affekts in einer Sphäre,
die man individualpsychologisch mit dem Unterbewußtsein vergleichen könnte’.67
Whereas for this reason democracy, unlike dictatorship, is safeguarded from the
danger of a revolution that might destroy it, nevertheless it is the victim of a para-
doxical privilege inasmuch as the freedom of political self-determination that follows
from the perfection of its legal form ‘directly favours its enemy’. Kelsen writes that ‘it’s
a paradoxical privilege of this form of government, a doubtful advantage which it has
over autocracy that it may, by its own specific methods of forming the will of the state,
abolish itself ’.68
Therefore, on the one hand, in accordance with its scientific spirit, democracy – be-
cause it offers expression to all values – constructs political truth through discussion
and compromise, replacing the top-down paternalism of dictatorship with the bot-
tom-up approach of a ‘fatherless society’.69 On the other hand, however, it exposes itself
to a mortal, but inevitable, danger, because the peculiar value of relativism categorical-
ly rules out its imposition by force.
Unlike Rousseau, in fact, Kelsen claims that one cannot force people to be free.70 Free-
dom can only be freely chosen, and this also applies to democracy, which is founded
65 H. Kelsen, Hauptprobleme, cit., 433, 465 ff.

66 H. Kelsen, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie, cit., 202.
67 Ibid.
68 H. Kelsen, Foundations of Democracy (1955), in Hans Kelsen Verteidigung der Demokratie, cit., 292.
69 Ibid., 291: ‘On the whole, democracy has no ground which is favourable to the principle of authority in
general and to the Fuehrer-ideal in particular. Insofar as the father is the archetype of authority, because it
is the original experience of all authority, democracy is, according to its own idea, a fatherless society’. On
this point, see also S. Freud, Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse, Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag,
Vienna 1921; P. Federn, Zur Psychologie der Revolution: die vaterlose Gesellschaft, Anzengruber-Verlag Brüder
Suschitzk, Vienna and Leipzig 1919.
70 J.-J. Rousseau, Du contrat social, Livre I, Chapitre VII (Du Souverain): ‘Afin donc que le pacte social ne
soit pas un vain formulaire, il renferme tacitement cet engagement qui seul peut donner de la force aux au-

upon freedom. In fact it is from the freedom that it accords to its members that democ-
racy derives its strength and nourishes its only possible self-defence mechanism: those
who want democracy, because they want relativism, cannot at the same time want a
value that excludes all other values, thereby attempting to escape from the tiring and
never-ending process that is part and parcel of democratic life. The democratic convic-
tion of the relativity of all convictions is both the poison that democracy injects into
its political organism and the antidote to this poison, in such a way that authoritarian
impulses are short lived, because they are defused by the same relativism that allowed
them to arise in the first place.
In 1927, in The Public and its Problems, John Dewey claimed that ‘the cure for the ills
of democracy is more democracy’.71 In 1932 Kelsen wrote that if the ‘people in parlia-
ment’ no longer want democracy, then they have simply ceased to be democratic, and
so democracy – which persuades but doesn’t compel, educates but doesn’t oblige – can
only hope that the people will want it again one day. No external guarantee or ‘father
figure’ can relieve the democratic citizen from the endless search for civil cohabitation.
This is why, as Kelsen writes: ‘die Erziehung zur Demokratie wird eine der prak-
tischen Hauptforderungen der Demokratie selbst’.72 And so, when it is surrendered
up to an ill-educated people, democratic relativism can lead to nothing but the ap-
palled realization of its own defeat: ‘Man muss seiner Fahne treu bleiben, auch wenn
das Schiff sinkt; und kann in die Tiefe nur die Hoffnung mitnehmen, dass das Ideal der
Freiheit unzerstörbar ist und dass es, je tiefer es gesunken, um so leidenschaftlicher
wieder aufleben wird’.73
Federico Lijoi
Università di Roma ‘La Sapienza’, Via Carlo Fea 2, 00161 Roma,
federico.lijoi@uniroma1.it
tres, que quiconque refusera d’obéir à la volonté générale y sera contraint par tout le corps: ce qui ne signifie
autre choses sinon qu’on le forcera à être libre’.
71 J. Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (1927), in J. A. Boydston (ed.), John Dewey The Later Works
(1925–1953), Southern Illinois University Press, London and Amsterdam 2008, vol. II (1925–1927), 325.
72 H. Kelsen, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie, cit., 219.
73 H. Kelsen, Verteidigung der Demokratie, cit., 237.


Salvaging Scientific Socialism?
Hans Kelsen’s Attachments and Detachments
to Austro-Marxism
REUT YAEL PAZ / MAXIMILIAN WAGNER

Abstract: This contribution situates Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law (1934) together with
his earlier political involvement with Austro-Marxism during the 1920s. The move here is
two-fold: after a brief discussion of the cultural milieu of the Austro-Marxists in Vienna, it
unpacks Kelsen’s positionality within the group first assembled in 1907. More specifically,
in order to distil Kelsen’s critical attachments to the Austro-Marxists, the focus here is
on Kelsen’s debate with the jurist/sociologist Max Adler (1873–1937) primarily over the
‘dismantling of the capitalist state machinery’. Whereas such contextualization salvages
Kelsen’s political commitment to scientific socialism, it also sheds light on the importance
of this ‘phase’ in Kelsen’s later intellectual development.
Keywords: Historical contextualisation, Vienna, Austro-Marxism, scientific socialism,

Max Adler, the concept of the state
Schlagworte: Historische Kontextualisierung, Wien, Austromarxismus, Wissenschaftli-

cher Sozialismus, Max Adler, Staatsbegriff
Hans Kelsen, who drafted the Austrian constitution and acted as a judge in the Aus-
trian Constitutional Court, a court he himself had conceived, was first and foremost
a legal scientist. Kelsen’s serious scientific but also political engagement with other
scholars and texts is often overshadowed by the originality of his 1934 Pure Theory
of Law (Reine Rechtslehre). His somewhat Platonic legal interest in securing ‘a hole in

414 REUT YAEL PAZ / MAXIMILIAN WAGNER
time’ for the law in its purest form – separated from social reality and the moral ideal –
was driven by methodological, even mathematical, precision.1
His attempts at scientific purity cannot, and should not, remain detached from
Kelsen’s eventful life. Born in Prague, Kelsen grew up in Vienna, where he got his first
professorship after converting from Judaism, and established a name for himself in
numerous legal fields. Kelsen never concealed his favouritism for social democracy,
even if he never formally committed to the party.2 Karl Renner (1870–1950) ‘the father
of the (Austrian) Republic’ – an ‘Austro-Marxist’ who shared Kelsen’s socialist con-
victions and particularly his insistence on the protection of minorities and multi-cul-
turalism – asked Kelsen, while Kelsen acted as the state chancellor of the provisional
government, to participate in the drafting of the new Austrian Constitution. One of
Kelsen’s drafts was adopted.3 Arguably, Kelsen’s dedication to the socialist cause while
maintaining political independence officially made it possible for Renner to entrust
Kelsen with this task.4

Be that as it may, it was Kelsen’s ‘socialist’s commitments,’ as they are often de-
scribed, that were responsible for his dismissal from the Constitutional Court in 1930.5
He relocated to Cologne but was stripped of his teaching duties by the Nazis shortly af-
ter becoming dean in 1933. Kelsen then escaped to Geneva and eventually to the Unit-
ed States where he settled in Berkley. After his retirement in 1952, Kelsen continued to
research, lecture worldwide and publish. Despite the lack of recognition he received
1 Reut Yael Paz, Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law as ‘a Hole in Time’ / La Théorie pure du droit de Hans Kelsen
comme “un trou dans le temps”, Monde(s) 7 (2015), 75–94.
2 As Clemens Jabloner writes, Kelsen “never actually joined a political party” (Clemens Jabloner, Kelsen
and His Circle: The Viennese Years, European Journal of International Law 9 (1998), 368–385, at 368).
3 Fore more on Kelsen’s contribution to the Austrian Constitution, see Thomas Olechowski, Der Beitrag
Hans Kelsens zur österreichischen Bundesverfassung, in: Hans Kelsen: Leben – Werk – Wirksamkeit, ed.
Robert Walter / Werner Ogris / Thomas Olechowski, 2009, 211–230; Jochen von Bernstoff, The Public In-
ternational Law Theory of Hans Kelsen Believing in Universal Law, 2010, 272–278. Reut Yael Paz, A Gateway
Between a Distant God and a Cruel World: The Contribution of Jewish German Scholars to International Law,
2012, 180; Ewald Wiederin, Der österreichische Verfassungsgerichtshof als Schöpfung Hans Kelsens und
sein Modellcharakter als eigenständiges Verfassungsgericht, in: Schutz der Verfassung, ed. Thomas Simon /
Johannes Kalwoda, 2014, 283–306.
4 Agustín E. Ferraro, Kelsen’s Highest Moral Ideal [Review of Jochen von Bernstorff, Der Glaube an das
universale Recht Zur Völkerrechtstheorie Hans Kelsens und seiner Schüler, 2001], German Law Journal 3 (2002),
available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=11&artID=200.
5 More specifically, it was due to the political issue of remarriages in Catholic Austria: a Catholic-led cam-
paign smearing Kelsen’s name followed his participation in abolishing the ‘Dispensehen’ decision from the
regular courts (1928). “This decision was intended to put an end to the competency-exceeding repeal by
regular courts of official permissions for remarriage following a divorce. According to Austrian constitu-
tional law, this power of repeal belonged only to the Administrative Court, not the regular courts. The
conservative government, which opened itself increasingly to Fascist influences from the end of the 1920s,
used this decision to abolish the independent status of constitutional court judges, which was replaced with
a panel of politically appointed judges.“ (von Bernstoff (footnote 3), 278).

Salvaging Scientific Socialism? 415
in the United States,6 Kelsen obtained eleven honorary doctorates as well as other in-
ternational awards. During his lifetime he managed, against all odds, to assemble 400
works translated into 24 different languages. Hans Kelsen died on 19 April 1973.7
The quality, depth and gravitas of Kelsen’s approach triggered attention, criticism,
polemics and condemnations that were and are still discussed in numerous shapes and
formats. In spite of the attention that Kelsen’s work gets – including this edited vol-
ume – there always seems to be more that can be excavated. This is exemplified perfect-
ly by the little attention paid to Kelsen’s involvement with Austro-Marxism, particular-
ly in English language scholarship. His later debates with the Bolshevik/communist
legal theorists are also mostly overlooked or ignored.8
That these debates remain sidelined if not neglected entirely in histories of Kelsen,9
may be excused (or at least understood) given the twentieth-century Cold War atmos-
phere. The disregard for legal positivism that continued from the Weimar period and
the Nazi period could not have helped.10 That these contributions are still overlooked –
even now after Kelsen’s work has begun to receive more interest from contemporary
scholars – needs to be rectified.11 Although much of these theoretical and historical
confrontations cannot be discussed in the present context (Kelsen alone dedicated at
least four monographs and two longer articles to socialist and communist theories12)
the overarching intention of the following contribution is to contextualize Kelsen and
his 1920s scholarship in its original Austro-Marxist milieu. Note that we follow Kels-
6 As David Kennedy puts it: “Kelsen has come to be treated as a leftover European philosophizer who
could never quite get with the program in the United States after the war, and is remembered as much for
his tin ear towards specific international legal issues as for his old worldly philosophical argument.“ (David
Kennedy, The International Style in Postwar Law and Policy, Utah Law Review 7 (1994), 7–118, at 103).
7 For more on Kelsen’s biography see Paz (footnote 3).
8 Notable exceptions: Stanley L. Paulsen / Michael Stolleis (eds.), Hans Kelsen Staatsrechtslehrer und Re-
chtstheoretiker des 20 Jahrhunderts, 2005; Raffaele de Giorgi, Wer rettet Marx vor Kelsen?, in: Rechtssystem
und gesellschaftliche Basis bei Hans Kelsen, Werner Krawietz / Helmut Schelsky (eds.), 1984, 463–483; Wer-
ner Krawietz / Ernst Topitsch / Peter Koller, Ideologiekritik und Demokratietheorie bei Hans Kelsen, 1982;
Hans-Kelsen-Institut (ed.), Reine Rechtslehre und marxistische Theorie, 1978. From a Marxist perspective:
Umberto Cerroni, Marx und das moderne Recht, 1974, 137–173.
9 See for instance Mónica García-Salmones Rovira, The Project of Positivism in International Law, 2014;
Jörg Kammerhofer Uncertainty in International Law: A Kelsenian Perspective, 2010, but also Paz (footnote 3).
10 See for instance Michael Stolleis, Reluctance to Glance in the Mirror: The challenging face of German Juris-
prudence after 1933 and Post-1945, 2002.
11 As argued elsewhere, this renewed interest itself can also be a reaction to the historical anxiety Kelsen’s
dominant scholarship induced, which after attempts at self-appropriation was then suppressed and perhaps
still needs to be overcome within the discipline of international law (See Reut Yael Paz, A Forgotten Kelse-
nian? The Story of Helen Silving-Ryu (1906–1993), The European Journal of International Law 25 (2015),
1123–1146).
12 Hans Kelsen, Sozialismus und Staat: Eine Untersuchung der Politischen Theorie des Marxismus, 1st Ed. 1920;
2nd Ed. 1923; Die politische Theorie des Sozialismus, Oesterreichische Rundschau 19 (1923), 113–135; Marx
oder Lassalle: Wandlungen in der politischen Theorie des Marxismus, 1924; Allgemeine Rechtslehre im Lichte
materialistischer Geschichtsauffassung, Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 66 (1931), 449–521;
The Political Theory of Bolshevism: A Critical Analysis, 1948; The Communist Theory of Law, 1955.

en’s lead in his general distinction between, on the one hand, socialism – he admits to
being a socialist – and his interchangeable use of communism, Bolshevism and Marx-
ism on the other hand. While this glaring lack of distinction by such a meticulous
scientist should remain an open query, it necessitates a more serious examination of
the Austro-Marxists because this movement – of friendships and comradery – was his
intellectual reference point during the 1920s. Importantly, Kelsen was a leading mem-
ber of this group, even if others saw his contributions as coming from its ‘right,’ more
conservative side, and he considered himself ‘an outsider.’13
The importance of this socialist ‘phase’ in his intellectual development should not
be discarded even when Kelsen’s vehement and consistent rejection of Marxism is
considered. Kelsen’s relationship with Marxism, the Austro-Marxists and other forms
of socialism is hardly linear nor straightforward. As he discloses in his Autobiographie:
“from the very beginning, I was in complete agreement with the democratic program
of the Austrian Party, which did stand fundamentally on the ground of Marxism, but
which had practically nothing to do with the anarchistic state theory of Marx and
Engels.”14 Kelsen’s liaison with Marxism leads him into an almost obsessive need to
restructure its scientific inconsistencies. Here we attempt to explore what such the-
oretical preoccupation could mean, especially for the development of his 1934 Pure
Theory of Law, which succeeded his Austro-Marxist moment. We begin with a brief
discussion of the cultural milieu of the Austro-Marxists and then unpack Kelsen’s po-
sitionality within the group.
Detour into Vienna’s Wertvakuum?15
Assembled around 1907, the Austro-Marxists, who were also referred to as the Austrian
School of Marxism or the ‘second generation’ of the Austrian Social Democratic Party
(founded 1889), sought to construct a ‘third way’ to social democracy. Relying on the
dangerous yet energizing tension between defending social difference and securing
harmony, they sought to avoid the German example that followed Eduard Bernstein’s
revisionism and Russia’s bloody revolution.
13 For more on the Austro-Marxist ‘left’ wing, ‘right’ wing and in general see for instance Ewa Czerwińs-
ka-Schupp, Otto Bauer (1881–1938): Thinker and Politician, 2016; Janek Wasserman, Östereichische Aktion:
Monarchism, Authoritarianism, and the Unity of the Austrian Conservative Ideological Field during the
First Republic, Central European History 47 (2014), 76–104; Gerhard Botz, Austro-Marxist Interpretation of
Fascism, Journal of Contemporary History 11 (1976), 129–156; Norbert Leser: Sozialismus zwischen Relativis-
mus und Dogmatismus, 1974; Zwischen Reformismus und Bolschewismus, 1968.
14 Hans Kelsen, Autobiographie, in: Hans Kelsen Werke (ed. Matthias Jestaedt), Vol. 1, 2007, 29–91, at 58–59.
15 In 1948 Hermann Broch identified Vienna as the centre of Wertvakuum: as the source of the problems
characterizing the modern world (See Steven Beller, Vienna and the Jews 1867–1938 A cultural history, 1989,
1).

Otto Bauer, one of its leading thinkers, argued retrospectively in 1937 that the term
Austro-Marxists comes from the American publicist Louis B. Boudin (1874–1952), who
coined it to establish a much-needed distinction between other socialist movements
and the theoretical contributions of Austrian socialists in the early twentieth century.16
There were many crossover influences and mutual stimuli between Austro-Marxist in-
tellectuals, each representing many shades of red in ‘red Vienna,’ especially during the
1920s.17 Whatever the label’s origin, from 1904 onward, the movement’s platform was
composed of three regular publications: the Blätter zur Theorie und Politik des wissen-
schaftlichen Sozialismus / Marx-Studien (1904); Der Kampf (1907) and a journal pub-
lished by the Viennese Sociological Society (1907) that was led by the rabbi/sociolo-
gist/philosopher and pedagogist Wilhelm Jerusalem (1854–1923).
The Austro-Marxist movement embraced the momentum at the end of World War
One to achieve firmer links between socialist theory, political transformations and a
closer affinity to democratic parliamentarism. The goal to entrench ‘unity in diversity’

was heightened,18 but harder to sell to the disillusioned, weary and frightened public
of the crumbling Habsburg Empire. The superiority of the German nation was used
as the very thin albeit necessary thread.19 That the group’s predominant socio-cultural
and religious identity was Jewish – virtually all Austro-Marxists except for Karl Ren-
ner were born into Jewish families – was neither forgiven nor forgotten.20 In brief, the
paradoxical atmospheric conditions of Vienna – a city governed by an anti-Semitic
party since 1895 but also the birthplace of Zionism – is engraved in the scholarship and
convictions of the Austro-Marxists.21
16 Norbert Leser (footnote 13), 11. More specifically Boudin attributed the Austrian socialists with the
manner in which they modernized the theory of value familiarity, theory of marginal utility/exchange,
which “by origin and popularity, England has as much claim upon it as Austria.” (See more in Louis B.
Boudin, The Theoretical System of Karl Marx in the Light of Recent Criticism, 1907, 85.)
17 The Austro-Marxists and the Austrian School of Economics “reflected similar influences and demon-
strated mutual awareness of their respective approaches … (Both) placed special emphasis on distortions
in the structure of prices as fundamental to the propagation of capitalist crises.” While for the Austrians
“these distortions were autonomous to the market process, coming particularly from the state, for the
Austro-Marxists its origin was in the normal workings of a capitalist economy. See more in William A.
Darity, Jr. / Bobbie L. Horn / Rudolf Hilferding, The Dominion of Capitalism and the Dominion of Gold,
The American Economic Review 75 (1985), 363–368, at 364. For more on the theory of value by the Austrian
school see Friedrich von Wieser, The Austrian School and the Theory of Value, The Economic Journal 1
(1891), 108–121.
18 Wolfgang Grassl / Barry Smith, A Theory of Austria, in: From Bolzano to Wittgenstein: The Tradition of
Austrian Philosophy, ed. János C. Nyíri, 1986, 11–30.
19 Ewa Czerwińska-Schupp (footnote 13), 7.
20 While Wilhelm Jerusalem, who has completed his Rabbinical title by the Jewish community in Prague,
the others were of Jewish descent. (i. e. Friedrich Adler (1879–1959) the son of the founder of the Austrian
Social Democratic Party Viktor Adler; Rudolf Hilferding (1877–1941); Otto Bauer (1881–1938); Gustav Eck-
stein (1875–1916); Tatiana Grigorovici (1877–1952); Max Adler (1873–1937); Alfred Adler (1870–1937); Otto
Felix Kanitz (1894–1940)), see more in Yuri Slezkine, The Jewish Century, 2004, 85–86.
21 See more in Paz (footnote 3), 27.

Whereas it is hard to estimate the exact timeline of Kelsen’s association with the
Austro-Marxists, the fact that Renner asked him to draft the Austrian Constitution
at the end of the war is informative. Kelsen remained in Vienna during the war as due
to a serious lung infection he was deemed ‘fit only for office work’ by the military au-
thorities. It was during this time that he was trusted by the empire to act as an advisor
to the military and justice administration and as the legal advisor to the Minister of
Defense. He was also appointed as the personal advisor of the Minister Colonel Gen-
eral Stoeger-Steiner on issues of military and international law. In other words, Kelsen
got a front row seat at the end of the Habsburg Empire and the final demise of Fin de
Siècle.22
Ewa Czerwińska-Schupp attempts to sum up the concerns of the Austro-Marx-
ists as “centred around the neo-Kantianism of the Baden and Marburg schools, Ernst
Mach’s empirio criticism, Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalysis, Hans Kelsen’s pure theory
of law, Böhm-Bawerk’s theory of marginal utility, the works of Eduard Bernstein and
Vladimir Lenin, the historical works of Karl Lamprecht and Karl Grünberg, and the
sociological theories of Ferdinand Tönnies, Georg Simmel and Max Weber.”23 While
it is clear that Kelsen was an important figure to add to this respectable list – because
it shows the multi-faceted and mutual influences just discussed above – it neglects an
important fact: Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law was published almost exactly when
the Austro-Marxists disintegrated during the bitter Austrian Civil War of 1934.
Unpacking Kelsen’s debates with the Austro-Marxists in toto is a task beyond the
remit of this essay, so it suffices to focus on the debate with the jurist, sociologist and
philosopher Max Adler (1873–1937) during the 1920s.24 Whereas Kelsen arguably came
22 In his autobiographical note Kelsen describes his personal experience of the last weeks of the Habsburg
Empire in the following anecdote: “I can still vividly remember one of my last conversations with the min-
ister. I had been summoned to the minister via phone in the middle of the night. He received me in his
dressing gown in his private office in the official residence he had in the building of the Ministry of War.
He handed me the text of a telegram that President Wilson had sent in response to the officer by the Aus-
tro-Hungarian government to grant the nationalities of the monarchy the right of self-determination, and
he asked me to comment on Wilson’s statement. While I was reading Wilson’s response, the minister put on
his uniform jacket and invited me to go into his office. On the way there we had to pass the ballroom that
was part of the minister’s residence. At that point the minister said to me that it was embarrassing to live in
such splendid chambers during such a terrible time. “Especially, Your Excellency, if one knows that one is
the last Minister of War of the monarchy.” “You are crazy,” he responded, “how can you say something so
awful!” To the very last moment, the old officer, even though he had no illusions about the magnitude of the
military defeat, could not believe it possible that an empire of four hundred years could simply vanish from
the stage of history. When I took my leave in person a short time later, he stood there in his office deathly
pale. On the drive into the Ministry, the mob had pelted his car with stones, a shard of glass had injured him
on the cheek. He shook my hand and said with emotion: “You were right. I am the last Minister of War of
the monarchy.” (Kelsen (footnote 14), 49–50 as quoted in Paz (footnote 3), 178–179).
23 Ewa Czerwińska-Schupp (footnote 13), 8.
24 For his debates with Otto Bauer, see Norbert Leser, Kelsens Verhältnis zum Sozialismus und Marxismus,
in: Krawietz/Topitsch/Koller (footnote 8), 423–437, at 430 f.; Hans Kelsen, Otto Bauers politische Theo-
rie, Der Kampf 17 (1924), 50–56, and Bauers response: Das Gleichgewicht der Klassenkräfte, Der Kampf 17

from the socialist ‘right’ and Adler from the ‘left,’ Kelsen was also in the prime of his
life. Apart from having a respectable professorship, he had just finished drafting the
Austrian Constitution, helping to establish its court and acting as a judge in that court.
Adler, however, was only an associate professor at the faculty of sociology (although
he was trained in law) and was often seen as politically “unimportant.”25 Given the dif-
ficulties of being both a Jew and a Marxist in Vienna at the time,26 it is no surprise that
his political activities were not taken seriously.27 Kelsen displays his clear appreciation
of Adler’s work – in fact they both admit the high esteem they have of each other in
their respective book prefaces. There is a lasting significance in Adler’s ‘leftist’ attempt
to create theoretical foundations of a ‘transcendental Marxism’ combining neo-Kan-
tian epistemology with a Marxist approach to sociology.28 And indeed together with
the post-1968 revived interest in critical theory, there was renewed engagement with
Adler’s work, who was now considered the most interesting Austro-Marxist.29 As Nob-
ert Leser argues, Adler’s lasting contribution is nothing short of the epistemological
foundation of the social sciences and “thereby socialism.”30
As discussed below in more detail, this debate proves Kelsen’s dedication to the so-
cialist cause. His practical engagement with Austrian politics accounts for his familiar-
ity with Marxist theory. Its nuances are significant if we are to understand what was at
stake for the Austro-Marxists in the 1920s but also might explain Kelsen’s tight embrace
of the purity of law a decade later. We next discuss Kelsen’s 1920 book Socialism and
State: an Inquiry of Marxisms’ Political Theory (Sozialismus und Staat: eine Untersuch-
ung zur Politischen Theorie des Marxismus) or rather its much revised 1923 edition that
responds to Adler’s 1922 Marxist conception of State: a Contribution to the Distinc-
tion between Sociological and Legal Methods (Die Staatsauffassung des Marxismus: ein
(1924), 57–67; for his sympathies towards Karl Renner, see Norbert Leser, Hans Kelsen und Karl Renner,
in: Hans-Kelsen-Institut (footnote 8), 41–62. Interestingly, Kelsen calls Renner’s Die soziale Funktion der
Rechtsinstitute (1904) the only contribution of lasting value („Leistung von Rang“), see Hans Kelsen, Sozial-
ismus (footnote 12), Rechtslehre, 71. For the overall topic, see Gerald Mozetič, Hans Kelsen als Kritiker des
Austromarxismus, in: Krawietz/Topitsch/Koller (footnote 8), 445–457.
25 As Eric Voegelin describes, Max Adler’s politics were unimportant enough to even be arrested by the
government (see Eric Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, Revised Edition with Glossary, 2011, 112).
26 See more on these difficulties in Paz (footnote 3).
27 In fact, were it not for Kelsen’s intervention on Adler’s behalf, the latter’s Habilitation might have never
been awarded by the rampant anti-Semitists of Vienna University. (See Gerald Mozetič, Über den Stellenw-
ert transzendentaler Argumente bei Hans Kelsen und Max Adler Ein Vergleich, in: Paulson/Stolleis (footnote
8), 302–316, at 303; Michael Siegert, Warum Max Adler nicht Ordinarius wurde, Neues Forum 215 (1971),
30–31.
28 Adler confesses his leftist agenda and conviction in Demokratie und Rätesystem, 1919, for more see Alfred
Pfabigan, Hans Kelsens und Max Adlers Auseinandersetzung um die marxistische Staatstheorie, in: Hans
Kelsen-Institut (footnote 8).
29 See for instance Alfred Pfabigan, Max Adler. Eine politische Biographie, 1982; Max Adler, Ausgewählte
Werke (ed. Alfred Pfabigan), 1982.
30 Leser (footnote 13), 72.

Beitrag zur Unterscheidung von Soziologischer und Juristischer Methode). In other words,
the debate begins with Kelsen’s first edition of Sozialismus und Staat, it moves through
Adler’s presentation at the Vienna University in 1921 – which as Adler describes it in
1922 was the trigger for his Staatsauffassung des Marxismus – that he indeed dedicates
to “the critique delivered by my friend and respected colleague the Vienna University
Professor Hans Kelsen.”31
The Foggy Land of Utopia – Kelsen’s Critique of Marxism
Arguably, Hans Kelsen was among the first and best compilers of the fragmentary state-
ments Marx made about the state with the outspoken intention of formulating (and
criticizing) a Marxist approach to political theory.32 Kelsen’s critique of Marxists of all
shades could be divided into two mains parts: first, he deconstructs Marxism’s theo-
retical foundations, then he moves on to criticise its normative implications. Basically,
Kelsen criticizes Marxist ‘sociology’ for falling short of accounting for the normativity
of social phenomena; secondly, he identifies Marxist political thought with anarchism,
ultimately surrendering the individual to the dictatorship of a planned economy while
stripping it of individual and political rights.
From neo-Kantian epistemology, Kelsen derives a distinction between nature and
society and establishes an irreducible difference between natural sciences and norma-
tive theories. In science, the principle of causality applies, ergo if A, then B must follow.
In normative theoretical terms, however, this attribution involves an ought – if A, then
B ought to follow. Keeping this distinction in mind, any attempt at analysing socie-
ty – “the epitome of social phenomena”33 – could only be undertaken in the spirit of a
normative theory.34 As Kelsen argues in Socialism and State, such a theoretical design
differs fundamentally from what Karl Marx and his followers understood as ‘sociology,’
namely, a theory that “examines purposes and actions … with regard to their causes
and effects, i. e. explains them causally.”35 Kelsen’s primary concern here, as elsewhere,
was to look at the normativity of social orders.36 For him, normativities are regularly
neglected by attempts to dissolve social phenomena into cause-effect relations.
31 Max Adler, Die Staatsauffassung des Marxismus: ein Beitrag zur Unterscheidung von Soziologischer und
Juristischer Methode, 1964 [1922], 7.
32 Harold J. Bermann, Review of Hans Kelsen, Communist Theory (footnote 12), University of Pennsylva-
nia Law Review 104 (1955), 444–446.
33 Kelsen, Sozialismus (footnote 12), 20.
34 In Kelsen’s terms: “Für den ganzen Bereich des Sozialen, gilt eine von der Kausalgesetzlichkeit der Natur
wesensverschiedene Eigengesetzlichkeit ” (Ibid., 12).
35 Ibid, 4.
36 From his earlier works see for instance Hans Kelsen, Der soziologische und der juristische Staatsbegriff:
Kritische Untersuchung des Verhältnisses von Staat und Recht, 1922.

Marxists also fail in their dialectical method of ‘sociology.’ Instead of making a clear
separation between the science of sociology that addresses the normative nature of so-
cial phenomena, they mix politics and science. For Kelsen, it is problematic that Marx
and the Marxists argue for a unity between theory and practice, masking their activ-
ism as science, ultimately confusing political with scientific socialism. This is Kelsen’s
toughest criticism of Marxist ‘sociology’: the “almost tragic syncretism of methods”
and “strange blending of a causal-explanatory with a normative-valuing view.”37
This specific critique by Kelsen seems to be misunderstood generally. Alfred Pfab-
igan, for instance, argues that Kelsen’s criticism lacks a proper reading of Das Kapital
as “the main work directly relevant for the methodological approach,” which, in turn,
makes his study of Marx somewhat eclectic and sloppy.38 More specifically, it is argued,
also by others, that Kelsen overlooks important works such as Marx’ Critique of Hegel’s
Philosophy of Right, that he blends together works by the ‘young’ and by ‘old’ Marx as
well as quotes sociological studies next to Marxists/Socialist congressional conven-

tions.39 Some authors even went so far as to suggest that Kelsen was not familiar with
the writings of Marx and Engels altogether.40
The only ‘fault’ Kelsen admits to having is of a terminological nature, namely that al-
though he consistently rejects ‘historical’ definitions of state and/or society – because
the state for him is not necessarily a capitalist state and the society is not only the bour-
geois society – he nonetheless resorts to these ‘historical’ material concepts to make
his argument clearer.41 This, however, does not justify accusing Kelsen of lacking sci-
entific precision. Kelsen was perfectly aware of the different quality and origins of the
works he quotes. He himself remarked that Karl Marx makes certain arguments for the
sake of political agitation only, or that Marx, at times, speaks as a political activist, not
as a scholar of economics, and that the ‘old’ Marx had outgrown some of his idealistic
prejudices.42 Furthermore, Kelsen never set out to give an authentic representation of
Marx’s theory of society, whatever that would entail, because, as Kelsen reminds his
readers tirelessly, he is solely interested in the political theory, a theory not instilled by
Karl Marx himself but by Marxists, Austro-Marxists included. He follows Marx in say-
ing that he too “is certainly not a Marxist.”43 Arguably, it is for this reason that Kelsen
dedicates an entire chapter to the Communist Manifesto and underlines it as “theo-
37 Ibid. 3.
38 Pfabigan (footnote 28), 74.
39 Ibid. 74; Cerroni, (footnote 8), 137–173.
40 Hermann Klenner, Rechtsleere Verurteilung der Reinen Rechtslehre, 1972.
41 In a 5 page footnote Kelsen explains: “Ich mag gelegentlich einen solchen Gesellschaftsbegriff – als den
der herrschenden Lehre – für die Diskussion vorausgesetzt haben; nie haben ich ihnen als meinen eigenen
konzediert.” (Kelsen, Sozialismus (footnote 12), 21–25).
42 Ibid. 18, 27–33, 93.
43 “ce qu’il y a de certain c’est que moi, je ne suis pas Marxiste” (Brief von Engels an an Eduard Bernstein, MEW
37, 386–390, at 388.

retical basis of modern socialism,” while Das Kapital gets almost no mention at all. In
fact, it is mentioned when Kelsen describes Das Kapital as “the bible of the proletar-
iat.”44 Perhaps because Kelsen is not a true believer he avoids the movement’s bible
and focuses on different sources? Either way, to argue that Kelsen was ignorant of the
writings of Karl Marx is groundless.
After criticising Marxist sociology, Kelsen focuses on how Marxist political thought
is another form of revolutionary anarchism. For Kelsen anarchists want to abolish all
forms of coercion, while Marxists want to overthrow the state. Since Kelsen equates
the state with coercion, his logical deduction is to identify anarchism and Marxism,
given the latter also demands the ’dismantling of the capitalist state machinery’.45 True,
the anarchists seek the immediate destruction of the state and the Marxists assume
it will simply wither away with victory over the antagonist class society. But this just
proves that the main difference between anarchism and Marxism is in degree, not in
nature.
Kelsen’s argument equating Marxism with anarchism seems to touch a soft spot. It
was this point that got Kelsen’s engagement with Marxists most attention and coun-
ter-critique (or Anti-Kritik in German). This is especially clear in Adler’s 1922 reaction.
In his Marxist Conception of State he strongly rejects this equation entirely. Adler is
personally offended by Kelsen’s identification of anarchism in Marxism. In any case,
he argues that anarchism does not necessarily mean chaos: anarchists do not reject the
importance of force and coercion in securing peace and maintaining inner harmony.
Instead they argue that both remain important to resolve social conflict.46 However, in
the future society to come, any form of repression will not be applied by a state actor –
an agent of capitalist exploitation – but by civic organisations. In other words, the state
as a tool of class oppression alone would wither away. Moreover, Adler accuses Kelsen
of placing his own idealistic distinction between science and politics at the centre of
Marx’s methodological monism, thereby doing it great injustice. According to Adler,
under the false pretense of criticizing Marxism, Kelsen only reviews a pseudo-Marxist
political theory from the perspective of neo-Kantian epistemology. 47 From Kelsen’s
point of view, the state indeed appears to be a neutral tool.48 The state only shows a
tendency to exploit the workers in the same way that an axe shows the tendency to cut
44 Kelsen, politische Theorie des Sozialismus (footnote 12), 207.

45 Ibid. 149 f.
46 „Trotzdem aber ist es doch richtig, daß auch der Anarchismus eine Ordnung anstrebt und daher nicht den
Zwang überhaupt ablehnt, sondern nur den aus der Klassengegensätzlichkeit hervorgehenden Zwang einer
Herrschaftsordnung“, see Adler (footnote 31), 218–219.
47 Ibid. 65.
48 Significantly, for Kelsen, the state was not an instrument of class oppression, but a „spezifische Form des
gesellschaftlichen Lebens, die sehr variable Inhalte aufnehmen kann, um ein Mittel gesellschaftlicher Technik, mit
dem die verschiedensten Zwecke erfolgt werden können “ Kelsen, Sozialismus (footnote 12), 13.

down trees.49 For Adler, however, the state is not just any form of coercion, a neutral
kind of force, but one with a specific historical content: the exploitation and expropri-
ation of the working masses is characteristic of antagonistic class society.50 With the
progressive realization of socialism, classes would cease to exist and hence the state
wither away. However, Adler admits that even after the abolition of an antagonistic
class society we are bound to be left with crime and the need for punishment. Never-
theless, these acts would be lowered to isolated incidents, because crime too “will be
diminished up to a kind of social pathology.”51
In a much-revised 1923 edition of his 1920s book, Socialism and State, Kelsen crit-
icizes Adler as hopelessly utopist. According to Kelsen, for socialism to be what it
is supposed to be, it ought to be liberated from the utopian promise of an anarchic
society in which “all men will become a nation of brothers.”52 It is here that Kelsen
attempts to salvage scientific socialism, which is his political commitment, to be-
gin with. It is also what differentiates his work in the 1920s from his later turn to
pure theoretical construction in the 1930s. Kelsen criticizes Adler for being tauto-
logical: his inability to admit that anarchism is in fact anarchism – the absence of
force – and that the state is the sole proprietor of coercion, for better or worse. The
utopian promise to end all forms of oppression is not only dangerous but would
never succeed without force or coercion. The only way to oppress and replace vio-
lence is – with violence. In this respect, Kelsen concludes, the sober experience of
a state is a better advisor than speculative dialectic. For Kelsen, as unfortunate as it
might be, capitalism is suited best to fit the human condition. After taking a Freud-
ian turn here, Kelsen almost turns Nietzschean when he invokes the will to power.
Only in oppressing man’s natural instincts such as envy and ambition could culture
as a whole progress. Again, however unfortunately, only the state would be a strong
enough force to oppress human nature itself. The anarchist/Marxist tradition that
Kelsen sees as working in unison fundamentally overestimates or indeed underes-
timates human nature. “Whoever believes that it is possible to build the palace of
the future from other material than human nature rests hope on a different kind of
human nature that exists.” This can only lead us, as Kelsen insists, to the “foggy land
of utopia” (Nebelland der Utopie).53
49 Ibid, 15.
50 Adler (footnote 31), 74, 84.
51 Ibid. 296 f.
53 Ibid. 110 f.

Back to Lasalle – an apotheosis of the state?
In the Austro-Marxist context of the 1920s, the problematic relationship between state
and socialism was not only theoretical. While the Marxists were less significant, they
remained an important radical and forceful minority. Kelsen argues, in his 1924 pam-
phlet, Marx or Lasalle, that they were able to make virtue out of necessity, and theoreti-
cally reject the power that was impossible to seize. Almost with a lament, Kelsen argues
that this political theory was bound to collapse in practice at the very moment when
the socialist movements got more powerful in different countries, be it Austria, Ger-
many or Russia.54 The ‘catastrophic fiasco’ of Bolshevism did not help. It is not without
satisfaction that Kelsen reports only a year after his debate with Adler that eventually
a socialist theory of the state did emerge as an “apotheosis of the state, which stands in
striking contrast to Marx-Engels’ rejection of the state.”55 The protection of the state is
arguably one of the main reasons Kelsen engages with Marxist theory to begin with.
At the end of his debate with Adler, in the second edition of Socialism and State,
Kelsen empathically takes the side of the head of the German workers’ movement,
Ferdinand Lassalle (1825–1864), who takes a pro-state position. Kelsen’s embrace of
Lassalle does not mean that he produces a better theory than Marx.56 Instead, it is be-
cause Lassalle envisioned a better policy to get there. It was Lasalle who stood “on solid
ground in terms of what can be achieved in the foreseeable future” and would take
into account the “national and state-affirming sentiment of the German workers” – a
sentiment Kelsen shares.57
A decade after Marx oder Lassalle, Kelsen was pushed out of Austria and retreated
into the Pure Theory of Law. His experience with the politics but also scientism of
Austro-Marxism does not just fade. Kelsen abandoned his scrutiny of Austro-Marx-
ism when he turned to legal purity in 1934, when his whole world was not only turned
upside down but also began to be systematically exterminated. Nevertheless he does
write a thorough scrutiny and response to Bolshevik notions of legality after he re-
settled and eventually escaped Europe for the United States. The Political Theory of
Bolshevism: A Critical Analysis was published in 1948 and The Communist Theory
of Law in 1955. Whereas the former is dedicated to dissecting the paradoxical con-
tradiction between Bolshevik anarchical theoretical basis and its de facto totalitarian
practice, in the latter, he logically demonstrates how, despite Marxist denunciation of
natural-law doctrine, the Communist Theory of Law was essentially based upon no-
tions of natural law.
54 Kelsen, Marx oder Lasalle (footnote 12), 271.

55 Ibid. 272.
56 Pfabigan (footnote 29), 78 ff.

Kelsen’s style and urgency of his critique in these two books hardly matches his pre-
vious debates. Something important was lost. He no longer speaks of socialism. Cer-
tainly not of a possible combination between scientific socialism. While his critique
now is as thorough as it always was, it is now dryer and lacks his previous passion and
commitment. This is hardly surprising: Instead of his older socialist/Austro-Marxists
peers, who fought for a different middle ground between reformism and Bolshevism,
Kelsen now focusses on the communist/Marxist/Bolshevik internationalist legal the-
orists who were hardly scientific or socialist let alone utopian in the true sense of the
words.
One of the reasons, Kelsen’s debates with Marxists receives little attention, may be
the need to see Kelsen as a liberal democrat, a relativist, instead of the scientific so-
cialist that he actually was. This certainly makes his theory more comfortable. That he
does not go out of his way to rebuke this liberal entitlement – for instance, in his 1955
Communist Theory of Law there is almost no mention of his previous works – could
only mean that this suited him. After all, and as unfortunate as it is, his political com-
mitments hardly got him, or anyone, anywhere. Leaving them behind with the ashes
of Austria made perfect sense. Kelsen was now ready to substitute his political engage-
ment with social scientism with the Pure Theory of Law that corresponded academic
needs better, in any case. While Kelsen’s political commitment still needs to be reck-
oned with, the way it was undermined with the rise of fascism and Stalinism explains
his desire to retreat – together with his scientific socialism – into the “hole in time”.
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Reut Yael Paz

Senior Researcher, Public Law and International Law Faculty of the Justus-Liebig
University, Giessen, Licher Straße 76, 35394 Gießen, Reut.Y.Paz@recht.uni-giessen.de
Maximillian Wagner
PhD Candidate, Faculty of Law of the Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, Unter den
Linden 6, 10099 Berlin, mxwagner@rewi.hu-berlin.de


Hans Kelsens Reine Rechtslehre weckt die Aufmerksamkeit der Rechtswissen
schaften auch noch nach einem Jahrhundert – in Zuspruch wie in Wider
spruch. Sowohl die Aneignungs als auch die Widerlegungsversuche sind
mitunter von Missverständnissen und Ausblendungen geprägt. Während
sich die Forschung recht intensiv mit bestimmten Schriften und Konzepten
Kelsens auseinandersetzt, haben andere seiner Schriften, beispielsweise
unübersetzte Werke, sowie die Werke weiterer wegbereitender Mitglieder
der „Wiener rechtstheoretischen Schule“ international wenig Beachtung
gefunden. Eine Debatte um die Reine Rechtslehre in und zwischen den unter
schiedlichen Kulturen und Traditionen ist daher besonders vielversprechend.
Dieser Band vereint kritische, neutralanalytische und zustimmende

Beiträge, die die Reine Rechtslehre aus philosophischer, rechtstheoretischer,
ideengeschichtlicher und rechtsdogmatischer Perspektive durchdringen.

Die Autorinnen und Autoren analysieren diesen Zugang in einem inter
nationalen und inter wie intradisziplinären Rahmen; ihnen gelingt
es so, die Reine Rechtslehre vorurteilsfrei und offen als Zugang sowie
Forschungsfeld zu würdigen und nach der Relevanz, die ihre Thesen
heute noch beanspruchen können, zu fragen.
ISBN 978-3-515-12568-0 www.steiner-verlag.de

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Die Reine Rechtslehre

auf dem Prüfstand

Herausgegeben von Matthias Jestaedt, Ralf Poscher

Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie Beiheft 163

Franz Steiner Verlag

Franz Steiner Verlag

Franz Steiner Verlag

Herausgegeben von der Internationalen Vereinigung für Rechts-

Redaktion: Dr. Annette Brockmöller, LL. M.

Franz Steiner Verlag

vom 27.–29. September 2018 in Freiburg im Breisgau

Herausgegeben von Matthias Jestaedt, Ralf Poscher

Franz Steiner Verlag

Franz Steiner Verlag

Umschlagbild: Justitia, Landgericht Ulm

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek:

Dieses Werk einschließlich aller seiner Teile ist urheberrechtlich geschützt.

Franz Steiner Verlag

I. Die Grundlagen der Reinen Rechtslehre / The Foundations of the Pure

II. Rechtstheorie / The Mechanics of Law

Franz Steiner Verlag

MATHEUS PELEGRINO DA SILVA

RODRIGO GARCIA CADORE

Kelsen meets Cognitive Science

III. Die Anwendung der Reinen Rechtslehre auf Rechtsordnungen /

Franz Steiner Verlag

IV. Ideengeschichtlicher Kontext / Kelsen in Context

URSZULA KOSIELI Ń SKA-GRABOWSKA

REUT YAEL PAZ / MAXIMILIAN WAGNER

Franz Steiner Verlag

Franz Steiner Verlag

MATHIAS JESTAEDT / RALF POSCHER /

Franz Steiner Verlag

Franz Steiner Verlag

Franz Steiner Verlag

rechtstheoretische Folgediskurse angeschlossen, wie zum Beispiel der argentinische, der

Franz Steiner Verlag

Franz Steiner Verlag

Freiburg i. Br., 9. September 2019

Franz Steiner Verlag

Franz Steiner Verlag

Franz Steiner Verlag

Schlagworte: Rechtsphilosophie, Humes Gesetz, Hans Kelsen, Normativität, Hand-

An Ought cannot be reduced to an Is, or an Is to an Ought; and so an Is cannot be

Franz Steiner Verlag

Franz Steiner Verlag

overblown or misdirected preoccupations.

2. Norms and Oughts

Franz Steiner Verlag

Franz Steiner Verlag

are eo ipso valuable to perform. That is a crazy position to take.

3. Reasons beyond norms

Franz Steiner Verlag

Franz Steiner Verlag

4. Reasons with and without values

Franz Steiner Verlag

Franz Steiner Verlag

6. The special problem of legal normativity

12 But cf Gilbert Harman, ‘Logic and Reasoning’, Synthese 60 (1984), 107.

Franz Steiner Verlag

Franz Steiner Verlag

Franz Steiner Verlag

7. The special problem of moral normativity